Issue No.

63

SUCCESON CRISIS IN INDONESIA

A DICTATORSHIP
SELF-DESTRUCTS
 SUCCESSION CRISIS IN INDONESIA
Issue No.63 July-August 1978

About This Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Last Days of Indonesia's Suharto? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Popular Culture Goes Political . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
1978 Student White Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 .
, Why Fre tilin Keeps O n Fighting in E. Timor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -24
Riches of the East: US Interests In Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -26

Specill Prr>ductinn Arqistnncr fmm: Typtsct ant1 Atrlietypc (Typc+crrinp) and Inkwtrrk%I l ' r ~ n r i n ~ )

I
h k s to Rafic Wi Center forthdt help in photo research.
h d thanks also to fmlm photographer R'utdy ty-t for donating his photm

Cover Photo: Stuhnt demomtratots face polim In Djakarta in early January1078.t Tenrpn magazine)

T h e Southeast Asia Resource Center, formerly the
Indochina Resource Center, is a major non-governmental
source of information on cursen t develnpmen ts in the coun-
tries of Southeast Asia, and on the U.S. involvement there,
The Center follows and interprets events in the new socic-
ties d Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia), and
also covers Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. We
continue in the tradition of the Indochina Resource Center,
which played a crucial role as one of the key sources of ac-
curate information for the anti-war movement's successful
effort ta cut U.S. aid to theThieu regime.
As a service to our readership, the Southeast Asia Re-
source Center maintains a mail-order service specializing in
books, articles and audio-visual materials rrn Scltrthcast
Asia. M a n y of these materials are not normally available
in local outlets, and they include government studies,
foreign publications and unpublished academic r-carch,
as well as many out-ot-print works on the Indochina war.
The Center offers a unique collection of hooks tor children
and high school students, and also poetry and prosc by
Thais, Vietnamese and Vietnam-era veterans. A free cata-
l o ~ u eis available on request.
T h e SRC Collective is: Candace Falk, h w e l l Finl~y,
.
Glenn Hirsch loel Rocarnora, and Mart ha Winnacker
The Chronicle is published six times a year. Subscriptions
are: 88 regular; % low-income: 9 2 institutions; 510 foreign
surface-mail: $15 foreign airmail : 520 sustaining. AI! con-
tributions to the Center are tax-exempt.

P O BOX W D CALIFORNIA 94704 1415) 545-2546

 About This Issue
n this issue of the Snrrtl~m.;t..l<in
rllrnrlicfr we evarnine recenr dcvel-
rlpmentz in Ir~doncsin, the fifrh
lar , r s t c r ~ u n t cIn ~ h c~vorlcland a major
U . S . ally in Snuthcast Asla. AS qerlou?
opposition to Pres~ilcnr Suharrtr has
surfaccd dirnng the part yrnr. many
casust ohsrrvcrs of Indoncsin have won-
dered n o t why there ic dissrnt. hut why it
has taltcn ro long ro rlwelop. I n his
artidc. Hen Anderson, a Cornchll LTniiocr-
sity lndunccta specialist and nnc of the
U.S.' lend~nyaurtinritlcs a n t h a t country,
an:llyres t h e nnture o f the coalition which
has wpportcd the Suhartn government.
tlr also explains the aticnation of kt?
rlemrnrs of rhat coalitton nvcr the past
tlrcadc. In 3 pattcrn charnctert~tic nf
dfctntr~rship~ in orhcr rtllrntrie< . ~ qwell,
.-2ndcrsan hclirvcs t h e c o n t r a d i t r i o n s
spawncrl by his own politic\ will force
Issue No. 63
Suhattn out of office heforc the end of t h e Essr Timorcse have heen aide tn carry
hit: crlrrenl fivc-year r u m . Yet rvirhol~t3 on tt)rir fight for so long against a n
well-orgnn~rcd democratic ar lcfr mouc- overwhelrn~nglv supcrlor militan* force.
menr, i t ts I~kcly!hat Suharto's .;ucccsfclr F ~ n a l l v ,I,rnny Siegcl, dircrtor or rhe
wilt Ilr another rni11mry s t m n p a n . l':~cifrc Shldicq Center, provides Ih~stow
Suliarto's weaknew artscs from tiis of IJ.S. rnrcrcsts in Indonesia during thc
gn\*crnrncnr*sinab111ry ro dclivcr on irs twenricch c c n t u n . Sic~elclcscrihcs eco-
promises $5 wefl 3 s f r o m a dcvclopmr.nt nomlc a n d rnilicart. c n n s ~ d c m t i a n s and
stratcgs which is creating increasing the c a v i n g approaches ,\mcrican p o l i c y
poiucrry among I ~ r g t scctnrs of Inrlo- makers have cmplnytd to enrurr. U.S.
nes~n's popula rwn. f4nwevrr, IF d ~ f f i - access rtl Indonr-~ia.Staff frnni t h e Pacific
cultics havc bccn i n c r e a ~ e d IEV the Srudies Centcr, :I crtnlnlunity rcscarch
cont~nlring wu.;lr in G a ~ t Timur, where anti ~ n f u m a r i o ncenrcr born out ot thc
Indnnflian rroops are h o g e d down In a anti-war nrovcnlunt, have dcrrorccl mucfl
no-win ';ituation. Now In ~ t sthird year. of t h e P ~ S T rhrcc yean T O research on
the war is c n u ~ i n gprolnund dirconrrnt Inrlonesia and U.S. invnlvcrnrnts there. In
a m o n g thc peaqan ts ~ v h o s csnns. llrothcrs atldition, Sicgel Iim wrlrtcn frcgucnrl!~ nn
~ dyrnp gn an %pparCnrlv U.S. m ~ l i t a r ? and rconnrnic cnnccrns In
anti t ~ u r b a n darc
FuriIe attempt r o conquer hall an island at thc Pacific. PSC: wrtrkerl cic~seIywith thc
nne end uC the Iridoneqian archipel:~gi.rl.I n Sr~uthcalit Asia Reqnurcc Center in pre-
this issue, wc Zonk at some o f rlw rcasons paring rhiq issuc of rhc (7lrrotlirlr 10
I
 Today's opponents of the political status quo are
the same social groups which supported the New Order
at its inception.

Cummumist Party (PKT), which had been rapidly rrowing in

CRSON influence under the protection of the then Prcs~tlencSul~amo.

O"( tncl
5 1udr n t lc,,, .,,, ,la,ri suspenl,,, " II elected
<?*,l ,,,= ,.I
The most important clernenn in it were t h e f ~ l l o w i neach
o f rhis y.enr, the I ndanesian government in irs own reasons for anti-communist animus : ( 1 ) The bllfk of the
srrokr ciIr~sed. down two-thirds of the senior offices of the Indonesian army; ( 2 )The dpvout Xsfamic
prcss i~1 Jn karta , arrested hundreds of community, both urban and rural; ( 3 ) Protestanr and CsthoIic
Student Councils minorities; (4) A small indigenous entrcpreneurial, profesriond
~ , with

t h r o u g l i o ~ ~t th e crlu ;cl,ru:iy and hlarch, a number of and bureaucratic m i d d k clnss; ( 5 ) -A Westernized inrelligennia,
the nation's most p u~inlpusmwere put under direct partly professional, partly academic, and partly artistic.
military occupation :placrs, s n ~ d e n t swere a s s a ~ ~ l t e d Of these elements, far the m w t important was t h e lcadeship
with bayonets, and in others,universfty buildings were attacked of t h e Indonesian army. As age and ill health made it clear rhat
with panzers. During the same period, somc nf Indonesia's most Sukarno's days were numbered, Indonesians came to expect a
prornlnent intellectuals werc placed in detention. s t r n ~ l c that would pit the army generals against the
The immediate occa5ion f o r the series of repressions-the comrnunists in a battle for control of the state. Although the
most severe in a decade-was an eccalating movement of army had originated aq an extrcrnety heterogeneous guerrilla
opposition to t h e scheduled reelection of Preqidena. Suharto t o force during t h c national revolution against ~ b t c hcolonialism
another five-year term. The ~ I ~ C F body, O ~ t h e People's (194549), by the mid-1960%. ix had become a coherent and
Consultative Assernbfy, includes 60 percent government ap- powcrfu'ul opponent af President Sukarno and his left-wing
pointees. Beyond the government's concern for the smoothness supporters. -The proceqs of development from decentralizei
of the efeetion-which toolc place as scheduled in March-wits a guerrilla units to unified military-political force had included
deepseated alarm at t h e strength and character of the p u r p s of left-wlng, devoutly Islamic and Outer-Island elerncnts
opposition. For rhe movement indicated that the coatition as well as t h e centralizing and homogenizing impact of training,
wh~chhas kept Suhnrto in power since 1966 is breaking up. equipment and organizaticln by the United Stateq. '
Today's nppnnenrs of the political status q u o are not The army leadership hated the PKI for three fundnmcntal
descendenrs of S~tharto'sfoes in 1965-66. They are instead t h e reasons. First, there was sheer instlcutional rivalry: the generzls
same sociat groups which supported t h e New Order at its intended t o he mashers of indonesin once t h e chariqrnatic
inception. Through 12 years of military rule, they have Sukasno passed from the scene, and only the PKI was
gradually l o s ~faith in the goilernment as irs policies have created sufficiently organ~zed,diqchplined, and popular t o pose a real
new versions of thr problems thar alienated them from the "old threat t o that goal. Second, the army I?ad become deeply
order." IIencc, in order t o undewtand what is happening today, dependenr on the United Srates in almost even, aspect of its
and ro p u g e the future, i t is imporrant to consider the nature o f existence; in 1965 it could not even manufacture ia o\vn rifles.
the co:alition that 1,rought Suharto t o power in 1965-66 and the The PKl's stronglv - - anti-American poficv threatened to cut the
kind of legitimacy the New Order originally claimed. annv's organizational, technoiogical and ideological life-line.
'She coalition rhat united behind General Suharto, then Third. the generals had heen rhe main beneficiaries of the
Commander of the Army's Strategic Re5erve, after he 1957-58 natnonalizatlon of the vast array of Dutch corporate
suppressed chc so-called 'Youp" of October 1, 1955, war, highly holdings in Indonain, for as state enterprises, the corporations
diverse, united only in irs fear and hatred of t h e Indonerian had heen placed under the control of senior army- officers,

2 SOUTHEAST ASlA CHRONICLE

 Indonesia is a nation
of over 13,000 is-
lands. Toclap, only
12OJo of the land
is cultivated.
Fifty-eight per
cent of the coun-
try's 135.2 million
people are under 21
years old. There are
five doctors per a
100,000 people, and I
i ----
#

the average iife expectancy =

. .-
is 38 ppars. 62% of Indonesia's people
work in agriculture, 11%in cammcrce, and
8% in mining & manufacturing. Indonesia to the 1
1 exports no manufactured g o d s , and under
Suhartolr regime, has herome the wrorld'sNo.1 rice importer United stat@ I
NDONE I2
w,

SOC"TI-lErZCT ASIA CfIHONICI.1.: 3

 and print P r r rhe pre-m
f ~ c rhn colonial sl:ate%in Ja va, 2nd had a.r much to do with hcaritity to the style and aims of the
r h c crllln .-t:i~ic~ r irocracy
s tl at J~enrrtIDurcl? Sukarno r e ~ i m eas anything clsc. 17nrl rcnsons roo corn1)!ex to
cnloi~~alrs .rc d<tminatcd 1)): s 1 ~ 1 1"stnt iqtical" rl~scus.;here, thc regime of I;uidcd Deinocrxcy, while arlvt:rtking
. " . .. . .. ., . . 7

itself ac "rrvoli~r~onary," "?elf-rel~nnt.' "narlnnalirt," and

Indor~cs~; : n ~ e n t of rndcpand cncc in I 949 ~ p p c n r c dto "liberating," was a n y of r h e ~ eonly t o a very l~rniredextent.
prcmisc I s for Islan1 . Ihii i l ~sr r were (la trhrd tirst by the Sukarno's personal style W ~ Sdecidedly "feudal," and the
politic~l y a n d fwpulnrit> o r SuL ,irno, a clas~ic atmosphere in t h e presidential palace was more reminiscent o f
"sr:itlst~cal" Muslii e rapid ricr of rhe PKl, s pre-colonial royal courts than anything else. Sultarni>'s cabinet5
p:trt>. riot onl? ): ~ p h y of matrrialism, hat wrrc full of people with aristocratic background? a n d manners.
rlr,in~tlg 11s popul vlrnlngly from '%rarist~cal While Sukarno attacked "colonial-minded," "lcglistic" thinking
Mils1ims " ~ ' 1 l l . n ~0111c ,1Iu'r11111 1~'ddCrswcre drawn into rhe in the name of "revolurionary law," in practice r h ~ ramountecl
"regional I C I ~ t c185M, Snkarno, with PKI largely t o bureaucratic arbitrariness, adrninistrat~veconfusion,
SLI pport. l o h n one of the major Muslim and corruption-and great day-to-day uncertainty alwut the
p ~ r t i c s"3 f m u t l ~of its political freedom of latest whims of t h e repme.
l>l~IlL~il\'Cl ~lthoupli out Xluclim community '%atiunal selPrrliance" w2s also perceived by many as a
rccogr~i/~ I C army I L .c predornina ntly "statisti- self-serving fraud, because it perrn~ttcdopportunist bureaucratic
cnl Musli hail goo to feel that t h e overthrow cxactioas o n independent businessmen and led to catastrophic
nt Sukar,,., .,..-. ,.lc dcstruc.r~c)nof t h e I'KI would at last make inflation (600 percent in the last year of S~ikxrno'srule). While
C I I i ~ a ltlol ini.al ~ 1 1 d 11101:11 force in Indoneqian ~ociery. Sukarno rcpratrdly rrumpcred the slogan of national economic
ou5 icic:~lisn~ was h! ncr n~cnrrsthe onlv f;ictor attaching independence, American I n t e r e t s continued to dominate
~d cspccizll!. I s l a n ~ ~ c1c:ldcr~-to Suharto's coal~tlon. indoneqia's crucial forcign cxchang-earning oil indr~stry. I<y
-I'i-:iditk<>r nic Icadcr shrp has i~ o m efrom two prominent I 965 thc government had accumulated over twa billion dollars
social gr Ivng-:-sr:u1d111g urh:an, indigenous ( i t , non- in extcrnal debts, mainly to the Soviet Union. If Sukarno
(:hin~.sr) rJr rncrcI1.1 tnr c l a s 5 . .dnd n ~ r a retigious
l scholars continuousiy heaped scorn on lawyers and economists for
( I ~ I ~ ( I H 2~n~d) pilgrims rctilr- ..--
, , ,
r~r~rt .l .m,n,.,Mecca
i (hi+), many of "bourgeois" atritudcs, these p r o f c r ~ i o n delements were pro-
whom . ~crsi~nblc.!Innti-amncrs. {Only t h r well-off can afford the foundly repelled by what thcy saw as his trampling on legal
rxpcnsn tr trip r o hlcccn a n ~ fhach.) The policies of Sukarno's dcccncies and economic ratirrnalip. Finally, Sukamok attempts

-
I;u~tlr.tlT)cnr<,cr;~c!

of "cllc~
~ c ; ~-dc.r~
ll~
, ( 1053-65) srriously thrcatencd the pofitions

squewcd t h c ~ n t ~ c p c n r i cMtrrl~rn r~t

~ r i s t orientation and its
ltslnessrne'R who depended
SII bsidies, and so forth)
entrepreneur4 to thc marsin.
At t h e fame tlmc, the rcgirnc's policicr on land reform and rent
rqualizarinn tl~rcatrnctit h e rirral arccndancy of ~ d I n ? ~and a baji
It WRS eaqy to tusc r e l i ~ r o t ~and s economic grievances and t o
read into cnt pnlici~ r ~ strnngly
, hacked by the PKI, not
soclal re1 anothrr savage attack on Idam. Suharto's
ascendan1 1 to prorrlise not only t h e ~ n of d land rrform,
- ,
but also a new chance for inciigeno~~s snpit a I rsm.
' One t ~ n a "prornisc"
Indonesia's Christian rnin{rrit~cs,nn rhc other hand, opposed
Sukarno and the Ipft more fur s r > c ~ a land economic t h a n
religious re;! sons. Long favoretl I y rllc Dutch cotonla4 rcglme,
they found thtlmsclves protccrcd hy Sukarnu, as hc used
argument., f o r religous tolerance rr) ward off claims by devout
Mt14irnq. Thanks t o the rnoncy and enerpy of a variety of
missionary groups, Chrivians had exceptional opportuntties t o
pursue advanced education. As a reqult, thcy were reprcrcnted
in key social positinnc; q ~ r i t eout of proportion t o their numhers,
particularly in the armed forccs and the professional middle
claqs. They feared PKI ascendancy would threatcn their
continued enjoyment of these social rofes. In additron, key
clement5 of t h e Catholic community violently oppclced
communism on religiou~grotinds. Thus these rninoririe~looked
m Suharro. backcd hy an zrmv officer corp5 tn which they were
well-represented. t o puaranrre thcir intererts and che~t-faith.
The remaining scgrncntr of Suharto's coalition can bc treated
-- together. (To snme extent their mcmbcrrhips overlap rhosc: of
the rellp~ous comrnunitie~ discuscrd so h r . ) f e l r they
reprr5cntcd various elements of IniInnrsia's small midrlle class.
Yet while as middle class people they all had economic reawns
for their anri-communism, thelr adhcrrnce t o Suharto's
coalition had sipnuficantly different additional gsou r ~ c l x . Thew
to impose a shallow, would-hc "revolutionary" cultural policy
(by censonhip, in timidation, and selective suhsidic~),in part to
compensate for lack of wrious progrrse, in other fields, offended
and frightened a s~gnificant proportion of Indonmia's arriqtl;,
journalisrs, ncademics, and other cfcmcnts of the intelligentsia.
In joining Subarto's coalirion, all these groups, in cltfferent
wavs and with different emphases, expected that the New Order
would bring about a rcstoraticw of the r u l e of law, OF economic
rationality, of intellectual an tl artistic freedom, and an end to
corruption and the m o r t g s ~ i n gof thc cc>untry's future by the
irresponsihle acct~mufatroiiof extcmnl del~ts.
l of 1969 need< t o be mentioned, because
it appealed to almoqt at1 the group5 that have been discusqed so
far. There was a widespread feeling that Sukarnr~'~ foreign
policy, in particular hi.; attempts to break u p the Malaysian
Tederarion hy military, cconomic and diplomatic means, had
been cliqx<trous. Nut o n l y had it discrediteri Indonesia In t h e
eyes of many members of the "Afro-Asian" btoc, but it had
been both uncuccrssf~~l and extrerneiy costly. Many believed in
fact that Sukxrno had focused so much on foreign affairs
preciselv to divert atren tion from sevcre internal prohlerns and
rapidly deteriorating soclal and economic conditions a t home. I t
w a s thus expected hy many that under S ~ h a r t othere would be
an end to unsucccsrftd and irresponsible adventures outside
Jndoncsia's border$.
CONSO1,IDATING THE NEW ORDER
In the earlv vcars of the Yew Order, until about 1970, many,
if not rnoct, of the coalition's cxpectationr gppearl-d rr, be on
rhcir way to fulfillment. Suharco's own prcstiyc, not only as rhe
"hero of t h e hour" o n Ortoher 1, 1965, seemrtl irna~sa~lal~lu.
Thc mhcsive purge of suspected pro-communists from the state
administration (and of course many orher institutions) In
1966-67 allowed Suharto t o keep at least in part, three different

4 SOUTI FEAST ASIA CHROYICLE

 n -1 ITI.~SSII'C' ~ - j l o r tt < ~IIIIJI~~IIC IT\ r t i r t ~ l r l i ~ \ rnav Ilr JCFC r h l n l)npp\
hum.in r l ~ h t fItr1.1gc. t h c Intl~)nccl.rn I',~rn III~F S~~lleluviw: P~IFIITIC'~C to I111nt1i.ltt

COIC~HIIIC~II~ ~ n ~ ~ t r t t n ~r h! ~c ctrclc l tqc ttlrlnil Ic~ntlit~nnq ~ n u rh morc t l ~ l t ~ c u l t

~ I I 1 t ~ , t l t t O 11(~li11( ,11I > ~ I S { ) I I C ~ r11 D c L - ~ . I T I ~ ~ ~ than t h c t hntl lrcrn l r t l trl ccprt.r, ant1
1077 :tt>(lplt-tl~*rd i t 1 rthl~-;h\r t3(l r t v n ~ of rhosr who h . 1 ~appllcd rtl r c t ~ i r n t h c ~ r
t!ic 2 I -4h l 11(-1 II~II< 111 I I I ~ C ~~C ~ - ~ I T I I > C ~ f ~ r m c r hnmcr h a t e brcn torl~ic!rlcn r o
I Q79. 'I'hin (: jrtpr :I~III tr~i<~i-.! t i o n i1~.15 Ir:tvr thc i~lanct.
~ l ~ i 141 i ~ kr;*<pon~l i i ~ r l i ~ ~ O I I W fttr rlw ITrc,l , dcl,.+rr dl,nLlt nunlhcrr,
'''I~''
The 1077 rclc3cc5 lcft h.llf (>I'Indtp
nffrrial'!. nc'knr'wlrll~c-d P ~ ) I ~ ~
Intlonrxtnn .Ictlrrn, ; ~ n t l \'ict. Prrvdrnt . . . ... h h.ille~t IIC t'lrt. r,F 54) rn;~ti!~ ILVCS,
\I'~licr .flon~l.tlc rt.i~cr:~rcil rht. Lt 5. goy- tI1~4cp o l n r ~ S I I ~ ~ L *th.u ~ ~ m:1ny ~ 3 1 ' the pT''OnCr ~'l""'~"'~ On r'lrh "la nri
crnrnrnt'< plvacr~rr t l ~ l r l tn~ Xlav ~ 1978 o f ' f ~ c ~ . ~rc.lc*trc(l
ll\ pri<clnrn arc nnt vcr nhlu" hn' L'crrl i'cvc'n~clr I' .k
i1i11tr, f ~ 1 , 1 r t ? . trcr, (-r,nfitjrntB.ll rr.pnrr9 fn,m ,nrlllnexiat r a n ~ r n ~ q r ~ c iccnrcr im slncc priwnerr u7rrr
C.lr)rer u)l';rrv~rq ttr.~n M~inrl 1 I<: !1.:t,t. rckc.ivr.rl 1,) '1 :lF1 (kl.S./Rritlsh C.lmp,~~gnfir't srnt thcrc In 1''69= Fnrrrrt r"
twcbn Icss plr.~cc.cl.;\rnnnr t h C 1 ,<Il!-,t1 .I- for rhc Rclc.~rc nf I n d ( ~ n t - ~ i : I'ol~n~.at ln LI'vclo~ i u n ~ l r lanrf 11
tic? nc>tctl IIVjourn:lli.;r'; m i 1111. 5t't.IIt' ll) I'rl<r>nt.rr) ~nthcaterhar thr\r.r. rt Ir :I ;'llI lit "'"'rr""t ' "' 1" C

I)cccn~l>cr. grit,-, rlvl, !,, . ,,' ,,,),. r! tf

11 listb f-rt-~r 4 1t 6 $*I ~ l h ~ L l n~ l a

*' IInsr of tfic 1,500 pri\t>ictc 11.- ~ > T L ! 01 l p t l I , t !(.(, 11rt31,,11~hr~tl~:t1

r:rq t j ~ ! I L ( l ~ b ~ ri if *, ~ I !I ( :.! !

Icnsrtf from rhu notonotrq ~ rII,L~ l ~II I:u~ir 11 II\!.C: Lp

.l
,r, mlwt I!< ~ ~ I ~ I L I
r q~ IT(V
L I IIL- lrl,!~t.~~5 itlv?
wcrc nlrl m thrtrnr~-,~llv 111; I~I'ITI(I I,ccn rcrlrllrtctl xrc thchr yu hrtl\ I(?~ o m cr~r~ttiatcq. rhr
** I\ Carrp ~ r n p o r ~ t1 7~1 n r,, rl r r t ~ c ~
~ r r r l 11
l h rr> r n r ~ hltjsr
. ot ~hcsc. R'lru dctcrrr'r'n ccnrcrr the
QICCL-'S~~U t >~ i tr~dlnnrsin'q tr:lnvvrptlnn
rclc:~srd 111 (17 l ~ c r:TTC;LS w3crc rchy Pri,(,rlcr,
,vCrC rclcnScll fmm prisnr,r
~:IYL. cl~t,qc-nt o rc-m.jln nc,tr t h c ~ r 111 I or rrrurntrl ro J - I I ~frrlm fiurl,.lng
tllc ~ l ~ ~ t ~t~ ~ ruthm ~ n t
dt.tciit~on in spcc~:kll\ prey.u crl rth<tr t lc ~ n d ~rnc1llding
;, 1311nl. Ahlc-holl lccl " u ~ " ~ ' '
1r'matc5 as "ran'rwdva
r r l ~ nCt C ~ T C P ; , ,,crc rr.~c.aqcrf ptlrnnrilv In K~l~,nl,lntall A n m Tocr ~ rhat " I ' h l ~phcc ?llo\lld I)c
'* Conrlitlnnc for nllowinc lnd sum:ttra. ,\
trcrP nlany l,crr tr3nq- Ixmm~iI rlnivn."\.\ccr~rtlcnplv, cotlrccq
pnsnncrl LO returrr r o rhCtr hnrr I urruii frnln drtcn hr,n rc.nrc.rq tl, ru5cttlc- !\ ho h:~vr rnnnirnrccl thc < ~ t u a r ~ n01n
t L s n as I 2 i I - I t nlcnr .krras. Accorrllng p v c r n m e n t ~ ' ~ lI'riqnner5 ' ~ ~ In ~ lni'nnc'ln
' ~ cl''\c15
< t r i n ~ r r > tThe! , ~ncludrhdcvirlt rlk-r. rii.rr 5nurcc~. t. i-prikqvnerc mrn,ing rn rcscrrlc- ff'.:'"kt~lt Runl mnl\ l*c tlc'r?n.llctl
"h" :4
thc pr,w,nrr h:lrl conductrrl 1 1 : 7 1 5 < . 1 ' 1r1 ~rjcritsrca.; havc rlonr QO v t r l ~ ~ n t a n l y l l t,l r
tr"lsmigrarinn r'rnrcr r:l h~ln .I Jrrvn-

yrtwn In accordlncc with t l l r )V3\'1'Yrl- rllc a ~ n i l : ~ lcrjjctlcr

)l~ ~ k l g p lrtl.,i ~ fhcblr ti"" CCnTcr \.rrlrh Ilrflc r I ~ a n g~n { ~ the acrwn!
rncnr's "l'nncnsila" iiJcoloprr. rr clll,icc lnav have llrcn cnnrinucL~ st3t~1s01 11s rrqirlrnrs. l.iren !I' rhcy wrrr
by Imrh f3rnrhcs and n r i ~ h l ~ r l r s frtl rwT rlctcnt ion allrrwcr! to v i s ~ t t h c ~ rIirlmcr, rnmy ~n
I+\, t.\-lvikfi~rt-rr ~ t n r n and , a ~ I1 I 111 3 c,l3tcr:lcnt ~ t /c.s.
l ~ sf,1tc- I1va- the 1 "0 nlilcs KPsrarlnfi tturu
.I ~ t h , I ) irl ,977,
~ ~ ~ ~ Java
~ Irorn d z v ~~~ i~rI)r ~
l i l n forni ~ ~
, lrl.thle crh~taclc ~ ~
* * Fu-pr~sr~ncrq whr 1 r r ! F:rnh~~s\ in W3qhlngtun norc.d to rwc m ~ c . m r n t .
~ m u l d nor hc nllow I I '*l'licrr .IIY. t w n mutl\nd< of rctu:~sr;
Now\
rcwtrlrnltrlr seas fnr ;I yt..kr I namvly ~ l ~ r c crrlcast- t to socictv and 1, ,,,,,,, ,,,,,,,
,,f rhlr nrrlcle ,<
"'
,,L
l

r c r u r n i n ~ h n m c \v(11iIt1 mni.ll ~ l ~ r n urcscrrlcmcn

~li t. ; I
Jlnr r ~Stlrlnrno
l flrrrlwr.. ~*n.cII-tIrr~~ui~cnt~tI rcpclrt prcp3rt t! 11).
hnusc arrest for siu n~<~ntlbc. told J:lkartn'% frndlnF ne\r.spnper rh.11 the ' V ~ % l ' t ~ l - . I3ri~istl ( ~ r n p ~ f <~~ rtp
t l c R V ~ L 114
3,0 mtll,nn l n ~ l r x ~ r c ~I'~)!ILIL:I~ m I'r~roncn In t etrrunrr
'' No cnrnpletu l l ~ ill t tllnir. gn,,crnmmt h a t ] ,pCnl
has 1)c.c-11lnatie .~v:lilnLbI~
* * M t r v s e r ~ r ~ ~ ~thc
?(I tlic p i
~ l v ,It,
t IJ-S. %762.0[1fll 1 0 ~ ~ t ~ l ) 16 ~ i sl r s
1 W U . 'Vlw rcpt>rl 1% ~ i l i r t t " T r , v t ~ ? ~ t ~ ~ ~ t
h~ l l s - <,,,,lrTr,,w ,#n/811,",1] ,b m,r,,,,.v,
~niparicrn c ~ m p qelpccial!! for rch!r,i~ctl #md r r n r l r r r r r < r , 1 r r r , r l
,
,,,., , ,,
.,nil I, .rvnil.1l4r lrtln~
,
thc t 077 ~ r l (
yo1 L 1 I I ~ ~ I L - I J T t~l.11111~ prlrr,nenhd iI'hlle rhc Iiidnncsl.ln ~ r ~ i c - r n -r \PO! I* 0 nu, hrlo, M~rl~tcl.~lr. N.1 17 142
I S r I I I I n c n t l ~ . ~ ~ p ~ ~ q l ~ ~ ~ { t I l c p ~ r l t c l . r , l ~ r ~ nM- ;.m
l ~l e
g "r .. ll l- ~ 4 * n ~ l l n c ~ ~ I n l h ~ I ' 7 ~ o l r e p o r t 1 '
rlctcnt~rrn~ anrl II h nr I,l~tlrrcrl t rinn ftlr nvrr .I tlrc.ltfc. a r n mein\
c o n f ~ r ~ ~tjy ~ r\toric~
d t i l t h t l tly . ST,

most o f t h r rcrn;~lnrn~ r f I~ jlllrr F crllsl t i l ~ u ~ irnh~ ~ u v c r r r o ~tic11

\ pr~pula- ,I ,, ,
~t\urnnllrt\whn ~r.~tnc-sc+l wmc. 111

cnrl of 1979. Ilr~wcvrr. ~ \ r n n c < llrln c,f J ~ : I thc, crtai)lr.;hn~cnr of cprclal 1 Irl prcw ~rltrwlc\rtin N 7
n,ir~on;rl bclicvc\ rhc ~ I C1111 c . ~ m f rfor fOmlcr l,rrlrtlc,il ~ r r l s ~ n.;rbliFrc ~fi 1077. i!tInl ~ I I It?nl*~
, hb rcp~jrtc~l 1
t 1 . 1 ~\ 1~ 1 a i 11) L [ ' ! T L I \ ~PI*
tlctaincc9 is near 100,000 11 r' cL,n rl13t Tk,l ,,,lli rc,T lJin iqo, , l t c t1 fr(,ln pcrccnr J . ~ k f r ant1t~li1111c%
~ 10 pcrtcllt of tht rt n1 llliln:, 1~111h
0

caw, thc gor'crtimcn~'s pl.~nr I-.) soclcty. I n t h c ~ rf ~ r w!c.lr ,1t F U C ~c LI'IP'F. +,rc .~llchAraT~ , i l , , , l , , , ~ , v ,,%< - -- ,lBkr
,IS nmn! .IF 70.000 ~)coplcrn pt , ,, , ,,,, ,,, torrner prisani-rs will nor 1~ :I llowccl ttr ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f, ~ ~p , ,~,,., , , , ;I ~, ! l l a ,I,
~ ' 1 \~~ ~~~ h!r i i . ~
I
rlctrntiun, r h u ~ r cui<tcnc.c tlt nr~.tl 11) Ic.~vc t h c cthllrcIT. -I+IIC.T~,~~IC.T, V E V ~ C 1x1 :I> L~JIIIIV 111 ' ,<ml~,k.It>!I I < * ~ L ~ C . I W L !
otl ~cial c~rul~.;.5tatc~i1cnrs I n . l t l t ~ ~.itt l rhvlr h~,rnr<will I ~ pcrn~itrcd c t+nIy31 the ''lCJI' '"p I0
? ( ltctt
Stlrlomcl, lic:~clr ~ l Kophnlntll). I)cc~rln~nrr tliwrctirm o l luc.ll : ~ ~ ~ t h o r ~ W t ~I lc~rl .c ,\i,n,,l i 3 r r 10, 1 0 7 7 I'lrci! III
in hluvcn~bcr1977, th3t I n r ~ 1111 r I:brnllics will hc cncournqcd I ~)ern I fnrnivr ,I
pr~cttncrk.1ru " ~ l ~ t h n r c anrl l ~ " n~., t r . t~hc tr,ln*qnlgr.ltlcln c a m p ,
t f c . ~ ~ ~ n in I,I 1 1 7 & i * " ' LA:~V,,~ ,
J.ITILI \ C

irtbcclIcncl c r c t l c ~ ~ ctnc t l i t ~f t . ~ ! '

thc c\twncnrc Kuru C ~ I ~ ; ~ F I C fh.tt \ t i L h -11
"pmmiser." All vestigial PKI :influence al life cs~tastrophicinflation o f Suka mo's Iast years. In add~tion,thev
was wiped out. T h c govcrnltllC'111 E<>11 ation- in s r ~ t u t e d n e w replatinn? for foreign investrnmt, which
ali7ing" the hugr, ~inrvicli Iy, and crncy h~ ~ o ~ ~ ga hhost t o f muftinatinlnal carpolration? inl'n t h e country
inherited from rlie C1.I-.,rmn
L1llRlllllV
A ,
, rr
1 .I..,
?CUL.7.
illl,I, rllCIC
JlllCC
,ms=r
v.CIC
f
1111110 . , ~ r rthe nert decade.
I,.

of emergency, rnili~nrymcn could I,c placed In key po5it1ons Morc than mything eke, ?he S U C C ~ C Fof St~harrn'spolicieq in
throughout t h e society i t lthour ~irtlustngmuch oppost~ion o r ending t h e inflation pave his coalition a sense of confidrnce in
fears of militarism. By thrsc lncdlls Suharto consolidatud his its leader. Not l~rngsymbolized more rhe new reg~me'ssnhrjetv,
support within thc : withou t scriousl ~lidity,and c n m p c t ~ n c e . Norl~ingcrtw e d rnol 2nd
any elements in his r :epl!; a relieved sense of w c r y clay norir lifc.
The purge wwas n, ~d to civiIians, howl uslnessmen, civil servants, pensionerr., and dep I felt
if not thousands, n t military mcn wcrc also purged-forclbly rheir positions and frltnres at last secure,.A 1-,, ",l,4; ,,,, Sood

- thc governmen- . . ;akened its own support by its

Y

aoying the organized left ...

rctirL'cI o r ~nrpr~sonea--ongrounds or t>erng secretly pro- of cheap {and many n o t so cheap) imports now permitted
corn~nunist,pro-Sukarno. ~ n so d forth. 7'11c "mutiny panic" and appeared like manna to middle clnsec, starved of such
oCtcrl p a r a n o ~ ; ~ anri-cornmu
c nisin in t h c upper officer corps commodiries under the protectioni~rnand hankniptc?) of the
aIlowcd SI ~ h a r l oto .;ltc. his p he army to an last Sukarlno y e a s . Ir seemr:d pnsqiblc to "liv main '*
e xtcnt th;k t no pn donrsian military man had ever Meanwhile , the huIge loans and rnaqsive inw wcre
a chirved. "L'he purge ack kcy v,acancies j n the initially in as signs of the rich Wmt's s,,,,J,,,,,ce in
-.. " . .. ..
rn~iltary h~crarchywith closc tricnds xrld tollowers, espccialIy Indonesia's nctv lcadershlp and its future.
frnm his c>wn Dipo ntgoro Division (the territorial Uiv~sionof The second area of policy c h a n p can be called the
Central j a r la). Accuscd of Ocing "Sukarnoist," t h e armyts srrvice polirico-cultural. I f rigid 'bans werr imposed on all expreniom
r~rals,the navy ( a n d especially ~ t sMnrinc Corps), and the Air of leftwing thought and anything remotely resembling left-wing
fa r c virtual and plat:cd direct ly under army organizations, this w'as not sornerliing that trouhlcd any dement
c I 1969, a on of t h e, entire defense of Suharto's cnalitiorI. For thc f i r g t time since t h e middle 1950s,
c rry power and sreepened thev were, almost all of t hem, given freedom ro exprem
and strcarnllncd rn~l .,..., ,,.,, archies under Deputy Minisrer of ..,
themselves, and the)-, ,,,,,courxged to think that freedom of
I.P%-PP " .

Uefensr rncral hia radenn l'angga bcan. General Panggabcan was expression would q u ~ t c soon be followetl by freedom of
not onIy penonall! i loyal to Suharro. As a I'rotcstant and organization. Doaens of ncm newspapers, magazines, and
mcmbcr of ' the n a t n k ethnlc minorrty, h e could not herome an journalr appeared. TTundreds of poemc, -short storics, pbys and
indcpendcr ~r ccIItcr In this role, General Pan=tl;ean songs which had been 1,anned or remained unpubliched under
uqs in cfftr c t itcting ministcr r ~ n t i l1973, when h e was Guided Democracy, emerged into the light of day. I t would 'he a
formalf!* p,rornorc.d. the defensc p o d o l i o tlntil early great mistake to underertimatr t h e polutical and psychological
1978. Impact of this aspect of earl^ Vew Order life. i t wac. crucial to
In tandem with the purgm, the Suhxrto goverrlrnent launched maintaining the support of the professional, academic, and
two other policies which d ~ dmuch in the short term co satisfy artistic intelligentsia, and its pro~rmsive disappearance after
its various constituencies. Mc>st impor tanrly, A~ h a r r oreversed 1970 is directly related to their n~l,<cqucnl:aliennrion.
Su kamo's program o f rcstr~cring toreign access TO the Einalfy, Xuharto rnm~rdquickly to liquidate the "Confrunta-
lndonc~ianeconorn?r and selliing primardy on state enterprises tion" with Malaysia, ending (tcrnpor~r~ly) Indonesian inter-
a r the vehicles of <it.celuprnen t. S u h a r t c ~caIled on the services of ventions ovet~eaq.~ hlthougfr aclations with the Chinese People's
~ n d o n e s ~ s tcclrnac
n rat< . ..uding
inrl
-. , . a group referred to w e n Repu hFic were frozen, and Indonesia became increasingly
today as t la," man!, of whom hold Ph.D.s dependent on the West and Japan, diplomatic relations wcre
from the 'ornia-Rcr keley. Their jr~b was to maintamed with the Sovirt Union, t h e Easrrrn European stares,
create a c .rnnomlc policy anenred toward Cuba, a n d the Democratic Rep11,lic of Vietnam. ?'his pattern
"rational~rp" 2nd "dcvclopmcnr." These men were all com- created the impresr;ion that Indonesia's Traditional 'Yndependcnt
rnirtcd to the nmerlcan economic orthodoxies of the 195Os, foreign policy" had n o t been compromised and that the inter-
anti rhey tireresrrongly backrd t)y the ISIF, t h e Wortd Bank, and national community understood and respected Indonesia's in-
ult~matcly the inrernarional cnnqnrtiurn of l e n d ~ n gcounttie4 tention of soberly putting its own house in order.
{the I!.S., Wcstern anrl Japa n) known as the IGGl
(Inter-Govr:rnmctl ral ia). They proceeded very
rapidlv ro s t n l j i l i ~ ~ rnonetarv, system and
SEEDS OF DISINTEGRATION
.
reestablish an al~nc rsr vanish ed confidence in the Indonesian In retiospecr, it secmq like Iy that the vear 1971 marked the
currencv. &y a s cries of inter-related policies, including apope of t h e New (3rdt-r's ccrherrnce a nd of Su harto's personal
budgetary cuts, virtt131 nholiti o n nf rxpnrt-import controk, and a~~rlioritv and prcstige. r ~ n ti 12t same vear, however, the first
liqurdation of bankrupr s t ~ t t enterprises,
. and with the crucial
P 0
clear signs of t h e diqlntegratlon or me anti-communist ctjalition
inflow o f hundred? nf rn~lllnnrot dollars of loans m d grant5 became visihte. In ,a uer! ctrnple map, the government we~lrened
from JEGI rnernhen, thry succeeded in overcoming the its own support t ~ vits colnpfere succesq in decrmyin~t h e

6 SOUTITEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

organized left in 1965-66, killing hun
imprisoning further hundreds of thousa..,.,, ...., ririvlng r,,,
rrrnatnder into hiding or terrified si!,mce. Bp 1871, t he
I<
communist menace" had begun t o rece,d e into nlernory, and
pvcrnment legitimacy derivrd solelv fimrn this source vr 3 S
becoming. tenuous, while the c n ~ d euse of "anti-corn
justify policies and actions that had nothing
wpprcaing the PKI undermined that residual
. .
fnrthrr. With the decline of the vividness and* p~aus~h~llt!, ot the
"cainmunist threat," the prime cement of thc 1965 coalttion
nect~sarilvgrew brittle. The government itself began r o fcel the
need for some more contemporary confirmatton of its
legitimacy.
The elections of 1971 were exrmplarv nf organiz ed
ratifications by military rcgimm. At the same rime, t h e
government's very st~cccwin using the poll3 t o srwe its p u r p o ~ ,
.PP
created the first serious divisions in the 1965 c o a l i t i ~ n2%
, ~xve1I
as foreclosine the poqsihility rhalt parliamentary instirurionc
would become a mean< of broadening the coaIition Ity
integrating new elements into it. For bv 1971, Suharto's policies
hepinning to create grievances as ~vellas satisfaction, bur
the engineering of the clectionq--which were intended to
demonqtrate srlpport for the Suharto resimr-lvas such that
grievances wou!d find neither expression nor resolution in tIie
bodies rhey crcared.
Issue No. 63
e government's a\ ~ge,"successing" the
bLctBull- lllcnnt arranging an O U P C C ~ ~ T Iwhich
C would ensure
cnmplcre control over rhe legislature they produced. But there
were real difficulties. While Suharto himsclf remained reason-
ably popular with the coalition, rhe military as such, never
h liked bv the population, had grown in unpopl~lnricyalong
wcalth and power since 1965. Moreover, the army had
ys claimed t o he above politics, so its direct participation in
thr elections in competition with the sfirviving parries wo11Id
have been cmbarrassrn~. The solution to thw difficu'fty was
found hy formally excluding the armed senrice4 from the
elrctions and awarding them 100 appointive scars in thc new
pnrl i arncnt. Ry this expedicnr, Suharto avoided the potential for
split!j within the milirary due to electoral competition and
pro!, ided hirnqelf wirh a means of rewarding his supporten in
*IlC
,a,,. ,niiitav hy appointing them to the legirlature. Ac the same
time, h e assured turnself of the support of a solid 22 percent of
t h e new 460-rnemkr assernbty.
\I'ith the military provided for, the government srill needed a
party of its own. Otherwise, rhere W ~ Fa real powibili ty that the
traditionaf parties, with deep roots in Indonesian society, would
tvin enough votes to place rhem in a porltlon o f relative
independence from Suhartn-even if they conrin~iedto support
him. The solt~tion to this delicate politicai predicament was
something called Gol kar (an acronym from the Indonesian
7
woras Tot' runctlonal c,roups), a h: mhlrd r!ertoral
machine amply funded by the govc nd' const]:ucted
uneqr~ally from three very dispara ncs. Firs1t and
Fort.most wcrc thc parallel vertical h ~ e .f f~ h ,.,,.r~strrrs
ulk
%~A~; - ~ ~ ~ ~ , ~ ~
of Defcns e and Int .crier, each keadcd by general? in Srtharto's
inner circ le. These hierarchies reached down from the c.tpital
0 .,,
virtually KO tne vulapc Icvel. Oqtcnsiklly the neutral organi7crs
larders of an open process, i n fact the:y used
1 ginablc rntans fox ensuringI the SUC cess of I'iolkar
;. Not lFur noth,ing did Intcrior Minister Amir
(
. . ... .. .
!.,,C.....UYearn the n~cknarne"bulldozer.. .,-+-..
.. +r(lnCi
- WAS a s ~ z c a b l ~
Imdy of promincn~t "indepl ~ n d c n t " Inotat~ilitie s, intellectuals,
academics publicists, and tlcchnocrat s, il core clcrncnt in the
New Ordrf r coalititIn, peopllc who ha d traditio~nally disdained
1mrry puli tics. 'Fhei I was to F ~1 and
1.dcologica1 uphi~lfta che skclei td h y
Ithe ministries of ( id rhe in J here
there IS room perhaps tor some surprise-was tne rraa~cicrnal
I?opular cl~nstiruent :y o f the old Ieft, the kind of people who rn
thc last p revious e!lcctlons (1955) had supported the PKI and
chc left rwing of t he Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). Nor
1only were those vut ers with01~t their traditional parties; 1965-66

wits recrrt t enougki for the m to he e a s ~ l y it~timidatec I into I

"proving" their goo d behavio r t ~ yvutlng for Golkar.
"~ h Lt. General Widoda, leader of a powerful army faction op-
-
1 1 this was not rnought sufficient
H i l t -.1 . . . for a thrl r o u

"s~ccessirlg" of tkre elrctirtns. Thc iylvcrnmer ;h the posed to !iuharto.

agency ol: General Ali Murcopo's Spt.cia1 Opcratians pu lirical-
intcliigcnc:e appara'tus, P'OC' :cded tu directly in t h e a Finally, the very t ,f the electcd parlia~
rnent,
. . . ,, .. ..
kr partics to tnslire that tkotr leadersh~p tell TO so carrtulfv engineered t ~ ptnc pc)vernmc.nr, closeu rne one
3 T I

~t and ol'ten vcna 1 second-raters. While this policy possi hle national channel for voicing rhe :~ccurnulatinggriev-
I d thc pli:ability of party Icaders. it undcrmincd the nnces wh~ch the government's own poiic~es rrtere by now
oarfies' electoral creating. It is to these rhat rve now mtlst turn.
1 ,
cntnuslasm or party rvorners ana ~owcred ... . rhc
.

sppcal. ?'he most :significanl ation, from t h c pc

view o f o u r anal ysis, was lent i n r c-vention
~ ,in the
internal ,affairs ol the M usi. lt wrill he
. .
ren~crnbered that in 1960 Sukarno had hxnned t h e largest Much of the early credrn~!it)r of the New Order had come
ex~slingMuslim parry, ~Masjurn~. Aflcr 1965, Suharto had come from a belief that it was mpidly setting the Indonesian economy
undcr strong pressure from rhe Mtlslirn component of his t o righrs after abuses undcr St~karno which had led to
coalrrion to rwokc t h e ban and pcrrnit Masjurni's revival. He had corruption, speculation, inefficiency and the mortgaging of the
attempred to satis fy t h i s ctmstrnrcnc,p, aiid at the same time country's future. This belief had gained strength from the
keep it firmly unde r his runt]rol, by refusing to t?evoke Sukarnok rapidity with which New Order financial policies had brought
ban, hut permittin g t h e par t y ' ~parti al rcsurrcction under the inflation under control, hut by 1471 it was becoming clear that
new name Parmus~. Btrr hlasjuml'r popu lsr older leaders, the promise nf that early achievement had been overstated. For
including nvo former Prime Mrnisters, were tjarred from t h e belirf rhac the New Order would lead to national prosperity
leadersh~ppositions i n ir. As a rusult, while Masjumi had won rested on one basic illr~sion:that the economic problems of the
20.9 percent of t h e votes in 1 9 55 Parmusi secured a mere 5.4 Sukarno years had been primarily the product of Snkamo's
percenf in11971. (n tions helped t o reduce rhe personal cxnavagance agd willful Ignoring of eiernentary
PNI's vote from 22 economic realities.
While rhcse poi icics and t h e targeted 63 The truth of the matter, however, was very different. The
, - ..
percent majclnt? tor C;nikat on elecrlon day, they helped tn real locus of t h e crisis lay in rhe eventi of 1957, when the vast
alienace permanently stgnlficant sectors of the Muslim commu- Dutch holding in Indonaia, ahove all in its non-oil export
nity, who s a w rhumsclves once again deprived of their legitimate sectors, were nerninalty nationalized b u t actually fell under
rights and nlace in Indanes~an sociury. In addition, the one control. of the military. These state corporations-operated as
party whi $Ed t o ho,Id i t s o wn a g i n s t t h e government the private fiefdoms of the generals in charge of them-quickly
hulIdozer,, the cor~scrvative ru~al-uln mo dominated Nahdarul fell into ruin and in the process dragged the economy down
. .
uarna, alarmed tl-I C govern m e n t 1)). its tenacious ]>old on i t s with them. The norable exception, for a time, was the state oil
. . . ..#
rural: following, stirnuratlng nitnerto fairly well-concealed enterprise, Pertamina. They rteclined for three inter-related
mspicion and hosriliry rnwards all devout Muslims In the reacons. Almost all the new military managers had absolute1y no
president's stmnglp "statistical Muslim" inner circle.' A t the serious experience in managing cornplev corporate empires. The
same time the governmen t's open ru thleqsness produced a small great majority of them plundered the entcrprrses' assets for their
but significant protest from the younger liberal intelligentsia, own private profit. And the army lexdenhip, desperately
which mounted G campaign to get vorers to abstain from vodng concerned to maintain discipline ant1 morale In the ranks, and

8 SOUTHEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

no less despt -o find rnr nance a hr-oad as t ,ft drinks, and so forth. where earlier they had bt
anti-cnminur crnaric;lll! e starc cr Iter- ablt .lop some: strength. Key scctors c ~ frhc ccono
prisec whlec. I y r c r ~ u i r , , ,,,~,, L;l:*nl.l ml ,>
I I I R l l d s ~ I~I ~
.>.....- *-.J t o ..-,.- >*-. under whdr ir eunhemist~callv cnl
can I L LU UL r,pcr~tiril
tmr n over sec:retly llarp ions i f th c cntcrpri rces "jo rn t-ccnturcs." Thcoretically partners vccn fore
TO rhe army. The owlrrhrtlw of Suk:arno, thc supp the andI do~ilcsti c capital, in fact thcy repr exchnngc
left and the insritu rir,n o f the Nctr Orticr did r ~ c the for,:lgn w o n 1 technoltngical rcs r palitica
gen .-. *I.. ~ ~ , ,re*-
I, ~~. ~ thc Ibuaru
I . '
I ~ luurllb. UC'I' iicCnSeS, conccsstons, ann a r c m TO prlvliegra
I

Whar thc cr did in t rnic arcna was tr} in:stall ma1rkcts. I n effect, tb nic palici m of rhe: Nrw Or dcr
"nmkelc and thci e s in the governrnrn t ' s bro iiphr u n dlreamr (a: led) weal th to t h t,se with the
-
. politic g of the banking- sysl t led
ickly to embezzlerrrent on a sfialo never st:
- - fore -
financial rn and planning agencies and to srv~tch political power t o dlocate these lie1mses, c n and
m,phns~sfrt>m state t o privatc cnterprisc. Acting in lrne with concesstons: namely,, the fimerats a,nd their late
. .
t h r ~ rown rralnlng nnd t h c wishes of t h e IMF and the I(iG1, the cntouragcs.'
ect ,rhnocl-ar( cd national economic policy to In additio tion and the aminc)us spreadI OF
ct11 on and privatc domertic and foreign "joint ventu -amrer of the RCO nnmy of the
~ ~ V L ~ L ~ T I LThey
~ I L . did I I U L - J I I U thcv could n o t curb t h c ability 1970s workcu r u u r l u c r l ~ l l ~ rtc h ~PoVtr .----..*"
~ I ~ I I C 3
-:,121* -
~ I LI I I I U U I C - C . ~ ~ S S

of t t ~ rgene1 vert nalrn rccs fur t y or sup ;t was thc: qujre fl a g r m t ppo nipulatior I of
f0l their orv lent. As t ~ pstare
t e lost ban essential for the growth of r J I indigennus
th trir key 1
.
in t h e I
. :conolrly, tary bus banks ape rated u n d
,.+ .
oftlcers wno nsu managed then1 ~ n t orum went rnto nus~nesstor 2nd were cornperled to otter huge credrts and unreallstleali?f low
.. y supervis ion
.. . .>,

tIlemseIvcs, drawing financial and inn:rcsi rate!: t o senior officers rg working them).
business supporr. Vel-y uftcn tIiese cheap credif ~t used for ptoductive
In this ct>rr{c.rr -. olrrrr rmrnr 1h W V ~ L I I U C ~ I.I I I Y .
.----.* unc: - . - . - . - A .

1r1 I I rstnlcnt, b u t for real-e~tatc ~ ~ c r l l r a t i o nland. graljhing,

IVFiile t h e at nly Ieade~ rship had installed generals n 'IS as Iu x ury housing, and so forth. Second was the survival o f a
thl: top rn.anagers c~f t h e stare enrcr.prist.s ( c f o r nur nbcr o f iiImportant statc rnonopolies, which in effect leg:dly
PQIitical reasons), it t ~ a dtried,, in its (13 ,vi~
.. . way. I
..
that e x c,luded in digcnous entreprencurs frctnl certalIn econo mic
. - . . - * .
some cxpcrrencen mislnesqrnen assumctl sullordlrlntc pr>sltivns fields. tJarfrcuiarly notorlous lnstznces or these were, and 3tc,
T

so t h a t the gcese would continue t a Iay same goldcn cggsIs, The ~ h rstare oil company Pmtamina, and Rulog, the National
at>vious choice of such h l ~ s i n e w n e nlay between indigenous aird Supply Board, which controls the import, marketing, and
Ctrinew. In tIie great majanty o f cases the decisiotl was ~nadt. dr>mcstic wurchase of basic staples. Not sur~risinrly , the~e
for the Chinese, Irtving the hasis For the partncrd kip of gr3ncrals l i ~ c rnopolies were and are the or ~rnporwnt
and rlcknng (Chinese tycoons) which has bccrm e a cei!nrral mil mrters of Suharto.
cl~aracteristic of late New Order 1nclonesia. t* o r t h e :rear '
acpcncesof all of the above F he almmt the
" ., 3
advantage of the Chinese, from t h e perspccr~veor tnc rnllitary mart opposrte of the economic expectation9 or s ~ r e a b l cparts of
elite, is rhey are a pariah poulp, wlm, even if many of the111 are rhc 1965 coalition. Far from frnding their situation and
Indonesian citizens, are still viewed with hostiliry by many opportunities improved, many indigrnous buqines~men(perhaps
indigenot~sIndonesians ar aliens. In effect exc1udc.d from thc cisptcially devourly Islamic busines5men) found it even harder to
political arena-there bnq never been a gencr: 11 of Chi nese survivc rhan under Su kamo. Far from the New Order economy
ancatry, and, under the New* Order, there has irb~tingtll e virtues of economic rationality, predictability,
cahinet minister of Chinese origins- -the Chir icsty and autortolry, it showed every sign of symrnecricaHy
polltical thrcat to the army leaderrhip, anaI nave Deen a t ]ear1 opposite f n i l ~ n g .
I

superficially content with the narrowIy economic hich M'c have secn how access te bank credit WM a n d is not in the
rhey have heen confined. slighresr determined by provrn entrepreneurial ability, financial
During the decade 1968-78, the Indoneslazt ~ ~ ~ ~- ~probiry, .n r n or y the social benefits to b e derived from i t s utifimtion.
assumed a verv specific character, one which in certain 1lasic RUIt in addirion, political plundering of the banking system led
respects steadily erntied the regime's political stbpport. Nnmi- ~ lckIy i to embezzlement and corruption on a scale Indonesia
nally a largely "free-enterprise economy," it came quickly t o l ~ e hat1 never secn hefore. Some indication of this scale is suggested
dorninared by giant multinationa! corporation<. Lonccnrrarca tl! rhe recent criminal conviction of a middie-lweI provincial
n _ I f

heavily in t h e envrrons or the capital city, in remu iclal of the National Supply Raard fox the emhezzlemtnr of
(minerals, fuels, and lumber), and in fight cnnsr~ 3 million.9 In COntTaSF, the conventional figure for per capita
these corporatiom quickly drove the RaSCcrr~ I I I U I ~ L ,Illllual income in indon~siai s $150. The "joint venture" waq
IIIIU?

tndoneqian husiness class to tI-le waH. Far from recciviag the another natural breeding ground f o r corruption, and many
expected opportunity to expand their opcrarionq, strch hfNCs were willing to pay huge bribes for licenses and contracts.
businrwnen found thcrnselves even squeezed 011 t of fields, such In a recent casr, Seymour Hersh o f the New York Times

Issue No. 63 9
Kornpns, a liberal Catholic newspaper, is nne of Djakartav<thrce major dailier. Thc government clorett it down fur three wcckq.
a l h v i n g it to rcsumc pulllication only aFter prol~ihitingall rncrltion of thc ~tutlrnrrnnvemcnt.

Fnrlsidtfrn ro criticize cithcr prvernrncnt pulicics o r poccrnmenr within university watls. Kvcn rhcrc, studcnts and tcnchem were
p'""""r1. u\+i~rnedthat cr1tici9111 must l ~ c" c o n s t n ~ c t ~ v c . "'t'll I? pnlicy,
Iiowa~cr. had thc onintt,ntlrd cffect of niaking t h e u n i v c ~ ~ t l r r
appr:ir more :In[] morc as s;~ncruaricsof rclattvc frretlrlm III a
NEW STUDENT MOVEMENT prtlitic;~l sysrcrn of dccpcninp authoritarianism. !r aErcj hcight-
,\,significant turning point was the explosion of mid-Januar!. cncd srlliclarity ;inlong univcrs~tystudcnts across thc rounm..
1974. whcn siors broke our in Jnknrrn durinc thc vis;~to f then ,Mranwhilc, n n u t h r r pnvcrnnient pol icy wa< p r o d t ~ c ~ n g
Japnncsc Prlrnc Minister Knkuci Tanakn. 'fhc riots follnwrd itnintrnded conscqilcnccs: t h e politicai 1rnp:tct o f research.
wvcral months of incrc;rsiri~lychnrp critlcisrn OF the poucrnmenr Suhnrtr)'~ t o p tcchriclcr;~ts wcrr acat!rnrics, primarily ccclno-
l ~ y~ n l d c n rluarlcrs 2 n d younger intcllcttrlnls, c a t ~ t ~ n u s lbackcd
l- rnists. Tht-sc mcn, rvl~nsc altthcwity dcpcridctl rxt.ltrsir~cly a n
by RI Irnst nnr nlilltary f ; ~ cion. t Regmning nc pcaccful, nrd'rly thcir scicnrific kno\rlc.dge : ~ n d thrir capacity t o f o m u l a t c
prutcqts. osrcnsilrI!, a p i n ~ rurhlcss
t 1apancsc ctjrparfitc. t:~piral- succcssirr na rional flvc-year plans. cncouragrd thc pntfc.rnmcnt
ism. but transparentlv 8150 : p i n s t Indoncslan povcmrncnt rn spend large sums elf rnoncy nn policy-or~cntctlr c ~ ~ + a r cSuch h.
complicity wirh rt, tlic dcrnon.;ltrntions rnrlcd in wrdcrprcatl rosrnruh was conccnt rn tctf in what wcre rcgartlcd as poliric:~lly
Ijuming of Jaynncsc :rutnmnhiles and other propcrry by innoclluus fic1d.r lfkr ;\gricultur:~Trctlnnmirs, rirrnogr:~phy.ant!
i ~ n e m p l o y e d urban yon t f ~ s ant! same gmUcrnment agcnrs nutririon. I n this cffort, tile tcchnocrnrq hat! thc rnrhusinstic
provticntcisrs. Thc gnvcrnnienr tnok t l 1 1 ~~ ~ ~ t t 3~s lR~prctcst, f j t support of ~nstltutinns like the \Vr)rlrl Rank and USAID, on
nnt unlv for a r r c s ~ i n gsttc:~ble numtwrs of its ttitirs, but for w l l r ~ r rI n r ~ s s rrhc gilvcrnrncnt \tn?s hravity depcndcnt. Tlicrc IS
insisriny thar st~tdciirsshr>uld nnt gr1 invrr!r*etI in politics. T l ~ c ! ~ no tIrlirt~talqo thnt many o f I ! I ~m ~ l i r a r yIcatIrfi aroclnd S ~ t h a r t o
W P I I I ~ have tn cnnfine thcn~sc-lvcsr o rhcir carnpuscs. Acadcrnic saw rhc rapid rsp:tnsion of ihiq rc<c:trch as a uscful deflecrion of
Crectlr~rnwt,uItE hc rcrpcctctl, but nnly sa long as ir was confincd the energics of thc youn~c-r intdlipcntsi;i. \'rlhnt happcncd,

Issue No. 63 11
ho\vmer, was tha I ~ h cup
c policy rrfenrch, While GNP was riring rapidly, real apricultrrral wages were
young m i<Id\r-clas! ;~ntlin tcl ame to a painful declining. In the same area wlrer~ claily wnEe rates f o r
" . . .
awarunea o t what war happcn~ngIn a world with which they agricultural labor were in the neighhorhoad of S d , the price of
would o have ha, Indonesia'r, and irrigated wet-rice land was betneen $4,000 and $5,000 per
espvciall) illagcs. hectare-prices driven fantaqtically high by rich urhan absentee
land speculators.
In Java and Rali, 55 percent of farmers were unable to live
VILLAGES from the yield$ of their fields. Villagers' share in the Gross
What lents disc little by little, were the Domestic Product steadily dr~lrnpdduring the New Order vears.
reafities concealed bq o p t i m ~ s t i cult~cidlda*cfopmenr statistics, The rechnolopical revoltttion in agriculture, hailed by the
w ~ c has I-king Gh' realities f undarnent ally eroded their technocrats as rhe soIution ro Indane<ia's long-sfanding agrarian
faith, no t urnply 1 rd will of thr gown~ m e n t bur , in the problems, was depriving millinns of villagers o f ernploymenr and
good sense and EC : of thc tcrc hnocmt:F themselves. l4 I t income. Japanese rice-hullers, American tractors, Geman
may he u s c ~. lu lro hurrchc L r l C- 1.:..
.--a+ -1.. .r : - c - - - -
i o n research
K ~ I I ~U I~ Ii l l t ~ ~ l l ~ d t this rotary-weeders made hngc numbers of agricultural lahoren
was turrling up, this also hy the youthful incren5indy redundant, wrrhout at the same time significantly
idealism and sacia1 conscier ger generation of increasing producrinn. Dmrnatic illustrations of thew trends
. . . crime at the end of 1777: 'Ihr government wax forced to admit
students were so detplq sr~rxcd."'-1'ht.y learncd chat one-fifth of
all Indonesian babies do nor lice t o the agc of five. Contrary to that Indonesia had become the urorldk No. 1 rice-~rnportcr,
rhe myth of t.he too-fertile pour, scvcrc malnutrrtion means that purchasing more than 2.5 million tons ahroad in that year-a
the tr~rlypoor hxve fctvcr childrcn rhan the more twl!-to-do. figure higher than ever before in Indoneqia's history. At the

22 SOUTIIEAST AStA CHRONICLE

siim e time, famine hrnkt o u t in the drstnct o t Krawang, only a IY7X war a five- or six-year-old chitd in 1965. Hear she had no
few m i l e q f r ~ tn. and traditiot~allyone of J a m ' s mosr concrcte experlcnce of cnrnmunism, or even real memory of it,
fcrt ile rice hn qrl succc.ssful h a d t h e extirpation of the communist party been.
ttcsearch ;LIW m;tclc vcrv C I C ~ how t h a t char~ucsnrtd +'- - '---c 1971 the government had 40 prodigally uqed accusatio--
distribution 'of politic 31 pOWeY under th c New 0 1rdcr a f f w "heing expIoited hy undergrnu
the systcnr r,f rural s.ocial stra.tification . The "G rn threat en o r sile nce critics of wery conct.lval

technolc llture was

~ or emproymen~. . Indonesia was
~ e ~ n v m ons
19W ,
,,, world's No. 1 rice-im~urter . . a

tion '"ha be nefitred r ;c. dites. giual inncwa- strip e that its initial ci.edibility as the cot~ntry'r"rarior" frc
. . .. . . . .
+;-s llnri allawc.rl these c.11rc.s to attlid crrlployng their Innd>,,,,
. .,
IPCC . ., . . .
nunism ism had hy E 978 worn very thin indeed, especial.,,
rnln

fcllrnv-vi l1agc1rs for h a ,rvesting a nd the li kc. Govc rilmcnt rl 11ng.

111 was largrly m olopoli,cd ~ by the s,amc clitc s, steepen

thc gap bcl wecn vil'lag" rich a n d prl,or. Cc~ncs entration
A NEW COALITION
ip mas st catlirv i n creasing, in t h e h: ~ n d sboth tlf
3TOrb all(i of villa~ g c notab lcs such as headn~ en. 7'hr elcctirIns of 1977 illtlqtrate very well what had become '
t h t u,xkc o f the Jr:;tmctiun I3f the PKII, thc lnoclest of S uhnrm's t:oafition by that year. As in 1971, the government
. + ,P ,
I-reform and crop-sharing ICgisratlon or rnc buttarno yc'mrc
*
-.-. .,
.- ' ' c i ~-ct.sseu
r
<
rhrsc elections largely according to plan. Golkar
had bccorrle .a dcad lct tcr. Much of tile la1~d re-distr ibutcd in t h e won almost exacrIy the same prcenrage of rhe vote that it had
car1y 1960s had rcvu rtcd to Its carlicr owners 1I)? rhr e ;~ r l y in 1 871. Yet there were important difference from 1971 aq
1970s. Although t h c 1; provid ed for 50b 5 0 share s in t h e u rnp well In . the . first placr, the victory was achieved almost
.,-*..
vucr,, L L C ~ ~ * ~ Iand
+<..+,>
T
.
landlard, illI m a n y arsr a s 111~'ac ri~alratio ran CXCI uslvrlv by strong-arm hulldozer tactics, with the ministries
righ as 70-30 nr evrn 80-2CI in the I; indlords' favor. It was of clcfensc and ehe interior, as well as Kopkarntih, playing the
J roo easy ro brand any ntrcmpts to e nforcu t h t: land-ref<,rnl lcading roles The array of distinguished independents who had
...,. share-crnpping srarutes as "cornmrinrst. ..,, 0, 0

- - - - 1 pers~raded to stand as Grhknr candidates in 1971 had

- - - , her1
w ~ t nt n e rnm(>rv
of the rnaqsacres of 1965-66-which rook place 1: ~rgelyin h e 1arg1:ly disappeared. jMany of the more honest and self-
t
villages-srill only too vivid, f e w poor fa.rmers da red to rry to rcsp ~ctiny!of them had found their soles in a pcrwerteqs
ognni7e to defend their legal righm. par1 iarnent meanindess and had withdrawn. Secondly, Golkar
t:ina!ly, smdcnts sent to L I ~ -esearch i,n rural xr Cd3
1,rnc-
actually outpolled, nor only in the traditionallv strong1y
became aware, in terns of re31 ce, of thr? meaning of Muslim province of Aceh, but in t h e capital city of Jakarta
the government's own statistics arion: ( 1 :I Only a bau ~ t itself. Its successfi~l rival was a pnrcv called the United
one qllarrer of primary-sc-hod-age c h ~ l d r e n were ~ctuaHy ... In n~vcloprnentParty, a fusion of all pre-existing Muslim parties
school; (2) Less than 2 percent nf coilcge-age y o t ~ t hwcrc in forced by the government itself, All the other parties, including
institutions of higher learning.16 In other words, stude nts ~ I CNationaIist Pnrzy, the Pmteqtant Party, the Carholic Pnrty
lwcame conwions of their eutranrdinarilv privileged sirr~ntionhy and so forth had been forcibly rnergrd into a political Freak
comparison with the vast hulk hful lndoneslans. Jot known as the Indonesian Democracy Party.
surprisindv, in some this consci f pr~vllegcin thc mldst f iefore tur ning t o t h e meaning of this surprising victorv, it is
of deepening rural misery produced a real radical1zation, wl lllc nect:ssary firs t to undcnrand hath the purpose and the
. . ..
in o t l ~ c r sit g e n ~ r a t e da t least a rtrong sense o f middle-c 1 1 . 7 ~,.An,
,L.ruL,,,,. o f these impoqed fusions. The government's
reformist concern. poli tical strategists, most notably General Ali Murtopo, had
Under the circumstances, it is not suq t t aq the hfew calc ulnted that the forced fusion of p a r t i e traditionally in
Ordcr regime celebrated its tenth anniversary, r he canlptrses riva:Ir). nit11 one another and ~ 4 t hwelf-established pnputar
became t h e focal: poinr o f opposition tcI it. ITnr T lses idcr ti ties ~vould fatally weaken them, both internaIIy and
werc the meering point of two diffrrent streams c on- extc.rnalIy. I t was expected that the rivalries would continue and
ment and dissatisfaction. As youthful rn emlwrq o dle eve1r rntenslfy as the different parties' leademhips srntggted for
class which had backed Snharto in 1965, thc stildeilts sha ~~~1 "" Y L L eminence in the new entities, thereby paralyz~ng their
my,>-

that class's r~rhanfrustrations: government cornlprron, offi,cia1 electoral energies and sapping their morale and organizational
lawlessness, restrictions on freedom of exprrssion, nrarginal iza- cohlerence. I t was also cxpected t h a t t h e artachmcnt of, say,
rion of independent entrepreneurship, huge foreign del)ts, .~ n d blurJim voters to a ftlsion of idamiu parries, in whase imposed
squandering of the national patrimony. But tht:y were :~ l s o nnt*re (United Development Party) no trace of Islam was,
much more aware of and concerned by t h e i~ccumulat 'ing d ~ =ctal>le,
tt would h e decisively reduced. Would a traditional
problems of non-middle-class Indonesians, most pa rticularly t h e sup]3orter of the Nahdanrl Ulama he enthusiastic ahnut a new
.
vast a r m i e of the m-ural poor. We should also n o t t n,,n n h . ~hrmr + .,,,y
n ert in which leadership positions had to be shared by
aspect o f the political experience of the srudenr population, a Nalldstul tllarna with it<longstanding competitors. for M~tslim
direct prodrict of its youth. The 18-vear-old college fre5hman of loyalties? In fact, the government's strateqy worked perfectly in

Issue No. 63 13
 thc C:I\C r .lc ~ l ~ r r r \bl . ~r ~~t r R c m r x ~ r : ! i ~I ' n r t ~ . M'prhour a
- ~ ~ t ibr jvr(yr:rrii :~nrlrc=tlt
~ ' r l h ~ . r rInin11r4 I)!, ~ n t c r n a l i r ~ i c l l ~ i p a t i l ~ i l -
I T 1 I I I . 8 . r c t o Fn thc
<:*W u! I!W [ ' T I f ' . h , ~ ! t imr-!..
-~ <IVITL-~ W.L< i n ~ ? r i > t~i,mplcrc
~<r
f : I~ .:.nt 'i yrd nlrt.n:!rion t t i i f < 1oh.F
$11 rr! l,!rt>i!<! 11:~.:tn<l (:c~~n~*~~~~<~ilv.
prc l c tt114im , vnlv
whi[*li ttir i'its!(~n
I . .
!<I! II1CI ,.!, I..1 L t 1 11.

!{ti1 1 1 1<
~ I ~ I ~ ! IrLt -i d ~ i~\trrr<fin!!
l ~hin;: X~IIUI? thr 1 Ill!' vtlrt- (ir
t t b ~ > r2?9 ~ ~ ~ ' r - r ~i ? ~ I ' . ! ? . IIY
. :.\~ l ~ : ~ r
! I '. ri n [.![;xrf:~.1v.15 \I~<>II~

r11dc.ni.r~r11.1r r aqr tElr. f l r ~titnt.

~ 1!1 hirtort
nl~lilcrnInilor~r<i;~ri
5i7 '~:l.:l~~:b,.?l " -1id rw!! [ ' r r > t c ~ t a n t ~
;an8 q r r h 1 r 1~ :rvrgr nl' :I \ltt~llmp a r t v ,
CYl r : v \ v t!>:11 .-1 ~ r l IrrtY!ll>?r
~- i l b C ~ I \ ,if
..-.. I.. .
11 I V Y t ~ : ~ ~ i i t i t ~ t I!
~;~Il\- ~rorlvl! inf!uc.ncrrl rc.lit.iortr 1119

t > r l t . ~ ~ t . ? ~<i I,I>< -n~ I. + L- IV~T:V~!,~I-IC< !ii$~ly <I~III~IC.I~T+

nntl 1r.l.11 rr-!l<*rrr r l l ~ . rft.;rrr. ~t t l r ~ s a lt ~ i : l crl>n
t IV~I~F r t l ~

13 I? \, ilii.il II n~ .tl>ic :r+ p?:1! o f c t i l t

1.1-1 ~mlriiinit
rr I n cl'lccr, thc
rlrl1r.r.
1rcn1:71 nrn- cr-lalition
c>\~cr! r
.
vlt,

f"~.,,,,,~.. I t . ....
.................................
1ll.l.V
IICI l l l l n Suk:~rntv,.~g:~iri<r rllr
" Y t - ~ v< > i r ! ~ rr", , * l i v r rh:!rr t < , ~ t * * ! ~ ~ ! i~xI.~n .I I ; I I - !i nY ~
!!I(+ ~ . k k : t . t ~ f
r h r c-lctrtrt~nq,tlrcrr n c r t - %rr;*np;ntfic.~tja,t~< u , i ncrv F ~ ! I < ! : B T ~ T ~ c ~
nrntmr ~Vir.s t l ~ u l c n ~ar\.cr!.!Jrnrf
t, tr.~tllr:r\n:~l rcliptqr~rant! other
..
-
I . ,
Aivi\i(ms, Xt I F 'II-C'C!' f l !? ~ % ? ~ ~ ~ ~ ? ? ~ I I I F I I ~Icndcrr.
srr~rlt~nr TI
: ~ n d zhvct, .I'<'TC incr c:)qin~l\ nt~~nslhiri~! ntm-hludtm .-
----+

"r.t<lic:~I"co ,? '?~::l\,~<*< beitiirht-ir t ? ~ ~ r ~ k i ~ t ! ! .

It c7r1 tnr I ~ I ~ ~r::t!c.rl

~ I ~ I tI t t~t S u h ~ r r o c'nalit~r>n
'~ h 3 ~
h~'r !TIC, 11 cutrrlnrlr ~ n ~ ~ ~ r t r tr:llrnr n
€ v, ~ i t .thc Thr Im~ic~ t r l u r i o nt t t rhc prnhlr1-n (nrltlt. fill111 ihc. Ixtrpc
mi! TI I T [ t i ) cllic!uOc t 4 i ~,tn.ll\ rtt rhcrcfnrt- m:~dcP ~ ~ C F L~Iv>hI cCnrnurrnlcs r+r rctlcll~r*n<
were <ucccwfullt- prrt
H1I r \vr.l) 1t ha< Ii:i~~pt-nccltn thc rnilrtnr? \lntlrr dn\r,n) w r twts-trlltl. Frr.ir, for :I dccarlc nt) nu\\ ( r f f ~ t r . f w i rrv
!~IC YL.W, 0r1k-r .111tl ( 5 h31 i t < ~ ~ t ~ i i ~ r l i tr <- I~~ t n ~ ~ t c lrailcr
rni r c ' r ~ ~ l r e ,%
~ ~117i!i~:?r\
. +?c.~<Tt*rtiy w a ? nnt w t 111) ~i!! t h r I.I!c14)sfk
cur v IvL-. 3nd tlul nur <tart j ! r . \ t \ i \ ~ t \ n pc.tdcrs k1nt11t hc cnrlv I9ht)s.
qr-~ntfthy p ) l i t l r < utf thr In<lnncci:kn nrrrty. nnc has Sr-contl. lucr.111r.c. .131rl prt-xflgirlriF IoI><tvrrr Fn11ncl ntttxidc I llc
ti7 t'~.rti t had I I i1rtr;nc
~ 111 !ltr j.ip.~nt-fcOcciipnrir*n n ? \ f ~ t a r yqrhcrc m ,Iwunqc .r!lc ,%rnf>i~~,lnt kc\- 0l'irt.n. n ~ t r l t l ~
~ n t lthc ir,ttirbii:il r i ~ t~r rr~l i r l rnf ~ I 045-40. ?'i~r.l ~ ~ rl l fk i t < scnic~r C;~~!tlcrlI)crnocra~!~,rhc. t,.~rirm:~lirctlIrrrnrcr D i ~ t c hcntcrprlsc.;
L ~~I I~ L Tf <o t h 1' .ITC' t r t t' T 1 I 1 F r v i 1 tt'rct* crcnrc,! In rhc J?ptnrce t ( + pro\ rdrd t f i r high-lrvcl !r>l,g. qttcr 1065, n 11h ~ h n c m l i ln f r j l t
Ilclp r l r l r i i dI rhr IF\. ~ n t l s of !.I~:I ;tntl 511tnarr;t ay:lln~t :tn
anr~clpqtcii i \ ~ f ~ c d
.... Incrslcln. T h c v wrrc rrilnctl In lrrrgulnr
w ~ r l n r c~ n d scn.t.d in r l l c ~ rhumr Iocallr~re.\ c r ccnitr:~lsr.tft W:LF
c r r ~rl.rl.5inct Ihc f :rl~:tncrc.scrrc~ltbar t rlnctlon. The t c n t i c n c ~
ro\v.~rtl.: "hcar!!c~snrr<." I1r~;lTi7al1rrn, and dcccnrr.ili,at~on n . l r
. . . Suharto's coalition
.~crrnrual~+al In the rc.rnlr~~icln,
prrrlr!t - t r + ~ l n r ~ ll .n r ~ -arint.il,
rl\
n h c n hitndrcrk of t l l i l l t ~ : t n r lc~i f
Irut mllltnnr < nuthr jrllnctl horh
was reduced to a single
t h r otf'it.) t l , ~ r n ~of' v 11ic III!,ITI~ r c p ~ l d i c . ~ n :I~ v\rvrt\
l nf ~ r r e p ~ l ~ \ r
fc~rccx. 111 s c i i l r ~ t ~ nI r,i .In Irmv crcatt.(l .ilrnnsr tlvrrn~gt\r,rhc
arnl\. l~lrrnrchv. rrtrrn gc.ncr:~l ctnivn trl prwatc, wnq lrllcd Ilv
element: the military
p r ~ ~ v ' nt c l r n r x r thr sdmc ncr- Thr rcr,oluriunnry rnn~mnntlcr-11,-
ch IL-f , 511~ l i r r n11.: ~~~:i.; nr!rri 5 0 tvlirn Itc ,~r<umctl th;kt po5trlon, Ar coilrrok or thr smtc. .I!\ Imnchcr of p t l v r r n t ~ ~ crni tn p l n ~ r rarmv I
t h c r n d < I ! the, rcr.nlr:tion, thr. gr~rrrtlmcnt ~ n t lr ' l t . rnil/t:trl cifl'lcers. 'rllrtc r< nr, ilc~ul>t i h x r rhr r r r r . ~ r ~ r ~ l i ncrppr\rrllnrrlrb<
aw
Icadr.~l-ril,wcrc- Facrrl ~ v ~ .t<-lttc th tiroldrn~sal' Jcmol~~Zl,at\rm,.IS ftlr dirprncinc patrlln.tyr- w f l ~ i r l l rhr nnsrr nF r h r Nctv Or11c.r
rvr.11 n c r b f rnctplrn? cr1nfllr.1 I>cr{rcrn h ~ n d r ~ of r k wlilnr: rrnlor p t c w n ~ t v l t o ! % ~ h . i r t ~ - n ,l ~
r c c 1 h 3 n tlic :inti-trv~nmur~irt 3~111
c ~ f i r c t f i w l ~ o 11.1rl nt, 1t1c-t o t rt.~irity, Ct}r a Itmg ti ti^-, and :rnti-"Suk:rrnt~i<r" 1)llrgcr crsn\lr~ctetl trirttln tlic n i ~ I ~ r : ~- rh:~r.r r.
h:r~itlrctl<r-r! !rlunp lur IT whc~11x1I I ~ J ~ t f c :*I!'
~ rc!i~.iininq hrr.11 ? h c kc! rmc;<ln\ ~ v h vhib h w srl f.lr i,rcrl;E 11,s vcrl <CrltttlF
jun~wr nlrra-em nndct 1 ' h ~t r n ~c i o n ~ CTC;~TCII ~ ~ r t ' r c -ihxtlcnpr from rvirh~n thc :trrn!. In ntt~lrt~dln, Srtli.~rtn. ~ n t Ihlr;
disr.i~rlitinr\ yrtllllcm.; ,ln~rihutrrl t n rhc dntcr~c IF^' afc-11 ct>hnrrs arc I)!. nOH' hcavr. rnidtltt-;~gc.tImrn In ttrrrr cnrfv
n?iit1n1c5I ~ rrllr-ll~rms J t11:tt pl.rritr.il Inrilrnrr~alw-tween \?-kc' . ~ n d rn~rl-f;k. wit11 I:~rgc hmrnrlrr. n i r h .I srromg 5ral.c In tilc
n n ~ lI ~ 0 2 . ~I:I~EIS 1!11(1. an'! in nt, nirlwl tcl icapnrrli/r thinly I>!. poliricnl
 roo ur~sv nollntelnvC and ma kin^ C
money to j u ~ r ~ r rne v
colnrnand 8 ticlns. Tht lming Lynited Katio ns conden
natio,n of thc Ncw Ord mssinn in 'Timot ant1 refusal t
coun IInAnnmrimi
fPn".l"P
CCIlllllCC IIIVIILJIU I laHlld
*,. I . n l r a " ~ n t c g r a d"
CV 1. t ~ ir hat
. ..
: ir d i f f i c111 ~ for Sullartcr to give rhe fighr~ngmtlch publlclr).
omc. P o r a Inng time, t h e namr ot t h e Indnnrsian
nandcr 011 the ~ s l ai dl was kept secrct from the rndonc5ian
c.. as. ...,. .. L L . - - - -
~t.c~ 111cc rrarrles and numbprs of casualties. Suharttl's
t war has lifficult f r>rhim to maintain I mornIe
~g thc I;( en who are acru: 11Iy carry rng nn the
.. .. . .
rng. N o patrrrjric ceremonzes, such as rncdaT-g~vlngor puhlic
rune1-31s for b::~ t t l t .trerntT have ht:en politic:ally possi blc: i n d o
the vvholc mct 1 who iac e tllr pro qpect of (Ienth in 11 attle like t
b e l iu~r that tli c ~ rcotlnlrry is proud both 4-d them a nrl nf wh:
,I..:--
t h t ~d l r U~JIIIK. ..>ll',. -L-.
.. . -..--.- - .
wrc \ ~ r u r l I d not bt x u ( trrlwd then if s t l r ~ t l n r r r c
,--* *

grow g !-(,~ngcrofficers thar '9rhing.r u ~ ~ go ~ hctter

l d
if "w i charge.
..
T h l r t l ~ ythcrc~ 1s the matter of the army's honor, sornethlr
r, less cy nicaI officers in almost any army raE
than dn their elders. The youngtr men do nt
arta governrnent'q policies hut they arr expecte
I-rl
, l l l L l mnny of them are u ~ l aware l of ho
*..r
tu c d r r ? rlrclll (Jul.

unpopular the ~ n Iinst become. To the extent that rfi

unpopular~ry1 to attach tn the army, it is prohahly
matter of conrern t o them. More particularly, thc penon ...
disrc ~ L I W wliich hi3 a m t~itiolisant1grecdy f am11y has I,rough t nn
thc President i s a soutrce of d aily embarrnssment to these
off~cl crs, w11t1:qe rnilitnry trxinirig empll: sizes rhc need for
...*, -:.",
I r l i r g1 1 1 %
,. * ,4 .ICCLILIIUC
>. ,,.*a:.+. LWU
: - -:I:&-& . - -----
,$A
' ~ S . the extent
111 I ~ I I I I L , + ~ ~C ~ J I ~ I ~ I I ~ I T ~ C TO

turers sup ,f its equi that thc indilr~dual Sulmrta comes to he viewed acr bringing
o1)lor {"lr' 011 th c lnstirut Ion of the army, he is in serio~ispolitical
,Ic.
,. . ?
advcrIrures. ,mny reel rtiar wnalcvcr nls mlStaKc5, sunaxto n as In J U C ~ K I C to ) ~ rhe grmeration gap, two other linrs o f fission
donc well hp t h e army, 2nd that his successor, who ought tn 1,e divid I. the ; ~ r m y . Its thrset. g e a t territorial divisions (Siliwangi in
a re!;petted army officer, should tnke ovrr I n an ordcri y , West jnvn, DI]mncgorn in CentraI Java, and Brawijaya in E:as~
"lrel1.l rimed and institutiona1izt.d fas1jior1-l,v
*TL11-1 consensus ~ainot " ln,-\
arc cons ,,.-.. w:.,nl-
L X ~ I J L I l r a r 3 . There are alio strong tensions between

the generals themselver. After all., rhcy anr arc all mt mainstream militav estahli3hment in the Minisrry of
nf t h e "1945 Generation," the gp c r n t i o n g h t for ar nsc a n d the politics! generals o f Suharto's personal clique,
won -independence for their count q'. dominate the palace, t h e cabinet and t h e Stare Entelligence
Ylrt there art certainly tensions within the arm! ;which a re ngen cg. Suha~ rro oncr commanded t h e Diponegor *1,
likel) t o play an increasingly imp ortnnt sole. Most irnportant I7f and II I O S ~mem11wrsof his inner circle are also from t h
r 7.
these is the \vide gap, in ter r n q of ge, exper'iencc, arrd A t h c,ugh he Ihas attempted to keep some sort of
*w* ca
l,,,7,Lssionalism, I;+*-,
lwtween the rni,,,,,~ .- , AC , r,o nL C n
mr
,,,,n r l rl LC l%*llnn
cadets of the early 1960s. WIlile thc yoanger men, now irr thc,ir alwa!i s acknowledge ~ h e efforts.
.,.,... , ,.,m the divisions, members ef the other r wLl u t r a l d t
3 .
V N L a l l
~ P + . I I P .

~e It is not surprising that those

ye

late 3 0 s and early 40s, I~ave none of t h e "rt.volurionar>"' gcncr,315 who in rccent years have been more or less publically
prestige of their elders, they are much more highly tra~ricd,ar~d critic al of Suharto-and have been punished for it-hnve come
l~elieve themselves to he Far mtwe prr~fc: ssiorldly Rrawija ya (Gen. St~mitro), and Siliwangi (Generals
They ?hare no particular sense (7f c o r n ricshiy~ wi. tion, Dli:srsono, a n d Kemal Idris). Their crlricisms have
Indeed, there are a number of go,od rensor IS w h y his :-d and elncouragd student criticism of the government.
;- their eyes may he quite low. Ptrst, t h e r n . a t r , r ; e v l
111 .,.,,,,...,
equrpnlcr ,I,
. ...
S ~ lwang~
i
3 111 Divi5ion is especially important because it
anc1 irainrng of the army have been allowed to nln scriousl y contr-01s the province of W e t Java where the capital city is
do1vnhill since the 1960s. I t is likely that some ynunper offlce rr; located. (The actual metropolitan area is under another
klileve that if the New Order has rakcn goorl t a r t of t l I C comrnand.) If rhc rumors a r t m e that it is primarily Siliwangi
erals, it has neglrcted t h e army. Secondly, it is an opc,n and Brawijaya troops that are heing sent off to fight in Timor
ret, even in Intloncsia, that t h e invasion of t,Ire for~nt :r (and taking heavy casualties there), one can ma pine rhat
nrpuese colony of East Timor in Decemher T 975 was rcscn trnent of presidential favoritism far Diponegorn is being
L'Lllitary disaster. The army's inahili ty in the s ~ c c e e .." ,,avu~ -"
d i ,*...,. * v . a r r :rl,ared.

a h alf years to crush t h e Eretilin independence fighters, or evc ~nflicr between the Defense Ministry and the "political
car'ture any of their leaders, let alone win over t h e populntio~ As" is l~a~ically a matter of institutional rivalry. Career
has compounded the younger officers\c*)ncerns. There a1 ars, primarily concerned with the military's own internal
reaqons for supposing that they have attributed this rn~lirary rvcH-t~cingand development, are concentrated in the ministry.
tjumiriation to t h e bungling and incompetence of their elders, On the tvhoPe, they shun the spotlight and emphxqize "the

ue Yo. 63 I5
CIITPF" :111(l ~)~IXI'RIIC~:ICII- ~C'XIYI-I'I~OTK. I ~ I C Yn r t ~ n c t i t ~ trod II'~IO~P
th:?r rntlli incrmcnl <!icllilrl drpcntl on p r ~ ! ~ w l n n n lcstitlid.trr for t h c p r t . ~ i ~ l r t ~ t i rltvt.rrcrrm. .!t ncpnn \tm>ctl I rlrt c-u
r ~~rnjlr-rcrr~ -h:tr, prr-.oti.~l rrrilnrrFlon<. Suh~rrtl. tiow Conimandrr-in-C:f~~cf S u r ~ m owas \vt~r<kctE rlut of t l l v 1111llt.irv
t ~ r r .h~rltl-L V I C Il<r~~ttc.ll ~i1'1,-v 11i p r ~ s d r n r1~ \v1-11 1% hciry ;I hicmrch! lntlr n pre<tfC!tlit< ant1 pntvcrlrrr pcwt ~ u p r n - ~ ~ i n : ; ' c t ~
s c a ~ r l n r d \ * r r v n n o f tvrcrr1,tl . ~ r m \ 1c 3ro c ~ v t11 in~self n r l f I ~ Vp o l ~ t ~ lct v~\ .? 11.1rniin~:(4 ,111 T ~ ~C< I < I T I ~ I ~ <l>f I !cn~t! ,~f
p i ~ ~ o n :ptnrrvr.
ll :1n4 ,rvcr~ctI w c t l m i n ~t h r prrq<,rICT r l f ?Irc :~vnly thc Sr.~tc I11rcll1ycnt.t- ; 1 ~ c n r ~:inJ C l l i c f o f Srnff (r.c., ac.rlr.tl
c<r:~iili<+n,rnt..he h.15 r*~rbrrctE.tra)ilntI hrm :I p c r \ ~ > i ~mi
crnrr.~ls.i r ho hnvc ~ p t * t ~ n l i / nett
8 .,.
r d ~n TII.I*I o p ~ r : ! t i o n ~
a l of
I ,~ i in
t
cr~nrrcjllc-r)trt Kr-pl.,,~mrllv Irnvr- Il:-rn p n i In :flc I ~ ~ r r d(11< IHHC
prfinn. rhr, fr-:~rcrl Lcrlcml 'rrr~~:;i k~rrrrrno (.\II !\tiirrlc:l n
w c h nrcaq ,is ~rrtrtllyr.ncr,w ~ p p l \ .f ~ n q n ~nnrl . ~ , i n ~ l t t a r \pu1ic.c.. a n . ~ l o pwr~irldIlc nrnlring rhc snnic. rnzn \~r~tuliqnett!~<ty t ~ r l i t c,f
t
7 htw. ~ t cnor J c p + i r t . r ~ r ~th,tt t < mn:nrtrr-nrn .lrmy m r l i I:oltF In rhc. 1:1:1 ant1 tbc. CIA.)
TllpJ~ c.<tcbrm, and rhv~r.~cr~crnI< C t r l r n v r l ~ a rrheir ptlwc-r :111d Mc.lnwhlFc, nrhirmr\* nrrcqts o f rtutfr.nr5 ~ n r lrrcpc-ctcd
prtxrI2y rcst \sfiolI\~rtrl t ? ~ c . Prc.r~dcnt's rtl!:rical .;unrr..il. 'l'hr tIt~s~dcrirt i o r ~ l ~ ~ l i t i c~" iZ V C cont~nucd trn~llatrrf rincr t 5 r
rr~!ttl l.nr~tv thcv will urt .I hvnrl. whrrrvcr 111lld~t h ~ p r c ~ t d r n rr' ~ - ~ I c ' ~ t iThcrc- t ~ r i . Irc ntl ricnq of :I \ o f ~ r n i r l go n r t ~ i c .
prcsit2cnr.\. Whrn 111rtcr r~t.;rlric.; anlong thr gcner.11~ h,~uc tronr. 1 Ilc trrcnrli s ~nrhc nppo<trc dart-t rlcrtl.
<rirf-+crdI+t.firrr :hr putll~c.r i o t z l ~ l rr r t 1 0 7 3 - 7 4 ant1 14)78, they l l t 3 ~ ! < . r n ili<?t)r> I< f l l l ~ oi' r ~ 2 m p l r < <>! ,81%l<lL~r3t<a \VII(I IJIYt
~:IVI. i l i v n l l ~ ~ 1TI~O~C\IIIPTI
1 for rhc ' ' e ~ r ~i h ~ !h m ~ n ! ' (f.;c.ncral
* orll\. :~ltcn:trctlt hcir lvcol)lt.s, t ~ u t.tiso t h l l 1-\1crvthlng thrv cnliltl
Sunl~rruin I(";.?-74, Cicneral Siirilnr~in 1Q:R) .lp,lmrr thr- ~ u l a c r rn rn:~kr.-I peat-rt'ul i.lrangc of tulcfi .:ant1 pr>lickrrrnpos<jhlc. X g 1
p d i r i ~ ~ t 1> bl~nvi.
s :11!. l ; i v ) r r ~ ! 11; l l t ~ r t t , ~on ~ , IHHII o~.cxion<\. Dinh I)icm, !.on Nnl :incl S\ ngrn:ln I?)ict. nrc- 1mlt8 stllnc
ru.bmplt.%.I t i'.;I ~ k c l vrl>:~rSttharral I\ rnn\lnK rnrtr j w r w r h n
p l ~ i t ~ o llr n i13n nt+t cot>~rrt11rr4*n~l11 l*c scv!.:cCd fllr n n n t l ~ c r
t k t c*\rq, j ~ f 1% tJrrt ~\nr~l,civt h a r h i i nt!c tvill IIV:~l)lc t o
Yc~rtcrrf rlicsr irrrcrri2l tli\irtcrrrr wirhin rlrc ,trrricil forcrc, ir
WFISI IIICTCIII~T fnr cI11n~:c r? 1 1 I c l n ~ .1 ~ TIT? thc r ~ r r ~
, Scnr, r imr
fat:~l, l n ~ iti c ~ r l i r nrc r rlrcv rcrnrlraldc. As Srih:~rtrrIS vcrlv much
undrr rbc h'cw Orrlet, thr p11vtrnlltcnl . i n n j ~ ~ ~ n r ttl.l ndr :In
nwrnrr, \\ ~ t htl7c ~ ? l r lrrgr,ttir$n lr of t!iv rrqt o f ! I ~ F cjnr-:lmc
ass.tss~n:~t~on p l o t h , ~ r lhccn tI~ccnr.crc~la vrlilng I l u < l ~ r <t~r,lr~n
n
coalition. it rnxy I>c tcrnptlng f o r romr m i t i r a y officer t r l try
R'V r h . r r ~ r c lwrrh p l n n n i n ~tcl htvnh f ! ~ cprrcit!t.rrr. hrc ~ v ~ f~c r. l d
[IF put toyctcthrr a r ~ c w ~cl:ll~;t~rln,coup. .issacsln:lti<m. or rlrfrcr
nvcrnl h ~ b ~ r of s c prrr\t~tur~ori.l!)
~ \Yl~rtlicr:in?. ~ r plnr h :~c*tlrnll\
me.xn\. I f war rhi\ fr.~l+, nlorc ~ 1 1 3 1 1 an\ rhlny c?rr. ~vhich!a\.
cslrrc(l 1s a m:itrcr c & F c+r~rTjtrrrlrc,1)11r thr nrlntluncr-~ncrlt.;h<lirz
lwhint! nhr cr.irLlnrrn uf J.~riilnr!. 20, 1078. 'fhat this fear
what rhc p.llacv Icsn.
r.cm.<lnr u n x < . ~ i ~ x pis,d indicsrv~l tn cvrnr.; a f t r r S~r!lnrto'<
Shnultl Suh.trtn bc .t~~:~q.;inatrtl or cllr I n r3ihc.r. it Ir rnrtcr
rucc.r.r<f~~l cnr:irlc'cnnF of ~ L tlrvn F rc-t!rct~o~ 35i prccirlcni in
iinf~kelvrli:rt r l ~ cliyljr-tvcietii Adnw hlalrk., . l l < r ~ n dcc;#rlc crltltr
M:~rcll.I r tr r t ~ t h.I ~ I i n r c:tr thrw t-uttnr.; flint tvc m;ty I ~ t r ~ n g l y
rli:in rile E'rcsi~lcnt, tvnrilri I)v nllorrrrrl to r~1rcr.c.dh~rn.T h e way
rim~=ltrdr.For CIS-h c v ~ ~ ~Tq ~ i ~c
\ ! InO ~ t lcc ~ r l v1h.11 5 1 1 h r ~ t 3 15
\vrlrhtl hr oprn for n hirtcr and prwqbhl~ hlrwlcfr' ~rn.\:lylc f,lr
drrcrlninrrl trl c u ~ l ~ i n uwirh. c or sccs n0 :~lter~latlvr tu, ihr
po\r.cr nrncmc t.rrnrrr~di~ry ~ . t v r s!lrlutil not
rnilit:~rr ~ T ( H I PAnrl
rnurrc h c ha5 pursrrcd over t3nc p:wr fctv !r:ifi
n c ~ l c c t[hi* p o w i b ~ l i t v .t WLI 1) lc'[ It! rot1ngrr i>t'flct-fi, who
'Tfie rcpinw rc.rrivrd TI, ilnp!c~s.lnt jolt zvhci~ S ~ ~ l t a n
r n ~ ~ r 'at t~rrt m p rcr 1>1111c1 '1 nrw ptdiltt 11 ct~:iT!tionon I ~ IC~ R of TI~
I tarncnek~~Rt~rvonr~ nf Jtlf:jnknrta, itmg<tnnd\n~\'ice-l'rm~ilcnt
t l ~ r - r~lra i ~ to ~ ircvirr
~ hrrncrrv i n gowrnmcnr, rcrclir rhr nnrlrln
undcr S ~ t h n nn~n~n ,r n ~ n c ~In t l \?nrr!l that he zvrn:lrl nor rtnntf fnr
from p c c d v fnrcipcrs. .!rid, for .I \ v h ~ l czr Icnr;t. rcstort. popular
r ~ ~ l c c t t o n'1'11~ . .irtriL*ttncrnlcnr. IVIIIIC ~ l d c l i ~ ~"~r rn. c~ s ~ r (it' n~
hcalrh." niadc i t c(i11tc p!:izrt tEinr ~thr\\1t1<[1 r c \ p ~ c t r t lS ~ ~ l t a nl i h c . ~ i r ~:at~ , leaxt rr, lnd~wlts~,l'c troublcd rniddlv clnsws. ~t nnl to
hr-r huge, Itmpsuffcr~ng a!!mrlln ~lcrpulntion.
find lrecornc dir:~lfcctr.tl From t h r govrrniilcnt, and u r a e no
f r ~ n g r willing
r r o shoulrirr r r r p n n < i t i ~ l ~for t v ptrlicirs hr cvpposcd.
In chtjocmg .{ ilcrv vicr-!~rc~r~lrrrt, Suhnrrrk h.lrl mrprc or Ir\r thc
I'nllnwing chnircs- ,I wrll-knrwn Ficurt. trtrm nnc o f thr. pnlitical
pm-rlt*<. IIIc~II\ fro ti^ [Itc 5t11din1!-'Ill'; v r v wnv*r gvmrral with
3 r r l ~ t ~ v c pard lv r r p u r , ~ t i o ncrr, :in "intlrlwnrlcn~" rv~tliout:Iny
qrrong pnl~tic.:~f Support of his rrtvn. 'I hc ! I K ~I-hoice wtlultE 11;lt~
rr.twr\cntc.ri nn nrrcmpr ra woo h ~ rcrlrics. rhu sccimrf wr>r~ltl
h:ivr mrazit that lie 1 ~ x 5(.3rrii1llr, s m n n r h i n ~thc psth for a
nlccrwor. Thc rhirtl-rvh~ch v . . ~rhc choice artt~allym a ~ l tn r rhc
~wrsoti of rlir g~rnt!an~scu-f:~lrcign 3lin1ster h d : ~ r n 13:ilik-
r ~ ~ . v r : l l fr d
h ~ . tSulr:~rrvrnisrcd no unc wrrh rcnl pnl~ttcalwcighr
In s t 1 rrrltepc B f1091~11m. an11 xva? ~ l c t r r m i n c d11) nrle rrrr rhc
irldcfinitc future.
St~nrrly after his rt-rtrcrirm. Suh.trttl annr>uncrd 3 new
r ~ h t n r t . Far from rrprrwnrzng an atrenipt to u-idm h ~ s
rhrunltc.11 potitic:il hasc, it t ~ o r call rhr char:irtcrixrirs r j f a rtf!inlr
rlndrr sicp-. Ir cnntair~riif . ~ rmnrr grner.~lsrtl.in i t s prrtlecr\snr,
and thcct. ~ e l ~ r W m ~l T~C:tII rncn~kwfio f rhc nld palscc cliqu~'.
tVhnt ncw i a c r ~I-mcr~rdwvrc nia~nlyc.rcnarurc<r r F I;cnt-ml :\I1
hlurtttpo'c ~ntclligrnccapp?r>tltc. I n a s!pnil~cxntc)nlcn t'rrr rtrr
l u n ~ r c of rllc Indoncs~nn prcss. ~hlitrtnpo himsclf hccamc
minlrter o f intr)rmatxe~n.1.07 t31c Irrv rime tn I n d o n e r ~ :h~~' ~r t o n
rhr ininir~ryO C r c l y i n n (an c - I l l Slu\lrrn I>niliwiclc\rvnc r i t r n to J
 North Relincse ttmplc rclief ~ h o w i n gDrrrch cnlonilcrs drinking h e r (ca. 1 9 1 0 ) . Holland ruler! Indonesia far over 300 years.

NOTES puinrc nirr, w l ~ i l ct11c government u u r l thc cmr r a \how i~

\ 1 J r i t ~ Htmk
ws SCC~OUFallnut s u p p r m i n ~corruptinn, no nar~n~laf-lcwl I I u l o oiLrid
~
1. On thc tnnsf~~rmaticrn of the rcvnlutianary x m y , ker the ho* cver hccn prn<ccutctl, though trRulog'< corruptiori I < lcpcn+lar_r..
mnfistcrl:kl ,~nirlek nf Kuth 'I'. MrVqv. "l'he Pmr-Revnlutionow 10. V m J or[- I~rmcr.I . ~ n u . ~2v5 , 1977.
Tr:irlrform:trion or rhc 1rl.rlont.sinn Amp," l'~rr$ I 2nd E l , in I)>rf~>n*.rrn.I I 1I . For dctails. wc In$ro>rpr;r I c-n?mmir r'rncperts nnd ~ h Slarrrf r nf
(April lt'?l 1, pp. 131-76. :\ntl I 3 (April 1 Q7?),pp. 147-HZ. t l r r r r r , l n R ; ~ l . > f(W:tuhinpft~n,
~ F).C:.: Ccntcr for Intvrnatirmal Pul!ry.
2. Fnr trlnrlsrinns nF thr "cnwp Croup'c" drcrccc, ~ P P"Srlwted lnternntionnl Policy Heprlrr. Decemher 1 976).
Docttmenrs Rclar~ngro rhc Srptcml)cr 311th Movcmcnr IIKI 11s Fpllopc," 12. Vig-ura ~ l r n w nirom tlrc t c ~ r i m o n yof IIencdict R. O'C:. 11ndcrcnn
I>ltIo?~c*ia I (April 1 O f i f i j , pp. I 3 1-204. i n tirrnmrr Iilphrr nl I ? I I ~ R ~ I ~ mtd I I I'hiirppirit.r. tlcnrin-p Itrforc rhc
~ T Itt't.
5 . I'nr ilctnilq nl the rcnrgnnirarinn, :tnd a discuwion of its Strhcclmmittcc on lnternntionnl Organtnat~nlirof rllc (:rbmmrrtcc rln
~ r n p l ~ c a t i n n%cc
~ . "Currcnt Slat3 o n t llt: Inclhnr\rnn Army l - ' l ~ t cnftcr rhc 1nternstiun:tl Relntions. I Inuse of Iicprr-entaz tvcr (Dcceml~rrI H. 1 9 7 5 .
Kcurp:tn~!:~tlnn of 1 9 b ~ - 1 9 7 0 . " Indr~rrr~rrr,10 (Orrrrtwr 1?7F1), ;wtl M a y 3, 1976), W:rshingtori. D.C.: (;nv~+r~irncnl Printinp Office, 19761,
rl pp. l u g - 2 0 8 .
p. 72.
4. Scc I'ranklin 11. Weinqrtin. Itrdont~in/ I h n w f n n ~ Con/rorrr~~rrov 13. Sec R. Wjlliarn I.idrtfc, "lnrlonfiis 1977: Thr Ncw Orrlrr's
(Ithac:~:C:umrll Mrbdcrn I n ~ l c ~ n cl'rirjcct r~r lntcrirn Rcport, 1969). Swnnd P.irliamcnrnn7 Elrctivn," Asir~tt Srrrvr,v. 18.2 (Frltrunry IPi'R),
5. Thc Ilrrt crutlic., of r t ~ c 1971 rlectlnn.. nre M m : ~ r hNish~harn, ~ pp. 175-85. 3 t p. 181.
(:olRar atld thr Ir~dowt~n~r~r I-lvrtic~nfu/ 1971 (I tt!a~.a. (:crrnrll Moclcrn 11. Thrs hitrcr ~li~illusionrncntwith the tcchnocrars is vlvirllv
lndoncria Project hlonttgr~rrpll S C ~ I ~ FI671 . ) : r n t l K c r ~W.brrl, Tbtn 1071 aprrs.;cd t h m u ~ h o u rthe I1 1*r!t~ IEnnk.
Ilrctron rn I~rdunt,rra ~ r n hirrt ,l,rw I . , ~ r r 5rrrdv (Cl.~yrnn. I'lc1ori3- 15. Thv l : ~ rr r l~sred1)rlow~:[re Fnlrly rnndnrnty ~rlecrcd.Thcv arc
l\4nnx4i I ' a p m on Sourhca~rA ~ i : i .No. 2 , lg73). %Instof rtic olwrv.~rionq d r s w inter 31i:i from A n \ l ~ . f ~ oi n. ~' ~ n g r v w i ~ n aicrrirnnny
I c ~ r c dal5ovc;
11cl~~ w Ibnwtl 11n ~ I I c ~ .
nrc ~ l i cnrticlw trv W i l l i a m I:olllcr, "l'oo1'1I ' r ~ ~ l r l c m ~.
Vnrrnploymcnt nnd rlrv
6 . Src Ufsr(l, 7 % l ~p 7 1 Flr.crion, ch3prt.r 9. Cirecn Hcvnlutinn In Rural Jnvn," ant1 Ily J n o E. R t ~ h c f c Trrcnct. , I!, tlull.
7. The Nahdnrul lllnrns'c vote actualtv rose from 18.4 ro 18.7%. ant1 Lukos Ilcndrato, "Who Dlcs nC Wlrxt ant1 i\rhv." rn I ' n ~ l r r i r IJakart:r).
8. For :I ucrful an:lly%~cof thc "'jtr~nr\.rnturr," :zml 0 1 tIie ktrucrurc Q (Mar& 1')7H), pp. 3H-52 anti 2 6 5 7 , wh1c.11wrnrnari~cc.~rl~cr rcscnrch
r>f cxpitfliwn in Iatc New Ortlcr tlrtloncGn in p n v r : ~ l , rcc K ~ c l r : ~ r ~findlnp; l ant! rlrher w u r c f i .
Rot+r\cln, 'Tl'r,ward a I:ln<\ A n a l y w c ~ t the Indnncsmn M ~ l ~ t a r y t h. Scc Andctson'< ~ongrcqsionaltcctimt~nv.p. 71.
nnrc.:luur~r~c Statc." I~rdont.rrrr,? S (April lt)7H1. pp. 17-41). 17. Sce Lidrilc. "lndnnrrin 1377," p. 17'1.
9. For morr ticr.~lls, rcc t l l r Ifl - l w Ilcrrlk I J / r l v 197R StrrBnrtts" IX. For ~llurninntinp ilrraits on thc prcfitlrnrinl farn~lyk tinmcial
Stnr~Ir.in I n d o r i r ~ m .2 5 (April l'r7HI. pp. I 71-HZ, eqp. a t p. 1 5 5 . R f rhc h i ~ l i - r o l l i ~qcv~ p .Rot~i<ot~, "Tu\r'arJ~3 Class Analvkts," pp. 30-32.

Issue No. 63 17
 Itf S. !Icndr:i, 13ne I n d ( ~ t ~ m ~ITIOST :~'s
pnyular prtrrs : ~ n t f ~ll.tywr~ghrr, rccrntly
rc~.brcdthlq ant! o t b c n nt !I:< pocrns to :in
r n t h o r i n x r ~audirnct.
~. r b f 2,F;DI) in Jak.~n:l.

'fhrcr ~ l n v \Intr-r, nn hlny 1 , 1?17R, h r was

a ~ r < t r c l hy t h e rnr11t.try. 1 % ~r r u l ~ l i c ~ ~ .
nr&lcr, thv In(Iont~~.tt~ nicrle.~ msv nor
mrnrinn 111c nnrrw. frr t l i a t o f ci.vrr7l rlthcr
npprflltltln f i g ~ l r ~ rI.t~nc . a crirlc 1)1 rflc
g u \ t " ~ ~ n i e n tItendn
. nnt hten prr-
miriel! tt? per!orni hic play< in hit n n r i v r
j ~ l ~ t ~ l i l for ~ t : l yeam. Wrth vlmrriutj\
di*;\,~tlrFn~.r~r~n now rstrnrl~nl!much fur-
t 5 r r rl1:tn dcmon~fratlnq ~ r l ~ i l r n r qa r ~ d
t l i ~ ; ! * f ~ v r ~grncral<,
.~l i t < artistic c s p r r r ~ i o t i
I 4 homn Iralna. tlrc "kilt{ prt~\brlkcrf'lcrrr povcrnlnrnt rcprcwion.
- : \ l r i l Suiletmr>, com~nanrlcr (II
Indnnt.rrl0< ftnrcd sccurlrv forte.
h c dirwna rtmr nns rnckvn Ind~r-
ncwan pnl~rrcalc~rclcc;in ~ h clnrr
Fiarnkarntib, jtt~t~ficrl Rrntlr:i's :IrrrLt
1110

wIftnF thnr t ~ i q ~ v o r b l r "frlll rlf ~rruirth-

yiqr ir fintllny vul>trwldm in manv
fxt i s of rn<lr,nc~iaii lilr, r:inmnp fr(31n
hil*h cult~rrcro srrcrr-cc~rncrFolk murn-.
R C [ I ~ O E IIC SR I ~ C R a5 swll nr a r r i c r ~ nrc unrtrr nnrl social conflfcr~.I t givrq ~ w n p l c
rabinq t ~ ptllr r r f r f i n of' c~pporlt~trn
l>rr.~t~lrnt Suhnrro. I n thc v:lr~ctlfarms In
w t ~ ~ crhc h r n c < s a F IF F { I I I C ~ L ' ~ ~ , ~t r ~ r i k r t
drrp rcsrxnanct- arnnng I r z ntldicncrs. m ~ n t action
wltr, I I ~ F ijn won!^, strnp : ~ n drvcrrts
whtch rhc youernmcnr c I a c 5 rlor nllmt. to
hc p1111l1cval.r v h ~ l r t t ~ ernrllrny rrlcs
ftttilclt. t o srnp i t .
I hxvc rr-rirren rhrc pnmphtrt t,ccnurr
rhc inr;titu~iort<of p t l l > l iripiriion ~
:ire ccngcrctl nr~tli~.ol>wt-ls.
Pcoplc 5pcnk In n4lrllrr. l'n sprak yoitr
mind hcconlc< .I t-rmfvqs~r~n.
t f rntlcrcm ir allarwerl o n l y ihrouyh
clff1ci3F chnnnclr, lifc will Iyr likc
catinf: vcprtnltlcs w~ttiours3lt,
I Iimr wrrrrcn t ? ~ spamplhrt
: hcr.lusc
pamphlets arr- not tall~>tlfor ~ O C ~ C'I'cn
I I o n ~I'or csrricr pipcons. izlv h:iricls,
lrch t t * usc slgnnl flap. 1 yc:rrti Firr
t h c rmokr 5ign3Es usrtl Iw thc
Indianc.
1 src n o rrasrrn t n rcinain silent. 1 ~ 1 t h nwnr bnn nn ~ t spctiunn.lncr or pub-
foldctl handr ...
mcnr5." 'I'Jlc j:ik.lrta +I~CimryC:rrmn~anri
espan~lcdo n r b t ~ "<uch .;tt~fCcan lracl ru
thc wm11,p picrtlre of t h c rrrulrr oi
trr
dcvclopmrnt." Ic:irhcr ~ h a nsilrnce thc
prntert inp rnic~%.howcvrr, t h c prrvcrn-
'~ sccms ro create nrw nncs.
Cln j .~nu:irj, 24, 14 \earlinp inrt.l!rttunlc
and :~rrisr< rlgncd n y~rhlic qrarrrncnr
r ~ l > l r c t i n gto rhr cl(r5urc o t rnnlrrr RI'~I~F-
p n p m :lnrl : ~ r r ~ - t sof hz~ntlrcilsc d s ~ r i -
Jrnrs, I'op~har mllslclnns hsvt. ~wvtittrn
sonp to prorcst govcrnrncnt r c n s t l ~ l i i p
ol' critical films nnd nrt rxhihitq.
In rhc p . m >car, Prcs~ctcnt S~shartn
xnrt his f n r n ~ l y havc hccn rhe ruh~cctn f
A l ~ n r i cSun, Oh ,111nttc Stin, .I weer
t l l r r r t crlticrcm fnr rhr fifit timr sinrc
aunttc,
Suli:lr80 charnr fr, pntvrr in 19Clh. I l ~ l
l-'vt.r?.dav ir r'nen)~vd113 FP(IT~C.
Tlrn, Sulr:arttr's I V I ~ C , 11as gainrtl partlcu!.ir
C;[~r.ruulfinq tjnt14 norrn,
nt>turicr\, hccauw of I ~ c rcurr~icivrant1
7 11t.n ~rr.11gh1 to Iht' Irra~~t)-' parlor
shady hurincsr d c a l i n ~ L)uhl>rtl . M:tdninc
for :I mil\<l>:~th.
. I'erct-nr in rhe carlv 1t370<, slir !\:IS
rccrntly h r e n r r n : ~ r n r dI l ~ 5Q-50. u .A pop- ;\unric Sun, n h ..211nrleSun. an dcriv
uldr rrrck g n u p , T r ~ oRimtln, wrorc a :~llntlr.,
sane a t > l ~ u tI t ~ uTicri w l l ~ c h!la<c i r c latcd ~~ St) ;lcrrzrc. in qrr nlanv d i i f c r ~ n t
wirlcl\r arnrlnp studcntr d m p ~ t ra envctn- n ~ c c t i and
n ~ club<,
l*lt>rn~ng,noim, and nlght,
IIC:II LOTI. (Ih ,Iirr~ticSun. ;I rnr3drl a1tnritL.
 I'n~cr:~ld, dinrncrr~iland c-rt~\hrd~ t ~ l : ~ c .
C ; r + l ~ l , arid (tm<trllr.tion ( $ 1 Iron Ir.~r.:
:trthltcr lwinc*<q.
..
I rcclcmq, d i r c c r ~ ~ ranti~ . , hrnkcn "Tycoons, directors, and brokers,
.2rr rlo\rn o n i hvrr L r i ~ c - f<~rClni~ttbn~l
ttl Auntit. S i ~ i i

,luntltn Sun. 0 1 1 .\unr~r..sa1n. a ~tvI15lr

Are down on their knees
.rtrntle.
Yrvrr Ic c i ~un7i.ill
r\~rr\*l>tltlv,
y t,ld a n ( l r t ~ rvrrrlntr.
T ; r p ~ i \ a ~ tr11c
n h ,\urir:c Sl~n.011 . l ~ r n t ~.Iunrlr
-
r. 5ttn to -AuntieSun."
h$c:~ntvl.~~le,rlic nlrm 1 w y 1I : i r f o r n ~t r F
rnu<iC in b n ~ l ( mI,c ~!\ntvun
~ ,I% ' ' ~ i , r t 7 i ; , { 7 1 r ' '
I>r~aurr- ~ I C1 1 5 ~ l i ; i r . l ~ t ~h~a1.1.
r : ~ l ,it>nn-
~~
rlrr.sr %t,nrr in,! ptrcrnq Tmth , L ~ I C E rlirn~nt<licdprrpr~lnr Lnrtercst In thr CIW
C'I-TI.FS
1,c.at. II:I< n l ~ n I,ct.c)mc :I tnctliun~ r ~ l
lnqulr -111 CX~VI~I~III~: o fI - p i ~ s i t ~ o'In(I
II~~LI~ rn:lny J.1r~nr-;c, t h r "5:tw~roAfl.iir" 1s
disscnt, rcachln!! rjut t o hupc .~udicnci.~ In rncrlr I n t 41r rrmntrwidc. 11rlwr.vc.r. proof lrhnr rhc z+alvjr, Iprrwcr) oiF rhc
mnrkt-tpf~cc-5. <trCCTt-Orn{
Sulinrro rcclrrw hac .;lip!>rtl r l t l r r l f Its
~rmolrrh tc \r.cm1~hr (1' :ht. p v r r n l n v n t
hctnlc5 Ithnrn~ I m n i a , r h r I ?ll\-!i X L kc(? 1 1 ~<!rrTl FrFrC'<$lOtl- Vi.in~l~.?'firs ~ t ~ t t r p r r t s t i ~drr~vvt
)n from
i!c7t~qyifnt, " rc<ptui~ L-I~ t 4 b 1 rlic rtimh1~13rinnof S:~ruitn'r hziic :I$ +a
c ~ l (lirr-t t t'Yprc'FT1OR oh
~ r ~ . v e n t .111\,
c,cns~mhipol :r f r l r i ~tlcpictinl: I flc I ~ l r( .1 1 ;I
L!~ w ; ~ rY I T ~ I. hrvutri.r, fatnr rnvqtic nnrl tr:~tlitinn,tlJlv-tnc~rctmcr! -
TtTC'Ct ptqn.cln w ' h .i runt-. rsf p r r l r l t r t l
xhytr c r f d ~ r s ~ r ~ ~ r t . ~rk b ~ n ~ 1hc i ~ l tirvns
~ of ptwcr. T h c grrvcmnrcrir'~r r a c -
r~hng<.lnclt~clcdjn :I rcccnr t . l < S C E t c rc II,rl.' that i t , irw, nkeq J.tvnnr<r
cn'ort <+ti ~ L > I c I < ~ i o i~nJicntc-s
l
/Istl\l (F Eur~iqnR y h r q ) :
' 1r1i <tFrrlnp In ~r.itl~tin11al Indonc- p n l ricnl~ idc.a~scricsurl!'. Sawltr, Irrr~ird li~
I%<+ r ~ k c ncIr~rn.tt~c rortti in nor n r1ircr.r pr~liricnErlirvnr, for lir h:~rn o
Il o t i { ~human
r TEP~LS
?~c~-,lti<c 1L t < tt1r <!lltV u v f l>lll If! 11r." < I L Y ~ ? T~ .mt~ltlTc- pr.rrnnal f o ! l ~ w ~ n I~l c. \rras nor rvm
\vi. arc all frcc ro C[IOI)S' ~ y ( 8t ~,IS.~IICV t ~ t i \~-n.iri?
i ~ l t a h pol7111:1rr r ~ t l r l t known 11ntEl rhc povt-rnmtnr
'T IC-~FII
rhc H ' ~ V of I I ~ HC :~iuvn :I\ , I % cuwrnfl\* on tlccutlcrl to prmrCutcfirm.

!-1.t-n (.nJ ~ I w \ n ' rr(~rnpci
$ 1 5 scnTnr7 In thrrr nctlrbnk.
Apply r hc P:rnr..rsrln rlcnir~cr3cy
.IF I ht. rif cwr r.otlntry.
f'r,t~ntl.tr~lrn
Doil't Iiccp 'tprnt: rnv:?vrnt:)
tlir frcrtlr*rn t r ! (lrtjrnr
I)CC':IIIFC it 17 111 ~ o n f l i c lwit11 hum:~n
(1it:nity.
Iturnan r i j ~ h1i
Thc l'rccdnm ol' qpccuh (rhlr.5
Itt1n1:1nr ~ e l ~ r )
Wc:trv nll frctc I r k iIn anr t l r i n ~
fiir "iuln crlrnr p r ~ n r ~ l r . ~ h ! c T?ITpr~)<w.~urion 0 1 SS!V~T(T. !!i*wCver,
r7:h. t t 1 5 1 !TI L ~ I sC ~ t l m ~ ~ ~Irt ~prcwtnp
t ! mthn n ~ o w~ l . i n ~ a ~ t~! n ~ r: r~hn~ s
n lcrrcr to Suharrn ur!ilny hlln t o r t b q n . rctlucqt t113r St~hnrtcircsiFn. 1'rl:tl rcrclrlns
rwth rri)\rrl< nE r n l h u -
Of ~rkc.TI, t l m zcc t l u c - ~ not .ippc:ir arr r l . ~ ~ l pnckcri y
p.~rt~oi~+ <~ r lt \l l t ~ . f ci no r t - \ c h n ln7rrt4>ttng. r~artic~t!ppnrrcfi R h t r chr-t-r P . I C ~ ~ C rbf T
Itlir 5 . t i~t o r t n , ~ n . t ~ ~ ct,) t l pcmuadr \<~ t l c l \ pcrl irtcll Iwnv l ~ l nIn. rlrc u n rcpcnranr
~ C F I crvrP
I~ fnnnrr VICC 11rt+51rlcnt 1 Jat 13 S : i w ~ ~ uR!.' t~rinF;ng hini t c ~ t r ~ . ~ lthc ,
anrl A<-> IC.l(+<-fi (TI' I n i l ~ m c ~ ~,Alti<l~m .~'\ Sr~h:~rtn pwvrtlnlcril !):IS crcattarl n nctv
rtl, ~ ?.I\ n t e 3 ~ J rc l r 'rri~lt t ~ t I'rott-t I T I ~ !nil pr)lrriczt flgiirc, urhnsc ~ r c r n ~ n qIrrlrbrm- lv
, ,
C!tllr~e+ccrlt~tcht\to rrvn Iris d u c ~ ~ ~ n c 31 n t .In(! qr!r\ritlc sttar hq o n :hc vcvrcrn-
Alr/imigh t!it*<c f i p ~ r c \l.itcr t-I"t~rncdmrnt s r r l l t ~~ + ~ i l t ~ ~dc-cp t . ~ land
l y rcwn:int
3 rliat \ rrvitu h t t l ~ r i i k c trlrcm l inso ugnmg rh(rrt1r tn thr. t nilone.i~:~npublic. 0
rhc Icttcr, rh-ir ~ ~ F C I S I h~ a Cw ~ nor

1;rct.c.i'fotn re work (rhar's a human

I ryh t 1
\t"r-::trc Crrc t f r d ~anl.thtng
l :I< long 2%
il tlocr;tr't c n n n r~~~ ~t ht I'ancns~l~.
~h
I,.~sr Dcrcml?cr (1"77), rhir Font WIF
torll~rlrlcnrn I y r FIT(I;ILIC~~ t111 t r k v i ~ i r > n ,

I ~ r tt h c rrnsr,rrliip 1 1 3 ~nnF!' nladc Ir more

pc'pll t.11..
S I I ~ ) 4-x prrx-iitir~< o f i ! \ w - r ~ tbt, ~scst-
rrnii-cri I n ~ c l l ~ c t ~ r . :inl)
r l % t ~ r h n:Irrhrrr
hnvc lrlatlc ~ n ~ p ~ ~ r r~al rni rt t < in tflc
l c c i r i ~ i ~ a<if
~ - v111v Strh3rtlt rt.pitnr. Ttrr Irr
"~ntr<tr.~t~ 1 ~~". r t ~ c Ci '~! ~
1%t ~ I . I T I C ~i n~ thr-
r c p t n c ' ~ wlf-im:icc. A t tlrr 1;3nlc I I ~ I I C ,
Editor's Note
TI1,. 8uku I'utih (Il'l-i!e Souk) i r tllr ~ i t r ~ T~ rv ~o s rimportrrnf
danfr~~i.tir t o cortzr r ~ r nt f IESP politicilI disr rrrl7r;zrcer r r ~Intiow~sfn
rndy in S 978 /I ltl~o~rgl* ir is f(rrrr;ully ,a .vtr~tr*mr~lt or11,y(I/' t l ~ c The cover 1971
6&S tutZcntHlhite Irr,r, h , . . publ irheri
.S'~rrdrntf nrr~icflnj' rlrtn Rrtndrrr~~,In.clrrrttr nf 7'echnnnlfl tIn17'). CounciI of fiantSung I nstittrtc n f T c c ~ , n o ~ ~ , v
it rt.prr3~rntsr E v w ~ ~ r i t n r t l t01 r rlrp s r i t t l ~ n t ?no?~r7~t.nt 0s R
wlrolr. It i r trlqrl i~mpottt7ntRS ~n i~lrl;r-ntio?to f thr rbnngrs in t h ~
sfridrnt mnnmtrrrttr drtrina tlw p~rsrst3mtr y~'rlrs.HJ/?rtfit f i m ~
I>ugi~nt n stir in 1970, tlrr rr~tdenrJrtovettrmf wzr cnnc~rnrd
pnmnnrily with pnvrntm~rrr comrprron. i r ~tune ulnc mornfi~tic
1. Suhccrto
and n r r n n ~ t apoIittc,rl Ry 1974, stridrnr ikrui~s Jnrl1iriipr.1I
~ r a n n n r i r nnrrnnaljsnl. n111-yI?, 1978 drd s;rtrrzrtn 11inlsrIf The students of the RIT dcclarr rhat they d o nut t n ~ t
b e c o ~ n rtbr. t a r p t of i ~ t t l i ~ kMort-
. sipi]icrmrl,y, the rzlwrnr and du not want Suharto to he Prcsidcnt rsC rlic Ttcpuhlic of
rirrt?~n1 ~t~nvmmcnt!WF sr,!)jrrrrrl riat. r')ttin3 strrrctrtr(* o f Indancsia again.
Zl'r~trrw-inspitrrl n?rd FV't,:rtcnr-ori~r~ted t+conatnir pnlicy t o N Thr stvlc of a national leadcsslr ~p rhat 11s conucnmatcd all
s y s t ~ r ~ c n tcrirtqtte,
ir rlw jjnf itr t2 ytvn o f rttrilirntjr ntlr. prrwcr ln its own hnndr haq cr~pplcilthe offiri:il c.c~nrrifl~tiona[
Huku Putih is nrtdi?cinrt~find nt tlw snTniq i r m ~seller rrnd polirical forces . . tliiq ccntrali~ationof pol~ricalpr~wcrss clcme
S Y ~ ~ O I ~1 S8f.n. us it^ critic-01 a?~,rlytisuf povrrnment policy is simply t o s a f c ~ s a r ditf own continttation.
contprtrnt. sopl*isticnirJ 17nd closely ~ ~ r , i p r ditq , asc of In addition, t l ~ rlife swlc of d i e Family of ilr. Prcridcnt
Fntfonesirrn snlloqrli,rli~t~r T r?trrf?vil pnprrlari~f ~rrrssibledocu- Suhnrra has had a great sociocuItural Impact on the major1tv of
rnrnt. 11s i ~ t t i l r kotn .\ rtlv~rro~ t l dI ~t ~F ~ c l ~ n o c is r ud~rs ~ ~ n t ~ i t i n ~ , people. 1 Its \Sit harrrl'sl nepotism tarvards his chiltlren and
our
hrrrrrts~ir rrddrcrs~r.5 tl~i*nr rr!~nmtrwprrritrr*nt.irnJtt, younger ~iMinghat hum rop~cdtty many Fovcrnmrnt nffrcisls
irt Jlfir~iliar,

7b mpficrr Irotl~rlsppcrs nf rl-r d o l - ~ m v w rin n I~rniredcpacp, wt, of all r a n h , such as c ;avrrnors, Bupari. vrllnp hcndmcn. and so
Ilrrw rfrosr~rt o r r m n g orir rxrrrptr trot in t/rr> nrdrr tlrr-y Irtrth. The f ~ that t thc family of f'rc5~dcnt 5uhnrto has becarnc
nppctrx b t ~ rnrcnrrling t n !l)rmni~rti-rrnr~ro,! tilt. documrnr ns ?UP vast\v wealth! ~ i n c ch e bcczrne llenrl of S t ~ t csome yeilrr a ~ o
st^ sl*rrrt. ?'Ire-r~oYEtirswhirl) lrrr 1l1e s!~ttjrctof R~rktlI'urih n r r (see. e.g.. l'apos, hlnnpdcp) h:~s$\,en rhr imprcssinn t o lower
t,.rplnln~d in tl>r artick i71 rlli~irsrrc of the Souttimst Asla officials that chcv tor, h:tvc thr r y h t trr acr Iilic rhcir l'residcnt.
Chron~clcIrv ISr,rrdict InrJd.rron, 7Yrc t*n~irr,dncnntmr Pnny ht, In this war, thr wcnlth of .\ti-. I1rcsidcnt Suhntro has exestcd
rt*,td a n tljt. .\prii, 1978 rrsirr 01' tndonmia, rnljnw frirnslnrion u p gent influcnct. on thc drvclnpmunr of :i srrStrrrr nfCnwrrprit~nin
lr rr 11.~1'ug. -.I. H. Indnncsra!
 2. Technocrats
From a scrim of dizcus<io.ns and :ir ~:ilyscsc;~rricdnut I>\.thc
a u t h o r s of rhir papcr, u-c r. .
ha.... ,c:lchcd n very srartIirig
conclusiofi: Namdv, rhc rles~gnrrso f crur precent dcvvlopmc.nt,
Bappcnas and thr. I)cp:itfments of t h e government, arc In fact
awnrr and (in vrnlrzte r h a t thcrc. arc dclects anrl crrnrs I n thc
prescnr development srrntcrrv. C.
R u t why do rhcv remain silent'
Why do they rem:iin m u t r a l t h n u ~ htheir policy errors have
made millions of ~ f f r r ' l ' c r h a p ~they rcnlun silent
hccausc they are ,,,,,,,LLLdal prortitutrs tr~lio (In nor havc
scientific integrity? Or rlo hey I~rlnngro t h t group who rnjoy
thc "fruits 01 develnpncnt" precisely hecatlsc nf rhc~rpnlicy
ci-~ors??
stanmlnp,they arc s ~ i d"not to have enough to eat" or "possibtv
ma!. not have cnnu2h tcl cat,'' etc. Cr~ricisrn is answ,ercd hy
bring tcrmed "a d:lngrr to stahil~ty" or "rvidenrl>, trine
ruplnircd," a n d so fnrth. . .
In measuring rbc qrtcrrqs uf t , . ~ t t ~ ! d i ~ rpoltrirs,
lwf T11an Wijrrvu
and his fr~cndqusc scrcral s ~ a t i ~ t i c nich s, as Inrrtnasr i n (;.z'I'.
r,'DI'. per cnpita rrrrnmr., tbr rirtp n/' injlaliun, etc. Using thcsc
figures, the 1301~cy-lllakersclaim that . . . /only! 3 nlrt of l o
lirc Ilrlow tlw pnaer?y lin(7. Thi5 is am wing
Etr t l o ~ r r ~ i n ) r s
prtpress. Thcrc i s also the critcnon which drterm~nrpthat 3 per
u:iplra income of nvcr $[IS 75.00 per ;Innurn is :thrrvr rhr
Iwvcrty lint.
Takc the c ~ s cof a pavcrty-srricken, uncrnploycrl v;lpran t. I lr
picks up ciprcctc burrs: he scrounFcs for his dailv food in the
garbage-c~nsof rrstauctnts: he sleeps under a Lridgc or under
the carre< elf shops; he wears whntever he cnn find. 1 Ir m a k a Up.
300 a day. En a rnonrh, t h a t amounts to Rp. 9.000. and in a year
to Rp. 108,000 nr SL!S 250. This is \vcll ahovr the povcrrv linc.
Ir t l l i ~thc itray to mcasttrc thc success of a polluy? In t l i ~ r
cast, the more vagrants wc havc, the mote prnspcrnlrs our
country. I - u n ~live 1':kk \%?joyo!?!!?

3. Wives of Officials
(3nr srt-finn oj Ru krl Purih t n q ~ i ~ib~r ~ r7rtiz~t-sof r~lfiriltis,k n o w n
5. Credit
(IF "1t>11," OF R . ~ o ; ~ r r r L-nnnxol'nffirinl ~ ( ~ r r r t p f i r ~ t t .
nvrf
f r ~ critiui=i~~,ynihrr ,rvpt3rrs of thr govnvrmrnnlr'~ econo~trir
Duar Ihu . . . it) tslking ahout thc rcllc of women in polic+y, Dukku Purih fnrrrst,s or1 illr in~bd~lrinrr it] hrrit,firr f m ~ n
dcvclapmcnr rvc often also ~ a l kabout womcn's cmanciparion. this p n ! i r ~ # .T ~ ~ r o r q ~[be ~ o riorv~rrr7ti
~lt tlw chrlrp i r rrprtltr-d
Ern;~nriparion,howevcr, doer: not mean that tlic wife nrlrst t d k c r l r ~ r t, f ' r ~ r t , ~ , otr7 t?rortz nrad v~orr*rnnnry wllilr, Irrrlo-
~ ~ r~r~trfifr~g
s
~ ~ rn~rrsrt+splnrr nrsinns RTr' hrc~rnit?~q
PW'I i n Ibc~rlv~sbarid'sarJicir~1firm-tinns or r i ~ sbt* purrrt'r clnd poorrr.
Ibr-r hltshnr7d:c position. It dnc5 not mean chat rhc wife Inmt
h k c part In dctcmiining hcr hushantI's policy in matrcrs
conctlrning his officc or that shc stinuld prtnfic w<r7 of I I ~ Most guvernmcnt credit fall5 into the hands of non-nativcr.
jircilities nnd perqziisiirs f a wl~ir'lllwr IrllsIm~di s r ~ ~ t i t i ~~ iVi .C hIr)st of rhosc who crnbe~rlethere crcdits art: al3o non-natrues.
fccl. too, rhar [here arc many orhcr rnatrcrs rclarcd t t ~characrcr Of the Rp. 20Q,OOO,OOU1000 Rank Rumi Dxya crcdits rhat
and I>charl~cirthat can have n nrgative cffcct on tlic acttvitic-s o f d~sappenred,most again W;IS taken hv non-nat~vcs.B u t if is thc
her husblnd, pcoplr rvho h:wr tn suffrr the I~rsrtlcn of it all. The proplt bear
Wu sav this bcrausc in fact we havc the irnprewinn and we rhc conspquenccq, hut thc nnn-nztlvcs cnjoy rhc fntirs. In fact,
olwwe that there are many of you, Illt~,who linvc gnnt- rlrtri~y it ir ~ h c i rpcr capita inrnmc drat has increased many ttnlts owr.
irr pliying yrljir s o l i ~ , many who hnve rnisundcrstood ttlc Not the people's.
r n r a n i n ~o f womcn's cmanciparion. Ten ycars ago t h c h s t n group, the Panin p s u p , rhc Central
Aria Rank. f.icm Soci I-ioag and orhtr ~ r r k o n , ~wcrc ' noch~ng
o w h a t they are now. Rut the proplc of Krawang still starvr.
rhe government proudly aggregates the incomes of r h m e
I 4. Development Policy . r i k < ~ r rwith
~ t h t incnrncs of thc penplc of Krawang, Royoldi.
2~ n dCiunung ~ i d u ~and ' then avenge< thcrn. Next rhr gov-
rmrncnt loudly prrlclaims that "pcr capita incornc ha5 sky-
I n establishing "dtvcluprnrnt policy" we hwe smnllowed r ocketcd." Is rhir not manipul*rion?? Thc pcoplc of K r a w a n ~ ,
hook, linc. and slnker thc data and ,znalyses made by f o r ~-+ i .~..r- ~ r .who
t ~ . have been reduced tc* cat1 ng water-t~yac~n ths, have I>c.comr
cven though they obviously h a w inturcsts ul rhcir own. To t h e victims of a manipularinn of the nutnbers that thc govcrn-
tlrrerminc rhc number of ptclplc who arc IIEIOW the povrrry mien? alwayq wonhips, Thc pcoplc o f Krawang have becornc thc
I ~ n c , we use the dnta and analyses o f t h e World Rank. To v ~ c t i m so f sratistics. It i ~said , that in 1967 pcr capltn incornc
rncasurc rhc success r ~ f dcvcIclprnent, we employ foreign r v s %US RR, whilr by 1977 i t had incrcascd tn %I& 130. But
mcasurcs nf grnwrh, such s G N P , CDP, per capita incomr. and rfle fact rcn~ainsrhnt Krawang, which always uscd to be a rich
so forth. . . rice p a n a r y rvhcrc pcoplc ncver suffered hunger, h a tod;~?dc-
.4 great campaign to stupidif? the people is taking place clinecl into a famine area, where people are reduced tco racing
today. TIic ~ ~ c o p larc r bcing swamprd rvlth v a p c terrnino!ogy warcr-hyacinrlls! no you know. fricnds, what wl~trr-hyacinths
or tcrminolngy made v a p c on purposc. Z\'licn pcoplc arc arc? Water-h!.acinthq are feed for p~gs.

Issue No. 63 21
 I
t 3. Popular Participation
Popular Control
Il'i.r!ltrps tltc sinfilt' tttosf in~pnrtilrrttl~rnrrin r l l i s ilnt,umrrlr i s i f f
. ~pnpril~on.
R J I ~ It n

Thc dcfccrs t h a t wc scc t o d l v are caused b\+ rhc kLrtiontll

Lrrtdrrs!rip a n d by t h e "Systcn~o f C;ovtarnmcnr" t h : ~ tIr h n ~
crestcd, Improper nicchanisrns for nhr m m a p m e n t n l t h e StAte,
which in turn have ~ i v c nbirth trr crroncouq and uncontroflcd
j 4 q np d , t - s r i t i ~llukii
1 si~rlildrL ~ n r i - / i ) ~ ~ ,rnrrt7 ~ I'ii I ih's di'irt-lr~siosr!f pol trim and prosrams, havc hrcd rcsrlcssncs< In soctcr y .
i ~ p ' r r ~ l t r r rpntirv.
d ip,zrr Jro?n r r r s f i p n r i r i ~ rl)r nqolrr-rtimentJirr The i n n ~ r t ~ r o \aotrt*
t 01' tlw littL, J J P O ~ I P . ~ r l l olivr under r h r
~ t ~ ~ ~ v d ~! t l>? i i v/ rrt-nj0m7,
g Ihikn h t ~h i dc!~op u i ~ ~ t uq t l v , L ~ t / t t r i of
, opllrr~srottand ri*pn*ssinaof thc "elitc" forcer, never rcaclrcc
tbr R O ? ~ I ' W J ! 'F~ "ricr ~ ~ [ ~ ( I ~ / ? ~ T pmagrirtn.
I S P ) ~ ? ' / T ~ yrnr,
F Iudrsnesi,r tlic cars of t h e povcrnmcint. tn nsrn, rhr Irovcrnmunt lias nc\.cr
will i m p o r t 2.4 million rnr!.r r ~ j?ic,r', rrrnn* r l l i ~ n n q ! r)tl)r-r opcnrd its ticart to the pure : ~ n dFiontljt "~rrricr.01 !!rr c nntnrnn
cortpltrjv r ~ ?thin wnrtd. p i ~ i ) p I ~Irctrrr.
's " Thus a system in rvh ich rhc 1-irj1pr,nplr~ cuploit

the tliIl,rgt7rr, the rrr/j npprtss t h c pour. prrvcrtrq rllrr rltrow r it11
. . . thc prlcc r 7 T thc i n ~ p a ~ r t c ricc. t i ir Kp. 100 per k i l u y s m I)rrsi,s c ~ i rinto r l ~ csl.c~wI:rnes. r\~-;ilthyI ~ I O ~k C~ c kacirlc prrnk
m o r t c x p c n s ~ ~ ~t hca n dornrs~ic rhcc. This means t h a t t h e bvi,q/11 p~npIt*,~ I ~ H - T J L I ~t~tlsincsslnen
~V~. kill off Jznrrar I~urjncsq-
Indor~csi.~rigcrlcrnrncnr is frrdr?z,y ((s~~F~ridi/ingl fnrmers from mcn, crc , gocs on and on, a n d r h c npprc.ssed havc nu w n l of
Soutti Korco. J:ipnn, .Iu<tr:rli:~,urc. .I[ .I n t c 21f tip. TOO per kiln. stopl~ing it. '['here arcn't even an! r-n?npbri~r/cnhnut rt it)
Wcll, ~ v r l l , Zlr. *I'hoyih Il;~ttil\~rjay:r,~Zlr. Hustanul ~ l r i f ~ .tnd n,~ Parl iamcnt .\nv morc.
you gcnrfr-incn i n Ihppcnns, livw c o n w !*ou acru:~ll?' hclp rrr 'I'llr prevailing sicu:~tic>nis such rhnt "thc rtlp pcnplc" solely
tncrc:lsc agriurrlrur;tl productrt,n In crtllcr ctrnntrics?T k n ' i thcrc direct their cycs ancl cam furrhcr up. They ;ill str:~mlllct o cnlnIb
snrnctliing funny h u e ? ) 131d you yct !,our palms grcasccl, thr Iit.rrmii.s rhac arc i ndccd Irt-tuly "~F-OZ?ILEI*IJ " t I F thc l i I > ( ~ ~ ~ l
nx-iybc?? I t " n o t onl!~ rh31 yrlu arc h n n l ~ l ct o incrcasc dr)mcstic ccrrnnmic s y t c m pr~icfi~-t"i by rhc ~ O V C ~ I It !~! ~' Ir Il ~ r ~C ~rT I O T S
lirocll~ction. I n i r . . . ht-v! yon'rc actually Ilclping rtl incruasc could decclop to such a disxrroi~s poinr bccansc cotrtrol
roniconc C'IFC'S Yo11'12 p3y far it some
: ~ g r i c ~ ~ l t u r~~r,rducricm.
xI functinns have nrtc r~pcrarerl as rhc! shnr~ld.St:irc In.;r~t~rt~nns
c3nv. f r ~ c n d < ll!! havr in Facr bcrn "trucd" so ss nor t o intcrfurc wirh t h r
1)uild-up of "cxcrluri~~ci ~ t ~ w r ,Firr " thc sake of s r a t ~ ~ l i tin y
ccnnomic dcvtllopmcnt, t l ~ ewliolr systcm and :dl the ;actlVitics
of the Ilighcsr Statc I n a i t u t i n n s have Iwcn "harnroni/e~l" with
thc tasrcs o f thc cxccutivc..
7. Employment and the
Industrial Sector
Ovcr tlic p:w rieht ! ~ B T S ,t h c inditqtrial ssctor has o n l y Ixen
9. The Parliament
ablc ro , ~ h s o r b 1.2 million pcoplc. Thir is an alxorprion raw o f 11p till nmv, P:~rliamcnt is n n t an insritution cap;~lblcof
only 1 2.5 pcscrnt oT .nrail.lF)lc rnnnpolver. Thiq prow4 t h a t rhc channtrIlrne t h c azpir3tinns nf the pcnplc, nor is i t an c-ffcctivc
p r r s r n ~policy In 1thc Cicld of industry will trr-vrr hr trblp to instirucion for con~rcrl. I'arlinmrnt is stmplv a spectator to all
. ~ I , ~ t > rthr
h i~lcrrlcr Islmr Lircr. The picture h e c o m ~ thr irrcplnritics r h : ~ t:trr rakine plncc within rhc cucci~nvtr!
WIITW ~f H'P ~ l ta ~ kcn i n t o a i c o u n t the lnrs of j r h c ~ p p o r t u n ~ t i r'fhcrc
~ hnvu hccn many incicirnts, r h ~ r n c f u lrn cntr nation nntl
. . .
in narionnl cr)mpanIcs rhat have h ; ~ dto cltlsr down hccauw of statc, which have dc~rt.~ndcd :~ctiveinrcwcnricrn hy rhc pcoplc'r
t h e Influs of' fitrcil!n c a p ~ t s l .?'he only local raw material l~scd reprcscn tativcs, bit t the!. l ~ a v ctlonc al,rolu tcly nothing.
Ilv t h c Indo ,ttiIk c:nrnpnny, for inqtancc, i~ watcr. The milk I'hc reason, of counr., ic rhat I':~rli;lnirnt has been ' ' l i ~ r t f lay "
crlncentrarc. irwli' i< imprlrrcd from itustmlin. ICfhilc t h e jnh the nacional cxccurivc lcadersl~ipKO I>cct~rnc so pnn~l.ylrrrr!JEvcn
rnsrkur has nnt cxll,andctl, rhc sidc effrcrs are wrccl.;inr the life a t t h e time when thc official / i ~ of t plrrli,rr?rrrttilry mjrdiitntr,~
o f rht. natlIon. fmm the Political Parties anrl from (Icrlk;ar wnq being drawn irp
The C;r wcrnrncni I ~ C I U F C T I A Ip o l ~ c ys11011ld ha\^ hccn gcarcd For r h c Gcncr:~lI;lcctirm, t h c inrlivirlital~listcd wcrc picl<cJ 11y
-IF
. . .
cowarrls t h c d c v c t r ~ p m m t of ~rrtlusfrv rlnigncd to suppclrt thc t;r~vcrnrncnt. 13cr)pk rhoufihr rn h ~ v eroo nrrrrly r n ~ r r ~ ~ ~ ~
a ~ r i c u l t u r c .P>ccau.;c xyriculturc i~the [ m a i n ] w i t r c c of incornc iv1t7,prit.y~~ ~ r r rpri?rcip/i, i urcrtT .I-ansidt7rtprirlL,rnpr-rnm- a n d wcrc
for 60 pcrccnr of chc. flnclonrqinn pcnpk. Y c t what wr now scc i ~ .scrarchcd nft' rhr list. l'liose wlio r c m n i n r ~ l on thc Iist of
xhc rapid ~ c r w r ho f consunrrr-oricnred ~ndusrrics,suclr as rhc candidates " h l c ~ s c d " by ~ h cgovcrnmcnr consisrcd o f pr.r~pIc
motnrcyult and c:lr indurtrics, not of a ~ i c ~ l l t u r e - s i r p p o r r i n gwho wcrc rithcr a.r17k or, :lr lwsr ntnt/~-r,rrrs, rc.:lrly t o srrring ro
industries. t h c r i ~ h to r 113 the Icfr, Intr the ?tllrlr~ritjj,of count, wurc wvirk.
 10. The P o l l i ~ ~
~~a rax~e s IG
Could rll e little F
q v
the villqes, who i
4 .
pcrs~cutru dur~nf! me e ~ e c t ~ o n snslc
,
. - .
Tor nclp trnm thc
'oplc's representatives in Parliament''= . . . "-he simple answer
In reaIit tical f o r ces, ~ name1 . h'o! I'ari~arnent's Cornrnirtee 11, in charge nf J e a l ~ n gxv~ththe
Political Parrrw a n u C I O I K R T , arc I I O LY C I I U I-I I-C- -U I .III-I*L-I.C. -JI I IE U......
ICT~ -oblcm of cucesses dur~ngthe General Elections, could never
me that dley atc classificd 'r,: d t ~ i a l i s t r ~ ~ i ifiicial p ( ~ :
litical m eet to di these incl .c was ncicr a
groupings, 1,at real political pow" lies in the hands of the 41I O r U l n , S11 d k a r merr f...
G'ovtmrnenrt. Thc PI?~liticalPar-tics and Eiolkar hat,c to follo w thc
. . ... -
will: of this govcrnltlcnr, w t ~ c t h e rthey i ~ k c~t or not. I T tht
-.. .
the pwsent s-yst~m !hp:oiqand i t s
obstinate, the gov* ncdia1t.1). interfere piircr cwrcnt
~ l syzritt (remove S~rrb~nrt~
manipulate them ro o longer 1Jose a t h r ~
.-~rlnpvnp>, y), Ruku Putih l t o f i r miy
the government ..
rernntiws. nror riors tbqt~stzrdebent ~ t r o o ~ ~ r z tRFw rCT w17nIr. TIJF
In add~ir i m , the parties are not allowed to operate i doncsiun student n~owwmzti s wlariz
villages, ye# e the vil lager are whcrc 80 pcrcunt of lndrlrl rrlly out o j rg smse oj selfprsewr?tioj
inlu bitancs Tivr!! if thc parlies are not allowed to operate I itirizu tJ~r rentral mlc o j t h m . L,L‘+brmX
villages, thrs ineans that mtzly 2 0 purrcnt o f the inhabitants ot thejt ddrsm'be so eloqnc~?tly./'he mninstrt7am oJ ihe
cc
Indonesia \ heir aspir; rcsen tcd.
PP? nlso rrmm'ns pxplidtly onti-comm-rr~list. ljnt it worrld
hr ' y to pvcdict itt frltltlr~cdr.~rlopmcnt.As govemlncnt
rc7presslon znt~nsifips,ns it did in the ~ n r l months y o]' 1978. ~ b r
s n o u e ~ n t n tu7iII bovt. t o d ~ w l o ppew smtrres of poIitira1 strrngtk'

11. Elections ij it is t o surunve. Its longterm choice wordid appear to lie

bt,twt,en finding poweftil s p o ~ s o witbin ~ the mifitay
tablisbmc nt and developing s positfoe poIitiral propurn which
ill rrpprd to the pensants nwd workem u d ~ ownke 7tp the I

~t,ruhelrn~ ;ng r n a l o r i ~oftbe Iwdowesfunpopztlntion. O

. . . Consider t h c General Elections, tor I n s t a n c e : rhe Plectiofl
Cammission was forrncd and appointed, not t ~ > *Parliamenr, bur
by the (;orernmmt, rho~iglmin fact the (;wernrno-it, through
Cinlkar, w n ~also a participant in the Geilrrd PIccrL l O- -l -I b- . Footnotes
Excesses, naturally, were unavoidable. tfcrce
Amir Machm~td "joining in the gap 11rrL2h o Nitisastro 1s Indoneqix's top economic planner.
[village headmen] and c a m t [c;uhd~strrctoft~cersj, all trrr the 2. ( ukcing is a rerm for wcaltlly ( Itinme businrrs pantnelv of key
sake o f recuring victory for Colkar. Rut little [~copici ,n the Itdonm mi an ~ r n r m Isnd ~ pol~ticrms.
3. noyrt1:rli and Cunung Kidul, in Centrd Java, are among the poorest
village?; were pressured, and not just prcssulred, but even a,-eas 111 t h e country.
persecuted, with threats of he in^ kidnapped -cspecjall [p in 4. I l a l l i w ~ j a j ai\ the Minister of hgiculturr. Atifin i s the head of the
....
crt~ciakareas such as West Java. Centra! lava, and r.-., I..BSL lavd. o w r l u l sratc tood di*rrihurron agcncy BUI.~?G.

Issue No. 63

- ..
 i t ! I I ! C;t~ttlc.nr~
dcrn~ln<rrat~ng :Icn:llcr h11.1 In I l c ' c - e ~ ~ ~ l ~ c r
I V 7 ;tcldccl ~ t ~ c,>hlrc1141n<
tr to [ T I C 7 jf1111r
carnpllcn t o t h r ~ ~r T O I I ' C T C .II*~IIRTCF(I\'cTn-
n i r n t c'tjmlllrrlon
To m f n r o ~ i r < ~ c I r rf+?\t ~ . 'rtrnt~~-.*nd
Frer~ltn-appcnr nr trzplc vlr-trmt Yrr I r ~c
ImpOrtRTIl I < >c?i.lmirit- i!le n.lsttnc l'rrtilin
har l w c n ;111lt- t t r l i r l l t i cult <rr Tonp, I:rt~rrng
t f ~ cIndcrntb<i~nrn~l!r.irr 7 1 1 a .ct?!crn lrc .
Jorc I<.trnilr-l l n n : ~ , t.rt*t ~ltn's.t~~i't~gss 1c1r)r
t o rhr I ? n ~ t r t i K~rtr>n<.~'Y~~.IIIIS tht
phcnomencln in hoth phv~1~;11 .111<1 ~ir~fitl-
h c m i l l ~ c ~tnh:t7it
n rrrlq (7: r:n\ F trt 1974. Frertlin ernrryerl as thr ~rrtjnrc-t c.t! tcrms. IYointitig o t 1 1 t h : ~mr)Lt ~ of I ~ < t
'rtnlclr have tIrtl.cn d r r p w r.11pc.q and mrtst ptjpitlsr of thc threc p r ~ l ~ r ~ c I'lmor ,\l is r ~ i ~ ~ ~ i i r Rsrnor-l . ~ ~ n s l, ~ ~ r tatltlq
a
rnra r thr 5rrh rrrn ronti?~on.I)c- P O H P I R ~ F cnrnperln!! f o r control of r l ~ c rhnt nhcrc are f'w p?rwfilr roa+i<-inJ rl:nt
7 ; ~ ~ f f i c t :Inllonrc~xn
~l t.!q~nt* to 11.lr.r ~ n u n - t ( ~ - l >~nrlcpmtlcnr
c starc For rlir n l u v crf tllc lwuplr. I i v r 111 rvrl.1rctl.
~ r : ~ n < f ~ w m rrhc r l ftprrncr Portuprsc col- Inrlrmfilxn pmreinnlcnt. thr npccndenc\* r ~ l l ~ ~ Thr t - c czprtal cltv of I>i!t a t I I F pr:tk
i,n!* I n r n :4 pr?rrfirl ~rrnr.inrc ~trcnrnirr c r l I-rcrllin HW a l a r r n i n ~on rwo counrr: ronr2ined 30,1101F ~rlliab~r.tnt<, ant1 ihc
crntic l i r l , t ~ l l l ~ cof I:.lrr 'I lmnr r r ~ l crrcrs
l ( 1 ) r.xr 'T~rnor govcrncd hv F r t l r l ~ n " r l r t r ~ ncenrrrr," a t i l r h 1 rCrllin nrknt~w.l-
r~vu-:~nd-.t-b:~It full-~cale .~plm.rstl 52 3 pot~n?l:11"<:lib3 nn rlur c(!!WF :ire c n n r r r ~ ! ~ t trv ( I rhr lnri~*nr%~:fns.
In d n r ~ m a nI nl v h c ~n.. ~ donrrrrp," :I prilgrrssivc ccnrcr within i h r COIIFtCt pf a h:tlf-dn:cn h o ~ t ~tvherr x rhc
I'rrlm r h r htel ~ m r n to
t mil !tan.-ruled Intlcrncsian nrcliipclay~~.I'onupiesc onrc mar nra lncd pol ~ c po<rs. c
~ l r cv i l l n ~ r s o! Jl.lvn, ttic onqrrlng n x r I?) t i I'rcrilln wrrr surccssf~r~ In Icacl~r~pIntiontri:tn trotrllc, ~ h t dr ~ nor t F ~ C : Ithc
~

pcnrrstcs ~ I I S F : I ~ I F ~ C2nd ~ ~ OInce*

P Thc F l r r Tunlor rn indcpcn Jcncr, thc. cxnm plc Y l n ~ ~ i pof r 'rirntw ant! arc not
rwo ride< sccnictl so uncvcnty rnarchcil r n ~ ~ f rnrotirnpe
rt rrr~olrq on rlrhcr ~ < l n n t l ~f : ~ n i ~ I ~W: I~I r~ 11% rcrrnin, tacc 1 hoqr~lc
thar 11 wns ~ 1 %<:IrvrlFr to I c R ~ r~ l i x t \v~:OFC p r ~ p l cwcrr nnt tlappv ~ V I I ~ In~tr yr>p\ll:rtlnn. I:rrr~lin h i~ wrln rhc I r t v ~ l t y
1lr~wrt-n I r O . I 100,000 F.nft from J:~kan:l.The U n ~ t c dStatrc povc-rn- 02' mnsr 1. IF^ Stmorrsc hy nn cncrctrlc
'rimt~rcsc- 3 C) sf tlrr p+%l~ulatirjn- mcnt. w ~ r h.t gcncrzl rntrrcq: 111 Indo- carnpnicn ro I , r i r ~ctlucarrdvn, ~ hcnlth cnrc
hnvc t~ecn kiI wnr in w h ~ c hr h r nmian r t a b i t ~ n ant1
l a t ~ ~ ~ l t t intcrmr
aty In : ~ n d ~ltipr<lvc(l ~ond prrrrlt~ct~onr r ~ 2
1nvdr.r rlW< :trrplanr<, f - i ~ h ianti ~ n . 1 ~ 1 p w ~ c n v \ n~qu h m 3 r i t ~nccesC
c t n the clrcp- pcnplc WI>IIW tornler r(>it~r~t.!l nl.hK<IT ti:irl
trunil~ardmcnr in .rddit~nn t r h rrm o i wntrr Elnlbai-Wct:~rstraits juqr n t ~ r r hof lcfr O i i prrccnr uf them ~l[itcrarc. I n
! h o t l ~ : i n t lo~f wrlf-nrmctl ~ n k ~ n ttrnnps r~. Timor, tacirly FU 1~11nrrcdSuhartcr'q p l . ~ n < Itsmt~r-Ffrlrt:~'ruordc, W " c n wr taIk
acatnqr :I rlntlnn c,f pcacanrs. Intlonrsinn to fnrcc Ilnrt 'I'imrlr to join Intlnnc<ia. hour s r n ~ r r lsrrugglr we 1nc7i t a t r l ! Iinvr.
t t r r c c ~ have nlsn ~:npr><cd :in -11 ~IIOFI tndone!:!n S t n t C p t 3 t q r\pet.rcd t o tri 13lk ?t>~-t~rr <c.hoclEr. hellth crnten, a n
unhrc:lknl~lr r n ~ h : ~ r ~,Inn rhc ~ s f : ~ n d , "11:acifv" E:wt Tiinor In a few dnyr. Vcr ford prorl~iution.b c r - ; ~ r~h~c ~ w cthrngr ni
<IICC~~F~U IIV
prcvcnttng c ~ i ~ r r i dclh\cn.err
c t ~ rvcrksr ~ f t c rrht 1n1rinF rnvnqliln 11%. I ~ n k r t l . 'rlrcrc c.innitl i r r I r:rcrt.r~fr
from rrportiny what Ir happur~ingtlirrc, lfl,On0 troop?, tlicy w r e forced tr, srntl zn11ir.lry r:irnp;ilrn without :I p ~ r l l l r l
n l t h n u ~ h t h e I n d o n r q ~ ~goccrnmrnr
n oc- anorhcr 15,non mcn. 'I'wo-rrnd-a-lrnlC campaign t t ~Ilrcar.ac!.. pol 1t1c31C ~ U C . I I ~ n n .
casitln.~liv rakm erlltrps rrporrcrq nntl yc:rrs I:~rcr. thc war continues. I:rc*r~linIF htaith ancl f o ~ ~ prr~durttrrn." tl Clncr rhr
dl?n~t.~r~ rtnc <c.ircfullr. ct>nrrt~Elrtl clrlr- nr h c l ~ ~ \ .to~ rci,ntrt~l
l twrt-rlidril< o f r hc l:~ncI I y o r t ~ ~ p : r <dc~ dnor rerii~rirlr.r c n r p n i ~ c
r\vwtfni- r i ~ i r s . :1rtn:t of I~;Iv ' I ' i r n ~ ~:ITI~
r u p w a n i ~of HO Il.lrr I'imr~r'q \uhs~rtcncr ccrmnrnv, rhcb
Tltc Inilcrnrs~:in artack #In f-nst l'tmor percent of the pnp~~l:ar!r,n.I n k l r ~ n ~ ~w!f-rtb!ianrr i~n foscrd by Inttonmln's Illnck-
w x mntns.ircrl t>y fcar of 1-r~tilin. thc h~>rpit:~l.; and cenreterics arc rcptrrrrtl tn :~rle rlf r l ~ t 1sl:lntI i< n c n l ~ ~ n g new,
Rnroliitionary I-ronr ' tor tnc ' Inrlrpen- I,r crowdcrl with cdcl~altlr<lrtnm n war ac.crrrtlrng tn R:imtx-;i lorr,t.
ctcncr of I < R ~ T Tinior. 1.rcril1n IS cnnl- th:at is arldom acknnwlrdyed in put~lic h s I-'rctrl~n Ic~riers, who hrtmrirasr dc-
mrrtrd ro 3 prc~grarnof na~icln:~l intlcpcn- n~orcand more peoplc Iccl Irs cftcccs n n ~ l spalrlng c-371s for help a< rhc IntJoncc~:~n<
dencr, sot-1x1n n ~ rrcmolllr( l A . .
~t~t1.1lirr.. a112 RC it h r c o n ~ cclrar ~ rhnr direr r n i l ~ t n r y launchrd rt,r~r firqt w:nc cr! slsughtrr
~ntrrnarionnl rlr,n-.~I1gnrr1i.nt. \tsth thc f~ircewilt nor dmtroy I;rct~lrn. thr c o < ~ rr, a g ~ n ~tllc t rcrltlrnt5 r>F fhti, ntlw \llrak
clccltnr n f P o n ~ ~ m ~ rcolnni.11 -~c- power In 5uharr1r of the rrfon ta F ~ ~ I H F : I T C F ; I c ~ i.r+nl'lc!tntly 0 1 ultimntr victcjry. In :I
 spccch on May 20. 197FI,Nicolau I.nhato. "That that r o d d Ilnpprrz ir t-wor~gl~ to " 7 % ~crperirncr of ~ t i r e r ~ P U O I I I -
presidrnt of I*rcril~il'sCcntr:ll Cnmrnittrc c l l o ~ r . ! / > C murld iarir T P S O ~ I I ~ Pwid' t o tinnoty ~ P O I I ~ P Fas , w ~ l l~ 1 s our own
and prcsidenr r ~ t hf e I>rrnocrntic Repuldic fwrly Iitv our idr-ntii~jos t.;lsr Tinlnn*se, rxpt-rii-nrr. ~ I ~ o w1/73! s ~ J ' P m r m y will
nf E . ~ r tTrmtlr, exprrrrcd the nrtr mood. orir rrnl~~irttlfi~rhlt~ ndtinrra/ i o t ~ s ~ . i n a ~ s n r s ttr7lrr
s. 1~ ~ O R Z ~ ~ I II Cp yI rt'rlqt~n
' ~ ~ ~ l j i ~ ~
Lobato's spccch m:~rkcdtlrr fllnrth * r iit,i,pt,ir rrprddrarfnr~01- tv~pbnidwt~I;rilt-d c-iiv?pai=qnif wrii y nnorllrt (?rid so
vrrslv rh l h c foitntiing r b f 1-rcrilin: (1 t ~ l/l< ) n t t soJ d r t t ~ i ~ ~ i ~tmd
t i o,-.~p!oito+
~i Q I I + to it< c o r ~ ~ p 1 t(./tt~, [ t ~ ,.~.t . r i ~ tJntJmy
r
r 7 1 of~z11~1 I),v t ~ i t n .. . . rnrrst br ~ft*/t-,rrrdIrr];.lrr it ~ i i l hr
,
". . /Il~oat,,711, rl7c.y were [urrr y n r s - 0 -
hurtt ~ri?ri, I ? I O H I ~ * S sincr the canwincrd. . . .
a[ pnliticid d<-zv-lt>p??rt-?rt, +/in17.vt7un of I'TI chcd its lirrt big r n r ~ r p o i pof "\lJr. HOW f@t w i t h bnlf rictoty -on.
S I Y I I ~ I C . :irtd in ti>i'st* f o r t r rJ*nrf jji'rrrs. te?r ~ttld r7?~nilriintinn, n i.a??r- ht~crrrrsr~ L ' P,we rryturn o j ' n r a m'ctory. For
t h pc'oplt' 0)- J.'~IsI l'imnr /.rrrzlcv fcrfirrr rr f 1 7 r , ~ r rw r l r r r. 7' ~lj'Tt'Spf'I't. rll,ir rrtlson W F ~ ~ 7 . y . 'I/ICIOT ir
p;,,tt strp 1;)~ x w r djivn? , o jq
,if] rtr ( . i , ~ t t~ t t i ~ " ! l o ~ u r ? ~ r tlvcp~ri,
~r, rlv. smprr~ssinrsizi, crrtu;?].'. . .
~.o!ot?inlilurrrinrrtion, t o rr tloiri! i o n . I.rrrrr o j ' t l l i . ~c , i ~ n p ~ ij1rl1 p ~ ,o f tlw noier r ~ tf l ~ r " I tllirlk rhat Scnhorrs Jrrkarrrl J ~ ~ ' ? I P T I ~ F
yrors rrn(l! o ~ rcrrr t ? t n ' t ~ s . rnncliini,~ o f ttl,rr, illis r n t n p a t p is ir- slwrild r ~ n t i r r ~ ttlwt i ~ ~ F~ o~~i fTimor i s n o t
" 4 grrlrr rtt,p, i n Inct. m n r f ~p o ~ ~ i h l rri.nrt,drnbly sinkrrrg ivi tl'.r,Jin17rt<,rrty$nns. u colotty of Indotr~sin,and will n m v t Irr n
!J)* Frrti1i11 !i>r$ir!g Tin~nrrw 1711i p i , ~ / t ~ f , , r r ~ z i l ~Lz>~,f
o t r r )tt?iriotiz,,*
~~ of t l ~n r v r n l n n y . I'int, PI-RIISC I ? ~ i l n n t ' r<!OPT ~~~
r~unsciortsnr+sc,j i j r rlbr pvnlilt= trr i n r r ~ S S C ' ~i l l fl'i. t r o f r o r ~ l i ~ Ceiht(Jrx r r7rtJ no! Irnvt* tllr r-co~iontil: Crlprlt:lty t o
frnvr j h u r r ~ t7trivv ~ t t j j r d o ~ ~ i ,~i I/ ~ r r k , ,7.,+fimrir~,q
~ ~ ~ , s ~ t rt7~iuii7trci/mt t!ftn / d o o t f ~ f - nrnrtlrar?i r11.a-r.vlotrrt,s. Spc-rind, i u - r n r t s ~
- t r j xl~t<pr tr s t ~ ~ ! ~ l 1 r ~ j r ~ t r r ~ o ril,rt ~
l o) ~nr~o t,ntttl
nr~~tr*tl~ t r : i , & ~ , L ~ , p ~ i t!lt" l l ~ ~~!'rl??lt'ltil !b
I r r ~ i n t ~ t ~ ~gr
i nrn~ r r ~ r E t~l l ( ~ ti~ r ~ r t i r i n l ~trot
. . . W e !JrIid'2t' 1 1 7 ~ ./or. . .
l wbrlr wr nri- Ji4qf~rr~t4t

a,qpips~io?t oj tJ*e I I T ~ ~ O ~ I C S ~coIn~?i~ll ~FH Ir1 ,tt-d ,lsrfi,lrr<l~ n r r n l r ''With all our srrt,t~gt/*.W F proclut~n
~+.~p~ufiSiorrisf~ and ~-r>rrr,wi,orrslv rrrdvnrrce < / > < > 1 4 1 l # T1.C OP711Lt' l h ~ l ' /?(7:'f /i?<t ~ / I P lorrd nrrd rkxi~r ON? ~tndm/r I-ontinirrr crtrd
* on rl7c rt victuqr trrtclin ' "

nrican pilota and m i l i r a v s d r ~ i s r r shnve jiinrtl rhc nrt:lcli

4)n Fast Timor, nccnrrlin~ro T:rctilin stlurcc$. In n l u n c 211
l,madcast, l;trtilin Infc~rni:iricrn Sccrct;~? Alarictr t-'ernanr!cs
chargctl that "Arncrican pillit< arr fl).iny nronco O\,'-19

Klshor:rting on rhr ch:rrges, Fretilin's Aml)nux:ldar to the

Unirrd Nntinria Jme R : ~ m o s - l l n r tl:i~: ~ i ~oln July 1 2 thsr ttvn
Arncrican rnili~ar!' advisrrs h w c 11cc.n srarionrll in Dili sincc
I;~stUccctnhur nrlrl t h ; ~ rworthh:td arrivcll duriny t h c f ~ n thrcc
t
months of this year. hltIinuph t t ~ e st:lrc ncpnrtmcnt has AskThai!ancl *a b.. u. . t it. 8 r 8, ., I,nr".,., I*.IU,~!I"Q,#1C,

prevcnrs ovtsidc o l ~ s e n ~ r rfrom

s investipring the Gtti:~rinn
therc, I-Inwrvcr, the t c t t h a t such chsrgcs 17avc n o t hcrn mnrl

In a icttcr ro U.S.r\ml,assndnr trl rhe Ilnired Smtes Antlrcw Y m ~ n g .Frctilin Ambassador K;~mos-ldortarccallcd his countrl-'s
initi:~l enur*uragemcnt a t Jimmy C~rtrr'scarnpai-p "cnrnrnitrncntr; tn human rights and promises to ccase U.S. support to

Issue Ntr. 63 25
 Riches of the East
. INTERESTS IN INDONESIA

J.S., INT:
!+'OR LI)
If ~ h clnp;?i~rrr-.trc p v r m ~ r t r rn .~~L..lrrx ncui,l I ~ n t ~ l ica ~ r rnxxqirr rlchtr tc* the
nnrt.11 E:l.;t Inrllcc prrlr)ld~:tl rhc [ I S. with rrtsr rl~c.ir threat [ t i n r r w k anti ronrpcr Vrt!irrlanrls. In thc c:~rlyl'JjO<. r h t~l S.
rln, r l r f ~ h r r ,nntl qurnlnr-, , I T ( r d l .a? IEW [rhc UcrhrrT:~ntl~ Fasr Ind~csantT rhr ~ n c t ~ ~ r l o r n irnlwl1ns
c t 4 ~ In(!(>nc'<lato
c t h . l l t - ~ ~ <r nrnnlr~rlitir.~ inr.!n~'l~rlp crrl'l'cr, LI*l:tlavan ~ r - t r l c m c i i r r, ] uur mporrq ~'qr3hlish A r n r r ~ c i n nid prrlgr:lnls. r v h ~ l r
rupar, anti c o y m Ijurch prcltrrc on r h ~ r !ram ~IICK C V U R t I I l ' S rrlll Ilt' Inter- [witt t c . t!.S. r~rr.int,ntir)n~, irirti :tr tile
tr:rtlr wl)s?rlirt.tl Nt.tlrerlantlr lIilpnrrs of ruptcd and dcstr~lvcd.. . . In rinw of ICrrrtl l;rruntlatic~n :rntl rht. h~:I.-CIC),FCT
,\rnrrlc.ln ~ o n d <ll.t;. KuVq!>cr ~ n t l(;nod- war, rvjrh the splrcr of c\ploirarinn a n d up 1-rnprms 11, Iclrn Ir~tlnncq~nn ccon-
vc:tr c<t:12llrrhrrl n ~ l d ~ rr lrx n ~ . ~ t i o r l in < tlc5rrlrt-t~un( ~ cnrnrncrrc
r wtiich cu lsrq r?nll\rp, <r>c~al srlrnr~qtr.aruP Ial)or Icatlrrs.
1010 I ~ L I CInIrcx, .i jnrnr vcnrurr of
1910. t r l rlic \vr,rld torl:~?,w r h a n tnrrrrrlp- En ITJS1, j u ~ tf ~ j V~P J~~ Sr nfrcr tr~dn-
T c u : ~ c r .tnd~ Ci.~!idart! 011of I:.~l!ftwn~a, tirln of rrur ~ r a d cw t h thc Nerhcrlnnds n r m n intlrpcncfcnrr, I'rr~tdrmr 1;l~cn-
. ~ c q ~ ~1~ ~?etn'lcurn
rcd crlnctrston ti 1'4.35. I.?<t Intlic~ 2 n d t h C \ 1 ~ l a ~ a X nr J r r S tin\r,cr inullkerl r hc rrr hc5 n t 1nrlnnrrl.t ro
Hv !*!?. rhc 1 nqr Inrhcq qt~pplicdmarc wrruld hc c~tastt-ophic" ' j u v i f r 1J.S. conrrihurion.; r o t h r I rcr~ch
than 1t31:' thr I ' . F crln<blnil?rlonr>f 21 lrnst :I I.~rerdr:ift warncrl ttir thrc.31 t t s t1.S. w a r cFforr an Inrl(~ch~na
I 5 ~lirtincrcnrnniodlr~cc. ronr nicrcr "l)crwc.cn the I':tc~lic and thv
L1nlrc-dSt.~tc'izprltrq QSnfl
V<-:~rl\rwtr !.can h ~ f o r rPrarl t tlrhor. '
I n r l r ~ nOrcxn. " Thr surprlsr arrark on
liar. wltcn rhr
~ n hclp that wir. wt. arc n o t
r n ~ l l ~ rto
I7.S. Sccrcr,~rv o! Statr Corrlcll 11~111 PTNI !nrl>or ~>rccluded~ o r ~ s r v c l t 'mcs- s
i7~rrionccl t h : ~ t r f J {pall ~ ~ c c ~ l p rhc ~ e t l say'. hut h ~ spor1tic)rl \ I ~ X~f.Ie:~r. vlrfrnr f o r :I ~ I V U ~ \ \ ~ . Vro7:lm.
IV Wc nrc
~ Thr (!.S.
h'cthcrlanti~Indics, "'I lh cradr routrr of vrrtbn;! for t11c chmyrclt ~v.ir. t h : ~rw ~
w:I': p r c p ~ r c dTPI f'lrht l a p a n tn prorcct
~ h cITnnlr(l St.itrr rvnultl t>t- rrrrtrurly .tlnt.r~c:lnruppllcs ( 1 1 Snurlira~rt \ < ~ a nr a \ r cnn I n prch\.cnr tlrc occrlrrrncr nf
vripptrd, :an41 ~ n r l ~ t s t r rnv i l r n r r + c ~wrri~lcl
n s~~rncrhlng rhar \voulbl Ilc. of thc n i m ~
rn;~~rrl~!s.
hc most rrnpr,rrL~nrly .~ffrctcd. . ."' ,2fter the war, rhc llnitcrl S t , l t s
frrritdr- rr!nlificarirc fcbr tlrr Ilnitcd
h n r i r ~ p : ~ r:r ~ Inpanr.';t'
n~ :lr\ault rln Indn- pr.rsu:~dcrl rhc Nrrhrrlnnds ro kqanr S r a t r r o f ,\rnr.rlr..l-<)\ir r c ~ u r i r v .nur
newt 4nJ ! ! ~ I . I v t w r l w Rau~t~t-IT adnitnt-
p t ~ u .~~rn d?hi!it\ rcr y r t ccrt,tin th1nL5
~nrlcpentfrncc to Inrlrlnc~~n, lqlcnin? thr
crr:Iiion prr.pnrrrl 3 clarl.inc?ir rn N o r r m - (loor to ;try ~nt*rc.nsrrlArncricnn rcorlarmlr wr. ncrrl t r r m rhr r~chrs n! t?rc
bcr 1041 :isk~neCrrngrCr~trt rlr~.larr-a n r . roSc rhcrc. A t thc samr rlrnc, rhc C1.S. Inrionrslan t c r r ~ t r ~ n :.t.n t l fl.,,rn S ~ l ! t f h -
r:rsr
Scxcrttnr!. r>f lt'nr Sr~msonprc:parrtl rho : ~ r r : ~ n ~tcrniq e d ~ ~ a r ; ~ n r t * c -1 m1girs:~rictity
flmr r l r ~ f t . nt Dutch Inrfcrrnrntc :lntt I ~ o l r l ~Intfo- n~ dt~rnino
A ~ I ~ I I It Eh ~i ~
~ rhcrltl.. rhc nrltron
rhar Indonesia
iqrn if itr ne
I - - I --.- - -Ec'Ic
dlqcrcditcd, m;
kerli~vcdV.S. inrrwenrron in i terl-l,iln h . 1 ~ 1
Iwuyht timr f
Indnneia.
RACKSTAGE INFLUENC:
I n rhr ltrrr -, the
Indonrsisn go\. not'lng
left, ndopring na~rtul,l~rsr cuclnrjmrr ~ ( I I I -
cirs, Anpretl 11I!. thr r:o
dzim to IV-t ?<P\V ( : U ~ I I
the Suknrnn rt"glrnt qc-i~ct
, .
ttm and reptidt.9 trtl its dc1)t to the
Werherlandr. \lrlitrugh Altrericnn Inrercsts
fared hettrr, the clilnarc lor Invr.\tmcnt
2nd rradr \vat poor. i,nol;ing fnr inllrrr>vtA-
menr, In 195% rhr I1.S.- plantarinns. Rel~rvingthat the right-atpin?
Ford Foundntion'~ ernnc c\. I ~ L ' t:t.dcr.it~otl tln~ted CounciF of Gen~rals,which workrd with
Sumirra njojoh;tdfk~i~trrn 1f>.i11, S,ir.l~r.lk ~ n t l Singapore. the U.S., w a s a h a t to serizr: power.
t o join a rrlwllir~n IN ~onserv3t11,t~ ant1 >lth.lr1io \J\L 11s ~.I.c;til<)n , t s a i f i r c c ~thrcnt left-leaning officers staged a prc.rmprive '
tdarnic g r o ~ ~ p sin Intlcmesia'.: ourcr 1 l~e pursch o n Srptrmhcr 30, 1965, IctTFing six
islands. The ( I A also hnrked rhc rel)<.lc, 1 rn rnemhen 0nT the Cor~ncil of Gent.rals.
and AmrrEcan pilor Allcn Pope spnrkcd .. - .. t n l L~k K , t l t , . ,,,, t c , l , c , L , 6 n L , t
L , ~ ~ ~ ~ , his
, General Sr~harro,the cr~nsemarivecorn-
an inrrrnatinnal ~ncirlrnt wlicn I Ile war; C jplrr s u c h sanr tlon! :in manner of the stratrgic rewwe, rnnhtlised
chot down o r w Sktlnrvc.;i ICclct>esl In t11c r n :~ntl rr tl~ttctl U. S. riyttt-win? army s r r t n ~ t h to quell rhe
same vear. c ,t>cd town,rtl rcpl:ic At lei r i m . Charpng that t h r PKI was
f)mpite the small <calf of Amrncnn OIIC' pnlnr. rrle c,.,. t . 1- r.c~tirr7mniatcri - t
- - r -
Iris responqihle for the Septcmhrr 30 coup,
pcnnnlrlir acrnity in Indonecia i n rhe n .tnoi her. I r pn'duc cd Sul~arm forcer, in coopewtion with
enrly I96fls, L1.S. prrlicy m a k e s cnn- a n stnrrlng .i Su karno sn~tfentl;and labor proupc Iinked to the
c ! c o v e rhe cottntrv's
~ j r ~ t ~ etn n+..,*l
.z, 1
a<wrh-.tllh<
~ . I I I Z ~ 1 ~ 1 LZ furrnilnc J hl:, . *...\,-";<
.IUIII~-FIIJ?. L.I.S., unleashed a W I of~ terror againrr
rclrources. Ruhlxr ruprwtr m thr V.S. hnti Mort- i ~ r ~ p r n \uch "dirrv rricks," quspecrrd PKI mernlwrs. At least hnlf a
actuaHv decttned, as the nrkber com- fiovxcer, t jurtship of ri~ht-wing million were killetl. In March 1966,
p a n i e druelr>ped cheaper, h t t e r syn- Indc)nc\~ar Ic2tIcn. Suhnrtn formally took power from
rhetics, hut Indonminn oil continued t o I,nllmv~np I I I C f n ~ l i l r r o f the CIA- Su knrna.
Iw an imprtanr conccrn. tn 1963, whcn hackcd 01 rir Rcbeilron, Ameri- A . soon as Suhnrro took thr rsrnq,
it apprnrctl that Irrdr~nerin might s e i x can lcatlc ssrd chcir approach Indonesia annotrncert itr renewed horpi-
Cdceu and other American oil aqsrt5, thr tclwnrd Ii1dones1.1.Ptnddctl by Sti~tthcast tality toward foreqn invcstmrnt. Witli~n
Kenn~dy admfniqtration riiqpatchrd a Asi,~\pc~.i. list E;t#v tJaukcr nl .thr R r \ N n days, the U.S. and it5 a1Ii-v~offered cretlitr
speci~lernissnrv ro Japan to rnediste in Cnrpnr.1r lrIn, t f i c U .S. gowrrlrncnlr devtl- to *upport the parchas? o f rirc. Invtrtnrr
clmmsqlons betwren flw indoncsian gotr- nperI 11c.c to righr- wing gen crnls in the did not rurh in, howcvrr. blrqt unmc an
.
crnrnent .and the rrif companies. Indnnnlan arm!. nrtc-rr rr -.~rrrrrress
- A .%,

r
1
cnactrd 1171; team, which deriped a ntn- qrnhili-
On a hroadcr scale, the U.S. attempted thr Rroornfirld 4111 cntlmcnt ~n 1963 to ].ation p3ck:~~e supported hy lofins from
ro influence Suksrno's ~conomtc pnl- rrstrirt cronnmic a t ld nnrl tlre shipment nF rhe 'U.S., the U"orld Rank, Japan, and
. .
1~ cjr replace his pvemmrnr itti ti a tucapnnq 'to indonrwr. I T was perctiaded Et~royran nations. Indonesia's crediron
r c ~ ~ r nmore
e Cavorshlt to the U'rsr and to hy I'entagon cxpl-rr~rn rerain train~ng formed the Inter-GovcrnrnentaI Croup on
fnrelgn investment. The Ford Po~rnda- and civic action p r n p m r rlmi_ped to Indoneria {KG!) to canrdinare a d poli-
tion, working wirh the Universitv of maintain the h+rrncldripol armv Ir3drm. tier ant? moniror Indoneria's rcnnamy.
(::tlifomin-Rrrkclry, Ilarvard, and other American ndvrserr c n t o u r a p d the armv Meanwhile, the U.S. graduaUv huilt up Its
tt.S. tnsr~~~-tltions, continued ro teach to prepare to take power-if not imme- rnili~~,zr?.arqistance and salw propam,
American development strsteyy TO lado- diatplv, then upon the death or retirement pmvidint;. tht- military governmrnt with
nesian ecnnornists. In 1963 ttie U.S.,in of rhe aging, nilrng St~karno. A team of the wcnponr to comhat domcrric insur-
allies, and the Internatinnal Monctar), tl.S.-rraincd ~conarnis1 s sponqnred hv the rection. .l+urc than rupplvin~hardware,
T;trnd irnpowd a "stahilizntion pm~ram" Ford Foirndattnn tau$% colrmec a t t h e howwer, military sqsirtancr, ecr,nr>mic
nn Indonesia as a condition for foreign arm!? command scl~nrrlto promote nte~t- prograrnq, 2nd privarc training PrOJFCtS
eachanee loans. Il lowrver, the program ern capirzli~r ~ h o u g l ?within ~ the top reintorcvd hmrrican pnlitical influence.
was never carried nut, becausr the U.S. ranks ot the militant. With fowign assistancr in hand, the
and the IMF canceilett rhc Toam after Rv 1965. lndnneian pniirrcr polar- pnrralr instatled the Ford-rrainect ecnn-
Sukarno ~ri;rcdKritish propertv to pm- ;led. tndnneqian zvnrkrts. rpurred hy the omicrq, known 3%f h u "Eierkrlev Mafia,"
tcsr rhe formation of the Malaysian l a r and ~ well-nrgant7ed Indon~qianCorn- in key planning pfiitionq and rcturncd
Frderation. Spcmsored hy Cirent {{ritain, rnuniqc h r t y (1'Ki). wi7rd t<S. rubber U.S. propertrt-s seizcd nexr the end of $he

Issue No. 65 27
Sukarno reg~mt ase e l Goodvcar,
n o t oniy r l ~ t ltl c ~ t plnnrntlc)ns,
s rnlc of oit in rhc Indnncs~anrcnnomy i s
hut they cvcntl I thc cclnrpnnv t ( i
Rtn tivn g i l v c r ~ l L~, ~~ r- L~ I I * ~ Clire
~ pl:mts.
~ I V I R F C;clnt!yc:~r:t nionopnly rrves Indu-
ncsian rirc prcrtlr~crirrn. 7'11~ Ikrkelcy
hlafin, nidctf 2):) tlicir :\mr.ric:~n mentors,
d c l - ~ c d new laws t n cncuurayc fclrrign
ccnnr>micnctir-ity.
THE AMRRICAN STAKE TODAY
Sharrly aftcr thc Suhxrtil rcgimc took
powrr. Richnrcl Nivon clcqcrihr~lhis irlcn
of the Rrncricln intertqr in Indnnesi:~:
"Witti in 101) rnill~onpcoplr lnrrw f 35
rn~ll~on andl its 3.OOOmilc arc of tflantlr
cnn tn inin5 rhc r c g i o n ' ~ richest t),oard of
natur:11 rcsniitr:cs, Fndo~ nrsia con s t i t u t s
rhc prcintcst pr 1 7 in ~ [hi- Sou thcast Asian
;tr~;b.', T ,+, .".. -L..*
I.. .lr. r l r dt-cnclc sinlE hll.tt
*: , " *I..
ttlblL, ll#=
U.S. stakc in Intlonmia hns incrcnscd
many times ovcr. Stratug1c3tly, rlie
i.\~ncrican defeat in Inclorl~inaknq forced
3 rc3 of rhc 17,s. dcfcnsivc.
~OFXII n t BTC3. T ~ FPrnragon's
pl:irln' think ir1 terms of rlw
"~slan, .,
r. ".,
, l,,,,h
r:r dclincs idand
Southcast Asis ; ~ qpart of n I~nr:of ilcfrnsc
stretching from japan rrhougli archi-
p r l n p ~ c Sor~thcnst Asin m thc Incli:~n
Occ.:tn. Sirtine on the rnajor sca lancs
which connect I5urope and thr. MirIdle
Fast m h q i a r i : ~rhc lndinn and Pacific
Occ:ans, lnrlnncsi:1 providc~ the linchpin
for this srr.rtcby. Thc most hravily
aavclud route is thr. Stnits af Malacca,
bcrwccn thr hidayan ptninsula and
Swnarra. hut rhc Sombr~k,hlaknsrar and
Ornt~ai <traits are 3 1 ~ 0 irnpnrranr for
milirary traffic.
Indoneia's p e o p p h i u significance
nlco applies ro tht. cconnniic firld. As rhc
Pentagon told the U.S. Congrrss this
vear: " Uiiimpcilcrl passage thrclugk rhcsc
watcrw:~)-sis cqwntial for t l ~ cprtroPcum
and othcr n w m~rcriabymports crf Jnpan.
a major ally, as tvcll as iinpnrtnnt for thc
llnitcd Sratcs and fricndl?. Asian
n:~rinnq."' American concern for J:~pan's
cconornic wclfarc- 5tcrns frnm m t m than
a l t n ~ i r r n .Much nt thc oil a n d nrher rnrv
marcrials pawing t h m u g h Inrl4lncsia arc
w l d t o J:~pan by Amcncan rntllti-
natlonalq. 'rhc rnmrr multi-nntionnls
control thc cxtrnction o f Indoneqinn n w
rnxtckals-nl~o fnr sale to Japan. Over 90
lpercent of rhc c n i d c oil prtrditccd in
Indonesia cnm- from arcas ~ v o r k c dbv
American oil crtm panics such as at tcx,
1 b c r 1 and Union Orf. In 1973 ncnrly
three-quarters o f I n d o n c ~ i a ' s rlil wxs
extraction sector, particularly in ail. The
c s c m p l i f ~ c dIn thc expansion of ourpur
from 500.000 pcr [lay l n 1467 to 1.4
million hsrrrls per day in 1973. Irs
connibuttnn to the Oalnncc crf paymcnn
has thercforc un~lctgonc a rtmarkahlc
changc. MrhcrCnct oil caming-s wcrc only
3 5 percent of non-ohl cupnrtq in 1956-66,
by 1933-74 - l ~ c i o r ethc risc In oil priccs
- thry wcw alrc;tdy 96 purcvnr n l lion-oil
cxporrs.
T h c lndoncrian involvcmcnr of Arnerl-
can llankc nrv-d? no qua1ificnarir,n. They
carry rtt lcasr $2.2 bill~nn.a n d pow~hfy
more. of lndr,nt.sis'r ctapgcring 519
hillinn cxtcmal ilcht. W h m Pcrtnrninn,
the starc r~ilcompany. wcnr Ijanltntpr in
1975. leading U.S. Ixtnks joincrl with
Europc~an,C3nadi:jn and Japnnrw finan-
ri:11 Inslln!tlnns to !,nil out rhc cnnlp3ny
un condition rhar Pcrtarnina bc pi-iced
under thc conrrnl of Indonc-63's
Arnrric:~n-tmined tcchnocrars. Since thc
rcorpmizatinn o f lErrtnrnina, (ndnnc~in's
finaiicial position h.15 impmvcd, but
rreditrir I ~ a n k sstill have a large rtakc In
thc continued pcrwth of Indtrnesin cu-
ports, ~i+ticharc thcit collatcr;tl.
In rhc past dccndc. lndoncsia has
indeed l,een tlic W.S.'?; " n c h e ~ tp r t ~ c "in
IFollyw~)oct\ vicw of Indonesia:
Sourhcasr Asin, The thruat frnm thc left
Hall I-lopc in R n n d f o RaIi (1952). has hcen rcmovcd; a cc~opcrarivcm i l i t a n .
Icadcnhip is in polrrcr: and irs cconomic
shipped to Japan, alrhnuph thir propor- prlliricc. p i d c d 11s L1.S.-traincd cxprrrs,
tion had drtvppcd to 48 percent in I 9 7 7 have f:~cil~tatedsuhstanrial incrcascs 1n
as thc U.S. share of ~ntioncria'sexports American loans, r r a d ~and invustmcnr
rosc t o 3 7 percenr. in Indonesia. Rut thcse sanir policics have
Apart f r o m t h e oil companies, Free- inevi tntsly gcncraterl social prcqsnrcs
port I M ~ ~ ~ has M ! as lucrnrjve coppcr mine rvhich arc now finding cxprrrrion. dupitc
in lrian Jaya (West New Guinea); Wcyur- intenrificd povcrnrncnr rcprcssion. While
hacuser, Georpra Pacific and othcr U.S. rhc c a s t ro the U.S. nf chc hencfitr i t lias
l u m r ~ e rcomp;~nicshave large c o n c c r ~ i o n s rcapcd from l n d o n e s ~ ain the p-t drcadc
in Kalimantan. Not all U.S. companies in 1135 lwcn rclativcly low, rhc next dccadc IS
I n d o n e ~ i aarc ~nvolvcdin primnr!. produc- likely to rcquire more cnmmitment of
tion, however. Such firms, sttch as Singer, American economic a n d mi1it:~r-y rlwis-
ITixrr and Union Carbide opcrzre rance to prop up a n inerrasinply un-
"import s u h ~ t i t u r i o n ' h a n u f a c t u r i n g popular miIit3ry rcgirnc.
facil~tit=s which pmducr goods for rhc
Ind(mt.qia market. Orhcr cornpanics pm- Notes
vidc s c r v i c ~ : IFi~phcs Aircmlt, for In-
I . Citcd in Fred h a e l . ti!., Tfrr Wirr IJ~cny
stance, npcnrcs thc new I'nI~pasarellirr r)f Iirt-rlrtnnrlgr I.ran~(CJnivrm\tv rlf Ncl~r;~%k:~
communications system. A few carpnr;t- Prw%,1 ohb), p. 81.
{inns. si~ch as National Sernicondllctor 2. F#rrr.t,pi ptrttb~rioirr o ~ thr=
- . I t r r t r d 'tairr
and Faircl~ild Semiconducror. nwrrnl~lc Jdpnrr. 1041. I V . pp. 677-78,
U.5.-supplied components for rcLr.sporr. 3. Ih~cl.,p. 67 H.
4 . Remark% t r Gmcrnors' Cnnfercnce.
Althoirgh Arnc~ican invmtnlrrnt in Auptri 4. 1 4 5 3 . Circtl in I ' m t ~ ~ ~ 1o8n~ p c r r ,
Indoncsil, ~ v h i c his. approx-irnatcly 5730 Gr:~vel Etlition. Vnl. 1, p. 592,
million, is anlv 11 pcrccna of rota! 5. I . u w ~ , p ~.Illbirr.,
~ ncrohr 1967 ("Aqis
foreign investmint :rnd " i s only haEf thnr Virtn:tm*"pp. I 1 l-?5).
h. I:r~~!qr~,r~nnn.rl I'n'rrnrutton I ) r > c r r ~ $ r c . t r f ~
of Japan's. its impclrtance is cnlar-vd by
its concentration in the kcy mineral ~ - 4 7 .
ccrmr , crrrm,rc,. I,IIIF nnt Firca, Yc:,r s70,
 Amnesty International. Int'l Secretariat- TAPDL.'USA-Org; i. support for movpment. 134 Roundary St., tj/F, Kow.
Orqaralzcs international adopthon of lndo potlt~c;tlr~r~soners I sin. Pi~hlishes loon Hong Kong.
nerian political prisoners, thr foc!tr af bi-rnnnthly newslelter r s - r JLI'USA. P.O.
therr 1'177 campalqn. Has publrsh~d a Box 609, F.lon~cla~r, N w J c r r ~ y17 t 42. The Indonesian Action Group-Organizes
major report on Indonesian prisonerr. 10 around the human riqhts ~ s s t w and
Soutlihanpton St. Lonrfon WCZE J M F f APO C l f3ritish Campaign for the Release pressurm for cufs in Australran military
on
- .lndonesian
'
Politteal Prisoners- and economic support to the Indonesian
England.
lniriared the ~nfernat~onal support work r q l m e . Publishes bl-rnonthty Indon~sian
Church Committee on Human Rights in for indon~sinn political prisoners. Pub- Nrlws S~lecttons, based prirnar~l y on
Asia- Works with church and community trshs hr-rnanfhlv n~wsletterTAPoL. 103 translations of the lndonesran press. P.0.
groups to prewure for improved human Rand. ZVandworth Common, Box 137. Collingwood 3066, A i ~ ~ t r a l ~ a .
rights in Indon~sia,the 'Philipp~ner,and ;\VIR Enqland.
South Korea. Recently f ~ l stnckholder
~ d Campaign for an independent East Timor
resolutions with U.S. corporatkons call ~ n g (CkET)-Network of int~rnationalqroups
'
for improved labor conditions in AsIan Eurapean support for improved human do~ng solrdarity work and providinq
np~ratfonr. Publrshes thr A s h F~nhts rlqhn in Indonesia. Sponsored ronfrrence wrltten and aud~o.visual TPSOUrGfi on
i
Advocate. 5700 S. Woodlnwn Avr?. on "The Qthpr Indonesia," critiquing the Timor, U.S.A. Emr Tirnar Defense Corn.
Chicago. IL 65637 phone (815) impact of f o r ~ i g naid. Pubtish~srrq~llar rnittee: P.O. Box 251, Pld Chels~a
756-9335. 1 bulletin in Dutch. P . 0 . Rnx 4098, Statlan, MY, NY 10010. British Cam-
Amsterdam, Holland. paign for an Independent East Timor: 40
Pacific Studies Center-Maintains a public Concanon Road, London SUT Enqland.
rewarch crnter on U.S. foreign polrcy in Int'l Mo of Cathdic Sksdents, Australian Campaign for an Independent
Asia, ~ncl~idinq Indones~a. P ~ ~ b l i s hbi-
~ s Asian Ser Maintmns contact wi?h East Tirnor: 232 Castlereanh St 4th
monthly Sacr!rc Rtrs~arrIi, a journal on Stutfmt: IJ, uu,l, indonrsia and coordi- Floor. Sydney 2000 Australia. New
U.S. and multinational corporatp activity natrr work with internatnonal student Zealand Campaign for an Independent
In Asra. 867 !V. Dana Rm. 204, Mountain groups. Has publjshecl an annotated East Timor: P.O. Box 1157, M1hanqarel.
View, CA 94041 phone (4 15) 969-1545. chronolnqy on t h e 1977-78 sttrrknt New Zeafand.

1
A
IH

n
II
m
m
D
D PLEASE ENTER M Y SUBSCRIPTION
I
58 regular I
a
A % low income
Name 910 foreign
M
$15 foreign airmail
!
R
Organization
$12 libraries, institutions
m
;Address NEW II
IR
r m
II RENEWAL la
I@

fl Reprints of this Issue fI

A

SOUTnEAST ASIA RESOURCE CENTER S Single Copy $1 llIi Ten or more ,65/ea. mn
:P.O. Box 4000-0 Cl I m o r more .SO/ea.
IR
m
BERKELEY, CA 94704 r4
a!
"
I
(4153 548-2546 Issue No. 63 PLEASE SEND A FREE CATALOG 81
w
I
-
 I L A '

The indonesian anmy invaded East Tirnor in 1975. A bloody guerrilla war continue to this day

U.S. POSTAGE P A I D
I!€ )thiFLEY ( A
P I IIPJIT NO 1 7 1 1

PRINTED MATTER