Yale University Press

Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir's Second Sex

Author(s): Judith Butler
Source: Yale French Studies, No. 72, Simone de Beauvoir: Witness to a Century (1986), pp. 35-49
Published by: Yale University Press
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 JUDITH BUTLER

Sex and Genderin Simone de

Beauvoir'sSecond Sex

"One is not born,but ratherbecomes,a woman"'-Simone de Beau-

voir'sformulation distinguishessexfromgenderand suggeststhatgen-
deris an aspectofidentitygraduallyacquired.The distinction between
sex and genderhas been crucialto thelong-standing feministeffortto
debunkthe claim thatanatomyis destiny;sex is understoodto be the
invariant,anatomicallydistinct,and facticaspectsofthefemalebody,
whereasgenderis the culturalmeaningand formthatthatbodyac-
quires,the variablemodes ofthatbody'sacculturation.Withthe dis-
tinctionintact,it is no longerpossibleto attributethevalues or social
functionsof women to biologicalnecessity,and neithercan we refer
meaningfully to naturalorunnaturalgenderedbehavior:all genderis,
by definition, unnatural.Moreover,if the distinctionis consistently
applied,itbecomesunclearwhetherbeinga givensexhas anynecessary
consequenceforbecominga givengender.The presumption ofa causal
or mimeticrelationbetweensex and genderis undermined. Ifbeinga
womanis one culturalinterpretation of beingfemale,and if thatin-
terpretationis in no waynecessitatedbybeingfemale,thenit appears
thatthefemalebodyis the arbitrary locus ofthegender'woman',and
thereis no reasonto precludethepossibilityofthatbodybecomingthe
locusofotherconstructions ofgender.Atitslimit,then,thesex/gender
distinctionimplies a radical heteronomyof naturalbodies and con-
structedgenderswiththeconsequencethat'being'femaleand 'being'a
womanare two verydifferent sortsofbeing.This last insight,I would
suggest,is thedistinguished contributionofSimonede Beauvoir'sfor-
mulation,"one is not born,butratherbecomes,a woman."

1. Simone de Beauvoir,The Second Sex (New York: VintageBooks, 1973),301.

Henceforth,
references
will be givenin thetext.
35

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36 Yale FrenchStudies
Accordingto theaboveframework, theterm'female'designatesa
fixedand self-identical set ofnaturalcorporealfacts(a presumption, by
the way, which is seriouslychallengedby the continuumof chro-
mosomal variations),and the term 'woman' designatesa varietyof
modes throughwhich those factsacquire culturalmeaning.One is
female,then,to the extentthat the copula assertsa fixedand self-
identicalrelation,i.e. one is femaleand therefore not some othersex.
Immeasurably moredifficult, however,is theclaimthatoneis a woman
in thesamesense.Ifgenderis thevariableculturalinterpretation ofsex,
thenit lacks thefixityand closurecharacteristic ofsimpleidentity.To
be a gender,whetherman,woman,orotherwise,is to be engagedin an
ongoingculturalinterpretation ofbodiesand,hence,to be dynamically
positionedwithina fieldofculturalpossibilities.Gendermustbe un-
derstoodas a modalityoftakingon orrealizingpossibilities, a processof
interpreting the body,givingit culturalform.In otherwords,to be a
womanis tobecomea woman;itis nota matterofacquiescingtoa fixed
ontologicalstatus,in which case one could be borna woman,but,
rather,an activeprocessofappropriating, interpreting, and reinterpret-
ingreceivedculturalpossibilities.
For Simonede Beauvoir,it seems,the verb"become" containsa
consequentialambiguity.Genderis not only a culturalconstruction
imposedupon identity,but in some sense genderis a processof con-
structing ourselves.To become a womanis a purposiveand appropri-
ative set of acts, the acquisitionof a skill,a 'project',to use Sartrian
terms,to assume a certaincorporealstyleand significance. When 'be-
come'is takento mean 'purposefully or
assume embody',it seemsthat
Simonede Beauvoiris appealingto a voluntaristic accountofgender.If
gendersarein some sensechosen,thenwhatdo we makeofgenderas a
receivedculturalconstruction? It is usual these days to conceiveof
genderas passivelydetermined, constructed bya personified systemof
patriarchy orphallogocentric languagewhichprecedesand determines
thesubjectitself.Evenifgenderis rightly understoodto be constructed
bysuch systems,it remainsnecessaryto ask afterthespecificmecha-
nismofthisconstruction. Does thissystemunilaterally inscribegender
uponthebody,in whichcase thebodywouldbe a purelypassivemedi-
um andthesubject,utterlysubjected?How,then,wouldwe accountfor
thevariouswaysin whichgenderis individually reproduced andrecon-
stituted?What is the role of personalagencyin the reproduction of
gender? In this context,Simone de Beauvoir's formulation might be
understood to containthefollowingset ofchallengesto gendertheory:
towhatextentis the'construction' ofgendera self-reflexiveprocess?In

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 JUDITH BUTLER 37
whatsensedo we constructourselvesand,in thatprocess,becomeour
genders?
In the following,I would like to show how Simonede Beauvoir's
accountof 'becoming'a genderreconcilesthe internalambiguityof
genderas both 'project'and 'construct'.When 'becoming'a genderis
understoodto be bothchoice and acculturation, thenthe usuallyop-
positionalrelationbetweenthesetermsis undermined. In keeping"be-
come" ambiguous,Beauvoirformulates genderas a corporeallocus of
culturalpossibilitiesbothreceivedandinnovated.Hertheoryofgender,
then,entails a reinterpretation of the existentialdoctrineof choice
whereby'choosing'a genderis understoodas the embodimentofpos-
sibilitieswithina networkofdeeplyentrenched culturalnorms.

SARTRIAN BODIES AND CARTESIAN GHOSTS

The notionthatwe somehowchoose ourgendersposes an ontological
puzzle.It mightat firstseem impossiblethatwe can occupya position
outsideofgenderfromwhichto standback and choose ourgenders.If
we are alwaysalreadygendered,immersedin gender,thenwhatsense
doesit maketo saythatwe choosewhatwe alreadyare?Not onlydoes
the thesisappeartautological,but insofaras it postulatesa choosing
agentpriortoitschosengender,it seemstoadopta Cartesianviewofthe
self,an egologicalstructurewhichlives and thrivespriorto language
and culturallife.This view ofthe selfrunscontrary to contemporary
findings on thelinguisticconstruction ofpersonalagencyand,as is the
problemwith all Cartesianviews of the ego,its ontologicaldistance
fromlanguageand culturallifeseems to precludethepossibilityofits
eventualverification. IfSimonede Beauvoir'sclaimis tohave cogency,
ifitis truethatwe 'become'ourgendersthrough somekindofvolitional
and appropriative sets of acts, then she must mean somethingother
than an unsituatedCartesianact. That personalagencyis a logical
prerequisite fortakingon a genderdoesnotimplythatthisagencyitself
is disembodied;indeed,it is ourgenderswhichwe become,andnotour
bodies.IfSimonede Beauvoir'stheoryis tobe understood as freedofthe
Cartesianghost,we must firstturnto her view of bodies and to her
musingson thepossibilitiesofdisembodiedsouls.
Whetherconsciousnesscan be saidto precedethebody,orwhether
it has any ontologicalstatus apartfromthe body-these are claims
alternately affirmed and deniedin Sartre'sBeingand Nothingness, and
this ambivalencetowarda Cartesianmind/bodydualismreemerges,
althoughless seriously, in SimonedeBeauvoir'sTheSecondSex.Infact,

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38 Yale FrenchStudies
we can see in TheSecondSexan efforttoradicalizetheSartrian
program
to establishan embodiednotion of freedom.Sartre'schapter,"The
Body,"in Beingand Nothingnessechoes Cartesianismwhichhaunts
his thinkingas well as his own efforts
to freehimselffromthisCarte-
sian ghost.AlthoughSartrearguesthatthe bodyis coextensivewith
personalidentity("I am my body"),2he also suggeststhatconscious-
nessis in somesensebeyondthebody("My bodyis a pointofdeparture
which I am and which at the same time I surpass. . . ").3 Rather than
refuteCartesianism,Sartre'stheoryseeks to understandthe disem-
bodiedortranscendent featureofpersonalidentityas paradoxically,yet
essentially,relatedto embodiment.The dualityof consciousness(as
transcendence) andthebodyis intrinsictohumanreality,andtheeffort
to locatepersonalidentityexclusivelyin one ortheotheris, according
to Sartre,a projectin bad faith.
AlthoughSartre'sreferences to "surpassing"thebodymaybe read
as presupposing a mind/bodydualism,we need onlyconceiveof this
self-transcendance as itselfa corporealmovementto refutethat as-
sumption.The bodyis not a staticphenomenon,but a mode ofinten-
tionality,
a directional forceandmodeofdesire.As a conditionofaccess
to theworld,thebodyis a beingcomportedbeyonditself,sustaininga
necessaryreference to theworldand,thus,nevera self-identical natural
entity.The bodyis livedandexperienced as thecontextandmediumfor
all human strivings.Because forSartreall human beingsstriveafter
possibilitiesnotyetrealizedorin principleunrealizable,humansareto
thatextent'beyond'themselves.This ek-staticrealityofhumanbeings
is, however,a corporealexperience;the bodyis not a lifelessfactof
existence,but a mode ofbecoming.Indeed,forSartrethenaturalbody
onlyexistsin the mode ofbeingsurpassed,forthe bodyis alwaysin-
volvedin the humanquest to realizepossibilities:"we can neverap-
prehendthiscontingency as suchinsofaras ourbodyis forus; forwe are
a choice, and forus, to be is to choose ourselves . . . this inapprehensi-
ble bodyis preciselythenecessitythattherebe a choice,thatI do not
existall at once."4
Simonede Beauvoirdoes not so muchrefuteSartreas takehim at
hisnon-Cartesian best.5Sartrewritesin Beingand Nothingness
that"it
2. Jean-PaulSartre,Beingand Nothingness:An Essay in PhenomenologicalOn-
tology,trans.Hazel E. Barnes(New York:PhilosophicalLibrary,1947),329.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.,328.
5. SimonedeBeauvoir'sdefenseofthenon-Cartesian character
ofSartre'saccountof
thebodycan be foundin "Merleau-Ponty Les TempsModernes,
et le Pseudo-Sartrisme,"
10:2,1955.Fora generalarticletracingSartre'sgradualovercomingofCartesianism, see

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 JUDITH BUTLER 39
would be best to say, using 'exist' as a transitiveverb,that con-
sciousnessexists itsbody... //.6 The transitive formof'exist'is notfar
removedfromherdisarming use of'become',and Simonede Beauvoir's
becominga genderseemsbothan extensionand a concretization ofthe
Sartrian formulation.In transposing theidentificationofcorporealexis-
tenceand 'becoming'ontothesceneofsex andgender,sheappropriates
theontologicalnecessityofparadox,butthetensionin hertheorydoes
not residebetweenbeing'in' and 'beyond'the body,but in the move
fromthe naturalto the acculturatedbody.That one is not born,but
becomes,a womandoesnotimplythatthis'becoming'traverses a path
fromdisembodiedfreedom to culturalembodiment. Indeed,oneis one's
bodyfromthe start,and only thereafter becomes one's gender.The
movementfromsex to genderis internalto embodiedlife,i.e. a move
fromone kindofembodimentto another.To mix Sartrianphraseology
withSimonede Beauvoir's,we mightsay thatto 'exist' one's bodyin
culturallyconcretetermsmeans, at least partially,to become one's
gender.
Sartre'scommentson the naturalbodyas "inapprehensible" find
transcription in Simonede Beauvoir'srefusaltoconsidergenderas natu-
ral.We neverexperienceor knowourselvesas a bodypureand simple,
i.e. as our'sex',becausewe neverknowoursexoutsideofitsexpression
as gender.Lived or experienced'sex' is always alreadygendered.We
becomeourgenders,butwe becomethemfroma place whichcannotbe
foundand which,strictlyspeaking,cannotbe said to exist.ForSartre,
thenaturalbodyis an "inapprehensible" and,hence,a fictionalstarting
pointforan explanationofthe bodyas lived.Similarly,forSimonede
Beauvoir,thepostulationof'sex' as fictionalheuristicallowsus merely
to see thatgenderis non-natural, i.e. a culturallycontingentaspectof
existence.Hence,we do not becomeourgendersfroma place priorto
cultureor to embodiedlife,but essentiallywithintheirterms.ForSi-
monede Beauvoirat least,the Cartesianghostis put to rest.
Althoughwe 'become'ourgenders,thetemporalmovementofthis
becomingdoes notfollowa linearprogression. The originofgenderis
nottemporally discretebecausegenderis notoriginatedat somepoint
in timeafterwhichit is fixedin form.In an importantsensegenderis
nottraceableto a definableoriginpreciselybecauseit is itselfan origi-
natingactivityincessantlytakingplace.No longerunderstood as a prod-

ThomanW. Busch, "Beyondthe Cogito: The Questionof the Continuityof Sartre's

Thought,"TheModernSchoolman60 (March1983).
6. Beingand Nothingness,
329.

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40 Yale FrenchStudies
uctofculturalandpsychicrelationslongpast,genderis a contemporary
way of organizingpast and futureculturalnorms,a way of situating
oneselfwithrespectto thosenorms,an activestyleoflivingone's body
in theworld.

GENDER AS CHOICE
One choosesone's gender,but one does not choose it froma distance
whichsignalsan ontologicaljuncturebetweenthechoosingagentand
the chosengender.The Cartesianspace of the deliberate'chooser'is
fictional,but thequestionpersists:ifwe are miredin genderfromthe
start,whatsensecan we makeofgenderas a kindofchoice?Simonede
Beauvoir'sview ofgenderas an incessantproject,a dailyact ofrecon-
stitutionand interpretation, drawsupon Sartre'sdoctrineofprereflec-
tivechoiceandgivesthatdifficult epistemological structure a concrete
culturalmeaning.Prereflective choice is a tacit and spontaneousact
whichSartreterms"quasi knowledge."Not whollyconscious,butnev-
erthelessaccessibleto consciousness,it is thekindofchoicewe make
andonlylaterrealizewe have made.Simonede Beauvoirseemsto rely
on thisnotionofchoicein referring to thekindofvolitionalactthrough
whichgenderis assumed.Takingon a genderis not possibleat a mo-
ment'snotice,but is a subtleand strategicprojectwhichonlyrarely
becomesmanifestto a reflective understanding. Becominga genderis
an impulsiveyetmindfulprocessofinterpreting a culturalrealityladen
withsanctions,taboos,and prescriptions. The choiceto assumea cer-
tain kindofbody,to live or wear one's bodya certainway,impliesa
worldofalreadyestablishedcorporealstyles.To choose a genderis to
interpretreceivedgendernormsin a way thatorganizesthemanew.
Ratherthana radicalact ofcreation,genderis a tacitprojectto renew
one'sculturalhistoryin one's ownterms.Thisis nota prescriptive task
we mustendeavorto do,butone in whichwe havebeenendeavoring all
along.
The predominance ofan existentialframework has beencriticized
byMicheleLe Doeuff7and othersforresurrecting "a classicalformof
voluntarism"whichinsidiouslyblames the victimsof oppressionfor
'choosing'theirsituation.Whenthe doctrineof existentialchoice is
used in this context,it is assuredlyinsidious,but thisuage is itselfa
misusagewhichdivertsattentionfromtheempowering possibilitiesof

FeministStudies6,
7. MicheleLe Doeuff,"SimonedeBeauvoirandExistentialism,"
no. 2 (1980):278.

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 JUDITH BUTLER 41
the position.The phenomenologyof victimizationthat Simone de
Beauvoirelaboratesthroughout The Second Sex revealsthatoppression,
despitethe appearanceand weightofinevitability, is essentiallycon-
tingent. Moreover,it takesout ofthesphereofreification thediscourse
ofoppressorand oppressed,reminding us thatoppressivegendernorms
persistonlyto the extentthathuman beingstake themup and give
themlifeagainand again.Simonede Beauvoiris not saying,however,
thatoppressionis generated through a seriesofhumanchoices.Herown
efforts in anthropology and historyunderscoreherawarenessthatop-
pressivesystemshavecomplicatedmaterialorigins.The pointis rather
thatthese systemspersistonly to the extentthatgendernormsare
tacitlyyetinsistently takenup in thepresentthroughindividualstrat-
egies which remainmore or less disguised.Over and againsta less
sophisticated view of 'socialization',she is usingthe existentialappa-
ratusto understandthe momentof appropriation throughwhich so-
cialization occurs. Throughthis emphasis on appropriation, she is
providingan alternativeto paternalisticexplanatorymodels of ac-
culturation whichtreathumanbeingsonlyas productsofpriorcauses,
culturally determined in a strictsense,andwhich,consequently, leave
no roomforthetransformative possibilitiesofpersonalagency.
Byscrutinizing themechanismofagencyand appropriation, Beau-
voiris attempting, I believe,to infusethe analysiswithemancipatory
potential.Oppressionis not a self-contained systemwhicheithercon-
fronts individualsas a theoreticalobjectorgeneratesthemas itscultur-
al pawns.Itis a dialecticalforcewhichrequiresindividualparticipation
on a largescale in orderto maintainits malignantlife.
Simone de Beauvoir does not directlyaddress the burden of
freedom8 thatgenderpresents,but we can extrapolatefromherview
howconstraining normsworkto subduetheexerciseofgenderfreedom.
The social constraintsupon gendercomplianceand deviationare so
greatthatmostpeoplefeeldeeplywoundediftheyaretoldthattheyare
not reallymanlyor womanly,that theyhave failedto executetheir
manhoodor womanhoodproperly.Indeed,insofaras social existence
requiresan unambiguousgenderaffinity, it is notpossibleto existin a
sociallymeaningful senseoutsideofestablishedgendernorms.The fall
fromestablishedgenderboundariesinitiatesa senseofradicaldisloca-
tionwhichcan assume a metaphysicalsignificance. Ifexistenceis al-
waysgenderedexistence,thento strayoutsideofestablishedgenderis

8. A termcommonlyused by Sartreto describethe experienceofhavingto make

choicesin a worlddevoidofobjectivemoraltruths.

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42 Yale FrenchStudies
in some sense to put one's veryexistenceintoquestion.In thesemo-
mentsofgenderdislocationin whichwe realizethatit is hardlyneces-
sarythatwe be thegenderswe havebecome,we confront theburdenof
choiceintrinsicto livingas a man or a womanoras someothergender
identity,a freedommade burdensomethroughsocial constraint.
The anguishandterror ofleavinga prescribedgenderoroftrespass-
inguponanothergenderterritory testifiestothesocialconstraints upon
genderinterpretation as well as to the necessitythattherebe an in-
terpretation,i.e. totheessentialfreedom attheoriginofgender.Similar-
ly,thewidespreaddifficulty in acceptingmotherhood, forinstance,as
an institutional ratherthanan instinctualrealityexpressesthissame
interplay ofconstraintand freedom.Simonede Beauvoir'sview ofthe
maternalinstinctas a culturalfictionoftenmeetswiththe argument
thata desireso commonlyand so compellingly feltoughtforthatvery
reasonto be consideredorganicand universal.This responseseeks to
universalizea culturaloption,to claimthatitis notone's choicebutthe
resultof an organicnecessityto whichone is subject.In the effort to
naturalizeanduniversalizetheinstitution ofmotherhood, it seemsthat
theoptionalcharacterofmotherhood is beingdenied;in effect, moth-
erhoodis actuallybeingpromotedas theonlyoption,i.e. as a compulso-
rysocialinstitution. The desiretointerpret maternalfeelingsas organic
necessitiesdisclosesa deeperdesireto disguisethechoiceone is mak-
ing.Ifmotherhood becomesa choice,thenwhatelse is possible?This
kind of questioningoftenengendersvertigoand terrorover the pos-
sibilityoflosingsocial sanctions,ofleavinga solid social stationand
place.Thatthisterror is so wellknowngivesperhapsthemostcredence
to the notionthat genderidentityrestson the unstablebedrockof
human invention.

AUTONOMY AND ALIENATION

Thatone becomesone genderis a descriptive claim; it assertsonlythat
genderis takenon, butdoes not say whetherit oughtto be takenon a
certainway.Simonede Beauvoir'sprescriptive programin The Second
Sexis less clearthanherdescriptive
one,but her prescriptiveintentions
are neverthelessdiscernible.In revealingthat women have become
"Other,"she seems also to be pointingto a path of self-recovery. In
criticizing she remarksthat,
psychoanalysis,
Womanis enticedbytwomodesofalienation. Evidentlytoplayat
beinga manwillbeforhera sourceoffrustration;
buttoplayatbeinga
womanisalsoa delusion:tobea womanwouldmeantobetheobject,

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 JUDITH BUTLER 43
theOther-andtheOthernevertheless subjectinthemidst
remains
ofherresignation.... The trueproblemforwomanis to rejectthese
flights
from
reality intranscendence.
andseekself-fulfillment [571
The languageof "transcendence"suggests,on the one hand,thatSi-
mone de Beauvoiracceptsa gender-free model offreedomas the nor-
mativeidealforwomen'saspirations.It seemsthatBeauvoirprescribes
theovercomingofgenderaltogether, especiallyforwomen,forwhom
becomingone's genderimpliesthesacrificeofautonomyandthecapac-
ityfortranscendence. On theotherhand,insofaras transcendence ap-
pearsa particularly masculineproject,herprescription seems to urge
women to assume the model of freedomcurrently embodiedby the
masculinegender.In otherwords,becausewomenhavebeenidentified
withtheiranatomy,and thisidentification has servedthepurposesof
theiroppression, theyoughtnow to identify with'consciousness',that
transcending activityunrestrained by the body.Ifthiswereherview,
she would be offering womena chanceto be men,and promoting the
prescription thatthemodeloffreedomcurrently regulatingmasculine
behaviorought to become the model afterwhich women fashion
themselves.
Andyet,Simonede Beauvoirseems to be sayingmuchmorethan
eitherof the above alternativessuggest.Not only is it questionable
whethersheacceptsa viewofconsciousnessorfreedom whichis in any
sensebeyondthebody(sheapplaudspsychoanalysis forshowingfinally
that"the existentis a body"),(10,38) but herdiscussionofthe Other
permitsa readingwhichis highlycriticalof the masculineprojectof
disembodiment. In thefollowinganalysis,I wouldlike to readherdis-
cussionofSelfand Otheras a reworking ofHegel's dialecticofmaster
and slavein orderto showthat,forSimonede Beauvoir,themasculine
projectofdisembodiment is self-deludingand,finally,unsatisfactory
The self-asserting'man' whose self-definition requiresa hier-
archicalcontrastwith an "Other" does not providea model of true
autonomy,forshe pointsout the bad faithofhis designs,i.e. thatthe
"Other"is, in everycase, his own alienatedself.This Hegeliantruth,
whichshe appropriates througha Sartrianfilter,establishestheessen-
tial interdependence ofthe disembodied'man' and thecorporeally de-
termined'woman'.His disembodiment is onlypossibleon the condi-
tionthatwomenoccupytheirbodies as theiressentialand enslaving
identities.Ifwomenaretheirbodies(whichis notthesameas 'existing'
theirbodieswhichimplieslivingone's bodyas a projectand bearerof
createdmeanings),ifwomenare onlytheirbodies,iftheirconscious-
ness and freedomare only so manydisguisedpermutations ofbodily

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44 Yale FrenchStudies
need and necessity,thenwomenhave,in effect, exclusivelymonopo-
lized thebodilysphere.Bydefining womenas "Other,"'men' are able
throughthe shortcutofdefinitionto disposeoftheirbodies,to make
themselvesotherthantheirbodies,andto maketheirbodiesotherthan
themselves.This Cartesian'man' is not the same as the man with
distinctanatomicaltraits,andinsofaras a 'man'is hisanatomicaltraits,
he seems to be participating in a distinctively
femininesphere.The
embodiedaspectofhis existenceis notreallyhis own,and hencehe is
not reallya sex, but beyondsex. This sex whichis beyondsex must
initiatea splittingand social projectionin ordernot to knowhis own
contradictory identity.
The projectionofthebodyas "Other"proceedsaccordingtoa pecu-
liarrationality whichreliesmoreon associativebeliefsandconclusions
whichdefythe laws of commutativity thanon soundreasoning.The
disembodied'I' identifies himselfwitha noncorporeal reality(thesoul,
consciousness,transcendence), and fromthis point on his body be-
comesOther.Insofaras he inhabitsthatbody,convincedall thewhile
thathe is not thebodywhichhe inhabits,his bodymustappearto him
as strange,as alien,as an alienatedbody,a bodythatis nothis.Fromthis
beliefthatthebodyis Other,it is not a farleap to the conclusionthat
othersare theirbodies,while the masculine'I' is a noncorporeal phe-
nomenon.The bodyrenderedas Other-the bodyrepressedor denied
and, then,projected-reemergesforthis 'I' as the view of Othersas
essentiallybody.Hence,womenbecomethe Other;theycome to em-
bodycorporeality itself.This redundancybecomestheiressence,and
existenceas a woman becomes what Hegel termed"a motionless
tautology."
Simonede Beauvoir'suse oftheHegeliandialecticofselfandOther
arguesthe limitsof a Cartesianversionof disembodiedfreedomand
implicitlycriticizesthemodelofautonomyupheldbymasculinegen-
dernorms.The masculinepursuitofdisembodiment is necessarilyde-
ceivedbecause thebodycan neverreallybe denied;its denialbecomes
the conditionforits reemergencein alien form.Disembodimentbe-
comesa wayoflivingor 'existing'thebodyin themodeofdenial.And
thedenialofthebody,as in Hegel'sdialecticofmasterandslave,reveals
itselfas nothingotherthanthe embodimentofdenial.

THE BODY AS SITUATION

DespiteSimonede Beauvoir'soccasionalreferencesto anatomyas tran-
scendence,her comments on the body as an insurpassable"perspec-

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 JUDITH BUTLER 45
tive" and "situation"(38) indicatethat,as forSartre,transcendence
mustbe understoodwithincorporealterms.In clarifying thenotionof
thebodyas "situation,"she suggestsan alternative to thegenderpolar-
ityofmasculinedisembodiment andfeminineenslavementtothebody.
The bodyas situationhas at leasta twofoldmeaning.As a locus of
culturalinterpretations, thebodyis a materialrealitywhichhas already
beenlocatedand definedwithina social context.The bodyis also the
situationof havingto take up and interpretthat set of receivedin-
terpretations.No longerunderstoodin its traditionalphilosophical
senses of 'limit' or 'essence', the bodyis a field of interpretive pos-
sibilities,thelocus ofa dialecticalprocessofinterpreting anewa histor-
ical set ofinterpretations whichhave becomeimprintedin the flesh.
The bodybecomesa peculiarnexusofcultureandchoice,and 'existing'
one's body becomes a personalway of takingup and reinterpreting
receivedgendernorms.To theextentthatgendernormsfunctionunder
the aegis of social constraints,the reinterpretation of those norms
throughthe proliferation and variationof corporealstylesbecomesa
veryconcreteand accessibleway ofpoliticizingpersonallife.
Ifwe understand thebodyas a culturalsituation,thenthenotionof
a naturalbodyand,indeed,a natural'sex' seemsincreasingly suspect.
The limitsto gender,therangeofpossibilitiesfora livedinterpretation
ofa sexuallydifferentiated anatomy,seem less restricted by anatomy
itselfthanbytheweightoftheculturalinstitutions whichhaveconven-
tionallyinterpreted anatomy.Indeed,it becomes unclearwhen one
takesSimonede Beauvoir'sformulation to its unstatedconsequences,
whethergenderneed be in any way linkedwithsex, or whetherthis
conventionallinkageis itselfculturallybound.If genderis a way of
'existing'one's body,and one's bodyis a "situation,"a fieldofcultural
possibilitiesbothreceivedand reinterpreted, thengenderseemsto be a
thoroughly culturalaffair.Thatonebecomesone'sgenderseemsnowto
implymorethanthe distinctionbetweensex and gender.Not onlyis
genderno longerdictatedby anatomy,but anatomydoes not seem to
pose anynecessarylimitsto thepossibilitiesofgender.
AlthoughSimone de Beauvoiroccasionallyascribesontological
meaningsto anatomicalsexual differentiation, her commentsjust as
oftensuggestthatanatomyalone has no inherentsignificance. In "The
Data ofBiology"she distinguishes betweennaturalfactsand theirsig-
nificance,and arguesthatnaturalfactsgain significance onlythrough
theirsubjectionto non-naturalsystemsof interpretation. She writes:
"As Merleau-Ponty veryjustlyputsit,manis nota naturalspecies;he is
a historicalidea. Womanis nota completedreality,butrathera becom-

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46 Yale FrenchStudies
ing,and it is in herbecomingthatshe shouldbe comparedwithmen;
thatis to say,herpossibilitiesshouldbe defined(40).
The bodyas a naturalfactneverreallyexistswithinhumanexperi-
ence,but onlyhas meaningas a statewhichhas been overcome.The
bodyis an occasion formeaning,a constantand significant absence
whichis onlyknownthroughits significations: "in trutha societyis
nota species,forit is in a societythatthespeciesattainsthestatusof
existence-transcending itselftowardtheworldandtowardthefuture.
Individuals... are subjectratherto thatsecondnaturewhichis cus-
tomand in whichare reflectedthe desiresand fearsthatexpresstheir
essentialnature"(40).
The bodyis nevera self-identical phenomenon(exceptin death,in
the mythictransfiguration ofwomen as Other,and in otherformsof
epistemicprejudice).Anyeffort to ascertainthe 'natural'bodybeforeits
entranceintocultureis definitionally impossible,notonlybecausethe
observerwho seeks this phenomenonis him/herself entrenchedin a
specificculturallanguage,butbecausethebodyis as well. The bodyis,
in effect,
nevera naturalphenomenon:"it is notmerelyas a body,but
ratheras a bodysubjectto taboos,to laws,thatthesubjectis conscious
ofhimselfandattainsfulfillment-itis withreference to certainvalues
thathe evaluateshimself.And,once again,it is not upon physiology
thatvalues can be based;rather,thefactsofbiologytakeon thevalues
thattheexistentbestowsupon them"(40).
The conceptualization ofthebodyas non-natural not onlyasserts
the absolutedifference betweensex and gender,but implicitlyques-
tionswhethergenderoughtto be linkedwithsex at all. Genderseems
less a functionofanatomy than one ofits possible uses: ". . . the bodyof
womanis oneoftheessentialelementsofhersituationintheworld.But
thatbodyis notenoughto defineheras woman;thereis no trueliving
realityexceptas manifestedby the consciousindividualthroughac-
tivitiesand in thebosomofa society"(41).

THE BODY POLITIC

Ifthepurebodycannotbe found,ifwhatcan be foundis the situated
then Simone de Beauvoir's
body,a locus of culturalinterpretations,
theoryseems implicitlyto ask whethersex was not genderall along.
Simonede Beauvoirherselfdoes not followthroughwith the conse-
quencesofthisviewofthebody,butwe can see theradicalizationofher
view in theworkofMonique Wittigand Michel Foucault:theformer
extendsSimonede Beauvoir'sdoctrinein "One is Not
self-consciously

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 JUDITH BUTLER 47
Borna Woman";9the latteris not indebtedto Simone de Beauvoir
(although he was a studentofMerleau-Ponty) andyetpromotesinfuller
termsthe historicityof the body and the mythicstatus of natural
'sex'.'0 Althoughwritingin verydifferent discursivecontexts,Wittig
and Foucaultbothchallengethenotionofnaturalsex and exposethe
politicaluses ofbiologicaldiscriminations in establishinga compulsory
binarygendersystem.For both theorists,the verydiscrimination of
/sex'takes place withina culturalcontextwhich requiresthat 'sex'
remaindyadic.The demarcationofanatomicaldifference does notpre-
cede the culturalinterpretation of thatdifference, but is itselfan in-
terpretive act laden withnormativeassumptions.That infantsare di-
videdinto sexes at birth,Wittigpointsout, servesthe social ends of
reproduction, buttheymightjust as well be differentiated on thebasis
ofearlobeformation or,betterstill,notbe differentiated on thebasis of
anatomyat all. In demarcating 'sex' as sex,we constructcertainnorms
of differentiation. And in the interestwhich fuels this demarcation
residesalreadya politicalprogram.In questioningthe binaryrestric-
tionson genderdefinition, Wittigand Foucaultreleasegenderfromsex
in wayswhichSimonede Beauvoirprobablydidnotimagine.Andyet,
herviewofthebodyas a "situation"certainlylaysthegroundwork for
such theories.
If 'existing'one's gendermeans that one is tacitlyacceptingor
reworking culturalnormsgoverningthe interpretation of one's body,
thengendercan also be a place in whichthebinarysystemrestricting
genderis itselfsubverted.Throughnew formulations of gender,new
ways of amalgamatingand subverting the oppositionsof 'masculine'
and 'feminine', theestablishedwaysofpolarizinggendersbecomesin-
creasinglyconfused,and binaryoppositioncomes to oppose itself.
Throughthepurposefulembodimentofambiguitybinaryoppositions
lose clarityand force,and 'masculine' and 'feminine'as descriptive
termslose theirusefulness.Inasmuchas genderambiguitycan take
manyforms,genderitselfthuspromisesto proliferate intoa multiple
phenomenonforwhichnew termsmustbe found.
Simonede Beauvoirdoes not suggestthepossibilityofothergen-
dersbesides'man'and 'woman',yetherinsistencethatthesearehistor-

9. MoniqueWittig,"One is NotBorna Woman,"FeministIssues,1,no.2 (1981) and

Wittig,"The CategoryofSex,"FeministIssues,2, no. 2 (1982).
10. See Foucault'sintroduction
to the volumehe edited,HerculineBarbin,Being
RecentlyDiscoveredMemoirsofa NineteenthCenturyHermaphrodite, trans.Richard
McDougall(NewYork:Pantheon,1980).Also,Foucault,TheHistoryofSexuality, vol. 1,
(New York:Bantam,1979).

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48 Yale FrenchStudies
ical constructs whichmustin everycase be appropriated byindividuals
suggeststhata binarygendersystemhas no ontologicalnecessity.One
couldrespondthattherearemerelyvariouswaysofbeinga 'man' or a
'woman',but this view ascribesan ontologyof substanceto gender
whichmissesherpoint:'man' and 'woman'arealreadywaysofbeing,
modalitiesof corporealexistence,and onlyemergeas substantialen-
titiesto a mystified perspective.One mightwonderas well whether
thereis somethingabout the dymorphic ofhumananatomy
structure
that necessitatesbinarygenderarrangementscross-culturally. An-
thropologicalfindingsof thirdgendersand multiplegendersystems
suggest,however,that dymorphismitselfbecomes significantonly
when culturalinterestsrequire,and thatgenderis moreoftenbased
uponkinshiprequirements thanon anatomicalexigencies.
Simone de Beauvoir'sown existentialframework may seem an-
thropologically naive,relevantonlyto a postmodern fewwho essayto
trespasstheboundariesofsanctionedsex.Butthestrength ofhervision
lies less in itsappealto commonsensethanin theradicalchallengeshe
deliversto theculturalstatusquo. The possibilitiesofgendertransfor-
mationarenotforthatreasonaccessibleonlyto thoseinitiatedintothe
moreabstruseregionsofexistentialHegelianism,butresidein thedaily
ritualsofcorporeallife.Her conceptualization ofthebodyas a nexusof
interpretations, as both "perspective"and "situation,"revealsgender
as a scene of culturallysedimentedmeaningsand a modalityof in-
ventiveness.To becomea gendermeans bothto submitto a cultural
situationand to createone, and this view of genderas a dialecticof
recoveryand inventiongrantsthepossibilityofautonomywithincor-
poreallifethathas fewifanyparallelsin gendertheory.
In makingthe bodyinto an interpretive modality,Beauvoirhas
extendedthe doctrinesof embodimentand prereflective choice that
characterized Sartre'sworkfromBeingand Nothingness, through Saint
Genet:Actorand Martyrand his finalbiographicalstudyofFlaubert.
Justas Sartrein thatlastmajorworkrevisedhis existentialassumptions
to take account of the materialrealitiesconstitutiveof identity,so
Simonede Beauvoir,much earlieron and with greaterconsequence,
soughtto exorciseSartre'sdoctrineof its Cartesianghost.She gives
Sartrianchoice an embodiedformand places it in a worldthickwith
tradition.To 'choose' a genderin thiscontextis not to move in upon
genderfroma disembodiedlocale,buttoreinterpret theculturalhistory
whichthe bodyalreadywears.The bodybecomesa choice,a mode of
enactingand reenactingreceivedgendernormswhich surfaceas so
manystylesoftheflesh.

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 JUDITH BUTLER 49
The incorporation oftheculturalworldis a taskperformed inces-
santlyandactively,a projectenactedso easilyandconstantlyitseemsa
naturalfact.Revealingthenaturalbodyas alreadyclothed,andnature's
surfaceas culturalinvention,Simonede Beauvoirgivesus a potentially
radicalunderstanding of gender.Her vision of the bodyas a fieldof
culturalpossibilitiesmakessomeoftheworkofrefashioning cultureas
mundaneas ourbodilyselves.

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