CALONG, JEANETTE P.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Angeles vs. Bagay, A.C. No. 8103, December 3, 2014

(Violation of Canon 7 & 9 of CPR and Rules on Notarial
Practice)…………………………………………………………………………………. CJ-1

2. Aquino vs, Casabar, G.R. No. 191470, January 26, 2015

(Violation of Canon 20.01 of CPR; attorney’s fees)………………. CJ-4

3. Cadavedo vs. Lacaya, G.R. No. 173188, January 15, 2014

(Violation of Canon 20 of CPR, champertous contract)………… CJ-6

4. Chua vs. Madrona, A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394, September 1,

2014 (Administrative Law; Minutes of Judicial Proceedings).. CJ-8

5. Cristobal vs. Renta, A.C. No. 9925, September 17, 2014

(Violation of Canon 18 of CPR)………………………………………………. CJ-12

6. Tormis vs. Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, February 4,

2015 (Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge)……………………………….. CJ-15

7. DBP vs. Famero, A.M. No. P-10-2789, July 31, 2013

(Simple Neglect of Duty)………………………………………………………… CJ-21

8. Edano vs. Gonzales-Esdala, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974, March

19, 2013 (Undue Delay)…………………………………………………………. CJ-24

9. Foronda vs. Alvarez, A.C. No. 9976, June 25, 2014

(Violation of Canon 1.01 of CPR)…………………………………………… CJ-26

10. Gaddi vs. Velasco, A.C. No. 8637, September 15, 2014
(Notary Public)………………………………………………………………………… CJ-29

11. In The Matter Of The Brewing Controversies In The

Elections Of The Integrated Bar Of The Philippines, A.M. No. CJ-31
09-5-2-SC, April 11, 2013 (rotation by exclusion)………………..
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

12. Jandoquile vs. Revilla, A.C. No. 9514, April 10, 2013
(Rules on Notarial Practice)…………………………………………………… CJ-33

13. Lorenzana vs. Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014

(Conduct Unbecoming a Judge)……………………………………………. CJ-35

14. Maglana vs. Opinion, B.M. No. 2713, June 10, 2014
(Rotational Rule)……………………………………………………………………. CJ-39

15. Malvar vs. Kraft Food Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 183952,
September 9, 2013 (Attorney’s fees)…………………………………… CJ-41

16. San Pedro vs. Mendoza, A.C. No. 5440, November 26,
2014 (Violation of Canon 16 of CPR) …………………………………. CJ-43

17. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Martinez,

A.M. No. P-06-2223, June 10, 2013
(Gross dishonesty)………………………………………………………………… CJ-47

18. Que vs. Revilla, A.C. No. 7054, November 11, 2014
(Unethical infractions and professional misconduct)………… CJ-49

19. Re: Allegations Made Under Oath At The Senate Blue

Ribbon Committee Hearing Held On September 26, 2013
Against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan,
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, September 23, 2014
CJ-52
(Impropriety and Impartiality)………………………………………………

20. Aba vs. De Guzman, A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011
(Burden of Proof on Disbarment Cases)……………………………… CJ-55
 CJ-1

ATTY. AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., PROVINCIAL LEGAL OFFICER,

BATAAN CAPITOL, BALANGA CITY, BATAAN, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. RENATO C. BAGAY, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8103
December 3, 2014

FACTS:

This case stemmed from the letter, dated June 11, 2008,
submitted by Atty. Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr., the Provincial Legal Officer
of Bataan, to Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, Jr., Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan against Atty. Renato C. Bagay, for his
alleged notarization of 18 documents at the time he was out of the
country from March 13, 2008 to April 8, 2008.

These documents were endorsed to the Provincial Legal Office by

the Provincial Treasurer who had information that they were notarized
while respondent was outside the country attending the Prayer and
Life Workshop in Mexico. The letter contained the affidavits of the
persons who caused the documents to be notarized which showed a
common statement that they did not see respondent sign the
documents himself and it was either the secretary who signed them or
the documents came out of the office already signed. Upon verification
with the Bureau of Immigration, it was found out that a certain Renato
C. Bagay departed from the country on March 13, 2008 and returned
on April 8, 2008.

The respondent admitted the fact that there were documents

that were notarized while he was abroad and his signature was affixed
by his secretary who was not aware of the import of the act. Thus, by
his own admission, it was established that by his negligence in
employing an office secretary who had access to his office, his notarial
seal and records especially pertaining to his notarial documents
without the proper training, respondent failed to live up to the
standard required by the Rules of Notarial Practice.

Finding respondent guilty of negligence in the performance of his

notarial duty which gave his office secretary the opportunity to abuse
 CJ-2

his prerogative authority as notary public, the Investigating

Commissioner recommended the immediate revocation of respondent’s
commission as notary public and his disqualification to be
commissioned as such for period of two years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said

recommendation in its Resolution dated September 28, 2013.

ISSUE:

Whether the notarization of documents by the respondent’s

secretary while he was out of the country constituted negligence.

HELD:

The Court answers in the affirmative.

Respondent admitted in his comment and motion for

reconsideration that the 18 documents were notarized under his
notarial seal by his office secretary while he was out of the country.
This clearly constitutes negligence considering that respondent is
responsible for the acts of his secretary. Section 9 of the 2004 Rules of
Notarial Practice provides that a Notary Public refers to any person
commissioned to perform the official acts under these rules. A notary
public’s secretary is obviously not commissioned to perform official
acts of a notary public.

Respondent must fully bear the consequence of his negligence. A

person who is commissioned as notary public takes full responsibility
for all the entries in his notarial register. He cannot relieve himself of
this responsibility by passing the buck to his secretary.

Respondent violated Canon 9 of the CPR which requires lawyer

not to directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Due to his negligence that allowed his secretary to sign on his behalf
as notary public, he allowed an unauthorized person to practice law.
By leaving his office open despite his absence in the country and with
 CJ-3

his secretary in charge, he virtually allowed his secretary to notarize

documents without any restraint.

Respondent also violated his obligation under Canon 7 of the

CPR, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession. The people, who came into his office
while he was away, were clueless as to the illegality of the activity
being conducted therein. They expected that their documents would be
converted into public documents. Instead, they later found out that
the notarization of their documents was a mere sham and without any
force and effect. By prejudicing the persons whose documents were
notarized by an unauthorized person, their faith in the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession was eroded.
 CJ-4

AUGUSTO M. AQUINO, Petitioner, vs. HON. ISMAEL P.

CASABAR, as Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court-Guimba,
Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 and MA. ALA F. DOMINGO and
MARGARITA IRENE F. DOMINGO, substituting Heirs of the
deceased ANGEL T. DOMINGO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191470
January 26, 2015

FACTS:

Atty. Angel Domingo (now deceased) contracted with Augusto M.

Aquino to represent him in an Agrarian proceeding concerning his
property situated in Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Aquino successfully
prosecuted the Agrarian case from up to the Supreme Court. For the
legal services he rendered, Aquino filed a Motion for Approval of
Charging Attorney’s Lien and for the Order of Payment. The said
Motion was denied by Judge Cabasar ratiocinating that the court has
no jurisdiction over the motion for approval of charging attorney’s lien,
it having been filed after the judgment became final.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Motion for Approval of Charging Attorney’s

Lien of Aquino be denied by reason of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:

No. In the case of Rosario Jr. vs. De Guzman, the Court clarified
a similar issue and discussed the two concepts of attorney’s fees – that
is, ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal
services rendered. In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the
court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages. The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar
in other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite to their grant,
the intervention of or the rendition of professional services by a
lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of
his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not
 CJ-5

held liable for attorney’s fees as damages in favor of the winning party
who enforced his rights without the assistance of counsel. Moreover,
both fees are subject to judicial control and modification. And the rules
governing the determination of their reasonable amount are applicable
in one as in the other.

Similarly, in the instant case, the attorney’s fee being claimed by

Aquino is the compensation for professional services rendered, and not
an indemnity for damages. Aquino is claiming payment from Domingo
for the successful outcome of the agrarian case which he represented.
We see no valid reason why Judge Cabasar cannot pass upon a proper
petition to determine attorney's fees considering that it is already
familiar with the nature and the extent of Aquino’s legal services. If we
are to follow the rule against multiplicity of suits, then with more
reason that Aquino’s motion should not be dismissed as the same is in
effect incidental to the main case.

The Court is, likewise, unconvinced that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the motion solely due to non-payment of
docket fees. Aquino’s failure to pay the docket fees pertinent to his
motion should not be considered as having divested the court a quo's
jurisdiction. The Court notes that, in this case, there was no showing
that Aquino intended to evade the payment of docket fees as in fact he
manifested willingness to pay the same should it be necessary.

Likewise, pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.

(SIOL) v. Asuncion, should there be unpaid docket fees, the same
should be considered as a lien on the judgment. Thus, even on the
assumption that additional docket fees are required as a consequence
of petitioner's motion, its non-payment will not result in the court’s
loss of jurisdiction over the case.
 CJ-6

THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE SPOUSES VICENTE

CADAVEDO AND BENITA ARCOY-CADAVEDO (both deceased),
substituted by their heirs, namely: HERMINA, PASTORA, Heirs
of FRUCTUOSA, Heirs of RAQUEL, EVANGELINE, VICENTE, JR.,
and ARMANDO, all surnamed CADAVEDO, Petitioners, vs.
VICTORINO (VIC) T. LACAYA, married to Rosa Legados,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 173188
January 15, 2014

FACTS:

The Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant over a

parcel of land known as Lot 4515 located in Gumay, Piñan,
Zamboanga del Norte. They were issued an original Certificate of Title
No. P-376. The spouses Cadavedo sold the subject lot to the spoused
Vicente Ames and Martha Fernandez. TCT No. T-4792 was
subsequently issued in the name of the spouses Ames.

The present controversy arose when the spouses Cadavedo filed

an action before the RTC against the spouses Ames for sum of money
and/or voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter failed
to pay the balance of the purchase price. The spouses Cadavedo
initially engaged the services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health
reasons, later withdrew from the case, he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.

Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity of the

sale and the issuance of TCT No. T-4792 in the names of the spouses
Ames as gross violation of the public land law. The amended complaint
stated that the spoused Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency
fee basis. The contingency fee stipulation specifically reads:

That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs were forces

to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if they become the prevailing
parties in the case at bar, they will pay the sum of P2000.00 for
attorney’s fees.
 CJ-7

Eventually, Atty. Lacaya represented the Cadavedo spouses. On

appeal to the CA the appellate court granted attorney’s fee consisting
of one-half of the subject lot to Atty. Lacaya, instead of confirming the
agreed contingent attorney’s fees of P2,000.00

ISSUE:

Whether or not the award by the CA of attorney’s fees is vaild.

HELD:

No. Spouses Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency

basis. The Supreme Court held that spouses Cadavedo and Atty.
Lacaya agreed on a contingent fee of P2,000.00 and not, as asserted
by the latter, one-half of the subject lot. The stipulation contained in
the amended complaint filed by Atty. Lacaya clearly stated that the
spouses Cadavedo hired the former on a contingency basis; the
Spouses Cadavedo undertook to pay their lawyer ₱2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees should the case be decided in their favor. Granting
arguendo that the spouses Cadavedo and Atty. Lacaya indeed entered
into an oral contingent fee agreement securing to the latter one-half of
the subject lot, the agreement is void. The agreement is champertous
and is contrary to public policy. Any agreement by a lawyer to
“conduct the litigation in his own account, to pay the expenses thereof
or to save his client therefrom and to receive as his fee a portion of
the proceeds of the judgment is obnoxious to the law.” The rule of the
profession that forbids a lawyer from contracting with his client for
part of the thing in litigation in exchange for conducting the case at
the lawyer’s expense is designed to prevent the lawyer from acquiring
an interest between him and his client.
 CJ-8

GEORGE T. CHUA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE FORTUNITO L.

MADRONA, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394
September 1, 2014

FACTS:

On January 26, 1994, Manila Bay Development Corporation

(MBDC) leased 10 hectares of reclaimed land to Jimmy Gow. A year
later, Gow, who was the president of Uni wide Holdings, Inc. (Uni
wide), assigned the lease to Uniwide. MBDC and Uniwide then entered
into a supplemental agreement over the lease in 1996.

On February 17, 2011, Uniwide filed an action for reformation of

contract against MBDC in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parañaque
City. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-0060, and was
raffled to Branch 274 under respondent Presiding Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona, essentially alleged that MBDC had reneged on its promise to
develop the area into a commercial and business center; that the
construction of what later came to be known as Macapagal Avenue had
cut through the leased area, greatly affecting Uniwide’s construction
plans; and that subsequent changes in circumstances had gone
beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into
the lease contract.

Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon MBDC

on March 23, 2011. On the last day for the filing of its responsive
pleading, MBDC moved for the dismissal of the complaint instead of
filing its answer, claiming prescription and failureto state a cause of
action. MBDC also stated in its motion that the action for reformation
was merely a ploy by Uniwide to forestall the ejectment case against
it.

The RTC denied the motion to dismiss through its order dated
August 1, 2011. MBDC received a copy of the order on September 26,
2011, and filed its motion for reconsideration 11 days thereafter.
Judge Madrona then directed Uniwide and MBDC to file their comment
 CJ-9

and reply, respectively, after which the motion for reconsideration

would be deemed submitted for resolution.

Before MBDC could file its reply, Uniwide filed a motion to

declare MBDC in default.

On December 23, 2011, Judge Madrona issued another order

resolving the two pending motions, declaring MBDC in default, and
declaring its motion for reconsideration moot. Aggrieved, complainant
George T. Chua, as the president of MBDC, filed a complaint-affidavit
dated February 13, 2012 to charge Judge Madrona with manifest
partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law.

The Court referred the administrative case to the Court of

Appeals (CA) for investigation and recommendation.

The complainant asserted that the December 23, 2011 order

declaring MBDC in default, and rendering the motion for
reconsideration moot showed Judge Madrona’s manifest partiality in
favor of Uniwide; that the motion for reconsideration should have first
been resolved; that the motion to declare MBDC in default had not yet
been deemed submitted for resolution, for, in fact, Uniwide submitted
its reply to MBDC’s comment/opposition to the motion only after the
issuance of the December 23, 2011 order; that by failing to resolve
the substantial issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, MBDC
had been deprived of its right to participate in the proceedings; and
that MBDC had actively participated in the proceedings in the RTC, and
did not deserve to be declared in default.

On the allegation of gross misconduct, the complainant averred

that Judge Madrona’s refusal to dismiss the complaint, which on its
face had no basis and had already prescribed, made him unfit for his
position as judge; that the action was filed only in 2011,although the
contract sought to be reformed had been executed in 1994, while the
supplemental agreement had been entered into in 1996; and that in
declaring that Uniwide’s cause of action had arisen only in 2005 and
thus denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Madrona acted arbitrarily
and without basis.
 CJ-10

With regard to the allegation of gross ignorance of the law, the

complainant alleged that as a judge, Judge Madrona was expected to
know the pertinent law and procedural rules, and to apply them
properly and in good faith; that his stubborn refusal to reconsider the
default declaration despite having been fronted with jurisprudence,
citing Diaz v. Diaz,13 that the reglementary period within which to file
an answer to a complaint should be counted from a party’s receipt of
the order denying a motion for reconsideration; and that MBDC should
not have been declared in default without an earlier resolution of the
motion for reconsideration.

Finally, complainant accused Judge Madrona of tampering with

the minutes of the November 18, 2011 hearing, alleging that during
the hearing, MBDC was given 15 days to comment on Uniwide’s
motion to declare defendant in default, which was reflected in the
minutes of the RTC and confirmed by Sofronio Rojo, the court
interpreter, but that the minutes were later made out to give only 10
days to MBDC.

After thorough investigation, the undersigned Investigator

respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint against
Judge Madrona be dismissed for patent lack of merit and the
Complainant be admonished to refrain from filing groundless
administrative complaints against Judges without substantial or
credible evidence

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the administrative

case against Judge Madrona.

HELD:

No. The complainant’s allegations against Judge Madrona arose

from the following orders he had issued as the judge trying the civil
case involving MBDC, namely: (1) denying MBDC’s motion to dismiss;
(2) denying MBDC’s motion for reconsideration; and (3) granting
 CJ-11

Uniwide’s motion to declare defendant in default. Yet, it is clear that

such orders were Judge Madrona’s resolutions of the motion to
dismiss, motion for reconsideration, and motion to declare MBDC in
default, and thus involved the exercise of his judicial functions.
Assuming that Judge Madrona thereby erred, his errors were
correctible only through available judicial remedies, not by
administrative or disciplinary actions.

This administrative complaint against Judge Madrona is

disallowed and should be summarily dismissed. To start with, no
administrative recourse could supplant or pre-empt the proper
exercise by the CA of its certiorari jurisdiction. Furthermore, not every
error or mistake by a judge in the performance of his official duties as
a judge renders him administratively liable. Indeed, no judge can be
held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law,
or incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts
constituted fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or were imbued with
malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice.
These exceptions did not obtain here, for, as CA rightly observed,
MBDC did not adduce convincing evidence showing that Judge
Madrona’s acts were so gross or patent, deliberate and malicious; or
imbued with evident bad faith; or tainted with bias or partiality.
 CJ-12

MARIANO R. CRISTOBAL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RONALDO E.

RENTA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9925
September 17, 2014

FACTS:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Mariano Cristobal

against Atty. Ronaldo E. Renta.

Complainant engaged the services of Renta Pe & Associates Law

Office for the filing of a petition for recognition for the minors Codie
Darnell Green and Matthew Darnell Green before the Bureau of
Immigration. Respondent as the managing partner signed the special
contract of legal services in behalf of said law office. Respondent also
received from complainant the full package and price of P160,000.00
for the filing of the petition for recognition. No such petition, however,
was filed. Thus, the instant complaint was filed against the respondent
for the latter’s failure to file the petition for recognition and return the
amount of P160,000.00 despite demand.

In his comment, respondent explained that the petition for

recognition was not filed because Anneth Tan, the one supposed to file
the petition, misplaced it and did not inform him of such fact. He also
claimed that he begged complainant to forgive him and assured him
that he will return the money. However, respondent failed to refund
the money on time for he was hard up in funds. Eventually, he was
able to save money and refunded the money to complainant.
Respondent likewise begs forgiveness from the Court and promised
not to repeat his mistake. In addition, respondent submitted
complainant’s Affidavit of Desistance. In the said affidavit, complainant
said that respondent cried for forgiveness and that he has forgiven
him. Complainant confirmed that respondent had already refunded the
amount he paid.

In complainant’s reply, he confirmed the contents of his affidavit

of desistance, the refund made by the respondent and his act of
forgiving the respondent for the latter’s misdeeds.
 CJ-13

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of respondent is unethical?

HELD:

Yes, Atty. Renta was liable for violation of Canon 18 and Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility reads:

Canon 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted

to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.

The Court held that once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is

that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and diligence.
Here, it is beyond doubt that respondent breached his duty to serve
the complainant with diligence and neglected a legal matter entrusted
to him. He himself admits that the petition for recognition was not
filed, seeks forgiveness from the Court and promised not to repeat his
mistake. Complainant also submitted official letters from the Bureau of
Immigration that indeed no such petition was filed. That Anneth Tan
supposedly lost the petition for recognition and failed to inform
respondent cannot absolve him of the liability for it was his duty not to
neglect complainant’s case and handle it with diligence.

However, he was reprimanded with a stern warning that a

repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.

On complainant’s affidavit of desistance, we hold that its

execution cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings
against respondent in view of the public service character of the
practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public
interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and
 CJ-14

not meant to grant relied to a complainant as in a civil case, but is

intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable
members in order to protect the public and courts. A disbarment case
is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct
as an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of
the Bar.
 CJ-15

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MEINRADO P.

PAREDES, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366
February 4, 2015

FACTS:

Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a

student of Judge Paredes in Political Law Review at the Southwestern
University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August 2010, in
his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge
Rosabella Tormis as one of the judges involved in the marriage scams
in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge
Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of
the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his

discussions not only once but several times. In one session, Judge
Paredes was even said to have included in his discussion Francis
Mondragon Tormis, son of Judge Tormis, stating that he was a "court-
noted addict."

To avoid humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class

under Judge Paredes and transfer to another law school in Tacloban
City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O. Lachica v.

Judge Tormis, her mother was suspended from the service for six (6)
months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the
temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a
case then pending before her sala.

Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the findings conducted
therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced to severe
reprimand. Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate
language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements
in class, tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the
 CJ-16

laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and

inexcusable.

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes' position that he

could not be held administratively liable for his comments against
Judge Tormis and Francis as these were uttered while he was not in
the exercise of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence, as well as the
New Code of Judicial Conduct, required that he conduct himself beyond
reproach, not only in the discharge of his judicial functions, but also in
his other professional endeavors and everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jill's allegation that Judge Paredes

violated the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the marriage
scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still
being investigated.

Based on this findings, Justice Diy came up the with the

recommendations that the undersigned Investigating Justice finds that
indeed Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge.

Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes' first offense and considering

the factual milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it
is respectfully recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the
penalty of reprimand with a warning that a repetition of the same or a
similar offense will be dealt with more severely

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Paredes is guilty of conduct unbecoming a

judge and whether or not he violated the subjudice rule.

HELD:

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice

Diy.
 CJ-17

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and

definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves
any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate
the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established
by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant
disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists
in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of
others.

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct

relation to and be connected with the performance of his official
duties.20 Considering that the acts complained of, the remarks
against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in his
class discussions, they cannot be considered as “misconduct.” They
are simply not related to the discharge of his official functions as a
judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct,
much less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of

Judicial Conduct provides:

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or

could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment
 CJ-18

in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue.

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to

the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.21
The rationale for the rule was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v.
Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of
civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous
influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced
by bias, prejudice or sympathies.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary

comments tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant
judge in his class discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge by Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
requires judges to exemplify propriety at all times.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of

impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would

preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court
and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose
 CJ-19

his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself.
In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.
Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-
tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he

cannot be held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of
Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes
should be reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a judge
not only in the performance of his judicial duties, but in his
professional and private activities as well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2
of the Code mandates:

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial

office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the

people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely
be done but must also be seen to be done.

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in

or out of the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only
occasionally. It should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a public official is also
judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order
 CJ-20

to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the

judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judge’s official
life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge
should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should personify
judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal
behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion.
 CJ-21

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by

ATTY. BENILDA A. TEJADA, Complainant, vs. DAMVIN V.
FAMERO, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-10-2789
July 31, 2013

FACTS:

In a letter complaint, the Development Bank of the Philippines

(DBP), through its Office of the Legal Counsel, charged Sheriff lV
Damvin V. Famero (respondent), Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 43, with Gross Neglect of Duty amounting to
Gross Misconduct.

The complaint stemmed from the respondent's alleged

failure/refusal to implement the Writ of Execution issued in Civil Case
No. C-4 75, entitled "Development Bank of the Philippines, Calapan
Branch v. Damayang Buklurang Pangkabuhayan Roxas, Represented
by Romeo Tejada" (for Forcible Entry with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Damages). The complaint shows that in a decision
dated August 24, 2004, the RTC directed the defendant Damayang
Buklurang Pangkabuhayan Roxas (association), or any person acting in
its behalf or deriving any right from it, to vacate and deliver
possession of the property to the plaintiff, now complainant DBP. On
July 13, 2005, on the DBP’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution
directing the respondent to implement the judgment. Despite repeated
demands, however, the respondent allegedly failed to implement the
writ. After almost four (4) years from its issuance, the writ remains to
be implemented.

The respondent claimed that he is aware that when a writ is

placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any
instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it according to its mandate. Thus, upon receipt
of the writ, he immediately went to the property to enforce it. The
respondent further stated that, in his desire to help the DBP to fully
implement the writ, he suggested that it secure a writ of demolition so
 CJ-22

that he could proceed with the demolition of the structures and

improvements on the property. He believed that on his own, he cannot
just demolish the improvements without first securing a special order
from the court. He insisted that he has never been negligent in the
performance of his duty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sheriff Famero committed gross neglect of duty

amounting to Gross Misconduct.

HELD:

Yes. The respondent cannot fully be excused for his failure to

make periodic reports in the proceedings taken on the writ, as
mandated by Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 14,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides the manner for the
return of a writ of execution to the court and the requisite reports to
be made by the Sheriff or officer, should the judgment be returned
unsatisfied or only partially satisfied; every 30 days until the full
satisfaction of a judgment, the sheriff or officer must make a periodic
report to the court on the proceedings taken in connection with the
enforcement of the writ.19 Specifically, it provides –

Section 14. Return of writ of execution. – The writ of execution

shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the
judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt
of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the
reason therefore. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion.
The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30)
days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is
satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic
report shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and
shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties.
 CJ-23

The submission of the return and of periodic reports by the

sheriff is a duty that cannot be taken lightly. It serves to update the
court on the status of the execution and the reasons for the failure to
satisfy its judgment. The periodic reporting also provides the court
insights on how efficient court processes are after a judgment’s
promulgation. Its overall purpose is to ensure speedy execution of
decisions. A sheriff’s failure to make a return and to submit a return
within the required period constitutes inefficiency and incompetence in
the performance of official duties; it is conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
 CJ-24

CARMEN P. EDANO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE FATIMA

GONZALES-ASDALA and STENOGRAPHER MYRLA DEL PILAR
NICANDRO, Respondents.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1974
March 9, 2013

FACTS:

The complainant alleged that she was the plaintiff in a civil case
for Support with prayer for Support Pendente Lite (Civil Case No. Q-
97-30576), entitled “Carlo Edaño and Jay-ar Edaño, represented by
Carmen Edano v. George F. Butler,” pending before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 87, Quezon City, presided over by the respondent
judge.

The complainant claimed that the respondent judge made it

appear that Civil Case No. Q-97-30576 was decided on March 22,
2005, although the records show that she (respondent judge) still
ruled on several motions relating to this case even after that date. The
complainant further alleged that the respondent judge erred in
denying her notice of appeal.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required the

respondent judge to comment on the complaint. In her comment, the
respondent judge maintained that she had rendered the decision on
March 22, 2005, although it was mailed on a later date. Even
assuming that there was delay in rendering the decision, the delay was
not deliberate. She added that the complainant was not prejudiced by
the delay as she continuously received support pendente lite from the
defendant.

The respondent judge likewise explained that the orders she

issued after March 22, 2005 did not touch on the merits of the case;
they were orders directing the release of money deposited by the
defendant as support pendente lite. According to her, she denied the
complainant’s notice of appeal because Section 1, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an
order dismissing an action without prejudice. Finally, she explained
 CJ-25

that her dismissal of the subject civil case and the denial of the notice
of appeal are not the proper subjects of an administrative case as they
are acts pertaining to her judicial functions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Judicial

Ethics and guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

HELD:

Yes, the respondent judge is guilty of undue delay in rendering a

decision. Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution requires judges to
decide all cases within three (3) months from the date of submission.
This Constitutional policy is reiterated in Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which states that a judge should administer
justice impartially and without delay; and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the
same Code provides that a judge shall dispose of the court’s business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court

held that the 90-day period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases
within the reglementary period constitutes a ground for administrative
liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay. We
explained the raison d’etre behind the rule on mandatory compliance
with the constitutionally prescribed periods in Office of the Court
Administrator v. Reyes.

The honor and integrity of the judiciary is measured not only by

the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the
efficiency with which disputes are resolved. Thus, judges must perform
their official duties with utmost diligence if public confidence in the
judiciary is to be preserved. There is no excuse for mediocrity in the
performance of judicial functions. The position of judge exacts nothing
less than faithful observance of the law and the Constitution in the
discharge of official duties.
 CJ-26

ALMIRA C. FORONDA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ,

JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 9976
June 25, 2014

FACTS:

The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. In May

2008, she returned to the Philippines to institute a case for the
nullification of her marriage. The respondent was referred to her and
the complainant agreed to engage his services for a fee of
P195,000.00. The complainant paid the amount as agreed.

The complainant averred that the respondent promised to file

the petition after he received the full payment of his attorney’s fee, or
on June 11, 2008. In September 2008, the complainant inquired about
the status of her case and was allegedly told by the respondent that
her petition was pending in court; and in another time, she was told
that a decision by the court was already forthcoming. However, when
she came back to the country in May 2009, the respondent told her
petition was still pending in court and apologized for the delay.
Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and
found out that it was filed only on July 16, 2009.

The complainant further alleged in her complaint that the week

after she signed the contract of service with the respondent, the latter
requested for a meeting. Thinking that they were going to discuss her
case, she agreed. But during the meeting, the respondent invited her
to be an investor in the lending business allegedly ran by the
respondent’s sister-in-law.

The complainant finally agreed on the condition that the

respondent shall issue personal and postdated checks in her favor. But
according to the complainant, upon presentment of these checks, the
drawee-bank honored the first two checks, but the rest were
dishonored for being drawn against a closed account.
 CJ-27

In his Answer, the respondent admitted that he filed the petition

for annulment only on July 2009 but this was not due to his own fault.
The delay was caused by the complainant herself who allegedly
instructed him to hold the filing of the said petition as she and her
husband were discussing a possible reconciliation. He further claimed
that he filed the petition on July 16, 2009 after negotiations with the
complainant’s husband apparently failed.

The respondent also admitted that he invited the complainant to

be a partner in a lending business and clarified that the said business
was being managed by a friend. He further stated that he was also
involved in the said business as a partner.

The respondent admitted that only the first two of the checks he
issued were honored by the drawee-bank. He stated that prior to the
presentment and dishonor of the rest of the checks, he advised the
complainant that the third check should not be deposited just yet due
to losses in their lending business caused by the failure of some
borrowers to settle their obligations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Alvarez remiss his duties as a lawyer.

HELD:

Yes. It was established that the complainant engaged the

professional services of the respondent. She expected the immediate
filing of the petition for the nullity of her marriage after the full
payment of attorney’s fees on June 10, 2008. However, the
respondent filed the said petition only July 16, 2009. The respondent
gave out different reasons for the delay in an attempt to exculpate
himself. At the end, the respondent admitted through her agent was
diligent in following up the petition. The different excuses proffered by
the respondent also show his lack of candor in his dealings with the
complainant.
 CJ-28

Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer

owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He is required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and
utmost devotion. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client, he also serves the
ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect
of the community to the legal profession.

The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that
a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The issuance of checks which were later dishonored for
having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him, shows such lack
of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action.

It cannot be denied that the respondent’s unfulfilled promise to

settle his obligation and the issuance of worthless checks have
seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far as to file
multiple criminal cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 against him. The
relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary. Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his client. Necessity and public interest enjoin lawyers to be
honest and truthful when dealing with his client.

All told, the Court finds that the respondent is liable for violation
of Canon 15, 17, Rule 18.04, and Rule 16.04 of the CPR. Likewise, he
is also liable under Rule 1.01.
 CJ-29

IMELDA CATO GADDI, Complainant, v. ATTY. LOPE M. VELASCO,

Respondent.
A.C. No. 8637
September 15, 2014

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Imelda Gaddi against

Atty. Lope Velasco for violation of 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

According to Gaddi, she was the Operations and Accounting

Manager of the Bert Lozada Swimming School (BLSS) when she
broached the idea of opening a branch of BLSS in Solano Nueva
Vizcaya to Angelo Lozada, the Chief Operations Officer of BLSS.
Believing the Angelo agreed, Gaddi opened a BLSS in Solano.
However, in April 2010, Angelo informed the management that he did
not authorize a BLSS in Solano. Upon Angelo’s complaint, the police
officers apprehended the swimming instructors of BLSS in Solano,
namely; Jonathan Lozare, Katherine Gaddi Ancheta, who is Gaddi’s
niece, and Lorenz Ocampo Gandi, who is Gaddi’s grandson.

On April 22, 2010, Gaddi was informed of the apprehension of

the swimming instructors. Worried, Gaddi pleaded with Angelo’s wife,
Kristina Marie, and the BLSS Programs Manager Aleza Garcia for
permission to leave the office and proceed to Nueva Vizcaya. Instead
of acceding to her plea, they commanded Gaddi to make a handwritten
admission that the BLSS in Solano was unauthorized. They warned
Gaddi that she cannot leave the office without the handwritten
admission. Thus, Gaddi conceded in doing the handwritten admission
and left the office of the same day. Subsequently, Gaddi found out
that Angelo filed a complaint against her regarding the BLSS in Solano
using her handwritten admission which was already notarized by
Velasco.

Thus, Gaddi filed the present complaint against Velasco for

violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, specifically Rule IV,
Section 2 (b) and Rule VI, Section 3. Gaddi denied that she personally
appeared before Velasco to have her handwritten admission notarized.
 CJ-30

She alleged that she did not consent to its notarization nor did she
personally known him, give any competent evidence of identity or sign
the notarial register.

Investigating Commissioner Pablo Castillo found the complaint

impressed with merit and recommended a penalty of fine of P5,000.00
on Velasco for violation of Rule IV, Section 2(b) and Rule VI, Section 3
of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Velasco is liable for violation of the 2004

Rules on Notarial Practice.

HELD:

Yes. The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice provides that a notary

public should not notarize a document unless the signatory to the
document is in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the
notarization, and personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified through competent evidence of identity. At the time of
notarization, the signatory shall sign or affix with a thumb or mark the
notary public’s notarial register. The purpose of these requirements is
to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature
and to ascertain that the document is the signatory’s free act and
deed. If the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will, a notary
public is mandated to refuse to perform a notarial act. A notary public
is also prohibited from affixing an official signature or seal on a
notarial certificate that is incomplete.

For notarizing a document without ascertaining the identity and

voluntariness of the signatory to the document, for affixing his
signature in an incomplete notarial certificate, and for dishonesty in his
pleading, Velasco failed to discharge his duties as notary public and
breached Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR. Considering these finding
and our previous rulings, Velasco should not only be disqualified for
two years as a notary public, he must also be suspended from the
practice of law for one year.
 CJ-31

IN THE MATTER OF THE BREWING CONTROVERSIES IN THE

ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC
April 11, 2013

FACTS:

On December 4, 2012, the Court issued a resolution addressing

the issues with respect to the election of governor for IBP-Western
Visayas. In clarifying that the rotational rule was one by exclusion, the
Court explained that in the election of governor of a region, all
chapters of the region should be given the opportunity to have their
nominees elected as governor, to the exclusion of those chapters that
had already served in the rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle
would be completed, all chapters of a region, except the chapter which
won in the immediately preceding elections, could once again have the
equal opportunity to vie for the position of governor of their region.
The chapter that won in the immediately preceding election, under the
rotational cycle just completed, could only vie for the position of
governor after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.

Earlier, on July 27, 2012, IBP-Southern Luzon filed its Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Attached Petition In Intervention
and the subject Petition In Intervention, seeking a declaration that the
post of EVP for the 2011-2013 term be held open to all regions and
that it be qualified to nominate a candidate for the position of EVP for
the 2011-2013 term.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said petition is a violation to the principle of

rotation by exclusion.

HELD:

No. Election through "rotation by exclusion" is the more

established rule in the IBP. The rule prescribes that once a member of
the chapter is elected as Governor, his chapter would be excluded in
 CJ-32

the next turn until all have taken their turns in the rotation cycle. Once
a full rotation cycle ends and a fresh cycle commences, all the
chapters in the region are once again entitled to vie but subject again
to the rule on rotation by exclusion.

Thus, applying the principle of ‘rotation by exclusion’ in Western

Visayas which starts with a new rotation cycle, all chapters (with the
exception of Romblon) are deemed qualified to vie for the
Governorship for 2011-2013 term without prejudice to the chapters
entering into a consensus to adopt any pre-ordained sequence in the
new rotation cycle provided each chapter will have its turn in the
rotation.

The Court takes notice of the predictability of the rotation by

succession scheme. Through the rotation by exclusion scheme, the
elections would be more genuine as the opportunity to serve as
Governor at any time is once again open to all chapters, unless, of
course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle. While
predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one
chapter remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court
"the rotation rule should be applied in harmony with, and not in
derogation of, the sovereign will of the electorate as expressed
through the ballot.
 CJ-33

BERNARD N. JANDOQUILE, Complainant, vs. ATTY. QUIRINO P.

REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 9514
April 10, 2013

FACTS:

Atty. Revilla, Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by

Heneraline Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas-Pedrosa and Elmer Alvarado.
Heneraline and Herezaline are sisters of Atty. Revilla, Jr.'s wife, while
Elmer is a houseboy of the Brosas’s Family.

Jandoquile complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. is disqualified to

perform the notarial act per Sec 3c, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, viz: “Notary public is disqualified from performing a
notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal
within the fourth civil degree”.

Jandoquile also complains that Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not require
the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their valid
identification cards.

Hence, this complaint for disbarment against Atty. Revilla Jr.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not deny but admitted Jandoquile’s material
allegations. He submits that his act is not a ground for disbarment. He
also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should
be considered more as counsel than as a notary public when he
notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to
present valid identification cards since he knows them personally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not notarizing a document of relatives within the

fourth civil degree of affinity and, at the same time, not requiring them
to present valid identification cards is a ground for disbarment.
 CJ-34

HELD:

Atty. Revilla, Jr. violated the disqualification rule under Section

3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Given the clear
provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr.
to act with prudence and should have refused notarizing the
document.

The court didn’t agree with Atty. Revilla’s proposition that he

should be considered more as a counsel of the affiants than as notary
public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial
certificate at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his signature
as a notary public, with a notarial commission valid until December 31,
2012. He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as counsel of the
three affiants.

On the second charge, Atty. Revilla, Jr. cannot be held liable. If

the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need not require
them to show their valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is
not without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the "jurat" of the
complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows
the three affiants personally.

Atty. Revilla, Jr.’s violation of the disqualification rule under

Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice is not a
sufficient ground to disbar him. Atty. Revilla, Jr. did not commit any
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct or gross immoral conduct, or
any other serious ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Atty. Revilla, Jr., was just reprimanded and
disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public, or from
performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary
public, for a period of three (3) months.
 CJ-35

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA

I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City,
Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200
April 2, 2014

FACTS:

The complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-
7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave
Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence,
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack
of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza,
Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections and despite serious
conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver
for SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of
SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as
legal adviser.

The respondent conducted informal meetings in places outside

her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports
club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the
terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted
to approve for SCP.

The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal

meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that she had
favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB). The respondent had secret
meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without
the knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.

The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or

accusations against SCP, leading to EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create
a management committee. When requested to conduct an evidentiary
meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIB’s
witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the
 CJ-36

creation of a management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s

requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute.
At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated
SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to
speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made
condescending and snide remarks. The respondent failed to observe
the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation
plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for
permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC). The
respondent also erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4
of the Rules (the court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to
include the power to amend, modify and alter it.

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint dated

April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the respondent committed an act
of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social
networking website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details
as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible
partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a
shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except
probably a brassiere.

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the

respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the
complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad
faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. The OCA also found that the
charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings
were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s
explanation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary
period. Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse
of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they
should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on
allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, lack of circumspection and impropriety, the
OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations that the
respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account
contravened the standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
 CJ-37

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Judicial

Conduct.

HELD:

Yes. On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section

6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all

proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others
with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.

Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s

legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural
and negligible lapses, her snide remarks, as well as her condescending
attitude, are conduct that the Court cannot allow. They are displays of
arrogance and air of superiority that the Code abhors.

On the ground of impropriety, in the exercise of freedom of

expression, Judges should always conduct themselves in a manner
that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of

judges in all of their activities, whether it be in the course of their
judicial office or in their personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2
of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety
and even the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance

of impropriety in all of their activities.
 CJ-38

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must

accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Based on this provision, the Court held that the respondent

disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her
when she posted Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-
shouldered" suggestive dress and made this available for public
viewing.

To restate the rule, in communicating and socializing through

social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they
communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of
his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s
opinion not just of the judge but of the entire Judiciary of which he or
she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes
are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by
acquaintances and the general public.
 CJ-39

ATTY. AILEEN R. MAGLANA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE

VICENTE R. OPINION, Respondent.
B.M. No. 2713
June 10, 2014

FACTS:

On May 25, 2013, thirteen (13) delegates of the IBP Eastern

Visayas Region gathered at the Leyte RTC to elect a Governor of their
region for the 2013-2015 term. Governor Enage presided over the
election and thereafter. Atty. Maglana was nominated for the position
of Governor. Atty. Maglana moved that Governor Enage declare that
only IBP Samar Chapter was qualified to be voted upon for the
position, to the exclusion of all the other eight (8) chapters. Atty
Maglana cited the rotation rule under BM No. 491 and argued that
since the start of the implementation of the rule, only IBP Samar
Chapter had not served as Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas.

Atty. Opinion, the candidate of the IBP Eastern Samar Chapter,

thereafter, took the floor and manifested that before he decided to run
for Governnor, he sought the opinion of the IBP if he was still qualified
to run considering that he also ran for Governor and lost in the
immediately preceding term. Through a letter, the IBP said that losing
the Governorship elections does not disqualify a chapter from seeking
an election for Governorship.

Governor Enage counted the votes, with six (6) votes in favor of
Atty. Opinion considered as stray votes and four (4) votes in favor of
Atty. Maglana. He then proceeded to proclaim Atty. Maglana as the
duly elected Governor of IBP Eastern Visayas in view of the
disqualification of the other nominee, Atty. Opinion.

Atty Opinion filed an election protest with IBP BOG, where he

contends that the Rotational Rule was not followed. Second, Atty.
Maglana cannot simply reclaim IBP Samar Chapter’s right to the
governorship in the 2013-2015 term because it is contrary to Section
39, Article VI, as amended, of the IBP By-Laws.
 CJ-40

ISSUE:

Whether Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected

Governor for IBP Eastern Visayas for the 2013-2015 term.

HELD:

The rotation rule under Section 39, Article VI, as amended, of

the IBP By-Laws actually consists of two underlying directives. First is
the directive for the mandatory and strict implementation of the
rotation rule. The rule mandates that the governorship of a region
shall rotate once in as many terms as there may be chapters in the
region. This serves the purpose of giving every chapter a chance to
represent the region in the IBP BOG. Second is the exception from the
mandatory and strict implementation of the rotation rule. This
exception would allow a chapter to waive its turn in the rotation order,
subject to its right to reclaim the governorship at any time before the
rotation is completed.

Based on the above considerations, we agree with the IBP BOG

that Governor Enage seriously erred in disqualifying Atty. Opinion as a
candidate and in declaring the six (6) votes he garnered as stray.

The election of Atty. Opinion is well-settled. He did not only

come from the chapter which is entitled to be elected for the position
but also got the majority of six (6) votes, as opposed to the four (4)
votes garnered by Atty. Maglana in the May 25, 2013 elections.

As the Court held in its December 14, 2010 Resolution in In the

Matter of the Brewing Controversies in the Election in the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,50 “if a validly nominated candidate obtains the
highest number of votes in the election conducted, his electoral
mandate deserves to be respected unless obtained through fraud as
established by evidence.” Similarly, such is not the case here and thus,
Atty. Opinion should be declared the duly elected Governor for IBP
Eastern Visayas in the 2013-2015 term.
 CJ-41

CZARINA T. MALVAR, Petitioner, vs. KRAFT FOOD PHILS., INC.

and/or BIENVENIDO BAUTISTA, KRAFT FOODS
INTERNATIONAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183952
September 9, 2013

FACTS:

Malvar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal

dismissal against KFPI and Bautista in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The Labor Arbiter found and declared her
suspension and dismissal illegal, and ordered her reinstatement, and
the payment of her full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits, plus attorney’s fees. NLRC and CA affirmed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter. After the judgment in her favor became final and
executor, Malvar moved for the issuance of a writ of execution but the
execution failed due to questionable computation of the award. Malvar
requested for the second issuance of the writ of execution and was
partially complied with but with protest on the part of Kraft by filing a
TRO for further execution since the computation is incorrect. CA ruled
in favor of Kraft. Thus, Malvar appealed.

While her appeal was pending in this Court, Malvar and Kraft
entered into a compromise agreement. Thereafter, Malvar filed an
undated Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw Case, praying that the appeal be
immediately dismissed/withdrawn in view of the compromise
agreement, and that the case be considered closed and terminated.
Before the Court could act on Malvar’s Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw
Case, the Court received a so-called Motion for Intervention to Protect
Attorney’s Rights from Malvar’s counsel. The counsel indicated that
Malvar’s precipitate action had baffled, shocked and even embarrassed
the Intervenor/counsel, because it had done everything legally
possible to serve and protect Malvar’s interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the Motion for Intervention to protect

attorney’s rights prosper.
 CJ-42

HELD:

Yes. A client has an undoubted right to settle her litigation

without the intervention of the attorney, for the former is generally
conceded to have exclusive control over the subject matter of the
litigation and may at any time, if acting in good faith, settle and adjust
the cause of action out of court before judgment, even without the
attorney’s intervention. It is important for the client to show, however,
that the compromise agreement does not adversely affect third
persons who are not parties to the agreement. By such, a client has
the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any
time with or without cause. But this right of the client is not unlimited
because good faith is required in terminating the relationship. It is
basic that an attorney is entitled to have and to receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client. The attorney who has acted in good
faith and honesty in representing and serving the interests of the client
should be reasonably compensated for his service.

Although the practice of law is not a business, an attorney is

entitled to be properly compensated for the professional services
rendered for the client, who is bound by her express agreement to
duly compensate the attorney. The client may not deny her attorney
such just compensation.
 CJ-43

SPOUSES NICASIO AND DONELITA SAN PEDRO, Complainants,

vs. ATTY. ISAGANI A. MENDOZA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5440
November 26, 2014

FACTS:

For resolution is a complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses

Nicasio and Donelita San Pedro (complainants) against Atty. Isagani A.
Mendoza (respondent).

On or about November 21, 1996, complainants engaged the

services of respondent to facilitate the transfer of title to property, in
the name of Isabel Azcarraga Marcaida, to complainants. Complainants
then gave respondent a check for P68,250.00 for the payment of
transfer taxes. They also gave respondent a check for P13,800.00 for
respondent's professional fee.

Respondent failed to produce the title despite complainants'

repeated follow-ups. Several letters were sent by respondent
explaining the delay in the transfer of title. However, respondent still
failed to produce the title. Complainants subsequently referred the
case to the barangay. Respondent refused to return the amount
complainants gave for the transfer taxes. Complainants were then
issued a certificate to file action. They also sent a letter demanding
the refund of the money intended for the transfer taxes. Respondent
still did not return the money.

On May 8, 2000, respondent sent another letter to complainants.

He promised to settle the transfer of the land title. However,
respondent reneged on this promise. Complainants were then forced
to obtain a loan from Philippine American Life and General Insurance
Company to secure the transfer of the title to the property in their
names.

The present administrative case was referred to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. The parties were then called to a mandatory
 CJ-44

conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. They were

required to submit their position papers. Respondent did not submit
his position paper.

On July 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Salvador

B. Hababag, submitted his findings and recommendation. The
Investigating Commissioner found that respondent violated Canon 16,
Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 16 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility for failing to hold in trust the
money of his clients.

HELD:

Yes. It has been said that the practice of law is a privilege

bestowed on lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency
and morality. Any conduct that shows a violation of the norms and
values of the legal profession exposes the lawyer to administrative
liability.

An examination of the records reveals that respondent violated

the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS

AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property

collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate
and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
 CJ-45

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his
client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien
to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client's interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling
for the client.

Similarly, Rule138, Section 25 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. When

an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client
after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt
as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a
bar to a criminal prosecution.

A lawyer's duty under Canon 16 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility is clear. The fiduciary nature of the relationship between
counsel and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the
money or property collected or received for or from the client, thus
when a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account to the
client how the money was spent. If he does not use the money for its
intended purpose, he must immediately return it to the client. His
failure either to render an accounting or to return the money (if the
intended purpose of the money does not materialize) constitutes a
blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 CJ-46

The lawyer’s failure to return the client's money upon demand

gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him
by the client.
 CJ-47

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs.

LORENZA M. MARTINEZ, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Candelaria, Quezon. Respondent.
A.M. No. P-06-2223
June 10, 2013

FACTS:

This administrative case arose from the financial audit conducted

by the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), in the Municipal Trial Court of Candelaria, Quezon (MTC). The
audit covered the accountabilities of Lorenza M. Martinez, Clerk of
Court, from March 1985 to November 2005.

The audit disclosed that Martinez incurred cash shortages in the

Judicial Development Fund (JDF). The audit team discovered that the
shortages were due to the manipulation of Martinez.

In a letter, dated September 4, 2006, Martinez denied

responsibility for the shortage in the JDF as it was the court’s Clerk II
who did the transactions. Martinez asked for a reconsideration of her
suspension citing her 28 years of service as basis and begged for the
release of her withheld salary.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Clerk of Court Martinez be dismissed from the

service for gross dishonesty resulting in malversation of judiciary
funds.

HELD:

Yes. Martinez violated OCA Circular No. 26-97, which directs

judges and clerks of court to strictly comply with the provisions of the
Auditing and Accounting Manual, particularly Article VI, Sections 61
and 113 thereof, which require collecting officers to promptly issue
official receipts for all money received by them. She likewise violated
OCA Circular No. 50-95 which mandates all clerks of court to deposit,
 CJ-48

within 24 hours from receipt, all collections from bailbonds, rental

deposits and other fiduciary collections.

The Court reminds that those charged with the dispensation of

justice, from the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. A public servant
is expected to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and
integrity, and should be made accountable to all those whom he
serves. There is no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot meet
the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity. The Court
condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission
on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice which
would violate the norm of public accountability and would diminish, or
even just tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
 CJ-49

CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANASTACIO E.

REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 7054,
November 11, 2014

FACTS:

Que filed a disbarment case before the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines, case against Atty. Anastacio Revilla of committing the
following violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138 of the Rules of Court:

1. The respondent’s abuse of court remedies and processes by

filing a petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, two
petitions for annulment of title before the RTC, a petition for
annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC to assail and overturn the final
judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case
rendered against the respondent’s clients. The respondent in this
regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the
MeTC and RTC knowing fully well that these courts have
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also
repeatedly attacked the complainant’s and his siblings’ titles over
the property subject of the unlawful detainer case.

2. The respondent’s commission of forum-shopping by filing the

subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the
efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and
to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute
the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case.

3. The respondent’s lack of candor and respect towards his

adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and deception
to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of
justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of
judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the
presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion
 CJ-50

to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The

complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his
lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients
(who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.

4. The respondent’s willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly

maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late
Atty. Alfredo Catolico, the previous counsel of the respondent’s
clients.

5. The respondent’s deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized

appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment
for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

6. The respondent’s willful and fraudulent appearance in the second

petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines without being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complainant further alleged that the respondent of

representing fifty-two (52) litigants in a civil case when no such
authority was ever given to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the imputed
unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty
these transgressions should carry.

HELD:

Yes, the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical
infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.

Under the circumstances, the respondent’s repeated attempts go

beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in
defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for
measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC
 CJ-51

and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03 of the
CPR which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of
procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the end of justice. By his
actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct
the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice
to the winning parties in that case.

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of

the CPR, as well as rule against forum-shopping, both of which are
directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same
objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they
tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly
judicial procedure, and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened
dockets of the courts.

For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of
CPR for violating the lawyer’s duty to observe candor and fairness in
his dealing with the court.

In defending his clients’ interest, the respondent also failed to

observe Rule 19.01 of CPR which obligates a lawyer, in defending his
client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and
honor.
 CJ-52

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE

RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
September 23, 2014

FACTS:

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc

after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan.

In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate

Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue
Ribbon Committee) on pork barrel scam, the names of certain
government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-
blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind,
Napoles, wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by
the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs.
Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

Marina Sula executed a Sworn Statement before the National

Bureau of Investigation (NBI), part of it which reads that in her the
sixteen (16) years that she worked with Ms. Napoles, she witnessed
several personalities visit Napoles’ offices and join them as their
special guests during their parties and other special occasions. Among
them is Associate Justice Ong.

Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to

conduct an investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and
members of the legal profession.
 CJ-53

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never

really had personal knowledge whether respondent is indeed the
alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she
supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence,
Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on hearsay.

Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or

irregular for him to have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in
order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending
case with his court, and to his knowledge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Associate Justice Ong violated the New Code of

Judicial Conduct.

HELD:

Yes. A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial and that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this
appearance. Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all
impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the subject of constant
public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions
on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.

In Cañeda v. Alaan, the Court held that Judges are required not
only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety. They must conduct
themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
Respondent’s acts have been less than circumspect. He should have
kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored
to distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of
indecorum.
 CJ-54

As the Court held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana, Judges should

be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing
before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or
partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in
retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be
desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work
commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar in
worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are
in keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession.
In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges
should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to
awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess
proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such
manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their
counsel of the judges’ competence, integrity and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer

pending when improper acts were committed by the judge. Because
magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a
case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion
on its disposition or resolution. As what transpired in this case,
respondent’s association with Napoles has unfortunately dragged the
Judiciary into the “Pork Barrel” controversy which initially involved only
legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles’ much-flaunted
“contact” in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We
cannot, by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider
respondent’s transgression as a simple misconduct.
 CJ-55

SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, and BENJAMIN

DANDA, Complainants, vs. ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR.,
WENCESLAO “PEEWEE” TRINIDAD, and ANDRESITO FORNIER,
Respondents.
A.C. No. 7649
December 14, 2011

FACTS:

Complainants claim that they met former Pasay City Regional

Trial Court Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in
Cotabato City. De Guzman allegedly persuaded them to file an illegal
recruitment case against certain persons, in exchange for money. De
Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his group,
composed of Pasay City Mayor Trinidad, Atty. Fornier, Everson Lim Go
Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Stevenson Lim Go Tian, were
untouchable.

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar

Discipline found that the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and
Fornier are deemed to be without basis and consequently, the
undersigned recommends dismissal of the charges against them.
However, as to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court
Judge, there is enough basis to hold him administratively liable.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

adopted the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioners
Report and Recommendation on the dismissal of the charges against
Fornier and Trinidad. In De Guzmans case, the Board of Governors
increased the penalty from a suspension of two (2) months to a
suspension of two (2) years from the practice of law for his attempt to
file illegal recruitment cases to extort money.

ISSUE:

Whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be

administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint.
 CJ-56

HELD:

Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and

Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal
of the charges against Trinidad and Fornier is adopted. Decision of the
Board of Governors and the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzman's liability is
reversed, and likewise dismiss the charges against De Guzman.

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a

person is presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This Court has
consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he
is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and
that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his
duties in accordance with his oath.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment

proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.
In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise
doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent