Compiled Digests Feb 2015 To July 2015

PERSONS
AND
FAMILY RELATIONS
CASE DIGESTS

FEBRUARY 2015 TO JULY 2015*

FOR
DEAN MEL STA. MARIA

PREPARED BY
ERIC ANDRES, MATEO ESCUETA AND BEAU MASIGLAT
FIRST SEMESTER, SY 2015-‐‑2016

September 2, 2015

ATENEO LAW SCHOOL

*
Available decisions at the Supreme Court Website as of August 31, 2015.
Persons & Family Relations Digests 1 February 2015 to July 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. PEREZ V. CATINDING
(BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; DISBARMENT)
............................................................................................................................................. 3
II. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION V. AZOTE
(VOID SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE; BENEFITS)
............................................................................................................................................. 5
III. PEOPLE V. ARAMBULO AND ARAMBULO JR.
(PREJUDICUAL QUESTION; ESTAFA CASES)
............................................................................................................................................. 7
IV. BUCAL V. BUCAL
(VAWC; VISITATION RIGHTS; PROTECTION ORDER)
............................................................................................................................................. 9
V. DINAMLING V. PEOPLE
(VAWC; CONVICTION)
........................................................................................................................................... 11
VI. PEOPLE V. ESUGON
(CHILD COMPETENCY AS A WITNESS)
........................................................................................................................................... 14
VII. EULOGIO V. BELL
(FAMILY HOME; WRIT OF EXECUTION)
........................................................................................................................................... 16
VIII. SANTIAGO V. PEOPLE
(MARRIAGE EXEMPT FROM MARRIAGE LICENSE; FALSE CLAIM; BIGAMY)
........................................................................................................................................... 19
PEREZ V. CATINDING
A.C. No. 5816
March 10, 2015
Bigamous marriages (grossly immoral conduct; ground for disbarment)
FACTS
Dr. Elmar Perez filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig and Atty.
Karen Baydo for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Dr. Perez alleged in her complaint that Atty. Catindig, who already married Lily Corazon Gomez
in 1968, started courting her in the pretext that he would obtain a divorce decree to terminate his
subsisting marriage and subsequently marry her. Catinding said he only married Gomez because
he got her pregnant and he was afraid a scandal would have jeopardized his scholarship in the
Harvard Law School.
Sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was
lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. On July 14,
1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that the divorce decree obtained by Atty. Catindig was not
recognized in the Philippines and that their marriage is a nullity. Atty. Catindig then promised
Perez that he would obtain a declaration of nullity of marriage to declare void his marriage to
Gomez. Such promise never materialized.
In 2001, Dr. Perez received an anonymous letter informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous
afair with Atty. Baydo, and that he promised to marry her once “his impediment is removed.” On
August 13, 2001, Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. He further
claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he
was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their
relationship Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catinding and claimed she
resigned from his law firm because he did not stop pursuing her.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended the
disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross morality because of his bigamous marriage to Dr. Perez.
ISSUE
1. WON the respondent committed gross immorality, which would warrant his disbarment.
HELD
1. Yes, contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly
immoral conduct.
From Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly
immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church
in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started
pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and
four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart
due to Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court
in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction, as he and Gomez were both
Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot
marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his
subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The
foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral
values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the
USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the
logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely
manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out
of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a
deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus
warrant the penalty of disbarment.
Thus, Catindig was found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility1 and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.

1
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION V. AZOTE
G.R. 209741
April 15, 2015
Article 41, Family Code (Marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage; null and void; claims to SSS benefits must be proven by substantial evidence)
FACTS
Edgardo and Edna Azote married on June 19, 1992, and their union produced six children.
Edgardo, a member of the Social Security System (SSS) submitted to the SSS two E-4 forms in
1994 and 2001 designating Edna and their six children as beneficiaries. Edgardo passed away on
January 13, 2005.
Edna filed her claim for death benefits as Edgardo’s wife, but the Social Security Commission
(SSC) denied her form because their records showed that Edgardo had previously submitted E-4
forms in 1982 designating his spouse Rosemarie Azote and his son Elmer as beneficiaries.
Edna insisted she was Edgardo’s legitimate wife and filed another claim for the death benefits,
lup sum, and monthly pension of Edgardo. The SSC dismissed Edna’s petition stating that (1)
Edgardo did not revoke the disgnation of Rosemarie as his wife-beneficiary; (2) Rosemarie was
still presumed to be Edgardo’s legal wife; and (3) the National Statistics Office (NSO) records
revealed that Edgardo and Rosemarie wed in 1982, thus making Edna’s and Edgardo’s
marriage as not valid without showing that his first marriage was annulled or dissolved.
The SSC denied Edna’s motion for reconsideration as Edna failed to prove that her marriage
to Edgardo was valid by showing a judicial determination of nullity of Edgardo’s marriage
with Rosemarie.
Edna appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the SSC’s, holding that (1)
the SSC had no power to determine the validity of Edna’s marriage considering that Rosemarie
or Elmer did not appear or contest Edna’s claim; (2) Edna established her right to the benefits
using her marriage certificate and the baptismal certificates of her children; and (3) Edgardo
deliberately changed his wife-beneficiary to Edna by submitting an E-4 form in 1994, which
superseded his former designation in his 1982 E-4 form.
The SSC appealed to the Supreme Court and asserted that (1) the SSS had authority to determine
the validity of marriages in determining entitlement to SS benefits; and (2) Edna was not the
legitimate spouse of Edgardo because there was no judicial declaration of nullity.
ISSUE
1. WON the SSS can determine the validity of Edna’s marriage to Edgardo considering
Rosemarie or Elmer did not appear or contest Edna’s claim.
2. WON Edna is entitled to Edgardo’s SSS death benefits as his legitimate wife
HELD
1. Yes. Although the SSC is not intrinsically empowered to determine the validity of marriages,
Section 4(b)(7) of R.A. 8282 (Social Security Law) requires the SSC to examine available
statistics ensure that benefits go to the right beneficiaries.
Section 8 (e) and (k) of the same law mandate that only the legal spouse of the deceased-member
is qualified to be the beneficiary of the latter’s benefits. In this case, there is proof that
Rosemarie is Edgardo’s legal spouse and designated beneficiary.
2. No, Edna is not qualified to be Edgardo’s legitimate wife, thus she is not entitled to SSS
death benefits. She could not adduce evidence to prove that Edgardo’s earlier marriage was
either annulled or dissolved, or whether there was a declaration of Rosemarie’s presumptive
death before Edna’s marriage to Edgardo.
The Family Code was in force when Edgardo and Edna’s marriage was celebrated in 1992.
Article 41 expressly states:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)
It is also a settled rule that “whoever claims entitled to benefits provided by law should establish
his or her right thereto by substantial evidence.”2
Dissenting opinion; Justice Leonen
Edna should be entitled to SS benefits because (1) she sufficiently established the legality
of her marriage to Edgardo; (2) The E-4 forms Edgardo submitted designating Edna as his
beneficiary supercedes the prior E-4 forms in favor of Rosemarie; Section 24(c) of RA 8282
presumes that these documents are correct; (3) nothing in RA 8282 expressly prohibits changing
of beneficiaries; and (4) The validity of Edna’s marriage was not decided in any adjudicatory
process thus her marriage to Edgardo must be presumed valid.

2
Signey v. Social Security System, 566 Phil. 617, 627 (2008)
PEOPLE V. ARAMBULO AND ARAMBULO JR.
G.R. 186597
June 17, 2015
Elements of a prejudicial question; estafa cases
FACTS
Anapped Estate Inc. (ANAPED) was incorporated as a conduit to hold the properties of the state
of Pedro Reyes and Anastacia Reyes for and in behalf of their heirs: Victoria R. Arambulo,
Emerencia R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes, Domingo Reyes, Rodrigo Reyes, and Oscar Reyes.
Jose Buban, Vice-President and General Manager of ANAPED, filed a complaint for estafa
against Victoria and her husband, Miguel Arambulo, Jr., for failing to remit rentals collected
from the time commercial apartments were transferred under ANAPED. Buban claimed the
Spouses Arambulo misappropriated the P319,888.00 paid by IMF International Corporation.
Spouses Arambulo filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicual

question pending in two intra-corporate cases before RTC of Quezon City and Makati City. SEC
Case 05-97-5659 was filed by Oscar Reyes for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of
ANAPED while SEC Case 03-99-6259 was filed by Victoria and her brothers Reynaldo and
Domingo claiming that their elder siblings Rodrigo and Emerencia, including Buban had
no authority to act for and in behalf of ANAPED.
Spouses Arambulo, therefore, claim they would be acquitted of the estafa case if Buban
were found to have no authority to demand for remittances.
The RTC granted their motion for suspension of proceedings, saying that the authority of Buban
to demand rentals is directly link to their liability for estafa. Pre-trial, however, was set upon
prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Spouses Arambulo petitioned for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), which enjoined the
RTC from continuing the criminal case while the intra-corporate cases pended. The CA
concluded that if Buban’s authority was defective, it is as if no demand was made, hence
prosecution for estafa would not propser.
The prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court, asking the Court to determine if a prejudicial
question exists in SEC Case 05-97-5659 or SEC Case 03-99-6259.
ISSUE
1. WON the intra-corporate cases gave rise to a prejudicial question, which suspends the
estafa case against Spouses Arambulo.
HELD
Yes, the CA correctly ruled that there is a prejudicial question to estafa case in SEC
Case 03-99-6259 and none in SEC Case 05-97-5659. The Complaint in SEC Case 03-99-6259
prays for the nullification of the election of ANAPED Directors and Officers, including Buban,
and their authority to act for and behalf of the corporation.
The criminal case against the Spouses Arambulo is for estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are (1) that the money,
goods, or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, of under any obligation involving the duty fo make dlivery of, or to return, the
same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand by the offended party to the
offender.
Sec 23 of the Corporation Code provides that corporate powers of all corporations formed will
be exercised by the board of directors elected from among the holders of stocks. If it is ruled,
therefore, in the SEC case that the present ANAPED diretors and officers were not validly
elected, then Victoria Arambulo has every right to refuse remittal of rental to Buban; in
effect, there essential element of misappropriation in estafa may be absent.
Moreover, Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for the elements
that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicual question:
(1) The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action:
(2) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In this case, the SEC case 03-99-6259 was the civil action intimately related to the estafa case,
and said SEC case will determine if Buban and the other directors have the authority to demand
remittances from Spouses Arambulo.
BUCAL V. BUCAL
G.R. 206957
June 17, 2015
Granting of Visitation Rights; Protection Order under VAWC (RA 9262)
FACTS
Cherith and Manny Bucal were married on July 29, 2005 and they have a daughter named
Francheska, who was born on November 22, 2005.
On May 7, 2010, Cherith filed a Petition for Issuance of a Protection Order (Temporary
Protection Order) based on the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act. She
alleged Manny’s alcoholism and not being loving and caring. She also alleged that Manny’s
behavior affected her health.
Her Petition for TPO includes:

1. Prohibit Manny from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating with her, directly or indirectly;
2. Order a law enforcement officer and court personnel to accompany her to the residence of
Manny to supervise the removal of her personal belongings in order to ensure her
personal safety;
3. Direct Manny and/or any of his family members to stay away from her and any of her
designated family or household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay
away from the residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented
by her and any of her designated family or household member;
4. Enjoin Manny from threatening to commit further acts of violence a gainst her and any of
her family and household member;
5. Grant her custody and charge of Francheska, until further orders from the court;
6. Order Manny to absolutely desist and refrain from imposing any restraint on her personal
liberty and from taking from custody or charge of Francheska; and
7. Direct Manny to provide support for her and Francheska
Cherith also petitioned the Court that after hearing, the TPO be made Permanent (Permanent
Protection Order). The TPO was granted on May 14, 2010 by the RTC, for 30 days. Manny was
given visitation rights every Saturday from 8:00am to 5:00pm. On June 22, 2010, the RTC
granted the PPO. It ordered Manny to provide support to Francheska, and clarified that the
visitation rights would only be from 8:00am to 5:00pm on Saturdays, where Francheska will be
brought to Manny’s residence by Cherith’s relatives.
Cherith argued that continuing Francheska’s weekly visits to her father defeated the purpose of
the protection order granted to them as the obligation made her and the child vulnerable to
Manny’s abuse. She also alleged that there was an ‘unauthorized intercalation’ in the addition of
the visitation rights for Manny. On November 23, 2010, the RTC ordered Cherith to bring
Francheska to McDonald’s in Tanza on Saturdays at 9am, where she will be picked up by Manny
and returned on Sundays, 5pm.
Cherith elevated the case to the CA, arguing that the RTC had no authority to grant visitation
rights because it was not prayed for. The CA dismissed Cherith’s Petition for Certiorari, saying
that she did not file a Motion for Reconsideration at the RTC and that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in granting visitation rights.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Cherith’s Petition for Certiorari.
HELD
Yes. The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari.
Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. However,
an exception to the rule is where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; or where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the Petitioner.
Cherith’s persistent petitions opposing the award of visitation rights was squarely and
definitively presented to the RTC. There was no need for the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration. It must be noted that there is urgency for resolution as Cherith and Francheska
are unduly exposed to the very danger which they are seeking protection from, despite the
standing PPO.
The records do not show that Manny never prayed for visitaiton rights. Cherith also never sought
the award of visitation rights for her estranged husband. It would appear that Cherith never
authorized such intercalation because she consistently contested the grant of visitation rights in
favor of Manny, and it (the prayer for visitation rights in Cherith’s RTC Petition) was merely
penned in the handwriting of an unidentified person, which renders the same dubious.
Hence, for all these reasons, the Court concludes that the grant of visitation rights by the RTC in
favor of Manny, as contained in the PPO, and reiterated in its assailed Orders, being both
unexplained and not prayed for, is an act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction which deserves correction through the prerogative writ of certiorari.
Petition is granted. the Decision of the Court of Appeals is Reversed and Set Aside. The
orders of the RTC granting visitation rights to Manny Bucal are Void.
DINAMLING V. PEOPLE
GR No. 199522
June 22, 2015
Conviction under VAWC (RA 9262)
FACTS
Dinamling, a policeman, and AAA (the victim) had a 5-year relationship and they had two
common children aged 2 and 4 years old. On March 14, 2007, Dinamling and a friend came
home from a drinking session and went to the Boarding House of AAA, as she was putting the
two children to bed. Dinamling started to evict AAA and the children, ordering her to pack their
things in a trashbag and a carton box for ducklings. He says she was allegedly using the boarding
house as a ‘whore house’ where she ‘brought her partners.’ AAA did not want to leave initially
but left when Dinamling threw a baby’s feeding bottle outside the house, causing it to break.
She then went to the house of BBB and asked BBB to fetch her children. When BBB with
another friend went for the children, Dinamling already left with the older child and only the
baby was left. The baby was brought to AAA.
Dinamling had a history of being violent with AAA. He would hit her head, pull her hair and
kick her. On March 20, 2007, 9:00pm, AAA was at the house of CCC when Dinamling arrived,
intoxicated. He shouted and counted down for AAA to come out. When she came out, he
punched her at the left ear, which bled. He said she was ‘good-for-nothing.’
AAA left for the Barangay Captain’s house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her
until she fell to the ground. On the road, he pulled down her pants and panty and shouted at her
while people looked on. He threw her pants and panty back at her and shouted her family name.
He then left on a motorcycle.
AAA stayed at her friend’s home until she felt some back pain the next morning. She was
bleeding and was brought to the hospital. She was 19 weeks pregnant and had an incomplete
abortion. She was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but showed no remorse.
Dinamling was charged in two criminal Informations at the RTC for violation of Section 5(i) in
relation to Section 6(f) of RA 9262:
Criminal Case No. 1701: That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX,
Ifugao, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
inflict psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two common
children, resulting to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by
repeated verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting utterances
directed against the victim and a feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended by the special qualifying
aggravating circumstance of the victim being pregnant at the time.
Criminal Case No. 1702: That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX, Ifugao, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict
psychological violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two common children, resulting
to mental and emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by boxing the victim on the
head, kicking her at the back and removing her pant (sic) and panty (sic).
Petitioner’s defense was only denial and alibi, claiming he was at the Police Station when the
offenses were committed. The RTC found him guilty.
The Ruling in Criminal Case No. 1701 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court of Appelas erred in disregarding Petitioner’s defenses of denial and alibi.
2. WON the Court of Appeals erred in discounting the supposed exculpatory testimony of one
of the witnesses.
HELD
No, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The Court, upon a close examination of the case
records, still found no error in the appellate court’s finding of guilt in the petitioner. There is no
reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim AAA’s evidence. In particular, AAA’s
testimony narrating the specific incidents was clear, categorical and straightforward and,
therefore, worthy of credence.
The trial court and Court of Appeals have found AAA’s testimony credible, and the Court has
little option but to accord respect to such findings. In addition to AAA’s testimony, her mother
DDD also testified that her daughter was ‘like a corpse’ because of Dinamling’s maltreatment,
and that she saw her with bluish spots and when AAA had a miscarriage from the boxing and
kicking she received from Dinamling. she also said that Dinamling was a married man during the
relationship with AAA and that he went home to his own wife.
The testimonies establish the elements of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262 and as
alleged in the two Informations filed against the petitioner:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or
her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial
of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the woman's child/children.
In relation to other sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:
1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;3

2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom
the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be
legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the family abode;4
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.5
In Criminal Case No. 1701, the elements have been proven and duly established. It must be
noted that AAA was in fear of the petitioner due to physical and verbal abuse. According to
DDD, these violent incidents have happened before. In Criminal Case No. 1702, the crime’s
elements were likewise proven. All such acts were committed while in full view and hearing of
the public, highlighting the public ridicule and humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental
and emotional pain. Even the sound of the petitioner’s motorcycle put fear in her.
In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling’s defense overcomes the clear, straightforward,
unequivocal and positive declarations of AAA. It only takes two to three minutes to go from the
Police Station to AAA’s boarding house. Positive Identification of Dinamling is not an issue. He
harps on the allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, that the abortion might or might not
have been caused by her mauling. AAA’s physical injuries, including her abortion, do not
constitute an element of the crime with which he is charged. The pregnancy is treated as an
aggravating circumstance.
The petition is Denied. The ruling of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and modified.

3
In relation to Sec. 3(a), RA 9262.
4
Id.
5
Any of the acts enumerated in No. 4 comprise this element and they are a means or way of causing mental or
emotional anguish, per the definition of ‘psychological violence’ found in Sec. 3(a)(C):
C. “Psychological violence” refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering
of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children. (Emphasis supplied.)
PEOPLE V. ESUGON
G.R. 195244
June 22, 2015
Child Competency as a Witness
FACTS
Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness. The party challenging the child's competency
as a witness has the burden of substantiating his challenge.
Appelant was charged with Robbery with Homicide. He was convicted in the RTC and his
appeal with the CA was dismissed. He alleged that the RTC erred in finding him guitly beyond
reasonable doubt of the composite crime of robbery with homicide based solely on the testimony
of Carl, a 5-year old witness whose recollections could only be the product of his imagination.
Carl, the son of the victim, testified that:

1. On the night of the incident, he, his younger sister Cheche and their parents were sleeping
on the ground floor of their house.
2. He saw appelant, whom he calls ‘Nonoy,’ enter their house and stab her mother with a
knife while he peeped through a chair.
3. Although there was no light at the ground floor, there was light upstairs, which
illuminated the ground floor through the stairway.
4. After his mother got stabbed, his father chased the appelant, and he saw blood come out
of his mother’s lower chest.
5. Subsequently, his father brought her to the hospital.
6. Carl then identified the appelant as a neighbor who often goes to their house and as the
one who stabbed his mother. Carl also related that the assailant took money from his
father’s pocket.
Insp. Marquez, who autopsied the body, related that the cause of the victim’s death was
hemorrhagic shock due to stab wound.
ISSUES
1. WON Carl’s testimony, filled with inconsistencies was not credible.
HELD
No, Carl’s testimony was credible.
The most important task of the State in the successful prosecution of the accused is his credible
and competent identification as the perpatrator of the crime. The qualification of a person to
testify rests on the ability to relate to others the acts and events witnessed.
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is clear in who may or may not be witnesses in judicial
proceedings. Anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness. Age,
religion, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment or social status are not necessary to qualify a
person to be a witness, so long as he does not possess any of the disqualifications as listed in the
rules. The generosity with which the Rules of Court allows people to testify is apparent, for
religious beliefs, interest in the outcome of a case, and conviction of a crime, unless otherwise
provided by law, are not grounds for disqualification.
That the witness is a child cannot be the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness
with which the testimonies of child witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased.
Under the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness (AM No. 004-7-SC, December 15,
2000), every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness.
To rebut this presumption, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child’s
competency. Only when substantial doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive,
remember, communicate, distinguish truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth
in court will the court, motu proprio or on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination
of a child.
The appellant did not object to Carl’s competency as a witness. He did not attempt to adduce
evidence to challenge such competency by showing that the child was incapable of perceiving
events and of communicating his perceptions, or he did not possess the basic qualifications of a
competent witness.
All that the Defense did was to attempt to discredit the testimony of Carl, but not for once did the
Defense challenge his capacity to distinguish right from wrong, or to perceive, or to
communicate his perception to the trial court. Consequently, the trial judge favorably determined
the competency of Carl to testify against the appellant.
Although children have different levels of intelligence and different degrees of perception, the
determination of their capacity to perceive and of their ability to communicate their perception to
the courts still pertained to the trial court, because it concerned a factual issue and should not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of a strong showing of mistake or misappreciation on the part
of the trial court.
EULOGIO V. BELL
G.R. No. 186322
July 8, 2015
Art. 160 of the Family Code (Family Home can’t be sold even on a Writ of Execution)
FACTS
Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Bell Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and
Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of Paterno C. Bell and
Rogelio Calingasan Bell (spouses Bell).
In 1995 the Bell siblings filed a Complaint at RTC Batangas to annul the Deed of Sale of their
329-square meter family home and lot executed by the spouses Bell in favor of Enrico and
Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). The Bell siblings also prayed for the cancellation of the title
obtained by the Eulogios by virtue of said Deed of Sale.
On July 15, 1998, the RTC granted the Bell siblings’ prayers, but clarified that the Deed of Sale
was only an equitable mortgage in favor of the Eulogios, and declared the spouses Bell liable to
the Eulogios for their loan worth P1 million and 12% interest per annum. Additionally, the
RTC ruled that the mortgage can’t bind the property in question for violating Article 160
of the Family Code since the mortgage was not consented to in writing by a majority of the
beneficiaries of the family home.
On June 9, 2004, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution upon the Bell’s family home. The Bell
family filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking for the writ to be lifted, saying that the property
can’t be sold because it is a family home. The Eulogios, on the other hand, argued that the family
home exceeded the P300,000-limit provided in Article 160 of the Family Code.
The RTC then set a case to determine the present value of the Bell family home. The Bell family
asked the RTC to cite the Eulogios for contempt because they were forum shopping, and that
their ploy to re-litigate the issue had long been settled with finality (res judicata) by the 1998
RTC decision.
The Court of Appeals (CA) enjoined the execution sale after the Bell family filed for a temporary
restraining order, but the CA later rejected the Bell family’s theory that res judicata had already
set in. The CA declared that the RTC decision in 1998 only declared their house and lot as a
family home not the issue of whether it may be sold in execution.
ISSUES
1. WON a hearing to determine the value of the Bell family home for purposes of execution
under Article 160 of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res judicata
2. WON respondents’ family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the
Family Code
HELD
1. Yes, re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents’ family home is barred by res
judicata.
From the facts of the trial court, it can be gleaned that it has already determined that the property
is a family home and therefore EXEMPT from execution, to wit:
City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified that during the prior years the assessed values
were lower. This shows that the limit of the value of Php300,000.00 under Article 157, Title
5 of the Family Code has not been exceeded. She said that beginning 1985 the subject lot
with an area of 329 sq. m.had a fair market value of Php76,000.00 and the residential house
located thereon of Php50,000.00, for a total value of Php126,000.00.
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the property in dispute
exceeded the statutory limit of Php300,000 has already been determined with finality by the
trial court. Its finding necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution.
Assuming for the sake of argument that causes of action in the main proceedings and in the
execution proceedings are different, the parties are still barred from litigating the issue of
whether respondents’ family home may be sold on execution sale under the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.
2. No, respondents’ family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family
Code.
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to
Php300,000 in urban areas and Php200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are
adjusted by law.
If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of
currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable
to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the
payment of any of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it,
its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment provided the following conditions obtain:
o the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined
to fall below the statutory limit; and
o the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a
forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the
obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the trial court’s money judgment against the Bell
spouses, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense of respondents’ rights over
their family home.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, the Eulogios must
establsh that (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its owners
or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.
The Eulogios have not proven that they are protected by the exceptions under Articles 155 and
160 of the Family Code.6

6
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)
Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment
in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than
the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an
order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual
value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution.
If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent
voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner
or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The
proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the
judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)

SANTIAGO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 200233
July 15, 2015
Article 34 of the Family Code (Exemption from marriage license; Bigamy is consummated
despite the second marriage being void when the spouses perpetrated a false marriage
certificate; fabricated claim)
FACTS
Four months after Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor Santos solemnized their marriage on July 29,
1997, they faced an Information for bigamy. Santiago pleaded not guilty while Santos died
during the pendency of the suit.
The prosecution presented evidence that Santos had been married to Estela Galang since June 2,
1974 when he asked Santiago to marry him. Santiago, who was a 43-year-old widow then,
remarried despite her in-laws insisting that she remarry someone “without responsibility.”
Santiago argued that she could not be accused for bigamy because she believed that Santos was
still single when they married. Santiago argued that (1) her marriage to Santos was void to the
lack of a marriage license,; and (2) the prosecution had to prove that Santiago’s second marriage
was valid for her to be convicted of bigamy.
Galang testified in court that she met Santiago as early as March and April 1997, and that
Santiago introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Santiago denied this and said she only
met Galang after she had already married Santos.
The RTC, however, convicted Santiago of bigamy, and said that Santiago’s marriage with Santos
did not need a marriage license as per Article 34 of the Family Code because they cohabited long
before their marriage.
Santiago appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) and contended that her conviction was
misplaced becaus the absence of a marriage license renders her marriage to Santos void. She
added that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage
license, because they did not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at
least five years. She alleged the records showed that she married Santos in 1997, or only four
years since she met him in 1993.
The CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.
ISSUE
1. WON Santiago’s conviction for bigamy will hold despite the fact that second marriage is
void ab initio
HELD
1. Yes, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and
misrepresented that they cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other.
We are faced with an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of

bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license
despite knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement; and (2) falsely
making claims in no less than her marriage contract.
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy,7 the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity.
After a careful perusal of the facts, it is clear that the second marriage was void because the
cohabitation of Santiago and Santos were less that the five-year requirement. Santiago and
Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do
not show that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family
Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that
they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the
solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the
marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code.
However, despite such flaw in the second marriage, we chastise this deceptive scheme that hides
what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our
penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.
The State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals "to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals)."

7
ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
In Montanez v. Cipriano (684 SCRA 315), this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:
• The offender has been legally married;
• The marriage has not been legally dissolved x x x;
• That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
• The second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage
and, in the same breadth, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a
mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has
consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded."
Consequently, it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal
act to escape criminal conviction.

Compiled Digests Feb 2015 To July 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Compiled Digests Feb 2015 To July 2015

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Compiled Digests Feb 2015 To July 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

PERSONS

FEBRUARY 2015 TO JULY 2015*

September 2, 2015

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous

Dissenting opinion; Justice Leonen

Spouses Arambulo filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicual

Her Petition for TPO includes:

1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;3

Carl, the son of the victim, testified that:

1. WON Carl’s testimony, filled with inconsistencies was not credible.

No, Carl’s testimony was credible.

The CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy.

We are faced with an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to be acquitted of

You might also like