Torts and Damages

CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE
The discussion hereunder covers the substantive aspects of negligence based on quasi-delict.
However, the definition of negligence and the test thereof as well as the standard of conduct
discussed below apply to obligations arising from contract. This is evident from Article 2178 of
the New Civil Code which provides that provisions applicable to culpa contractual (Articles 1172
to 1173 of the Civil Code) are likewise applicable to quasi-delict.
The same test and definition apply to criminal negligence. Although the Revised Penal Code
distinguishes between simple imprudence and reckless imprudence, they are conceptually
compatible with negligence arising from quasi-delict. The Supreme Court adopted the view of
Wharton in United States vs. Garces (31 Phil. 637, 639 [1915]):
“Ker’s Wharton on Criminal Law (11th ed.), section 163, note 4 reads in part as follows:
‘To impose criminal responsibility, Sir J.F. Stephen (2 History Crim. Law, 11) maintains
that there must be more, but no one can say how much more, carelessness than is required
in order to create a civil liability. For instance, many railway accidents are caused by a
momentary forgetfulness or want of presence of mind, which are sufficient to involve
the railway in civil liability, but are not sufficient to make the railway servant guilty of
manslaughter if death is caused.’ But the better view is that the only difference between
criminal and civil procedure in such case is that in the first there can be no conviction if
there be reasonable doubt of guilt, while in the second the verdict goes with
preponderance of proof.”
Hence, the cases cited hereunder include criminal cases and cases arising from culpa contractual
which apply with equal force to quasi-delictual actions.

A. DEFINITION AND TEST OF NEGLIGENCE.

Article 1173 defines negligence as the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place.
Jurisprudential definitions of negligence include the following:
“Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do (Black’s Law
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930) or as Judge Cooley defines it, ‘(T)he failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.’ (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265)” (Layugan vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (167 SCRA 363 [1988]).
“Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and
United States v. Barias. Cooley’s formulation was quoted with approval in both the
Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: Judge Cooley, in his work on Torts (3rd ed.), Sec.
1324, defines negligence to be: ‘The failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’ There was likewise reliance
on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus: ‘Negligence is want of care required by the

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circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not absolute term and its application

depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the
circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances.’” (Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674 [1969]).
“Negligence, as it is commonly understood is conduct which creates undue risk of harm
to others.” (Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303 [1996], citing Keeton and
Dobbs, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 1984 Ed., p. 451).
An oft repeated discussion on negligence is embodied in the decision in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil.
809, 813 [1918], cited in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 [1988]; Layugan vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]; Leano vs. Domingo, July 4, 1991; McKee
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 211 SCRA 517 [1992]; Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Court of
Appeals, 216 SCRA 51 [1992]; Mandarin Villa, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 538, 543
[1996]) penned by Justice Street:

“The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the
Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference
to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved
in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them
or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence, they
can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn danger.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision,
is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper
criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding
against its consequences.”
B. NEGLIGENCE IS CONDUCT.
The above-quoted discussion of the Supreme Court makes it clear that negligence is conduct. A
court that determines the question of existence of negligence is concerned with what the defendant
did or did not do. What is important in the determination of the presence or absence of negligence
is whether the person who is sought to be held liable omitted to do something which a reasonable

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man would do or did something which a reasonable man would not do. The state of mind of the
actor is not important; good faith or use of sound judgment is immaterial. Hence, the existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment but by the
behavior of the actor in the situation before him. (Picart vs. Smith, ibid.). Even if the actor believed
that he exercised proper diligence, he will still be liable if his conduct did not correspond to what
a reasonable man would have done under the same circumstances.
For the same reason, motive is not material in negligence cases. For example, the defendant may
still be held liable for damages even if the act was meant to be a practical joke. (57 Am. Jur. 354).
It should likewise be emphasized that only juridical fault is subject to liability and not moral fault.
“Acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so
as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise
which limit the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy.” (Donoghue vs. Stevenson,
A.C. 562 at 580, [1932]).
For instance, a person who does not give assistance to a person who is in danger of death is guilty
only of moral negligence, but not of juridical negligence. In such case, the person who lacked the
virtue of charity is not liable for damages. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p. 594).
Nevertheless, the conduct that should be examined in negligence cases is prior conduct, that is,
conduct prior to the injury that resulted or, in proper cases, the aggravation thereof. The law
imposes a duty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results, hence, what is
important is that what was called in a dissenting opinion in one case as “diligence before the fact.”
(St. Francis High School vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 341, 356-357 [1991]). This diligence
may include the duty to investigate. Where the situation suggest investigation and inspection in
order that its danger may fully appear, the duty to make such investigation and inspection is
imposed. (Dichitang, et al. vs. Vicente V. Aguilar & Co., et al., 8 CAR 2s 618, 622 [1965]).
Moreover, such diligence before the fact does not necessarily mean that conduct which is the safest
way of doing things. The fact that there may have been a safer method than that employed or
danger may have been avoided by action in a different manner, does not make an act negligent.
(67 C.J.S. 472).
C. UNREASONABLE OR UNDUE RISKS.
Negligence, as it is commonly understood is a conduct that creates an undue risk of harm to others.
(Valenzuela vs. Court ofAppeals, 253 SCRA 303 [1996]). For example, if a driver of a vehicle
recklessly drove his vehicle thereby causing damage to another’s vehicle, the reckless driving
created an undue risk that resulted in such damage. Of course, driving without recklessness also
involves risks. The moment a driver gets out of his garage, there exists a risk that somebody might
be injured. Indeed, all actions entail a degree of risk and all conduct under certain circumstances
may be a source of damage.
However, in negligence, risk means a danger which is apparent, or should be apparent, to one in
the position of the actor. (Prosser and Keeton, pp. 169-170). Such type of risk is unreasonable risk.
If such unreasonable risk results in injury to the plaintiff, the latter can recover from the defendant.
(Phoenix Construction vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 353 [1987]).

D. FORSEEABILITY.

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Since the unreasonableness of the risk means danger that is apparent or should be apparent, the
determination of negligence is a question of foresight on the part of the actor. The test to determine
the existence of negligence is to ask if the defendant used reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used. However, to determine what a reasonable man would
have done requires the application of the test of foreseeability. As stated in Picart vs. Smith (supra),
the question is “Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of
the course actually pursued?” In determining whether or not the actor was negligent, the court will
place itself in the position of the actor and see if a prudent man could have foreseen the harm that
would result if the conduct is pursued. However, the courts should look more on the possibility of
hazard of some form than the particular chance that happened. (Pease vs. Sinclair Ref. Co., 123
ALR 933, 104 F2d 183). In other words, even if the particular injury was not foreseeable, the risk
is still foreseeable if possibility of injury is foreseeable.
Thus, in a case where the vehicle being driven by the defendant bumped another vehicle parked in
the highway, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was negligent because at the time of the
incident, he was driving in a highway at the rate of 70 kilometers per hour although he could hardly
see an object at the distance of ten (10) meters because of heavy rain. A reasonable man would
have foreseen that a stalled vehicle is parked in the highway. (Cabardo vs. The Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 118202, May 19, 1998).
E. PROBABILITY.
It is clear that foreseeability involves the question of probability. The Supreme Court explained
that there is negligence “if a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that
the effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his conduct or guarding against
its consequence. (Picart vs. Smith, supra.)” If there is a great probability and risk that damage will
result, a person is negligent if he did not exercise due diligence in the face of such great probability.
Generally, the degree of care required is graduated according to the danger a person or property
attendant upon the activity which the actor pursues or the instrumentality he uses. The greater the
danger the greater the degree of care required. What is ordinary under extraordinary conditions is
dictated by those conditions; extraordinary risk demands extraordinary care. Similarly, the more
imminent the danger, the higher the degree of care. (Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of
Appeals, 297 SCRA 30, 64-65 [1998]).
However, foreseeability is not the same as probability. Even if there is lesser degree of probability
that damage will result, the damage may still be considered foreseeable. Indeed, there is no
mathematical rule of percentage to be followed here. A risk is not necessarily unreasonable
because the harmful consequence is more likely than not to follow the conduct, nor reasonable
because the chances are against that. A very large risk may be reasonable in some circumstances,
and a small risk unreasonable in other circumstances. (Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40, 42
[1915]).
As explained in one case, “when the inquiry is one of foreseeability, as regards a thing that may
happen in the future and to which the law of negligence holds a party to anticipation as a measure
of duty, that inquiry is not whether the thing is foreseen or anticipated as one which will probably
happen, according to the ordinary acceptation of that term, but whether it is likely to happen, even
though the likelihood may not be sufficient to amount to a comparative probability.” (Gulf Refining
Co. vs. Williams, 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234 [1938]). The test as respects foreseeability is not the
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balance of probabilities, but the existence, in the situation in hand, of some real likelihood of some
damage and the likelihood is of such appreciable weight and moment to induce, or which
reasonably should induce, action to avoid it on the part of a person of a reasonably prudent mind.
(ibid.; Tullgren vs. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82 N.H. 268, 133 A. 4 [1926]). In the last cited Tullgren
case, the court ruled that:
“x x x Danger consists in the risk of harm, as well as the likelihood of it, and a danger calling for
anticipation need not be of more probable occurrence than less. If there is some probability of harm
sufficiently serious that ordinary men would take precautions to avoid it, then failure to do so is
negligence. That danger will more probably than otherwise not be encountered on a particular
occasion does not dispense with the exercise of care. One who crosses a railroad track may not
reasonably anticipate that a train will in fact be met but, by reason of the risk that one may be, he
is called upon to do what is reasonably required to find out. In going around a sharp turn on a
highway, where the view is obstructed, a driver may be careless toward opposite travel in speed or
other ways, though the probabilities may be against meeting one. If the chance is so great that
ordinary men would drive differently, then it is careless not to do so.”

STANDARD OF CONDUCT: GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY

The Supreme Court explained in Picart vs. Smith (supra, at p. 37) that the standard of conduct
used in the Philippines is that of paterfamilias in Roman law or that who is referred to in Article
1173 of the Civil Code (in rel. Art. 2178) as a good father of a family. What should be determined
in negligence cases is what is foreseeable to a good father of a family. A good father of a family
is likewise referred to as the reasonable man, man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, or
ordinary reasonable prudent man. In English law, he is sometimes referred to as the man on top of
a Clapham omnibus. (Bolam vs. Friern Hospital Management Committee, 2 All E.R. 119 Queens
Bench Div. [1957]).
A. ATTRIBUTES OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY.
The Philippine concept of a reasonable man is consistent with the above-quoted description. The
law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence. The attributes of the actor and the person exposed to the risk are
circumstances that are also material in the determination of negligence on the part of the actor and
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. There is only one standard, an objective
standard.
a. Knowledge and Experience of the Actor.
The prudent man is expected to act according to the circumstances that appear to him at the time
of the incident and he is not judged based on his knowledge or experience after the event. (67 C.J.S
528). The law does not require the standard of one who is fortified with a gift of prophesy or one
who is omniscient of the future (Picart vs. Smith, supra; Adams vs. Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208, 125
N.E. 93 [1919]). However, there are matters which a prudent man is conclusively presumed to
know based on actual knowledge and experience. For instance, where a particular act is followed
from past acts or omissions, one is charged with notice that a similar act or omission, may produce
a similar result. (67 C.J.S 527). If the actor is familiar with the place of the accident because he
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always passes by such area, he is also charged with the knowledge of the make-up of the same
area.
In PLDT Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (No. 57079, September 29, 1989), the plaintiff was
not able to recover from the defendant telephone company even if he was injured because of the
excavation of the company in the street. He sustained such injuries when his jeep ran over a mound
of earth and fell into an open trench dug by the telephone company for its underground conduit
system. Although there were no warning signs in the area, the plaintiff was not allowed to recover
because he had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations, having passed on the
same street almost everyday. He was found negligent in exercising due care for his own safety. In
Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company (supra, p. 685), knowledge of the victim was also
considered material in determining his negligence in crossing the railroad resulting in his death.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s reliance on several circumstances, including the
victim’s knowledge and familiarity with the set-up of the check point and the existence of the
tracks.
A reasonable man is also deemed to have knowledge of facts that a man should be expected to
know based on ordinary human experience. For instance, a reasonable man can be expected to
know the effect of heavy rains on the road or a railroad track. (Philippine National Railway vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 217 SCRA 409, 414 [1993]). Experience teaches that a driver should
anticipate sudden appearance of other vehicles at an intersection or if a driver sees a child on a
curb, he may anticipate the child’s sudden dash into the street. (Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals,
supra at p. 671). One should also expect children to roam around vacant lots (Taylor vs. Manila
Electric and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 [1910]) and should be expected to know the natural reaction of
animals to frightening objects. (Picart vs. Smith, supra).
A prudent man should also be expected to know basic laws of nature and physics like gravity. For
example, a driver is expected to know that his vehicle will accelerate if the street is going downhill.
Any person is also expected to know that a boulder might fall from a high place if it was placed
there in a precarious state.
b. Children.
The rule that there is one standard of conduct — that of a reasonable man — is subject to certain
exceptions or qualifications. Thus, the action of the child will not necessarily be judged according
to the standard of an ordinary adult. Neither will an expert be judged based on what a non-expert
can foresee.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that “the care and caution required of a child is according to his
maturity and capacity only and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the
case.” (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 [1910]). If a minor is mature
enough to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his actions, he will be
considered negligent if he fails to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts.
The Court explained in Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (ibid.), however that
“the law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his acts, so as to make it negligence on
his part to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would
be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of
negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own

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acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will
necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be
done by him.” The Court went on to explain that:
“x x x But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these
Islands may be gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at
which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising certain rights and
incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law
are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate
the rule that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with
the varying circumstances of each case.”
It should be noted in this connection that under the Revised Penal Code, a child who is age nine
(9) or below is exempt from criminal liability. (Art. 8). A child over nine (9) but below fifteen (15)
is likewise exempt from criminal liability if he acted without discernment. Under the Family Code
and the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the choice of the child who is at least 12 where his custody
is in question is to be respected unless there is no valid reason to accord the same with respect.
The consent of children who are at least ten (10) of the person who will adopt and the natural
parents of the person to be adopted are likewise required in adoption cases.
Applying the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, Judge Sanco takes the view that a child who
is nine (9) or below is conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. (1 Sanco, Phil. Law
on Torts and Damages, 70-71). On the other hand, if the child is above nine (9) but below fifteen
(15), there is a disputable presumption of absence of negligence. Judge Sanco’s opinion was
adopted in Jarco Marketing Corporation et al. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No.
129792, December 21, 1999), where the High Court quoted the following portion of his work:
“In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have
acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The
same presumption and a like exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with
discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years
of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child
over nine but under fifteen years of age is rebuttable one, under our law. The rule,
therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed
incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.”
The doctrine in Jarco Marketing Corporation et al. v. Court of Appeals (ibid.) therefore modifies
the rule laid down in Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (supra.). If the child is
under nine years, it is no longer necessary to determine his maturity and capacity because he is
conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. If the child is above nine to fifteen, he is
disputably presumed to be incapable of negligence but the opposing party can prove that the child
is at such stage of maturity and capacity that he can already determine what a reasonable man
would do under the same circumstances.

(1) Liability of children.

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It should be noted, however, that the absence of negligence does not necessarily mean absence of
liability. Thus, under the Revised Penal Code, a child who is nine years old can still be subsidiarily
liable with his properties. (Art. 101, Revised Penal Code). This liability is considered liability
without fault. (1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code 883). Similarly, the absence of negligence or intent
on the part of the child may not excuse the parents from their vicarious liability under Article 2180
of the Civil Code or Art. 221 of the Family Code because they are liable for their own negligence
in the supervision of their child. The minor child, on the other hand, shall be answerable with his
own property in an action against him if he has no parents or guardian. The Supreme Court in
interpreting the provisions of the Old Civil Code on tort explained that if the theory of the action
is culpa aquiliana, the minority of the actor does not free him from responsibility for damages.
The Court further explained that the liability of an infant in a civil action for his torts is imposed
as a mode, not of punishment, but for compensation. If property had been destroyed or other loss
was occasioned by a wrongful act, it is just that the loss should fall upon the estate of the wrongdoer
rather than that of the guiltless person, and that liability is imposed without reference to the
question of moral guilt. Consequently, for every tortious act of violence or other pure tort, the
infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same extent as an adult.
(Magtibay vs. Tionco, 74 Phil. 576, 578-579 [1944]).
In other words, the effect of the circumstance that the actor is a child would vary if the child is the
defendant-actor or the plaintiff. The circumstance becomes material if the child is the person
exposed to the risk. If the child is the actor, even if he is legally incapable of discernment because
he is, for example, only six (6) years old, the parents or any person exercising parental authority
over him may still be liable if they did not exercise proper diligence in supervising the child. The
actor himself is liable up to the extent of his properties.
c. Physical Disability.
In The Common Law, Justice Holmes explained that the weaknesses of a person will not be an
excuse in negligence cases. A weak, clumsy or accident prone person must come up to the standard
of a reasonable man, otherwise, he will be considered negligent. Justice Holmes, therefore,
subscribes to the view of the Romans. In Justinian’s Digest of Roman Law, Ulpian is credited with
the following explanation:
“8. And the law is just the same if one misuses a drug, or if having operated efficiently,
the aftercare is neglected; the wrongdoer will not go free, but is deemed to be guilty of
negligence. Furthermore, if a mule-driver cannot control his mules because he is
inexperienced and as a result they run down somebody’s slave, he is generally said to be
liable on grounds of negligence. It is the same if it is because of weakness that he cannot
hold back his mules – and it does not seem unreasonable that weakness should be
deemed negligence, for one should undertake a task in which he knows, or ought to
know, that his weakness may be a danger to others. The legal position is just the same
for a person who through inexperience or weakness cannot control a horse he is riding.”
(C.P. Kolbert translation, 1979 Ed., p. 75).
However, the rule is different if the defect is not a mere weakness but one amounting to real
disability. The Constitution recognizes the rights of disabled persons. In fact, it mandates the
creation of a “special agency for disabled persons for their rehabilitation, self-development and
self-reliance, and their integration in the mainstream of the society.” (Section 13, Article XIII, 1987

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Constitution). The same principle for the integration of the disabled in the mainstream of society
is being upheld under existing laws, particularly Republic Act No. 7277 otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons.
Nevertheless, integration of a disabled person in the mainstream of society does not mean that he
will be treated exactly the same way as one who is not. A person who is physically disabled cannot
be expected to act as if he is not disabled. Thus, the standard of conduct to which he must conform
to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable person under like disability. For example, in the
case of a blind man, he must take the precautions, be they more or less, which the ordinary
reasonable man would take if he were blind. (Roberts vs. State of Lousiana, 396 So. 2d 566 [1981],
citing W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, Section 32, at Pages 151-152, 4th ed., 1971).
A person who is suffering from physical disability must, however, refrain from activities which a
reasonable person suffering from such disability would not undertake. Obviously, a blind person
should refrain from driving altogether.
d. Experts and Professionals.
An expert should exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular field that he
is in. In fact, when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring
professional skills, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of
one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempted to do. (Culion Ice, Fish & Electric
Co., Inc. vs. Philippine Motors Corporation, No. 32611, November 3, 1930, 55 Phil. 129).
The Supreme Court explained in Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals (297 SCRA
30, 64 [1998]) that an act may be negligent if it is done without the competence that a reasonable
person in the position of the actor would recognize as necessary to prevent it from creating an
unreasonable risk of harm to another. Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are
required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a standard minimum
of special knowledge and ability. Every man who offers his services to another, and is employed,
assumes to exercise in the employment such skills he possesses, with a reasonable degree of
diligence. In all these employment where peculiar skill is requisite, if one offers his services he is
understood as holding himself out to the public as possessing the degree of skill commonly
possessed by others in the same employment, and if his pretentions are unfounded, he commits a
species of fraud on every man who employs him in reliance on his public profession.
The above-cited Far Eastern Shipping Company case involved a compulsory pilot of a seagoing
vessel. A pilot in maritime law is a person duly qualified to conduct a vessel into or out of ports,
or in certain waters. It is more generally understood as a person who was taken on board at a
particular place for the purpose of conducting a ship through a river, road or channel, or from a
port. In some states and localities, it is quite common to provide for compulsory pilotage and to
enact safety laws requiring vessels approaching their ports to take on board pilots duly licensed
under local law. (supra, p. 60). Thus, upon assuming the office of a compulsory pilot, the latter is
held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot, whereby
he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over which
his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. A pilot should have
a thorough knowledge of general and local regulations and physical conditions affecting the vessel
in his charge and the waters for which he is licensed, such as a particular harbor or river. He is not
held to the highest possible degree of skill and care demanded by the circumstances, but must have

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and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded by the circumstances, and usually shown by an
expert in his profession. Under extraordinary circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary
care. (p. 61).
The rule regarding experts is demonstrated in United States vs. Pineda (37 Phil. 456, 462-464),
involving pharmacists. The Supreme Court explained that the profession of pharmacy is one
demanding care and skill. It requires the highest degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance
and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, in
order that human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution
of deadly poison for harmless medicine. “In other words, the care required must be commensurate
with the danger involved and skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the
business which the law demands.”
The rule regarding experts is applicable not only to professionals, like doctors, pilots and others,
who have undergone formal education. In Sofia Fernando, et al. vs. Court of Appeals (208 SCRA
714 [1992]), an invitation to bid was issued to different persons for the re-emptying of the septic
tank in a public market in Davao City. Later, a non-winning bidder named Mr. Bertulano, with
four other companions were found dead inside the septic tank. It appeared that the five victims
entered the septic tank and proceeded to re-empty the same without the consent of proper
authorities. When the heirs of the victims sued for damages, they were denied recovery by the
Supreme Court explaining, among others that the accident in the case occurred because the victims
on their own and without authority from proper authorities of the city opened the septic tank. The
Court observed that:
“Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has
not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware
of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old
hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the
proximate cause of the accident. In Cullion Ice, Fish and Elect. Co. vs. Philippine Motors
Corporation (55 Phil. 129, 133), We held that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence
if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work
which he attempts to do.”
Care required must also be commensurate with the danger that the activity entails. Thus, where
the performance of work involves danger to the public unless performed with skill, the ordinary
prudent man is deemed to have such required skill. (57 Am. Jur. 2d 420). For instance, a person
hoisting a heavy safe in a public place where people are constantly passing is bound to use such
care as the nature of the employment and the situation and circumstances require of a prudent
person experienced and skilled in such work. (ibid.). Similarly, a person engaged in the business
of selling explosives or even mere firecrackers should exercise due care commensurate with the
demands of such dangerous activity.
e. Nature of Activity.
In some instances, persons impose upon themselves certain obligations and non-compliance
therewith will be considered negligence. For example, a railroad company may impose upon itself
the obligation to operate a gate at a railroad crossing even at night and close the gate every time a

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train passes in order to avoid causing injury. In such a case, if a gate is open, the same shall
constitute an invitation to the public to pass without fear of danger and failure to operate the gate
conveniently constitutes negligence. (Consolacion Junio vs. Manila Railroad Company, 58 Phil.
176 [1933]).
There are activities, however, which by nature impose duties to exercise a higher degree of
diligence. Banks, for instance, “handle daily transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very
nature of their work, the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their
employees and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious
reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees.” (Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 51,
71 [1992]).
Common carriers are also required to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of their
functions. Article 1733 imposes the duty on common carriers to exercise extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over their passengers and transported goods. In Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping
Agency Corporation vs. Catalino Borja (G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002), the Supreme Court took
into consideration the fact that the carrier was carrying highly inflammable materials. The
petitioner’s vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals but its officers and crew failed
to take the necessary precaution to prevent any accident. An explosion occurred setting the vessel
afire. The private respondent, who was then on board while performing his functions as customs
inspector, was forced to jump out of the ship resulting in his permanent disability.

f. Intoxication.
Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish want of
ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove
negligence. It is a general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of
ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be
exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than a sober one. If one’s conduct is
characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or
sober. (Wright vs. Manila Electric Co., 28 Phil. 122 [1914]). In other words, intoxication is of
little consequence in negligence cases if it was not shown that such drunkenness contributed to the
accident or that the accident would have been avoided had he been sober. (U.S. vs. Crame, 30 Phil.
2 [1915]). For example, the plaintiff cannot be considered negligent based on the sole fact that he
was intoxicated when he fell into an uncovered hole in the sidewalk of a public street. “A drunken
man is as much entitled to a safe street, as a sober one, and much more in need of it.” (Robinson
vs. Pioche, Bayerque & Co., 5 Cal. 460 [1855], cited in Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials
on Torts, 1995 Ed., p. 187).
However, as pointed out earlier, intoxication may be one of the circumstances to be considered to
prove negligence. For instance, intoxication may be considered to prove negligence in driving a
motor vehicle. As explained by the Supreme Court, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the
senses. While driving, the body releases catecholamines in response to ‘alerting’ or threatening
conditions (called ‘fight’ or ‘flight’ conditions by physiologists) rendering the individual, through
his reflexes, senses and other alerting mechanisms responsive to these conditions. Alcohol dulls
these normal bodily responses. (Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 77, citing Best and
Taylor, Physiological Basis of Medical Practice, 81 [1993]). However, different persons have
different reactions to liquor. A person may take as much as several bottles of beer or several glasses
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of hard liquor and still remain sober and unaffected by the alcoholic drink. (Nitura vs. Employees’
Compensation Commission, 201 SCRA 278, 282-283 [1991]).
Moreover, proof of intoxication may in proper cases establish a presumption of negligence.
Driving under the influence of alcohol is a violation of traffic regulations. Under Article 2185 of
the Civil Code, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the
time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
g. Insanity.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an insane person is exempt from criminal liability. However, by
express provision of law, there may be civil liability even when the perpetrator is held to be exempt
from criminal liability. “Such is the case of a lunatic or demented person who, in spite of his
deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his
acts, even though they be performed unwittingly. Law and society are under obligation to protect
him and, when so declared liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still
entitled to reservation of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not
exclude liability for damages caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the
consequences of his act.” (U.S. vs. Bagay, 20 Phil. 142, 146).
The same rule is applicable under the Civil Code. The insanity of a person does not excuse him or
his guardian from liability based on quasi-delict. (Articles 2180 and 2182, Civil Code). This means
that the act or omission of the person suffering from mental defect will be judged using the standard
test of a reasonable man.
The bases for holding a permanently insane person liable for his tort are as follows: (a) Where one
of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it should be borne by the one who occasioned it; (b) to
induce those interested in the estate of the insane person (if he has one) to restrain and control him;
and (c) the fear that an insanity defense would lead to false claims of insanity to avoid liability.
(Breunig vs. American Family Insurance Co., 173 N.W. 2d 619 [1970]).
It should be noted, however, that there are rare cases in the United States when a person may
escape liability by invoking his mental disorder. Thus, a driver of a motor vehicle is not liable if
he was suddenly overcome without forewarning by a mental disorder or disability which
incapacitated him from conforming his conduct to the standards of a reasonable man under like
circumstances. It was explained that it is unjust to hold a man responsible for his conduct which
he is incapable of avoiding and which incapability was unknown to him prior to the accident.
(Breunig vs. American Family Insurance Co., ibid.).
h. Women.
There is no question that when it comes to physical features, there is a distinction between man
and woman. A man is generally physically stronger than a woman and the same should be taken
into consideration in determining if the defendant, who is a woman, was negligent. The Supreme
Court adopted the following rule in Jose Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [G.R. No. 12191,
October 14, 1918]:
“We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed
in Thompson’s work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:

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“The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care.
It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition
of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances
disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or
should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary
prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.” (Thompson,
Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010).
Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith
(37 Phil. 809), we may say that the test is this: Was there anything in the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have
admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions
then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and
his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be
drawn to the effect that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he
stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform
and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented,
it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the
obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and
as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its
passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in
the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was
clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is
proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by
it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility conceded that it had a right to pile these
sacks in the path of alighting passengers, placing of them in that position gave rise to the
duty to light the premises adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this
case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company’s platform was
constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground.
The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would
place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also
assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would
have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted
prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule, are less capable than men
of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was
perfectly familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at

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this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform
where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking
to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence
and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.’’ (emphasis supplied)
The problem, however, arises if the question involves attitude. The question may be posed: Can
we apply the same objective standard to women that we are applying to a man or are we to assume
that there is a fundamental difference between the reaction or attitude of women compared to men
given the same set of facts? Although there is no unequivocal statement of the rule, Valenzuela vs.
Court of Appeals cited earlier, appears to require a different standard of care for women under the
circumstances indicated therein. The Supreme Court seemed to say that the conduct to be expected
of women is different from that of a man. Thus, the Court explained:
“While the emergency rule applies to those cases in whichreflective thought, or the
opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is
required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by the suddenness of
the event which absolutely negates throughful care, but by the over-all nature of the
circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy
night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so
and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire
boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would
likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the
emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone)
because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to
A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists
in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court:
“She stopped at a lighted place where there are people, to verify whether she had a flat
tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear
right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk,
about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car.” In fact, respondent court noted,
Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that
Valenzuela’s car was parked very close to the sidewalk. The sketch which he prepared
after the incident showed Valenzuela’s car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a
convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact
was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.”
Is the Court saying that a man driving a vehicle, suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night,
should be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for him to do so and which is
not a hazard to other motorists? Is he expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking
zone or turn on a dark street or alley where he would likely find no one to help him? Would it be
not hazardous for him to stop and assess the emergency because the hobbling vehicle would be
both a threat to his safety and to other motorists? It is believed that it can also be reasonably argued
that the same conclusion that was reached by the Court can be reached if it was a man who was in
the position of the actor in Valenzuela. A man is not necessarily as brave as the Court may presume

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him to be. On the other hand, many women may find the conclusion of the Court as too patronizing.
They may find it insulting to be treated in such a stereotypical manner.
Dean Guido Calabresi believes that there should be uniformstandard of care for men and women.
He explained in one of his lectures:

“All of this argues that before we move to the standard of a reasonably prudent person,
linguistically, we must make sure that what we have put into that standard is not simply
a carryover of male attributes. We must be careful lest we simply apply sexist precedents
and cases. We must not just take the old lawn-mowing man on the Clapham Omnibus,
call him a person, and think we have done the job. We must work to define a person, and
think we have done the job. We must work to define a person who is reasonably prudent,
and reasonable behavior, may be male in some regards, but will in other regards be
female. We must do this not because tort law directly shapes much of the behavior or
many of the attitudes that are important to society. We must do it, rather, because what
law does in general is crucial to shaping fundamental societal attitudes and behavior.
This is not to say, once the society, the legal system, works its way toward this one, non-
sexist standard, and that the standard should not apply equally across the board, to men
and women both. It is not to say that reasonable prudence should be different for men
and women. That is a different issue altogether and I am more than inclined to accept
the notion that the standard should be the same for men and women. We should, I think,
either men’s and women’s rooms or ladies’ and gentlemen’s rooms. (Though when we
come to deal with other cultural and religious attitudes we may well decide that at times
a single, unitary standard is less desirable than more diverse one applying to different
groups.) It is just that in choosing such a single standard we ought not simply and
mindlessly choose the previous male one (or for that matter, the previous female one),
but work toward a new standard that might include the better parts of both past
stereotypes.” (Calabresi, Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law, First Ed., 1985, pp. 31-
32).

5. STANDARD vs. SPECIFIC RULES

In legal philosophy, there is an old debate on the choice of correct legal norm — a debate on the
choice between rules and standards. Rules are legal norms that are formal and mechanical. They
are triggered by a few easily identified factual matters and are opaque in application to the values
that they are designed to serve (example, drive at not more than 60 k.p.h.). Standards, on the other
hand, are flexible, context-sensitive legal norms that require evaluative judgments in their
application (example, drive safely). However, there are legal norms that are hybrid, in that they
are both rule-like and standard-like. (Larry Alexander and Ken Kress, Against LegalPrinciples,
reproduced in Law and Interpretation, Essays in Legal Philosophy, 1995 Ed., Ed. By Andrei
Marmor, p. 280).
The discussions in the preceding sections make it clear that standards are the legal norms that are
being followed in deciding negligence cases. Courts apply a standard in the light of the circum-
stances obtaining in the particular case they are deciding. The courts do not prescribe specific rules
of conduct to be followed by all persons. “The standard of reasonable care is set by law but its
application in a particular case is a question of fact in the sense that propositions of good sense

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which are applied by one judge in one case should not be regarded as propositions of law. If that
were the case, the system would collapse under the weight of accumulated precedent.” (W.V.H.
Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Torts, 1998 15th Ed., p. 179). What results is that the courts in
each case must balance all conflicting interests and consider all the circumstances.
The dichotomy of rules and standards was highlighted in Corliss vs. The Manila Railroad
Company (supra, at page 37). In the said case, the Supreme Court pointed out the opinion of Justice
Holmes in one railroad case that seemed to indicate that setting the standard means specifying
what to do in a given situation. The opinion had been interpreted to suggest that a driver who is
traversing a railroad crossing must, at all times, stop and see if there is an oncoming locomotive.
What was suggested then was a mechanical and inflexible rule. It should be pointed out in this
connection that Justice Holmes predicted in his work, The Common Law, that the accumulated
findings of juries should eventually crystallize into increasingly precise legal rules.
Justice Cardozo, however expressed the view that specific rules of conduct cannot be imposed.
The Supreme Court explained in Corliss that:
“4. The fourth assigned error is deserving of a more extended treatment. Plaintiff-
appellant apparently had in mind this portion of the opinion of the lower court: “The
weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a signal
of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own, ignore
such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility. Corliss, Jr., who undoubtedly
had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must have known that locomotive
engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing where the accident had taken
place.”
Her assignment of error, however, would single out not the above excerpt from the
decision appealed from but what to her is the apparent reliance of the lower court on
Mestres vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. and United States vs. Manabat &
Pasibi. In the Manabat case, the doctrine announced by this Court follows: “A person
in control of an automobile who crosses a railroad, even at a regular road crossing, and
who does not exercise that precaution and that control over it as to be able to stop the
same almost immediately upon the appearance of a train, is guilty of criminal negligence,
providing a collision occurs and injury results. Considering the purposes and the general
methods adopted for the management of railroads and railroad trains, we think it is
incumbent upon one approaching a railroad crossing to use all of his faculties of seeing
and hearing. He should approach a railroad crossing cautiously and carefully. He should
look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he
attempts to cross the track.” The Mestres doctrine in a suit arising from a collision
between an automobile and a street car is substantially similar. Thus: “It may be said,
however, that, where a person is nearing a street crossing toward which a car is
approaching, the duty is on the party to stop and avoid a collision who can most readily
adjust himself to the exigencies of the case, and where such person can do so more
readily, the motorman has a right to presume that such duty will be performed.”
It is true, as plaintiff-appellant would now allege, that there has been a drift away from
the apparent rigid and inflexible doctrine thus set forth in the two above cases as
evidenced by Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Co., the controlling facts of which, however,
are easily distinguishable from what had been correctly ascertained in the present case.

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Torts and Damages

Such a deviation from the earlier principle announced is not only true of this jurisdiction
but also of the Untied States.
This is made clear by Prosser. Speaking of a 1927 decision by Justice Holmes, he had
the following to say: “Especially noteworthy in this respect is the attempt of Mr. Justice
Holmes, in Baltimore & Ohio Railway vs. Goodman, to ‘lay down a standard once for
all,’ which would require an automobile driver approaching a railroad crossing with an
obstructed view to stop, look and listen, and if he cannot be sure otherwise that no train
is coming, to get out of the car. The basic idea behind this is sound enough; it is by no
means proper care to cross a railroad track without taking reasonable precautions against
a train, and normally such precautions will require looking, hearing, and a stop, or at
least slow speed, where the view is obstructed.”
Then, barely seven years later, in 1934, came Pokora vs. Wabash Railway, where,
according to Prosser, it being shown that “the only effective stop must be made upon the
railway tracks themselves, in a position of obvious danger, the court disregarded any
such uniform rule, rejecting the ‘get out of the car’ requirement as ‘an uncommon
precaution, likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous,’ and saying that the driver
need not always stop. ‘Illustrations such as these,’ said Mr. Justice Cardozo, ‘bear
witness to the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of
law . . . Extraordinary situations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or
regulations that are fitting for the commonplace or normal.”
The Supreme Court explained that “what Justice Cardozo announced would merely emphasize
what was set forth earlier that each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided
in accordance with the peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard
and fast rule. There must be that observance of the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the situation demands.”

6. OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMINING NEGLIGENCE

There are certain cases where other factors determine the presence or absence of negligence.
Discussed hereunder are the effects of violation of statute and rules, practice and custom.
A. VIOLATION OF RULES AND STATUTES.
a. Statutes and Ordinances.
Violation of statute may be treated either as (1) a circumstance which establishes a presumption
of negligence, (2) negligence per se or (3) a circumstance which should be considered together
with other circumstances as evidence of negligence. (Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. The
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 99 Phil. 480, 484-485 [1956]). It is up to the legislature
or the Court to select which competing theory should be applied in a particular jurisdiction.
In several cases, the Supreme Court consistently held that violation of statutory duty is negligence
per se. (Cipriano vs. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 711, 717 [1996]; F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 731 [1988]; Teague vs. Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181). “The reason for
this rule is that the statute or ordinance becomes the standard of care or conduct to which the
reasonably prudent person is held. Failure to follow the statute involved constitutes a breachof the
legal duty imposed and fixed by the statute. Since negligence is a breach of legal duty, the violator

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of a statute is then negligent as a matter of law.” (Walz vs. Hudson, 327 N.W. 2d 120 [1982]). At
times, the definite and inflexible standard of care of the traditional reasonably prudent man may
be, in the opinion of the Legislature, an insufficient measure of the care that should be exercised
to guard against a recognized danger. The Legislature may, by statute, prescribe additional
safeguards and may define the duty and standard of care in rigid terms. When the Legislature has
spoken, the standard of care required is no longer what the reasonably prudent man would do under
the circumstances but what the Legislature has commanded. (Tedla vs. Ellman, 280 N.Y. 124, 19
N.E. 2D 987 [1939]).
However, not all statutory enactments prescribe inflexible commands that must be followed. Some
may prescribe general rules of conduct which must be followed under usual conditions. When
unusual conditions occur, strict observance may defeat the purpose of the rule and may even lead
to adverse results. (Tedla vs. Ellman, ibid.). For instance, a statute or ordinance requiring all
persons to walk on the sidewalk may be construed as subject to an exception permitting pedestrians
to walk on the road itself, if doing so will prevent an accident.
Moreover, there are specific cases when the statute expressly provides that violation of statutory
duty merely establishes a presumption of negligence. These include cases covered by Articles 2184
and 2185 of the Civil Code.
The rule that violation of statute is negligence per se was applied in F.F. Cruz and Co. Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals (164 SCRA 733 [1988]). In the said case, the defendant was found guilty of
negligence since it failed to construct a firewall between its property and plaintiff’s residence that
sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. As a result, the plaintiff’s house was
burned when fire originating from defendant’s furniture manufacturing shop spread to plaintiff’s
house.
b. Administrative Rules.
With respect to the rules promulgated by administrative agencies, the Supreme Court observed in
one case that “there is practically unanimity in the proposition that violation of a rule promulgated
by a Commission or Board is not negligence per se but it may be evidence of negligence.”
(Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, supra, citing
C.J.S., Vol. 65, p. 427). However, in Cipriano vs. Court of Appeals (supra), the Supreme Court
considered violation of a Ministry (Department) Order which was issued pursuant to and to
implement a statute as negligence per se. Petitioner in said case was the owner of an establishment
engaged in rustproofing of vehicles. Private respondent’s car, that was brought to the petitioner’s
shop for rustproofing, was burned when fire destroyed the same shop. It was established later that
petitioner failed to comply with the requirement of Presidential Decree No. 1572 to register with
the Department of Trade and Industry as well as Ministry Order No. 32 issued by the same
Department requiring all covered enterprises to secure insurance coverage. Such failure to comply
with the statute and administrative regulation was considered negligence per se.
c. Private Rules of Conduct.
The same rule applies to rules imposed by private individuals like an employer. The order or
prohibition of an employer “couldn’t be of greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or
Board” and violation thereof is merely a “possible evidence of negligence.” (Marinduque Iron
Mines Agents, Inc. vs. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, supra). In the last cited case,
the employees of the petitioner were prohibited by the employer from riding its hauling trucks.

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One of the employees violated such prohibition and rode one of the truck. The same employee
died because the truck turned over and hit a coconut tree while the driver was negligently trying
to overtake another truck. The heirs of the deceased were able to recover despite his violation of
the rules of the employer.
d. Proximate Cause.
It is important to emphasize, however, that in any event, the requisites of quasi-delict must still be
complete before an action based thereon can prosper. Although violation of statute is negligence
per se (or even in case negligence is merely presumed), the plaintiff must still present proof that
the proximate cause of his injury is the negligence of the defendant. Proof must be presented that
there was causal connection between the negligence or violation of statute and the injury. Absent
such proof, the defendant will not be held liable. (Honoria Delgado Vda. de Gregorio, et al. vs.
Go Chong Bing, 102 Phil. 556 [1957]; Dunkle, et al. vs. Emil Landert, 23 CAR 2s 1083). In other
words, the rule that no liability attaches unless it appears that there was a causal connection
between the negligent act or omission charged and the injury is applicable where the act or
omission complained of constitutes a violation of some statute or ordinanceeven though such
violation constitutes negligence per se or is prima facie evidence of negligence. (65 CJS 1143-
1144). Hence, the Supreme Court ruled in United States vs. Bonifacio (supra) that even if the driver
violated traffic rules by going beyond the speed limit, there would still be no liability on account
thereof because causal relation was not established. Thus, the Supreme Court explained:
The provisions of Article 568 of the Criminal Code under which the accused was convicted are as
follows:
xxxxxxxxx
“Any person who, while violating any regulation, shall, by any act imprudence or
negligence not amounting to reckless imprudence, commit an offense, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.”
This does not mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or kills another
he is criminally liable therefor, if at the moment he happens to be guilty of a violation of
some petty regulation (reglamento). The injury or death must have resulted from some
“imprudence or negligence” (imprudencia or negligencia) on his part. True, it need only
be slight negligence, if accompanied by a violation of the regulations, but the relation of
cause and effect must exist between the negligence or imprudence of the accused and
the injury inflicted. If it appears that the injury in no wise resulted from the violation of
the regulations, or the negligent conduct of the accused, he incurs no criminal liability
under the provisions of this article.
Viada, in his commentaries on this article of the Penal Code (vol. 3, p. 685), sets out the
following question and answer which clearly discloses that a conviction thereunder
cannot be maintained, unless there was culpable negligence in the violation of a duly
prescribed regulation; and unless, further, the latter was the proximate and immediate
cause of the injury inflicted:
“Question No. 17. — A pharmacist left his store forgetting and leaving behind the keys
to the case where the most powerful drugs were kept. During his absence his clerk filed
a prescription which he believed was duly made out by a physician but which, in fact,
was signed by an unauthorized person. The prescription called for certain substances
TIMOTEO B. AQUINO 19
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which were afterwards employed to procure an abortion. These substances, according to

a medical report, were of a poisonous and extremely powerful nature such as should be
most carefully safeguarded and only expended after ratification of the prescription in
accordance with article 20 of the ordinance relating to the practice of pharmacy. Under
these circumstances would it be proper to consider the pharmacist as guilty of the offense
of simple imprudence with violation of the regulation of the said faculty? The Supreme
Court has decided this question in the negative on the ground that the fact of the
pharmacist having forgotten and left behind, during the short time he was out walking,
the key of the closet in which, in conformity with the pharmacy ordinances, he kept the
most powerful and active drugs, properly considered, does not constitute the culpable
negligence referred to in Article 581 of the Penal Code, nor was it the proximate and
immediate cause of the said prescription being filled in his store without being properly
ratified by the physician who signed it, as required by the said ordinances. The Court
held, therefore, that the trial court committed an error of law in holding the appellant
liable. (Decision of December 23, 1881; Official Gazette of April 14, 1832).”
See also the recent decision of the Tribunal Supremo de España dated July 11, 1906,
wherein the doctrine is reaffirmed in a case involving the alleged negligence of certain
railroad employees in handling railroad cars.
Doubtless a presumption of negligence will frequently arise from the very fact that an
accident occurred at the time when the accused was violating a regulation; especially if
the regulation has for its object the avoidance of such an accident. But this presumption
may, of course, be rebutted in criminal as well as in civil cases by competent evidence.
In the Federal Court of the United States the rule is stated as follows:
“Where a ship at the time of collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended
to prevent collisions the burden is upon her of showing that her fault could not have been
a contributory cause of the collision.” (7 Cyc., 370 and numerous other cases there cited).
The evidence of record in the case at bar clearly and satisfactorily discloses that even if
the train was running at a speed slightly in excess of the maximum speed prescribed in
the regulations, that fact had no causal relation to the accident and in no wise contributed
to it.”
The Supreme Court reiterated the rule in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (300
SCRA 20 [1998]). In the said case, the petitioner claimed that the defendant corporation was
negligent because it violated Article III, Section 2 of R.A. No. 4136, known as the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides that “no person operating any vehicle shall allow
more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered carry capacity” and
Article IV, Section 3(e) which states that “every motor vehicle of more than one meter of projected
width, while in use on any public high way shall bear tow headlights . . . which not later than one-
half hour after sunset and until at least one-hour before sunrise and whenever weather conditions
so require, shall both be lighted.” The Supreme Court explained that the alleged violations
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. The petitioner, however, had the burden of
showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate
or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in

TIMOTEO B. AQUINO 20
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whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless
it is a contributing cause of the injury (pp. 26-29).
In some cases, however, proof of violation of statute and damage to the plaintiff may itself establish
proximate cause. These are cases where the damage to the plaintiff is the damage which is sought
to be prevented by the statute. (Teague vs. Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181 [1973]).

e. Negligence per se rule reconsidered.

Statutes may also provide specific rules of conduct to be observed in a given situation and may
even impose penal sanctions in case the rule is not observed. In those cases, the law already
determines in advance what a reasonable man should do under certain circumstances. Example of
statutes that provide for specific rules are the National Building Code and the Fire Code of the
Philippines.
More specific rules are likewise provided for by administrative agencies that are tasked to enforce
and implement statutory mandate. In the field of environmental protection, for instance,
administrative agencies may provide for specific guidelines pointing out what every individual is
supposed to do before proceeding with a particular project. Thus, the rules of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority provide for specific requirements before an industrial development can
proceed in its area of jurisdiction. Similarly, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources may promulgate rules specifying particular acts that must be performed by owners of
commercial establishments and the equipment that should be installed by them.
As explained earlier, the weight of authority is that violation of statute is negligence per se.
Although there is authority for the view that violation of administrative rules merely constitute
evidence of negligence on the part of the violator, there is also authority for the view that violation
of administrative rules is also negligence per se. It is believed that the better rule is to consider
violation of statute or administrative rules as a circumstance that gives rise to a presumption of
negligence unless the law provides otherwise. It is not consistent with the demands of justice and
equity to put citizens in straightjackets consisting of detailed prescriptions with no room for
exceptions or discretion.
Legal theorist H.L.A. Hart commented that communications of standards of behaviour, however
smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their
application is in question, prove indeterminate. They will have what has been termed an “open
texture.” He went on further to explain:
“x x x So far we have presented this, in the case of legislation, as a general feature of
human language; uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the use of general
classifying terms in any form of communication concerning matters of fact. Natural
languages like English are when so used irreducibly open-textured. It is, however,
important to appreciate why, apart from this dependence on language as it actually is,
with its characteristics of open texture, we should not cherish, even as an ideal, the
conception of a rule so detailed that the question whether it applied or not to a particular
case was always settled in advance, and never involved, at the point of actual application,
a fresh choice between open alternatives. Put shortly, the reason is that the necessity for
such choice is thrust upon us because we are men, not gods. It is a feature of the human

TIMOTEO B. AQUINO 21
Torts and Damages

predicament (and so of the legislative one) that we labour under two connected
handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere
of conduct by means of general standards to be used without further official direction on
particular occasions. The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact; the second is
our relative indeterminacy of aim. If the world in which we live were characterized only
by a finite number of features, and these together with all the modes in which they could
combine were known to us, then provision could be made in advance for every
possibility. We could make rules, the application of which to particular cases never
called for a further choice. Everything could be known, and for everything, since it could
be known, something could be done and specified in advance by rule. This would be a
world fit for ‘mechanical’ jurisprudence.
Plainly, this world is not our world; human legislators can have no such knowledge of
all possible combinations of circumstances which the future may bring. This inability to
anticipate brings with it a relative indeterminacy of aim. x x x” (H.L.A. Hart, Concept
of the Law, 1997 Ed., p. 128).
The rigidity of the rule that violation of statute is negligence per se would necessarily result in a
finding of negligence even if they should be excluded from the operation of the rule “to give effect
to reasonable social aims.” On the other hand, the rule that will give rise merely to a presumption
of negligence would give room for human handicaps to operate. It will allow the defendant in
negligence cases to prove that his case is one of those unanticipated cases where the rule is
inapplicable. There would be no harm to the injured party because if the said harm caused by the
defendant is the harm sought to be prevented by the statute, then it can only mean that the defendant
will not be able to rebut the presumption of negligence.
This view is a matter of equity and is supported by the philosophical musings of the great Aristotle
in his extremely influential writing Nicomachean Ethics (Book 5, x, 3-7). He expounded that:
“The source of the difficulty is that equity, though just, is not legal justice, but a
rectification of legal justice. The reason for this is that law is always a general statement,
yet there are cases which is not possible to cover in a general statement. In matters
therefore, where, while it is necessary to speak in general terms, it is not possible to do
so correctly, the law takes into consideration the majority of cases, although it is not
unaware of the error this involves. And this does not make it a wrong law; for the error
is not in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the case: the material of conduct
is essentially irregular. When therefore the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter
a case arises which is an exception to the rule, it is then right, where the lawgiver’s
pronouncement because of its absoluteness is defective and erroneous, to rectify the
defect by deciding as the lawgiver would himself decide if he were present on the
occasion, and would have enacted if he had been cognisant of the case in question.
Hence, while the equitable is just, and is superior to one sort of justice, it is not superior
to absolute justice, but only to the error due to its absolute statement. This is the essential
nature of the equitable; it is a rectification of law where law is defective because of its
generality. In fact, this is the reason why things are not all determined by law; it is
because there are some cases for which it is impossible to lay down a law, so that a
special ordinance becomes necessary. For what is itself indefinite can only be measured
by an indefinite standard, like the leaden rule used by Lesbian builders; just as that rule

TIMOTEO B. AQUINO 22
Torts and Damages

is not rigid but can be bent to the shape of the stone, so a special ordinance is made to
fit the circumstances of the case.” (Harris Rackham translation, 1996 Ed., pp. 133-134).

B. PRACTICE AND CUSTOM.

Justice Holmes said that “what usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what
ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with
or not.” (Texas & Pac. Ry. vs. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 [1903]). Such statement is equally
applicable in this jurisdiction. Compliance with the practice and custom in a community will not
automatically result in a finding that the actor is not guilty of negligence. On the other hand, non-
compliance with the custom or practice in a community does not necessarily mean that the actor
was negligent.
The rule was applied by the Supreme Court in Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. (33 Phil. 11, 12-
13 [1915]). In that case, an automobile was struck by a train while the former was crossing the
tracks. The owner of the automobile tried to establish the absence of negligence on the part of the
driver of the automobile by presenting evidence that there was a custom established among
automobile drivers of Manila by which they habitually drove their cars over the railroad crossings
without slackening speed. The Supreme Court rejected the argument by ruling that: “To this the
obvious reply may be made, for the moment admitting the existence of the custom, that a practice
which is dangerous to human life cannot ripen into custom which will protect anyone who follows
it. To go upon a railroad crossing without making any effort to ascertain the approach of a train is
so hazardous an act and one so dangerous to life, that no one may be permitted to excuse himself
who does it, provided injury results. One who performs an act so inherently dangerous cannot,
when an accident occurs, take refuge behind the plea that others have performed the same act
safely.”
It could very well be that the custom in a community is the correct way of doing things under
certain circumstances. The way of doing things in a particular situation may, in fact, have ripened
into custom precisely because it is how a reasonable man would act under the same circumstances.
The very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are beneficial rather than
prejudicial (S.D. Martinez v. Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910).
C. COMPLIANCE WITH RULES AND STATUTES.
While violation of statute may be considered negligence per se, non-compliance is not sine qua
non of negligence. In addition, one cannot avoid a charge of negligence by showing that the act or
omission complained of was of itself lawful or not violative of any statute or ordinance.
Compliance therewith is not conclusive that there was no negligence. (65 C.J.S. 471). Thus, the
defendant can still be held liable for negligence even if he can establish that he was driving below
the speed limit. Compliance with the speed limit is not conclusive that he was not negligently
driving his car. It can even be established that he was not negligent even if he was driving at a rate
of speed beyond that required in a place where there are people crossing the street.

7. DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
In some jurisdictions, degrees of negligence are not recognized and courts therein consider that the
word “gross” does not have legal significance. A striking expression of this view is found in the
statement that gross negligence is merely ordinary negligence with a vituperative epithet. (67 C.J.S
TIMOTEO B. AQUINO 23
Torts and Damages

543, citing Travellers Insurance Co. vs. Reed Co., 135 SW 2d 611; see also People vs. Vistan, 42
Phil. 107, citing U.S. vs. Gomez, G.R. No. 14068, January 19, 1919).
In the Philippines, the presence of gross negligence is statutorily recognized. Article 2231 of the
Civil Code provides that “(i)n quasi-delicts exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant
acted with gross negligence.” Hence, although it is very difficult, if not impossible, to draw the
line between ordinary negligence and gross negligence, courts are compelled to rule on the
existence of gross negligence.
Gross negligence is defined in this jurisdiction as negligence where there is “want of even slight
care and diligence.” (Amadeo vs. Rio Y Olabarrieta, Inc., 95 Phil. 33). It is also characterized as
implying conscious indifference to consequences; pursuing a course of conduct which would
naturally and probably result to injury; utter disregard of consequences. (Marinduque Iron Mines
Agents, Inc. vs. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission, supra, citing 38 Am. Jur. 691).
There are legal writers who believe that gross negligence is similar to reckless imprudence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. (Padilla, Civil Law, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. VII-A,
1994 Ed., p. 413).
8. PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE
A. BURDEN OF PROOF.
Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Revised Rule Court defines burden of proof as the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defenses by the amount
of evidence required by law. It is up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of action or the defendant
to establish his defense. Thus, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged because
of the negligent acts of the defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proving such negligence.
(Taylor vs. Mla Electric Railroad supra, citing Scaevola, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6,
pp. 551, 552). It is even presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. (Sec. 3[d],
Rule 131). The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence. (Sec.1, Rule 133, Revised
Rules of Court).
The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. There are exceptional cases when the rules or the
laws provide for cases when negligence is presumed.
B. PRESUMPTIONS.
The Civil Code provides for the following cases when the existence of negligence is presumed.

“Art. 2184. x x x It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months. x x x
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a
motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
xxxxxxxxx
“Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant
if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances,

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such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable
in his occupation or business.’’
It should be noted, however, that the party invoking such presumption must still establish certain
preconditions before the presumption can operate. Thus, Article 2185 requires proof that there was
a violation of a traffic regulation while Article 2188 requires proof of possession of dangerous
weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison.
Presumption of negligence may also arise because of certain contractual relationship between the
parties. Thus, the Civil Code provides for a presumption of negligence in case a passenger was
injured in an accident involving his carrier. (Article 1735, Civil Code).
C. RES IPSA LOQUITUR.
Another rule which is relied upon in negligence cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur – the
thing speaks for itself. Its function is to aid the plaintiff in proving the elements of a negligence
case by circumstantial evidence. (Epstein, p. 294).
The doctrine was restated in Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 376, cited in
MA-AO Sugar Central Co., Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83491, August
27, 1990) thus: “Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.” The requisites for the
application of the doctrine were enumerated in Rogelio Ramos v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R.
No. 124354, December 29, 1999) as follows:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the “control of the instrumentality”
which caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the
dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition
to proving injury or damage; must show a situation where it is applicable, and must
establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.
(ibid.)
The Supreme Court explained the nature of the rule in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court
(supra.):
The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of
substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule,
when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to
and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part

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of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie
evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of
due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances
involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been
held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or
is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the
specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there
is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and
circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause
of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant,
no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the
circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendant’s
liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case.”
The Supreme Court further explained the doctrine in Rogelio Ramos, et al. vs. Court of Appeals,
et al. (supra.):
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule that the fact of
the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case,
and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing
which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care.
xxx
However, much has been said the res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and,
as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability.
Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is
regarded as a mode of proof, of a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of
negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process
of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident,
enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or
presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going
forward with the proof.
a. Rationale.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an
inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the
injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is
grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience
or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident
TIMOTEO B. AQUINO 26
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itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge
(Rogelio Ramos, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., ibid.)
Another theoretical basis for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or
not available. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in
charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore
is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded
upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person (D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001, 357 SCRA 249, 258).
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff, without
knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any
explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff
complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory
that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of
the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s
negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Accordingly, some courts add to the three prerequisites for
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge
as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior
knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident (D.M. Consunji v. Court of Appeals,
ibid., at pp. 258-259).
b. Cases when the doctrine was applied.
In Africa vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc. (G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448 [1966]), the
Supreme Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and adjudged defendant Caltex liable for
the damage done to the property of its neighbor when fire broke out in a Caltex service station
while gasoline from a tank truck was being unloaded into an underground storage tank through a
hose and the fire spread to and burned neighboring houses. The principle applies with equal force
because the gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of the defendant. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses.
The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were the defendant and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference
that the incident happened because of want of care. The Supreme Court cited a strikingly similar
case of Jones vs. Shell Petroleum Corporation, et al. (171 So. 447):
“Arthur O. Jones is the owner of a building in the city of Hammon which in the year
1934 was leased to the Shell Petroleum Corporation for a gasoline filling station. On
October 8, 1934, during the term of the lease, while gasoline was being transferred, from
the tank wagon, also operated by the Shell Petroleum Corporation, to the underground
tank of the station, a fire started with resulting damages to the building owned by Jones.
Alleging that the damages to his building amounted to $516.95, Jones sued the Shell
Petroleum Corporation for the recovery of that amount. The judge of the district court,
after hearing the testimony, concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a recovery and
rendered judgment in his favor for $427.82. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
TIMOTEO B. AQUINO 27
Torts and Damages

reversed this judgment, on the ground the testimony failed to show with reasonable
certainty any negligence on the part of the Shell Petroleum Corporation or any of its
agents or employees. Plaintiff applied to this Court for a Writ of Review which was
granted, and the case is now before us for decision.”
In resolving the issue of negligence, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held:
“Plaintiff’s petition contains two distinct charges of negligence — one relating to the
cause of the fire and the other relating to the spreading of the gasoline about the filling
station.
“Other than an expert to assess the damages caused plaintiff’s building by the fire, no
witnesses were placed on the stand by the defendant.
“Taking up plaintiff’s charge of negligence relating to the cause of the fire, we find it
established by the record that the filling station and the tank truck were under the control
of the defendant and operated by its agents or employees. We further find from the
uncontradicted testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses that fire started in the underground tank
attached to the filling station while it was being filled from the tank truck and while both
the tank and the truck were in charge of and being operated by the agents or employees
of the defendant, extended to the hose and tank truck, and was communicated from the
burning hose, tank truck, and escaping gasoline to the building owned by the plaintiff.
Predicated on these circumstances and the further circumstance of defendant’s failure to
explain the cause of the fire or to show its lack of knowledge of the cause, plaintiff has
evoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. There are many cases in which the doctrine may
be successfully invoked and this, we think, is one of them.
Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of defendant or his servantsand the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation by defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care. (45 C.J. 768, p. 1193).
“This statement of the rule of res ipsa loquitur has been widely approved and adopted
by the courts of last resort. Some of the cases in this jurisdiction in which the doctrine
has been applied are the following, viz.; Maus vs. Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So.
977; Hebert vs. Lake Charles Ice etc., Co., 111 La. 522, 35 So. 731, 64 L.R.A. 101, 100
Am. St. Rep. 505; Willis vs. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 115 La. 53, 38 So. 892; Bents vs.
Page, 115 La. 560, 39 So. 599.”
Similarly, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine in F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-52732, August 29, 1988), an action for damages on the property of the
plaintiff which was destroyed because of the fire that started in and razed the furniture
manufacturing shop of the defendant. The furniture manufacturing shop of defendant in Caloocan
City was situated adjacent to the residence of respondent. Sometime in August 1971, the plaintiff
first approached the defendant’s plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between
the shop and plaintiff’s residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf
ears. In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fire broke out in defendant’s shop. Defendant’s
employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, but their efforts proved futile.
The fire spread to plaintiff’s house. Both the shop and the house were razed to the ground. The
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cause of the conflagration was never discovered. The National Bureau of Investigation found
specimens from the burned structures negative for the presence of inflammable substances. The
facts of the case likewise called for the application of the doctrine considering that in the normal
course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips,
sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon.
The doctrine was applied in Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. (G.R. No. L-
21749, September 29, 1967) which was decided under the following factual background: “In the
early afternoon of August 17, 1960, barge L-1892, owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
was being towed down the Pasig river by tugboats “Bangus” and “Barbero,” also belonging to the
same corporation, when the barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of theNagtahan bailey
bridge, smashing the posts and causing the bridge to list. The river, at the time, was swollen and
the current swift, on account of the heavy downpour in Manila and the surrounding provinces on
August 15 and 16, 1960.” The Court made an inference of negligence ruling that:
“As to the first question considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and
stationary object and uncontrovertedly provided with adequate openings for the passage
of water craft, including barges like that of appellant’s, it is undeniable that the unusual
event that the barge, exclusively controlled by appellant, rammed the bridge supports
raises a presumption of negligence on the part of appellant or its employees manning the
barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary course of events, such a thing does
not happen if proper care is used. In Anglo-American Jurisprudence, the inference arises
by what is known as the “res ipsa loquitur” rule. (Scott vs. London Docks, Co., 2 H &
C 596; San Juan Light & Transit Co. vs. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 56 L. Ed., 680; Whitwell
vs. Wolf, 127 Minn. 529, 149 N.W. 299; Bryne vs. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 269
Mass. 130; 168 N.E. 540; Gribsby vs. Smith, 146 S.W. 2d 719).”
It should be noted that the ruling in Republic of the Philippines vs. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation
is also supported by another evidentiary rule in American Jurisprudence that was explained by the
Supreme Court in Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals (297 SCRA 59). The rule
is that there is a presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object such
as a dock or navigational aid. In admiralty, this presumption does more than merely require the
ship to go forward and produce some evidence on the presumptive matter. The moving vessel must
show that it was without fault or that the collision was occasioned by the fault of the stationary
object or was the result of inevitable accident. It has been held that such vessel must exhaust every
reasonable opportunity which the circumstances admit and show that in each, they did all that
reasonable care required. In absence of sufficient proof in rebuttal, the presumption of fault
attaches to a moving vessel which collides with a fixed object and makes a prima facie case of
fault against the vessel. The Supreme Court, quoting American jurisprudence, explained that logic
and experience support this presumption:
“The common sense behind the rule makes the burden a heavy one. Such accidents
simply do not occur in the ordinary course of things unless the vessel has been
mismanaged in some way. It is not sufficient for the respondent to produce witnesses to
testify that as soon as the danger became apparent everythingpossible was done to avoid
the accident. The question remains, How then did the collision occur? The answer must
be either that, in spite of the testimony of the witnesses, what was done was too little or
too late or, if not, then the vessel was at fault for being in a position in which an

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unavoidable collision would occur. (ibid., citing Patterson Oil Terminals vs. The Port
Covington, 109 F. Supp. 953, 954 [E D Pa. 1952]).
In Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals (258 SCRA 334 [1996]), the Supreme Court applied the doctrine
to a doctor who performed a simple caesarian section on the plaintiff. It appears that soon after
leaving the hospital, the plaintiff suffered abdominal pains, complained of being feverish and lost
her appetite. She consulted the defendant doctor who gave her medicines. Later, the plaintiff
returned to work but abdominal pains kept on recurring. When the pains became unbearable, she
went to another doctor who found that the plaintiff had infections in her uterus and ovaries. When
she was operated on, a piece of rubber was found on the right side of her uterus which could have
been a torn section of a surgeon’s glove. The Supreme Court ruled that all the requisites for
recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present. “First, the entire proceedings of the
caesarian section were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin (defendant). In this light, the
(plaintiffs) were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign
object finding its way into (plaintiff) Villegas’s body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless
through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarian section, (plaintiff)
underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in
the uterus, it stands to reason that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarian section
performed by (defendant). The (defendants), in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable
for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in (plaintiff’s) abdomen and for all the adverse
effects thereof.”
Similarly, the Court of Appeals found reason to apply the doctrine in Bernal vs. Alonzo (12 CAR
[2s] 792.) because of the presence inside the peritonial cavity of a patient of a surgical gauze
reported as missing after a ceasarian operation. (See more discussions regarding doctors in
Chapter 3).
Although the Supreme Court did not refer to it by name, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was, in
effect, applied in Gotesco Investment Corporation vs. Chatto (210 SCRA 18, 28 [1992]). The
plaintiffs therein were injured because the ceiling of a moviehouse where they were in collapsed.
The owner of the moviehouse could not explain why the ceiling collapsed. The Supreme Court
relied on the following explanation in Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 86, p. 718):
“Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing
that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not
have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or
permits an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant.”
In Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works vs. William Lines, et al. (G.R. No. 132607, May 5,
1999), the Supreme Court sustained the application of the doctrine when one of the vessels of
William Lines caught fire and sank while it was in the dockyard of the petitioner for annual dry-
docking and repair. The Supreme Court ruled that all the requirements for the application of the
doctrine were present. First, the fire that consumed the vessel would not have happened in the
ordinary course of things if reasonable care and diligence had been exercised. Second, the agency
charged with negligence was the petitioner that had control over the vessel when it was docked for
annual repairs. The High Court also observed that the other responsible causes including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons were sufficiently eliminated by evidence.
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The Supreme Court sustained the finding of the Court of Appeals in D.M. Consunji v. Court of
Appeal (supra.) that the doctrine was applicable to a case where the private respondent’s husband
fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working in petitioner’s
construction project, resulting in his death. The construction site was within the exclusive control
and management of petitioner. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter
leadman and others who were in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of
any accident that would occur therein were peculiarly within the knowledge of the petitioner or its
employees. On the other hand, the private respondent widow was not in a position to know what
caused the accident. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement
while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite
for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur was present. The construction site with all its
paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury was under the exclusive control
and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite was also present. No contributory
negligence was attributed to the private respondent’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisitewas
also present.
Ludo and Luym Corporation v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 125483, February 1, 2001, 351 SCRA
35) involved the private wharf belonging to the petitioner that was used by vessels for loading and
unloading copra and other processed products. Among the wharf’s facilities are fender pile clusters
for docking and mooring. It was established that while a vessel belonging to the private respondent
was docking at petitioner’s wharf, it rammed and destroyed a fender pile cluster. It was ruled in
the said case that all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur exist because
the vessel was under the exclusive control of its officers and crew. Petitioner did not have direct
evidence on what transpired within as the officer and crew maneuvered the vessel to its berthing
place. No other possible cause of the damage was likewise established.
c. Cases when doctrine was held inapplicable.
The facts in the above-cited Layugan case, which did not warrant the application of the doctrine
are as follows: On May 15, 1979 while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the
National Highway. Defendant’s truck, driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff
and as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. It was established during the trial that an
early warning device in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp was placed by the plaintiff at the back
of his truck. The defendant argued, however, that any immobile object along the highway, like a
parked truck, poses serious danger to a moving vehicle which has the right to be on the highway.
The defendant posited that the burden of proving that care and diligence was observed is shifted
to the plaintiff, for, as previously claimed, his Isuzu truck had a right to be on the road, while the
immobile cargo truck had no business, so to speak, to be there. The absence of such proof of care,
defendant concluded, would, under the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur, evoke the presumption of
negligence on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper, who was fixing
the flat tire of said truck. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine was inapplicable because there
was sufficient proof that the plaintiff exercised due care by sufficiently placing an early warning
device. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the
defendant, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck.
In other words, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable if there is direct proof of absence
or presence of negligence. As early as 1910, the Supreme Court already explained that the doctrine

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merelycreates a prima facie case, and applies only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. It is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff
in the absence of proof. If there is sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstances under
which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears. (S.D.
Martinez, et al. vs. William Van Buskirk, G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910).
The doctrine is also inapplicable if other causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are not sufficiently eliminated by the evidence. It is not applicable when an unexplained
accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the defendant could not
be responsible (FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation and
Lambert M. Eroles, G.R. No. 141910, August 6, 2002).
Dra. Abdulia Rodriguez, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., (G.R. No. 121964, June 17, 1997, 273
SCRA 607) involved a quasi-delict case for damages filed by the owner and the lessees of
apartment units that were destroyed by fire. It was alleged that the units were destroyed by reason
of the gross negligence of the construction workers and employees of the defendants. Plaintiffs
further alleged that because of such negligence, the bunkhouse or the worker’s quarters in the
construction site at the back of the apartment units caught fire and spread rapidly to the neighboring
buildings. The plaintiffs tried to pin the blame on the defendants by claiming that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur should have been applied because the fire started in the generator in the
bunkhouse. The Supreme Court rejected the argument because the allegation that the fire started
in the generator and the bunkhouse was not established. Thus, the Court concluded that it was not
established that the fire was caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendants.
In Wildvalley Shipping Co. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 119602, October 6, 2000, 342 SCRA
213, 228), a vessel of the petitioner ran aground in the center of a channel blocking ingress and
egress of other vessels. The allegation that the negligence of the master of the vessel is presumed
because of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was rejected because it was not established that the
vessel was in his control at that time. It was established that there was temporary shift from the
master to a pilot on a compulsory pilotage. Hence, the second requisite — that the instrumentality
that caused the damage was within the exclusive control of the defendant — was not established.
d. Culpa Contractual.
The Supreme Court explained in FGU Insurance Corporation v. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
Corporation (supra.) that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not
a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference of
negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and not from the nature of
the relation of the parties. Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other than those
due to defendant’s conduct must first be eliminated, for the doctrine to apply, should be understood
as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of
negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so pointed out, immediately attaches by a failure of
the covenant or its tenor.
Codal Provisions (Civil Code of the Philippines)
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidary liable with his driver, if the former, who was in
the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed

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that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at
least twice within the next preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Art. 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has
been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188. There is a prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or
injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.

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