31.

Maria luisa park association vs almendra 508 scra 858

32. Rcbc capital corporation v banco de oro 687 scra 583
33. Gerardo lanuza jr vs BF corporation 687 scra 583
34. KOPPEL INC., V. MAKATI ROTARY CLUB FOUNDATION, INC.
G.R.NO. 198075, September 4, 2013, 705 SCRA 142

FACTS:
Fedders Koppel, Incorporated (FKI), was the registered owner of a parcel of
land which it bequeathed in favour of Makati Rotary Club Foundation, Inc. by way of
conditional donation in 1975. The respondent accepted the same with all its
condition. Eventually the parties executed a Deed of Donation to evidence their
consensus.
One of the conditions of the donation required the respondent to lease the
subject land back to FKI under terms specified in their Deed of Donation which the
respondent accepted. Subsequently, the parties executed an Amended Deed of
Donation which reiterated the provisions of the first deed of donation. By virtue of the
lease agreement contained in the Deed of Donation and Amended Deed Donation,
FKI was able to continue in its possession and use of the subject land.
Two days before the expiration of the lease, FKI and the respondent executed
another contract of lease (2000 Lease Contract) covering the subject land on a new
five-year lease which also contains an arbitration clause enforceable in the event the
parties come to disagreement about the “interpretation, application, and execution”
of the lease. After the expiration of the 2000 Lease Contract, the parties renew their
lease contract for another five years (2005 Lease Contract) in which FKI was
required to pay a fixed annual rent and to make a yearly “donation” of money to the
respondent. The renewed contract also contained a similar arbitration clause.
In 2008, FKI sold all its rights and properties relative to its business in favour
of Koppel, Incorporated, herein petitioner. FKI also executed an Assignment and
Assumption of Lease and Donation and all its interests and obligation under the
Amended Deed of Donation and the 2005 Lease contract in favour of the petitioner
with the conformity of the respondent.
On the succeeding year, the petitioner discontinued the payment of the rent
and “donation” under the 2005 Lease Contract on the belief that the rental
stipulations of the 2000 and 2005 Lease Contracts cannot be given effect because
they violated one of its material conditions. It appears that in the first contract the
lease agreement was for a period of 25 years from 1975 to 2000 while the 2005
contract is for a period of another 25 years from 2000 to 2025. These lease
agreements are material conditions of the donation.
35. DEL MONTE CORPORATION V COURT OF APPEALS
GR. NO. 136154 February 7, 2001 351 SCRA 373
FACTS:
DMC-USA entered into Distributorship Agreement with Montebueno
Marketing, Inc. (MMI) making the latter as the sole and exclusive distributor of the
former’s Del Monte products in the Philippines for a period of five years. Said
agreement provides for an arbitration clause. With the approval of DMC-USA, MMI,
SFI and MMI’s Managing Director Liong Liong C. Sy filed a complaint against DMC-
USA, Paul Derby Jr., Daniel Collins, Luis Hidalgo and Dewey Ltd. Before RTC
Malabon. The complaint is predicated on Arts. 20, 21, and 23 of the Civil Code. It
was alleged by the complainants that DMC-USA products continued to be brought
into the country by parallel importers despite the appointment of MMI with the
Distributorship Agreement thereby causing them great embarrassment and
substantial damage. DMC-USA filed a motion to suspend proceedings invoking the
arbitration clause in the agreement. The lower court deferred to consider the same
as the grounds alleged therein did not constitute the suspension of the proceedings
considering that the action was for damages with prayer for the issuance of writ of
preliminary attachment and not on the Distributorship Agreement. The complainants
filed Urgent Motion For Leave To Admit Supplemental Pleading which the lower
court admitted while DMC-USA adopted their motion to suspend proceedings. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling on the ground that the
interpretation of Art. 21 would require a full blown trial making arbitration out of the
question.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTIES CAN BE COMPELLED TO
SUBMIT TO ARBITRATION

RULING:
No, the parties in the case cannot be compelled to submit their disputes to
arbitration. Though, a careful examination of the case shows that the arbitration
clause in the Distributorship Agreement between DMC-USA and MMI is valid and the
dispute is arbitrable, the parties cannot be compelled to utilize such provision. The
agreement between DMC-USA and MMI is a contract. The provision to submit to
arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of
the contract and is itself a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law
between the contracting parties and produce effect as between them, their assigns
and heirs. Clearly, only the parties to the Agreement., DMC-USA and its managing
Director for Export Sales Paul E. Derby, Jr., and MMI and its arbitration clause as
they are the only signatories thereto. Petitioners Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo and
private respondent SFI, not parties to the Agreement and cannot even be considered
assigns or heirs of the parties, are not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration
clause therein. Consequently, referral to arbitration in the States of America pursuant
to the arbitration clause and the suspension of the proceedings of the pending civil
case pending the return of the arbitral award could be called for but only as to
petitioners DMC-USA and Paul E. Derby, Jr., and MMI and Lily Sy, and not as to the
other parties in this case. This is in consonance with the case of Heirs of Augusto
Salas vs. Laperal Realty Corp., wherein the SC ruled that the contention that the
arbitration clause has become dysfunctional because of the presence of third parties
is untenable because contracts are respected as the law between the contracting
parties and as such parties are thereby expected to abide with good faith in their
contractual commitments. However, only parties to the Agreement, their assigns or
heirs have the right to arbitrate or could be compelled to arbitrate. The court declared
that in recognizing the right of the contracting parties to arbitrate or to compel
arbitration, the splitting of the proceedings to arbitration as to some of the parties on
one hand and trial for the others on the other hand, or the suspension of trial pending
arbitration between some of the parties, should not be allowed as it would, in effect,
result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay.
The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a dispute.
Clearly, the issue could not be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety if
simultaneous arbitration proceedings and trial will be allowed. The interest of justice
can only be served if the trial court hears and adjudicate the case in a single and
complete proceeding.
36. DENR v United Planners Consultant Inc., GR No. 212081 (2015)
37. Philrock vs CIAC 359 SCRA 632
38. Asian Construction and Development Corporation 704 SCRA 332
39. METRO CONSTRUCTION INC V. CHATHAM PROPERTIES INC 365 scra 697
40. ABOITIZ TRANSPORT SYSTEM CORPORATION V CARLOS GOTHONG
LINES 730 SCRA 178