DANIELA ALEJANDRA SÁNCHEZ PATIÑO.

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KNOWING HOW AND KNOWING THAT

In the following text I am going to expose the problem dichotomous that

Gilbert Ryle considers on the knowledge and the action: ' knowing how and
knowing that'. This problem is derived from the theory of Descartes about
the ghost in the machine. According to this theory, the mental processes are
different from the physical processes, this would lead to belief or to
affirmation of two reaso for the same action; a mental reason and a physical
reason. Followed by this theory, as there are two reasons for the same
action one gives then what Gilbert calls like: ' knowing how and knowing
that '.
Knowing that refers to the practical knowledge, that is to say, to the
knowledge that is had on doing a thing. And knowing how it refers to the
intellectual knowledge. These aptitudes "to 'know", are different.
Nevertheless, that are different it does not mean that they are separated,
since they believe the intelectualistas. Gilbert explains the difference
between intelligence and intellect: the intelligence to knowing; is to know
how to execute an act capably in certain circumstances. And the intellect; it
is to know how the whole knowledge put into practice a posteriori that has
been obtained. This way, knowing how it refers to the intelligence and
knowing that, to the intellect.
The problem takes root in that if the intelectualistaffirm the dichotomy of
these two capacities, his effect would be the same that the mentioned one
previously, and this representaria a contradiction. An example of this
would be:
“when the agent is thinking what he is doing while he is doing it, and
thinking what he is doing in such a manner that he would not do the action
so well if he were not thinking what he is doing”1
This way, from this example I am going to explain the contradiction in
which this theory happens: according to the intellectualists, an action
executed capably, or, intelligently must be preceded for the intellectual
capacity of the being. Nevertheless, this is to fall down in a mistake
1
RYLE, Gilbert. The concept of mind. Cap. II
categorial. As I said previously, the intellect is not the same thing that the
intelligence, and it is a concept logically before the knowledge that. If the
knowledge of a rule has not to interpret of a certain way, the idea that the
knowledge that is before the knowledge how. So, The knowledge how,
traditionally seen as the low process, it is actually logically before the
knowledge that. The propositions that we do, for example, the knowledge
that one can have on the chess it is put in practice when to put to play. Now
then, does question arise from how the maxims must be understood for the
success of the action? According to Gilbert, they must be understood in the
logical function of the action.
To this question the intellectualists answer that: the rational behavior is
compared with the internal systems of reasoning, as the valuation or the
reflection. Nevertheless, this affirms that the this wrong theory, and it
produces something that Gilbert names an infinite regress. This is, to
reduce the theory to an absurdity: since in order that an action could be an
intelligent debit to be governed by an intellectual operation, even if these
capacities are not the same thing. Of this form, “intelligent cannot be
defined in terms of ‘intellectual’ or ‘knowing how in terms of knowinh
that’; ‘ thinking what I am doing’ does not connote ‘both thinking what to
do and doing it’. When I do something intelligently, i.e. thinking what I am
doing, I am doing one thing and not two”2

2
Ibíd., cap. II