Journal of Occupational Science

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Explaining Collective Occupations from a Human

Relations Perspective: Bridging the Individual-
Collective Dichotomy

Elelwani L. Ramugondo (Head of Division of Occupational Therapy and

Associate Professor) & Frank Kronenberg (visiting lecturer/scholar in
occupational therapy)

To cite this article: Elelwani L. Ramugondo (Head of Division of Occupational Therapy and
Associate Professor) & Frank Kronenberg (visiting lecturer/scholar in occupational therapy)
(2015) Explaining Collective Occupations from a Human Relations Perspective: Bridging
the Individual-Collective Dichotomy, Journal of Occupational Science, 22:1, 3-16, DOI:
10.1080/14427591.2013.781920

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14427591.2013.781920

Published online: 21 Mar 2013.

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Elelwani L.
Ramugondo &
Frank Kronenberg
j Elelwani L. Ramugondo,
PhD, MSc, BSc(OT), Head of
Division of Occupational
Therapy and Associate
Professor, Department of
Health & Rehabilitation
Sciences, Faculty of Health
Sciences, University of Cape
Town, South Africa
j Frank Kronenberg, PhD
Candidate, BSc(OT), BA(Ed),
University of Cape Town,
South Africa and visiting
lecturer/scholar in
occupational therapy at Zuyd
University, Netherlands;
Universidad Andres Bello,
Chile; University of Salford,
United Kingdom; University of
the Western Cape, South
Africa; Saint Louis University,
United States
Correspondence to:
elelwani.ramugondo@
uct.ac.za
frank.kronenberg@gmail.com
– 2013 The Journal of
Occupational Science
Incorporated
Journal of Occupational Science,
2015
Vol. 22, No. 1, 316,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
14427591.2013.781920
Explaining Collective Occupations from a
Human Relations Perspective: Bridging the
Individual-Collective Dichotomy
A core proposition in this paper is that central to occupations that individuals,
groups, communities and societies engage in, is the intentionality behind them.
While occupation as a construct has been explored in detail in both
occupational science and occupational therapy literature, there has been
insufficient attention paid to what drives collective human engagement. In
addition, the recent emphasis on socio-cultural perspectives of occupation has
not adequately addressed a persistent dichotomous view of the individual
versus the collective. Humans, as part of context, have not been sufficiently
fore-grounded. By introducing the notion of ‘intentionality’ in the explanation
of occupation, and drawing from ubuntu, an African interactive ethic to
demonstrate how collective occupations manifest on a continuum between
oppressive and liberating relationships, this paper aims to bridge the
individual-collective dichotomy in the conceptualization of human occupation.
This teleological approach to occupation which highlights interconnectedness
between the individual and the collective has the potential to lay the
foundation for socially oriented occupational science research, as well as a
social practice and scholarship of occupational therapy.
Keywords: Explanation, Collective occupations, Human relations, Intentionality,
Ubuntu
There has been increased effort in took a step further and explored
recent years to build a theoretical complexity theory and transactional-
foundation to understanding the ism for their explanatory utility in
complex nature of occupational en- relation to occupation. While Al-
gagement (Aldrich, 2008; Dickie, drich’s presentation placed more em-
2010; Dickie, Cutchin, & Humphry, phasis on comparing the two
2006; Fogelberg & Frauwirth, theories’ contribution to scholarship
2010). Drawing from complexity on occupation, there was some
theory, Fogelberg and Frauwirth attempt at analyzing what drives
(2010) provided a framework human engagement. Apart from
through which to identify naturally Kielhofner’s extensive work on voli-
occurring collective occupations, tion, which focused mainly on indi-
while Dickie et al. (2006) used a vidual occupational performance
Deweyan perspective to explicate a (Kielhofner, 1997, 2002, 2008; Kiel-
transactional nature of occupation, hofner & Burke, 1980), Aldrich’s
critiquing the dualistic view of per- tentative effort to explore the expla-
son and context. Aldrich (2008) natory element to human occupation
J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , Vo l . 2 2 , N o . 1 , 2 0 1 5 3
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
appears to be the only one of its kind in occupa-
tional science and occupational therapy literature.
On the other hand, explanation in relation to
human action found in philosophy appears to
suggest strong possibilities for the exploration of
what lies behind human occupation.
Expanding on the complex nature of human
engagement, occupational therapists and scien-
tists have only recently started to challenge an
overly individualistic orientation to the study of
occupation (Cutchin, Aldrich, Bailliard, & Cop-
pola, 2008; Dickie et al., 2006; Fogelberg &
Frauwirth, 2010; Hocking, 2000; Kuo, 2011).
While Dickie et al. (2006) viewed individuals in
transactional relationships with their context,
brought into balance and integrated with their
situation, in much of occupational science litera-
ture there is insufficient attention to human
relations as part of the context that shapes
individual as well as collective engagements.
Kuo (2011) as well as Reed, Hocking and Smythe
(2011)’s contributions, which highlight the cen-
trality of human relations in the meaning that
individuals derive from everyday engagements
point to an important recent shift. Arguments for
a theoretical re-orientation towards acknowled-
ging the socio-cultural dimensions of occupation,
however, remain underpinned by a dichotomous
view of individuals versus the collective (Pierce,
2012), often engendering fears that a focus on one
necessarily precludes the other (Kinsella, 2012).
Drawing from philosophical texts, as well as the
African ethic of ubuntu, the current paper aims to
push the individual-collective dichotomy in the
conceptualization of human occupations into
redundancy. We hope to achieve this by arguing
for the consideration of intentionality in human
occupations and demonstrating that this, in
essence, centers on human relations.
The first part of the paper clarifies our perspective
on essential elements of human occupation as a
construct, drawing from various definitions as
presented in occupational science and occupa-
tional therapy literature. This is followed by the
argument for an explanatory element in theoriz-
ing about human occupation, drawing from other
4 J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , V O L . 2 2 , N O . 1 , 2 0 1 5
disciplines, particularly occidental philosophy. A
tentative definition for collective occupation is
then provided, building on previous work by
Fogelberg and Frauwirth (2011) and raising
possible issues of contention. The notion of
‘intentionality’ is then employed in the examina-
tion of what drives collective human occupation.
The latter part of the paper introduces ubuntu 
an African ethic that has governed human
engagements on the African continent over cen-
turies and is said to be gradually disappearing
(Coughlan, 2006) in the context of a western-led
model of globalization and rapid social change. A
nuanced interpretation of ubuntu as an ‘ontic
orientation’ (Van Marle & Cornell, 2005) to
humanity provides a unique perspective through
which to explore interconnectedness between the
individual and the collective, bridging the dichot-
omy which often presents these entities as
opposed to each other. Framing occupation
from an ubuntu perspective offers exciting po-
tential for a social practice and scholarship of
occupational therapy, and socially engaged occu-
pational science (Angell, 2012).
Human Occupation as a Construct
A review of occupational therapy and occupa-
tional science literature offers various ways of
viewing human occupation. Consensus seems to
only be about the complexity of the construct and
the improbability of a universal definition (Chris-
tiansen, Clark, Kielhofner, & Rogers, 1995;
Curtin, Molineux, & Supyk-Mellson, 2010;
Hocking, 2000; Pollard & Sakellariou, 2012;
Whiteford & Hocking, 2012; Wilcock, 2006).
Although some authors advocate for a shared set
of philosophical beliefs and central constructs
(Rudman, Dennhardt, Fok, Huot, Molke, Park, &
Zur, 2008) within the discipline of occupational
science and the occupational therapy profession,
others have cautioned that dominant theories of
occupation reflect the specific perspectives of a
minority of the global population (Hammell,
2009, 2011; Hocking, 2009; Iwama, 2005; Kro-
nenberg, Pollard, & Sakellariou, 2011).
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
Existing definitions, however, do contain a num-
ber of conceptual elements that recur, ranging
from ‘‘goal-directedness’’ and ‘‘use of time’’ to
‘‘influence of culture and the environment’’
(Christiansen & Baum, 2005, p. 4). Hocking
(2000) carried out a stock take of what she
referred to as ‘‘essential elements of occupation
commonly identified within occupational
science’’, identifying that occupation is: ‘‘cultu-
rally, temporally and ecologically contextualized;
it has a purpose or goal which may differ from
received cultural ideas of its purpose’’ and ‘‘is
understood to be subjectively experienced and
the product of human capabilities’’ (p. 61).
The construct of human occupation has predo-
minantly been defined from Western philosophi-
cal and conceptual perspectives, which may not
be universally shared. Therefore there is a need to
continue to draw from a ‘‘diversity of cultural
perspectives’’ (Hammell, 2011, p. 27), including
ontologies and epistemologies of the south (Kro-
nenberg, Pollard, & Ramugondo, 2011). For the
purposes of this paper, we fore-ground four
‘broadened’ elements of occupation. These ele-
ments are chosen in order to highlight the
pervasiveness of occupation in human life, as
well as the implications of taking a teleological
approach to understanding human occupation.
The first is that occupation refers to both the
ordinary and the extra-ordinary. Existing defini-
tions predominantly focus on ‘‘the ordinary and
familiar things that people do every day’’ (Chris-
tiansen et al., 1995, p. 1015), pointing out that
‘‘when phenomena are recognizable, they quickly
become part of the working language of the
culture which enables people to describe and
communicate about them’’ (Christiansen &
Baum, 2005, p. 4). The triad ‘self-care, produc-
tivity and leisure’ is perhaps the best known and
most widely used practical conceptual break-
down of this depiction of occupation. This view
is, however, incomplete and does not do justice to
the complexity and diverse manifestations of
occupation. Some human occupations are extra-
ordinary, whether this is judged on the experience
of those who engage in them, or the impact these
J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , Vo l . 2 2 , N o . 1 , 2 0 1 5
occupations have on society. Hocking (2003) was
probably the first to refer to both ordinary and
extra-ordinary human occupations.
The second element is that people do every day.
Doing is a critical aspect of human existence
(Nelson, 1988; Punwar & Peloquin, 2000; Wil-
cock, 2006). Thirdly, we are occupied. From the
perspective of occupation as action on the
environment, people are occupied in terms of
their resources of time, energy and personal
capacities. Articulated less explicitly is that
when people do, what is done most often is
done to themselves and others. In other words,
doing has a relational dimension. Here the
emphasis shifts from what appears to be the
dominant view that humans occupy their world,
utilising personal time and resources, to the view
that human subjects are produced by the occupa-
tions they engage in, which seems to link with
Guajardo’s notion that ‘‘we are occupation’’ (Gua-
jardo & Kronenberg, in press).
Fourth and finally, meaning is derived along a
continuum of meaninglessness and meaningful-
ness. The notion of ‘meaning’ is widely associated
with occupation (Hagedorn, 2001; Hasselkuss,
2002; Nelson, 1988; Townsend & Polatajko,
2007; Stein & Roose, 2000). However, most often
positive manifestations of ‘meaning’ seem to be
fore-grounded within occupational therapy and
occupational science literature, whereas recogni-
tion of negative manifestations of occupation is
rare (Galvaan, 2012; Russel, 2008). Kronenberg
and Pollard (2006) pointed out that ‘‘the decision
of when occupation is dignified and meaningful is
not only culturally informed, but also likely to be
politically negotiated’’ (p. 619).
The Place for Explanation in Occupational
Science
If human occupation refers to the fact that human
beings are indeed occupied and that experience
oscillates between a sense of meaningfulness and
meaninglessness, with possible implications for
health and well-being, explaining why people
engage in occupation becomes imperative. A
5
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
pertinent question may be: To what end are human
beings occupied at individual, group, and collective
levels? Individuals, groups and societies may be
persuaded to ask of themselves: Whom do my or
our occupations serve?
These two questions may not be ones that
individuals, groups and societies ask of them-
selves but it may be argued that they underlie a
commonly asked question; the ‘why’ of
occupations. Why individuals engage in particular
occupations and not others is a pre-occupation of
the occupational therapy profession, as is the
general public’s curiosity about why someone
may have done something, especially if what
was done was a heinous crime.
The ‘why’ question constitutes the theory of
explanation; the realm of science for which the
goal is to understand; going beyond purposes of
‘‘empirical adequacy and strength’’ (Van Fraassen,
1980, p. 154). Distilling what an explanation is;
Van Fraassen (1980) suggested that it is; an
answer, clearly distinguishing it from what it is
not * a proposition, an argument, or a list of
propositions. He further suggested that an ex-
planation ought to include law-like statements
‘‘asserting relationships of necessity in nature’’ (p.
155). The essence of explanation lies in articulat-
ing the relation ‘‘between theory, fact, and con-
text’’ (Van Fraassen, 1980, p. 156), and ‘‘in each
case, a success of explanation is a success of
adequate and informative description’’ (p. 157).
We shall return later to this aspect of explanation,
to address what an explanation looks like and
how it may be undertaken in relation to human
action. It seems prudent to first draw from diverse
disciplines to sketch out what it is that is often
explained through scholarly text.
Physicists, biologists, psychologists, social scien-
tists and philosophers have sought to explain
something, as part of their research endeavors
and academic discourse. Much can be learnt
about the object of explanation from the different
disciplines. Physics credits its contribution to the
exponential growth in knowledge on its long
trajectory and well-documented efforts to explain
6 J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , V O L . 2 2 , N O . 1 , 2 0 1 5
the universe. What is particularly remarkable
about physics is that it has succeeded in many
ways to ‘‘provide explanations of a vast diversity
of natural phenomena on the basis of a very few
fundamental principles’’ (Clark, 1990, p. 155).
Where physics may have fallen short, in that it
does not explain life, biology has come in.
Although not mutually exclusive, biology offers
causal explanation to physiological and biochem-
ical phenomena, and functional explanation to
evolutionary ones (Smith, 1990). Additionally,
biologists offer the notion of consequence as part
of their explanatory endeavors. For example, one
consequence of a horse having a stiff back bone is
that people ride it.
Rather than seeking to understand the universe,
as physics does, and perhaps the species, as
biology so effectively accomplishes, explanation
in psychology begins to account for the behavior
and actions of living things. As can be read of
Papineau’s work (1990), psychology serves to
explain decision-making, and the role of beliefs
and other mental states in determining what
course of action individuals will take. Unsurpris-
ingly, and perhaps more so than psychology,
social science extends the explanation into terrain
very close to the core focus of occupational
science; human occupation. The social sciences,
in the fact that they are concerned with accurately
and systematically documenting the social world
(Skorupski, 1990), lend themselves well as a
distinct cluster of disciplines to explain human
behavior and action, as well as events.
Philosophy as well, the last discipline to be
attended to here in relation to the object of
explanation, has much to offer occupational
science in the explanatory effort. This is demon-
strated in the next section when exploring the
nature of explanation, its offerings and limits with
regards to human action. The object of explana-
tion for philosophy, however, appears to be
propositions of any kind (Sober, 1990). It is no
wonder, therefore, that philosophy can penetrate
much of the explanatory endeavor across disci-
plines and has often been referred to as the
mother of all science (Rand, 1982).
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
Explanation: Philosophical Offerings for
Human Occupation
Instead of describing the nature of explanation in
theoretical terms, we have sought to demonstrate
in this section how human action has been
explained in text, drawing mainly from Von
Wright’s work (1971). In his philosophical reflec-
tions, Von Wright sketched interesting possible
explanations of human occupation, highlighting a
teleological element to collective action. He
offered two distinct explanations. First he de-
scribed how violent actions of others may prevent
individuals from doing certain things, citing
mutilation or imprisonment as examples. He
qualified this explanation, however, indicating
that observers would need to first satisfy them-
selves that were it not for this deliberate act from
others to stop these individuals; they would have,
out of other teleological considerations, engaged
in the said actions.
The second explanation of human action Von
Wright (1971) described is non-physical compul-
sion, constituting an order or threat which forces
people to take certain actions in order to avoid
negative consequences. A sophisticated form of
this compulsion is normative pressure, where
individuals will do things in order to satisfy
certain societal norms. Normative pressure, how-
ever, may also dissuade people from taking
certain actions. Von Wright argued that the acts
that are refrained from have ‘‘a clear-cut teleolo-
gical explanation’’ (p. 148). He made the further
point that a teleological explanation lies not only
in this ‘‘evasion of sanction,’’ but also in the fact
that the enactment of laws is usually ‘‘motivated
by purposive considerations’’ (p. 148). Human
beings thus share a purpose for which societal
norms have been put in place, even if they as
individuals may not ‘‘be convinced of the neces-
sity of [their] personal contribution for securing
the fulfillment of this purpose’’ (p. 148).
As much as it is evident that explanation of
human action pervades much of the social
sciences, including philosophy, this does not
suggest that all human action can be explained.
J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , Vo l . 2 2 , N o . 1 , 2 0 1 5
In Von Wright’s (1971) reflections above it is clear
that while it may be possible to link collective
action to general purposive considerations shared
within a given society, explanation of individual
action in teleological terms is often problematic.
This thinking is supported by Branch’s (2009)
analysis of the perpetration of violence in Kenya
during the Mau-Mau led civil war. He argued that
during this war, individual actions towards peace-
keeping or war were at best instrumental, based
on immediate strategic decisions rather than
motivated by notions of morality.
Even as Von Wright (1971) suggested that a
teleological explanation to individual action
may at times be controversial, he did make the
point that without an agent (human being)
intentionally making ‘‘something happen’’, it
would be difficult to justify the agent’s response
to a stimulus as an action. He argued that at best,
such a response qualifies as a ‘‘reflex’’:
For it follows like a ‘reflex’ upon the
stimulation, the reacting subject can no
longer confidently claim that, in situations
when the stimulus is applied, the change
which is supposed to occur would not
happen, unless he (as an agent, intention-
ally) makes it happen. This confidence, as
we have seen, is a logical prerequisite of
action. If it is missing, the reaction is
drained of intentionality. Then it is no
longer meant as a response to the stimula-
tion. It just is this. (pp. 150151, empha-
sis original)
With reference to normative behavior, it may also
be argued that an individual who goes against
normative behavior must inherently have a strong
sense of purpose. Controversy surrounding con-
ferring a teleological explanation to individual
human action seems to stem from discomfort
around the ‘‘determinism of causal necessitation’’
(Von Wright, 1971, p. 166), rather than an
argument about the intentions of individuals.
The argument that ‘‘the imputation of responsi-
bility is an imputation of intention[ality]’’ has
otherwise been effectively made.
7
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
It seems necessary at this point to distinguish
what explanation within the social sciences may
serve, as opposed to what it may achieve within
occupational science. While retrospective infer-
ence or causality may be explored through
specific research across disciplines, occupational
scientists might be veering a bit too far from their
scope if they were to venture into exploring past
events for their predictive value in relation to
future human actions or occupations on their
own. Collaborative research with historians may,
however, afford such possibilities. With respect to
a ‘‘relativistic rationalism which views actions in
light of set purposes and cognitive attitudes of
agents’’ (Von Wright, 1971, p. 166), it seems
occupational scientists may however contribute
meaningfully to an explanation of current and
ongoing human occupation.
Causal necessitation may have a place in explain-
ing human occupation if propositions are made,
drawing from a subset of beliefs about humans
who are engaged in current and ongoing occupa-
tion. Here we again borrow from philosophical
texts, but later on, employ a biological analogy.
An Aristotelian take on explanation is that it is
essentially a question about all aspects of what-
ever is under scrutiny (Kinoshita, 1990). Bringing
this argument into human occupation, we may be
persuaded that in order to explain human occu-
pation, some presupposition ought to be made
about the nature of being human. Kinoshita
(1990) called this an ‘‘ontological commitment’’
(p. 306). Kinoshita also argued that explanation
serves to orient, or amplify, ‘the object’ within a
specified realm of discourse. With human occu-
pation ‘the object’ of our explanation, our onto-
logical commitment about being human will
serve to orient the reader to antecedent condi-
tions to human engagement, clearly situating the
task for explaining human occupation within the
bounds of occupational science discourse.
If we take an Aristotelian position that a human
being ‘‘by nature is a political animal’’ (Mulgan,
1974, p. 438) as given, our explanation about
human occupation will have to depart from this
belief about humans. An interpretation of Aris-
8 J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , V O L . 2 2 , N O . 1 , 2 0 1 5
totle’s position is that a human being is both
gregarious as well as solitary. In his distinction of
‘man’ from other animals that are often also
gregarious, Aristotle highlighted the relations of
a human being with other humans within the
bounds of a city, or polis as a natural community
wherein ‘he’ must gain a sense of belonging,
pursuing a common good or following the
interests of the rulers (Mulgan, 1974, p. 441).
Engels (1884/2004), in his analysis of the origin
of the state, supported this view of the social
political human who is dependent on mutual
cooperation and support from others in order to
develop and divide labour, as well as identify
worthy property to possess. Human beings’ need
for each other is thus innate, and it is in the polis
that a human being will develop his or her full
potential.
Interestingly, understanding humans as innately
in need of human relations may be compared
with the biological mechanism of breathing. The
analogy of breathing helps in two respects. Firstly,
it introduces the norm of necessity to the
explanation effort (Von Wright, 1971). In answer-
ing the question about why breathing accelerates,
we are forced to refer to the ‘‘antecedent sufficient
conditions’’ (p. 157) in the body: reduced levels
of oxygen in the blood that brought about this
acceleration. The ‘Why Necessary?’ question,
articulated with the Aristotelian view of being
human, brings about the possibility of explaining
current and ongoing human occupations in
relation to human relations.
In the second instance, the breathing analogy,
through its cyclical inter-relations between blood,
oxygen and breathing compares very well with
how current and ongoing human occupations
may be explained (See Figure 1). Blood is the
vehicle through which oxygen is transported
throughout the body, and breathing the mechan-
ism through which oxygen is introduced into the
blood. Oxygen is an essential necessity to life,
without which a human being will die. An
Aristotelian view describes human relations as
an innate need for humans.
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
Oxygen-Blood-Breathing Human Relations-Occupation-Doing
Human
Relations
Oxygen
Blood Occupation
Breathing Doing
Figure 1: The Breathing - Human Occupation
Analogy
Similar to blood, occupations may be regarded as
‘carriers’ of human relations as part of ‘‘experi-
ences that matter’’ (Kuo, 2011, p. 131). ‘Doing’,
like breathing, is an active and critical part of
occupations. When oxygen levels drop in the
blood, breathing accelerates. Similarly, when hu-
man relations become limited or unfulfilling in
people’s lives, individuals are often encouraged ‘to
do something’ about it. The answer to ‘‘I am
lonely’’ is often, ‘‘Go out there and meet people,
pick up a hobby, join a book club . . . do some-
thing!’’ It follows, therefore, that human relations
may be a sufficient need for doing. In other
words, in order to have human interactions, a
human being MUST do. However, as those who
engage in breath work will attest to, accelerated
breathing alone cannot guarantee that sufficient
amounts of oxygen will enter the lungs and the
blood stream. The quality of the breathing is
critical. In the same respect, certain kinds and not
all of doing will sustain human relations that
work.
Collective Occupation: A Tentative
Definition
Questions about who is the collective, who names
their occupation, as well as whether the occupa-
tions protect collective interests or not, are not
merely culturally informed. Answering them
fundamentally describes a process of political
analysis (Kronenberg & Pollard, 2006). On the
J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , Vo l . 2 2 , N o . 1 , 2 0 1 5
first question about who is the collective, our
idealistic notion of ‘collective’ seems to match
Engel’s (1884/2004) description of old gentile
communities vested with relative authority and
autonomy. It is clear, however, that with the
emergence of ‘the state’, the will of the ruling
class across many societies was increasingly
imposed on the masses (Engels, 1884/2004).
There are, therefore, contentious issues in the
notion of collective human occupations.
We wish to circumvent some of these as we name
levels at which these occupations occur, borrow-
ing from Fogelberg and Frauwirth’s (2010) notion
of occupational systems, albeit with some differ-
ences. We identify three main entities of group,
community and society in order to highlight how
collectives in the natural context often self-
identify. People belong to some sort of group,
community or society and may sometimes be at
liberty to determine what these entail for them.
Human occupations also often determine collec-
tives and vice versa. Interestingly, Brewer (2004)
also noted in her introduction to Engel’s work
that ‘‘our species became humanized through
labour’’ (p. 14), with human activity laying the
foundation for general human advancement.
In our view, populations are often determined by
those who wish to define collectives for purposes
such as research, and the distribution or gate-
keeping of resources or services. While the
construct of ‘population’ does not form one of
the three main entities we propose, it is an entity
that remains important in relation to the nature of
occupational apartheid (Kronenberg & Pollard,
2005), occupational deprivation (Whiteford,
1997), and occupational injustice (Whiteford &
Townsend, 2011). It draws attention to how
specific populations, e.g. street children, elderly
women, HIV positive youth, displaced people,
refugees or ‘illegal immigrants’ etc, by virtue of
their positions in society (Bourdieu, 1990) and
lack of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986), may be
marginalized and hindered from meaningful par-
ticipation. We view populations as forming part
of communities and societies. In our quest as
occupational scientists to understand what is
9
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
involved in building and sustaining community
or society, the extent to which collective occupa-
tions are inclusive or not requires particular
attention. Angell (2012) has recently also pointed
out that human occupation could ‘‘be a site of
both resistance to and reproduction of the social
order’’ (p. 1). Repressive social orders are thus
perpetuated by collective human occupations and
vice versa.
We propose the following working definition of
collective occupations: Occupations that are en-
gaged in by individuals, groups, communities and/or
societies in everyday contexts; these may reflect an
intention towards social cohesion or dysfunction,
and/or advancement of or aversion to a common
good. Collective occupations may have conse-
quences that benefit some populations and not
others. The definition we propose pre-supposes
the importance of intentionality with respect to
collective human engagement. The ‘common
good’ however, must remain contentious, neces-
sitating a social process for consensus which in
itself may reflect collective human occupation;
such as public participation in referenda or policy
frameworks within a given society.
‘Intentionality’ as a Key Construct in
Explaining Collective Occupations
The origins of the term ‘intentionality’ can be
traced back to Bentham (1781) and Aristotle
(Jacquette, 2004). Much of the current under-
standing on intentionality, however, can be cred-
ited to Brentano (Schumann, 2004). Brentano
(1966) was fascinated by the ontological status of
the immanent object; put simply, the existence of
objects of thought. He theorized that intention-
ality was characteristic of all acts of conscious-
ness, and that mental phenomena intentionally
conjured objects into existence. He thus coined
the phrase, ‘‘intentional in-existence’’, signifying
that thoughts always intentionally contained in
themselves the object to which they were direc-
ted, or content to which they referred (Jacquette,
2004, p. 101).
10 J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , V O L . 2 2 , N O . 1 , 2 0 1 5
In simple terms, intentionality refers to ‘about-
ness’ (Jacquette, 2004; Moran, 1996). Dennett
(1987) has been most influential in furthering
thought on the intentional idiom by introducing
‘intentional stance’ as a predictive strategy. He
argued that if predictions were to be made about
the actions of a rational system, it would stand to
reason that the system could be said to hold the
beliefs attributed to it, inferred in what is
proposed as its intentions. An example of such
a system could be an organization which, ‘‘given
its place in the world and its purpose’’ and ‘‘what
desires it ought to have’’ (Dennett, 1987, p. 17),
would allow for possible predictions about its
future actions. Disconnection between intention
and action within social systems bears serious
consequences for society, as suggested by one
South African political commentator reflecting on
the apparent flouting of rules within banking
institutions in order to accommodate allegedly
corrupt politicians.
The cavalier behavior by the banks, which
probably continues to this day, is a
symptom of a deeper problem afflicting
South African society: the weakness of
institutions despite a façade of strength
premised on the legal arrangements that
gave rise to their formation. They are
open to undue external influence and
abuse by those entrusted with ensuring
their optimal condition and performance.
They look strong, but are otherwise weak
because they suffer from a critical deficit
in the relationship between intention and
action. (Zibi, 2012, p. 8)
Visions within organizations essentially reflect
their intentionality. Where individual actions are
informed by a shared vision across all levels of an
organization, the system functions well. Using an
example close to the profession which gave birth
to occupational science, the American Occupa-
tional Therapy Association’s (2007) Centennial
Vision that ‘‘By the year 2017 . . . we envision that
occupational therapy is a powerful, widely recog-
nized, science-driven, and evidence-based profes-
sion with a globally connected and diverse
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
workforce meeting society’s occupational needs’’
(p. 613) reflects the association’s intentional
stance. An exploration of intentionality brings
the relationship between the construct human
occupation and other phenomena such as ‘‘health,
quality of life, identity, human development,
social structures and policies, and so on’’ (Hock-
ing, 2000, p. 59) under closer scrutiny. It also
holds the potential to expand our understanding
of what has been regarded an essential compo-
nent of occupation in occupational therapy and
occupational science literature, namely; purpose
or goal. As noted earlier, while positive goals or
purposes have been inferred in people’s engage-
ments towards promoting health and well-being,
occupations with negative consequences for in-
dividuals, groups, communities and societies
have received sparse attention.
Attending to the ‘intentionality’ of collective
occupations further serves to foreground the
explanatory element to theorizing about occupa-
tion. A teleological approach to human occupa-
tion is likely to make evident the powerful
contribution occupational science research and
occupational therapy scholarship of practice
could make in society.
Ubuntu: Bridging the Dichotomy between
the Individual and the Collective
A focus on collective interests in human occupa-
tion is not meant to suggest that individualistic
orientations within occupational therapy practice
are necessarily flawed. Rather, the attempt here is
to make visible the complementary perspective
that could enhance the value of occupations in
society. The exercise of reorienting an approach
to occupation from the dominant conventional
individualistic perspective to a possible expan-
sion of the scope of occupational therapy links
with Santos’ ‘‘epistemological operations of the
south: sociologies of absences and emergences’’
(as cited in Kronenberg, Pollard, & Ramugondo,
2011, p. 4). Such reorientation calls for theory
that may have never permeated our theoretical
discourse before.
J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , Vo l . 2 2 , N o . 1 , 2 0 1 5
The ‘southern’ local ontology and way of knowing
that was critical for surfacing a collectivist
dimension to human occupation that we drew
from is the African ethic of ubuntu, which Tutu
(2011) asserted ‘‘is akin to the Hindu notion of
dharma and the Islamic concept ummah’’ (as cited
in Kronenberg, Pollard, & Sakellariou, 2011, p.
IX). The reference to the term ‘southern’ stems
from the Australian sociologist Raewyn Connell
(2007), who used it ‘‘not to name a sharply
bounded category of states or societies, but to
emphasize relations*authority, exclusión and
inclusión, hegemony, partnership, sponsorship,
appropriation*between the intellectuals and in-
stitutions in the dominant European and North
American metropole and those in the world
peripheries, those groups and identities that sit
outside the hegemonic conception of society’’ (p.
VIII).
Although emphasis is given here to the concep-
tual synergistic links in the South, these concepts
of moral philosophy can also be traced within
certain aspects of Western epistemologies.
Against the backdrop of postmodernism and the
globalised world, questions have emerged, how-
ever, around the applicability and expediency of
notions such as ubuntu, with some cautioning
against possible misuse leading to intolerance and
political correctness (Fourie, 2011). Our view is
that such misgivings about ubuntu originate from
a time- and context- bound conceptualization of
the construct. Our understanding of ubuntu is
informed by van Marle and Cornell (2005) who
approached the concept as an evolving construct,
which requires that it constantly respond to
current realities:
Ubuntu in a profound sense, and what-
ever else it may be, implies an interactive
ethic, or an ontic orientation in which
who and how we can be as human beings
is always being shaped in our interaction
with each other. This ethic is not then a
simple form of communalism or commu-
nitarianism, if one means by those terms
the privileging of the community over the
individual. For what is at stake here is the
11
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
process of becoming a person or, more
strongly put, how one is given the chance
to become a person at all. The community
is not something ‘outside’, some static
entity that stands against individuals.
The community is only as it is continu-
ously brought into being by those who
‘make it up’, a phrase we use deliberately.
The community, then, is always being
formed through an ethic of being with
others, and this ethic is in turn evaluated
by how it empowers people. In a dynamic
process the individual and community are
always in the process of coming into
being. Individuals become individuated
through their engagement with others
and their ability to live in line with their
capability is at the heart of how ethical
interactions are judged. (p. 206)
Van Marle and Cornell’s (2005) definition of
ubuntu points to this construct’s four critical
dimensions. First it highlights an interactive
dynamic between the individual and the commu-
nity, challenging a dualistic approach where these
entities are seen as opposed to each other.
Secondly, attention is drawn to the iterative
nature of the interaction, where both the indivi-
dual and the community are in a constant shared
process of becoming. Thirdly, both these entities
have an ethical responsibility to how each allows
the other to exist. A fourth element relates to the
foregrounding of individual capability, which
must be protected and enabled by others, as a
necessary part of engagements.
It is in these four elements that important links
can be made between ubuntu and human occupa-
tion as a vehicle to building and sustaining
relationships that work. Relationships, and who
we are as human beings, are constantly being
shaped by what we are able or unable to do
within groups, communities, and society. Ubuntu
thus highlights the moral obligation for indivi-
duals and collectives to regularly ask of them-
selves; ‘How well are we doing together? Ubuntu, as
an ontological stance and epistemological offering
on the nature of being human from the South,
12 J O U R N A L O F O C C U PAT I O N A L S C I E N C E , V O L . 2 2 , N O . 1 , 2 0 1 5
therefore presents a strong moral philosophy on
the basis of which a social orientation of occupa-
tional therapy may be expanded, emphasizing
collective occupational well-being as a principal
focus of practice.
Whilst an ethic of ubuntu raises consciousness
around the responsibility of both individuals and
communities to allow meaningful existence for
all, occupational scientists and occupational
therapists have the obligation to identify in-
stances of social and occupational injustices
which ultimately impact negatively on collective
occupational well-being. It is here that human
occupations may be analyzed not only in terms of
those who are excluded on the basis of personal
attributes or group affiliation, but also in terms of
the ‘intentional stance’ that collectives identify for
themselves. Communities can thus no longer
exonerate themselves from blame when forms of
exclusion and inclusion are a result of how
society itself ‘‘is organized’’ and the ways in which
the goods necessary for survival are ‘‘produced
and distributed’’ (Brewer, 2004, p. 8).
Critical in this analysis are human relations that
are built or sustained. In essence, ubuntu seems
to provide a lens through which a teleological
approach to human occupations may be under-
taken, highlighting the interconnectedness be-
tween individuals in context. A given society
may for example be persuaded to reflect on its
current and future reality if its practices create
disabling conditions for any marginalized group
in its midst. A community of scholars may be
made conscious about silenced voices within its
ranks, and implications thereof for future innova-
tion. A social entrepreneur may be urged to act
with a sense of urgency when it is clear that his
or her actions will promote an inclusive society
for all.
Conclusion
We have argued for a teleological approach to
understanding collective human occupation. The
notion of intentionality was introduced as part of
the explanatory endeavor within occupational
 E L E LWA N I L . R A M U G O N D O & F R A N K K R O N E N B E R G
science discourse. Building on a socio-cultural
perspective of occupation, human relations were
fore-grounded as part of context, employing the
African interactive ethic ubuntu to bridge the
individual versus collective dichotomy. We hope
that Van Marle and Cornell’s (2005) re-interpre-
tation of ubuntu will resonate with occupational
science scholars across contexts, helping to dis-
mantle the constructed dualism of the East/South
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