G.R. No. 207264. June 25, 2013.
* assumed office; The term of office of a Member of the House of
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, respondents.
Election Law; House of Representative; House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; As held in
Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House of
Representatives.―As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
(1995), the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is
not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit: As to the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption
of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as
the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
Same; Same; To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites:(1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.―It is then clear that to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2)
a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Indeed, in some cases,
this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation
has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate
who had not only taken an oath of office, but who had also
assumed office.
_______________
* EN BANC.
523
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 523
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC);
Jurisdiction; The petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the
Commission on Elections retains jurisdiction.―Here, the petitioner
cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives
because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what
has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House
of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to comply with the second
requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken
before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is
not the oath of office which confers membership to the House of
Representatives. Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the
House of Representatives provides: Section 6. Oath or Affirmation
of Members.—Members shall take their oath or affirmation either
collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it
must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was
made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains
unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied
with. More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this
controversy — that before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the
issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was,
before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept
the argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days after
the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which
proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render
nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which affirmed a
decision of the COMELEC First Division.524
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Same; COMELEC Rules of Procedure; Under Section 2 of Rule I,
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be liberally construed in
order  to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission.”―It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not
bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure “shall be liberally construed in order x x x to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Commission.” In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition
to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are
summary in nature, then the “newly discovered evidence” was
properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; One may be heard,
not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times
more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings.―In administrative proceedings, procedural due process
only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be
heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC, 688 SCRA 552
(2013): The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by
verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many times more
creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings.
In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that
Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court merely requires that the
petition be sufficient in form and substance to justify an order from
the Court to act on the petition and to require the respondents to
file their comments.―Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
merely requires that the petition be sufficient in form and
substance to justify
525
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 525
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
an order from the Court to act on the petition and to require
the respondents to file their comments. The same rule also
provides that the Court may dismiss the petition outright (as the
majority did in the present case) if it was filed manifestly for delay
or if the questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant
further proceedings. In the present case, the petition is
indisputably sufficient in form and substance; no issue on this point
was even raised. Thus, the question before the Court ― if Rule 64,
Section 6 were to be followed ― is whether the issues raised by
Reyes were too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); Jurisdiction; View that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation and the party
questioning the qualifications of the winning candidate should now
present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo warranto)
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal who, by
constitutional mandate, has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving the election, returns and qualification of members
of the House of Representatives.―I submit on this point that
the proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests
relating to the winning candidate’s election, return and
qualifications. In other words, the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters
pending before it at the time of the proclamation and the party
questioning the qualifications of the winning candidate should now
present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo warranto)
before the HRET who, by constitutional mandate, has the sole
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving the election, returns
and qualification of members of the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; View that as far as the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is concerned, the
proclamation of the winner in the congressional elections serves as
the reckoning point as well as the trigger that brings any contests
relating to his or her election, return and qualifications within its
sole and exclusive jurisdiction.―It appears clear that as far as the
HRET is concerned, the proclamation of the winner in the
congressional elections serves as the reckoning point as well as
the trigger that brings any contests relating to his or her election,
return and qualifications within
526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
its sole and exclusive jurisdiction. In the context of the present
case, by holding that the COMELEC retained jurisdiction (because
Reyes, although a proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed office),
the majority effectively emasculates the HRET of its jurisdiction as
it allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for  quo
warranto only after the assumption to office by the candidate (i.e.,
on June 30 in the usual case). To illustrate using the dates of the
present case, any election protest or a petition for quo
warranto filed after June 30 or more than fifteen (15) days from
Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013, shall certainly be dismissed
outright by the HRET for having been filed out of time under the
HRET rules.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that as a
general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s
appreciation and evaluation of evidence.―As a general rule, the
Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions to this rule have been
established and consistently recognized, among others, when the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly
unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these
instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty
to intervene and correct the COMELEC’s error.
Election Law; Administrative Cases; Evidence; Substantial
Evidence; View that in administrative cases, the quantum of proof
required is substantial evidence.―It is also basic in the law of
evidence that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof required is
substantial evidence. In the present case, the majority obviously
believed, together with the COMELEC, that Tan did overcome this
burden and that his documentary evidence he submitted
established that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. A major clash
between the parties exists, of course, on this point as Reyes, as
expressed in her petition, is of the completely opposite view. Even
a quick look at Tan’s evidence, however, indicates that Reyes’ view
is not without its merits and should not simply be dismissively set
aside.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. 527
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 527
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
  H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., Joel Ruiz Butuyan and Roger R.
Rayel and Nelia S. Aureus and Michelle Anne S. Lapuz for
Regina Ongsiako Reyes.
  Herminio F. Valerio and Marcelino Michael I. Atanante
IV for Joseph Socorro B. Tan.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by
petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the Resolutions
dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No.
13-053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of
the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a
registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition
to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when
she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which
is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when
she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa,
Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional
Spouses of the House of Representatives;2 (3) that her date
of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 70.
2 Id.
528
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; 3 (4) that she is
not a permanent resident of another country when she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant 4 of the United States of
America;5 and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in
fact, an American citizen.6
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is
publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I.
Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and
binding marriage between them. According to petitioner,
although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was
solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain
formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code,
rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues
that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman
Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her. 8 As
to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July
1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a
permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of
America is not supported by evidence.10
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013,
respondent filed a “Manifestation with Motion to Admit
_______________
3  Id., at p. 71.
4  Respondent relies on the following facts: (a) [petitioner] was
admitted to the California State Bar on June 12, 1995; (b) [petitioner]
maintained a US address and earned her undergraduate studies in
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; (c) [petitioner] married an
American citizen named Saturnino S. Ador Dionisio in 1997, which
marriage was subsequently dissolved; and (d) [petitioner] acquired
properties and established businesses in the U.S.; COMELEC Resolution
dated 27 March 2013. Id., at p. 44.
5  Id., at p. 71.
6  Id., at p. 72.
7  Id., at p. 84.
8  Id., at p. 87.
9  Id., at p. 93.
10 Id., at p. 94.
529
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 529
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of
Exhibits”11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an
article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled
“Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes” with
an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document
executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a
database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that
petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S.
passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner,
issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and
Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which
indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various
travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution12 cancelling petitioner’s COC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is
hereby CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the
declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a
citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the
COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the one-
year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for the
position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 127-139.
12 Id., at pp. 40-51.
13 Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 14 on 8
April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and
using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised
that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her
marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she is a
naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however,
that such marriage only resulted into dual citizenship, thus
there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary
Public on 24 September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the
one-year residency requirement prescribed by the
Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a
naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin,
which is Boac, Marinduque.
 On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a
Resolution15 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate
of Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more
than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of
_______________
and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able
to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for
a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election.
14 Id., at pp. 140-157.
15 Id., at pp. 52-60.
16 Id., at pp. 163-165.
531
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 531
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining
its execution.17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office 18 before
Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which
officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following
issues:19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner
and who has already taken her oath of office for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque.
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged “newly-
discovered evidence” without the same having been testified
on and offered and admitted in evidence which became the
basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the
petitioner the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to
due process of law.
_______________
17 Section 13, Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to
Par. 2, Sec. 8 of Resolution No. 9523 provides that a decision or resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc in special actions and special cases shall become final and
executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a restraining order is issued by
the Supreme Court. Sec. 3, Rule 37, Part VII also provides that decisions in petitions
to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days from promulgation, unless restrained by
the Supreme Court.
18 Id., at p. 162.
19 Id., at p. 9.
532
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and
did not meet the residency requirement for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to
the qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a
non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not
confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this
Court, she is asserting that it is the HRET which has
jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her
eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House of
Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s
recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing its final and executory
judgment in SPA No. 13-053.
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and
consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The need to
do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En
Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was emphasized
that the term of office of the Members of the House of
Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.533
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 533
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed 20 because pursuant
to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET
has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications”
of the Members of the House of Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue
of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said
tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such
action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,  the HRET does not have
21
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the
House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the
_______________
20 Id.
21 318 Phil. 329, 397; 248 SCRA 300, 340-341 (1995).
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious
that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the
question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a
Member of the House of Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC  and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court ruled that:
23
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case
of Limkaichong v. COMELEC,25 wherein the Court, referring to
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption
of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the
_______________
22 G.R. No. 172131, 2 April 2007, 520 SCRA 166, 179.
23 G.R. No. 163756, 26 January 2005, 449 SCRA 400, 404-405.
24 391 Phil. 344, 352; 336 SCRA 458, 466-467 (2000).
25 G.R. Nos. 179240-41, 1 April 2009, 583 SCRA 1, 33.
26 G.R. No. 192856, 8 March 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 798-799.
535
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 535
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
matter of his qualifications, as well as questions regarding
the conduct of election and contested returns—were
 transferred to the HRET as the constitutional body created to
pass upon the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the
pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed
candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who
had also assumed office.
For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the
COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed,
taken his oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and
assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September
2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his
comment in which he brought to Our attention that on
September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status
quo ante order of the Court, he had already
been proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member
of the House of Representatives of the First Congressional
District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he
had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de
Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.
_______________
27 G.R. No. 179285, 11 February 2008, 544 SCRA 381, 390.
536
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has
already been transferred to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the
questioned candidate had already assumed office, and
hence, was already considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, unlike in the present case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the
term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives
begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.”28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement,
petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken before
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is
not the oath of office which confers membership to the
House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House
of Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members.—Members
shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or
individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of
the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here,
although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there
is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open
session
_______________
28 Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
537
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 537
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
office was indeed complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this
controversy — that before the proclamation of petitioner on
18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino citizenship
and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14
May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any
pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run for the
position of Member of the House of Representative. We will
inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of
the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction
when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the
COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which
proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to
render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which
affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division which was promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the
assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was
promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final and executory on
19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure which provides:
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days.—Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to
or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance
candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become final and executory after the
lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013
from becoming final and executory, petitioner should have
availed
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
herself of Section 1, Rule 37  of the COMELEC Rules of
29
Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by filing a
petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she
failed to do so. She would file the present last hour petition
on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent
COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her
Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in
Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed no
grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of “newly-discovered
evidence” without the same having been testified on and
offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission
of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation
of her right to due process of law because she was not given
the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to
strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be liberally construed in
order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determina-
_______________
29 Section 1. Petition for Certiorari; and Time to File.―Unless
otherwise provided by law, or by any specific provisions in these Rules, any
decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days
from its promulgation.
30 Section 2. Mode of review.―A judgment or final order or resolution
of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be
brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under
Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
539
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 539
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
tion and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission.” In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the
“newly discovered evidence” was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the
case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012
when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the
First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period
of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did
not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due
process only requires that the party be given the opportunity
or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC:31
 The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation
of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion
for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office
on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division,
discoursed as follows:
“x x x  for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship
and become eligible for public office, the law re-
_______________
31 G.R. No. 201796, 15 January 2013, 688 SCRA 552.
540
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
quires that she must have accomplished the following acts:
(1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of
proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it
is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent
resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered
evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of
an American passport which she continues to use until June
30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations.
The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial
evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly
failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA
9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen,
and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship, she remains to be an American
citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines.  (Emphasis
32
supplied.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In
moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that
_______________
32 Rollo, pp. 47-48.
541
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 541
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is
that of a “balikbayan.” At this point, the burden of proof
shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has reacquired such status in accordance
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however,
petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention.
Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of
R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of
a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual
Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to her. 33 Still, attached to the said motion
is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24
September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached said
Affidavit “if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the
people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity.” 35 We
cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If
petitioner executed said Affidavit “if only to comply with the
rules,” then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to
her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address
the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions
were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a
footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to
this effect: “This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior
to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator,
take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in
the
_______________
33 Id., at p. 148.
34 Id., at p. 154.
35 Id., at p. 149.
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of
office is in order to make reference to what is already part of
the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid
injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC.”  This statement raises a lot of questions — Did
36
petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not
present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC?
And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-
born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as
required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she
took her oath of allegiance in connection with her
appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she
is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being
presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of
allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of
R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine
Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular
No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No.
91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
Thus, petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator
cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance
with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt
was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner,
however, failed to clear such doubt.
_______________
36 Id., at p. 26.
543
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 543
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding
that petitioner has lost her natural-born status, we quote with
approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that
petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
“Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon
re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and
the period of his residency shall be counted from the
time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that
[petitioner] had already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained
her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that
[petitioner] had renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA.
The only proof presented by [petitioner] to show that she
has met the one-year residency requirement of the law and
never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque
is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such
fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year
residency. For, [petitioner] has never regained her
domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an
American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said
locality can substitute the fact that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA.”  (Emphasis supplied.)
37
 All in all, considering that the petition for denial and 39 G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.
cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the COMELEC 545
is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 545
evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining of
_______________ Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
37 Id., at pp. 49-50. Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of
the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A. No. 9225,
544
insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED House of Representatives other than those enumerated in
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same
whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held meritless.
in Mastura v. COMELEC:38 The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will candidates for the House of Representatives who have
not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support
qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
of such findings should be applied with greater force when it
concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born
intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year residency
made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by
has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if
by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It
not strictly bound by the rules of evidence. simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition
Time and again, We emphasize that the “grave abuse of
is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
discretion” which warrants this Court’s exercise
part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013
of certiorari jurisdiction has a well-defined meaning.
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March
Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.
Elections  where the Court held:
39

x x x A petition for  certiorari will prosper only if SO ORDERED.

grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to Sereno (CJ.), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
exist. “Grave abuse of discretion,” under Rule 65, has a Abad and Reyes, JJ., concur.
specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of Carpio, Villarama, Jr. and Leonen, JJ., We join the dissent
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the of J. Brion.
whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that Velasco, Jr. and Mendoza, JJ., No part.
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty Brion, J., See Dissent.
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For Peralta, J., On Official Leave.
an act to be struck down as having been done with Perlas-Bernabe, J., No part due to Voluntary Inhibition.
grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.) 546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately
and substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists. Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
_______________
38 G.R. No. 124521, 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499. DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The petition before us is a petition for certiorari1 with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction and/or status quo ante order, that seeks to annul:
(1) the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
March 27, 20132 and May 14, 20133 COMELEC Resolutions
cancelling petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes’
(petitioner or Reyes) Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative in the lone district of Marinduque,
and (2) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality 4 declaring the
May 14, 2013 Resolution final and executory in SPA Case No.
13-053(DC).
I. THE CASE AND THE DISSENT IN CONTEXT
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to express my strong
reservations to the majority’s outright dismissal of this
most unusual case — a term I do not use lightly as shown by
the reasons stated below.
I clarify at the outset that the present case is at
its inception stage; it is a newly filed petition that the
Court is acting upon for the first time and which the
majority opted to DISMISS OUTRIGHT after an initial
review, based solely on the petition and its annexes and its
“finding [that there was] no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Commission on Elections.”
Subsequent to the COMELEC’s rulings,
however, intervening events occurred that might have
materially affected the jurisdictional situation and the
procedural requirements in handling and resolving the case.
The petitioner
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-37.
2 Id., at pp. 40-51.
3 Id., at pp. 52-55.
4 Id., at pp. 163-165.
547
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 547
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
was proclaimed as the winner by the Marinduque Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC), and she subsequently took her
oath of office.
This Dissent is filed, not on the basis of the intrinsic merits
of the case, but because of the outright and reckless denial
of the minority’s plea that the respondents be required to at
least COMMENT on the petition in light of the gravity of
the issues raised, the potential effect on jurisprudence,
and the affected personal relationships within and outside
the Court, before any further action can be made. The
presented issues refer to —
-  the Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition, which jurisdiction should now lie
with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET), and
-  the grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in
handling the case that led to the assailed COMELEC
decision.
Viewed in these lights, it should be appreciated that the
Court in effect did not rule on the merits of the case
after considering the parties’ legal and factual
positions. The majority’s Resolution is in fact only a ruling
that the Court no longer wishes to review the COMELEC’s
rulings despite the issues raised and the attendant
intervening circumstances.
Despite its seemingly simple approach, the Court’s
outright dismissal of the petition is replete with profound
effects on the petitioner on the indirect beneficiary of the
ruling, and on jurisprudence, as it effectively upholds the
disqualification of petitioner and leaves the remaining
candidate in Marinduque as an unopposed candidate. 5 What
is not easily seen by the lay observer is that by immediately
ruling and avoiding the
_______________
5 Congressman Lord Allan Jay Velasco, son of incumbent Supreme
Court Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
jurisdiction of the HRET on the matter of qualification,
the majority avoids a quo warranto petition that, if
successful, would render petitioner Reyes disqualified,
leaving the congressional position in Marinduque’s lone
district vacant.
 Significantly, the Dissent is not a lonely one made solely
by the undersigned; he is joined by three (3) other
Justices.6 Seven (7) Justices7 formed the majority with three
(3) Justices inhibiting for personal reasons, 8 with one (1)
Justice absent.9
II. SUMMARY OF THE DISSENT’S
SUPPORTINGPOSITIONS
That this unusual case at least deserves further
proceedings from this Court other than the OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL the majority ordered, is supported by the
following considerations:
First, the questions raised in the petition are NOT
too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
a. Under Section 6, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the
Court may dismiss the petition if it was
filed manifestly for delay, or the questions raised
are too unsubstantial to warrant further
proceedings. In the present case, the majority
dismissed the petition outright despite the threshold
issue of jurisdiction that Reyes squarely raised.
b. The due process issues Reyes raised with respect to
the COMELEC proceedings cannot be taken lightly,
_______________
6 Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Marvic Mario
Victor F. Leonen.
7 Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno; and Justices Teresita J.
Leonardo-de Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. del Castillo, Roberto A.
Abad, Jose Portugal Perez, and Bienvenido L. Reyes.
8 Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Jose Catral Mendoza and Estela M.
Perlas-Bernabe.
9 Justice Diosdado M. Peralta.
549
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 549
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
in particular, the COMELEC’s failure to accord her the
opportunity to question the nature and authenticity of
the evidence submitted by the respondent Joseph Tan
(Tan) as well as controverting evidence the petition
cited. In fact, no less than COMELEC Chairman Sixto
Brillantes Jr., echoed this concern in his Dissenting
Opinion from the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc.
c. A third issue raised relates to the COMELEC’s
imposition of a qualification for the position of
congressman, other than those mentioned in the
Constitution. The Court’s Resolution glossed over this
issue and did not touch it at all. For this reason, this
Dissent will similarly refrain from discussing the issue,
except to state that the issue raised touches on the
Constitution and should have at least merited a passing
mention by the Court in its immediate and outright
dismissal of the petition.
Second, unless the case is clearly and patently
shown to be without basis and out of our sense
of delicadeza (which we should have), the Court
should at least hear and consider both sides before
making a ruling that would favor the son of a Member
of the Court.
To reiterate, the COMELEC en banc ruling cancelling
Reyes’ CoC means that: (1) Reyes’ CoC is void ab initio; (2)
that she was never a valid candidate at all; and (3) all the
votes in her favor are stray votes. Consequently, the
remaining candidate would be declared the winner, as held
in Aratea v. Commission on Elections10 Jalosjos, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections11 and Maquiling v. Commission on
Elections.12
_______________
10 G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 105.
11 G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 1.
12 G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420.
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Third, the majority’s holding that the jurisdiction of the
HRET only begins after the candidate has assumed the office
on June 30 is contrary to prevailing jurisprudence; in fact, it
is a major retrogressive jurisprudential
development that can emasculate the HRET. In making this
kind of ruling, the Court should have at least undertaken a
full-blown proceeding rather than simply declare
the immediate and outright dismissal of the petition.
 Note in this regard that the majority’s jurisprudential
ruling —
a. is contrary to the HRET rules.
b. effectively allows the filing of any election protest or a
petition for quo warranto only after the assumption to
office by the candidate on June 30 at the earliest. In the
context of the present case, any election protest protest
or petition for quo warranto filed on or after June 30
would be declared patently out of time since the filing
would be more than fifteen (15) days from Reyes’
proclamation on May 18, 2013.
c. would affect all future proclamations since they cannot
be earlier than 15 days counted from the June 30
constitutional cut-off for the assumption to office of the
newly elected officials.
III. THE ASSAILED COMELEC PETITION
A. The Petition Before the COMELEC
The present petition before this Court and its attachments
show that on October 1, 2012, Reyes filed her CoC for the
position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.
On October 10, 2012, Tan filed with the COMELEC a petition
to deny due course or to cancel Reyes’ CoC. Tan alleged that
Reyes committed material misrepresentations in her CoC,
specifically: (1) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac
551
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 551
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Marinduque when in truth she is a resident of 135 J.P.
Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa Quezon City or Bauan Batangas
following the residence of her husband; (2) that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen; (3) that she is not a permanent
resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country; (4) that her
date of birth is July 3, 1964, when in truth it is July 3, 1958;
(5) that her civil status is single; and (6) that she is eligible
for the office she seeks to be elected to.
B. The COMELEC Proceedings
In her Answer, Reyes averred that while she is publicly
known to be the wife of Rep. Hermilando Mandanas of Bauan,
Batangas, the truth of the matter is that they are not legally
married; thus, Mandanas’ residence cannot be attributed to
her. She also countered that the evidence presented by Tan
does not support the allegation that she is a permanent
resident or a citizen of the United States. With respect to her
birth date, her birth certificate issued by the NSO showed
that it was on July 3, 1964. At any rate, Reyes contended that
the representations as to her civil status and date of birth are
not material so as to warrant the cancellation of her CoC.
On February 8, 2013, Tan filed a Manifestation with Motion
to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of
Exhibits consisting of, among others, a copy of an article
published online on January 8, 2013 entitled “Seeking and
Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes.” This article
provided a database record from the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) indicating that Reyes is an American
citizen and a holder of a US passport that she has been using
since 2005. Tan also submitted a photocopy of a Certification
of Travel Records from the BID, which showed that Reyes
holds a US passport No. 306278853. Based on these pieces
of evidence and the fact that Reyes failed to take an Oath of
Allegiance and execute an Affidavit of Renunciation of her
American citizenship pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (RA
9225), Tan argued that Reyes’ was ineligible to run for the
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
position of Representative and thus, her CoC should be
cancelled.
C. The COMELEC First Division Ruling
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution granting the petition and cancelling Reyes’ CoC.
On the alleged misrepresentations in Reyes’ CoC with
respect to her civil status and birth date, the COMELEC First
Division held that these are not material representations that
could affect her qualifications or eligibility, thus cancellation
of CoC on these grounds is not warranted.
The COMELEC First Division, however, found that Reyes
committed false material representation with respect to her
citizenship and residency. Based on the newly discovered
evidence submitted by Tan, the COMELEC First
Division found that Reyes was a holder of a US
passport, which she continued to use until June 30,
2012; she also failed to establish that she had applied for
repatriation under RA 9225 by taking the required Oath of
Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of her
American Citizenship. Based on these findings, the COMELEC
First Division ruled the Reyes remains to be an American
citizen, and thus, is ineligible to run and hold any elective
office.
On the issue of her residency in Brgy. Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque, the COMELEC First Division found that Reyes did
not regain her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque after
she lost it when she became a naturalized US citizen;
that Reyes had not shown that she had re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, there being no proof that
she had renounced her US citizenship; thus, she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in America. Citing Japzon
v. Commission on Elections,13 the COMELEC First Division held
that a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively
_______________
13 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
553
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 553
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of
Filipino citizenship, he must still show that he chose to
establish his domicile in the Philippines by positive acts and
the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he
made it his domicile of choice.
Finally, the COMELEC First Division disregarded Reyes’
proof that she met the one-year residency requirement when
she served as Provincial Administrator of the province of
Marinduque from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011 as it is
not sufficient to satisfy the one-year residency requirement.
On April 8, 2013, Reyes filed her motion for
reconsideration. Attached to the motion were an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated September 21,
2012 and a Voter Certification in Boac, Marinduque dated
April 17, 2012. In her Motion, Reyes admitted that she was
married to an American citizen named Saturnino S. Ador
Dionisio in 1997 and thus, she acquired dual citizenship
through marriage to an American citizen.
D. The COMELEC en banc Ruling
On May 14, 2013, the COMELEC en banc promulgated its
Resolution denying Reyes’ motion for reconsideration and
affirming the ruling of the COMELEC First Division on the
ground that the former’s motion was a mere rehash of the
arguments she raised against the First Division ruling.
D-a. Commissioner Lim’s Concurring Opinion
Commissioner Lim concurred in the result and held that
Reyes failed to comply with twin requirements of RA 9225;
she belatedly filed her Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship but failed to submit an Oath of Allegiance. She
also failed to prove that she complied with the one-year
residency requirement for lack of evidence of any overt or
positive act that she had established and maintained her
residency in Boac, Marinduque.554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
D-b. Chairman Brillantes’ Dissenting Opinion
Chairman Brillantes dissented from the majority and held
that Tan failed to offer substantial evidence to prove that
Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship. He noted that the internet
article by a certain Eli Obligacion showing that Reyes used a
US passport on June 30, 2012 is hearsay while the purported
copy of the BID certification is merely a photocopy and not
even a certified true copy of the original, thus similarly
inadmissible as evidence. Chairman Brillantes also
emphasized that a petition to deny due course under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) cannot be a pre-
election substitute for a quo warranto proceeding. Under
prevailing laws, there remains to be no pre-election legal
remedy to question the eligibility or lack of qualification of a
candidate. Chairman Brillantes was of the view that a
petition to deny due course tackles exclusively the issue of
deliberate misrepresentation over a qualification, and not the
lack of qualification per se which is the proper subject of
a quo warranto proceeding.
Finally, he opined that the issues pertaining to Reyes’
residence and citizenship requires exhaustive presentation
and examination of evidence that are best addressed in a full
blown quo warranto proceeding rather than the summary
proceedings in the present case.
 IV. EVENTS SUBSEQUENT TO THE COMELEC
DECISION
A. On May 18, 2013, the Marinduque PBOC proclaimed
Reyes as the duly elected member of the House of
Representatives for Marinduque, having garnered the highest
number of votes in the total of 52, 209 votes.
B. On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued
a Certificate of Finality declaring its May 14, 2013
Resolution final and executory citing paragraph b, Section
13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in relation to
paragraph 2,
555
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 555
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Section 8, of Resolution No. 9523 which provides that a
decision or resolution of the Commission en banc in
Special Actions and Special Cases shall become final and
executory five (5) days after its promulgation unless a
restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.
C. On June 7, 2013, Reyes took her oath of office before
House Speaker Rep. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr.
V. THE PETITION BEFORE THIS COURT
A. Positions and Arguments
In support of her petition before this Court, Reyes submits
the following positions and arguments:
(1) COMELEC has been ousted of jurisdiction when she
was duly proclaimed the winner for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque;
(2) COMELEC violated her right to due process when it
took cognizance of the documents submitted by Tan
that were not testified to, offered and admitted in
evidence without giving her the opportunity to question
the authenticity of these documents as well as present
controverting evidence;
(3) COMELEC gravely erred when it declared that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the
one year residency requirement despite the finding that
he assumed and held office as provincial administrator;
(4) COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in enforcing
the provision of RA 9225 insofar as it adds to the
qualifications of Members of the House
Representatives other than those enumerated in the
Constitution.556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
B. The Issues Raised
As presented to this Court, the petition raised the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not the COMELEC is ousted of jurisdiction
over the petition who is a duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position
of Member, House of Representatives?
(2) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of Tan’s newly
discovered evidence without having been testified to,
as well as offered and admitted in evidence, in violation
of Reyes’ right to due process?
(3) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it declared that Reyes is not a Filipino
citizen and did not meet the one-year residency
requirement for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives?
(4) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when, by enforcing RA 9225, it imposed
additional qualifications to the qualifications of a
Member of the House of Representatives under Section
6, Art. VI of the Constitution?
How the public respondent COMELEC views the issues
presented, particularly the question of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion are presently unknown elements in these
proceedings as the COMELEC has not been heard on the
case. To be sure, it should have a say, as a named
respondent, especially on the matter of jurisdiction.
VI. THE MAJORITY RULING
On the issue of the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction557
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 557
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Without the benefit of full blown arguments by the parties,
the majority ruling ruled on the merits of the jurisdictional
issue and held that the COMELEC has jurisdiction for the
following reasons:
of
 First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue
of Reyes’ qualifications and the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions unless a petition is filed with the tribunal.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. A candidate is considered a Member of the
House of Representatives with the concurrence of three
requisites: (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath; and (c)
assumption of office.
It went on to state that Reyes cannot be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives because she had
not yet assumed office; she can only do so on June 30, 2013.
It pointed out, too, that before Reyes’ proclamation on May
18, 2013, the COMELEC en banc had already finally disposed
of the issue of Reyes US citizenship and lack of residency;
thus, there was no longer any pending case at that time. In
these lights, it held that COMELEC continued to have
jurisdiction.
On the issue of admissibility of the
evidence presented and due process
The majority emphasized that the COMELEC is not strictly
bound to adhere to the technical rules of evidence. Since the
proceedings to deny due course or to cancel a CoC are
summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was
properly admitted by the COMELEC. Also, there was no denial
of due process since Reyes was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC.
On the issue of citizenship
Again ruling on the merits, the majority upheld the
COMELEC’s finding that based on the Tan’s newly discovered
evi-
557
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 557
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
dence, Reyes is an American citizen and thus is ineligible to
run and hold any elective office. The majority likewise held
that the burden of proof had been shifted to Reyes to prove
that: (1) she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that (2) she
re-acquired such status by properly complying with the
requirements of RA 9225, and that Reyes had failed to
substantiate that she is a natural born Filipino citizen and
complied with the requirements of RA 9925. It emphasized
that Reyes inexplicably failed to submit an Oath of Allegiance
despite belatedly filing an Oath of Renunciation and that her
oath that she took in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator does not suffice to satisfy the
requirements of RA 9225.
On the issue of residency
The majority similarly affirmed the COMELEC’s ruling that
Reyes had not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
United States and thus did not satisfy the one-year Philippine
residency requirement. It held that Reyes effectively
abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque when
she became a naturalized US citizen. In the absence of proof
that she had renounced her American citizenship, she cannot
be considered to have abandoned her domicile of choice in
the US. The majority also noted that Reyes’ service as
Provincial Administrator from January 18, 2011 to July 13,
2011 is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency in
Boac, Marinduque.
VII. COMMENTS ON THE MAJORITY’S RULING
The majority’s unusual approach and strained rulings that
already touched on the merits of substantial issues raised
should, at the very least, not be allowed to stand without
comments. I call these “comments” as a “refutation” implies
a consideration on the merits of properly submitted and
debated issues, which did not happen in this case. 559
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 559
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
A. No basis exists to DISMISS the petition outright.
Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court 14 merely requires
that the petition be sufficient in form and substance to justify
an order from the Court to act on the petition and to require
the respondents to file their comments. The same rule also
provides that the Court may dismiss the petition outright (as
the majority did in the present case) if it was filed
manifestly for delay or if the questions raised are too
unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings.
In the present case, the petition is indisputably sufficient
in form and substance; no issue on this point was even
raised. Thus, the question before the Court ― if Rule 64,
Section 6 were to be followed ― is whether the issues raised
by Reyes were too unsubstantial to warrant further
proceedings.
I submit that the issues raised cannot be unsubstantial as
they involve crucial issues of jurisdiction and due pro-
cess.
The due process issue, of course, pertained to the assailed
COMELEC ruling that admittedly can be evaluated based on
the records. The matter of evaluation, however, is not simply
a matter of doing it; it is the very problem that I raise
because it must be a meaningful one that fully appreciates
the parties’ positions, particularly in a situation where the
petition raised arguments that are not without their
merits. In this situation, the Court cannot simply go
through the motions of evaluation and then simply
strike out the petitioner’s positions. The Court’s role as
adjudicator and the
_______________
14 Section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 6. Order to comment.―If the Supreme Court finds the
petition sufficient in form and substance, it shall order the respondents to
file their comments on the petition within ten (10) days from notice
thereof; otherwise, the Court may dismiss the petition outright. The Court
may also dismiss the petition if it was filed manifestly for delay or the
questions raised are too unsubstantial to warrant further proceedings. (n)
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
demands of basic fairness require that we should fully hear
the parties and rule based on our appreciation of the merits
of their positions in light of what the law and established
jurisprudence require.
a. The Due Process Component
The determination of the merits of the petitioner’s claim
point us, at the very least, to the need to consider whether
evidence attributed to a person who is not before the Court
and whose statement cannot be confirmed for the
genuineness, accuracy and truth of the basic fact sought to
be established in the case, should be taken as “truth.” Even
casting technical rules of evidence aside, common sense and
the minimum sense of fairness dictate that an article in the
internet cannot simply be taken to be evidence of the truth
of what it says, nor can photocopies of documents not shown
to be genuine be taken as proof of the “truth.” To accept
these materials as statements of “truth” is to be partisan and
to deny the petitioner her right to both procedural and
substantive due process. Again, at the very least, further
inquiry should have been made before there was the
judgment.
Some, to be sure, may label the denial of further inquiry to
lack of prudence; others, not so charitably minded, may
however refer to this as partisanship.
b. The Jurisdictional Component.
The jurisdictional component of the petition is interesting
because it involved matters that were not covered by
the assailed COMELEC rulings for the simple reason
that they were intervening events that transpired outside
(although related with) the assailed rulings. In fact, they
involved questions of fact and law separate from those of the
assailed COMELEC rulings. Yet, the majority, in its rush to
judgment, lumped them together with the assailed rulings
under the dismissive phrase “did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion” in the dispositive portion of its ruling.
Such was
561
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 561
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
the haste the majority exhibited in the desire to pronounce
swift and dismissive judgment. I can only surmise that the
majority might have considered the jurisdictional
issues raised “too insubstantial to warrant further
proceedings.”
Is this still lack of prudence?
Reyes’ proclamation divested the
COMELEC of jurisdiction over her
qualifications in favor of the HRET
The profound effect of the majority’s ruling on HRET
jurisdiction and on jurisprudence render comments on this
point obligatory, if only to show that the matter is not
insubstantial and should further be explored by the Court.
The majority held that the COMELEC still has jurisdiction
because the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over
the issue of the petitioner’s qualifications, as well as
over the assailed resolutions unless a petition is duly
filed. The ponencia emphasizes that Reyes has not averred
that she has filed such action.
This line of thought is, to say the least, confusing,
particularly on the point of why Reyes who has garnered the
majority of the votes cast in Marinduque, who has been
proclaimed pursuant to this electoral mandate, and who has
since taken her oath of office, would file a petition, either of
protest or quo warranto, before the HRET. Why she would file
a petition for certiorari before this Court may be easier to
understand ― the COMELEC, despite her proclamation and
oath, has issued an order mandating her disqualification
executory; she may merely want to halt the enforcement of
this COMELEC order with the claim that the arena for her
election and qualification has shifted now to the HRET and is
no longer with the COMELEC.
In any case, to stick to election law basics, the matter of
jurisdiction between the COMELEC and the HRET has always
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
constituted a dichotomy; the relationship between the
COMELEC and the HRET in terms of jurisdiction is not an
appellate one but is mutually exclusive.
This mutually exclusive jurisdictional relationship is, as a
rule, sequential. This means that the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
ends when the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. Thus, there is no
point in time, when a vacuum in jurisdiction would exist
involving congressional candidates. This jurisdiction, of
course, refers to jurisdiction over the subject matter,
which no less than the Philippine Constitution governs. Under
Section 17, Article VI, the subject matter of HRET’s
jurisdiction is the “election, returns, and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives.”
Where one jurisdiction ends and the other begins, is a
matter that jurisprudence appears to have settled, but is
nevertheless an issue that the Court should perhaps continue
to examine and re-examine because of the permutation of
possible obtaining situations ― which, to my mind, translates
to the existence of a critical issue that should be ventilated
before this Court if it is to make any definitive ruling on any
given situation.
I submit on this point that the proclamation of the
winning candidate is the operative fact that triggers the
jurisdiction of the HRET over election contests relating to the
winning candidate’s election, return and qualifications. In
other words, the proclamation of a winning candidate divests
the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before
it at the time of the proclamation and the party questioning
the qualifications of the winning candidate should now
present his or her case in a proper proceeding (i.e. quo
warranto) before the HRET who, by constitutional mandate,
has the sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
the election, returns and qualification of members of the
House of Representatives.
The Court has interestingly rendered various rulings on
the points which all point to the statement above. In Lim
563
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 563
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
kaichong v. Comelec,15 the Court pointedly held that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation.16
The Court speaking through no less than Associate
Justice Roberto A. Abad in the recent case of Jalosjos, Jr. v
_______________
15 G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 179120, 179132-33 & 179240-41, April 1,
2009, 583 SCRA 1.
16 Id., “We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a
winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The
party questioning his qualification should now present his case in
a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally
mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member
of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.”
x x x x
 “Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office
in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
assail one’s eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is
to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a 565
petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HRET VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 565
Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections we ruled that where the
candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Thus, the Court should now fully hear this matter, instead
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.” of dismissively ruling on a new petition where the respondent
side has not been fully heard.
564
The ponencia’s holding on the
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
COMELEC’s jurisdiction vis-à-vis
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections the HRET is inconsistent with the
Commission on Elections17 held that the settled rule is that HRET Rules
“the proclamation of a congressional candidate The view that the proclamation of the winning candidate is
following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction the operative fact that triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET is
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and also supported by the HRET Rules. They state:
qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in RULE 14. Jurisdiction.―The Tribunal is the sole judge of all
favor of the HRET.”18 contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Based on these considerations, it appears clear that any the Members of the House of Representatives.
ruling from this Court ― as the majority ruled ― that the RULE 15. How Initiated.―An election contest is initiated by
COMELEC retains jurisdiction over disputes relating to the the filing of a verified petition of protest or a verified petition
election, returns and qualifications of the proclaimed for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
representative who has been proclaimed but not yet Representatives. An election protest shall not include a
petition for quo warranto. Neither shall a petition for quo
assumed office is a major retrogressive jurisprudential
warranto include an election protest.
development, in fact, a complete turnaround from the Court’s RULE 16. Election Protest.―A verified petition
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter; such rule ― if it contesting the election or returns of any Member of
becomes established ― can very well emasculate the the House of Representatives shall be filed by any
HRET. candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
_______________ has been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15)
17 G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, 193566, June 26, 2012, 674 SCRA 530. days after the proclamation of the winner. The party
18 Id., “While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant while
decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without
limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns,
the adverse party shall be known as the protestee. x x x
and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the RULE 17. Quo Warranto.―A verified petition for quo
Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon warranto contesting the election of a Member of the
the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or
Representatives. of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by
 The Court has already settled the question of when the any registered voter of the district concerned within fifteen
jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET (15) days from the date of
begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following 566
the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed 566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Representative in favor of the HRET.
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed
 the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the How these instruments will co-exist and be given weight in
petition shall be designated as the petitioner while the relation with one another is a matter that, at this point and in
adverse party shall be known as the respondent[.] the absence of research, deliberation, debate and discussion
Based on the above Rules, it appears clear that as far as may not be easily be made. The Court, to be sure, would
the HRET is concerned, the proclamation of the winner in want to hear the HRET, the COMELEC and the Office of
the congressional elections serves as the reckoning the Solicitor General, on this point. Of course, this
point as well as the trigger that brings any contests relating hearing and debate will not take place under the
to his or her election, return and qualifications within its sole hasty dismissive action the majority made.
and exclusive jurisdiction. Did the COMELEC gravely abuse
In the context of the present case, by holding that the its discretion in the appreciation
COMELEC retained jurisdiction (because Reyes, although a and evaluation of the evidence
proclaimed winner, has not yet assumed office), the majority leading it to erroneously conclude
effectively emasculates the HRET of its jurisdiction as it that Reyes is not a natural born
allows the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo Filipino citizen and that she had
warranto only after the assumption to office by the abandoned and lost her domicile
candidate (i.e., on June 30 in the usual case). To illustrate of origin when she became a
using the dates of the present case, any election protest or a naturalized American citizen
petition for quo warranto filed after June 30 or more than As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the
fifteen (15) days from Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013, COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of evidence.
shall certainly be dismissed outright by the HRET for having However, exceptions to this rule have been established and
been filed out of time under the HRET rules. consistently recognized, among others, when the COMELEC’s
Did the COMELEC gravely abuse appreciation and evaluation of evidence are so grossly
its discretion when it declared its unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these
May 14, 2013 Resolution final and instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
executory? constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC’s
By the petitioner’s theory, the COMELEC en banc’s May error.19
14, 2013 Resolution (cancelling Reyes’ CoC) did not attain It is also basic in the law of evidence that one who alleges
finality because Reyes’ proclamation on May 18, 2013 a fact has the burden of proving it. In administrative cases,
divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters the
_______________
pending before it relating to Reyes’ eligibility. Two material 19 Sabili v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012,
records are critical on this point. First, the fact of 670 SCRA 664.
proclamation on May 18, 2013 which came one (1) day
568
ahead of the May 19, 2013 deadline for the finality of the
May 14, 2013 Resolution pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of 568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Procedure. The second Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
567 quantum of proof required is substantial evidence. 20 In the
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 567 present case, the majority obviously believed, together with
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections the COMELEC, that Tan did overcome this burden and that
is the COMELEC order of June 5, 2013 which declared its his documentary evidence he submitted established that
resolution of May 14, 2013 final and executory. Reyes is not a Filipino citizen. A major clash between the
parties exists, of course, on this point as Reyes, as expressed
in her petition, is of the completely opposite view. Even a
quick look at Tan’s evidence, however, indicates that Reyes’
view is not without its merits and should not simply be
dismissively set aside.
First, Tan submitted an article published online (blog
article) written by one Eli J. Obligacion (Obligacion) entitled
“Seeking and Finding the Truth About Regina O. Reyes.” This
printed blog article stated that the author had obtained
records from the BID stating that Reyes is an American
citizen; that she is the holder of a US passport and that she
has been using the same since 2005.
How the law on evidence would characterize Obligacion’s
blog article or, for that matter, any similar newspaper article,
is not hard for a law student answering the Bar exam to
tackle: the article is double hearsay or hearsay evidence that
is twice removed from being admissible as it was offered to
prove its contents (that Reyes is an American citizen) without
any other competent and credible evidence to corroborate
them. Separately of course from this consideration of
admissibility is the question of probative value. On top of
these underlying considerations is the direct and frontal
question: did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when
it relied on this piece of evidence to conclude that Reyes is
not a Filipino citizen?
Second, Tan also submitted a photocopy of a Moreover, the certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the
“certification” issued by one Simeon L. Sanchez of the BID
showing the travel records of Reyes from February 15, 2000
to June
_______________
20 Matugas v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 151944, January 20,
2004, 420 SCRA 365.
569
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 569
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
30, 2012 and that she is a holder of US Passport No.
306278853. This photocopy also indicates in some entries
that Reyes is an American while other entries denote that
she is Filipino. The same questions of admissibility and
probative value of evidence arise, together with the direct
query on the characterization of the COMELEC action since
the COMELEC concluded on the basis of these pieces of
evidence that Reyes is not a Filipino citizen because it is not
only incompetent but also lacks probative value as evidence.
Contributory to the possible answer is the ruling of this
Court that a “certification” is not a certified copy and is not a
document that proves that a party is not a Filipino citizen. 21
_______________
21 See Matugas v. Commission on Elections, ibid., where the Court
held:
“Furthermore, Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states
that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, as in this case, the
contents of said document may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. The subject letter-
inquiry, which contains the notation, appears to be a mere photocopy, not
a certified copy.
The other document relied upon by petitioner is
the Certification dated 1 September 2000 issued by the BID.
Petitioner submits that private respondent has declared that he is an
American citizen as shown by said Certification and, under Section 26, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, such declaration may be given in evidence
against him.
The rule cited by petitioner does not apply in this case because the rule
pertains to the admissibility of evidence. There is no issue here as to the
admissibility of the BID Certification; the COMELEC did not hold that the
same was inadmissible. In any case, the BID Certification suffers
from the same defect as the notation from the supposed US
Embassy official. Said Certification is also a photocopy, not a
certified copy.”
“nationality” of private respondent. While some entries
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
Interestingly, in its March 27, 2013 Resolution that the
petitioner now also assails, the COMELEC First Division ruled:
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered
evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013,
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of
an American passport which she continues to use until June
30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his
allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to
present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This,
the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion
inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her CoC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she
can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA
 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and
thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is,
therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public
office in the Philippines. 22
This ruling, undeniably, opens for Reyes the argument that
in the absence of sufficient proof (i.e., other than a
photocopy of a “certification”) that she is not a natural born
Filipino citizen, no burden of evidence shifts to her to prove
anything, particularly the fact that she is not an American
citizen. Considering that Tan might have also failed to prove
by substantial evidence his allegation that Reyes is an
American citizen, the burden of evidence also cannot be
shifted to the latter to prove that she had availed of the
privileges of RA 9225 in order to reacquire her status as a
natural born Filipino citizen.
It ought to be considered, too, that in the absence of
sufficient proof that Reyes lost her Filipino citizenship, the
twin
_______________
indicate that he is “American,” other entries state that he is “Filipino.”
22 Rollo, p. 48.
571
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 571
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
requirements under RA 9225 for re-acquisition of Filipino
citizenship should not apply to her. Of course, Reyes
admitted in her MR before the COMELEC that she is married
to an American citizen. This admission, however, leads only
to further arguments on how her admitted marriage affected
her citizenship. Jurisprudence is not lacking on this point as
in Cordora v. Comelec,23 the Court held that the twin
requirements of RA 9225 does not apply to a candidate who
is a natural born Filipino citizen who did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country,  viz.:
We have to consider the present case in consonance with
our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano Valles v. COMELEC,
and AASJS v. Datumanong. Mercado and Valles involve
similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and
Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the
circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino
parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino
father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated
that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by
cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by
effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born
Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who
seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and
swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about by the
individual’s active participation in the naturalization
process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino
who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is
allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act
of taking an oath of allegiance is
_______________
23 G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.
572
572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign
citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after the
promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not
concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Section 5(3)
of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who
reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective
public office in the Philippines shall “meet the qualifications
 for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
to administer an oath” aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin
requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the
bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,
Velasco v. COMELEC, and Japzon v. COMELEC, all of which
involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized
citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective
office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting,
a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.
573
VOL. 699, JUNE 25, 2013 573
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
As to the issue of Reyes’ residency in Boac, Marinduque,
the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the COMELEC en
banc held:
Accordingly, the more appropriate issue is whether
respondent had regained her domicile of origin in the
Municipality of Boac, Marinduque after she lost the same
when she became a naturalized American citizen.
x x x x
Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon
re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the
Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing that whatsoever that
respondent had already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained
her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that
respondent had renounced her American citizenship, it
follows that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in
the USA.
The only proof presented by respondent to show that she
has met the one-year residency requirement of the law and
never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque
is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such
fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency.
For, respondent has never regained her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact
that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA.24
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 48-50.
574
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
This COMELEC action again opens questions about its
appreciation and evaluation of the evidence and whether it
overstepped the limits of its discretion to the point of being
grossly unreasonable, if indeed the above-cited findings and
conclusions have no basis in fact and in law.
To begin with, the evidence submitted by Tan, even
assuming that it is admissible, arguably does not prove that
Reyes was a naturalized American citizen. At best, the
submitted evidence could only show that Reyes was the
holder of a US passport. In Aznar v. Comelec,25 the Court
ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a
holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application
for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. In the present case,
the fact that Reyes is a holder of a US passport does not
portend that she is no longer a natural born Filipino citizen or
that she had renounced her Philippine citizenship. In addition,
how the COMELEC arrived at a conclusion that Reyes is
naturalized American citizen can be seen as baffling as it did
not appear to have provided any factual basis for this
conclusion.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
All told, the COMELEC does not appear to have an airtight
case based on substantial evidence on the citizenship and
residence issues, and much less a similar case on the
jurisdictional issue, to justify a VERY PROMPT OUTRIGHT
DISMISSAL ACTION from this Court. Bolstering this view is
that petitioner Reyes is not lacking in arguably meritorious
positions to support her cause, even if only to the extent of
being fully heard by this Court.
If this Court is indeed SERIOUS IN ADMINISTERING
JUSTICE or at least to BE SEEN TO BE ADMINISTER-
_______________
25 G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703.

575
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Reyes vs. Commission on Elections
ING JUSTICE in the way described in the speeches of many a
Justice of this Court, it should not deliver the kind
of hasty and imprudent action that it did in this case. The
proper course of action, if the Court indeed honestly wants to
achieve this objective in the present case, is to require the
COMELEC to COMMENT on the petition and to decide
matters from that point.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.―The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of
party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption
of office. (Bello vs. Commission on Elections, 637 SCRA 59
[2010])
Since the representative of the elected party-list
organization becomes a member of the House of
Representatives, contests relating to the qualifications of the
said party-list representative is within the jurisdiction of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (ABC
[Alliance for Barangay Concerns] Party List vs. Commission
on Elections, 646 SCRA 93 [2011])
――o0o――
 G.R. No. 205505. September 29, 2015.*
 
ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T.
SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ,
SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE
GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ,
HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO &
JONATHAN DEQUINA, in their individual capacities, and as
legitimate members and officers of ADHIKAING
TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY LIST),
petitioners, vs.  THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC
and the self-styled sham ATING KOOP PARTYLIST represented
by AMPARO T. RIMAS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal; Jurisdiction; Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution  endows the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the
qualifications of members of Congress.—Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with jurisdiction to resolve
questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case
of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list
group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as member of
the House of Representatives. In this case, the COMELEC
proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico
took his oath; and he assumed office in the House of
Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not the COMELEC, that
has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
Same; Party-List System; A party-list nominee must have
been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or
organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election.—In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico’s
expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on his
expulsion from Ating Koop,
_______________
*  EN BANC.
597
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 597
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
which necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A
party-list nominee must have been, among others, a bona
fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona
fide membership in the party-list group is
a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications for
public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements.
They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election, or of assumption of office, but during the
officer’s entire tenure.
Same; Same; An amendment to the bylaws of a party-list
organization should become effective only upon approval by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC).—A party-list organization
owes its existence to the State and the latter’s approval must be
obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case
of Dayao v. COMELEC, 689 SCRA 412, We declared that it is the
State, acting through the COMELEC, that breathes life to a party-list
organization. The implication, therefore, is that the State, through
the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into by
the party-list organization and its members — the Constitution and
Bylaws — such that any amendment to these contracts would
constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the parties
involved. An amendment to the bylaws of a party-list organization
should become effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Equiponderance of Evidence; When
the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise, that is, when the
respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly balanced,
the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue.—
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to
legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into play. This rule
provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise,
that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are
evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that
issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither
side prevails. The courts are left with no other option but to leave
them as they are. The consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of
the complaint/petition.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 
598
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
  Ma. Rosario L. Payumo, Eric C. Opriasa and Nadine Faye
C. Miralles for petitioners.
  Francisco B. Sibayan  and Yasser B. Lumbos for private
respondent.
SERENO, CJ.:
 
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case
involve the seemingly elementary matter of the Commission
on Elections’ (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the expulsion of a
sitting party-list representative: from the House of
Representatives, on the one hand; and from his party-list
organization, on the other.
The instant case involves two rival factions of the same
party-list organization, the Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng
Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is headed by petitioner
Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who represents the
organization in the House of Representatives, and the other
group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents herein, or the Rimas
Group).
 
The Case
 
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 641 in
relation to Rule 65,2 seeking to annul the Resolutions in E.M.
No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013 of the
COMELEC.
_______________
1  Rule 64 of the Rules of Court deals with review of judgments and
final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit.
2  Rule 65 of the Rules of Court relates to the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
 
 
599
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
The Antecedent Facts
 
Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which
was registered on 16 November 2009 under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List System Act
(Party-List Law).
Under Ating Koop’s Constitution and By-Laws, its highest
policy-making body is the National Convention. The Central
Committee, however, takes over when the National
Convention is not in session.3
On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation
of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of
Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. 4 On 6 March
2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with
petitioner Lico as first nominee and Roberto Mascariña as
second nominee.
_______________
3  Article V, Section 2 of the Constitution of Ating Koop and Section I,
Article V of its Amended Constitution. Rollo, pp. 384 and 1621. For the
years 2010-2013, the Central Committee and officers of Ating Koop
consisted of the following:
1. Fr. Mario DJ Arenas as President;
2. Atty. Proculo Sarmen as Executive Vice President;
3. Mr. Eduardo C. Bato as Vice President for Luzon;
4. Dra. Sylvia Flores as Vice President for Visayas;
5. Mr. Isagani Daba as Vice President for Mindanao;
6. Ms. Erlinda Duque as Treasurer;
7. Mr. Reynaldo C. Golo as Auditor;
8. Mr. Roberto C. Mascariña as Executive Director;
9. Fr. Anton CT. Pascual as Independent Director;
10. Mr. Aurelio Jose as Head, Political Affairs Committee;
11. Ms. Cristina R. Salvosa as Head, Rules Committee;
12. Ms. Emma Dela Cerna as Head, Platform and Program;
13. Mr. Rito Fabella as Head, Finance Committee;
14. Ms. Amparo Rimas as Head, Membership;
15. Atty. James dela Vega as Secretary General. Id., at pp. 193-194.
4  Id., at p. 1511.
 
600
600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
599
On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as
one of the winning party-list groups.5 Based on the procedure
provided in BANAT Party-List v.  COMELEC,6 Ating Koop
earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner Lico
subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010
before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives,  and thereafter assumed office.
7
Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the
winning party-list organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating
Koop issued Central Committee Resolution 2010-01, which
incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its
nominees.8 Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve
as Party-list Representative for the first year of the three-
year term.9
On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National
Convention, during which it introduced amendments to its
Constitution and Bylaws. Among the salient changes was the
composition of the Central Committee,10 which would still be
composed of 15 representatives but with five each coming
from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-5-5 equal
representation).11 The amendments likewise mandated the
holding of an election of Central Committee members within
six months after the Second National Convention. 12
In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of
the incumbent members (referred to hereafter as the Interim
Central Committee) of the Central Committee.13 The Interim
Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas
Group.
_______________
5   Id., at p. 299.
6   G.R. No. 177508, 7 August 2009, 595 SCRA 477.
7   Rollo, p. 300.
8   Id., at pp. 1578-1585.
9   Id., at pp. 1578-1583.
10  Id., at pp. 384 and 1621.
11  Id., at pp. 384 and 1621-1622.
12  Id., at p. 1632.
13  Id., at p. 1622.
 
601
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 601
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner
Lico had assumed office, the Interim Central Committee
expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. 14 Apart from
allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the
Committee cited petitioner Lico’s refusal to honor the term-
sharing agreement as factual basis for disloyalty and as
cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop’s Amended
Constitution and Bylaws.15
On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the Interim Central Committee, 16 which
subsequently denied the same in a Resolution dated 29
December 2011.17
14  Id., at p. 689.  
15  Id., at p. 1454; Comment, p. 7.
16  Id., at p. 689.
17  Id., at pp. 117-120.
 
While petitioner Lico’s Motion for Reconsideration was
pending, the Lico Group held a special meeting in Cebu City
(the Cebu meeting) on 19 December 2011. At the said
meeting, new members of the Central Committee, as well as
a new set of officers, were elected. 18 The election was
purportedly held for the purpose of implementing the 5-5-5
equal representation amendment made during the Second
National Convention.19
_______________
18  Id., at pp. 1549-1558.
19  Id., at p. 1556; the following were the new members of the Central
Committee:
1. Amelito L. Revuelta Luzon
2. Tirso C. Buenaventura Luzon
3. Rafael A. Puentespina Visayas
4. William C. Ybanez Visayas
5. Rodolfo E. Perez Visayas
6. Hipolito R. Quillan Visayas
7. Jonathan B. Dequina Visayas
8. Lydia B. Tubella Mindanao
9. Atty. Proculo T. Sarmen Mindanao
10. Silverio J. Sanchez Mindanao
602
602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc

On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special
National Convention in Parañaque City20 (the Parañaque
convention), at which a new Central Committee and a new
set of officers were constituted.21 Members of the Rimas
Group won the election and occupied all the corresponding
seats.
Proceedings Before the COMELEC
Second Division
 
On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to
represent Ating Koop, filed with COMELEC a Petition against
petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-039. 22 The said
Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second
Division, prayed that petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the
office of Ating Koop in the House of Representatives, and for
the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascariña as
Ating Koop’s representative in the House.
The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended Petition
with the COMELEC on 14 May 2012, this time impleading not
only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico Group. The Amended
Petition also prayed that the COMELEC nullify the election
conducted at the Cebu meeting and recognize the Parañaque
convention.
In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the Rimas
Group alleged that Ating Koop had expelled Congressman
Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such as
malversation, graft and corruption, and that he had “boldly
displayed his recalcitrance to honor party commitment to be
upright and consistently honest, thus violating basic
principles of the Ating Koop. 23 The Amended Petition stated
further
_______________
11. Reynold S. Alejo Mindanao
12. Francis C. Loque Mindanao
20  Id., at p. 155.
21  Id., at p. 237.
22  Id., at p. 78.
23  Id., at p. 150.
 
603
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 603
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico Group violated notice
and quorum requirements.24
In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012, 25 the COMELEC Second
Division upheld the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating
Koop and declared Mascariña as the duly qualified nominee
of the party-list group.26 The Second Division characterized
the issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico
from Ating Koop as an intra-party leadership dispute, which it
could resolve as an incident of its power to register political
parties.27
Proceedings Before the COMELEC
En Banc
 
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for
Reconsideration from the Second Division’s Resolution, which
the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31 January 2013. The
dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En
Banc) RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVED, to:
a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro
Q. Lico in the House of Representatives and to Sanction the
Immediate Succession of the Second Nominee of ATING KOOP Party
List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascariña as its Party Representative, for lack
of jurisdiction;
b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico from
ATING KOOP Party-list Group; [and]
c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its
President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legiti-
_______________
24  Id., at p. 154.
25  Id., at pp. 687-696.
26  Id., at p. 696.
27  Id., at p. 692.

604
604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
mate Party-list Group accredited by the Commission on Elections,
to the exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico, Rafael A.
Puentespina, Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta, William C.
Ybanez, Silverio J. Sanchez, Gloria G. Futalan, Hilario De Guzman,
Eugene M. Pabualan, Rodolfo E. Perez, Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario
Arenas, Tirso C. Buenaventura, Lydia B. Tubella, and Jonathan
Dequina. 28
In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held
that it had no jurisdiction to expel Congressman Lico from
the House of Representatives, considering that his expulsion
from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the
House, and therefore it was the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had jurisdiction over the
Petition.
At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of
petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating Koop, explaining that
when the Interim Central Committee ousted him from Ating
Koop, the said Committee’s members remained in holdover
capacity even after their terms had expired; 29 and that the
COMELEC was not in a position to substitute its judgment for
that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the
expulsion.30
Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas
Group as the legitimate representative of Ating Koop
considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to show
that the Lico Group made a valid call for the special election
of Central Committee members as required under the
Amended Constitution and By-Laws; 31 2) there is nothing on
record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended the Cebu
meeting;32 and 3)
_______________
28  Id., at p. 726.
29  Id., at p. 725; Resolution dated 31 January 2013, p. 4.
30  Id., at p. 726; id., at p. 5.
31  Id., at p. 725.
32  Id., at pp. 725-726; Resolution dated 31 January 2013, pp. 4-5.
605
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 605
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating
Koop’s Amended Constitution and By-Laws. 33
 
Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us,
praying for a review of the COMELEC Resolutions.
The Court’s Ruling
 
On the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over
the expulsion of a Member of the
House of Representatives from his
party-list organization
 
We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the
Petition to expel petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his
expulsion from Ating Koop — a matter beyond its purview.
The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for
expulsion of petitioner Lico from the House of
Representatives and for the succession of the second
nominee as party-list representative as a disqualification
case. For this reason, the COMELEC dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of
unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution 34 endows the
HRET with jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifi-
_______________
33  Id., at p. 726.
34  SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the

606
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
cations of members of Congress. In the case of party-list
representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-
list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives. 35 In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list
group; petitioner Lico took his oath; and he assumed office in
the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and not
the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification
case.
What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the
action of the COMELEC in upholding the validity of the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its own
ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification
issue. These findings already touch upon the qualification
requiring a party-list nominee to be a bona fide member of
the party-list group sought to be represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the
expulsion, by relying on the rule that it can decide intra-party
matters as an incident of its constitutionally granted powers
and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that
when the resolution of an intra-party controversy is
necessary or incidental to the performance of the
constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter
can step in and exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party
matter.36 The Lokin case, however, involved nominees  and
not incumbent members  of Congress. In the present case,
the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the
time of his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the matter
from the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
_______________
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
(Emphasis supplied)
35  Infra note 41.
36  G.R. No. 193808, 26 June 2012, 674 SCRA 538.
 
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Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of
the HRET are not parallel concepts that do not intersect.
Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters is
circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral
tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is exclusive. It is
given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any
matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed
winner.37
In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico’s
expulsion from the House of Representatives is anchored on
his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily affects his
title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have
been, among others, a bona fide  member of the party or
organization for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day
of the election.38 Needless to say, bona fide membership in
the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have
ruled that qualifications for public office, whether elective or
not, are continuing requirements. They must be possessed
not only at
_______________
37  Javier v. COMELEC, Nos. L-68379-81, 22 September 1986, 144
SCRA 194.
38  The requirement is found under Section 9 of the Party-List Law,
which reads as follows:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-list Nominees.—No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or
organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-
five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty
(30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his
term.

608
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of
office, but during the officer’s entire tenure.39
This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon
the issue of HRET jurisdiction over the requirements for bona
fide membership in a party-list organization. In Abayon v.
HRET,40 it was argued that the petitioners did not belong to
the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they
should represent; as such, they could not be properly
considered bona fide members of their respective party-list
organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to
interpret the meaning of the requirement of bona
fide membership in a party-list organization. It reasoned that
under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is
the sole judge of all contests when it comes to
qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.41
Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the
issue on the validity of petitioner Lico’s expulsion from Ating
Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications to sit in
Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of
jurisdiction correctible by a writ of certiorari;42 the COMELEC
should not have encroached into the expulsion issue, as it
was outside its authority to do so.
 
Distinguished from Reyes
v. COMELEC
 
Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ong-
siako Reyes v. Commission on Elections. 43 In that case, We
_______________
39  Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013, 696 SCRA
420.
40  G.R. Nos. 189466 and 189506, 11 February 2010, 612 SCRA 375.
41  Id., at pp. 381-385.
42  Villareal v. Aliga, G.R. No. 166995, 13 January 2014, 713 SCRA 52.
43  G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013, 708 SCRA 197.
609
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Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of petitioner
Reyes, even as she was already proclaimed winner in the
elections at the time she filed her petition with the High
Court. In doing so, We rejected the argument that the case
fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.
In Reyes,  the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13
May 2013 Elections, and took her oath of office before the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. However, the Court
ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member
of the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to
assume office, the term of which would officially start at noon
of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition for Certiorari with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013
assailing the Resolutions ordering the cancellation of her
Certificate of Candidacy. In the present case, all three
requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption
of office were satisfied.
Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc  Resolution
disqualifying petitioner on grounds of lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency had become final and executory
when petitioner elevated it to this Court.44 It should be
mentioned that when petitioner Reyes filed her petition with
the Court, the COMELEC En Banc had, as early as 5 June
2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality over its 14 May
2013 Resolution disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no
longer any pending case on the qualifications of petitioner
Reyes to speak of. Here, the question of whether petitioner
Lico remains a member of the House of Representatives in
view of his expulsion from Ating Koop is a subsisting issue.
_______________
44  The assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013
became final and executory as early as 19 May 2013, based on Section 3,
Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The provision gives a five-day
period, to be reckoned from promulgation, within which to file a Rule 64
petition with this Court. Petitioner, however, failed to do so. She filed it
only on 10 June 2013.
  
 
610
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of
the HRET to be a non-issue, since the recourse of the
petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere attempt to
prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and
executory judgment. We said that the petitioner therein took
an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance, considering that she
sought remedy before the Court, and yet asserted that it is
the HRET which had jurisdiction over the case. 45 In this case,
the question on the validity of petitioner Lico’s expulsion
from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls within the
jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his
qualifications as party-list representative.
 
On which group legitimately represents
Ating Koop
 
We now pass upon the question of which, between the two
contending groups, is the legitimate leadership of Ating
Koop.
At the outset, We reject the Lico Group’s argument that
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide which of the
feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is the Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate
controversies. Indeed, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to settle
the struggle for leadership within the party is well-
established. This power to rule upon questions of party
identity and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an
incident of its enforcement powers.46
That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed
grave abuse of discretion in declaring the Rimas Group as the
legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the simple reason
that the amendments to the Constitution and Bylaws of Ating
Koop were not registered with the COMELEC.
Hence, neither of the elections held during the Cebu
meeting and
_______________
45  Reyes v. COMELEC, supra note 43.
46  Supra note 48.
 
 
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VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 611
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
the Parañaque conference pursuant to the said amendments,
were valid.
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert
that their respective elections were conducted pursuant to
the amendment introduced in the Second National
Convention held on 14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of
Article VI of Ating Koop’s Bylaws called for the conduct of an
election of Central Committee members within six months
after the Second National Convention.47
There is no showing, however, that the amendments were
actually filed with the COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State
and the latter’s approval must be obtained through its agent,
the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v. COMELEC,48 We
declared that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC,
that breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication,
therefore, is that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party
to the principal contracts entered into by the party-list
organization and its members — the Constitution and Bylaws
— such that any amendment to these contracts would
constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the parties
involved. An amendment to the bylaws of a party-list
organization should become effective only upon approval by
the COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of
filing of the amended bylaws and subsequent conformity
thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code, an
amendment to a bylaw provision must be filed with the SEC.
The amendment shall be effective only upon the issuance by
the SEC of a
_______________
47  Rollo, p. 1632. The provision states:
 SECTION  1. A special election of the members of the Central
Committee, after due notice, shall be conducted six months after the
approval of the amendments of this Constitution.
48  G.R. No. 193643, January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 412.
 
612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
certification that it is not inconsistent with the Corporation
Code.49
There being no showing that the amendments on the
bylaws of Ating Koop were filed with and subsequently
approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted pursuant
thereto may not be considered valid. Without such requisite
proof, neither the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim
to be the legitimate set of officers of Ating Koop.
Even assuming arguendo  that the amendment calling for
a special election were effective, this Court still cannot
declare any of the feuding groups as the legitimate set of
officers considering that the respective sets of evidence
presented were evenly balanced. With respect to the Lico
Group’s Cebu meeting, the COMELEC correctly found — and
the records bear out — that the notices sent were deficient
and that there was no sufficient proof of quorum. Hence, the
Cebu meeting was held to be invalid. On the other hand, the
COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the Parañaque
convention suffered from the same infirmity: the records of
the said convention, consisting merely of the Minutes
thereof, likewise fail to establish due notice and a quorum. 50
Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to
legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine comes into play. This rule
provides that when the evidence in an issue of fact is in
equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of
both parties are evenly balanced, the party having the
burden of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party
succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The
courts are left with no other option but to leave them as they
are. The consequence, therefore, is the dismissal of the
complaint/petition.51
_______________
49  Section 48, Corporation Code.
50  Rollo, pp. 1568-1576.
51  Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734; 284 SCRA 673 (1998).
613
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Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the
COMELEC, had the burden of proving that it is the petitioner,
and not the Lico Group, that is the legitimate group. As the
evidence of both parties are in equipoise, the Rimas Group
failed to discharge its burden. The COMELEC should have
dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group insofar as it sought
to be declared the legitimate group representing Ating Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Parañaque convention
“appeared to be in conformity” with Ating Koop’s Amended
Constitution and By-Laws.52 It should be stressed that the
COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion. 53
The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the
COMELEC’s appreciation and evaluation of the evidence. 54 But
when the COMELEC’s assessment of the evidence is so
grossly unreasonable that it turns into an error of jurisdiction,
the Court is compelled to intervene and correct the error. 55
As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties
was able to establish its legitimacy. The evaluation of the
evidence by the COMELEC in deciding the issue of which
group legitimately represents Ating Koop was therefore
grossly unreasonable, which amounts to a jurisdictional error
that may be remedied by certiorari under Rule 65.
The final, and most important question to be addressed is:
if neither of the two groups is the legitimate leadership of
Ating Koop, then who is?
We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim
Central Committee, whose members remain as such in a
holdover capacity.
_______________
52  Id., at p. 726; p. 682.
53  Id.
54  Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010, 622
SCRA 744.
55  Sabili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, 670 SCRA 664.

614
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
In Señeres v. COMELEC,56 the validity of the Certificate of
Nomination filed by Buhay Party-List through its President,
Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground that his term
had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by
analogy the default rule in corporation law to the effect that
officers and directors of a corporation holdover after the
expiration of their terms until such time as their successors
are elected or appointed.57 Señeres ruled that the holdover
principle applies in the absence of a provision in the
constitution or bylaws of the party-list organization
prohibiting its application.
In the present case, We have gone through the
Constitution and Bylaws of Ating Koop and We do not see any
provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the
application of the holdover rule. Thus, in accordance with
corporation law, the existing Interim Central Committee is
still a legitimate entity with full authority to bind the
corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the
term of its members on 14 November 2011, since no
successors had been validly elected at the time, or since.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 31
January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division Resolution
dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE insofar as it declares
valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and
it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by
its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list
Group.
A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate
Central Committee and set of officers legitimately
representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee
and set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop.
_______________
56  603 Phil. 532; 585 SCRA 557 (2009).
57  Id., at pp. 568-570; pp. 574-575.
615
VOL. 771, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015 615
Lico vs. Commission on Elections En Banc
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Bersamin, Mendoza and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
On Official Leave.
Brion and Reyes, JJ., On Leave.
Jardeleza, J., No part.
Petition granted.
Notes.—In computing the allocation of additional seats,
the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.
(Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency [BANAT] vs. Commission on Elections, 586
SCRA 210 [2009])
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted
obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.” (Id.)
 
 
——o0o——
 _______________
Estrella vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 160465. May 27, 2004. *
 EN BANC.
*

ROMEO M. ESTRELLA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON 790

ELECTIONS, HON. COMMISSIONER RALPH C. LANTION and
ROLANDO F. SALVADOR, respondents.
Commission on Elections; Statutory Construction;  The
provision of the Constitution is clear that decisions reached by the
COMELEC En Banc should be the majority vote of all its members
and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations; Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained.—Section 5(a)
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7,
Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides: SECTION 7. Each
Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of
its submission for decision or resolution. x x x (Emphasis and italics
supplied) The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be
the majority vote of all its members and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of
statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought
to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional provision
states “all of its members,” without any qualification, it should be
interpreted as such. In the case at bar, following the clear provision
of the Constitution, counting out Commissioner Lantion’s vote from
the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would leave just three
(3) votes out of “all” seven (7) members of the COMELEC.
Same;  Same; The Court hereby abandons the doctrine laid
down in Cua v. Commission on Elections, 156 SCRA 582 (1987),
and holds that the COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrella vs. Commission on Elections
scoring supplied). For the foregoing reasons then, this Court
hereby abandons the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the
COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought
before it by a majority vote of “all its members,” and NOT
majority of the members who deliberated and voted
thereon.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the
Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
     Leila M. De Lima for petitioner.
     Roque B. Bello for respondent.
     Jaromay,  Baylon,  Acorda,  Landrito &
Associates collaborating counsel for respondent Salvador.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
From this Court’s Resolution of April 28, 2004, private
respondent Rolando F. Salvador seeks a reconsideration.
In his petition for certiorari filed before this Court,
petitioner Romeo M. Estrella sought the nullification of the
November 5, 2003 Status Quo Ante Order  issued by the
1

brought before it by a majority vote of “all its members,” and not Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in EAC  No. A-
majority of the members who deliberated and voted thereon—had 10-2002, “Romeo M. Estrella v. Rolando F. Salvador,”
the framers intended that it should be the majority of the members directing the “parties to maintain the status quo ante order,
who participated or deliberated, it would have clearly phrased it which is the condition prevailing before the issuance” by the
that way.—Had the framers intended that it should be the majority Regional Trial Court of Malolos of a writ of execution for the
of the members who participated or deliberated, it would have
enforcement of said court’s decision declaring petitioner as
clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to the Supreme
Court in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution: SECTION 4(2) x
the duly elected mayor of Baliwag, Bulacan.
x x all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to In the issuance of the questioned COMELEC En Banc
be heard en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of Status Quo Ante Order, five (5) of the then
a majority of the members who actually took part in the incumbent  seven  (7) members of the COMELEC
deliberations on the issues in the  case and voted participated: Commissioners Benjamin Abalos, Sr.,
thereon. (Italics in the original; emphasis and under- Luzviminda Tangcangco, Rufino S.B. Javier, Ressureccion Z.
Borra and Ralph C. Lantion.
 Commissioners Abalos, Tangcangco, Javier and Lantion
voted for the issuance of said order, while Commissioner
Borra dissented.
_______________
 Rollo at pp. 55-56.
1
791
VOL. 429, MAY 27, 2004 791
Estrella vs. Commission on Elections
Commissioner Lantion previously inhibited in SPR  No. 21-
2002, a case pending before the COMELEC Second Division
involving the same parties, thus necessitating the issuance of
an order designating Commissioner Borra as his substitute.
The substitution order was subsequently adopted in EAC  No.
A-10-2002. Parenthetically, petitioner had previously filed a
Motion for Inhibition of Commissioner Lantion before the
Second Division in SPR No. 21-2002 which was denied, albeit
on Motion for Reconsideration the Second Division, in its
Resolution of May 7, 2002, noted that “Com[missioner]
Lantion indicated for the record that he is no longer taking
part in the proceedings in this case.”
In the COMELEC En Banc Status Quo Ante Order,
Commissioner Lantion stated in his handwriting that “his
previous voluntary inhibition is only in the SPR cases and not
in the EAC” and that “as further agreed in the Second
Division, [he] will not participate in the Division deliberations
but will vote when the case is elevated [to the] en banc.”
In this Court’s Resolution  of April 28, 2004 now the
2
subject of private respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, it
was held that:
Commissioner Lantion’s voluntary piecemeal inhibition cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the COMELEC Rules does it allow a
Commissioner to voluntarily inhibit with reservation. To allow him
to participate in the En Banc proceedings when he previously
inhibited himself in the Division is, absent any satisfactory
justification, not only judicially unethical but legally improper and
absurd.
Since Commissioner Lantion could not participate and vote in
the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving three (3)
members concurring therewith, the necessary votes of four (4) or
majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained. The
order thus failed to comply with the number of votes necessary for
the pronouncement of a decision or order, as required under Rule
3, Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required.—(a) When sitting en banc, four (4)
Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of
transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members
of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
decision, resolution, order or ruling.
_______________
 Id., at pp. 427-435.
2
792
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estrella vs. Commission on Elections
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Status Quo
Ante Order dated November 5, 2003 issued by the COMELEC En
Banc is hereby NULLIFIED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
In seeking a reconsideration of the above-quoted Resolution,
private respondent cites Cua v. Commission on
Elections  wherein this Court ruled:
3
After considering the issues and the arguments raised by the
parties, the Court holds that the 2-1 decision rendered by the First
Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A, section 7 of the
Constitution. Furthermore, the three members who voted to
affirm the First Division constituted a majority of the five
members who deliberated and voted thereon en banc and
their decision is also valid under the aforecited
constitutional provision. x x x (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
Private respondent argues that “[fo]llowing the doctrine laid
out in Cua, three (3) votes would have been sufficient to
constitute a majority to carry the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc as provided by the Constitution and the
appropriate rules.” 4
Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted
from Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides:
SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote
of  all its members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution.
x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)
The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the
majority vote of all its members and not only those who
participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the
rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the      Vitug (Actg. C.J.), Panganiban,  Ynares-
words in which constitutional provisions are couched express Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,  Coro
the objective sought to be attained.  Since the above-quoted
5
na,  Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
constitutional provision states “all of its members,” without      Davide, Jr.  (C.J.) and Puno, J., On Official Leave.
any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.      Quisumbing, J., In the result.
Motion for reconsideration denied.
_______________
_______________
 156 SCRA 582 (1987).
3

 Rollo at pp. 439-440.

4
 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413,
5
422 (1970).
793
VOL. 429, MAY 27, 2004
Estrella vs. Commission on Elections
In the case at bar, following the clear provision of the
Constitution, counting out Commissioner Lantion’s vote from
the questioned COMELEC En Banc resolution would leave just
three (3) votes out of “all” seven (7) members of the
COMELEC.
Even former Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, SJ, questions the Cua ruling in light of Section 7,
which says “majority of all the Members.” He thus concludes
that “[t]hree is not the majority of seven.” 6
 Bernas, SJ, Joaquin G., THE 1987
6
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION A
REVIEWER-PRIMER, 2002 at p. 410.
794
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
793
Estrella vs. Commission on Elections
Notes.—The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-
finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with
political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions. (Loong vs.
Commission on Elections, 305 SCRA 832 [1999])
COMELEC has the inherent power to amend and control its
processes and orders within the thirty-day period from their
promulgation, which may thus be recalled or set aside.

(Sahali vs. Commission on Elections, 324 SCRA 510 [2000])

Had the framers intended that it should be the majority of Basic is the rule in statutory construction that where the
the members who participated or deliberated, it would have law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
clearly phrased it that way as it did with respect to the (Guerrero vs. Commission on Elections, 336 SCRA
Supreme Court in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution: 458 [2000])
SECTION 4(2) x x x all other cases which under the Rules of Court
are required to be heard en banc, x x x shall be decided with
——o0o——
the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon. (Italics in the original; emphasis and italics
supplied).
For the foregoing reasons then, this Court hereby abandons
the doctrine laid down in Cua and holds that the
COMELEC En Banc shall decide a case or matter brought
before it by a majority vote of “all its members,” and
NOT majority of the members  who deliberated and
voted thereon.
WHEREFORE, private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 203833. March 19, 2013.*
MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The
Supreme Court has previously ruled that a majority vote requires a
vote of four members of the Comelec en banc. In Marcoleta v.
Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA 765 (2009), the Supreme
Court declared “that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require
that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec [en banc],
and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling.”—Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution requires that “[e]ach Commission shall decide by a
majority vote of all its members, any case or matter brought
before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution.” Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the
Comelec provided in Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.:
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required.—(a) When sitting en banc, four
(4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the
purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority
of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. [italics
supplied; emphasis ours] We have previously ruled that a majority
vote requires a vote of four members of the Comelec en banc.
In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA 765 (2009), we
declared “that Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require
that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec [en
banc], and not only those who participated and took part in the
deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling.”
_______________
* EN BANC.
623
VOL. 693, MARCH 19, 2013 623
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
Same; Same; To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion
is equally divided among the members of the Comelec en banc,
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a
rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and convince
the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their case.—
To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally divided
among the members of the Comelec en banc, Section 6, Rule 18 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a rehearing where
parties are given the opportunity anew to strengthen their
respective positions or arguments and convince the members of
the Comelec en banc of the merit of their case. Section 6, Rule 18
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure reads: Section 6. Procedure if
Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the Commission en banc is
equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot
be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no
decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if
originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all
incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
   The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for certiorari, with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Status Quo Ante Order,1 filed by petitioner Mamerto T.
Sevilla, Jr., to nullify the May 14, 2012 Resolution 2 of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Second Division and the
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-43.
2 Penned by Presiding Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle and concurred
in by Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph; id., at pp. 46-52.
624
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
October 6, 2012 Resolution3 of the Comelec en banc in SPR
(BRGY-SK) No. 70-2011. These assailed Resolutions reversed
and set aside the May 4, 2011 Order of the Muntinlupa City
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 80 (MeTC), dismissing
respondent Renato R. So’s election protest against Sevilla.
The Facts
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the
October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections. On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers
proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total of 7,354 votes
or a winning margin of 628 votes over So’s 6,726 total votes.
On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest with the
MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud,
anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So
pinpointed twenty percent (20%) of the total number of the
protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual revision of
the ballots.4
Following the recount of the ballots in the pilot protested
precincts, the MeTC issued an Order dated May 4, 2011
dismissing the election protest. On May 9, 2011, So filed a
motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead
of a notice of appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee
within the reglementary period. On May 17, 2011, the MeTC
denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it
was a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 1, Rule 6 of
A.M. No. 07-04-15-SC.5
_______________
3 Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Elias R.
Yusoph, concurring; Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene
V. Sarmiento and Christian Robert S. Lim, dissenting. Id., at pp. 53-58.
4 Id., at p. 47.
5 Id., at p. 7.
625
VOL. 693, MARCH 19, 2013 625
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31,
2011 with the Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC for its non-
observance of the rule that in the appreciation of ballots,
there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the
specific details of how and why a certain group of ballots
should be considered as having been written by one or two
persons.6
The Comelec Second Division Ruling
In its May 14, 2012 Resolution, the Comelec Second
Division granted So’s petition. The Comelec Second Division
held that certiorari can be granted despite the availability of
appeals when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority, as in the case
before it. It also ruled that the assailed Order was fraught
with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the
ballots, and was couched in general terms: “these are not
written by one person observing the different strokes, slant,
spacing, size and indentation of handwriting and the variance
in writing[.]”7
The Comelec En Banc Ruling
The Comelec  en banc, by a vote of 3-3,8 affirmed the
Comelec Second Division’s ruling in its October 6, 2012
Resolution whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Respondent
judge is directed to conduct another revision of the contested
ballots in Election Protest Case No. SP-6719 with dispatch.
9
_______________
6 Id., at p. 48.
7 Id., at p. 51.
8 Supra note 3.
9 Id., at p. 57.
626
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
It ruled that where the dismissal was
capricious, certiorari lies as the petition challenges not the
correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal. The
Comelec en banc emphasized that procedural technicalities
should be disregarded for the immediate and final resolution
of election cases inasmuch as ballots should be read and
appreciated with utmost liberality so that the will of the
electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities.
It found that the MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when she did not
comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 2(d),
Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC on the form of the decision in
election protests involving pairs or groups of ballots written
by two persons. It noted that based on the general and
repetitive phraseology of the Order, the MeTC Judge’s
findings were “copy-pasted” into the decision and ran
counter to the mandate of the aforementioned rule. Also, the
MeTC Judge failed to mention in her appreciation of the
ballots that she examined the Minutes of Voting and
Counting to ascertain whether there were illiterate voters or
assisted voters in the protested precincts. 10
Commissioner Lim’s Dissent11
 The dissent posited that So’s petition should be dismissed
outright as it was mired in procedural errors. First, So should
have filed an appeal within five (5) days from receipt of the
MeTC’s Order; a motion for reconsideration was improper as
the Order amounted to the final disposition of the
protest. Second, So should not have filed the motion for
reconsideration even if he believed that the Order was
interlocutory since a motion for reconsideration is a
prohibited pleading. Also, he could have simply filed the
petition for certiorari without the necessity of filing the
motion for reconsideration. Third, the
_______________
10 Id., at p. 56.
11 Joined by Chairman Brillantes and Commissioner Sarmiento.
627
VOL. 693, MARCH 19, 2013
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
petition for certiorari  cannot be a substitute for the lost
appeal. The Comelec could not even treat the certiorari as an
appeal since the petition was filed 25 days after So received
the assailed Order; thus, the Order already attained
finality. Finally, procedural rules should not be lightly
shunned in favor of liberality when, as in this case, So did not
give a valid excuse for his errors.
The Petition
The Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it gave due course
to the petition for certiorari
 Sevilla argues that the Comelec gravely abused its
discretion when it entertained So’s petition despite its loss of
jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a
quo’s dismissal order became final and executory due to So’s
wrong choice of remedy. Instead of filing an appeal within
five (5) days from receipt of the Order and paying the
required appeal fee, So filed a motion for reconsideration—a
prohibited pleading that did not stop the running of the
prescriptive period to file an appeal. Sevilla also emphasizes
that So’s petition for certiorari should not have been given
due course since it is not a substitute for an appeal and may
only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 12
The dismissal of the election
protest was proper
Sevilla also contends that the dismissal was not tainted
with grave abuse of discretion since the MeTC Judge
complied with the rules; she made clear, specific and
detailed explanations pertaining to the specific strokes,
figures or letters
_______________
12 Rollo, pp. 13-15.
628
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
showing that the ballots had been written by one person.
Granting that the decision was tainted with
errors, certiorari would still not lie because a mere error of
627 judgment is not synonymous with grave abuse of discretion.
Lastly, a liberal application of the rules cannot be made to a
petition which offers no explanation for the non-observance
of the rules.13 
On November 13, 2012,14 the Court resolved to require the
Comelec and the respondent to comment on the petition and
to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of
the assailed Comelec Second Division’s Resolution of May 14,
2012 and the Comelec en banc’s Resolution of October 6,
2012.15
In his Comment, the respondent contends that the petition
was filed prematurely. He emphasizes that the October 6,
2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc was not a majority
decision considering that three Commissioners voted for the
denial of the motion for reconsideration and the three others
voted to grant the same. So notes that the assailed October
6, 2012 Resolution was deliberated upon only by six (6)
Commissioners because the 7th Commissioner had not yet
been appointed by the President at that time. Considering
that the October 6, 2012 Resolution was not a majority
decision by the Comelec en banc, So prays for the dismissal
of the petition so that it can be remanded to the Comelec for the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a
a rehearing by a full and complete Commission. 16 decision, resolution, order or ruling.”
The Court’s Ruling _______________
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been 17 Emphasis ours.
18 G.R. Nos. 181377 and 181726, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 765, 773-
prematurely filed with this Court, and remand the 774; citation omitted.
case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.
_______________ 630
13 Id., at pp. 15-39. 630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
14 Id., at p. 168.
15 Id., at p. 168. Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
16 Id., at pp. 171-173.  In the present case, while the October 6, 2012 Resolution
of the Comelec en banc appears to have affirmed the
629
Comelec Second Division’s Resolution and, in effect, denied
VOL. 693, MARCH 19, 2013 629 Sevilla’s motion for reconsideration, the equally divided
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections voting between three Commissioners concurring and three
The October 6, 2012 Comelec Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the
en banc’s Resolution lacks legal Constitution and the Comelec Rules of Procedure require for
effect as it is not a majority decision a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012
required by the Constitution and by Resolution of the Comelec en banc.
the Comelec Rules of Procedure In essence, based on the 3-3 voting, the Comelec en
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution requires that banc did not sustain the Comelec Second Division’s findings
“[e]ach Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all on the basis of the three concurring votes by Commissioners
its members, any case or matter brought before it within Tagle, Velasco and Yusoph; conversely, it also did not
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or overturn the Comelec Second Division on the basis of the
resolution.”17 Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the three dissenting votes by Chairman Brillantes, Commissioner
Comelec provided in Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Sarmiento and Commissioner Lim, as either side was short of
Rules of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement one (1) vote to obtain a majority decision. Recall that under
of a decision, resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, a majority vote
sits en banc, viz.: of all the members of the Commission en banc is necessary
Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required.—(a) When sitting en banc, to arrive at a ruling. In other words, the vote of four (4)
four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for members must always be attained in order to decide,
the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a
irrespective of the number of Commissioners in attendance.
majority of the Members of the Commission shall be
necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or Thus, for all intents and purposes, the assailed October 6,
ruling. [italics supplied; emphasis ours] 2012 Resolution of the Comelec en banc had no legal effect
whatsoever except to convey that the Comelec failed to
We have previously ruled that a majority vote requires reach a decision and that further action is required.
a vote of four members of the Comelec en banc. The October 6, 2012 Comelec en banc’s
In Marcoleta v. Commission on Elections,18 we declared “that Resolution must be reheard pursuant
Section 5(a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and to the Comelec Rules of Procedure
Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that  To break the legal stalemate in case the opinion is equally
a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec [en divided among the members of the Comelec en banc, Section
banc], and not only those who participated and took part in 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure mandates a
rehearing where parties are given the opportunity anew to
strengthen their respective positions or arguments and
convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit
of
631
VOL. 693, MARCH 19, 2013
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
their case.19 Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure reads:
Section 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided.—When the
Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the
necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the
Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed
from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition
or motion shall be denied. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
In Juliano v. Commission on Elections,20 only three
members of the Comelec en banc voted in favor of granting
Estrelita Juliano’s motion for reconsideration (from the
Decision of the Comelec Second Division dismissing her
petition for annulment of proclamation of Muslimin Sema as
the duly elected Mayor of Cotabato City), three members
dissented, and one member took no part. In ruling that the
Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed
to order a rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the Court ruled:
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure specifically
states that if the opinion of the Comelec En Banc is equally divided,
the case shall be reheard. The Court notes, however, that the
Order of the Comelec En Banc dated February 10, 2005 clearly
stated that what was conducted was a mere “re-consultation.”
A “re-consultation” is definitely not the same as a “rehearing.”
A consultation is a “deliberation of persons on some subject;”
hence, a re-consultation means a second deliberation of persons on
some subject.
Rehearing is defined as a “second consideration of cause for
purpose of calling to court’s or administrative board’s attention any
_______________
19 Juliano v. Commission on Elections, 521 Phil. 395, 403; 487 SCRA 263, 271-
272 (2006).
20 Ibid.
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
error, omission, or oversight in first consideration. A retrial of
issues presumes notice to parties entitled thereto and
631 opportunity for them to be heard[.]” (italics supplied). But as
held in Samalio v. Court of Appeals,
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Thus, a rehearing clearly presupposes the participation of the
opposing parties for the purpose of presenting additional evidence,
if any, and further clarifying and amplifying their arguments;
whereas, a re-consultation involves a reevaluation of the issues and
arguments already on hand only by the members of the tribunal,
without the participation of the parties.
In Belac v. Comelec, when the voting of the Comelec En Banc on
therein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was equally divided,
the Comelec En Banc first issued an order setting the case for
hearing and allowed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda before voting anew on therein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. This should have been the proper way for the
Comelec En Banc to act on herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration when the first voting was equally divided. Its own
Rules of Procedure calls for a rehearing where the parties would
have the opportunity to strengthen their respective positions or
arguments and convince the members of the Comelec En Banc of
the merit of their case. Thus, when the Comelec En Banc failed to
give petitioner the rehearing required by the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, said body acted with grave abuse of discretion.  (italics
21
supplied; emphases ours)
To the same effect, in Marcoleta v. Commission on
Elections,22 the Court ruled that the Comelec en banc did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered a rehearing of its
November 6, 2007 Resolution for failure to muster the
required majority voting. The Court held:
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 402-403; citations omitted.
22 Supra note 18.
633
VOL. 693, MARCH 19, 2013 633
Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
 The Comelec, despite the obvious inclination of three Sevilla, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections
commissioners to affirm the Resolution of the First Division, cannot
Petition dismissed.
do away with a rehearing since its Rules clearly provide for such a
proceeding for the body to have a solicitous review of the Notes.—The Court has already settled the question of
controversy before it. A rehearing clearly presupposes the when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of
participation of the opposing parties for the purpose of presenting the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
additional evidence, if any, and further clarifying and simplifying
begins—the proclamation of a congressional candidate
their arguments.
To reiterate, neither the assenters nor dissenters can claim a following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
majority in the En Banc Resolution of November 6, 2007. The disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Resolution served no more than a record of votes, lacking in legal the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. (Jalosjos,
effect despite its pronouncement of reversal of the First Division Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 674 SCRA 530 [2012])
Resolution. Accordingly, the Comelec did not commit any grave The Department of Justice (DOJ) now conducts preliminary
abuse of discretion in ordering a rehearing.  (italics supplied;
23
investigation of election offenses concurrently with the
citation omitted) Comelec and no longer as mere deputies. (Arroyo vs.
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Department of Justice, 681 SCRA 181 [2012])
Comelec en banc did not issue an Order for a rehearing of ——o0o——
the case in view of the filing in the interim of the present
petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In both the cases
of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the
cases to the Comelec en banc for the conduct of the required
rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based
on these considerations, we thus find that a remand of this
case is necessary for the Comelec en banc to comply with
the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition and
REMAND SPR (BRGY-SK) No. 70-2011 to the Comelec en
banc for the conduct of the required rehearing under the
Comelec Rules of Procedure. The Comelec en banc is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with the rehearing with utmost
dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez,
Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
_______________
23 Id., at p. 774.

634
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 G.R. No. 192289. January 8, 2013.*
KAMARUDIN K. IBRAHIM, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ROLAN G. BUAGAS, respondents.  the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election returns are
Actions; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides
that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional
Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court on
certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.—Section 7,
Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part substantially provides
that any decision, order or ruling of any of the Constitutional
Commissions may be brought for review to the Supreme Court
on certiorari within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. The
orders, ruling and decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en
banc must be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial power. Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments and
orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.
Election Law; Pre-Proclamation Controversy; Omnibus Election
Code (OEC); Words and Phrases; A pre-proclamation controversy is
defined in Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code as referring to
any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by
any registered political party or coalition of parties before the
board or directly
_______________
* EN BANC.
130
130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections
233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.—A pre-
proclamation controversy is defined in Section 241 of the OEC as
referring to “any question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any
candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns.”
Same; Same; Same; Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code
restrictively enumerates the issues which can be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy.—Section 243 of the OEC restrictively
enumerates as follows the issues which can be raised in a pre-
proclamation controversy: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of
incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with
or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235
and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under
duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and (d) When substitute or
fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed,
the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.
Civil Law; Estoppel by Laches; A party may be estopped from
raising such jurisdictional question if he has actively taken part in
the very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the
court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him” is based on the doctrine
of estoppel by laches.—In Republic v. Bantigue Point Development
Corporation, 668 SCRA 158 (2012), we stated: The rule is settled
that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired
through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or
conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Consequently,
questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the
first time on appeal. The ruling of the Court of Appeals that “a
party may be estopped from raising such
131
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 131
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
[jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the
very proceeding which he questions, belatedly objecting to the
court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him” is based on the doctrine
of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first
enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29
(1968). In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the
proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings
therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse
Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-
litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the
unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by laches had
already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of
lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People, 285 SCRA 493
(1998), we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an exception
to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases
whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
Election Law; Board of Canvassers; The simple purpose and
duty of the canvassing board is to ascertain and declare the
apparent result of the voting while all other questions are to be
tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting elections or in
quo warranto proceedings.—Mastura v. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 493
(1998), is emphatic that: (T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial
body. It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns
submitted to it in due form. It has been said, and properly, that its
powers are limited generally to the mechanical or mathematical
function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the
election by adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate
as shown on the face of the returns before them, and then
declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. x x x. (Italics ours)
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to
ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting while all
other questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for
contesting elections or in quo warranto proceedings.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
and Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
George Erwin M. Garcia for petitioner.132
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
The Solicitor General for respondents.
REYES, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari  and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order1 filed under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court assailing the following resolutions of the
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC):
(a) Minute Resolution No. 09-09462 (December 22, 2009
Resolution), dated December 22, 2009, disqualifying the
petitioner herein, Kamarudin K. Ibrahim (Ibrahim), from the
2010 Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay, Maguindanao for
supposedly not being a registered voter of the said
municipality; and
(b) Resolution3 (May 6, 2010 Resolution) issued on May 6,
2010, relative to SPA Case No. 10-002 (MP) LOCAL, denying
Ibrahim’s opposition4 to Resolution No. 09-0946.
Antecedent Facts
On December 1, 2009, Ibrahim filed his certificate of
candidacy to run as Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay in the May 10,
2010 elections. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas
(Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said
municipality, forwarded to the COMELEC’s Law Department
(Law Department) the names of 20 candidates who were not
registered voters therein. The list 5 included Ibrahim’s name,
along with those of two candidates for mayor, one for vice-
mayor and 16 for councilor.
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 3-24.
2 Id., at pp. 26-29.
3 Id., at pp. 97-100.
4 Id., at pp. 66-73.
5 Please see Memorandum dated December 2, 2009, id., at p. 37.
133
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 133
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
In a Memorandum6 dated December 10, 2009, the Law
Department brought to the attention of the COMELEC en
banc the names of 56 candidates running for various posts in
Maguindanao and Davao del Sur who were not registered
voters of the municipalities where they sought to be elected.
The Law Department recommended the retention of the said
names in the Certified List of Candidates, but for the
COMELEC to motu proprio  institute actions against them for
disqualification and for violation of election laws. Thereafter,
the COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed December
22, 2009 Resolution approving, but with modification, the
Law Department’s recommendation in the following wise:
1. to disqualify the foregoing candidates for not being registered
voters of the respective municipalities where they seek to
be elected without prejudice to their filing of an opposition within
two (2) days from publication hereof; and
2. to file election offense cases against said candidates for
violation of Sec. 74 in relation to Sec. 262 of the Omnibus Election
Code.  (Italics ours)
7
 On January 8, 2010, Ibrahim and 50 other candidates filed
a Petition/Opposition8 to assail the Resolution dated
December 22, 2009. In the Petition/Opposition, which was
docketed as SPA 10-002 (MP) LOCAL, it was stressed that
some of those affected by the Resolution dated December
22, 2009 had participated as candidates in the 2004 and
2007 elections. If indeed they were not registered voters,
they should have been disqualified then. Further, it was
emphasized that the candidates who filed the
Petition/Opposition were permanent residents and were
domiciled at the place where they sought to be elected.
_______________
6 Portions of the Memorandum were quoted in the “Excerpt from the
Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the Commission on Elections
Held on December 22, 2009, id., at pp. 26-29.
7 Id., at p. 28.
8 Id., at pp. 66-73.  Arguments in Support of the Instant Petition
134
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
The COMELEC en banc denied the Petition/Opposition
through the herein assailed Resolution dated May 6, 2010.
The COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated December
22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued
by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of
Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim, among
other candidates, were not registered voters of Datu Unsay,
Maguindanao. The certification was issued in the
performance of official duty, hence, the presumption of
regularity attached to it in the absence of contrary evidence.
Ibrahim and company failed to adduce evidence proving their
allegations of registration and residence.
In the May 10, 2010 elections, during which time the
Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality,
Ibrahim obtained 446 votes, the highest number cast for the
Vice-Mayoralty race in Datu Unsay. 9 However, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by
Buagas, suspended Ibrahim’s proclamation on the basis of
Section 5, Rule 2510 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 11
Issue
Whether or not the COMELEC en banc acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it issued the Resolutions dated December
22, 2009 and May 6, 2010.
_______________
9  Please see City/Municipal Certificate of Canvass, id., at p. 102.
10 Sec. 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of
Canvass.—If the petition, for reasons beyond the control of the
Commission, cannot be decided before the completion of the canvass, the
votes cast for the respondent may be included in the counting and in the
canvassing; however, if the evidence of guilt is strong, his
proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received
the winning number of votes in such election. (Italics ours)
11 Please see Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of
Winning Candidates for Datu Unsay Mayor and Vice-Mayor, Rollo, p. 101.
135
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 135
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
Ibrahim posits that the MBOC is a ministerial body created
merely “to take the returns as made from the different voting
precincts, add them up and declare the result.” 12 As long as
the returns are on their face genuine and are signed by the
proper officers, sans indications of being spurious and forged,
they cannot be rejected on the ground of alleged questions
on the qualifications of voters and the existence of electoral
frauds and irregularities. Further, since Ibrahim received the
highest number of votes for Vice-Mayor, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of his eligibility, lest the will of
the electorate, which should be the paramount consideration,
be defeated.13
In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, 14 the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) proposes for the instant
Petition to be granted. The OSG points out that in Cipriano v.
Commission on Elections,15 this court nullified, for lack of
proper proceedings before their issuance, the resolutions
issued by the COMELEC relative to the cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy. The OSG emphasizes that similarly,
Ibrahim was disqualified as a candidate without prior notice
and hearing and he was given the chance to file an
opposition only after the issuance of the Resolution dated
December 22, 2009.
Further citing Bautista v. Comelec,16 the OSG argues that
jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy
pertains to the COMELEC sitting in division and not to the
COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc can only take
cognizance of petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy
_______________
12 Citing Abdullah Sangki v. COMELEC, et al., 129 Phil. 666, 673; 21
SCRA 1392, 1397 (1967).
13 Citing Sinaca v. Mula, 373 Phil. 896; 315 SCRA 266 (1999).
14 Rollo, pp. 115-138.
15 479 Phil. 677; 436 SCRA 45 (2004).
16 460 Phil. 459; 414 SCRA 299 (2003).
136
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
when the required number of votes for a division to reach a
decision, ruling, order or resolution is not obtained, or when
motions for reconsideration are filed to assail the said
issuances of a division.
The OSG likewise refers to Section 4(B)(3) 17 of Resolution
No. 869618 to stress that generally, the COMELEC
cannot motu proprio file petitions for disqualification against
candidates. Section 519 of the same resolution, however,
provides the only exception to the foregoing, to wit, that
certificates of candidacy of those running for the positions of
President, Vice-President, Senator and Party-List maybe
denied due course and canceled motu proprio by the
COMELEC based on grounds enumerated therein. While there
was a Petition for
_______________
17 B.  PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SECTION
68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR
LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION
xxxx
3.  The petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualification or
possessing some grounds for disqualification, shall be filed in ten (10)
legible copies, personally or through a duly authorized representative, by
any person of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or
coalition of political parties on the ground that the candidate does not
possess all the qualifications as provided by the Constitution or by existing
law or who possesses some grounds for disqualification as provided for by
the Constitution or by existing law.
x x x x (Italics ours)
18 Rules on Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10,
2010 Automated National and Local Elections, promulgated on November
11, 2010.
19 Sec. 5. Motu Proprio Cases.—The Commission may, at any time
before the election, motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel
any certificate of candidacy of any candidate for the positions of President,
Vice-President, Senator and Party-List xxx.
137
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 137
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
Disqualification20 filed by Bai Reshal S. Ampatuan against
Ibrahim and company, it was not the basis for the
COMELEC en banc’s issuance of the Resolutions dated
December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010. Instead, the
certification issued by Buagas was the basis for the
subsequent actions of the Law Department and the
COMELEC en banc leading to the issuance of the herein
assailed resolutions.
The OSG also invokes Section 16 21 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 867822 to assert that the MBOC had no authority to order
the suspension of Ibrahim’s proclamation. Upon motion, the
suspension of a winning candidate’s proclamation can be
ordered during the pendency of a disqualification case before
the COMELEC. However, only the COMELEC, as a tribunal, has
the authority to issue orders relative to cases pending before
it. The MBOC cannot substitute its own judgment for that of
the COMELEC’s. The MBOC can suspend a winning
candidate’s proclamation only when an actual issue within
the Board’s jurisdiction arises in the course of conducting a
canvass. The aforementioned issues include the commission
of violent and terrorist acts or the occurrence of a calamity at
the canvassing site. Absent any determination of irregularity
_______________
20 The petition, docketed as SPA No. 09-204 (DC), was dismissed
through a resolution (id., at pp. 91-96) issued on March 2, 2010 by the
COMELEC’s Second Division; Rollo, pp. 30-34.
21 Sec. 16. Effects of Disqualification.—Any candidate who has been
declared disqualified by final judgment shall not be voted for and the votes
cast in his favor shall not be counted. If, for any reason, he is not declared
disqualified by final judgment before the election and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes, the case shall continue and upon
motion of the petitioner, complainant, or intervenor, the proclamation of
such candidate may be ordered suspended during the pendency of the
said case whenever the evidence is strong. (Italics ours)
22 Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy and Nomination
of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the
May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections, promulgated on October 6,
2009.
138
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the
canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory
and ministerial duty of the MBOC concerned to count the
votes based on such returns and declare the result. 23
It is also the OSG’s position that Section 5, Rule 25 24 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure was irregularly worded for
using the word “shall” when Section 6 25 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6646,26 which the rules seek to implement, merely
employed the word “may.” The use of the word “may”
indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely
directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer
discretion.27
The COMELEC’s Contentions
In the Compliance28 filed with the court, the COMELEC
assails as improper Ibrahim’s immediate resort to the instant
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Despite the issuance of the herein assailed resolutions,
Ibrahim’s name was not stricken off from the certified list of
can-
_______________
23 Citing Grego v. Commission on Elections, 340 Phil. 591, 608; 274
SCRA 481, 499 (1997).
24 Supra note 10.
25 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence
of his guilt is strong. (Italics ours).
26 An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and
for Other Purposes, effective January 5, 1988.
27 Supra note 23, at p. 606; p. 497; citation omitted.
28 Rollo, pp. 146-158.
139
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 139
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
didates during the May 10, 2010 elections and the votes cast
for him were counted. Hence, no actual prejudice was caused
upon him as the COMELEC did not even direct the MBOC to
suspend his proclamation. It was the MBOC’s ruling which
resulted to the suspension of his proclamation. Such being
the case, Ibrahim should have instead filed a pre-
proclamation controversy before the COMELEC anchored on
the supposed illegality of the MBOC’s proceedings. Section
241 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881), otherwise known
as the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), defines pre-
proclamation controversies as referring to any questions
“pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter
raised x x x in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.”
Had Ibrahim instituted instead a pre-proclamation
controversy, the COMELEC could have corrected the MBOC’s
ruling, if indeed, it was erroneous.
The COMELEC further argues that Ibrahim was not denied
due process as he and the other candidates referred to in the
Resolutions dated December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were
given the opportunity to file their opposition. Ibrahim did file
his Petition/Opposition and sought reliefs from the COMELEC
en banc. Now, he should not be allowed to repudiate the
proceedings merely because the result was adverse to him.
Moreover, the OSG’s invocation of the doctrines enunciated
in Bautista v. Comelec29 is misplaced because in the said
case, there was a total absence of notice and hearing.
The COMELEC emphasizes that Ibrahim was undeniably
not a registered voter in Datu Unsay when he ran as Vice-
Mayor in the May 10, 2010 elections. He cannot possess any
mandate to serve as an elected official as by his act and
willful misrepresentations, he had deceived the electorate.
_______________
29 Supra note 16.
140
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
Our Ruling
We grant the instant Petition.
 Before resolving the merits of the petition, the court shall election returns.” Section 243 of the OEC restrictively
first dispose of the procedural issue raised by the COMELEC. enumerates as follows the issues which can be raised in a
Ibrahim properly resorted to the in- pre-proclamation controversy:
stant Petition filed under Rule 64 of (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of
the Rules of Court to assail the Reso- canvassers;
lutions dated December 22, 2009 and (b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain
May 6, 2010 of the COMELEC en banc. material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or
contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
The COMELEC seeks the dismissal of the instant Petition
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234,
on the basis of a technical ground, to wit, that Ibrahim’s 235 and 236 of this Code;
resort to a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 64 of the (c) The election returns were prepared under duress,
Rules of Court to challenge the Resolutions dated December threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously
22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 is improper. Ibrahim should have manufactured or not authentic; and
instead filed before the COMELEC a pre-proclamation (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted
controversy to allow the latter to correct the MBOC’s ruling if polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially
it was indeed erroneous. affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
The claim fails to persuade. candidates. 
Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution in part The illegality of the proceedings of the board of
substantially provides that any decision, order or ruling of canvassers is the first issue which may be raised in a pre-
any of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought for proclamation controversy. To illustrate, the proceedings are
review to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 30 days to be considered as illegal when the board is constituted not
from receipt of a copy thereof. The orders, ruling and in accordance
decisions rendered or issued by the COMELEC en banc  must _______________
be final and made in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi- 31 When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed.
judicial power.30 Further, Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of 32 Material defects in the election returns.
Court states that it shall govern the review of final judgments 33 When election returns appear to be tampered with or falsified.
34 Discrepancies in election returns.
and orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit. 142
_______________ 142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
30 Cayetano v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193846, April 12,
2011, 648 SCRA 561, 569. Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
with law, or is composed of members not enumerated
141 therein, or when business is transacted sans a quorum.
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 141 In the case at bar, the now assailed Resolutions dated
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections December 22, 2009 and May 6, 2010 were issued with
A pre-proclamation controversy is defined in Section 241 finality by the COMELEC en banc. Under the Constitution and
of the OEC as referring to “any question pertaining to or the Rules of Court, the said resolutions can be reviewed by
affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which way of filing before us a petition for certiorari. Besides, the
may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political issues raised do not at all relate to alleged irregularities in
party or coalition of parties before the board or directly with the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections appreciation of the election returns or to the composition and
233,31 234,32 23533 and 23634 in relation to the preparation, proceedings of the board of canvassers. What the instant
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the Petition challenges is the authority of the MBOC to suspend
Ibrahim’s proclamation and of the COMELEC en banc to issue “Sec.  78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a
the assailed resolutions. The crux of the instant Petition does certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny
not qualify as one which can be raised as a pre-proclamation due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be
controversy. filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under
The COMELEC en banc is devoid
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
of authority to disqualify Ibrahim time not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of
as a candidate for the position of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due
Vice-Mayor of Datu Unsay. notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
Section 3(C), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution explicitly election.”
provides: In relation thereto, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to certificate of candidacy for an elective office may be filed with the
expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation Law Department of the COMELEC on the ground that the candidate
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in has made a false material representation in his certificate. The
division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions petition may be heard and evidence received by any official
shall be decided by the Commission en banc. (Italics ours) designated by the COMELEC after which the case shall be decided
by the COMELEC itself.
Further, the circumstances obtaining in Bautista v. Under the same Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition
Comelec35 cited by the OSG in its Manifestation are similar to to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in
those attendant to the instant Petition. In Bautista, the Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be
election entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of
_______________ votes
35 Supra note 16. 144

143 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 143
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
officer reported to the Law Department that Bautista was
ineligible to run as a candidate by reason of his being an
unregistered voter. The Law Department recommended to
the COMELEC en banc to deny due course or cancel
Bautista’s certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC en
banc adopted the recommendation and consequently issued
a resolution. In the said case, this Court discussed the
COMELEC en banc’s jurisdiction over petitions for
disqualification, for denial of due course, or cancellation of
certificates of candidacy in the following wise:
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., the Court held that it is the COMELEC
sitting in division and not the COMELEC en banc which has
jurisdiction over petitions to cancel a certificate of candidacy. The
Court held:
The Omnibus Election Code, in Section 78, Article IX, governs
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in
the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions,
resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are
resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
xxxx
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, a petition for the denial or cancellation of a certificate of
candidacy must be heard summarily after due notice. It is thus
clear that cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of the
quasi-judicial functions of the COMELEC which the COMELEC in
division should first decide. More so in this case where the
cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a
report of the election officer regarding the lack of qualification of
the candidate in the barangay election. The COMELEC en
banc cannot short cut the proceedings by acting on the case
without a prior action by a division because it denies due process to
the candidate.  (Citation omitted and italics ours)
36

the procedure to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy, viz.:
 In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through
the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahim’s
disqualification even when no complaint or petition
was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed
before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due
course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78
of the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have
been instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly
being an unregistered voter of Datu Unsay disqualified him
from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation
as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview
of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to
assume that a proper petition had been filed, the
COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which
by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential
declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its
divisions.
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 474, 477; pp. 309, 312.
145
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 145
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
Ibrahim is not estopped from
challenging the COMELEC en banc’s
jurisdiction to issue the
assailed resolutions.
In Republic v. Bantigue Point Development
Corporation,37 we stated:  Interminably, we have declared that deprivation of due
The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission
of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if
raised for the first time on appeal.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that “a party may be
estopped from raising such [jurisdictional] question if he has
actively taken part in the very proceeding which he questions,
belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the
judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him” is
based on the doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that
doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In
Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings
before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years
thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits
from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower
court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we
held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-
litigant from raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In
Figueroa v. People, we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as
an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most
exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the
latter case.  (Citations omitted and italics ours)
38
As enunciated above, estoppel by laches can only be
invoked in exceptional cases with factual circumstances
similar
_______________
37 G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 158.
38 Id., at pp. 163-164.
146
146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
to those in Tijam.39 In the case now before us, the assailed
resolutions were issued on December 22, 2009 and May 6,
2010. The instant Petition, which now raises, among others,
the issue of the COMELEC en banc’s jurisdiction, was filed on
June 3, 2010. With the prompt filing of the instant Petition,
Ibrahim can hardly be considered as guilty of laches.
Ibrahim was not denied due
process.
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.40
In the case before us, Ibrahim was afforded the chance to
file an opposition to the assailed resolutions. Nonetheless,
even if due process was substantially observed, the assailed
resolutions remain null and void for want of authority on the
part of the COMELEC en banc to take cognizance of a matter
which should have instead been referred to one of its
divisions.
The MBOC has no authority to suspend
Ibrahim’s proclamation especially since
the herein assailed resolutions, upon
which the suspension was anchored,
were issued by the COMELEC en banc
outside the ambit of its jurisdiction.
Mastura v. COMELEC41 is emphatic that:
_______________
39 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968).
40 Villarosa v. COMELEC, 377 Phil. 497, 504; 319 SCRA 470, 476
(1999); citation omitted.
41 349 Phil. 423; 285 SCRA 493 (1998).
147
VOL. 688, JANUARY 8, 2013 147
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
(T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined by
law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted to it in due
form. It has been said, and properly, that its powers are limited
generally to the mechanical or mathematical function of
ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by
adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on
the face of the returns before them, and then declaring or
certifying the result so ascertained. x x x.  (Italics ours)
42
The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is to
ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting while
all other questions are to be tried before the court or other
tribunal for contesting elections or in quo
warranto proceedings. 43
In the case at bar, the MBOC motu proprio suspended
Ibrahim’s proclamation when the issue of the latter’s
eligibility is a matter which the board has no authority to
resolve. Further, under Section 644 of R.A. 6646, the COMELEC
and not the MBOC has the authority to order the suspension
of a winning candidates’s proclamation. Such suspension can
only be ordered upon the motion of a complainant or
intervenor relative to a case for disqualification, or a petition
to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy
pending before the COMELEC, and only when the evidence of
the winning candidate’s guilt is strong. Besides, the
COMELEC en banc itself could not have properly ordered
Ibrahim’s disqualification because in taking cognizance of the
matter, it had already exceeded its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant
petition is GRANTED. The December 22, 2009 and May 6,
2010 Resolutions issued by the COMELEC en banc is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the suspension by
the MBOC of Ibrahim’s proclamation on the basis of the
_______________
42 Id., at p. 430; p. 500.
43 Supra note 23, at p. 609; p. 500, citing Dizon v. Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Laguna, 52 Phil. 47 (1929).
44 Supra note 25.
148
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections
herein assailed resolutions is likewise ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. In the absence of a judgment, order or resolution
relative to another action or petition finally disqualifying
Ibrahim, denying due course or cancelling his certificate of
candidacy, the MBOC of Datu Unsay is directed to convene
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof and to proclaim
Ibrahim as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor of the said
municipality.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, COMELEC Resolutions en banc annulled
and set aside.
Notes.—The purpose of a pre-proclamation controversy is
to ascertain the winner or winners in the election on the basis
of the election returns duly authenticated by the board of
inspectors and admitted by the board of canvassers; The
Board of Canvassers and the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) are not to look beyond or behind electoral
returns. (Abayon vs. Commission on Elections, 583 SCRA 472
[2009])
Not every question bearing on or arising from the
elections may constitute a ground for a pre-proclamation
controversy. (Suhuri vs. Commission on Elections, 602 SCRA
633 [2009])
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