THE INTERPRETER

Is There a Risk of Wider War With Iran?

All but forced to retaliate, Iran will likely aim for limited counterattacks that damage
the United States but don’t lead to all-out war. Miscalculation could mean things
spiral out of control.

By Max Fisher
 Jan. 3, 2020

In the hours after an American drone strike in Iraq killed Iran’s most important

military leader, Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, a question has dominated discussion in
the Middle East, in Congress and on social media. Could this lead to war between the
United States and Iran?

In a sense, it already has. The killing of General Suleimani, the commander of Iran’s
Quds Force, its elite security and intelligence unit, meets virtually any definition of
an act of war, a categorical difference from the shadow conflicts that the United
States and Iran have engaged in for years. To Iranian eyes, it is akin to Tehran
ordering the death of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But it remains uncertain where this attack, which follows weeks of tit-for-tat
escalations between the two countries, will lead.

What follows is a guide to the risks of greater conflict between the United States and
Iran, how the killing of General Suleimani plays into those risks and what might
come next.

Does this increase risks of conflict?

 General Suleimani’s killing all but forces Iran to retaliate, most analysts say.
That’s not primarily out of national pride or saving face, but because of the
fundamental drive of any state: self-preservation, which includes preserving its top
leadership.

Killing one of those leaders is more than a slap in the face or a blow to military
capabilities; it is a threat to the functioning of the state itself. Iran will feel compelled
to retaliate, if only to demonstrate that killing its leaders will trigger counterattacks
dire enough to deter the United States from doing so again. But it is difficult to
predict how severe that retaliation will be, casting a cloud of uncertainty over the
region.

 Iran has an extraordinarily difficult needle to thread. It will likely aim for
counterattacks damaging enough to persuade the United States that killing General
 Suleimani was not worth it — a high bar, given his value and the far superior
American military strength — but not so damaging as to trigger an all-out conflict.

If Iran succeeds, the results could be costly to the United States and its allies, but fall
short of triggering outright war. But there is no way for it to know for sure what
actions would meet both goals. And miscalculation could lead things to spiral out of
control.

 The past month suggests that both the United States and Iran are already
failing to properly calibrate their counterattacks. Each cycle of tit-for-tat
escalations has, rather than forcing the other side to back down, instead led the other
to ramp up, triggering another round more costly than the last.

In a sense, both sides have already lost control: It’s not as if the United States wanted
its Baghdad embassy stormed or Iran wanted its Quds Force commander killed.

Is escalation inevitable?

 Another dynamic makes this cycle even harder to control: American

intentions have at times been unclear. Official statements have described limited
aims, such as deterring Iranian attacks. But senior officials have also described more
sweeping goals like expelling Iran from the wider region or even toppling its
government.

The uncertainty, along with the simple fact of overwhelming American military
might, puts pressure on Iranian leaders to plan for the worst. And it makes it harder
for them to know when they can safely back down.

 Faced with a potentially existential threat, any state has two options: stand
down and negotiate or hit the source of that threat hard enough to make it back
down.

Iran chose to cut a deal most recently in 2015, when, to relieve American-led
economic sanctions, it surrendered the bulk of its nuclear program and permitted
invasive inspections. But the United States had made that easier by seeking to
demonstrate that Iran would not expose itself to existential threats by curbing its
nuclear program. Monthslong negotiations allowed Iranian leaders to feel confident
that the terms were in their interest and had wide international backing.

But President Trump’s penchant for making sudden policy changes, disdaining
international support and withdrawing from agreements, including that very nuclear
accord, could shift Iran’s calculus. It may see gambling on retaliation as the safer
option.

What could escalation look like?

 Iran is a regional power with far more sophisticated military capabilities than
any country that the United States has gone to war with since World War II. It is a far
cry from Saddam Hussein’s crumbling Iraq or armies of North Vietnamese
irregulars. And it has invested years of preparation in enduring a possible war.
 Iran’s escalations are expected to be asymmetric, which means using proxies
or small attack groups to target American forces, allies or economic interests. Iran
has also shown a willingness to target civilians.

American adversaries have had little success in using asymmetric attacks to force
Washington to back down — just as the United States has never found a reliable
strategy for deterring asymmetric attacks.

 The greatest risk may be that asymmetric Iranian warfare reaches a point
where the United States feels compelled to strike Iran directly. Analysts fear that this
could lead to a direct, sustained war, but no one can say for sure how easily that
might happen.

Iran could hardly win a shooting war with the United States, but its conventional
forces would make any ground war costly and drawn out, analysts project. Iran also
has extensive medium-range missiles that could strike American bases or allies
throughout the Middle East.
Would a conflict go wider?

 Iran could call upon proxy militias in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Syria. But no
governments are eager to join it in an outright war. American allies in the region
— Israel and Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia — would be unlikely to join unless
dragged in by Iranian attacks.

 Iraq is coming under growing pressure to choose between the United States
and Iran. Should American forces be expelled, Washington would lose a point of
significant influence in Iraq, likely granting Iran greater sway in the country.

 While the possibility of an unintended slide to war is impossible to rule out,

fears of World War Three — a phrase that trended overnight on social media — are
overblown. Russia and China might strenuously object to American attacks, but they
are no more likely to join the fight than they were when the United States invaded
Iraq or helped to topple Libya’s government.
Is either side ready for what’s next?

 The suddenness of this escalation makes it difficult to know how fully Mr.
Trump’s administration has thought through and planned for the potential
consequences.

Early signs suggest that Mr. Trump’s trademark impulsiveness may have played a
role. It is unclear whether European allies were notified in advance. Even Israeli
leaders appeared to scramble in response.

 Iran’s willingness to take risky actions — perhaps driven by a perception that

the scale of the American threat leaves it with no other choice — increases the danger
to all sides.

The greatest stakes are not purely political. It can be easy for Americans to forget that
Iran is not just an adversary, it is also home to over 80 million civilians, many of
whom are already suffering under sanctions. Millions more across the Middle East,
where proxy fights are likely to play out, would also be at risk. The burdens of any
conflict are likely to fall overwhelmingly on those regular families, as they always do.

Max Fisher is an international reporter and columnist for The New York Times. He has reported from
five continents on conflict, diplomacy, social change and other topics. With Amanda Taub, he co-
authors The Interpreter, a column exploring the ideas and context behind major world events.
A weekly newsletter of the same name features original reporting and insights. He is based in
London. @Max_Fisher • Facebook A version of this article appears in print on Jan. 4, 2020, Section A,
Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Is There a Chance Of a Wider War?. Order
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