International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152

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International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ijdrr

Review Article

Deluge, disaster and development in Uttarakhand Himalayan

region of India: Challenges and lessons for
disaster management
Chandra Prakash Kala
Ecosystem and Environment Management, Indian Institute of Forest Management, Nehru Nagar, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh 462003, India

a r t i c l e i n f o abstract

Article history: The Himalaya has been venerated by communities since antiquity and hence visited by a
Received 8 November 2013 large number of pilgrims for paying tribute, annually. Uttarakhand state in the Indian
Received in revised form Himalaya being the place of major Hindu shrines like Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri and
4 March 2014
Yamunotri and also the place of origin of many sacred rivers including the Ganges, at
Accepted 12 March 2014
Available online 24 March 2014
present, is best known for the religious tourism. Though, the state population is about 10
million, over 25 million tourists visited here in 2011 despite the fact that the state remains
Keywords: under frequent natural hazards in the forms of landslides, earthquakes and flash floods
Himalaya mainly during monsoon. Recently, on 16 and 17 June 2013, the torrential downpour and
Ecosystem and environment
subsequent flooding had wreaked havoc that not only swallowed vast swathes of
Uttarakhand
Uttarakhand but also took life of thousands of pilgrims and tourists. The cloudburst,
Natural and man made disasters
Development heavy rainfall and subsequent landslides are the natural disasters but this disaster in
Disaster management Uttarakhand is mainly attributed by masses as a man-made disaster due to unregulated
tourism and unplanned construction. In this background, the major aim of this study is to
explore and review the factors responsible for increased intensity and scale of disaster due
to flash floods in the Uttarakhand state of India. The paper also reviews and discusses
various options for disaster risk reductions in the sensitive ecosystem such as the
Himalaya.
& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2. Pilgrimage, deluge and disaster in Alaknanda river basin of Uttarakhand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
2.1. Deluge and disaster of 16 and 17 June 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
2.2. Causes perceived for amplification of disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3. Issues of disaster management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.1. Environmental impact assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.2. Emergency action plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.3. Formation of eco-sensitive zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.4. Rescue, rehabilitation and reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

E-mail address: cpkala@yahoo.co.uk

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.03.002
2212-4209/& 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
144 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152

4. Planning ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
Appendix A Supplementary material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

1. Introduction Garhwal and Kumaon – which together form 13 districts.

Of the total 13 districts, four districts (e.g., Nainital,
The highest mountain region in the world, the Himalaya, Haridwar, Dehradun and Udham Singh Nagar) have large
being structurally unstable and young is still geologically areas in the plains, whereas the other nine districts
active, fragile and vulnerable to both natural and man-made comprise the hill region of the state [14]. The total
processes [1,2]. In the era of globalization and so that the geographical area of the state is 53,485 km2, elevation
industrialization and so-called modernization, people have ranges from 210 m to 7817 m, and the average rainfall
overlooked the natural ecosystems and carrying capacity of ranges from 1000 to 2500 mm per year, of which 50–80%
the Himalaya, besides the traditional beliefs and norms of comes down during the monsoon. Though, the land
nature conservation [3,4]. The seers and saints who found holdings are small, fragmented and mostly rain-fed, over
the Himalaya as the source of sacred thoughts and peace three-fourth of the state population mainly depends on
were subsequently followed by the large number of pilgrims. agriculture for livelihood [15].
Over the centuries, the numbers of pilgrims have increased Uttarakhand being a devbhumi (the land of Gods) has
exponentially at major pilgrim centers across the Himalaya been well known for pilgrimage to its historical shrines
[5,6]. Uttarakhand state of India is one such centers of such as Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri and Yamunotri,
pilgrim activities in the Himalaya, which is visited by popularly known as ‘chardham’. Earlier, pilgrims had to
millions of pilgrims, as it has four major Hindu and one walk to these holy spots, all located in the high altitudes of
Sikh shrines – the Badrinath, Kedarnath, Gangotri, Yamuno- the Himalaya. The paths were not wider and those who
tri and Hemkund [7,8]. In order to fulfill the need of such a were hard and tough had privilege to visit these places.
huge number of pilgrims an intricate network of roads, Like ‘chardham’ the lakes and rivers of Uttarakhand are
hotels, lodges and related support systems has built into the respected and considered sacred by the pilgrims. The most
remote mountainous areas of the Himalaya. sacred river of India – the Ganges – originates from the
The sensitive natural features of Uttarakhand such as Gaumukh glacier of Uttarakhand. The Alaknanda and
fragile ecosystem, tectonic set-up and high precipitation Bhagirathi are the major tributaries of the Ganges, of
are being made more precarious by the vested interests of which the Alaknanda drains a large catchment. At the first
people in real estate, haphazard tourism and plundering of stretch from Alkapuri to Vishnuprayag it meets with
natural resources as well as construction of mega hydro Dhauli Ganga. Further down, the Alaknanda meets several
power projects [9]. Like any mountainous region of the tributaries namely, Patalganga, Birahiganga, Nandakini,
world, historically, Uttarakhand Himalayan region of India Pindar, and Mandakini, before being called as Ganges after
has suffered from frequent natural hazards in the forms of meeting with Bhagirathi at Devprayag. Since all these
landslides, flash floods during monsoon and earthquakes major tributaries of the Ganges flow down through a
[10–13]. These incidences result in the loss of humans, fragile ecosystem that is prone to landslides, the small
agriculture lands, infrastructure, and further instability of amount of rainfall slides down the mountain slopes which
mountain slopes and ecosystems. Recently, on 16 and 17 block the river flow and create havoc thereafter.
June 2013, the torrential downpour and subsequent flood- The historical records reveal instances of deluge in
ing had wreaked havoc and swallowed vast swathes of Alaknanda on many occasions [16]. In 1893, a landslide –
Uttarakhand state. The cloudburst, heavy rainfall and the largest known in central Himalaya – blocked the
subsequent landslides are the natural disasters but this Birahiganga and formed a lake, a part of which was
disaster in the Alaknanda river basin of Uttarakhand is toppled after about ten months. The massive outburst of
mainly attributed by masses as a man-made disaster that water sent a tidal wave down the valley and washed away
attracts special attention, worldwide. In this background the vast swathes of land along with human settlements in
the major aim of this paper is to explore and review the the Alaknanda river basin. In 1968, a landslide dam burst
factors responsible for high human deaths and loss of and caused much damage. In September 1969, a huge
resources due to flash floods in the Uttarakhand state of landslide blocked nearly three-fourth of the width of
India. The paper also looks at and discusses various Alaknanda at Kaliasor [17].
options for disaster risk reductions in the sensitive eco- One of the worst floods in the Alaknanda took place in
system such as the Himalaya. 20th July 1970 that had triggered off numerous landslides.
The 1970 flood brought down an estimated 9.1 mcum of
silt and rock into the Alaknanda which buried a part of
2. Pilgrimage, deluge and disaster in Alaknanda river Srinagar town under several feet of silt [17]. Three years
basin of Uttarakhand later, the people of Garhwal came forward aggressively to
protect the fragile ecosystem of the Himalaya which gave
The Uttarakhand state of India lies between 281430 and birth to the world famous Chipko movement. The deluges
311270 N and 771340 to 81120 E. It comprises of two regions – and landslides have been persistent threats to the pilgrims
 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152 145

visiting along the Alaknanda river basin for paying tribute
at Badrinath and Kedarnath. In the last 5 years, the major
causes for human casualties due to disaster in the state as
per Comptroller and Auditor General of India [18] are
excessive rains (28%) and landslides (27%).
2.1. Deluge and disaster of 16 and 17 June 2013
The torrential downpour and subsequent deluge
wreaked havoc in Uttarakhand on June 16th night and
again within 12 h on June 17th morning 2013. The timeline
of events associated with this deluge is given in Table 1.
The state received 4 340 mm of rainfall on 17th June 2013
alone, which is 375% above the daily normal rainfall
(65.9 mm) during monsoon [19]. As known for natural
disasters, the hill districts of Uttarakhand (e.g., Chamoli,
Rudraprayag, Uttarkashi and Pithoragarh) were severely
affected. The worst-hit area was the entire stretch of
Kedarnath valley where the well-known Hindu temple
devoted to the Lord Shiva known as Kedarnath temple was
established in 8th century AD at an altitude of 3580 m. At
Gaurikund, the nearest place of Kedarnath, þ250 mm and
180 mm rainfall was recorded on 16th and 17th June 2013
respectively, as per the records of the India Meteorological
Department and the Central Water Commission. Such
heavy rainfall increased the water level to 625 m on 16th
June, 633 m on 17th June, and 626.65 on 18th June
2013 against the danger level of 626 m in Mandakini
at Rudraprayag, the place of meeting Mandakini with
Alaknanda.
The Kedarnath temple and town area is located in the
Mandakini river valley, which forms the upper catchment of
river Alaknanda. Mandakini river valley, (301440 6.7″N;
791040 1″E) spans over  67 km2 catchment area between
2740 and 6578 m elevation range, of which 23% remains
under glaciers. The famous snow-clad peaks in this area are
the Hanuman top (5320 m), the Mahalaya (5970 m), the Bhart
Khunta (6578 m), and the Kedarnath (6940 m). The Chorabari
glacier at 3895 m elevation near the Chorabari lake, which is
located about 2 km upstream of Kedarnath temple, is the
source of the Mandakini river and is one of the largest glaciers
in Garhwal with 500 m width and 14 km length [6]. Another
river, which is Saraswati originates from Companion glacier
and joins Mandakini at Kedarnath town along with Dudh
Ganga and Madhu Ganga. The channels of Mandakini and

Table 1
The timeline of events associated with June 2013 deluge in Uttarakhand.

Date Event

June 16th, 2013; Heavy rainfall in high hills of Uttarakhand including Kedarnath valley resulted in massive deluge in the river basins; water
night level in Mandakini increased 625 m against the danger level of 626 m
June 17th, 2013; Heavy rainfall continued; the Chorabari lake above Kedarnath town collapsed; water level in Mandakini increased upto 633 m
morning against the danger level of 626 m
June 18th, 2013; Water level in Mandakini increased upto 626.65 m against the danger level of 626 m. News came out that excessive rainfall left
8.00 am 99 people dead, toll expected to go up, and thousands of pilgrims remained stranded in the high hills. Some security forces
were pressed in rescue operation. Two Indian Air Force (IAF) choppers ferried some stranded pilgrims from Kedarnath to
nearby helipad
June 19th, 2013 The death toll officially placed at 150 based on body count, however very heavy casualties were speculated. Massive rescue
operation continued
June 21st, 2013 The prediction of meteorological department for heavy rainfall, which is generally ignored, was taken seriously, as such rainfall
would have hampered in rescue operation
June 22nd, 2013 Over 150 seers refused to be evacuated from Kedarnath. Devotees blamed the cause of disaster was shifting of statue of
goddess Kali, Dhari devi, from her temple a day before heavy rainfall. Dhari devi shrine was being shifted for construction of
hydropower project on Alaknanda
June 24, 2013 Some voluntary organizations speculated that death toll in much higher than the projected one. The death toll was believed to
be over 10,000
June 25, 2013 A chopper crashed during rescue operation, in which 19 people were died on spot. The fear loomed large of an epidemic to
outbreak, as people from local villagers reported in medical camps began complaining of fever, diarrhea and vomiting
July 1st, 2013 Chief Minister of Uttarakhand constituted the Uttarakhand Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority in order to supervise
rebuilding and rehabilitation work
July 2nd, 2013 The multi-agency rescue operation involving over 10,000 men and women from the IAF, Army, Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP),
National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) and Border Road Organization (BRO) finally claimed for evacuation of all stranded
pilgrims, about 110,000
August 5, 2013 State Government of Uttarakhand declared for tabulation of gross environmental product – an audit of the state natural
resources, which was proposed to be released alongside GDP figures every year
August 13, 2013 The Supreme Court of India ordered for fresh environmental impact assessment of 24 hydroelectric projects on Bhagirathi and
Alaknanda rivers. The Supreme Court ordered the Ministry of Environment and Forest and Uttarakhand Government not to
grant any further environmental clearance or forest clearance for any hydro-electric project in the state until further orders
September 11, 2013 The priests offered prayers at temple by chanting hymns and ringing bells. However, the temple remained closed for pilgrims
September 22, 2013 The figure on death toll was officially counted as 4120, pilgrims affected from 19 states, villages affected 1800, homeless 2500
families, and bridges destroyed 15
October 5, 2013 The pilgrimage to Kedarnath was allowed with 100 pilgrims only after 110 days of the day of catastrophe, as till then the
administration was able to make arrangements for this small number of pilgrims only
November 5, 2013 On the onset of winter, the temple was closed down for pilgrims as per the traditional norms to reopen the temple after about
6 months
146 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152
Saraswati cut their banks every year. Construction around
Kedarnath temple made to change the course of Saraswati
behind the Kedarnath town [20].
On 16 June 2013, the torrential downpour flooded the
Saraswati and Dudh Ganga catchment areas, resulting in
erosion and accumulation of eroded sediments and water
that struck the Kedarnath town. On 17 June 2013, the
Chorabari lake, which is 400 m long, 200 m wide along
with a depth of 15–20 m, collapsed due to heavy rains the
area had received between 15 and 17 June 2013 and
subsequent rapid melting of glaciers allowed large quan-
tities of water accumulation in the lake. The accumulation
of millions gallons of water in the moraine dammed lake
for 3 days reduced dam's strength and finally caused a
massive disaster in Uttarakhand [20].
The Kedarnath temple is opened for pilgrims for about
6 months only during May to October due to heavy
snowfall and snow deposition in rests of the months. July
and August being the rainy months, the period to visit the
shrine is squeezed further to four months only. Winter
starts in the Himalayan hills during late September and
October and therefore, generally, the pilgrims prefer to
visit the shrine during May and June, as these are the best
months to travel here. Though, the weather remains
unpredictable in the Himalaya, especially in the high
altitude areas, the amount of rainfall is expected less upto
3rd week of June [13]. The unexpected cloudburst at the
Kedarnath and torrential downpour all across the high
reaches of Uttarakhand, before the usual monsoon time to
hit here, did not give time to the pilgrims, tourists and
local people to arrange adequate safety measures, which
enlarged the intensity and magnitude of disaster. The loss
of humans and property, as estimated after the disaster,
was enormous (e.g., 44120 people died, 1800 villages
affected, 2500 families became homeless, 150 bridges
destroyed, and 17,000 square km road damaged). The
approximate cost of damaged bridges and roads was 285
million US $, dam projects 30 million US $, and loss to state
tourism was worth 195 million US $ [21].
The cloudburst, heavy rainfall and subsequent land-
slides are the natural disasters but the recent disaster in
Uttarakhand is mainly attributed by masses as a man-
made disaster [22,23]. Unplanned and haphazard con-
struction, mismanaged tourism and related activities
including intensive mining in this fragile ecosystem are
some of the reasons that made to name this natural
disaster partly as a manmade that increased the intensity
and magnitude of damages [23]. The debris flung along the
river banks and valleys while constructing dams and roads
had increased the damages across the towns situated in
the river banks. It is understood that disasters cannot
always be prevented, nonetheless its adverse effects can be
minimized. However, the basic proactive strategies such as
prevention, mitigation and preparedness for dealing the
disaster were not taken care for such an eco-sensitive zone
despite the state's suffering from natural calamities almost
every year and establishment of State Disaster Manage-
ment Cell in 2007.
After disaster, the rescue operation in hills itself had
become a risky task. The condition of weather, mountainous
topography, accessibility and availability of routes, physical
stamina, and experience of walking on hills all together
created troubles in rescue operations. The search and rescue
operations hence only geared up after army and paramilitary
forces were roped in for operation. The estimated numbers of
people stranded across the inaccessible hilly terrains,
during the catastrophe, were more than 1, 10,000 and there
was no possibility to evacuate such a large number of people
other than air lifting them in choppers due to massive
landslides, road damages and complete wash down of
bridges in intense flooding. About 45 aircrafts and helicopters
as well as over 10,000 troops were deployed to rescue
stranded people [24]. However, the evacuation could have
been made operational only if weather allowed doing so.
The slow pace of evacuation due to many natural and
manmade reasons created panic among the people and many
of them died due to hunger, illness and freezing temperature.
Since tourists from different states of India were trapped in
disaster, the panic had spanned in their families and relatives
sitting far away all over the country. According to a report of
the Ministry of Tourism, the state population is about 10
million only however 25 million tourists visited here in
2011 alone.
The prediction of meteorological department on June 21st
for heavy rainfall within three days of disaster in the hills of
Uttarakhand, which is generally ignored, was taken seriously.
It was expected that in case of bad weather and rainfall the
entire rescue operation and evacuation of thousands stranded
in Kedarnath, Badrinath, Gangotri and Yamunotri might be
placed on complete dock. The people marooned here, espe-
cially in Kedarnath town which turned into ruins, were most
vulnerable as they were without shelter in freezing nights and
living without food in depressed conditions among the dead
bodies. The people who were already in a depressed state of
affairs were less able to recover [25].
The reports of loot and anger were some of the social
issues that expanded panic, fear and insecurity among the
survivors in the desolate areas. The memories of traumatic
events including fear, sadness, guilt and anger among
survivors were expected to lead strong feelings, reactions,
and changes in their behavior [13,25]. Nonetheless, it was
not possible to predict the numbers of people bear
significant emotional difficulties and psychological disor-
ders after the disaster, as it varies with person to person.
Initially for more than a week, since the rescue operations
focused on evacuating stranded tourists and pilgrims, the
immediate emergency measures required to look after the
local people were negligible. Thousands of local people
remained cut off without adequate food, drinking water, and
power. Many resident families had lost their homes and
farmlands. Other residents had lost their livelihood and
income sources – hotels, lodges, shops and employment.
Numerous children, women and elderly people remained
without shelter and medicine for days [26]. The survivors
were worried about their health and threat of diseases
looming large and fear of epidemic break out, as the dead
bodies began to rot. Apart from trauma and injuries, fever,
dehydration, respiratory and cardiac problems were noticed
among the survivors. The girls, especially adolescent, were
distressed due to lack of privacy in relief camps at school
buildings. The rough weather and tough terrain continued
hampering the rescue operations and even 2 helicopters fell
 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152
down and damaged during the operation that led to die 20
people [27].
Several pastoral communities in the state migrate
to high hills and alpine meadows with their flocks and stay
in such high altitude areas during the summer and rainy
seasons. Though, no information exists about those pastoral
communities, they would have been severely affected, too. A
large number of mules those used to ferry tourists between
Gaurikund and Kedarnath (14 km trek) and also between
Govindghat and Hemkund (18 km trek) were swept away in
the flood and landslides along with their owners and care-
takers [13,28,29]. The marginal agriculture of hills, which is
based on hard practices, has ravaged. Since the top soil has
washed away, making these terraced fields suitable for
cultivation will take time. Besides agriculture, the horticul-
ture and agro-forestry system in many hill villages had
damaged and many of such farms had swept away.
The fear among pilgrims to visit Uttarakhand and
complete halt on tourism and pilgrimage for months had
crunched backbone of the local people who sustain on the
tourism and pilgrimage systems. One of the famous
festivals of Uttarakhand, the Nanda Devi Raj Jaat, which
takes place in every 12 years, was scheduled to begin in
the same year from 29 August 2013. During this month
long festival, which is devoted to the local deity Nanda,
the procession of thousands of devotees along with a four
horned ram go through hilly villages, sub-alpine forests,
alpine meadows, high altitude mountain slopes and snow
clad upper reaches of the state. The state government was
forced to cancel this festival due to severe damages of
roads, bridges and trails along the pilgrimage path [30].
The 86 days of haunting silence at Kedarnath was
broken on 11th September 2013 when priests offered
prayers at temple by chanting hymns and ringing bells.
However, the temple was not yet opened for pilgrimage
[31]. The pilgrimage to Kedarnath was allowed with 100
pilgrims only on 5th October 2013 after 110 days of
catastrophe, as till then the administration was able to
make arrangements for this small number of pilgrims only.
Each pilgrim had to pass through a medical check up at
Guptkashi and Sonprayag before proceeding to Kedarnath,
as it was made mandatory [32]. Since the route to
Kedarnath was changed, the state government also adver-
tized in national dailies to inform the pilgrims about the
arrangements for pilgrims and route, which was approach-
able only for small vehicles upto Sonprayag and thereafter
one had to trek 24 km on the mountains via Limcholi and
Bheembali. The faith of people in Kedarnath began to win
over the disaster who noticed that despite the catastrophe
and severe damage of the Kedarnath town the temple built
up in 8th century remained undamaged. On the onset of
winter, the temple was closed down by 5th November
2013 for pilgrims as per the traditional norms to reopen
the temple after 6 months on 4th May 2014, as declared on
the auspicious day of Mahashivratri – a day celebrated
every year in the reverence of the Lord Shiva.
2.2. Causes perceived for amplification of disaster
One of the major reasons of escalation of present
disaster was non-preparedness of peoples, administration
147
and governments. The heavy rain before the usual mon-
soon schedule, did not give time to the people to arrange
adequate safety measures, which enlarged the magnitude
of disaster. The inefficacy of state disaster management
cell that is neither well-equipped nor has resources to
combat any untoward situation had worsen the situation.
The Comptroller and Auditor General of India had warned
of severe disasters waiting to be happened anytime in the
state three years before the incident on the basis of environ-
mental assessment of the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi. Despite
the warning the disaster management cell remained inactive.
Besides non-preparedness, the haphazard and unplanned
development works all across the hill distracts of
Uttarakhand enhanced the scale of disaster. Flinging debris
carelessly down the hills into riverbeds while constructing
new roads, widening roads, rampant construction, and
expansion of towns and settlements even on the elevation
above 3000 m at sacred hill sites such as Badrinath, Kedar-
nath, Gangotri, Yamunotri and Ghangaria indicate the care-
less development in the state. The Kedarnath temple site that
was once in isolation along with a lonely hut for a priest
at an elevation of 3580 m had occupied over the years by
150 shops, 80 dharamsalas, 37 hotels, 23 rest houses, 6
ashrams, and 116 residential houses. Just before June 2013s
disaster, the Kedarnath town had been expanded to accom-
modate about 15,000 tourists and pilgrims. In many areas of
Uttarakhand state, the roads are along the rivers and there is
rampant riverside construction for attracting tourists. Earlier,
the flood plains that used for farming is now the sites of
residential and commercial construction, which remain
vulnerable, naturally [33].
Construction of multistoried cemented buildings in
such an ecologically sensitive zone questions the wisdom
and prudency of their developers. The major towns all
along the banks of Alaknanda and Bhagirathi (e.g., Srinagar,
Karnprayag, Rudraprayag, Devprayag, Uttarkashi, etc.) are
under the grip of unplanned construction in the name of
development. The lands of most of the seasonal rivulets
have been covered up by concrete jungles in these towns,
which create obstacle to the natural flow of rain water and
spoil the city's drainage system. Lack of risk assessment in
all these unplanned developmental works, absence of
disaster's mitigation mechanism and non-preparedness to
tackle the unforeseen situation have increased the magni-
tude of losses in the present disaster. The violation of
environmental norms in construction and planning has
exacerbated the scale of the disaster.
There is frequent detonation of rocks and boulders for
leveling land for construction of buildings and roads. Over 200
hydropower projects are under various stages of construction
and sanction, and 42 hydropower projects are operational all
along these two rivers within Uttarakhand. Constructions of
such a large number of hydropower projects, road networks,
and overexploitation of natural resources have led the severe
deforestation and damage to the natural ecosystem. Besides,
Uttarakhand being a ‘devbhumi’ the sentiments of people
attached with various religious sites such as Dhari devi – a
local deity – are not taken care while construction of hydro-
power projects making them to disappoint and dissociate
from the present system of ecosystem and environmental
conservation [9].
148 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152
Soon after its creation in 2001, the state constituted the
Uttarakhand Tourism Board with a major policy of increasing
tourism in the state. The focus remained on attracting high
numbers of tourists. Since then, a number of schemes for
building tourism infrastructure have ensured development
of hotels and resorts in the pristine natural areas. In the 10th
Plan, the budgetary allocation for tourism was raised by
224%. Over the past 12 years the tourism has increased by
168% (213% according to the Uttarakhand Tourism Depart-
ment) in the state. In a month of 2013 during pilgrimage
season, almost 1.3 million pilgrims had visited four shrines of
Uttarakhand [34]. In order to meet the increasing numbers of
tourists has led to mushrooming of illegal structures, even on
the riverbanks.
Annually, around 100,000 vehicles do three trips of the
Badrinath, Kedarnath, Yamunotri and Gangotri, of which
50–60% are not from the state. The number of taxis and
jeeps registered in the state has increased about tenfold
from 2005–06. About 4500 km of road has been con-
structed in Uttarakhand from 2010 under the Pradhan
Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana alone [35]. Developing such an
infrastructure and heavy influx of tourists without taking
care of nature and its carrying capacity were the factors
responsible for intensifying the scale of disaster.
Deforestation is the major cause of calamities in the
sensitive and fragile ecosystems like the hill districts of
Uttarakhand. Unsustainable harvesting of forest and forest
resources lead to agro-ecological changes, which subse-
quently impose serious impacts in long run on the natural
resource base of the communities [36]. Since 1980 over
44,868 ha of forestland in Uttarakhand has been diverted
to non-forest use, of these 9500 ha is diverted for road
construction, 5500 ha for hydropower projects and
3100 ha for transmission lines. Over 68% of forest diversion
has made after 2000. The maximum diversion of forest has
made in all four hill districts (e.g., Chamoli, Pithoragarh,
Rudraprayag and Uttarkashi) worst affected by the present
disaster [37].
The Gangetic plains, though have been suffering from
the process of deforestation for long period of time [36,38],
the state of Uttarakhand remained largely well wooded
until the early 19th century [39]. When the forests in
the plains had shrunk the traders began to move up in
the hills after 1840s. Since the timber harvesting had
increased revenue, a substantial part of this increased
revenue was used for construction of roads in the inacces-
sible areas for further exploitation of forests. The tree-
felling became so intense after 1850s that the transporters
were not able to transport the large numbers of trees out
and hence many trees were left to rot or be burnt in the
forests [16].
The Forest Acts in 1865 and 1878 further strengthen the
forest department to survey and harvest forests system-
atically. The harvesting of timber continued for the expan-
sion of railways in northern India that was mostly
dependent on the supply of sal (Shorea robusta) and deodar
(Cedrus deodara) sleepers from the sub-Himalayan and
Himalayan forests [39,40]. With the slowing down of rail-
way expansion from 1920s the demand for wood by the
railways began to decline however, the demand of forest-
based industries for wood and other forest produce began
to increase after independence [39]. The regeneration of
forests and plantation in timber felled areas were never up
to the expectation [40–42]. The present disaster is the
outcome of the cumulative impacts of historical exploita-
tion of natural resources and the hasty unreasonable
developmental activities, including violation of environ-
mental norms in construction and planning.
3. Issues of disaster management
The present disaster of Uttarakhand has revealed dearth of
pre-disaster planning and strategies, such as prevention and
mitigation for dealing disaster in the hill districts of Uttarak-
hand, as per the general condition of disaster management
continuum. The systematic process, as envisaged for disaster
management, which is based on the key principles of plan-
ning, organizing and leadership, including coordination and
control, seemed to be lacking or inappropriate in the state.
Human greed has also been responsible to a large extent for
such environmental problems across the Himalaya. The
natural resources of Uttarakhand are being plundered for
supplying materials for the growing number of forest-based
industries, tourism, and power generation. In order to manage
the perceived risks and disasters from developmental units
the provisions, as endorsed in the Acts and laws, must be
followed with all sincerity.
3.1. Environmental impact assessment
Uttarakhand is a sensitive ecosystem however defining
‘sensitive’ remains an uphill task. The 2006 notification of
environmental impact assessment sheds some light on this
issue, and emphasizes the need of addressing the basic
questions before considering new developmental projects,
erecting structures and changing the land use. These ques-
tions include: (i) whether the project causes a temporary or
permanent change in land use or topography and if this use
will increase in the future; (ii) whether the area is under
legislation for ecological, landscape, cultural or related values;
(iii) whether the area is susceptible to natural hazards. Such
questions provide a template to examine the question of what
and where is sensitive and how we need to plan not just for
the present but for future, too.
Systems such as rivers perform a range of ecosystem
services. If left to perform, as per natural workings, there are
chances for self-regulation within the system. The rationale
for not building on river beds and flood plains is that the flood
plain needs to be able to flood and thus absorbs excess water.
This area needs to be kept inviolate. Uttarakhand is a
seismically active zone [10]. With fast flowing and turbulent
rivers, the state has natural riverine systems, which require
inviolate spaces. Buildings on river beds or flood plains
become prone to severe disaster during deluge. The proper
environmental impact assessment must be carried out with
all sincerity for construction of dams, roads, buildings etc. in
the sensitive habitats. The Supreme Court's order of 13th
August 2013 for fresh environmental impact assessment of 24
hydroelectric projects on Bhagirathi and Alaknanda rivers
indicates the importance of such assessment for dealing with
disaster risk reduction.
 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152
3.2. Emergency action plan
The Central Water Commission of the Water Resources
Ministry had issued guidelines in May 2006 for develop-
ment and implementation of the emergency action plan
for large dams in India. According to the specifications of
the International Commission on Large Dams, a large dam
is classified as one with a maximum height of more than
15 m from its deepest foundation to the crest. A dam
between 10 and 15 m in height from its deepest founda-
tion is also included in the classification of a large dam
provided the length of crest of the dam is not less than
500 m or capacity of the reservoir formed by the dam is
not less than one million cubic m.
Only eight states in India have prepared emergency
action plan for 192 large dams against 4728 large dams in
29 States by September 2011. There are over 4500 dams in
India which are operating without an emergency action
plan. The non-preparation of emergency action plans by
the project authorities in respect of 96% of large dams
renders huge area and property left vulnerable to cascad-
ing affects of dam failure [43].
In Uttarakhand, the State Disaster Management Authority,
headed by the Chief Minister, was constituted in October
2007; however no rules, regulations, policies and guidelines
were framed till the disaster. The state has not prepared any
plan for early warning and because of inadequate commu-
nication system there is delay in passing on information to
the vulnerable population [18]. The Government of India had
sanctioned two Doppler radars in June 2008 to strengthen
early warning indicators related to disasters in Uttarakhand;
nonetheless these radars could not be installed [44].
Fortunately, in its positive note the Comptroller and
Auditor General of India appreciated the efforts of state
government for establishing emergency operation centers at
the state and district levels, some communication equipments
(e.g., satellite phones, SMS network and police wireless), and
giving training to 71,474 government and non-government
officials by the Disaster Management Department [18].
3.3. Formation of eco-sensitive zones
The major challenge, at present, is to prevent further
fragmentation or breaking up of ecologically fragile land-
scapes as happened in the past due to ill planned and
improper development projects. Realizing the ecological,
faunal, floral, and geo-morphological importance of
Uttarakhand, the state government has notified 12 protected
areas (6 national parks and 6 wildlife sanctuaries) for the
purpose of conservation of ecosystem and biodiversity
therein, as per the Wildlife Protection Act 1972 [12]. Besides,
the area up to 10 km width around a protected area has to be
notified an eco-sensitive zone as per the comprehensive
guidelines issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Government of India. Such an area for eco-sensitive zone
could be expanded beyond 10 km in case of ecologically
important areas. In 2011, the Ministry of Environment and
Forests added in guidelines of eco-sensitive zone that they are
of ‘regulatory’ in nature and not ‘prohibitory’. It, further,
clarifies that applications of prescriptions of eco-sensitive
zone are site-specific [45].
149
The activities in eco-sensitive zones are placed under three
categories – permissible, regulated and prohibited. Construc-
tion of large hydroelectric projects and mining that destroy
the integrity of fragile ecosystems such as the Himalaya are
placed in the prohibited category. This is the major cause of
concerns of local people of Uttarakhand who are skeptical
on the benefits of eco-sensitive zones. In 2013, the state
government of Uttarakhand passed a resolution against the
creation of eco-sensitive zone when forced by local people
not to declare the watershed around the 135 km stretch
between Gaumukh and Uttarakashi along Bhagirathi as an
eco-sensitive zone. In addition, the then state government
believed that even building a road in Uttarakhand is quite
costly (US $ 22,143 per km; 1 US $¼56 Rs) due to various
environmental rules, including payment for net present
value of forest (US $ 9643), muck disposal (US $ 8929), and
US $ 1786 each for compensatory afforestation and road-
side plantation [46]. The local people believe that declaring
any area as an eco-sensitive zone in their surroundings will
be counter productive in their growth and development.
According to the guidelines of eco-sensitive zone, all on-
going horticultural and agricultural activities fall under the
permissible category and can continue unobstructed. The local
people need to be assured that formation of eco-sensitive
zone does not mean to displace or disrupt their bonafide
livelihood activities. This may lead to reduce the resentment
in local people and may help to secure the ecologically fragile
ecosystem from destructive developmental activities such as
dams, roads and unregulated tourism activities [45,47].
3.4. Rescue, rehabilitation and reconstruction
The rescue, rehabilitation and reconstruction task in the
state were tough and enormous. The change in topography,
disappearance of several road networks, changes in river
courses and instant landslides were the factors impeded in
rehabilitation and reconstruction. Till the present disaster
Uttarakhand did not have resettlement and rehabilitation
policy for the people displaced by dams or by disaster.
Realizing the extent of disaster, the state government
announced setting up of the Uttarakhand Reconstruction
and Rehabilitation Authority after a fortnight of the disaster.
The major task of this Authority is to supervise rehabilitation
and re-construction work in all worst affected hill districts of
Uttarakhand such as Chamoli, Uttarkashi, Rudraprayag, Tehri
and Pithoragarh.
After rescuing over 110,000 stranded pilgrims, the Uttar-
akhand government had to face yet another uphill task of
rehabilitating the disaster affected villages. About 600 vil-
lages were identified by the government those affected in
the disaster [48]. Most of the inhabitants in these villages
were living a miserable life sleeping in open, makeshift tents,
schools and panchayat buildings. The road connectivity has
been badly disrupted. After three months of disaster only a
village namely Chhatikhaal in Rudraprayag district has been
partially rehabilitated. At Kedarnath, tons of debris formed
by massive heaps of sand and boulders under which several
unknown dead bodies were buried had to be removed. In
order to prevent the outbreak of diseases, the disinfectant
was sprinkled in the temple premises.
150 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152
As a part of rescue, the state government declared stay on
all recoveries of loans, claimed to provide US $ 1786 for the
marriages of girls above 16 years age, free boarding and
lodging for orphans, US $ 54 monthly rent for one year to
displaced families till they are rehabilitated at new places, and
distributed free ration to the disaster affected villages. It is
understood that the inhospitable climatic conditions and
mountainous topography had to hinder and delay the reha-
bilitation exercise. It is also well understood that rehabilitation
does not mean to provide financial support only or rebuilding
the damaged houses, it carries a far sighted approach of over
all development of the region.
In August 2013, the Supreme Court of India directed no
construction of new hydroelectric projects in Uttarakhand
and also directed the Ministry of Environment and Forest
not to grant further clearances for hydroelectric power
projects [49]. Further, the Court even asked the govern-
ment to examine and make a detailed study as to whether
hydroelectric power projects existing and under construc-
tion have contributed to the environmental degradation
and if so, then to what extent. The Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forest has been asked to examine if the
proposed 24 hydropower projects in the state were caus-
ing significant impact on the biodiversity of Alaknanda and
Bhagirathi river basins. The Court stated that proper
surveillance, inspection, operation and maintenance of
dams are essential to ensure safe functioning of the dams.
It is felt that the right experts need to be involved in the
preparation of restoration and recovery plans. The com-
mitted local groups may be empowered for on-ground
monitoring of the implementation of reconstruction and
rehabilitation plans.
4. Planning ahead
It is believed that disaster and development are inter-
related actions. Disaster can destroy development initia-
tives and at the same time it sensitizes the need of
appropriate and mindful development. Roads are needed
for development but to be crazy for roads and more roads
may take a big toll on the ecology. Dams are required for
power generation and may not be blamed for all sorts of
disasters. They may reduce the scale of disaster, as
reported in case of Tehri dam, which retained the excess
water in its reservoir during the present deluge and saved
Rishikesh and Haridwar – the downstream cities situated
on the Ganges banks. Nevertheless, this situation was not
arrived if the water level was already at the critical mark
before flooding. The need of present and future as well, is
the well-planned developments that can mitigate the
negative impacts and also decrease the levels of vulner-
ability [13]. The energy requirement needs to be chalked
out properly, which may be harnessed by establishing
solar and wind energy systems. Areas where winds are
stronger and more constant, such as high altitude sites,
may be selected as preferred locations for wind farms.
The exercise of reconstruction, rehabilitation and develop-
ment of Uttarakhand requires to begin with the identification
of lacunas and shortcomings in the current path of develop-
ment that has amplified the impact of disaster, manifolds. The
Himalayan ecology and environment must be examined
properly before utilization of its natural resources for eco-
nomic gains. The developmental plan needs to address the
issues of restoration of ecological balance and local people's
livelihood. This may be achieved by introducing the concept of
ecological entrepreneurship in the state, which is based on the
sustainable industrialization [50]. By adopting the ecological
entrepreneurship concept, the entrepreneurs are required to
be helped by remunerating them for restoration of natural
systems.
In Uttarakhand, a vast tract of land once cultivated has
left uncultivated at present due to several reasons. Orch-
ards and forests or both mixed (agro-forestry) can be
developed on such land by paying the owner for such
conversion. Entrepreneurs activities related to the natural
resource management, such as, soil conservation and rain
water harvesting may be considered as employment.
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Empowerment and Guar-
antee Act of the Government of India, which provides
wages for work, can be used to support such ecological
entrepreneurship constantly, also for maintaining these
resources. The role of pine forest, which covers 17% land
areas in the state, is negligible in conservation of soil and
water [50]. Plantation of species those possess soil binding
and water retaining capacities such as oaks must be given
preference.
Traditional models of villagers to survive need special
recognition and may be applied, which was primarily
based on animal husbandry and agriculture. The tradi-
tional knowledge on use of medicinal plants for curing
diseases and for healing wounds, which has declined
several folds [14,51], need to be revitalized. Such knowl-
edge can help people in far flung and difficult areas during
emergency and cut off from rest of the world due to
disaster and any other unforeseen tragedy.
Establishing an eco-sensitive zone has its own merits.
As per the guidelines of the eco-sensitive zone, re-
examining the regulation of building activity and change
in land use needs to be done on priority bases, if not
applying blanket ban on such activities in Uttarakhand.
Identification of seismic activity zones, drainage systems,
flood prone areas, landslide prone areas, and biologically
rich areas may help to guide the direction and areas of
reconstruction and non-reconstruction. Also, areas for
man-made infrastructure and height of buildings in the
sensitive zones need to be addressed.
Ecological degradation due to rampant development
coupled with unregulated religious tourism is one the
reasons for disaster in Uttarakhand. Collective impact of
any project components such as dams, tunnels, blasting,
powerhouse, muck disposal, mining, deforestation etc. on
ecosystem is yet to be scientifically examined. The Supreme
Court order, which grants directions for reviewing all
ongoing development projects, their carrying-capacity
and assessment of their cumulative impact on the ecosys-
tem, brings a ray of hope. Awareness should be created
among the people about the fragile ecosystem of Uttarak-
hand in order to cope up the disasters. After three months
of catastrophe the strict vigilance on pilgrimage including
restrictions on number of pilgrims and mandatory medical
check up of every pilgrim before proceeding to Kedarnath,
is an idea to be welcomed and it should be continued.
 C.P. Kala / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 8 (2014) 143–152
Construction of buildings and any structure on the river
basins, including at the Kedarnath temple site, must be
stopped. After the present deluge, there is no rationale for
construction
on the huge accumulated sediments and debris at the
Kedarnath. Any structure for human habitation and for
tourist's stay at any place in the Himalayan States should be
made on the safer sites, especially the site that is not prone
to avalanches, floods and landslides. Aftermath disaster, the
state's proposal to tabulate and release annually the gross
environment product – an audit of the state's natural
resources including glaciers, forests, rivers, air quality and
soil – needs appreciation.
It is expected that appropriate actions must be taken at
all levels to mitigate, if not stopped completely, the
negative effects of any natural and manmade disaster.
There is an utmost need of developing ways to decrease
the vulnerability of the region and the society to disasters
along with increasing the performance of the disaster
management functionaries. The process for risk assess-
ment needs to be initiated in order to systematically
evaluate and organize data, information, assumptions,
and uncertainties associated with any developmental
activity. This will help to understand and predict the
relationships between ecosystem and impacts of develop-
mental units in a way that is useful for environmental
decision making. The policy and decision makers,
scientists and managers need to recognize the importance
of planning at the scale of ecosystems or landscapes,
rather than at the smaller scale of arbitrary political
jurisdictions.
The accountability of development units, such as
hydropower project authorities in case of Uttarakhand,
must be fixed even after clearance and construction
of their projects, if any untoward incident takes place.
The communities must have their representatives in all
disaster related management boards and authorities.
Uttarakhand being an ecologically sensitive area the state
government must have priority for issues associated with
risk assessment and disaster management. Putting in place
the right technology, such as warning and proper mon-
itoring systems, is a need of the hour. Since the viable
economy depends on the health of ecology, there is a need
to ensure that the approach adopted for development
should not override the ecology.
Acknowledgments
The author thanks the local people of Uttarakhand and the
Director, Indian Institute of Forest Management for helping
during the course of this study. The valuable comments of two
anonymous reviewers and David E. Alexander on earlier drafts
of the manuscript are duly acknowledged. Natasha Sharma is
acknowledged for helping in preparation of maps.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be
found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
151
ijdrr.2014.03.002. These data include Google maps of the
most important areas described in this article.
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