was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
36.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4984            April 1, 2003
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN
J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR.
REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE
RABALO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina
S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the
Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to secure financial
spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of
the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on
December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she
was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal
Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C.
Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational
Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of
P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation
of her application for correction of name then pending before
the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the
effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie
B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to
P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of
name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED…
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the
effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella
G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of
her application for correction of name then pending before
the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent
even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full
knowledge of the existence of a prior registration…
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and
during the effectivity of Respondent’s designation as Officer-
in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded
from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount
which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and
initial fee of P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent
even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be
chosen by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for
correction of name.
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as
attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and
unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, which were subsequently dismissed.
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing
subparagraph b (22), Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807, for
her willful failure to pay just debts owing to "Borela Tire Supply" and
"Nova’s Lining Brake & Clutch" as evidenced by the dishonored checks
she issued, the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to
respondent.
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of
a crime against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo
Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan
Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to
draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of May 14,
1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against
the respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052,
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then
President Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned
the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED
Directors calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-
appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for
herself.
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a
Comment on the charges. A copy of said resolution was sent to the
respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision,
Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the
notation "Unclaimed."
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February
3, 1999, be served by registered mail to respondent at her office
address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center
Post Office informed the Court that the said mail matter had been
delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an
authorized agent of respondent on August 27, 1999.
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainant’s motion to refer the
complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline directed respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint,
failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex
parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002,
the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she
failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled
that she had waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the
Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis of the
documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded
that respondent in violation of her oath as a government
official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people
who had pending applications/requests before her office in
exchange for her promise to act favorably on said
applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used
her public office in order to secure financial spoils to the
detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the
maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further
warning that similar action in the future will be a ground for
disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-393, the full text of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A:; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that
respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to
secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the Commission on Higher Education,
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for three (3) years.
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined
by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the
time of filing of the complaint, was "Chief Education Program
Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards, CHED."
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not
be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge
of his duties as a government official. However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer,
then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar.
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various
occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted
to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G.
Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her
favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her
office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondent’s failure,
despite the opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges. We find
that respondent’s misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a
character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a
lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and
illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the
approval of applications and requests awaiting action by her office.

The Attorney’s Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every
lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment,
suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorney’s Oath imposes
upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent’s demands for sums of money
to facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before
her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when
admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to
govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of
said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the
utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should be more
sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their
conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.

Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications

or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the
Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of
the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting
their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting
gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the
approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his
office. Respondent’s conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one
occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected
not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a
high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in
private practice.

For her violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and
Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well
as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that
respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years’ suspension
from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment.
Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this
decision.

WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for

gross misconduct and dishonesty in violation of the Attorney’s Oath as
well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be

spread on the records of the respondent, as well as to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
JJ., concur.

EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC               December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga (respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S.
Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,
Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of
Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres
Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172, issued on October 16, 1987.
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was
issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a
Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared
open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the
Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee
members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and
Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondent’s district includes the
areas covered by the proclamations.
The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02
In the complaint, the complainant claimed that the respondent abused
his position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee on
Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales
application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The
complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and
influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter
to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject
land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent
prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of
money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land.
The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the
transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased
wife.
As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the
complainant’s sales application was denied. The conveyance of rights
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03
The second charge involves another parcel of land within the
proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainant’s
brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded
Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondent’s promptings,
the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent
met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights
over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed
that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one
Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The
respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated
that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.
The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01
The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful
conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was
not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide
resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award.
Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on
Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No.
172 and Memorandum No. 119.
The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)
(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in
the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards.
In his Comment, the respondent claimed that the present complaint is
the third malicious charge filed against him by the complainant. The
first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he
was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the
second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman,
for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a
different version of the antecedent events.
The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the
subject land and he later conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer
of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the
Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the
subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on
one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its
decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified
applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due
course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now
final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by
the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.
The respondent also advanced the following defenses:
(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo
told him (complainant) that the respondent had been
orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued
that this allegation was without corroboration and was
debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca
Olazo, the complainant’s sister.
(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered
the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject land and that he
(the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence
on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land.
The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate
interest in the subject land.
(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a
witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter asserted
his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested
to the truth.
(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and
that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject land
for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the
illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent
insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of
loan.
(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between
Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the
payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel
Olazo.
(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding
what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier
Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August
2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel
categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the
complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also
expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights
(Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s
application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s
application.
(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had
pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject
land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and
corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the
complainant had no rights over the subject land.
The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his third term as
Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not
included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards.
Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting
documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the
DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2,
2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of
the DENR.
Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision applies to
lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in
private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging
in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives
who are in the active practice of law. In this regard, the respondent had
already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the
Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since he did not
intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the
complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications
were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a
member.
The Court’s Ruling
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of
his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by this Court
as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the
respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical
conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official
and a member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was
no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client
before the office he was previously connected with.
After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their
respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss the administrative
complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the
continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by government
lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the
standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government
employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe
the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon
lawyers in the government service is more exacting than the standards
for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are
subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability.
They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private
interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities
should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.
The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following restrictions in the
conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to
interfere with his public duties.
The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public
position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests;
or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We
previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers
who use their public offices to promote their private interests.
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez, we defined promotion of private interest to
include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong, we recognized that
private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing
the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes
with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.
In Vitriolo v. Dasig, we found the act of the respondent (an official of
the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting money from persons
with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious
breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We
reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the
respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded
money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas
before his office.
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano we found the respondent (a Court Attorney
of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he
demanded and received money from the complainant who had a
pending case before this Court.
Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the
absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his position
as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in
the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales
application was ever brought before the Committee on Awards. By the
complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in
March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the
complainant’s sales application was pending before the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of
Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The
records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the
Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the
term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership to the
Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.
These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way
promote, advance or use his private interests in the discharge of his
official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought
before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a
member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position
to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the
complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the
DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent
"orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject land does not specify how
the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is
the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May
25, 2003, categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in
the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer
of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific
charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the
respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the
respondent’s favor.
Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the
complainant presented to support his claim that the respondent exerted
undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated
June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR; the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 12, 1996; and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
July 17, 1996), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or
force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents
merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his
farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also
showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are
neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do
not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of
Miguel Olazo to contest the complainant’s sales application. At the
same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay,
dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are
contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that
Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel Olazo told
him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel
Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation -
backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of the transaction in
which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25,
200324 and July 21, 2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the
respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to her and
Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel
Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that
some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his
medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.
The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the
respondent’s claim that the latter’s involvement was limited to being
paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo.
According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed
that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered
as part of the purchase price of the subject land.
It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary
evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money were
extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2,
1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of
Conveyance over the subject land was executed or on October 25,
1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the
transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are
consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel Olazo decided
to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from
the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.
Private practice of law after separation from public office
As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice
of law after his separation from the government service, the
complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20,
2000, of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the
respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to
persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
In Cayetano v. Monsod, we defined the practice of law as any activity,
in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics
of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or
deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down
the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon
Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s
claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) of Memorandum No.
119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified
applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to
apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas
has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in
the decision dated April 3, 2004, when the DENR gave due course to
his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound
by this finding.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated
with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers
to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by
the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals and, finally, the Court,
per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No.
173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on
certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no
reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on
and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. The respondent generally
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden shifts
hereby declared to be unlawful:
to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no
case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in
xxxx defense.

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public
officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
xxxx
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against
the respondent for the complainant’s failure to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions
warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year SO ORDERED.
after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in
the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year
prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private

practice of their profession during their incumbency. By way of
exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or
her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice
is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the
exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service
who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No.
6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this

restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service,
to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term "intervene"
which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has
the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall within
the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a
matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised
power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent

previously interfered with the sales application covering Manuel’s land
when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was
engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service
rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a
single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described
private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the
public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the
definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the
Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove
and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the
respondent’s favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01


SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8920               September 28, 2011
JUDGE RENE B. BACULI, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MELCHOR A. BATTUNG, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) finding Atty. Melchor Battung liable for
violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommending that he be reprimanded. The
complainant is Judge Rene B. Baculi, Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tuguegarao City. The respondent, Atty.
Battung, is a member of the Bar with postal address on Aguinaldo St.,
Tuguegarao City.
Background
Judge Baculi filed a complaint for disbarment with the Commission on
Discipline of the IBP against the respondent, alleging that the latter
violated Canons 11 and 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Judge Baculi claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the
motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was
shouting while arguing his motion. Judge Baculi advised him to tone
down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his
voice. When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the
respondent shouted, "Then cite me!" Judge Baculi cited him for direct
contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left.
While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the
courtroom and shouted, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance against you!
I am not afraid of you!" Judge Baculi ordered the sheriff to escort the
respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of
court for the second time.
After his hearings, Judge Baculi went out and saw the respondent at
the hall of the courthouse, apparently waiting for him. The respondent
again shouted in a threatening tone, "Judge, I will file gross ignorance
against you! I am not afraid of you!" He kept on shouting, "I am not
afraid of you!" and challenged the judge to a fight. Staff and lawyers
escorted him out of the building.
Judge Baculi also learned that after the respondent left the courtroom,
he continued shouting and punched a table at the Office of the Clerk of
Court.
Violation of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
According to Judge Baculi, the respondent filed dilatory pleadings in
Civil Case No. 2640, an ejectment case.
Judge Baculi rendered on October 4, 2007 a decision in Civil Case No.
2640, which he modified on December 14, 2007. After the modified
decision became final and executory, the branch clerk of court issued a
certificate of finality. The respondent filed a motion to quash the
previously issued writ of execution, raising as a ground the motion to
dismiss filed by the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Baculi
asserted that the respondent knew as a lawyer that ejectment cases
are within the jurisdiction of First Level Courts and the latter was
merely delaying the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
The respondent filed his Answer, essentially saying that it was Judge
Baculi who disrespected him. We quote from his Answer:
23. I only told Judge Rene Baculi I will file Gross ignorance
of the Law against him once inside the court room when he
was lambasting me[.]
24. It was JUDGE BACULI WHO DISRESPECTED ME. He
did not like that I just submit the Motion for Reconsideration
without oral argument because he wanted to have an
occasion to just HUMILIATE ME and to make appear to the
public that I am A NEGLIGENT LAWYER, when he said
"YOU JUSTIFY YOUR NEGLIGENCE BEFORE THIS
COURT" making it an impression to the litigants and the
public that as if I am a NEGLIGENT, INCOMPETENT,
MUMBLING, and IRRESPONSIBLE LAWYER.
25. These words of Judge Rene Baculi made me react[.]
xxxx
28. Since I manifested that I was not going to orally argue
the Motion, Judge Rene Baculi could have just made an
order that the Motion for Reconsideration is submitted for
resolution, but what he did was that he forced me to argue
so that he will have the room to humiliate me as he used to
do not only to me but almost of the lawyers here (sic).
Atty. Battung asked that the case against him be dismissed.
The IBP conducted its investigation of the matter through
Commissioner Jose de la Rama, Jr. In his Commissioner’s
Report, Commissioner De la Rama stated that during the mandatory
conference on January 16, 2009, both parties merely reiterated what
they alleged in their submitted pleadings. Both parties agreed that the
original copy of the July 24, 2008 tape of the incident at the courtroom
would be submitted for the Commissioner’s review. Judge Baculi
submitted the tape and the transcript of stenographic notes on January
23, 2009.
Commissioner De la Rama narrated his findings, as follows:
At the first part of the hearing as reflected in the TSN, it was observed
that the respondent was calm. He politely argued his case but the
voice of the complainant appears to be in high pitch. During the
mandatory conference, it was also observed that indeed, the
complainant maintains a high pitch whenever he speaks. In fact, in the
TSN, where there was already an argument, the complainant stated
the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
Court: This court has been constantly under this kind of voice Atty.
Battung, we are very sorry if you do not want to appear before my
court, then you better attend to your cases and do not appear before
my court if you do not want to be corrected! (TSN, July 24, 2008, page
3)
(NOTE: The underlined words – "we are very sorry" [– were] actually
uttered by Atty. Battung while the judge was saying the quoted portion
of the TSN)
That it was during the time when the complainant asked the following
questions when the undersigned noticed that Atty. Battung shouted at
the presiding judge.
Court: Did you proceed under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure?
*
Atty. Battung: It is not our fault Your Honor to proceed because we
were asked to present our evidence ex parte. Your Honor, so, if should
we were ordered (sic) by the court to follow the rules on summary
procedure. (TSN page 3, July 24, 2008)
It was observed that the judge uttered the following:
Court: Do not shout.
Atty. Battung: Because the court is shouting.
(Page 3, TSN July 24, 2008)
Note: * it was at this point when the respondent shouted at the
complainant.
Thereafter, it was observed that both were already shouting at each
other.
Respondent claims that he was provoked by the presiding judge that is
why he shouted back at him. But after hearing the tape, the
undersigned in convinced that it was Atty. Battung who shouted first at
the complainant.
Presumably, there were other lawyers and litigants present waiting for
their cases to be called. They must have observed the incident. In fact,
in the joint-affidavit submitted by Elenita Pacquing et al., they stood as
one in saying that it was really Atty. Battung who shouted at the judge
that is why the latter cautioned him "not to shout."
The last part of the incident as contained in page 4 of the TSN reads
as follows:
Court: You are now ordered to pay a fine of ₱100.00.
Atty. Battung: We will file the necessary action against this court for
gross ignorance of the law.
Court: Yes, proceed.
(NOTE: Atty. Battung went out the courtroom)
Court: Next case.
Interpreter: Civil Case No. 2746.
(Note: Atty. Battung entered again the courtroom)
Atty. Battung: But what we do not like … (not finished)
Court: The next time…
Atty. Battung: We would like to clear …
Court: Sheriff, throw out the counsel, put that everything in record. If
you want to see me, see me after the court.
Next case.
Civil Case No. 2746 for Partition and Damages, Roberto Cabalza vs.
Teresita Narag, et al.
(nothing follows)
Commissioner De la Rama found that the respondent failed to observe
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires a
lawyer to observe and maintain respect due the courts and judicial
officers. The respondent also violated Rule 11.03 of Canon 11 that
provides that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts. The respondent’s
argument that Judge Baculi provoked him to shout should not be given
due consideration since the respondent should not have shouted at the
presiding judge; by doing so, he created the impression that disrespect
of a judge could be tolerated. What the respondent should have done
was to file an action before the Office of the Court Administrator if he
believed that Judge Baculi did not act according to the norms of judicial
conduct.
With respect to the charge of violation of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Commissioner De la Rama found that the
evidence submitted is insufficient to support a ruling that the
respondent had misused the judicial processes to frustrate the ends of
justice.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
We ruled in Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr. that it is the duty of a lawyer,
as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of the judicial
institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on
very shaky foundations.
A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards
the latter’s role, stature and position in our justice system. When the
respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that
he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter,
the respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the
public confidence in Judge Baculi’s competence and in his ability to
decide cases. Incompetence is a matter that, even if true, must be
handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of
Court; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that
puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into
disrepute.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Battung be
reprimanded, while the Investigating Commissioner recommended a
penalty of six (6) months suspension.
We believe that these recommended penalties are too light for the
offense.
In Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, Former Senior State
Prosecutor, we suspended Atty. Bagabuyo for one year for violating
Rule 11.05, Canon 11, and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and for violating the Lawyer’s Oath for
airing his grievances against a judge in newspapers and radio
programs. In this case, Atty. Battung’s violations are no less serious as
they were committed in the courtroom in the course of judicial
proceedings where the respondent was acting as an officer of the
court, and before the litigating public. His actions were plainly
disrespectful to Judge Baculi and to the court, to the point of being
scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Melchor A. Battung is
found GUILTY of violating Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this
Decision. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to the respondent’s personal record as an attorney; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Department of Justice; and all
courts in the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Commissioner De la Rama recommended that the respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On October 9, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution

adopting and approving the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that the respondent
be reprimanded.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the IBP’s finding that the respondent violated Rule
11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty.
Battung disrespected Judge Baculi by shouting at him inside the
courtroom during court proceedings in the presence of litigants and
their counsels, and court personnel. The respondent even came back
to harass Judge Baculi. This behavior, in front of many witnesses,
cannot be allowed. We note that the respondent continued to threaten
Judge Baculi and acted in a manner that clearly showed disrespect for
his position even after the latter had cited him for contempt. In fact,
after initially leaving the court, the respondent returned to the
courtroom and disrupted the ongoing proceedings. These actions were
not only against the person, the position and the stature of Judge
Baculi, but against the court as well whose proceedings were openly
and flagrantly disrupted, and brought to disrepute by the respondent.

Litigants and counsels, particularly the latter because of their position

and avowed duty to the courts, cannot be allowed to publicly ridicule,
demean and disrespect a judge, and the court that he represents. The
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

EN BANC
A.C. No. 6332               April 17, 2012
IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED 28 APRIL 2003 IN
G.R. NOS. 145817 AND 145822
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Factual Background
This administrative case originated when respondent Atty. Magdaleno
M. Peña filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30 January 2003 (the subject Motion to
Inhibit) in two consolidated petitions involving respondent that were
pending before the Court. This motion is directed against the then
ponente of the consolidated petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, and
reads in part:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully
states:
1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to hurdle in
his quest for justice against Urban Bank and its officials, he
has remained steadfast in his belief that ultimately, he will be
vindicated and the wrongdoers will get their just deserts [sic].
What respondent is about to relate however has, with all due
respect, shaken his faith in the highest Court of the land. If
an anomaly as atrocious as this can happen even in the
august halls of the Supreme Court, one can only wonder if
there is still any hope for our justice system.
2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he is not
making a sweeping accusation against all the members of
this Honorable Court. He cannot however remain tight-lipped
in the face of the overwhelming evidence that has come to
his knowledge regarding the actuation of the ponente of this
Honorable Division.
3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private respondent
received a call from the counsel for petitioners, Atty. Manuel
R. Singson (through his cell phone number 09189137383)
who very excitedly bragged that they had been able to
secure an order from this Honorable Court suspending the
redemption period and the consolidation of ownership over
the Urban Bank properties sold during the execution sale.
Private respondent was aghast because by them, more than
two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period on the
various properties had expired. At that juncture in fact,
Certificates of Final Sale had already been issued to the
purchasers of the properties. The only step that had to be
accomplished was the ministerial act of issuance of new
titles in favor of the purchasers.
4. Private respondent composed himself and tried to recall if
there was any pending incident with this Honorable Court
regarding the suspension of the redemption period but he
could not remember any. In an effort to hide his discomfort,
respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente
to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did
not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they
obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not
afford to lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of
almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City)
as it might again cause the bank (now Export Industry Bank)
to close down.
5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy
of the order that Atty. Singson was talking about, he asked
Atty. Singson to fax him the "advance" copy that they had
received. The faxed "advance" copy that Atty. Singson
provided him bore the fax number and name of Atty.
Singson’s law office. A copy thereof is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It
appeared that a supposed Motion for Clarification was filed
by petitioners through Atty. Singson dated 6 August 2002,
but he was never furnished a copy thereof. He asked a
messenger to immediately secure a copy of the motion and
thereafter confirmed that he was not furnished a copy. His
supposed copy as indicated in the last page of the motion
was sent to the Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz
(ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA, however, was never
respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of
the petitioners. Respondent’s copy, in other words, was sent
to his opponents.
7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without
even giving respondent an opportunity to comment on the
same. In contrast, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated 19 November 2001 had been
pending for almost a year and yet petitioners’ motions for
extension to file comment thereon [were] being granted left
and right.
8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed
on 10 December 2002, an Urgent Omnibus Motion (to
Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13
November 2002 Resolution). He filed a Supplement to the
said motion on 20 December 2002.
9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to
respond to his motion, he received sometime last week two
documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two
documents indicate that this Honorable Court has not
actually granted petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They
indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of
this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about
WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received were
two copies of the official Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the
questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different
members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the
ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of
the Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely
NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in
the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13
November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it
makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at
by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are
hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C."
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but
conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty.
Singson was bragging to him about. The clear and
undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this Division
agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification would only be
NOTED but the ponente responsible for the 13 November
2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was
GRANTED.
12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is CERTAIN
that the ponente has a special interest in this case. Recently,
he also found out that the ponente made a special request to
bring this case along with him when he transferred from the
Third Division to the First Division. Respondent has a copy of
the Resolution of this Honorable Court granting such request
(hereto attached as Annex "D"). Indeed, this circumstance,
considered with all the foregoing circumstance, ineluctably
demonstrates that a major anomaly has occurred here.
13. In view of these, private respondent is compelled to
move for the inhibition of the ponente from this case. This
matter should be thoroughly investigated and respondent is
now carefully considering his legal options for redress. It has
taken him seven years to seek vindication of his rights
against petitioners, he is not about to relent at this point. In
the meantime, he can longer expect a fair and impartial
resolution of this case if the ponente does not inhibit himself.
14. This Honorable Court has time and again emphasized
the importance of impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality on the part of judges and justices. The ponente
will do well to heed such pronouncements.
15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon this
Honorable Court to clarify its real position on the 19
November 2001 Resolution. It is most respectfully submitted
that in order to obviate any further confusion on the matter,
respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 09 December
2002 (as well as the Supplement dated 19 November 2002)
should be resolved and this Honorable Court should confirm
that the stay order contained in the 19 November 2001
Resolution does not cover properties already sold on
execution. xxx (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty. Peña attached to
the subject Motion to Inhibit two copies of the official Agenda for 13
November 2002 of the First Division of this Court, which he claimed to
have anonymously received through the mail. He also attached a copy
of the Court’s internal Resolution regarding the transfer of the case
from the Third Division to the First Division, upon the request of Justice
Carpio, to establish the latter’s alleged special interest in the case.
In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17 February 2003 to
require Atty. Peña and Atty. Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban
Bank in the consolidated petitions, to appear before the Court on 03
March 2003 for an Executive Session.
The reason for the required appearance of the two lawyers in the
Executive Session is explained in the Court’s Resolution dated 03
March 2003. It states:
The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. formally opened the executive session and then requested
Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug stated
that the executive session was called because the Court is perturbed
by some statements made by respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña
involving strictly confidential matters which are purely internal to the
Court and which the latter cites as grounds in his "Urgent Motion to
Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion."
Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Peña and counsel for petitioner
Atty. Manuel R. Singson attended the session.
The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to obtain
copies of the documents he used as annexes in his motion to inhibit,
and whether the annexes are authentic.
The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken as entirely
different and apart from the merits of the main case.
Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three (3)
annexes attached to the motion to inhibit, Annexes "B", "C" and "D,"
questioned how the latter was able to secure copies of such
documents which are confidential to the Court and for the sole use of
the Office of the Clerk of Court, First Division and the Justices
concerned.
Annex "B" is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental agenda of
the First Division for November 13, 2002 (pages 61-62), with an entry
in handwriting reading "10 AC" on the left side and what appear to be
marginal notes on the right side of both pages. Annex "C" is alleged to
be a photocopy of the same supplemental agenda of the First Division
for November 13, 2002, with marginal notes on the right side of pages
61-62. Annex "D" appears to be a photocopy of the resolution dated
September 4, 2002 of the Third Division transferring the instant case to
the First Division (an internal resolution).
Atty. Peña was made to understand that all his statements taken
during this executive session were deemed under oath. Atty. Peña
acceded thereto.
Atty. Peña was asked whether he knows any personnel of the Court
who could possibly be the source. Atty. Peña replied in the negative
and added that he obtained those documents contained in the annexes
through ordinary mail addressed at his residence in Pulupandan,
Negros Occidental, sometime in the second or third week of January
2003; but failed to give the exact date of his receipt. He said Annexes
"B" and "C" were contained in one envelope while Annex "D" was
mailed in a separate envelope. He did not bring the envelopes but
promised the Court he would do his best to locate them. On questions
by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that the envelopes may no
longer be found. He was unable to respond to the observation of the
Chief Justice that the Court would be in no position to know whether
the envelopes he would later produce would be the same envelopes he
allegedly received. Atty. Peña further admitted that his office did not
stamp "Received" on the envelopes and the contents thereof; neither
did he have them recorded in a log book.
When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those annexes as
grounds for his motion to inhibit when the same were coursed only
through ordinary mail under unusual circumstances and that
respondent did not even bother to take note of the postal marks nor
record the same in a log book, Atty. Peña answered that he was 100%
certain that those documents are authentic and he assumed that they
came from Manila because the Supreme Court is in Manila.
At this juncture, Atty. Peña was reminded that since he assured the
authenticity of Annexes "B", "C" and "D", he should be willing to accept
all the consequences if it turns out that there are no such copies in the
Supreme Court or if said annexes turn out to be forged. Atty. Peña
manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences.
When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the original that
made him conclude that those photocopies are authentic, he replied in
the negative, but he believed that they are official documents of the
Court inasmuch as he also received a copy of another resolution
issued by the Court when the same was faxed to him by Atty. Singson,
counsel for petitioner.
Atty. Peña expressed his disappointment upon receiving the resolution
because he was not even furnished with a copy of petitioner’s motion
for clarification, which was resolved. He found out that his copy was
addressed to Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz Law Offices, which
was never respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of some
of the petitioners.
He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the motion for
clarification was acted upon even without comment from him, and he
admitted that under said circumstances, he made imputation of bribery
as a joke.
As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of record that Justice
Carpio and Justice Azcuna denied that Annex "B" is their copy of pp.
61 and 62 of the agenda, Justice Carpio also said that per verification,
Annex "B" is not Justice Santiago’s copy. Thus, Justice Carpio added
that Annex "B" does not belong to any of the Justices of the First
Division. It was also pointed out that each of the Justices have their
respective copies of the agenda and make their own notations thereon.
The official actions of the Court are contained in the duly approved
minutes and resolutions of the Court.
Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of both Atty. Peña and
Atty. Singson to paragraphs 3 and 4 of respondent’s "Urgent Motion to
Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion, which
contain the following allegations: "(Atty. Singson) very excitedly
bragged that they had been able to secure an order from this
Honorable Court suspending the redemption period and the
consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold during
the execution sale. Private respondent was aghast because by then,
more than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption period on the
various properties had expired. In an effort to hide his discomfort,
respondent (Atty. Peña) teased Atty. Singson about bribing the
ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty. Singson did
not even bother to deny and in fact explained that they obviously had
to exert extra effort because they could not afford to lose the properties
involved."
For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a copy of the
resolution dated November 13, 2002 to Atty. Peña and expressed his
belief that there was nothing wrong with it, as the resolution was
officially released and received by his office. He explained that his staff
merely copied the parties in the resolution of February 13, 2002 when
the motion for clarification was prepared. Hence, the respondent was
inadvertently not sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in paragraphs 3 and
4 of the motion to inhibit, reasoning that all he said was about the
suspension of the redemption period which was the subject of the
motion for clarification. Atty. Singson branded as false the allegation of
Atty. Peña that he, Atty. Singson, resorted to bribery in order that the
suspension of the redemption period would be granted.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña admitted that he was
only joking to Atty. Singson when on the cellular phone he intimated
that Justice Carpio could have been bribed because he has a new
Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to answer categorically
whether Atty. Singson told him that Justice Carpio was bribed, Atty.
Peña could not make any candid or forthright answer. He was evasive.
After further deliberation whereby Atty. Peña consistently replied that
his only source of the documents in the annexes is the regular mail, the
Court Resolved to require Atty. Magdaleno Peña within fifteen (15)
days from today to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be held in
contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if he will
not be able to satisfactorily explain to Court why he made gratuitous
allegations and imputations against the Court and some of its members
that tend to cast doubt or aspersion on their integrity.
Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within fifteen (15)
days from today his response to the allegations of Atty. Peña,
particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of respondent’s motion to
inhibit.
The Court excused Attys. Peña and Singson from the executive
session at 11:35 a.m. and resumed its regular session on the agenda.
In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the Court
Resolves to GRANT the motion by counsel for petitioner praying that
intervenor-movant Unimega Properties’ Holdings Corp. be directed to
furnish aforesaid counsel with a copy of the motion for reconsideration
and intervention and that they be granted an additional period of ten
(10) days within which to file comment thereon and require said
intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such service within five (5) days
from notice.
The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No. 145882,
Benjamin de Leon, et al., on the motion for reconsideration with
intervention by Unimega Property Holdings Corp. is NOTED.
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Peña duly submitted his Compliance with the Court’s Order,
where he stated that:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se, respectfully
submits the following explanation in compliance with the Resolution of
this Honorable Court dated 3 March 2003:
1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution
required respondent to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a
result of the allegations he made in his "Urgent Motion to
Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus
Motion" dated 30 January 2003. As this Honorable Court
stated during the 3 March 2003 hearing, the members of the
Court were "perturbed" by some statements respondent
made in the motion.
2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the
distress his statements may have caused the members of
this Honorable Court. While such distress may have been
the unavoidable consequence of his motion to inhibit the
ponente, it was certainly not his intended result.
3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003
hearing, it appeared that this Honorable Court was most
concerned with how respondent was able to secure Annexes
"B" and "C" of his motion (referring to the two copies of the
Supplemental Agenda of the First Division for 13 November
2002) and why respondent used those documents as basis
for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.
4. Respondent had explained that he received the two
annexes by ordinary mail at his residence in Brgy. Ubay,
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime during the second
week of January. The sender of the document was unknown
to respondent because there was no return address. Despite
efforts to locate the envelope in which these documents
came, he was unable to do so.
5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at his
residence. Since he is often in Manila on business, it is
usually the househelp who gets to receive the mail. While he
had given instructions to be very careful in the handling of
documents which arrive by registered mail, the envelopes for
Annexes "A" and "B" may have been misplaced or disposed
by the househelp because it did not bear the stamp
"registered mail."
6. When respondent read the documents, he had absolutely
no reason to doubt their authenticity. For why would anyone
bother or go to the extent of manufacturing documents for
the benefit of someone who does not even know him? The
documents contained a detailed list of the incidents
deliberated by this Honorable Court on 13 November 2002.
Definitely, not just anyone could have access to such
information. Moreover, respondent subsequently received
another mail from apparently the same sender, this time
containing a pink copy of this Honorable Court’s 4
September 2002 Resolution (Annex "D", Urgent Motion to
Inhibit) transferring this case from the Third Division to the
First Division. The receipt of this last document somehow
confirmed to respondent that whoever sent him the copies of
the Supplemental Agenda really had access to the records of
this Honorable Court.
7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main basis of his
motion to inhibit was the information relayed to him by Atty.
Singson during their telephone conversation on 19
November 2002. As stated in respondent’s Urgent Motion to
Inhibit, while Atty. Singson did not categorically claim that
they had bribed the ponente to secure the 13 November
2002 resolution, however, he made no denial when
respondent, in order to obtain information, half-seriously
remarked that this was the reason why the ponente had a
brand new car. Atty. Singson retorted that obviously, they
had to take extra-ordinary measures to prevent the
consolidation of ownership of the properties sold as the bank
may again close down. Indeed, one would normally be
indignant upon being accused of bribery but Atty. Singson
even chuckled and instead justified their "extra-ordinary"
efforts.
8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion was not
enough. An implied admission of bribery on the part of Atty.
Singson, sans evidence, may not have been sufficient basis
for a motion to inhibit. However, respondent did not have to
look far for evidence. Atty. Singson in not denying the
allegation of bribery is considered an admission by silence,
under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Further,
Atty. Singson faxed to him the "advance copy" of the 13
November 2002 Resolution. To respondent, that was solid
evidence and in fact to this day, Atty. Singson fails to explain
exactly when, from whom, and how he was able to secure
said advance copy. The records of this Honorable Court
disclosed that Atty. Singson’s official copy of the 13
November 2002 Resolution was sent to him by registered
mail only on 20 November 2002 (a copy of the daily mailing
report is hereto attached as Annex "A"). Why then was he
able to fax a copy to respondent on 19 November 2002 or a
day before the resolution was released for mailing?
9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to
inhibit. He only finally decided to proceed when he received
the copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To emphasize, the
Supplemental Agenda merely confirmed what Atty. Singson
had earlier told him. Contrary to the apparent impression of
this Honorable Court, respondent’s motion is not primarily
anchored on anonymously received documents but on the
word of petitioner’s counsel himself. The copies of the
Supplemental Agenda are merely corroborative (albeit
extremely convincing) evidence.
10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into
possession of the information relayed by Atty. Singson and
the copies of the Supplemental Agenda would bring them to
the attention of this Honorable Court. In doing so,
respondent was compelled by a sense of duty to inform this
Honorable Court of any apparent irregularity that has come
to his knowledge. It was not done out of spite but a deep
sense of respect.
11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by well-
meaning friends to publicize the incident and take legal
action against the parties involved. Instead, respondent
decided that a motion to inhibit before this Honorable Court
was the most appropriate channel to ventilate his concerns.
Respondent is not out to cast aspersions on anybody, most
especially members of this Honorable Court. He had to file
the Urgent Motion to Inhibit because he sincerely believed,
and still firmly believes, that he could not get impartial justice
if the ponente did not recuse himself.
12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered
confidential by this Honorable Court leaked out and assures
this Honorable Court that he had absolutely no hand in
securing them. Respondent just found himself in a position
where he had to come out with those documents because
his opponent was crude enough to brag that their "extra-
ordinary" efforts to secure a stay order from a certain
ponente had bore fruit. Respondent has devoted at least
seven years of his life to this cause. He almost lost his life
and was nearly driven to penury fighting this battle. Certainly,
he cannot be expected to simply raise his hands in
surrender.
13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was
confirmed during the 3 March 2003 hearing that Annex "C" of
his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful reproduction/"replica"
of the relevant portions of the Supplemental Agenda (TSN
dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on record with the
first Division. With this, respondent rests his case. (Emphasis
supplied)
On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance and
Affidavit dated 28 July 2003, categorically denied having bragged to
Atty. Peña and that he did not employ "extra efforts" to obtain a
favorable suspension order from the Court.
After considering and evaluating the submissions made by the two
lawyers, the Court ordered that a formal investigation be undertaken by
the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on the actions of Atty. Peña. The
Court’s Resolution dated 28 April 2003 in the consolidated petitions,
which is the subject matter of this separate administrative case, reads:
On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Peña filed an Urgent
Motion to Inhibit the ponente of the instant case. Respondent Peña
attached to his Urgent Motion Annex "B", a copy of pp. 61-62 of the
First Division’s Agenda of 13 November 2002. Respondent Peña
claimed that Annex "B" bears the recommended actions, in handwritten
notations, of a member of the Court (First Division) on Item No. 175 of
the Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent Motion for Clarification
filed by petitioner on 7 August 2002. The purported handwritten
notation on Annex "B" for Item No. 175 (f) is "N", or to simply note the
motion. However, the Court issued a Resolution on 13 November 2002
granting the Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his Urgent Motion to
Inhibit, respondent Peña claimed that the Resolution of 13 November
2002 was forged because the recommended and approved action of
the Court was to simply note, and not to approve, the Urgent Motion for
Clarification.
Thus, respondent Peña stated in his Urgent motion to Inhibit:
"9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to
respond to his motion, he received sometime last week two
documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two
documents indicate that this Honorable Court had not
actually granted petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They
indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of
this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about
WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received were
two copies of the official Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the
questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different
members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the
 ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of
the Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely
NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in
the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13
November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it
makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at
by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are
hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C".
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but
conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty.
Singson was bragging about. The clear and undeniable fact
is the Honorable members of this Division agreed that
petitioner’s Motion for Clarification would only be NOTED but
the ponente responsible for the 13 November 2002
Resolution misrepresented that the same was GRANTED."
On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent Peña and Atty. Manuel
Singson, counsel for petitioner Urban Bank, to a hearing to determine,
among others, the authenticity of the annexes to respondent Peña’s
Urgent Motion to Inhibit, including Annex "B". In the hearing,
respondent Peña affirmed the authenticity of the annexes and even
manifested that he was willing to accept the consequences if the
annexes, including Annex "B", turned out to be forgeries.
In the same hearing, the members of the Court (First Division)
informed respondent Peña that the handwritten notations on Annex "B"
did not belong to any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to whom
the case was assigned and the apparent object of respondent Peña’s
Urgent Motion to Inhibit as the "ponente responsible for the 13
November 2002 Resolution," stated that his recommended action on
Item No. 175(f) was "a & f, see RES," meaning on Items 175(a) and (f),
see proposed resolution. In short, the handwritten notations on Annex
"B", purportedly belonging to a member of the Court, were forgeries.
For ready reference, attached as Annexes "1" and "2" to this
Resolution are a copy of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpio’s 13 November
2002 Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpio’s recommended actions for
the entire 13 November 2002 Agenda, respectively.
In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Peña to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt and subjected to
disciplinary action for submitting the annexes to his Motion to Inhibit. In
his Compliance dated 3 April 2003, respondent Peña did not give any
explanation as to why he attached "B" to his Urgent Motion to Inhibit. In
fact, in his Compliance, respondent Peña did not mention at all Annex
"B". Respondent Peña, however, stated that he "just found himself in a
position where he had to come out with those documents because his
opponent was crude enough to brag that their ‘extra-ordinary’ efforts to
secure a stay order from a certain ponente had bore fruit." In
petitioner’s Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson
stated that he "categorically denied that he had bragged to PEÑA
about the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated November 13,
2002 and that extra efforts have been exerted to obtain the same."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS the Office
of the Bar Confidant to conduct a formal investigation of respondent
Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña for submitting to the Court a falsified
document, Annex "B", allegedly forming part of the confidential records
of a member of the Court, in support of his Motion to Inhibit that same
member of the Court. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to
submit its findings, report and recommendation within 90 days from
receipt of this Resolution. (Emphasis supplied.)
During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Peña and Singson duly
submitted their respective Affidavits.
While the administrative case was still pending, some of the other
parties in the consolidated petitions – specifically, Benjamin L. de
Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee, (the De Leon Group), the
petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 – manifested before the Court other
malicious imputations allegedly made by Atty. Peña during the course
of the proceedings in the said petitions. They moved that these be
considered as sufficient and additional basis to cite him for contempt of
court. The Court likewise referred this matter to the OBC.
In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De Leon Group,
respondent Peña denied having used abrasive, insulting and
intemperate language in his pleadings; and argued that his statements
therein were privileged and could not be used as a basis for liability. He
also accused Urban Bank and its directors and officers of violating the
rule against forum shopping by dividing themselves into separate
groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and
145822) against the same Decision of the Court of Appeals with the
same causes of actions and prayers for relief.
The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein respondent Peña
and Atty. Singson appeared and testified on matters that were the
subject of the administrative cases. Several hearings were also held
with respect to the additional contempt charges raised by the De Leon
Group. Thereafter, respondent Peña filed his Memorandum.
The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant
administrative case and made recommendations on the matter (the
OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this Court does not quote at length,
nor even disclose the dispositive recommendation of the OBC in
administrative investigations of members of the bar. However, Atty.
Peña, despite the fact that the OBC Report is confidential and internal,
has obtained, without authority, a copy thereof and has formally
claimed that this Court should apply to him the non-penalty of an
admonition against him, as recommended by the OBC.
Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that the present ponente
of the consolidated petitions from which this separate administrative
case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, would exclude or
suppress material evidence found in the OBC report from her ponencia
in the parent case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that Justice
Carpio had given her by allegedly recommending her to the Supreme
Court. The specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one Member
of the Court to another, without any extrinsic factual basis to support it,
is too undignified to warrant a response in this Decision. To allay his
fears that Justice Sereno would participate in any undue attempt to
suppress material evidence, the Court shall summarize and quote from
the OBC Report the four charges of professional misconduct in
connection with the instant administrative case.
On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against members of the
Court, the OBC found that respondent Peña gave the impression that
some anomaly or irregularity was committed by the Court’s First
Division in issuing the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution.
According to respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the
consolidated petitions, purportedly changed the action of the First
Division from simply "NOTING" the motion for clarification filed by
Urban Bank to "GRANTING" it altogether. The OBC opines that
although respondent Peña may appear to have been passionate in the
subject Motion to Inhibit, the language he used is not to be considered
as malicious imputations but mere expressions of concern based on
what he discovered from the internal documents of the Court that he
had secured. Moreover, the OBC ruled that respondent did not make a
direct accusation of bribery against Justice Carpio, and the former’s
remark about the latter having received a new Mercedes Benz was not
made in the presence of the court, but was uttered in a private mobile
phone conversation between him and Atty. Singson. Respondent’s
profound apologies to the Court were also taken cognizance by the
OBC, which suggests the imposition of a simple warning against any
such future conduct.
Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of the second charge
that respondent supposedly submitted falsified documents to this Court
as annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit, specifically Annex "B"
which appears to be a photocopy of the agenda of the First Division on
13 November 2002 with some handwritten notes. It reasoned that the
submission of falsified documents partakes of the nature of a criminal
act, where the required proof is guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but
respondent Peña is not being charged with a criminal offense in the
instant case. The OBC noted the statement of the Clerk of Court during
the 03 March 2003 Executive Session that Annex "B" does not exist in
the records.
On the third charge for contempt against respondent filed by the De
Leon Group and Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise
suggests the dismissal of the same. To recall, respondent submitted
pleadings in the consolidated petitions where he allegedly charged
Atty. Vinluan of having used his influence over Justice Arturo B. Buena
to gain a favorable resolution to the benefit of his clients. The OBC
suggests that respondent be acquitted of the charge of using abrasive
and disrespectful language against Members of the Court and his
fellow lawyers, but nevertheless recommends that respondent be
advised to refrain from using unnecessary words or statements in the
future.
Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth charge of
forum-shopping leveled by respondent Peña against Urban Bank and
the individual bank directors. In his counter-suit, respondent accused
the bank and its directors and officers of having violated the rule
against forum-shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and filing
three separate petitions to question the unfavorable decision of the
Court of Appeals. However, since not all the parties to the consolidated
petitions participated in the hearings in the instant case, the OBC
recommends that separate proceedings be conducted with respect to
this counter-suit in order to afford Urban Bank and all of the concerned
directors and officers, including their respective counsel, to defend
themselves and present witnesses and/or evidence in support of their
cause.
Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC submitted the following
recommendations for approval of this Court:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully
recommended the following:
A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:
1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the
statements in his Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not
constitute malicious imputations as he was merely
 expressing his concern of what he has discovered A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless Imputation of Bribery and
based on the documents he has obtained. Wrongdoing against a Member of the Court.
However, let this case serve as his FIRST
WARNING, being an officer of the court, to be
We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC on this charge.
more cautious, restraint and circumspect with his
dealings in the future with the Court and its
Member. Respondent Peña is administratively liable for making gratuitous
imputations of bribery and wrongdoing against a member of the Court,
as seen in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his statements
2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such
during the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, and his unrelenting
non-sense and unfounded joke against Honorable
obstinacy in hurling effectively the same imputations in his subsequent
Justice Antonio T. Carpio the latter deserves due
pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a Member of the Court in the
respect and courtesy from no less than the
manner he adopted, respondent Peña, as a lawyer, contravened the
member of the bar. Likewise, Atty. Singson should
ethical standards of the legal profession.
also be ADVISED to be more cautious in his
dealing with his opposing counsel to avoid
misconception of facts. As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to
abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
B. On the charge of falsification:
court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified
documents on ground of lack of legal basis. A
While lawyers are entitled to present their case with vigor and courage,
charge of submitting falsified documents partakes
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of foul and abusive language.
of the nature of criminal act under Art. 172 of the
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic
Revised penal Code, and the quantum of proof
but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
required to hold respondent guilty thereof is proof
offensive. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified,
beyond reasonable doubt. This is to avoid
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with
conflicting findings in the criminal case. The
the dignity of the legal profession.
administrative proceedings of the same act must
await of the outcome in the criminal case of
falsification of document. In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Peña insinuated that
the then ponente of the case had been "bribed" by Atty. Singson,
counsel of Urban Bank in the consolidated petitions, in light of the
C. On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, suspending the period of
redemption of the levied properties pending appeal. The subject Motion
1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the to Inhibit reads in part:
statements cited by Atty. Peña in his pleadings
previously filed in related cases, while it may
4. Private respondent [Peña] composed himself and tried to recall if
appear to be offending on the part of the
there was any pending incident with this Honorable Court regarding the
complainant, but the same do not categorically
suspension of the redemption period but he could not remember any.
contain disrespectful, abusive and abrasive
In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson
language or intemperate words that may tend to
about bribing the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise,
discredit the name of the complainant.
Atty. Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained that
Respondent merely narrated the facts based of his
they obviously had to exert extra effort because they could not afford to
own knowledge and discoveries which, to him,
lose the properties involved (consisting mainly of almost all the units in
warranted to be brought to the attention of the
the Urban Bank Plaza in Makati City) as it might cause the bank (now
court for its information and consideration. He
Export Industry Bank) to close down. (Emphasis supplied.)
must be ADVISED however, to refrain from using
unnecessary words and statements which may not
be material in the resolution of the issued raised During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First Division of
therein. this Court, respondent Peña explained that his reference to the bribe
was merely a "joke" in the course of a telephone conversation between
lawyers:
D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping

CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:

1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum
shopping, as embodied in the Comment dated 22
August 2003 of Atty. Peña, as a separate Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Peña on [sic] when you made
administrative case against the petitioners and mention earlier of him saying about Justice Carpio?
counsels in G.R. 145817, G.R. No. 145818 and
G.R. No. 145822;
ATTY. SINGSON:

2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a

Yes, Your Honor, he said "kaya pala may bagong Mercedez [sic] si
copy of the said comment dated 22 August 2003
Carpio, eh."
for their information.

CHIEF JUSTICE:
3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel,
SINGSON VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented
by ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA He said to you that?
ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA & CRUZ
represented by ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN,
ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S. D. AQUINO and ATTY. SINGSON:
ATTY. HAZEL ROSE B. SEE to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about bribery.
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x           x x x          x x x
ISSUES
ATTY. PEÑA:
In these administrative matters, the salient issues for the Court’s
consideration are limited to the following:
First of all I would like to … everything that he said, he told me that he
got, they got a stay order, it is a stay order from the Supreme Court
(a) whether respondent Peña made gratuitous allegations through Justice Carpio and then I gave that joke. That was just a joke
and imputations against members of the Court; really. He got a new Me[r]cedez [sic] Benz, you see, he was the one
who told me they got a stay order from the Supreme Court through
(b) whether he can be held administratively liable for Justice Carpio, that was what happened …
submitting allegedly "falsified documents" consisting of
internal documents of the court; CHIEF JUSTICE:

(c) whether he can likewise be held administratively liable for You mean you made a joke?
the contempt charges leveled against him in the
Manifestation and Motion filed by the De Leon Group; and
ATTY. PEÑA:

(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual bank directors

and officers are guilty of forum shopping. You Honor?

OUR RULING CHIEF JUSTICE;

You made a joke after he told you supposedly that he got (interrupted)
ATTY. PEÑA:
He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
And you say that is the reason why he got a new Mercedez [sic] Benz,
you made it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.
CHIEF JUSTICE;
That is correct, you are making it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, I think, because how they got (interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion that it was Atty.
Singson who said that Justice Carpio was bribed or the ponente was
bribed, is that also another joke? (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Peña insinuated ill motives to the then ponente of the
consolidated petitions with respect to the issuance of the 13 November
2003 Resolution. To respondent’s mind and based on his interpretation
of the two copies of the Agenda which he anonymously received, the
First Division agreed only to simply note Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification. Nevertheless, the questioned Resolution, which Atty.
Singson sent to him by facsimile, had instead granted the Motion.
Hence, respondent Peña attributed the modification of the action of the
First Division to simply "note" the Motion, one apparently unfavorable
to respondent Peña, to Justice Carpio, who had supposedly received a
Mercedes Benz for the supposedly altered resolution.
However, as pointed out by the Court in the Resolution dated 03 March
2003, each Justice has his own respective copy of the Agenda, where
he can make his own handwritten notations on the action for each item
and case, but "[t]he official actions of the Court are contained in the
duly approved minutes and resolutions of the Court." Hence, contrary
to the insinuations made by respondent Peña, Justice Carpio had not
altered the action of the First Division in granting Urban Bank’s Motion
for Clarification in the consolidated petitions, as in fact, this was the
approved resolution agreed upon by the Justices then present. The
ponente of the case had not recommended that the Motion for
Clarification be simply noted, but in fact, had referred to a separate
resolution, i.e., "a) & f) – See RES.," disposing of the said item (F)
including item (A), which is the Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice
Artemio Panganiban. In addition to the official minutes of the 13
November 2002 Session, Justice Carpio submitted for the record his
written recommendation on the agenda item involving the consolidated
petitions, to prove that this was his recommendation, and the minutes
confirm the approval of this recommendation.
The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members of the
First Division, had indeed adopted the recommended and proposed
resolution of Justice Carpio, as the then ponente, and granted the
Motion for Clarification filed by Urban Bank. It is completely wrong for
respondent Peña to claim that the action had been issued without any
sufficient basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so with
partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate to
immediately justify the imputation of such bias or prejudice as to
warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any verifiable proof
of specific misconduct. Suspicions or insinuations of bribery involving a
member of this Court, in exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave
accusations. They cannot be treated lightly or be "jokingly" alleged by
parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or motions. These
suspicions or insinuations strike not only at the stature or reputation of
the individual members of the Court, but at the integrity of its decisions
as well.
Respondent Peña attempts to draw a connection and direct correlation
between Urban Bank’s failure to furnish him a copy of its Motion for
Clarification, purportedly denying him an opportunity to refute the
allegations therein, and the supposedly corrupt means by which the
unfavorable Resolution was thereby obtained. This is completely
untenable and irresponsible. Had he simply confined the issue to an
alleged deprivation of due process, then there would hardly be any
controversy regarding his conduct as a lawyer and an officer of the
Court. The purported lack of notice of the Motion for Clarification filed
the bank in the consolidated petitions could have been raised as a
valid concern for judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Peña
insinuates ill motives on the part of Members of the Court imputing the
failure of a private party to give him due notice to be, in effect, a failure
of the Court. This merits the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers
over him as a member of the Bar. To allege that bribery has been
committed by members of the judiciary, a complainant – especially, a
lawyer – must go beyond mere suspicions, speculations, insinuations
or even the plain silence of an opposing counsel.
Based on the two lawyers’ disclosures during the 03 March 2003
Executive Session, respondent Peña appears to have been caught by
surprise by his telephone conversation with Atty. Singson, who
informed him of the suspension of the redemption period by the Court
and its issuance of a Stay Order over the execution pending appeal.
The astonishment of respondent would seem natural, since he was
caught unawares of Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification, which was
the subject matter of the 13 November 2002 Resolution. His supposed
joke, which he himself initiated and made without provocation, was
disdainful all the same, as it suggested that the bank had obtained the
Order from this Court in exchange for an expensive luxury automobile.
Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and accusatory
remarks at the expense of the reputation and integrity of members of
this Court, and for using those unsubstantiated claims as basis for the
subject Motion for Inhibition. Instead of investigating the veracity of
Atty. Singson’s revelations, respondent read too much into the
declarations and the purported silence of opposing counsel towards his
joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations of impropriety to a
specific Member of the Court. Such conduct does not befit a member
of the legal profession and falls utterly short of giving respect to the
Court and upholding its dignity.
Respondent Peña’s defense that the allegation of bribery and collusion
between Justice Carpio, Atty. Singson and the petitioners was a "joke"
fails to convince, as in fact, he was deadly serious about the charges
he raised. Respondent insisted that his alleged insinuation of ill
motives was just a "joke" between two lawyers engaged in a private
telephone conversation regarding the case. Although the courts and
judicial officers are entitled to due respect, they are not immune to
criticisms nor are they beyond the subject matter of free speech,
especially in the context of a private conversation between two
individuals. In this case, though, respondent himself was responsible
for moving the private matter into the realm of public knowledge by
citing that same "joke" in his own Motion for Inhibition filed before this
Court. In general, courts will not act as overly sensitive censors of all
private conversations of lawyers at all times, just to ensure obedience
to the duty to afford proper respect and deference to the former.
Nevertheless, this Court will not shy away from exercising its
disciplinary powers whenever persons who impute bribery to judicial
officers and bring such imputations themselves to the court’s attention
through their own pleadings or motions.
Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of bribery was only made
in jest, respondent has never backed down since he first made the
accusation in January 2003 and continually raises as an issue in the
consolidated petitions how Justice Carpio purportedly changed the
agreed action of the First Division when he issued the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution, even after the Court in the 03 March 2003
Executive Session had precisely explained to him that no impropriety
had attended the issuance of the said Resolution. In the Motions to
Inhibit dated 21 January 2010 and 22 August 2011, he repeatedly
insists on the "anomalous/unusual circumstances" surrounding the
issuance by Justice Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which
was allegedly contrary to the handwritten notes made in the copies of
the Agenda that he received. Respondent Peña most recently
capitalized on the purported alteration or falsification supposedly
committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics complaint against the
latter, where he alleged that:
Sometime thereafter, respondent Peña received a copy of the Suppl
[sic] Agenda – 1st Division of this Honorable Court with a notation in
handwriting "10AC" on the left side and marginal notes on the right
side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this Honorable Court took up
the matter of the Motion for Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank, this
Honorable Court merely "N" or "Noted" the Motion for Clarification of
petitioner Urban Bank and did not grant the same.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a copy of the Motion for
Clarification, or required to comment by the Honorable Justice Carpio
and opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, being able to secure an advance
copy of the assailed 13 November 2002 Resolution), the matter
brought out in the Executive Session and the admission made by Atty.
Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable Hilario Davide and the Honorable
Justice Vitug with regard to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st
Division of this Honorable Court which was sent to respondent Peña
was correct and that the Motion for Clarification was merely "N" or
"NOTED". However, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued a Resolution
"Granting" the Motion for Clarification.
Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the 13 November 2002
Resolution in an anomalous/falsified manner and in clear contravention
of this Honorable Court’s Decision to merely "Note" the same. A clear
judicial administrative violation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the bribery "joke" which respondent himself initiated has gotten
the better of him. Respondent has convinced himself of the veracity of
his own malicious insinuations by his own repetitious allegations in his
subsequent pleadings.
The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual penalties in
administrative cases in the presence of mitigating factors, such as the
acknowledgment of the infraction and the feeling of remorse. In this
case, the "profound" apologies offered by respondent Peña for his
insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and hypocritical, as
seen by his later actions. Although he expressed remorse for having
caused the Court distress because of his statements, he refuses to
acknowledge any unethical conduct on his part for his unfounded
accusations against the actions of Justice Carpio with respect to the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution. Worse, he has persisted in
attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio, even after the latter had
recused himself from the case since 2003.
This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating unfounded
and vicious attacks against the integrity and impartiality of Members of
this Court. Earlier in the proceedings of the consolidated petitions,
respondent assailed how retired Justice Arturo B. Buena showed bias
in favor of the De Leon Group, when the latter’s petition in G.R. No.
145822 was reinstated on a second motion for reconsideration:
It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein respondent that
petitioner’s counsel has been making statement to the effect that they
could get a favorable resolution from the Supreme Court, on their
second motion for reconsideration. In short, petitioners’ counsel is
practically saying that they are sure to get the Supreme Court to
entertain the second motion for reconsideration even if it violates the
rules.
1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice Buena
because it was he who penned the challenged Resolution, which
granted the second motion for reconsideration in violation of the Rules.
It was he who crafted, drafted and finalized the said Resolution. It was
he who tried to justify the violation of the Rules. It was from Justice
Buena’s office that contents of the challenged Resolution was
apparently "leaked" to the petitioners’ counsel long before its
promulgation.
What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what phenomenon
transpired? Why are herein petitioners "very special" in the eyes of
Justice Buena?
It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has been affected
by his relationship with Atty. Vinluan, as evidenced by the above-
described facts and circumstances.
Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente, reinstated
the petition without any explanation whatsoever, and in gross violation
of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. This was
highly irregular by itself. But what made reinstatement more suspicious
was the fact that even before the release of the Resolution reinstating
the petition in G. R. No. 145822, the counsel for petitioners, Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan, was already boasting that he would be able to
reinstate their petition. Obviously, even before the release of the
Resolution in question, Atty. Vinluan already knew what Justice
Buena’s resolution would be. (Emphasis supplied.)
In no less than six motions, he similarly accused former Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban of prejudice based on his affiliation with the
Rotary Club, wherein some of the directors and officers of Urban Bank
were also members. He even claimed that Justice Panganiban went to
Urban Bank to meet with some of the directors and officers, who
consulted him on the legal issues arising from criminal suits in relation
to the facts of the main petitions, citing only an unnamed "reliable
source":
The friendship and close relationship of the three (Justice Panganiban
and Urban Bank’s Arsenio ‘Archit’ Bartolome and Teodoro ‘Ted’
Borlongan) went beyond their being Rotarians. As a matter of fact,
Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of times going to Urban Bank
to see Archit and/or Ted, before the bank’s closure. Respondent has
also discovered, through a reliable source, that Justice Panganiban
was known to have been consulted, and his legal advice sought, by
Borlongan and Bartolome, in connection with the above-entitled cases,
while the same was still pending with the Court of Appeals and in
connection with the four (4) criminal cases filed the with the MTC
[Municipal Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent against
Borlongan, et al., for "introducing falsified documents in a judicial
proceeding". In the latter cases, it was even Justice Panganiban who
furnished a copy of the SC Decision in Doris Ho vs. People (his own
ponencia) to Bartolome and Borlongan, for the purpose of giving his
friends a legal basis in questioning the issuance of the warrants of
arrest against Borlongan and the rest of his co-accused in Criminal
Case Nos. 6683 to 6686, MTC Bago City (now appealed to Supreme
Court; see Footnote No. 1 below). (Emphasis supplied.)
Lastly, respondent Peña raised the issue of "unmitigated partiality"
against retired Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that
the latter resolved a separate case involving related issues to the main
petitions in favor of the opposing parties:
3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled "Teodoro C. Borlongan,
et al., v. Magdaleno M. Peña, et al", are also the same petitioners in
the above-entitled consolidated cases G. R. Nos. 145817 and 145822;
and the respondents in the above-entitled consolidated case G. R. No.
162562. Under the circumstances, herein private respondent is
ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the extreme bias and prejudice of
Justice Nachura against him in G. R. No. 143591 would certainly be
carried over to the above-entitled consolidated cases. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Not only has respondent Peña failed to show sincere remorse for his
malicious insinuations of bribery and wrongdoing against Justice
Carpio, he in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics in moving
for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the Court. Indeed, his pattern of
behavior can no longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court can
pardon given certain mitigating circumstances. Respondent Peña has
blatantly and consistently cast unfounded aspersions against judicial
officers in utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to the Court.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court chose to indefinitely suspend
Atty. Alan Paguia, when the latter imputed devious motives and
questioned the impartiality of members of the Court, despite its earlier
warnings:
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce
criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can
truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s
faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the
lawyer should observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
judicial officers and, indeed, should insist on similar conduct by others.
In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the Court, Atty.
Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert
the dispensation of justice.
Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar disrespectful attitude
towards the Court that cannot be countenanced especially for those
privileged enough to practice law in the country. To be sure, Atty.
Paguia has just been recently reinstated to the practice of law after
showing sincere remorse and having renewed his belief and respect
for the Court, almost eight years from the time the penalty was
imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Peña be indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law for his apparently irredeemable
habit of repeatedly imputing unfounded motives and partiality against
members of the Court.
B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court Documents.
We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with respect to the
second charge.
It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03 March 2003
and 28 April 2003, expressed administrative concern over Atty. Peña’s
behavior on three points: (1) his submission of a falsified court
document, (2) his access to Supreme Court documents that are highly
restricted and confidential, and (3) his use of court documents (genuine
or false) in his pleadings.
Respondent Peña submitted a falsified internal court document, Annex
"B," had illegal access to confidential court documents, and made
improper use of them in the proceedings before this Court. The Court
directed the initial investigation by the OBC based on the charge that
respondent Peña had submitted a falsified document to this Court. The
charge of falsification stems from his submission of an alleged copy of
the Court’s Agenda (Annex "B") purportedly belonging to a member of
the Division handling the case. The pertinent portion of the subject
Motion to Inhibit reads:
10. What private respondent anonymously received were two copies of
the Official Agenda of the First Division of this Honorable Court for 13
November 2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently secured from the office
of two different members of the Division, one of which is the copy of
the ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of the
Division had allegedly agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification
and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely NOTED and NOT
GRANTED contrary to what was stated in the 13 November 2002
Resolution (at least the version that was released to the parties) a
falsified document because it makes it appear that a Resolution was
issued by the First Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification
when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at
by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda merely
NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto attached as
Annexes "B" and "C". (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent Peña
expressed his absolute conviction that the document attached as
Annex "B" was an exact copy of the Agenda of the then ponente of the
case. It was later discovered, however, that no such copy existed,
either in the latter’s records or in those of any other member of the
Division concerned:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is concerned it was
confirmed by the Office of the Clerk of Court of this Division that the
original of that does not appear in the record, is not in the record and
that nobody, none of the members of the division has a copy of, that
copy of Annex B of your pleading does not come from anyone of the
members of the division. That is the position of the Court now as
explained earlier. Specifically Mr. Justice Carpio said that Annex B,
specifically with that capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not come
from his office, was not based on the document in his office and that is
also true to each of the members of this Division. (Emphasis supplied.)
The falsification, subject of the instant administrative case, lies in the
fact that respondent Peña submitted to the Court a document he was
absolutely certain, at the time of such submission, was a copy of the
Agenda of the then ponente. In supporting the subject Motion to Inhibit,
respondent misled the Court by presenting a document that was not
what he claimed it to be. Contrary to the assurances made in the same
motion he made allegations that were false and submitted documents
that were not borne out by the records of this case. Instead of verifying
the contents of Annex "B," which came to him through dubious means,
he unquestioningly accepted their genuineness and veracity. Despite
the Court’s own explanation that Annex "B" does not exist, he
continues to insist on its existence.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities exacted and
expected from members of the legal profession. Thus, lawyers shall
commit no falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice. As disciples of truth, their lofty vocation is to
correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of the case and to aid
it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. Courts are entitled
to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading
before them. In the instant case, the submission of a document
purporting to be a copy of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an
act of dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of respondent to
uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent Peña would argue, however, that falsification – as a
criminal act under the Revised Penal Code – was not judicially
established during the proceedings of the OBC investigation and, thus,
he cannot be held liable for falsification. The comparison of the present
administrative and disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of
falsification is misplaced.
The subject matter of administrative proceedings is confined to
whether there is administrative liability for the submission of a falsified
document – namely Annex "B," which respondent Peña claims (albeit
mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda of the ponente. The
issue, then, is whether he transgressed the ethical standards
demanded of lawyers, by which they should be truthful in their dealings
with and submissions to the Court. The investigation clearly does not
include the determination of criminal liability, which demands a different
modicum of proof with respect to the use of falsified documents. At this
time, the Court makes no definitive pronouncement as to the guilt of
respondent over his violation of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code regarding the use of falsified documents.
In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he submitted
was a faithful reproduction of the ponente’s Agenda, just to support the
subject Motion to Inhibit. The original of the purported copy was later
found to have been inexistent in the court’s records. Regardless of
whether or not Annex "B" was criminally falsified or forged is immaterial
to the present disposition. What is now crucial is whether respondent
was candid and truthful in claiming absolute certainty with respect to
the genuineness and authenticity of his submissions.
The assertion of respondent Peña that the typewritten contents of
Annexes "B" and "C" appear to be genuine and accurate is
unconvincing and cannot exonerate him from liability. Although Annex
"C" was determined to be in the Court’s records, the bare similarity of
its typewritten contents with those of Annex "B" will not shield him from
disciplinary action. Although the typewritten contents of the two
Agendas appear identical, the handwritten notes located at the right-
hand side are different. Respondent, in fact, claims that the
handwritten notes come from two different members of the Division,
one of them the then ponente of the case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of the
handwritten remarks – not on the printed contents – which are
allegedly contrary to the substance of the Court’s 13 November 2002
Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. Respondent Peña cannot
claim the genuineness of Annex "B" (which is not in the records),
based on the apparent identity of its printed contents with those of
Annex "C" (which is in the records). The handwritten notes are
markedly different and, according to him, made by two different
members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent failed to
substantiate his assertion that Annex "B" and the notes made therein
belonged to any member of this Court.
More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Peña has not
explained, to the Court’s satisfaction, how he managed to obtain
internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Peña would have the Court believe that he happened to
obtain the two copies of the Agenda (Annexes "B" and "C") and the
internal Resolution (Annex "D") in two separate envelopes
anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He supposedly received them
sometime during the second or the third week of January 2002 in his
home-cum-office in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental. He, however,
failed to present the envelopes containing the documents, but
explained that these may have already been thrown away, since he
had no system of recording incoming communications in his
home/office in the province. The Court is not persuaded by his account
of the receipt of these restricted court documents.
The Agenda, the Court’s action thereon, as well as the Resolution
(Annex "D"), are internal documents that are accessible only to court
officers, who are bound by strict confidentiality. For respondent Peña to
have been able to secure originals or photocopies of the Court’s
Agenda is disturbing because that ability implies a breach of the rules
of strict confidentiality in the Court. Notably, the Agenda purportedly
sent to him did not contain all the items for deliberation by the Court’s
First Division for that day; the copies sent were limited to the incidents
pertaining to his pending case. This circumstance can hardly be
considered as random, since the exact item (Item No. 175) of concern
for him – specifically, the Court’s action on Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification –was what had been sent directly to his provincial
home/office, and what he conveniently acquired thereby.
The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court records just
coincidentally and anonymously appeared in the provincial home/office
of respondent Peña through ordinary mail. Also incredible is his
explanation that the envelopes that contained the documents, and that
could have led to the identification of their source were opportunely
misplaced or thrown away, despite the grave importance he had
ascribed to them. It is highly improbable that a personnel of the Court
would breach the rules of strict confidentiality to send to litigants or their
counsel the Court’s Agenda, together with handwritten notes and the
internal resolutions of the Court, without any prodding or consideration,
and even at the risk of incurring grave criminal and administrative
penalties. Respondent Peña’s account of having lost the envelopes
appears too convenient an excuse to assuage the Court’s skepticism
towards this breach of confidentiality within its own halls.
Worse, respondent Peña flaunted his continued access – as recent as
2010 – to other internal and confidential records in the proceedings of
this case. Despite the administrative proceedings leveled against him
for having "illicitly" obtained the confidential Agenda of the Court’s First
Division, he brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior by
surreptiously acquiring no less than the confidential and still
unreleased OBC Report on the very administrative case of which he
himself is the subject.
In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010, respondent
Peña prayed that the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution be
recalled on the ground that there was a mistake in its issuance based
on the copies of the Agenda he had mysteriously received. In support
of this motion, he casually cited and attached a photocopy of the
confidential OBC Report. This OBC Report has not been released to
any party, and was then in fact still under deliberation by this Court.
Curiously, the attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to the
unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as it actually appears in
the rollo of the administrative case. Unfortunately, respondent did not
explain in the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy thereof.
Regardless of the means employed by respondent, his acquisition of
the OBC Report from the Court’s own records already speaks of an
appalling pattern of unethical behavior that the Court will no longer
ignore. Even as he was the subject of an administrative case for
obtaining confidential court records, he continued to have access to
other internal documents of the Court. His actions have established
that he is incorrigible and not likely to change. His continued obstinacy
in disregarding ethical standards and ignoring the rule of confidentiality
of court records deserves nothing less than the ultimate penalty of
disbarment from the profession.
Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent Peña even tried
to bolster his claim that the then ponente of the case had a special
interest in the case by attaching an internal resolution of the Court. In
the said Internal Resolution dated 04 September 2002, the two
consolidated petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822) were
transferred from the Third Division to the First Division, where Justice
Carpio was subsequently assigned. How respondent Peña was again
able to secure this internal document is another disturbing mystery in
this case, especially since the resolution was sent by the Third Division
Clerk of Court to the First Division Clerk of Court, the Raffle Committee
and the Judicial Records Office only, and not to any of the parties.
Similar to the copies of the Agenda of the First Division, respondent
Peña again purportedly received this Internal Resolution by mail. What
is more alarming in this instance is that he received not just any
photocopy of the Court’s Resolution, but a pink copy itself, the very
same material used for such internal resolutions in the Court’s records.
As he himself admitted, respondent Peña could not have gotten hold of
the said internal Resolution, which was on its face declared an internal
matter, without the assistance of a person who had access to the
records of his case in the Court.
This claimed "major anomaly" of the transfer of the case, which is
being decried by respondent in the subject Motion to Inhibit, stems
from his gross misunderstanding of the internal rules of the Court.
Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions due to the
retirement of other Justices, the cases already assigned to a Member-
in-Charge are required to be transferred to the Division to which the
Member-in-Charge moves. Hence, in this case, Justice Carpio, similar
to other members of the Court at that time, did not lose his case
assignments but brought them with him when he transferred to the
First Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned cases to the new
Division are made by request from the Member-in-Charge, because
otherwise the rollo of the cases of which he is Member-in-Charge will
be retained by a Division in which he is no longer a member. Thus, the
transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division that is
being heavily criticized by respondent Peña was simple compliance
with the established internal procedures of the Court, and not
attributable to any undue interest or malicious intention on the part of
the then ponente to retain the case for himself. Respondent had raised
"irresponsible suspicions" against the integrity of the ponente without
any understanding of the Supreme Court’s processes in the transfer of
cases.
Respondent Peña had, in fact, previously used this deplorable tactic of
obtaining internal court records to call for the inhibition of Justices of
the Court. In previously moving for the inhibition of Justice Buena, he
assailed how supposedly the retired Justice violated the rules with
respect to a second motion for reconsideration when the latter
reinstated the Petition of the De Leon Group in G.R. No. 145822.
Respondent attributed the special treatment extended by Justice
Buena to his supposed association with the De Leon Group’s counsel,
Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the ACCRA Law Office. To establish this
special treatment, he attached a complete copy of the Minutes of the
Division composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases dismissed by
the Court due to failure to pay the required fees, which Justice Buena
allegedly did not reinstate:
10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show that for the
past several months alone, seventy-seven petitions were dismissed by
the Supreme Court, mainly for failure to pay the required fees. Out of
that number, NONE WERE REINSTATED upon the filing of a
SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice Buena
willingly disregarded the Rules by reinstating petitioners’ petition (De
Leon Group Petition in G. R. No. 145822) upon the filing of a second
motion for reconsideration, then he should have reinstated also the
aforesaid 77 cases in order to be fair. At the very least, he should now
reinstate all of said 77 cases if only to show that he is not biased in
favor of herein petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however,
because those cases are not favored ones. Photocopies of the case
titles and numbers, as well as the resolutions dismissing the aforesaid
seventy-seven cases, consisting of 58 pages, are attached hereto
collectively as Annex "A".
Respondent Peña was able to attach to this motion for inhibition the
portions of the Court’s Minutes on 12 April 2000, 07 February 2001, 12
February 2001, 14 February 2001, 26 February 2001, 28 March 2001,
14 April 2001, 18 April 2001, 26 April 2001, 16 May 2001, 11 July
2001, 08 August 2001, 13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August
2001, 05 September 2001, 24 September 2001, 08 October 2001 and
others which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed to specific
cases which were dismissed for failure to pay the necessary fees,
among others. It was unclear if the cases were specifically assigned to
Justice Buena or if respondent Peña represented any of the parties
therein.
Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained confidential Minutes
of the Court pertaining to other cases, which specifically dismissed or
denied petitions on the failure of the parties to pay necessary fees.
This could not have just been mere coincidence again since it required
some legal understanding and familiarity with the cases in order to be
able to sift through and identify the kinds of cases, which were
dismissed or denied on such grounds. Although the parties to these
cases were notified and given copies of the Court’s resolutions, what
respondent Peña obtained were the actual copies of the Minutes that
included other items in the Court’s Agenda and that were not released
to the public. Under the Court’s own Internal Rules, only the Minutes
pertinent to the parties are those that are distributed to the parties
concerned. Yet, respondent was able to attach wholesale Minutes of
dozens of cases to his pleading.
Although the above confidential documents that were accessed by
respondent – totaling 58 pages in all – are not the subject of the
investigation of the administrative case, his previous receipt or
acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as 2000 confirm in no
uncertain terms his access to internal records of the Court, not just of
his case, but of other pending cases and that this access has
continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic that respondent Peña
would accuse his fellow lawyers of allegedly having an "inside track" to
members of the Court, when he in turn, on record, had mysteriously
easy access to confidential court documents. That internal documents
of the Court (whether voluminous or in relation to his case or
otherwise) would suddenly find themselves in the hands of respondent
Peña through registered mail is too incredible for this Court to attribute
any good faith on his part.
Even if the Court were to give some modicum of credence to the
unlikely story of how respondent Peña came upon these internal
documents, it looks with disapproval upon his actions with respect to
those documents, which were supposedly sent to him anonymously. If
indeed lawyers were sent official judicial records that are confidential in
nature and not easily accessible, the ethical recourse for them would
be to make a candid and immediate disclosure of the matter to the
court concerned for proper investigation, and not as proof to further the
merits of their case. In fact, respondent himself acknowledged that
reporting the "leaked out" documents was a duty he owed to the Court
– more so in this case, since the documents were sent anonymously
and through dubious circumstances.
No issue would have arisen with respect to his continuing fitness to be
a member of the legal profession, if he had simply reported his receipt
of the "leaked" court documents, and nothing more. Yet, he not only
failed to immediately disclose the suspicious circumstances of his
having obtained confidential court records; he even had the tenacity to
use the documents sent through suspicious means to support his
request for inhibition. As a lawyer, he should have known better than to
hinge his motions and pleadings on documents of questionable origins,
without even verifying the authenticity of the contents by comparing
them with sources of greater reliability and credibility.
If respondent Peña entertained doubts as to the veracity of the
Division’s actions with respect to the pending incidents in his case, as
allegedly embodied in the anonymous Agendas sent to him, then he
should have simply checked the records to verify the genuineness of
the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty.
Singson. It is through officially released resolutions and decisions that
parties and their counsel are informed of and guided by the Court’s
actions on pending incidents, and not by the confidential and
handwritten notes of the individual members of the Court.
Respondent’s wholesale reliance on copies of the Agenda purported to
be those of individual members of the Court and anonymously sent to
him is grossly misplaced.
The Court has already explained that there was in fact no discrepancy
between the agreed upon action of the Division and the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution, contrary to the assertions of respondent
Peña. He grounded the subject Motion to Inhibit on the fact that the
anonymously sent copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for
Clarification filed by Urban Bank should simply be noted, but it was
instead granted by the Court. The Court, however, made clear during
the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, that there was nothing irregular
about annotating the first item with "SEE RES" (See Resolution) and
marking the rest of the incidents with "N" (Noted). In fact, these
annotations conform with the recommended actions submitted by the
ponente for that particular item. The Resolution identified in the first
item governs and contains the actual disposition of two of the incidents
in the pending case. To be sure, what governs as the final action of the
Court en banc or in Division is the minutes of the proceedings, which
lists the dispositions of the items taken up during the session, reviewed
by the members, and finally approved by the Chief Justice or the
Division chairperson. Contrary to respondent’s suspicions, the action
taken by the Division in its 13 November 2002 Session was accurately
reflected in the questioned Resolution released by the Court.
Respondent Peña has no one else to blame but himself, since he
"allegedly," blindly and mistakenly relied on "anonymously sent"
unverified photocopies of the Court’s Agenda, in order to support his
call for the inhibition of a member of the Court. Neither can he rely on
the alleged "bragging" of Atty. Singson – which the latter denies – to
impute ill motive to judicial officers. Whether Atty. Singson actually
exerted "extraordinary efforts" to secure the suspension Order or freely
divulged it in their telephone conversation, respondent should have
been more circumspect in making grave accusations of bribery
(jokingly or not) without any extrinsic evidence or proof to back up his
claim.
Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using confidential and
internal court records and documents, which he suspiciously obtained
in bolstering his case. His unbridled access to internal court documents
has not been properly explained. The cavalier explanation of
respondent Peña that this Court’s confidential documents would simply
find themselves conveniently falling into respondent’s lap through
registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could no longer
be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the Court reason to infer that
laws and its own internal rules have been violated over and over again
by some court personnel, whom respondent Peña now aids and abets
by feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have
reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that criminal
liabilities have been incurred in relation to the Revised Penal Code and
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, with Atty. Peña benefitting
from the same. Respondent’s actions clearly merit no other penalty
than disbarment.
This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by the earlier
imposition of an indefinite suspension. If taken together, these two
violations already speak of respondent Peña’s inherent unworthiness
to become a member of the Bar. Although an indefinite suspension
opens up the possibility of future reinstatement after a clear showing of
remorse and a change of ways (as in the case of Atty. Paguia),
respondent has shown to be incorrigible and no longer deserves the
compassion of the Court. Not only has respondent thumbed his nose
on the integrity of the persons occupying the Bench by casting grave
aspersions of bribery and wrongdoing, he has also showed disdain for
the sanctity of court procedures and records by his haughty display of
illegal access to internal Supreme Court documents.
C. Third Charge: Respondent Peña’s insinuations of wrongdoing and
collusion between members of the Court and another counsel.
Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente, respondent Pena’s
allegations of collusion between previous members of the Court and
the counsel for the De Leon Group are unfounded and contravene the
ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his fellow lawyers. His
actions reveal a pattern of behavior that is disconcerting and
administratively punishable.
However, considering the ultimate penalty of disbarment earlier
imposed on respondent Peña, the Court no longer finds the need to
squarely rule on the third charge, as any possible administrative liability
on this matter would be a mere superfluity.
D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is not the proper
subject of the present allegations of administrative misconduct.
The counter-charge of forum shopping has been made by respondent
Peña against petitioners and their respective counsel in his defense.
However, this is already beyond the scope of the subject matter of this
administrative case. It will be recalled that he assailed the fact that
Urban Bank, the De Leon Group, and the other group of bank officers
filed three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818 and 145822,
respectively) before the Court. They all questioned therein the rulings
of the appellate court affirming the grant of execution pending appeal.
Considering that this claim is the subject of administrative penalties,
and that other interested parties did not participate in the investigation
conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity dictate that the
Court reserve judgment for the meantime until the subject is fully
ventilated and all parties are given an opportunity to argue their cases.
The charges of forum shopping are hereby dismissed without prejudice
to the filing and/or hearing of separate administrative complaints
against petitioners Urban Bank, Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel,
Jr., P. Siervo H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de Leon
and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel of record. Considering
their deaths, petitioners Teodoro C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr.,
can no longer be included in any future administrative action in relation
to these matters. On the other hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly
impleaded by respondent Peña and therefore, is not a real and direct
party to the case.
EPILOGUE
As parting words, the Court herein highlights the disorder caused by
respondent Peña’s actions in the administration of justice. In order to
foreclose resort to such abhorrent practice or strategy in the future, the
Court finds the need to educate the public and the Bar.
Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
towards their professional colleagues. They shall not, in their
professional dealings, use language that is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper. Lawyers shall use dignified language in their
pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system. The use
of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of a judicial forum.
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers, in the
hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for inhibition, make
grave and unfounded accusations of unethical conduct or even
wrongdoing against other members of the legal profession. It is the
duty of members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause with which
they are charged.
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that respondent Peña has
manifested a troubling history of praying for the inhibition of several
members of this Court or for the re-raffle of the case to another
Division, on the basis of groundless and unfounded accusations of
partiality. A sampling of his predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so
far, eleven Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to shop for a
sympathetic ear, includes the following:
1. Peña’s Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban) dated 12 January 2001;
2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated
20 August 2001;
3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October
2001;
4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18
February 2002;
5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;
6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January
2003;
7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing)
dated 08 July 2004;
8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28
December 2004;
9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B.
Nachura) dated 17 December 2007;
10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28
December 2004;
11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re:
Justice Panganiban);
12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January
2008;
13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for
Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio T. Carpio) dated 02 June
2008;
14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;
15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re:
Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Dante O. Tinga) dated
04 August 2008;
16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices
Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco) dated 14 August 2008;
17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justices
Arturo D. Brion, Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Carpio Morales,
Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated 28 August 2008;
18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21 January
2010;
19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices Carpio
Morales and Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno) dated 30 March
2011;
20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August 2011 (Re:
Justice Sereno); and
21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01 September
2011 (Re: Justices Carpio, Jose Perez and Sereno).
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these motions of
respondent ranged from flimsy and sparse relations between the
parties and the members of the Court to wild accusations of partiality
on mere conjectures and surmises. For example, respondent accused
former Chief Justice Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with
the Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro Borlongan, then President
of Urban Bank, was likewise an officer. He moved for the inhibition of
Justice Sereno on the ground that she was "a close judicial ally" of
Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter, according to respondent, was
antagonistic toward him during the Court’s 03 March 2003 Executive
Session in this administrative case.
Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the case re-raffled
from the Court’s Third Division because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a
member thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court through the
endorsement of former Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, who was
a close ally of the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former
President Fidel V. Ramos. He similarly sought the inhibition of Justice
Dante O. Tinga for his close professional and political ties with former
President Ramos. He likewise assailed the partiality of Justice Arturo
D. Brion, considering he is a law school classmate and fraternity
brother of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then Presidential
Legal Counsel of former President Ramos. Thus, according to
respondent Peña, "President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will most
likely exercise his influence over the Honorable Justice Brion."
Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice Nachura for his alleged
partiality in favor of Urban Bank because of his decision in a related
case and his prior appointment as Undersecretary of Education during
the Ramos presidency, respondent Peña impliedly prayed that his case
be specifically retained in the Court’s Third Division. Respondent’s
peculiar request, which was not included in his other motions, gives the
impression that in his quest to have Justice Nachura inhibit himself,
respondent nonetheless did not want his case to be raffled out of the
Third Division. If his only intention was to raise the possibility of bias
against Justice Nachura alone, then it would not matter whether his
case remained with the Third Division, with another member being
designated to replace Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division
altogether. Respondent Peña’s odd prayer in his motion for inhibition
bore signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he perceived to be
friendly to him, except for one member.
In Chin v. Court of Appeals, the Court warned against litigants’
contumacious practice in successively asking for the inhibition of
judges, in order to shop for one who is more friendly and sympathetic
to their cause:
We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity of the
judiciary as an institution worthy of public trust and confidence. But
under the circumstances here, we also agree that unnecessary
inhibition of judges in a case would open the floodgates to forum-
shopping. More so, considering that Judge Magpale was not the first
judge that TAN had asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of
prejudgment. To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners’
apprehension about the practice of certain litigants shopping for a
judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause than previous ones.

As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges to

disqualify themselves need not always be heeded. It is not always
desirable that they should do so. It might amount in certain cases to
their being recreant about their duties. It could also be an instrument
whereby a party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another
more amenable to his persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court’s warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple and

successive requests for inhibition and re-raffle filed by respondent
Peña. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the Court condemns in no
uncertain terms the practice of shopping for a justice, most especially
in the highest tribunal of the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one
of the reasons why this administrative case has dragged on for years.
Not only does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the members of the
Court, but it likewise delays the administration of justice.

Oddly enough, respondent Peña has been less concerned about the
inordinate delay in resolving the case than about making sure that the
"wrong" or "unfriendly" Justices – in his perception – do not sit and rule
on the issues. He has thrived on the protracted interruptions caused by
his numerous motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case
languishing in this Court for years and clogging its dockets.
Respondent stands out for this disorderly behavior and must be made
an example so that litigants be reminded that they cannot bend or toy
with the rules of procedure to favor their causes. Worse, respondent
has thrown no less than the rules of basic courtesy in imputing sinister
motives against members of the Court.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Peña has
violated several canons of professional and ethical conduct expected
from him as a lawyer and an officer of the court. His conduct,
demeanor and language with respect to his cause of action – in this
Court, no less – tend to undermine the integrity and reputation of the
judiciary, as well as inflict unfounded accusations against fellow
lawyers. Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to
obtain confidential and internal court records and to use them
shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his cause.

In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his inclination
towards casually moving for the inhibition of Justices of the Court
based on unfounded claims, since he has not shown remorse or
contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña has shown and displayed in these
proceedings that he has fallen short of the ethical standards of the
noble profession and must be sanctioned accordingly.1âwphi1

PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8, 10 and 11 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility and for failing to give due respect
to the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty. Magdaleno M.
Peña is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon
his receipt of this Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Peña’s personal

record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to INVESTIGATE how

respondent was able to secure copies of the following: (a) copies of the
Agenda dated 13 November 2002 of the Court’s First Division,
attached as Annexes "B" and "C" of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion
to Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated
30 January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution dated 04 September
2002, attached as Annex "D" of the same motion; (c) the Report and
Recommendation dated 11 December 2007, issued by the Office of the
Bar Confidant, attached as Annex "5" of respondent Peña’s Motion to
Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the Minutes of the
Court, consisting of 58-pages, attached as Annex "A" of the Reply (to
Petitioners’ Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit) dated 31
October 2001 filed by respondent Peña. She is further required to
SUBMIT such an investigation report with recommendations on the
administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all court personnel
possibly involved therein, as well as suggestions for protecting
confidential and internal court documents of pending cases within
NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9604               March 20, 2013
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T.
JARDER, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo E.
Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the
Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty.
Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the
Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated
14 October 2004 from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring
them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority,
falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed
against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-
employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The
Complaint dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law
Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other,
the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against them before
the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he
represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
declared that the signature appearing above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign
an affidavit to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo
signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on the
Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six
specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolo’s affidavit
and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-
affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of his alleged
counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the falsification of the
counsel’s signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint’s
validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate
cases for Falsification of Public Document and Dishonesty be filed
against Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August
2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer, Atty.
Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1
August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty.
Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia’s
case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.
Divinagracia asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the
cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against
him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint
for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of public
document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency
of evidence, without prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a
proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses against
Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED.
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19
September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty.
Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that they
were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Oqwmbudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo.
Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the
Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints
signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty.
Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the
letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty.
Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus,
complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent
people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the
Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They alleged that
a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder Bancolo
Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint,
respondents admitted that the criminal and administrative cases filed
by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the
Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after
being informed of the assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to
prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the secretary
of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the
disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly
supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. Respondents
also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of
their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006.
Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission on Bar
Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006.
The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date,
complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The
conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for the last time. Again,
respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the
conference. Complainants manifested that they were submitting their
disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the IBP.
Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were
directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October
2006, the IBP received complainants’ position paper dated 18 October
2006 and respondents’ position paper dated 23 October 2006.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two
years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner
opined:
x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that
his signature appearing in the complaint filed against complainants’
Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman were
signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his
signatures appearing in the various documents released from his office
were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a
lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating
the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot
serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all
respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1)
lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute
negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and
ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by
undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines’ Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It
betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law
firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office, failed to exercise
certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm.
As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command
responsibility". x x x.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner,
having passed the bar in 1995 and practicing law up to the present. He
holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as Jarder
Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder
to exert ordinary diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to
ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to
provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that
carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that, he could have known
the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo.
Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of
Governors of the IBP approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution
states:
legal profession. Atty. Bancolo’s authority and duty to sign a pleading
are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a
pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, counsel’s signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
and (3) it is not interposed for delay. Thus, by affixing one’s signature
to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to
these matters and give legal effect to the document.1âwphi1
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty.
Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of circumstances or of
manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence
in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not
take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to
Rustia denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to maintain his
innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty.
Jarder) dated 26 January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that
prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to
file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he
was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty.
Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of
the Joint Answer.

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo’s
violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for one (1) year.
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the
Board of Governors RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to
AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
case for lack of merit.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty.
Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007.
Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants’ Motion for Reconsideration and
Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some
minor lapses, the communications and pleadings filed against Tapay
and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance.
Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood which IS a ground for
disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was
directly involved, had knowledge of, or even participated in the
wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary
to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice
of law for one year is warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of
the case against Atty. larder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T.
larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of
violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Governors denied both complainants’ and Atty. Bancolo’s motions for
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the
one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a
findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
more severely.

The Court’s Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find reasonable
grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to
all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client SO ORDERED.
before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a
secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,

ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-

Tenorio, where we held:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards
of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty
of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose
is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him
not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency,
personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part,
subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized
practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, we held that the

preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving
the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10451               February 4, 2015
SPOUSES WILLIE and AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint for the alleged
betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross misconduct of respondent
Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the election
protest case involving the candidacy of Mariecris Umaguing
(Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing
(complainants), for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections,
instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36
(MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279.
The Facts
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK
Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival
Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. Because of this, complainants
lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera.
On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to
pay his acceptance fee of ₱30,000.00, plus various court appearance
fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
₱30,000.00. According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more
than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former moved at
a glacial pace and only took action when the November 8, 2008
deadline was looming. Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the
necessary documents and attachments for the election protest. Two (2)
of these attachments are the Affidavits of material witnesses Mark
Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was
personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid
affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were
unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. DeVera allegedly
instructed Abeth Lalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding
(Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera
and ask them to sign over the names. The signing over of Lachica’s
and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa
Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the
documents notarized before one Atty. Donato Manguiat (Atty.
Manguiat). Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and
immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit and
submitted his own Affidavit, declaring that he did not authorize Papin to
sign the document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to
the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo
(Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera
were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed
a pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with
Omnibus Motion, seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s
and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere flimsy
excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the
affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the
election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were
falsified.
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out
that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the MeTC, although promptly
notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any
explanation as to why he was not able to attend.
The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an
explanation regarding his non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera
explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because
of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera,
Judge Belosillo received ₱60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty.
Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for his client.
Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the
complainants would give him ₱80,000.00, which he would in turn, give
to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing.
On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity
and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary
relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
counsel and to reimburse them the ₱60,000.00 in excessive fees he
collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the
case.
In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s
disbarment.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the
accusations lodged against him by complainants. He averred that he
merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on
the statements of his clients. Atty. De Vera then explained that the
signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his knowledge
and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted
and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He added that he
actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned
Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the
affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could
no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of
the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from
the case. To add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of
Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled
"Release Waiver & Discharge," which, to him, discharges him and his
law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against
him, including the instant administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline,
the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation dated December 5, 2009, the IBP
Commissioner found the administrative action to be impressed with
merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.
While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that
Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the
IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respectto the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to
comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the
testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that
Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit,
and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its
signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not
Almera – was found to be credible as it was too straightforward and
hard to ignore. It was also observed that the backdrop in which the
allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits was done
on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of
the election protest, showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for
time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of advising his client’s
campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of
the affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the
deadline set for the filing of the election protest. To this, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is not
to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the
law and ethics of the profession.
In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of
the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner.
Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2)
month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.
On reconsideration, however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Resolution dated February 11, 2014, affirming with modification their
December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension
from two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue before the Court.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be
held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same
were duly substantiated by the records. However, the Court finds it apt
to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the
courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity,
and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are
the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine
Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide
member of the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.
I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis and underscoring Samonte:
supplied) The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the
laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
remain faithful to the Lawyer's Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession.
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as
Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to
well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
cover up one's misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty,
trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the
integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code
privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a
of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
disciplinary sanctions.
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is
found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon
After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in
10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
complete agreement with the IBP Investigating Commissioner, who
SUSPENDED for six ( 6) months from the practice of law, effective
was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De
upon receipt of this Decision, with a stem warning that any repetition of
Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e., Almera’s
the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.
affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the November 8, 2008
deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is
wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s appreciation of Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses
Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that nothing Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount of ₱60,000.00 which he
appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his
the fact that the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
the witness’s credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as they – Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
similar to trial courts– are given the opportunity to first-hand observe imposition of further administrative penalties.
their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera
authorized the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the same. In
to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Further,
fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’
let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed
by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that he was
to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information and
not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary
guidance.
public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,  and
that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned
documents, much less of the participation in using the SO ORDERED.
same. Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be
a mere general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s
positive testimony that he indeed participated in the procurement of her
signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of
falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors
rendered its recommendation – is that Almera’s affidavit was submitted
to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with
Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant
consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought,
prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is
highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about
the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court
when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal
and within the bounds of the law. Likewise, he is prohibited from
handling any legal matter without adequate preparation or allow his
client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document
captioned "Release Waiver & Discharge" which Atty. De Vera, in his
Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of
action that complainants may have against him, such as the present
case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him
administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott that:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of

interest or lack of interest of the complainant.1âwphi1 What matters is
whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is
premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is
a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving
courts of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who
called the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and
Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty.

Abellana (Samonte), suspended the lawyer therein from the practice of
law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In view of
the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose
the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement for the return
of the amount of ₱60,000.00, comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance
fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his professional
engagement, for he had actually admitted his receipt thereof in his
Answer before the IBP.

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10583               February 18, 2015
[Formerly CBD 09-2555]
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 10584
[Formerly CBD 10-2827]
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
These cases involve administrative Complaints against Atty. Victor Rey
Santos for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Canon 15, Rule 15 .
03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino)
filed a Letter-Complaint against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos
be investigated and subjected to disciplinary action.
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de
Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear
that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990.
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina
Turla. Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by
Atty. Santos states:
Being her surviving spouse, I am, the sole legal heir entitled to succeed
to and inherit the estate of said deceased who did not leave any
descendant or any other heir entitled to her estate. (Emphasis in the
original underscoring supplied)
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina
and Mariano Turla, filed a Complaint for sum of money with prayer for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order against
Bernardino, docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269.
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla is an
heir of Mariano Turla, which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented
clients with conflicting interests.
In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross-
examination:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C.
Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she was about four years old.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you
are a Ninong of the plaintiff, isn’t it?
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just
recently married to one of her cousins.
....
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina
C. Turla?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her
relationship[s].
THE COURT
: What’s the name of the mother?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an
heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?
A : Of course.
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness.
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this
document which you requested to be marked as Exhibit B.
THE COURT
: Exhibit?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication
for the extra judicial settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina
De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you as you just testified.
Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra
Judicial.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question
regarding my legal ethics because it is not the issue in this case.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and
appearing to have been duly notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994
with document number 28, page number 7, book number 23, series of
1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara. I call your attention to
the document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as
Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote,
"Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to
succeed to and inherit the estate of the said deceased who did not
leave any descendant, ascendant or any other heir entitled to her
estate." Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you have drafted
into this document . . . true or false?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the
matter that would impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is
impertinent and immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife Rufina
Turla [who] ha[s] the right to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and
that has been the subject of my continuing objection from the very
beginning.
THE COURT
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit
B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the floodgate to . . . questions on this
document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties
owned by the late Mariano Turla, your Honor. That is why that’s only
[sic] portion I have referred to in marking the said documents, your
Honor.
THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on
the materiality and impertinency and relevancy of this question, your
Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,]
and to be consistent with the ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to
answer the question[.] [I]s it true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this
court that you have drafted a document that caused the transfer of the
estate of the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you
did not tell anybody[,] ten or five years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what
about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told
me, "Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he
claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself. (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose
Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No.
10584. Similar to Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests. He also
alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would
necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating
the so-called "Dead Man’s Statute" because "he [would] be utilizing
information or matters of fact occurring before the death of his
deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be unscrupulously utilizing
information acquired during his professional relation with his said
client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged
communication[.]"
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he filed several cases
against the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate. In other words,
he engaged in forum shopping.
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turla’s
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is
the sole heir of Rufina Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be
false. Atty. Santos’ wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece. As part
of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other heirs. Atty.
Caringal further alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document
some fifteen years ago, he is fully aware of all the circumstances
therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was
then employed at the BIR[sic] who arranged for the payment of the
taxes due. There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a
husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while
the wife who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the
taxes due the government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact
recited in the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina
de Castro Turla) "did not leave any descendant, xxx, or any other heir
entitled to her estate’ [sic] . . . [.] (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in
Mariano Turla’s affidavit that Rufina Turla had no other heir.
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the
heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The funds involved were
rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties that were supposed to
be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty. Santos received the rental
income. Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the
repealed Article 262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.
In his Answer, Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death
certificate. He explained that the death certificate and the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication were given to him by Mariano Turla and that he was
not aware that there was a falsified entry in the death certificate.
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he
did not represent and was not representing conflicting interests since
Mariano Turla was already dead. Further, "he [was] representing
Marilu Turla against those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s
estate." Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that
there was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the sole
heir of Rufina Turla."
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that
he did not commit forum shopping because the various cases filed had
different issues.
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds
used were being held by his client as the special administratrix of the
estate of Mariano Turla. According to Atty. Santos, payment of
attorney’s fees out of the estate’s funds could be considered as
"expenses of administration." Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal
services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to
question.
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he
discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it
was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth certificate was registered.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines recommended that Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3)
months.
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos
knew that the death certificate was falsified and used it to support
Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Likewise, Atty. Caringal
failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from Mariano Turla’s
estate.
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on
Bar Discipline stated that the evidence presented did not prove that
Atty. Santos "knowingly cited a repealed law." Further, Atty. Santos did
not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed involved
different parties and prayed for different reliefs.
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino
and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting
interests. The Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly
Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes members of the bar from
representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained
that "the proscription against representation of conflicting interest finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or
merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented
Mariano Turla is no secret. The respondent has in a number of
pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the witness stand admitted
that he drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which
expressly states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed
to be Mariano Turla’s daughter. To substantiate her claim that she is
Mariano Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted that he relied on
the birth certificate presented by Marilu Turla[,] which indicates that she
is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla as
evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla is
Marilu Turla’s mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful
heir to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of the same
because of the Affidavit of Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano
Turla[,] stating that he is his wife’s sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu
Turla[,] placed himself in a position where he is to refute the claim in
Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir of
Rufina Turla. (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted
and approved the findings and recommendations of the Commission
on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, which was
denied by the IBP Board of Governors in the Resolution dated March
22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of
transmittal dated July 15, 2014, pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b)
of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership,
determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice
of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings
and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the
case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility; and (2) whether the
penalty of suspension of three (3) months from the practice of law is
proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of
Governors’ Resolution. However, this court modifies the recommended
penalty of suspension from the practice of law from three (3) months to
one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
his dealings and transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a
lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received
from their clients with utmost confidentiality in order to encourage
clients to fully inform their counsels of the facts of their case. In Hornilla
v. Atty. Salunat, this court explained what conflict of interest means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim,
but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of
interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney
to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any
matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists,
respondent would necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s claim that he is
Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to represent Marilu Turla.
Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the only heir. As stated in
the Report of the Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April
14, 2009 testimony in the Civil Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with the RTC of Makati City
admitted as follows: "I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . .
asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of properties
and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko
pababayaan yan.’ So he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of
Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself."
This very admission proves that the respondent was privy to Marilu
Turla’s standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s
estate. (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, "by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts." Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu
Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to obtain their written
consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009, while respondent represented
Marilu Turla in March 2009. It is understandable why respondent was
unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still, respondent did not
present evidence showing that he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he
previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in executing
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of
interest against respondent was sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors’ finding
that respondent violated Canon 10, Rule10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
mislead by any artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res
ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the respondent’s act of failing to thwart his
client Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . .
his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the
estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to uphold his obligation as
a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors of
what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting
dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but
was also in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. (Emphasis in the original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law.
In doing so, lawyers are expected to be honest in all their
dealings. Unfortunately, respondent was far from being honest. With
full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir, he acceded to
Mariano Turla’s request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply
that it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that has the authority to
impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court
under the 1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan elucidated on this court’s
disciplinary authority over attorneys" and discussed:
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal record as
attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
"plenary
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to
discipline officers of the court and members of the court and members
of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and guardian of the legal
profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The
authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court’s constitutional
mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as
well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court
over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper
administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. . . .

. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is

but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A
lawyers [sic] is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court
and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. (Citations omitted)

This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
specifically:

RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR

....

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,

grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo, this court emphasized the authority

of this court to impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the
practice of law.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated

duty to discipline lawyers. Under the current rules, the duty to assist
fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be
recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional powers of this
court.

Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature, recommendatory.

The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on

Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that
"[p]roceedings for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any person."
However, this authority is only to assist this court with the investigation
of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at best,
the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer.

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:

Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is
imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties
not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an officer of
the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing." (Citations omitted)

Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This
disciplinary authority is granted by the Constitution and cannot be
relinquished by this court. The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines are, at best, recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with Decisions and
Resolutions rendered by this court.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of

violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are
ACCEPTED and ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is imposed upon
Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
 will still remain permanently disabled for the rest of her life... (July 11 at
2:08am)

Argee Guevarra Just got my internet connection. WILL EMAIL U THE

LURID UNASSAILABLE FACTS ABOUT VICKI BELO'S QUACK
DOCTORING. (October 27, 2009)

Argee Guevarra yeah... actually the issue is simple and you will easily
see which side you'll be taking- just pay Ms. Josie Norcio a visit at St.
FIRST DIVISION Luke's at talagang binaboy siya ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan (July 10
at 12:08am)
A.C. No. 11394, December 01, 2016
The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his
MARIA VICTORIA G. BELO-HENARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's
ROBERTO "ARGEE" C. GUEVARRA, Respondent. medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300
employees for no fair or justifiable cause, to wit:
DECISION Argee Guevarra yup... [I'll] even throw the kitchen sink at her.
Enjoy nga ito, we will paralyze the operations of all her clinic and
seek out her patients and customers to boycott her. [So] far, good
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: response – 70% decrease in her July sales... (August 9 at 10:29pm)

The instant administrative case arose from a verified complaint for Argee Guevarra Guys, pandemonium has broken loose in [BMGI's] 6
disbarment filed by complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares clinics after Ms. Josie Norio's tell-all. With only 2 surgeons of BMGI
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra certified by PAPRAS, there is real-and-present danger that surgeries
(respondent) for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; like liposuction, nose lift, boob jobs which have been performed by
Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 [BMGI's] physicians, every patient runs the risk of something going
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. wrong with the procedures they have undergone under [BMGI's]
hands:(" (July 12 at 12:21am)
The Facts
Argee Guevarra [T]hey perform plastic surgery procedures without
licensed and trained doctors, they nearly killed a client of mine, medical
Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the
malpractice, use of banned substances/fillers on patients. Just
Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and
recently, in flawless clinic, a patient who had a simple facial landed in
existing under Philippine laws and engaged in the specialized field of
the hospital ... (August 9 at 10:04pm)
cosmetic surgery. On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a
certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio), who filed criminal cases
Argee Guevarra braces for typhoon Ramil without forgetting to ask
against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
comrades and friends in Cebu to greet Vicki Belo with a boycott once
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making
she visits there on Oct. 20. Cebu's royal set already knows that she is
her ill in 2009.
not a certified plastic surgeon: Boycott Belo, Flawless
Reckless, Belat Essentials!!!! (October 18 at 6:23pm)
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account,
a popular online social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing
Argee Guevarra [W]ell, with all the kababuyan of the Belo clinic, its
complainant. His posts include the following excerpts:
money-making machines, dapat convert them into public health
clinics!!! instead of pandering to the vanities of those who want to look
Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to
like Dra. Belo. (July 11 at 2:16am)
get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client's Ass, Belo. Senator Adel
Tamano, don't kiss Belo's ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong
Argee Guevarra darling kellyn, so far, i have 3 other ex-belo patients
tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a
who will tell all too!!!!! Grabe pala ang mga kapalpakan niyan. So
national campaign against Plastic Politicians No guns, No goons, No
did u leave Belo Clinic because it has become a Frankenstein
gold - IN GUTS I TRUST!
Factory? (July 11 at 2:30am)
Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio's Big
Argee Guevarra BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT
Bang on Friday - You will go down in Medical History as a QUACK
ESSENTIALS!!! I'll be gone for a week to a place where there will be
DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS,
no facebook so please, add Trixie Cruz-Angeles if you want to find out
BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the
more about our anti-quack doctor campaign! (September 24 at
U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles :) (September 22 at 11:18pm)
3:00pm)
Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against
Argee Guevarra Anyone care to sponsor T-shirts bearing this slogan? -
me through her office receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-
BOYCOTT BELO! FLAWLESS RECKLESS! BELAT
bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at
ESSENTIALS! (September 23 at 12:17arn)
Reyna ng Payola ang kaso... si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for
P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa
Argee Guevarra Pare, eksena on Thursday I will go to the hearing with
kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm)
a placard - BOYCOTT BELO!!! FLAWLESS RECKLESS!!! BELAT
ESSENTIALS!!! I will vote for Adel Tamano (La Salle-Ateneo lower
Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may 'extra-legal'
batch sa akin at mabuti ang pamilya niyan)... BUT WOULD YOU???
budget yon. Kaya lang, histado ko na kung sino-sino ang
(September 23 at 1:50am)
tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang
ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)
Argee Guevarra advocates a national patients' boycott of the Belo
Medical Group. To all my friends and comrades, please stay away
Argee Guevarra
from Belo's clinics. I have 2 cousins and 3 friends already who have
ATTENTION MGA BATCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NIYO AKO
canceled their lipo from belo. Please help me shut down the Belo
KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO
Medical Group until they perform their moral and legal obligation
HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me,
to Ms. Josie Norcio... (July 17 at 2:12pm)
ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions....
(September 15 at 3:57pm)
Moreover, respondent, through his Facebook account, posted remarks
Argee Guevarra thinks aloud how the payola machinery of vicki that allegedly threatened complainant with criminal conviction, without
belo killed the news of a picket demonstration in front of the Belo factual basis and without proof,25 as follows:
clinic. I wonder how television, print[,] and radio programs can kill the Argee Guevarra Mr. Jay, by next year- GMA will no longer be president
story when the next rallies will have the following numbers 100, 200, and she will be jailed for plunder; Vicky Belo will no longer be a
500 and 1000. Kung magkaasaran pa, 10,000 demonstrators will be doctor and she will be in the middle of a criminal prosecution. The
assembled in front of the Belo Medical Clinic at Tomas Morato on July General Surgeon of France will have a Philippine version. By October
27, 2009. Hahahahaha! (July 17 at 7:56pm) and November, some congressmen I have spoken with will be issuing
summons to Vicky Belo for a congressional inquiry; the subject -
Argee Guevarra Nakakatawa nga, 10milyon pa budget... [I] didn't know legislation regulating the practice of cosmetic surgery! (September 22
that my reputation is worth that much. Aba ako kaya magdemanda sa at 11:31pm)
kanila :) Ikot-ikot daw ang mga P.R. ni Belo trying to convince
editors to pin me down with something eh alam ko na wala naman Argee Guevarra Celso de1os Angeles can still get medical attention in
akong sex video!!! Adik talaga sa botox si Aling Becky at may prison - from Vicky Belo after she gets convicted too for criminal
tama na sa utak - eh kung gagastos ka lang ng 10 milyon para negligence and estafa (July 15 at 10:05am)
sa tirang-pikon laban sa akin at to protect your burak na
reputasyon as a plastic surgeon, i-donate mo na lang yon sa Argee Guevarra is preparing himself for a campaign against the Belo
biktima ni Ondoy, Pepeng at Ramil! Yung Medical Group for its criminal negligence which nearly killed Ms.
mga homeboys ko sa Pasig na nilimas [ni] Ondoy ang kukubra sa Josie Norcio over a botched butt augmentation procedure. He
yo! (October 23 at 5:31pm) found out that the Dr. Belo herself marketed the product to Ms. Norcio,
the operation was carried out by her doctors who were not
Argee Guevarra is inspired by Jose Norio's courageous act of showing licensed by the Philippine Association of Plastic Reconstructive and
her face on national television to expose the Reyna ng Kaplastikan, Aesthetic Surgeons.............. (July 9 at 8:54pm)
Reyna ng Kapalpakan. Inspired by shock nevertheless by the fact
that the much needed partial restoration of her behind would cost a
staggering $500,000-$1,000,000 Stanford Medical Hospital and she
Complainant likewise averred that some of respondent's Facebook
posts were sexist, vulgar, and disrespectful of women, to wit:
Argee Guevarra but can u help me too with maricar reyes? who's the
hottest cebuana chic chick there nowadays? haven't been there for
quite some time... pa-chicks ka naman!!! I'm sure marami kang 25-
and-below naprends diyan (August 10 at 8:36pm)
Argee Guevarra hay joseph!!! how's the gayest lawyer in cebu? our
forces will soon picket the belo clinic there, can u tell me where that
is? halato ko na sayo si hayden, promise!" (August 10 at 12:23am)
Argee Guevarra joseph, i can't say i love u too - baka belo's team will
use all sorts of attacks na against me. to thwart them, being the gayest
gay in the philippines, can u issue a certification that i am so not like
your type? at yung preferred ko lang
ay thin, thalino and thisay? (September 23 at 12:01am)
Finally, complainant averred that the attacks against her were made
with the object to extort money from her, as apparent from the following
reply made by respondent on a comment on his Facebook post:
Kellyn Conde Sy utang mo! Pay up time:) (July 11 at 2:37am)
Argee Guevarra kellyn, sisingilin ko muna si belo... at saka sabi mo
naman, maibagsak ko lang ang kaplastikan ni belo, quits na tayo ...
(July 11 at 2:38am)
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language,
were designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to
close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200
Million from her as evident from his demand letter dated August 26,
2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed
as CBD Case No. 09-2551.
In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation
of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy, asserting that the
posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private
account on Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends
of which complainant was not a part. He also averred that he wrote the
posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the
complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio,
had filed against complainant. He denied that the remarks were vulgar
and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred
against complainant. He likewise denied that he attempted to extort
money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a
requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as
the civil case for damages against her. Finally, respondent pointed out
that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of
fair comment.
After the mandatory conference had been terminated, the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers. Thereafter, the IBP,
through the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), set the case for
clarificatory hearing. Upon termination thereof, the case was deemed
submitted for report/ recommendation.
IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2013, the IBP-
CBD recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one
(1) year from the practice of law, with a stem warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. It held
respondent liable for violation of Rule 7.03, Rule 8.01, and Rule
19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for having posted the
above-quoted remarks on his Facebook account, pointing out that
respondent cannot invoke the "private" nature of his posts, considering
that he had at least 2,000 "friends" who can read and react thereto.
Moreover, the IBP-CBD maintained that the criminal cases he had filed
against complainant on behalf of Norcio had been dismissed for
insufficient evidence; therefore, he can no longer campaign against
complainant whose alleged crimes against Norcio had not been
established.
In a Resolution dated September 27, 2014, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the August 13, 2013 Report
and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing that there was no
specific act attributed to him that would warrant his suspension from
the practice of law. He also averred that the libel cases filed against
him by an employee of BMGI had already been dismissed, without
prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.
In a Resolution dated October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors
partially granted respondent's motion, reducing the penalty from one
(1) year to six (6) months suspension.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable based on the allegations of the
verified complaint.
The Court's Ruling
The Court has examined the records of this case and concurs with the
IBP's findings, except as to the penalty imposed on respondent.
At the outset, the Court notes that respondent never denied that he
posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant
and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes
his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his
"private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus,
when complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally
guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable.
Facebook is currently the most popular social media site, having
surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion
monthly active users. Social media are web-based platforms that
enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate and share
content. There are various classifications of social media platforms and
one can be classified under the "social networking sites" such as
Facebook.
Facebook is a "voluntary social network to which members subscribe
and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends
to share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with
one another." Users register at this site, create a personal profile or an
open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange
messages, including automatic notifications when they update their
profile. A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook,
which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the user's privacy
settings.
To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate
the accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information uploaded by
the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg,
Republic of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but with the cautionary advice that
although Facebook, as stated in its policies, "makes every effort to
protect a user's information, these privacy settings are however not
foolproof."
Consequently, before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her online social networking activity - in this case, Facebook - it is first
necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access
thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the
cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning
and insulting complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to
private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he
utilized any of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to
him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few.
Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement
that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible
only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best,
self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that
his posts were limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no
assurance that the same - or other digital content that he uploads or
publishes on his Facebook profile - will be safeguarded as within the
confines of privacy, in light of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected
by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any
conceivable way";
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who
are total strangers;
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
hundreds; and
(4) A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or
"tag" others who are not Facebook friends with the former,
despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook
friends.
Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does
not guarantee absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user
who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the
latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post,
the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the
circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to
privacy is negated.
Neither can the Court accept the argument that the subject remarks
were written in the exercise of his freedom of speech and expression.
Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. While the
freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are
among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every
person exercising them, as the Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not
be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their
name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of

disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice tending to insult
and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling
complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has
been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and
reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of
complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal
negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant
disfigured ("binaboy") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein
Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services all these despite
the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed
against complainant. He even threatened complainant with conviction
for criminal negligence and estafa which is contrary to one's obligation
"to act with justice."·

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene

language, and his act of publicly insulting and undermining the
reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are,
therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions in
the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use

language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain
an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant

and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is
bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or
private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner
befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent.
Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words
unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an
aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and
BMGI's reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a

public personage who is exposed to criticism does not justify
respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against
complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must
be administratively sanctioned.

"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their

private capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of
probity or good demeanor, a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct,
the reference is not confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection
with the performance of lawyers' professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in
them." Accordingly, the Court finds that respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as
originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found

guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of
this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 11113, August 09, 2016
CLEO B. DONGGA-AS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX
CRUZ-ANGELES, ATTY. WYLIE M. PALER, AND ATTY. ANGELES
GRANDEA, OF THE ANGELES, GRANDEA & PALER LAW
OFFICE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit filed on February 11,
2005 by complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as (complainant), before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) – Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), against respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles (Atty.
Cruz-Angeles), Atty. Wylie M. Paler (Atty. Paler), and Atty. Angeles
Grandea (Atty. Grandea; collectively, respondents) of the Angeles,
Grandea & Paler Law Office (law firm), charging them of various
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for, inter
alia, refusing to return the money given by complainant in exchange for
legal services which respondents failed to perform.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in May 2004, he engaged the law
firm of respondents to handle the annulment of his marriage with his
wife, Mutya Filipinas Puno-Dongga-as (Mutya). In his meeting with
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler, complainant was told that: (a) the case
would cost him P300,000.00, with the first P100,000.00 payable
immediately and the remaining P200,000.00 payable after the final
hearing of the case; (b) respondents will start working on the case
upon receipt of PI00,000.00, which will cover the acceptance fee,
psychologist fee, and filing fees; and (c) the time-frame for the
resolution of the case will be around three (3) to four (4) months from
filing. Accordingly, complainant paid respondents P100,000.00 which
was duly received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles.
From then on, complainant constantly followed-up his case with Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler. However, despite his constant prodding,
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler could not present any petition and
instead, offered excuses for the delay, saying that: (a) they still had to
look for a psychologist to examine Mutya; (b) they were still looking for
a "friendly" court and public prosecutor; and (c) they were still
deliberating where to file the case. They promised that the petition
would be filed on or before the end of June 2004, but such date passed
without any petition being filed. As an excuse, they reasoned out that
the petition could not be filed since they have yet to talk to the judge
who they insinuated will favorably resolve complainant's petition.
Sometime in the third week of July 2004, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler asked for an additional payment of P250,000.00 in order for them
to continue working on the case. Hoping that his petition would soon be
filed, complainant dutifully paid the said amount on July 23, 2004,
which was again received by Atty. Cruz-Angeles. However, to
complainant's dismay, no appreciable progress took place. When
complainant inquired about the delay in the filing of the case, Atty.
Cruz-Angeles attempted to ease his worries by saying that the draft
petition was already submitted to the judge for editing and that the
petition will soon be finalized.
In the last week of September 2004, complainant received a text
message from Atty. Cruz-Angeles informing him that the National
Statistics Office bore no record of his marriage. The latter explained
then that this development was favorable to complainant's case
because, instead of the proposed petition for annulment of marriage,
they would just need to file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. She also informed complainant that they would send
someone to verify the records of his marriage at the Local Civil
Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet (Civil Registrar) where his marriage
was celebrated. However, upon complainant's independent verification
through his friend, he discovered that the records of his marriage in the
Civil Registrar were intact, and that the alleged absence of the records
of his marriage was a mere ruse to cover up the delay in the filing of
the petition.
Utterly frustrated with the delay in the filing of his petition for
annulment, complainant went to respondents' law office to terminate
their engagement and to demand for a refund of the aggregate amount
of P350,000.00 he earlier paid them. However, Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler refused to return the said amount, and to complainant's
surprise, sent him two (2) billing statements dated October 5, 2004 and
October 10, 2004 in the amounts of P258,000.00 and P324,000.00,
respectively. Notably, the October 5, 2004 billing statement included a
fee for "consultants (prosecutors)" amounting to P45,000.00. In view of
the foregoing, complainant filed the instant Complaint-Affidavit before
the IBP-CBD, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1426.
In her defense, Atty. Cruz-Angeles admitted to have received a total of
P350,000.00 from complainant, but denied that she was remiss in her
duties, explaining that the delay in the filing of the petition for
annulment of marriage was due to complainant's failure to give the
current address of Mutya and provide sufficient evidence to support the
petition. Further, Atty. Cruz-Angeles alleged that it was Atty. Paler who
was tasked to draft and finalize the petition. For his part, Atty. Paler
moved for the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of
action, arguing too that complainant filed the present administrative
complaint only to avoid payment of attorney's fees.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated July 10, 2012, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner found Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler
administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that they be
meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for four (4)
months. However, Atty. Grandea was exonerated of any liability as his
participation in the charges has not been discussed, much less proven.
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant indeed
engaged the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler in order to
annul his marriage with his wife, Mutya. Despite receiving the
aggregate amount of P350,000.00 from complainant, Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler neglected the legal matter entrusted to them, as
evidenced by their failure to just even draft complainant's petition for
annulment despite being engaged for already five (5) long
months. Moreover, as pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner,
despite their preliminary assessment that complainant's petition would
not likely prosper, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler still proceeded to
collect an additional P250,000.00 from complainant. Worse, they even
billed him an exorbitant sum of P324,000.00. Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that the amounts respondents had already
collected and would still want to further collect from complainant can
hardly be spent for research in connection with the annulment case
that was not filed at all. Neither can they cover just fees for Attys. Cruz-
Angeles and Paler who did nothing to serve complainant's cause.
In a Resolution dated September 28, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation, with modification increasing the recommended
penalty to two (2) years suspension from the practice of law. Atty.
Cruz-Angeles moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied
in a Resolution dated June 7, 2015.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court's Ruling
A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in May 2004,
complainant secured the services of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler for
the purpose of annulling his marriage with Mutya, and in connection
therewith, paid Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the aggregate sum of
P350,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite the passage of
more than five (5) months from the engagement, Attys. Cruz-Angeles
and Paler failed to file the appropriate pleading to initiate the case
before the proper court; and worse, could not even show a finished
draft of such pleading. Such neglect of the legal matter entrusted to
them by their client constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Case law exhorts that, "once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client,
he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to
such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.
Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his
client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable,” as in this case.
In this relation, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when they failed to return to
complainant the amount of P350,000.00 representing their legal
fees, viz. :
CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS
AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.03– A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client
when due or upon demand, x x x.
It bears stressing that "the relationship between a lawyer and his client
is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good
faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or
received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is
a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics.”
 lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement." Hence, since Attys.
Furthermore, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler misrepresented to Cruz-Angeles and Paler received the aforesaid amount as part of their
complainant that the delay in the filing of his petition for annulment was legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
due to the fact that they were still looking for a "friendly" court, judge,
and public prosecutor who will not be too much of a hindrance in WHEREFORE, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty.
achieving success in the annulment case. In fact, in the two (2) billing Wylie M. Paler are found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1,
statements dated October 5, 2004 and October 10, 2004, Attys. Cruz- Canon 7, Canon 11, Rule 18.03, Canon 18, and Rules 16.01 and
Angeles and Paler made it appear that they went to various locations 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
to look for a suitable venue in filing the said petition, and even paid Accordingly, each of them is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
various amounts to prosecutors and members of the National Bureau law for a period of three (3) years, effective upon the finality of this
of Investigation to act as their "consultants." Such misrepresentations Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
and deceits on the part of Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler are violations similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, viz.:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the Likewise, respondents Atty. Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles and Atty. Wylie
land and promote respect for law and legal processes. M. Paler are ORDERED to return to complainant Cleo B. Dongga-as
the legal fees they received from the latter in the aggregate amount of
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision.
or deceitful conduct. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition
of a more severe penalty.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that "[a]s officers of the court,
lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
Meanwhile, the complaint as against Atty. Angeles Grandea
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
dealing." Clearly, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fell short of such
standard when they committed the afore-described acts of
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar
misrepresentation and deception against complainant. Their acts are
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the
not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal
country for their information and guidance and be attached to
profession; they also reveal basic moral flaws that make Attys. Cruz-
respondents' personal records as attorney.
Angeles and Paler unfit to practice law.
SO ORDERED.
As members of the Bar, Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler should not
perform acts that would tend to undermine and/or denigrate the
integrity of the courts, such as insinuating that they can find a "friendly"
court and judge that will ensure a favorable ruling in complainant's
annulment case. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and officers of the
court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the
courts guarantees the stability of the judicial institution. Without this
guarantee, the institution would be resting on very shaky
foundations. This is the very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others." Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn
duty violate the aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held
administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as in this case.

Moreover, Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to "at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession" for the strength
of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members. It
is every lawyer's duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by
staying true to his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It
must be reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is a lawyer's sworn
and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions emanating from
lawyers which tend to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the
continuity of the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound not only to safeguard the
good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the
honor, prestige, and reputation of the judiciary. In this case, Attys.
Cruz-Angeles and Paler compromised the integrity not only of the
judiciary, but also of the national prosecutorial service, by insinuating
that they can influence a court, judge, and prosecutor to cooperate with
them to ensure the annulment of complainant's marriage. Indubitably,
Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler also violated Canon 7 of the CPR, and
hence, they should be held administratively liable therefor.

Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler,

jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected
their client's affairs, failed to return the latter's money and/or property
despite demand, and at the same time committed acts of
misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the Court imposed
upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years. In Jinon v. Jiz the Court suspended the lawyer
for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his
client gave him for his legal services which he never performed. Also,
in Agot v. Rivera, the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of two
(2) years for his (a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted to him
and to return the legal fees in connection therewith; and (b)
misrepresentation that he was an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he
was not. Finally, in Spouses Lopez v. Limos, the Court suspended the
erring lawyer for three (3) years for her failure to file a petition for
adoption on behalf of complainants, return the money she received as
legal fees, and for her commission of deceitful acts in misrepresenting
that she had already filed such petition when nothing was actually filed,
resulting in undue prejudice to therein complainants. In this case, not
only did Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler fail to file complainant's petition
for annulment of marriage and return what the latter paid them as legal
fees, they likewise misrepresented that they can find a court, judge,
and prosecutor who they can easily influence to ensure a favorable
resolution of such petition, to the detriment of the judiciary and the
national prosecutorial service. Under these circumstances, the Court
individually imposes upon Attys. Cruz-Angeles and Paler the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering Attys.

Cruz-Angeles and Paler to return the amount of P350,000.00 they
received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that "while
the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's
administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule
remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in
nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the

EN BANC
May 31, 2016
A.C. No. 5179
DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on December 10, 1999.
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his
tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao
City. Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant.
Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila
sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap
complainant, and then left.
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate
number of respondent's car. Complainant later learned that the driver
of the car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board member of
Surigao del Norte.
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and
humiliated." Respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his
oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted
gross misconduct.
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit, Manuel Cuizon's
Affidavit, and a letter dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor
Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of
Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that
respondent slapped complainant and caused him great
humiliation. Thus, respondent should be administratively penalized for
his gross misconduct and abuse of authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October
4, 1999 in Surigao City, committed by Provincial Board Member Rene
O. Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie
Ricafort, a tricycle driver, causing great humiliation on the person. We
believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official.
Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully
submitted that appropriate action be taken on the matter as such
uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of
authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition
of the Municipal Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the
signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del
Norte. In his Comment, respondent denied slapping complainant. He
alleged that the incident happened while he was bringing his 10-year-
old son to school. He further alleged that complainant's reckless driving
caused complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of respondent's
car. When respondent alighted from his car to check the damage,
complainant approached him in an unfriendly manner. Respondent
pushed complainant on the chest to defend himself. Sensing, however,
that complainant was not making a move against his son and himself,
respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and
if they should wait for a traffic officer. Both parties agreed that they
were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a
sketch. No traffic officer was present during the incident.
Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the
subject of attacks on radio programs by the Provincial Governor's
allies, accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver. He alleged that
complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial
Governor as it was prepared in the English language, which was
unknown to complainant. Respondent was identified with those who
politically opposed the Provincial Governor.
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue
that might have arisen out of the incident during the conciliation
proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay
Washington, Surigao City. During the proceedings, respondent
explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that
complainant was carrying a weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers
did. On the other hand, complainant explained that he went near
respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's car. As part
of the settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any
indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car.
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification dated
October 27, 2006 of the Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating
that the case had already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano
F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the parties.
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner
De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay Washington,
Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already
been settled. 
Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be
the reason why the complainant has not been appearing in this case[.]"
The Mandatory Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only
respondent appeared. Hence, the Commission proceeded with the
case ex parte.
In his Report dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama
recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60
days from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to
recommend for the suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the
practice of law for a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof due to
misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to
discredit the legal profession. (Emphasis in the original)
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim,
there was indeed a slapping incident. The slapping incident was
witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of
Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's complaint; and (2)
the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999
of the Surigao Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty of
gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be held
administratively liable.
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors issued the Resolution adopting and approving with
modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's
misconduct and violation of Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O.
Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30)
days. (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Board of Governors'
August 14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution dated March 22,
2014.
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held
administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of
complainant. a complainant or a prosecutor.

Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against
happened. He stresses complainant's seeming disinterest in and lack lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not indispensable to the
of participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of
case is politically motivated. administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings.

It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the
disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with baseless allegations. Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a finding of
This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if administrative liability.
allegations of misconduct are established. A lawyer is presumed to be
innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the
presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her
Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene
oath. Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his
O. Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
or her claim.
Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is
preponderance of evidence, or evidence that is superior, more
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of
convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."
respondent as attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
In this case, complainant discharged this burden. Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout
the country.
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors also adopted SO ORDERED.
found that the slapping incident actually occurred. 

The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in

his signed and notarized Affidavit; complainant's Affidavit was also
supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit of a traffic aide present
during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed
complainant of respondent's plate number.

In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent, Commissioner

De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors
and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded"
because of respondent's act of slapping complainant. The Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and
adopted this finding.

The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors,

strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim
that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced
complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors'
signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It
reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.

The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public

is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In
this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and
harassment committed by its officers.

Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her

on the face hints of a character that disregards the human dignity of
another. Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa
ako?" ("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his
potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment,
and discrimination.

This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by

perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the
profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted
the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission.

Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. This Court has

the power to impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts
of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show
them unworthy to remain officers of the court. 

This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings

against lawyers are sui generis. They are neither civil nor criminal in
nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they
are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to determine
a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court
officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:

Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of