Duality in LPP and GAME Theory Solution

Two persons zero sum games

Ex. 1. The pay-off matrix for Player I (i.e. the loss matrix of Player II is shown below). The pay-off matrix for
Player II (I.e. the loss matrix for Player I) will be negative values of the given one.

Player II
E1 E2 E3
D1 -2 -7 -7
Player I D2 0 2 6
D3 0 -2 0

What will be strategy for each player?

Ans: Step 1: Check for dominance. Rules of Dominance for the payoff matrix:
1. If all the elements of a row, say kth row, are less than or equal to the corresponding elements of any other row, say
rth row, then the kth row is said to be dominated by the rth row.
2. If all the elements of a column, say pth column, are greater than or equal to the corresponding elements of any other
column, say qth row, then the pth column is said to be dominated by the qth column.
3. Dominated rows i.e. kth row or columns i.e. pth column may be deleted to reduce the size of the payoff matrix, as
the optimal strategies will remain unaffected.

In this case, Player I realizes that his D2 strategy dominates strategies D1 and D3, in that his expected pay-off is higher
with D2 no matter what he does. So strategies D1 and D3 can be removed from further consideration.

Player II
E1 E2 E3

Player I D2 0 2 6

Similarly, strategies E2 and E3 of Player II should be removed from further consideration.

Step 2: Find the Lower and Upper values of the game:

Player II will clearly choose strategy E1, as his lose will be lowest for the strategy. The pair of pure strategies {D2, E1]
is the solution of the game. The value of the game is 0, the pay-off when Player I chooses strategy D2 and Player II
chooses E1. The pair of pure strategies {D2, E1] determines a SADDLE POINT of the pay-off matrix. A strategy pair
whose pay-off matrix entry is a saddle point is called an equilibrium strategy pair.
Comment:
Player II Row minimum value
E1 E2 E3
D1 -2 -7 -7 -7
Player I D2 0 2 6 0
D3 0 -2 0 -2
MAXIMIN for Player I i.e. maximum of the row
minimums = G1 = Lower value of the game = 0
MINIMAX for Player II i.e. minimum of the column
Column maximum values 0 2 6 
maximums = G2 = Upper value of the game = 0

When G1 = G2, we have a saddle point and an equilibrium strategy pair.

But when G1 and G2 are not the same i.e. are not equal, there is no saddle point and we have a mixed set of strategies for
both players.

1
Ex. 2. The pay-off matrix for Player I (i.e. the loss matrix of Player II is shown below). The pay-off matrix for
Player II (I.e. the loss matrix for Player I) will be negative values of the given one.

Player II
N1 N2 N3 N4
M1 4 3 1 3
Player I
M2 0 5 2 1

What will be strategy for each player?

Ans: For (2 x n) or (m x 2) two person zero-sum game we can find the solution by graphical means.
Step 1: Check for dominance. Reduce the size of the pay-off matrix, if possible. In this case, we skip this step for
elaboration of the graphical method, although column N2 could have been removed from further consideration.

Step 2: Find the Lower and Upper values of the game:

Player II Row minimum values

N1 N2 N3 N4
M1 4 3 1 3 1
Player I
M2 0 5 2 1 0
MAXIMIN for Player I i.e. maximum of the row
minimums = G1 = Lower value of the game = 1
MINIMAX for Player II i.e. minimum of the
Column maximum values 4 5 2 3  column maximums = G2 = Upper value of the game
=2

Step 3: Check for existence of saddle point or mixed strategies for the players:
As G1 and G2 are not the same, no saddle point exists for this problem. Hence we must resort to mixed strategies
for a solution.
Step 4: Finding mixed strategies by graphical method.
A. Optimal Strategy of Player I:
If player I plays strategy M1 with probability k and strategy M2 with probability (1 – k), his expected pay-offs, R,
against each of Player II’s strategy are:

Player II’s Strategy Player I’s expected Pay-off

N1 4 x k + 0 x (1 – k) = 4 x k = R1
N2 3 x k + 5 x (1 – k) = (5 – 2 x k) = R2
N3 1 x k + 2 x (1 – k) = (2 – k) = R3
N4 3 x k + 1 x (1 – k ) = ( 1 + 2 x k) = R4

The Fig.1 graph plots the Player I’s expected Pay-offs R1, R2, R3 and R4 against probability k. If Player I plays a mixed
strategy of (0.4, 0.6), he can expect at least a return of 1.60 any strategy or combination of strategy that Player II
chooses to play. This point, as shown in Fig.1, occurs at the intersection of the straight line indicated by R1 and R3.

B. Optimal Strategy of Player II: Since Player I’s mixed strategy is (0.4, 0.6) assures him of an expected gain of
1,60, Player II wants a mixed strategy that will limit his expected loss to 1.60 units. Moreover, Player II can restrict
his choice of strategies to N1 and N3, because Fig. 1 shows that strategies N2 and N4 expose him to losses greater
than 1.60. Now, if Player II plays strategy N1 with probability h and strategy N3 with probability (1- h), his
expected losses against Player I ‘s mixed strategies are:

Player I’s Strategy Player II’s expected Losses

M1 4 x h + 1 x (1 – k) = 1 + 5 x k = S1
M2 0 x k + 2 x (1 – k) = 2 x (1- k) = S2

2
Fig. 2 shows that if Player II sets h = 0.2 , his expected losses are L = 1.60. Since Player II can limit his losses
independently of player I’s choice of mixed strategy, Player II’s mixed strategy is (0.2, 0, 0.8,.0), which guarantees him
of an expected loss no greater than 1.60.
Fig. 1

Expected pay-off of Player I

6 R1

4 R4

2
R2
1.60

1
R3
0
Probability, k
k=0 k = 1.0
k = 0.4

3
 Fig. 2
Expected Loss of Player II
S2
0 Probability, h

-1

-1.60
-2

-3

-4

-5

-6 S1

-7

h=0 h = 1.0

h = 0.2

So, value of the game = 1.60. Mixed strategy of player = [0.4, 0.6]; Mixed strategy of player II = [0.2, 0, 0.8, 0]

Ex 3. Solve the following game.

Ans:

4
 Solution of Game Theory Problem by Simplex Method

Ex. 4. What will be strategy for each player for the game for which the pay-off matrix for Player I is given below?
Player II Row minimum values
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
A1 3 5 0 9 6 0
Player I A2 2 6 8 1 2 1
A3 1 7 4 9 3 1
MAXIMIN for Player I i.e. maximum of the row
minimums = G1 = Lower value of the game = 1
Column maximum MINIMAX for Player II i.e. minimum of the column
3 7 8 9 6 
values maximums = G2 = Upper value of the game = 3
Ans:
Step 1: Check for dominance. Reduce the size of the pay-off matrix, if possible.
Step 2: Find the Lower and Upper values of the game:
Step 3: Check for existence of saddle point or mixed strategies for the players: As G1 and G2 are not the same; no
saddle point exists for this problem. Hence we must resort to mixed strategies for a solution.
Step 4: Finding mixed strategies by means of Simplex Method:
Mixed Strategies: We denote mixed strategies of players A and B as S A = [x1, x2, x3,….. xm] and SB = [y1, y2, y3,….. yn],
respectively, where, (x1, x2, x3,….. xm) are the probabilities with which player A will use his strategies A1, A2,
A3…….AM. Similarly, (y1, y2, y3,….. yn) are the probabilities with which player B will use his strategies B1, B2, B3….
….BN.
Pay-off Matrix for Player A
B1/y1 B2/y2 B3/y3 ….. Bn/yn
A1/x1 a11 a12 a13 ….. a1n
A2/x2 a21 a22 a23 ….. a2n
A3/x3 a31 a32 a33 ….. a3n
….. ….. ….. …... …... …..
Am/xm am1 am2 am3 ….. amn

Obviously, x1 + x2 + x3+……………………..+ xm = 1
and, y1 + y2 + y3+……... + yn = 1

Optimal Mixed Strategy for Player A; S A*: Let X4 be the value of the game i.e. the expected pay-off of Player I.
Then
3 X1 + 2 X2 + 1 X3 >= X4
5 X1 + 6 X2 + 7 X3 >= X4
0 X1 + 8 X2 + 4 X3 >= X4
9 X1 + 1 X2 + 9 X3 >= X4
6 X1 + 2 X2 + 3 X3 >= X4
And, 1 X1 + 1 X2 + 1 X3 = 1

So we can form the PRIMAL LPP as,

Maximize, Z = 0 X1 + 0 X2 + 0 X3 + 1 X4
S.t.
3 X1 + 2 X2 + 1 X3 - 1 X4 >= 0
5 X1 + 6 X2 + 7 X3 - 1 X4 >= 0
0 X1 + 8 X2 + 4 X3 - 1 X4 >= 0
9 X1 + 1 X2 + 9 X3 - 1 X4 >= 0
6 X1 + 2 X2 + 3 X3 - 1 X4 >= 0
1 X1 + 1 X2 + 1 X3 + 0 X4 = 1
with X1, X2, X3, X4 >= 0

Optimal Mixed Strategy for Player B; S B*: In our case, say the value of the game i.e. the expected loss of Player II is
Y6. Then
3 Y1 + 5 Y2 + 0 Y3 + 9 Y4 + 6 Y5 <= 1 Y6
2 Y1 + 6 Y2 + 8 Y3 + 1 Y4 + 2 Y5 <= 1 Y6
1 Y1 + 5 Y2 + 4 Y3 + 9 Y4 + 3 Y5 <= 1 Y6
1 Y1 + 1 Y2 + 1 Y3 + 1 Y4 + 1 Y5 = 1
5
 The DUAL LPP can be formulated as;
Minimize, W = 0 Y1 + 0 Y2 + 0 Y3 + 0 Y4 + 0 Y5 + 1 Y6
Subject to
3 Y1 + 5 Y2 + 0 Y3 + 9 Y4 + 6 Y5 - 1 Y6 <= 0
2 Y1 + 6 Y2 + 8 Y3 + 1 Y4 + 2 Y5 - 1 Y6 <= 0
1 Y1 + 5 Y2 + 4 Y3 + 9 Y4 + 3 Y5 - 1 Y6 <= 0
1 Y1 + 1 Y2 + 1 Y3 + 1 Y4 + 1 Y5 + 0 Y6 = 1

Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5 and Y6 >= 0.

Solving the PRIMAL LPP by Simplex method:

6
Solution of the PRIMAL LPP

7
Solving the DUAL:LPP by Simplex method:

Solution of the DUAL LPP

Sa* = [0.6667, 0.3333, 0] = [2/3, 1/3, 0] and SB* = [0.8889, 0, 0.1111, 0, 0] = [8/9, 0, 1/9, 0; 0];
Value of the game = X4* = Y6* = 2.6667.

Comments: A matrix game can be described by its pay-off matrix to Player I, an (m x n) matrix, A = [a i,j], the set of X
of all probability distributions x on the integers {1,2,3,…..., m}, and the set Y of all probability distributions y on the
integers {1,2,3…,n}. If Player I selects a probability distribution x = Sa and Player II selects a probability distribution y =
Sb, the pay-off to Player I is P (x, y) while the pay-off to Player II is [-P (x, y)]. Where,

P(x, y) = SaT x A x Sb
8
 i.e. the expected pay-off = Product of row vector Sa and the pay-off matrix A and the column vector Sa.

In our case, using the optimum strategies Sa* and Sb*,

the value of the game = [2/3 1/3 0] x [ 3 5 0 9 6 x [8/9 = 2.6667.

2 6 8 1 2 0
1 5 4 9 3] 1/9
0
0]