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 T H E

H I S T o R Y
O F T H E L A T E

WAR IN G E R MANY.,
B E T W E E N THE

KI NG OF P R U S S I A,
A N D T H E

EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES,

 T H E

H I S T O R Y
O F T H E L A T E

WA R IN G E R M A NY,
B E T W E E N T H E

K I N G O F PR U S S I A,
A N D T H E

EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES :

C O N TA IN IN G

I. Reflections on the GENERAL PRIN IV. The operations of the cAMPAIGN's

ciples of w AR, and on the compoſition and
charaćters of the different Armies in Europe.
II, Explanation of the cauſes of the war.
III. A MILITARY DEscRIPTION of the
seat of war ; wherein all the important
fortreſſes, poſitions, camps, rivers, roads,
defiles, &c. are indicated.
- W I T H
of 1756 and 1757: with REFLEctions on
the moſt conſiderable tranſačtions : from
whence the PRINciples of war are deduced
and explained; and the reaſons, which moſt
immediately contributed to the deciſion of
them, given.

A MAP of the seat of war; and PLANs of the Battles of Lowofitz, Prague, Chotzemitz,
or Kollin, Roſbach, Breſlaw, Liſſa, and Groſs Jagerſdorff.

BY M A J O R - G E N E R A L LLO Y D,
who ſerved ſeveral Campaigns in the Auſtrian Army. -

Bellum maxime memorabile omnium, quae unquam geſta ſint, me ſcripturum, quod Annibale duce Carthagi
nienſes cum populo Romano geſſere. Nam neque validiores opibus ulle inter ſe civitates genteſque contulerunt
arma: neque his ipſis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit et haud ignotas belli artes inter ſe, ſed
expertas primo Punico conferebant bello, et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepſºue Mars fuit, ut propius
#triculo fuerint, qui vicere, odiis etian prope majoribus certarunt, quam viribur.
L IV.

P A R T I.

- L O N ID O N:
Printed for S. HoOPER, N° 41, St. MARTIN's LAN E, Corner of May's Buildings.
M Dcc Lxxxi.
 - -
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H 1 S T o R Y

WAR in GERMANY.
P R E L I M I N A R Y D IS C. O U R S E.

N order to convey a more clear idea of the hiſtory of this

I war, and of its various operations; we think it may be uſeful

previouſly to ſhew the motives which induced the ſeveral
powers of Europe to undertake it. And alſo to give an exact de
ſcription of the country where it was carried on ; becauſe, the
knowledge of theſe two points will, it is imagined, enable the
the reader to form a proper judgment of the generals who
condućted the different armies, and of the propriety of their ma
noeuvres, to obtain the end each had in view.
As the reaſons which determined England to declare war againſt
France are generally known: a detail of them would be needleſs.
We ſhall therefore relate thoſe of other nations only.

of F R A N C E.
HE French convinced from experience, nothing could more
effectually contribute to realize that ſuperiority, which they
arrogated to themſelves in Europe, than the cultivation and improve
2 b ment
.*
ii H 1 s To R Y of the WA R

ment of their American colonies, reſolved, on concluding the peace

of Aix la Chapelle, to promote with care and vigilance every ſcheme
that ſeemed calculated to diſtreſs our, and advance their own ſettle
ments. The firſt ſtep towards accompliſhing this end, was to find
a means to cut off our communication with the Indians, on whoſe
friendſhip the greatneſs of our colonies much depends. This, in
the end, would naturally unite them to the French, who could fur
niſh them with what they wanted in exchange for the different
commodities of that country, and by degrees be made an inſtru
ment to drive us out of it. They begun to execute their plan by
eſtabliſhing a chain of forts behind our ſettlements, and by occupying
many countries, until then, thought, at leaſt neutral. Though they
had not as yet compleated it, what was already done had ſuch an
i, fluence on our inland trade, as made us tremble at the fatal con
ſequences which would neceſſarily follow, if we did not, in time, ex
ert ourſelves and repel the injuries they intended us. Some meaſures,
though ineffectual, were taken for that purpoſe, and hoſtilities were
ordered to be committed againſt the French both in Europe and
America. As they were not prepared ſufficiently to avow their pre
tenſions, they only oppoſed remonſtrances and a ſeeming moderation
to our repeated attacks. By this means they propoſed to gain time,
make us relax in our preparations, and render us odious to the other
courts of Europe. In all which they ſucceeded, more or leſs, as
the hiſtory of thoſe times, fully evinces. -

Finding at length that the conteſt muſt be decided by arms, and

that however formidable their land army was, the diſpute in Ame
rica was unequal, and would probably be determined in our favour,
as it depended intirely on the means of tranſporting and ſuſtain
ing an army there, and conſequently was intimately connected
with a ſuperiority at ſea; they wiſely formed a ſcheme for at--
- - tacking
 in G E R M A NY. . . iii.

tacking Hanover; the conqueſt of which they ſuppoſed eaſy, and

from the king's natural affection for that country, they hoped a reſti
tution of it would make them regain whatever they loſt in Ame
rica, or procure them ſome other advantages. In the mean time
their army would be maintained from the contributions to be raiſed
in the conquered country, and by its poſition on the Elbe, overawe
Germany, and effectually give laws to the contending parties.
This plan was in the beginning attended with all the ſucceſs
imaginable, and in the end was rendered ineffectual, only by the
rapaciouſneſs and ignorance of the French general who then com
manded. -

The French ſyſtem was, we think, well concerted and even

great. They had then, including the militia, near 220,000 men,
maintained at a great expence; theſe would remain intirely uſeleſs,
if the war was limited to America, or even to England, for want of
a marine, which could not be formed in time of war; and the leſs
ſo, as we had already acquired too great a ſuperiority. -

A German War, was for all theſe reaſons both eligible and neceſ
ſary, the expence of it to them, was comparatively nothing at all,
being reduced to the fimple difference, between maintaining an
army in the field, and keeping it at home. They had troops ſuffi
cient to form an army in Germany, to guard their country, and to
conquer America; ſuppoſing their marine had been capable to pro
tećt their tranſports into that country. To ſupply this extraordi
nary expence, they propoſed making every country between the
Rhine and the Elbe contribute. This they believed would produce
more than ſufficient for that purpoſe ; ſo that they would have an
immenſe army maintained and enriched at the expence of others.
Add to this, that being limitrophes, this alone gave them infinite
advantages over us. - * - - *

b 2 Whereas
iv. H is To R Y of the WA R
Whereas if England propoſed ſending an army into Germany, ſhe
muſt form it out of nothing, that is, ſhe had not one man as yet
inliſted for that purpoſe, and whatever Engliſh would be ſent there
muſt be replaced by new levies, in order to carry on the neceſſary
war in America. As to the Germans, they knew we muſt pay for
them at an extraordinary price, all which expence muſt be paid by
England alone, as it was not poſſible ſhe could make any conqueſt
to bear any confiderable part of it. Theſe circumſtances, the
French naturally ſuppoſed, would exhauſt the nation's treaſure, call
the king's attention, conſequently that of his miniſters to the
affairs of Germany, relax our preparations for America, produce
murmurs in the people, diſunion in our counſels, and at laſt reduce
us to the neceſſity of ſubmitting to whatever terms they ſhould
think fit to impoſe. To them much more juſtly may be applied
that remarkable ſaying, America was conquered in Germany. The
only or at leaſt the moſt probable means they had of ſaving or
conquering America, was to carry on the war with ſucceſs in
Germany.
It was indifferent to the French, whether they entered Germany
as allies to Pruſſia, or Auſtria, as either would anſwer the obječt
they had in view. It is probable, however, they would have
choſe the firſt connexion, as they could with more eaſe hurt the
Auſtrians than the Pruſſians. Being informed of our alliance with
Ruſſia, they inſtantly ſent a miniſter to Pruſſia to conclude a treaty
on the ſame footing as that in the war of 1741; but finding we had
been forced to renounce the alliance of the former, and embrace that

of the latter, they naturally accepted the friendſhip of the two im

perial courts, and under pretence of fulfilling their engagements
contracted by this new alliance, they immediately prepared an army
of above 100,000 men, about 20,000 of which were deſtined to
march
 in G E R M A N Y. V

march to the Mayn, and from thence where the empreſs ſhould
chooſe; the remainder, which was to form the main army, was or
dered to the lower Rhine, and from thence proceed againſt Han
nover and its allies. The command of this army was given to
Marſhal D’Etries, as a recompenſe for having negotiated the
treaty of Verſailles; and had not the favour of an intriguing miſ
treſs prevailed in the choice of thoſe employed afterwards to
execute the French plan, all the efforts of England and its allies
though ſupported by ſome of the ableſt generals, that this or
any age has produced, could not in all probability have pre
vented its future ſucceſs. -

Of A U S T R I A.

H E empreſs had ever refle&ted on the loſs of Sileſia with

infinite regret, being attended with a very great diminution
of her revenues and power. Theſe thoughts were aggravated by
obſerving the aſcendancy which this additional power gave the
king of Pruſſia, whom it is ſaid ſhe perſonally diſliked: ſhe ſaw him
treated every where with reſpect, feared and courted by moſt of
the courts in Europe. No wonder therefore, that animated with
theſe ſentiments, ſhe ſhould form a plan for recovering Sileſia.
This ſeems to have been the chief obječt of her counſels, ever fince
ſhe had ceded it to Pruſſia, as appears evident, from the papers
publiſhed by the king on this ſubject. She applied to the empreſs
of Ruſſia, and irritated that princeſs againſt the king of Pruſſia to
ſuch a degree, that ſhe was eaſily prevailed upon to concur in
any meaſures concerted for his ruin. The two imperial Courts
were therefore united, by new and ſtrong alliances: the objećt of
which was very extenſive, and tended not only to the recovery of
Sileſia;
vi H Is To R v of the WA R

Sileſia; but to annihilate the king of Pruſſia, whoſe dominions they

propoſed dividing among them. The better to accompliſh this end,
they invited the king of Poland to accede to this alliance. He
however declined it, till he ſaw the two empreſſes ačt with ſuch
vigour, as would make it ſafe for him to declare againſt Pruſſia.
Experience had taught him that the Pruſſians could oppreſs him with
more eaſe and facility, than the Auſtrians protećt him.
The Auſtrian miniſter at Peterſburg had contributed all he could
to the ſucceſs of the treaty of ſubſidy between that court and
England, with a view to make us, as uſual, pay the expence of thoſe
Troops, which the two imperial courts intended to employ only for
their own particular ſervice in attacking Pruſſia, and thereby facili
tate the recovery of Sileſia. Probably things would have gone to
their wiſhes, if the king of Pruſſia had not declared he would con
fider as enemies thoſe who brought any foreign troops into the
empire; which indicated plainly he would not only hinder the
Ruſſians from coming to the ſuccour of Hannover in caſe of need,
but would perhaps treat that electorate as an enemy's country. The
king of England very juſtly conſidered, that the Ruſſians would be
of no uſe to him, to protećt his German dominions, if they were at
war with Pruſſia. For whatever ſucceſs they might have on the
Baltick againſt that prince, they could never hinder him, being ſo
very near, from occupying the electorate, a country without any
natural or artificial ſtrength.
For which reaſon his majeſty very prudently, as we think, pre
ferred the friendſhip of Pruſſia, and renounced to that of the two
empreſſes. That of Germany, for whoſe advantage alone the alli
ance with Ruſſia had been made, being thus diſappointed, eaſily.
perſuaded the other to break her treaty with us; and the more
ſo, as theſe courts never had any other object in forming it, than
- to receive
 . . . . in G E R MA NY. . vii

to receive a ſubſidy that would enable them to carry their ſchemes

againſt Pruſſia into execution, and by no means to ačt in concert
with us, but on condition we concurred likewiſe in the plan
they had formed for his ruin. Our connexions therefore with him,
brought the treaty with Ruſſia to nothing, and very naturally pro
duced another alliance between the two imperial courts and that of
France, whoſe views we have already explained.

Of P R U S S I A.

H E late king of Pruſſia had cultivated the arts of peace, I

mean thoſe which fall more particularly under the cognizance
of a prince, juſtice and interior policy, from principle. The military
art rather for ſhew, than with any particular view, or love of glory.
He had left at his death 67,ooo men well diſciplined, and his maga
zines abundantly furniſhed with artillery, ſtores, &c.
The death of the then emperor Charles VI. left the affairs of the
houſe of Auſtria, in the utmoſt confuſion, and diſtreſs. This the
king of Pruſſia thought a favourable opportunity to aſſert the claims
he had to ſome part of Sileſia, and by ſuch a bold enterprize, at the
| beginning of his reign, ſatisfy the ambition he had, to appear a for
midable and enterpriſing power, capable to hold the ballance of the
empire, and protećt thoſe princes who ſhould hereafter recur to him
for ſuccour. He was the firſt who began the war againſt the em
preſs, which having ſucceeded to his wiſh, he concluded by a treaty
that gave him all Sileſia. -

The recovery of this moſt fruitful province had been the principal
objećt of the Auſtrian counſels ever ſince, which finiſhed, as we
have already related in an alliance with Ruſſia calculated for that
end. Though they had for many years been occupied by this one
objećt
 2.

viii H 1 s To R Y of the WA R

objećt, yet in 1756, they were not prepared to put it in execution,

and had fixed the following year for that purpoſe.
The king of Pruſſia perfeótly informed of what they had projećted
againſt him, thought it prudent to anticipitate their operati
ons, and attack the principal power of the confederacy, whom,
being as yet unprepared, he hoped to cruſh, and thereby diſſolve the
league before they could unite and bring their plan to bear. With
this view he entered Saxony: This brought on the general war in
Germany, of which we propoſe giving an exact account in the fol
lowing Work.

Of S A X O N Y.

V AR ICE, an impotent ambition, a ſpirit of intrigue

combined with indolence, a total neglect of every thing
that tended to the welfare and intereſt of the country, an immo
derate love for ſhews, pleaſures, and pageantry, had been long the
charaćteriſtics of this court. No wonder the man who governed in
the name of a too indulgent maſter, had brought with him into the
miniſtry thoſe habits he had contračted while a page. Attendance
coſt him nothing, his life had been diſſipated in the idle and trifling
occupations of a courtier; his great and indeed only talent was the s!'º
profuſion of an eaſtern monarch, which his vile partiſans called
magnificence. He was affiduous only in beſieging his royal maſter,
to prevent truth and virtue from approaching him ; ſo that this
humane and good prince, who had the greateſt defire to promote
the good of his people, was never permitted to know they were
unhappy and wanted his protećtion. Though this miniſter knew
- that
 in G E R M A N Y. - ix

that the abjećt ſtate, to which his bad condućt had reduced Saxony,
made it impoſſible for him to undertake any thing of conſequence.
He was, however, always intriguing with the courts of Vienna,
and Peterſburg, and forming projećts for aggrandiſing Saxony, at
the expence of Pruſſia without having prepared any one means of
realifing this vain chimera, or even provided for the common defence
of the country. The money raiſed with difficulty on the poor ſub
jećt, to provide an army for his defence, was diſſipated in building
magnificent palaces for the favourite, in expenſive journeys, &c.
to ſatisfy his abjećt and low vanity: ſo that the country, which
might eaſily raiſe and maintain an army of 50,000 men, had ſcarce
15,000 without artillery or magazines; and therefore fell an eaſy
prey to an ambitious and powerful invader.

Of R U S S I A.

H O U G H the plan, formed and purſued with unwearied

aćtivity and vigilance by Peter the Great, had not fince his
death, been cultivated with equal care and ſucceſs; however, what
he had already done, made this empire powerful; and therefore
reſpected and careſſed. The vaſt extent of this empire, the variety
of its produćtions, and the number of its inhabitants, form ſo many
and ſuch great ſources of power, that a ſmall neglect, which
in leſſer ſtates would be immediately and ſeverely felt, paſs in this
country unnoticed, and produce no ſenſible or direct bad effect.
Its reſources are ſo many, that in ſome meaſure they may be ſaid
to ſupply thoſe miſtakes which happen in the adminiſtration, and
C have
 * -

X H 1 s to Ry of the WAR

have kept up the luſtre of the empire, though the plan of the firſt
Peter has not been ſteadily adhered to. -

While the Ottoman empire was formidable, this court and that
of Vienna were naturally connected. The fear of a common, and
powerful enemy, united them by the ſtrong tye of mutual ſafety.
Since the decline of the Turkiſh empire, ſhe finds it no leſs neceſſary
to cultivate the friendſhip of other princes, particularly that of the
maritime powers, who take off a vaſt quantity of uſeleſs commo
dities. This brings a proportionable ſum of money into the
empire, which, there circulating, puts that vaſt machine in motion,
and renders it therefore formidable. Hence the facility, or rather
avidity with which the northern powers in general embrace every
opportunity of taking ſubſidies. The luxury and magnificence of
their courts are thereby kept up, and their princes abundantly
ſupplied with all the ſuperfluities, which vanity has made neceſſary,
and their armies maintained at the expence of others. To theſe
general motives may be added others, the late empreſs of Ruſſia
had, as we have already ſaid, conceived a moſt violent averſion to
the king of Pruſſia, and therefore readily concurred in any meaſure
concerted for his humiliation, and the more ſo, as they flattered her
with the hopes of extending her dominions on the Baltick, a thing
long aimed at, by the Ruſſians; ſhe therefore with pleaſure con
trađted an alliance with us, which would enable her to execute the
deſigns of her hatred and politicks at our expence. But finding
we would not break with Pruſſia, ſhe inſtantly renounced our friend
ſhip, and embraced that of France, who promiſed her ſuch ſubſi
dies, as would enable her to put her troops in motion, and act accord
ing to her own principle.

No country
 r

in G E R M A N Y. - X]

Of S W E D E N.

N O country has in ſo ſhort a time changed the principles of

its conſtitution ſo much as this, except Denmark. Sweden
in a very few years, from a moſt deſpotick government, as it was
in Charles the XIIth's time, is now the moſt limited monarchy in
Europe. Denmark, on the contrary, in near the ſame period,
from a free government, is become intirely deſpotick. Neither ſeems
to have got much by the revolution, as the power and credit of
either does not appear to have been thereby augmented at home or
abroad, particularly Sweden, whoſe intereſts in foreign courts is
much ſunk. The power of the crown is too limited, and that of
the different ſtates which form the conſtitution, too complicated,
to admit of any plan that requires wiſdom in deliberation, and
vigour in the execution. An attempt was made ſome years ago to
change the conſtitution, by augmenting the power of the crown,
which could not have been executed without endangering the lives
and fortunes of many: it was diſcovered in time, and ſome of the
authors puniſhed; as thoſe who endeavour to ſubvert the conſtitu
tion in favour of tyranny juſtly deſerve. Though the plot was ren
dered vain, it left, however, an univerſal ſpirit of diſcontent, not
to ſay hatred and animoſity againſt the court, whom they naturally
ſuppoſed had favoured at leaſt, if not promoted a plot, calculated
merely to augment the influence of the crown. They ſeemed
particularly exaſperated againſt the queen, a woman of ſuperior
talents, and fiſter to the king of Pruſſia, to whoſe inſtigation they
attributed the attempt made againſt their liberty. The French,
C 2. who
xii H is to R Y of the iW A R

who by ſubſidies, and that ſpirit of intrigue which diſtinguiſh their

miniſters in every court, laid hold of this occaſion, to make the
Swedes declare againſt his Pruſſian majeſty. The war, however,
being undertaken againſt the will of the king, was proſecuted with
out vigour, and they therefore embraced the firſt opportunity of
concluding a peace, which they never ought to have broke. The
Swedes muſt keep a watchful eye on the Ruſſians, who aim at
further conqueſts on the Baltick: this cannot be executed, without
endangering the ſafety of Sweden. Pruſſia and Denmark have a
common intereſt in oppoſing the progreſs of the Ruſſians. How
impolitick therefore were the Swedes to have acted on quite con
trary principles. Had the confederacy ſucceeded againſt Pruſſia,
Sweden and Denmark, particularly the former, would have been
the vićtims of their bad policy, and fell an eaſy prey to the ambi
tion of Ruſſia. -

THESE
 -, . . . .A

MILITARY DESCRIPTION
of T H E

S E A T of w A R.
Of Bo H E M I A and won avia
H E S E two great provinces belong to the empreſs of
| Germany. They are ſeparated from Sileſia, Luſatia, Saxony,
and part of Bavaria, and Auſtria, by a continued chain of
very high mountains, which neceſſarily renders the communication
between thoſe countries very difficult, there being very few mili
tary roads ". The firſt of theſe goes from Olmutz, in Moravia, to
a town called Sternberg, and there divides itſelf into two; the one
goes by Hoff to Troppau, and Jägerndorff, in the Auſtrian Sileſia;
the other paſſes by Friedland, Wurbenthal, and Zuckmantel, and
from thence goes to Neiſs. Theſe two roads, particularly the laſt,
may be confidered as one continual defile, formed by the mountains,
ravins, rivers, &c. and therefore may, no doubt, be defended by
a few troops, if properly placed, againſt a numerous army. The
Pruſſians have indeed one very great advantage: they can, by ſend
ing two corps, the one by Jägerndorff, and the other, out of the
• A road where infantry, cavalry, heavy artillery, and all kind of carriages can paſs.
w county
xiv H 1 s To R Y of the WA R.

county of Glatz, from Habelſchwert towards Altſtat, and Schon

berg, force the Auſtrians to quit any poſition they may take, be
tween Freudenthal and Neiſs, by cutting off their communication
with Olmutz, from whence they muſt neceſſarily draw their ſub
fiſtence. Whereas theſe can take no central poſition, that will effec
tually hinder the Pruſſians from entering Moravia, by the way of
Zuckmantel, from the county of Glatz, and by Troppau, and
unite theſe three columns with ſafety; Olmutz being too far back,
can be of no uſe to guard the paſſages beween Moravia and Sileſia.
As the king of Pruſſia cannot from any place, more conveniently,
carry on the war againſt the empreſs's dominions, than from Neiſs,
into Moravia, nor where his ſucceſſes would be attended with more
fatal conſequences ; it is ſurpriſing her majeſty has not thought
proper to oppoſe, on that ſide, a ſtronger barrier than Olmutz,
which is certainly a very indifferent place. The fine defence gene
ral Marſhal made, during the laſt war, was owing as much to the
weakneſs of the Pruſſian army, as to his own talents and vigilance,
as will evidently appear by the hiſtory of that famous fiege. This
fortreſs is ſo far back, that it leaves all the avenues leading from
Sileſia and Glatz, into Moravia, quite open, and a conſiderable
body of men cannot be ſent far into the mountains, without evi
dent riſk: nothing would be more efficacious to check the Pruſſians,
than the building a fortreſs, either in the neighbourhood of Alſtadt,
or between, Freudenthal and Zuckmantel; or laſtly, between
Jägerndorff, and Johanniſthal. The firſt, would be a check on Glatz
and Neiſs, at the ſame time, and enable the Auſtrians to make con
tinual incurfions into thoſe two provinces, without any riſk: nor
does it appear poſſible for the Pruſſians to penetrate into Moravia,
either from Glatz or Neiſs, without previouſly taking this
- fortreſs
 in G E R M A. N. Y. . .. .
1
* *
XV

fortreſs; becauſe a corps of troops poſted here, and ſuſtained by a

ſtrong garriſon, would cut off all communication with thoſe two
places, and ſoon force an army that would advance towards Olmutz,
to fall back or periſh.
The ſecond and third, would, indeed, effectually hinder the Pruſ
fians from advancing into Moravia, ’till they had taken them : but
the fiege of them would be more eaſy, becauſe ſuch a body of troops
might be ſent from upper Sileſia, and from Glatz, to ſeize the
defiles between them, and Moravia, as would make it impoſſible
to relieve them.
Moſt men think that a camp, or fortreſs, is well placed, if they
cannot be approached without great difficulty, which is true only,
in caſe they have in themſelves all the reſources neceſſary for their
defence; but as that ſeldom or ever happens, the perfeótion of
the one and the other would be, to find a fituation that preſents to
the enemy all the difficulties poſſible ; and which, at the ſame time,
may be eaſily ſuccoured, if neceſſary. The difficulty to find ſuch a
fituation, or the want of that ſure, coup d'oeil, has determined many
engineers, to chooſe the plains for their fortreſſes, which frees
them from the cenſure of having ill choſe their ground, and flatters
their vanity, by giving them an opportunity, to produce all the
different works they have ſeen in the ſchools, and make ſuch a fine
appearance on paper.
Another road goes from Olmutz, by Litau and Alſtadt, into the
county of Glatz. The next principal road, is that, which goes from
the circle of Königſgratz, by Neuſtat and Nachod, into the county of
Glatz, and from thence into the other provinces of Sileſia: it is not
leſs difficult than the others above-mentioned, being like them, one
continual defile, particularly, when it enters the Pruſſian domini
ons, where it is almoſt impoſſible for a conſiderable body of troops
to march, if they meet with any reſiſtance; eſpecially, in going
from
xvi H 1 s to Ry of the WA R

from Bohemia towards Glatz, as the mountains riſe gradually; from

whence appears, that the Pruſſians can with more eaſe penetrate into
Bohemia, than the Auſtrians can, into the county of Glatz. The firſt
have another confiderable advantage; they can be provided with every
thing from the fortreſs of Glatz, which gives them a ſafe retreat,
when puſhed back by ſuperior forces : they are maſters of the ave
nues which lead into Bohemia; which, being intirely open and
fruitful, they can enter with eaſe, and ſubſiſt for a confiderable
time; whereas the Auſtrians cannot enter the country of Glatz at
all, if the paſſes are properly guarded, and even ſhould they force
back the poſts placed in them, they can find no ſubſiſtence in the
country, and muſt begin their operations by the fiege of Glatz,
which, from its very advantageous ſituation, can ſcarce be taken,
though left to the defence of its own garriſon, and certainly not at alſ,
if there is a confiderable body of troops in the country to ſuſtain it.
- The hiſtory of the laſt and preceding wars, confirms what is here
advanced. In the firſt, it was reduced by famine, and, in the laſt,
chance, cowardice, and ignorance, of all which, general Laudhon
took proper advantages, were the immediate cauſes of its being
taken. - - º

The next road goes likewiſe from the circle of Konigſgratz, by:
Trautenau and Landſhut, to Schweidnitz, and Jauer, in Sileſia.
This, like the others, is a continual defile, and ſo difficult, that
when the paſſes are properly guarded, no army can penetrate into
Sileſia, on this ſide. The Pruſſians have a fine poſition near Land
ſhut, from whence they may, by an eaſy march on the left, cover the
road that goes from Friedland to Schweidnitz, and ſuſtain effectually
any corps, they may ſend to Schmidberg and Hirſchberg. It was
from this camp that Fouquet, with an inconfiderable army, ſo
often
 in G E R M A N Y. xvii

often baffled the attempts made by the Auſtrians, though much

ſuperior, to penetrate that way into Sileſia, and was at laſt over
powered, and intirely defeated in it, by his own fault.
The Pruſſians have here the ſame advantages as on the fide of
Glatz. The fortreſs of Schweidnitz, being another place of arms,
ſupplys them with every thing they want; and being ſo near, ena
bles them to begin their operations, much ſooner than the Auſtrians.
The mountains are filled with villages, where an army may be
put in cantonments with ſafety, if care is taken to occupy the
defiles, between them and Bohemia, which they can do with eaſe,
being within the Pruſſian dominions: nothing therefore, can hinder
them from invading that province on this fide, even if the Auſtrians
had an army there; becauſe that army cannot take any poſition
nearer the avenues that lead into it; than behind the Elbe, ſome
where between Konigſhoff and Königſgraatz, which can, effectu
ally, hinder the Pruſſians from advancing any farther; but cannot
prevent their entring it.
When one conſiders that the Pruſſians muſt, from the ſituation
of their country, make their chief efforts on this fide, as well,
becauſe they can penetrate with ſafety in various columns, can be
ſupplied, abundantly, from Glatz and Schweidnitz, with proviſi
ons, ſtores, &c. and can retire without danger in caſe of misfortune,
one is amazed, to ſee her majeſty leave this province, entirely, de
fenceleſs, and expoſed to the continual ravages of the enemy.
As there is no kind of fortreſs, nothing leſs than an army, can de
fend it againſt the incurſions, that may be made from the county
of Glatz, and from the mountains of Landſhut.
If the enemy once paſſes the Elbe, above Konigſgratz, all the
provinces on theright of that river, muſt be abandoned ; the troops
poſted on the frontiers of Luſatia, muſt inſtantly, fall back to Prague,
d for
XV111 H 1 s To R Y of the WAR

for fear of being cut off. Even the army itſelf muſt fall back into
the circle of Chrudim, in order to cover Moravia, and keep open
the communication with Auſtria and the Danube. Whereas, if a
fortreſscapable of containing Io, ooo foot and 4ooo horſe, was
placed behind the Elbe, between Königſhoff, and Konigſgratz,
with caſerns and magazines vaulted, bomb-proof, the Pruſſians,
could not take it, without infinite trouble ; and it would certainly
hold out ſome months, if we judge by their ſkill, on other occa
ſions, and give time, to come to its relief. This ſituation is ſo
advantageous, that it not only covers the country on that ſide, but
likewiſe facilitates the means of entring Sileſia. As it may be
made a general place of arms, to ſupply the armies deſtined on that
ſide, nor can the enemy leave it behind him and penetrate into the
country, becauſe the garriſon alone, with ſome croats and huſſars,
would cut off his communication with Sileſia and Glatz, in ſuch
a manner, as would ſoon force him to retire, or make him, and his
army periſh, though he ſhould leave a corps of 20,000 men, to ob
ſerve the place, to ſecure his convoys. -

Beſides, a fortreſs of that kind, and a numerous garriſon, muſt

force the enemy to keep a confiderable corps, both in the county
of Glatz, and in the mountains of Landſhut. The advantages of

ſuch a fortreſs, are infinite, and in my opinion, renders it abſo

lutely neceſſary.
The next road goes from the circle of Buntzlau, by Bakhofen,
Swigan, Libenau, Riechenberg, where it divides into two ; the one
goes to Friedland, and thence towards Grieffenberg, in Sileſia, Sei
denberg, in Luſatia. This road paſſes likewiſe through many very
high mountains; and therefore not eaſily to be paſſed, if there are
troops to defend the defiles.
Though the king of Pruſſia, will never make his chief effort on
this
 in G E R M A NY. xix

this fide, having no place of arms, at a proper diſtance, yet as in

every war with the Auſtrians, he will think it neceſſary to occupy
Saxony, ſome diviſion of his army will always enter Bohemia, on
the fide of Luſatia, while it remains quite open as at preſent: where
fore it would, no doubt, be very proper, to have as near the fron
tiers as poſſible, ſome confiderable fortreſs, which a diviſion of
twenty thouſand men, can neither ſuddenly take, nor ſafely leave
behind them, nor could any troops take their winter quarters, any
where in the mountains, from Friedland to Schandau, or even at
Grieffenberg, Markliſſa, Lauban, and Gorlitz, if a confiderable
fortreſs is placed in the neighbourhood of Friedland: neither can
the communication be kept up between Sileſia and Saxony, unleſs
an army be poſted to ſecure it. To theſe great and obvious reaſons
may be added, that as Sileſia, is quite an open country, without
any fortreſs to cover it, from Markliffa to Croſſen, near Frankfort,
it might be attacked, on that ſide rather, than on that of Moravia,
and Bohemia, which now can't be done, without leaving an army
to cover theſe two provinces. But if they are ſecured, by the
fortreſſes propoſed to be made in Moravia, and near Konigſgratz ;
the Auſtrians might, we think, enter Sileſiá, by the way of Luſa
tia, provided they have a place of arms, near Friedland, which
would enable them, as we think, to act with ſafety and vigour on
that ſide. The want of it, rendered ineffectual, the vićtories gained
by the Ruſſians at Zullichau, and Cunnerſdorff, and every attempt,
the Auſtrians made, on the Queiſs, and Bober.
Should the different fortreſſes, above propoſed, beexecuted, 30,000
men, beſides their garriſons, will, it's thought, be more than ſuffi
scient to cover Bohemia, all the remainder of her majeſty's forces,
may then, act with ſucceſs on the Queiſs, and Bober, otherwiſe not.
The next road goes likewiſe from the circle of Buntzlau, by
d 2 Leypa,
º
XX H Is To R Y of the WA R

Leypa, and Gabel, to Zittau, in Luſatia: this is the leaſt difficult of

any as yet deſcribed. In the mountains, however, about Gabel, there
are ſome defiles, which may eaſily be guarded, with few troops.
The next road goes from the ſame province, by Rumburg, and
from thence tawards Löbau, in Luſatia. This is extreemly diffi
cult, and, during the courſe of the war, I do not remember it
was taken by any conſiderable corps, excepting by that of the
prince of Pruſſia, after the battle of Kollin. Little uſe can be
made of theſe two laſt roads, by the Pruſſians, being ſo far from
their depots, excepting for ſome divſion of their army, when they
propoſe invading Bohemia on different ſides at the ſame time, and
therefore it ſeems uſeleſs, to fortify them.
The next, and one of the moſt important roads, in all this.
country, is that which goes from Prague, by Budyn, Lowofitz,
Auſſig, Peterſwald, and Ghiſhubel, where it enters Saxony. This
road is one continual defile, from Lowofitz to the laſt mentioned
place, runs cloſe to the Elbe, from Lowofitz to Auſſig, where the
river Bila cuts it, another deep ravin beyond Peterſwald ; and a
third at Ghiſhubel. In each of theſe three places, are ſuch advan
tageous poſitions, that twelve or fourteen battalions, would be able
to defend them againſt an army, though there be no kind of fortreſs,
and if there was a good one, it would be ſcarce poſſible to invade
Bohemia, on the ſide of Saxony, with ſucceſs. Whenever an
army propoſes paſſing from the one country into the other, it
is abſolutely neceſſary to be maſters of the Elbe, becauſe it is
by that river alone, ſuch armies muſt ſubſiſt, the mountains
being ſo high, and the roads ſo bad, that for many months in
the year, no carriage can paſs ; a fortreſs therefore here, would
be an invincible obſtacle for an army coming from either
country.
The next road goes likewiſe from the plains of Lowofitz,
Over
 in G E R M A N Y. xxi

over the mountains by Töplitz, and from thence by Zinwalde,

into Saxony. This road is very bad, and ſo full of defiles, that
it is ſcarce fit for any but infantry: there are many poſitions to
be taken on it, the principal one is near Toplitz.
The next goes out of the circle of Saatz, by Laun, and
Commotau, and from thence over the Baſberg into Saxony.
This and the next which goes likewiſe from the circle of Saatz,
by Caaden, over the Kupferberg, into Saxony, are extreamly
difficult, and when the defiles have been properly guarded the
Pruſſians have always been repulſed. During the war, except
ing in 1757, when prince Maurice paſſed there in two columns.
Scarce any thing but light troops ever attempted paſſing theſe
defiles.

From the circle of Ellenbogen, there go two roads, the one

over the mountains to Plauen, and the other through Egra.
Both theſe, are in ſome meaſure impaſſable, for an army com
ing into Bohemia, becauſe it would not be ſafe to paſs through
ſuch great defiles, ſo near a fortreſs. Theſe are the principal
roads and paſſes, which occur, in the counties where the war
was carried on in that part of Germany.
Bohemia and Moravia are watered by many rivers, the principal
of which are the Teiſs, which riſes in the mountains of Sileſia,
called Schneeberg, and runs by Alſtadt, Muglitz, Littau, Olmutz,
Hradiſch, &c. and falls into the Danube, at Preſburg; in the
latter part of its courſe, it is called the Morava: it is not navi
gable, nor can any poſition be taken on its banks, to ſtop an
enemy coming from Sileſia. The beſt, however, is on the
heights about Littau with the right extending towards. Olmutz,
and a corps further on towards Muglitz, otherwiſe a column
coming down the Teiſs would render that poſition very hazar
dous.
xxii H is to R Y of the WA R …’
dous. This is, no doubt, the moſt proper poſition of any to
cover Olmutz, which cannot be attacked while an army is here,
nor can it well be forced, by any indireét manoeuvre to quit it,
being ſupplied with proviſions from Olmutz, nor can an enemy
advance towards Auſtria, leaving that fortreſs, and army behind
him. -

There are many more, ſmall, rivers between Olmutz and

Brinn, which, paſſing through the mountains, furniſh every
where excellent camps. Moravia, in general, is a very ſtrong
country, and may be defended by a ſmall army againſt a very
numerous one, as appeared in the war which happened after
the death of Charles the VIth. For then prince Charles, aided
by the great Kevenhuller, at the head of a very inconfiderable
body of troops, compared with thoſe of the enemies, drove
them intirely out of that country, and Bohemia, merely by the
ſuperiority of manoeuvres, which the face of the country per
mitted him to execute.
The Elbe riſes in the mountains of Sileſia, called the Rieſenge
bürg, and runs by Arnau, Königſhoff, Jaromitz, Königſgratz,
Pardubitz, Neuhoff, Kollin, Nimburg, Brandeiſs, where the Iſer
falls into it, Melnick, where the Moldau comes into it, Letit
meritz, above which, the Egra falls into it, Auſſig, and from
thence to Königſtein in Saxony, it is navigable only as far as
Lowofitz, where it grows confiderable. In all this extenſive
courſe few good poſitions can be taken on its banks. The firſt
and moſt important of any upon it, and indeed in the whole
country, is between Konigſhoff, and Königſgratz, from whence
an army can effectually hinder an enemy coming from Schweid
nitz and Glatz, from penetrating into the interior parts of
Bohemia.
There
 in G E R M A N Y. - xxiii

There are other poſitions to be taken, between Nimburg,

and Brandeiſs, which cover Prague againſt an army coming from
Luſatia. Between theſe places and Saxony, no poſition can be
taken on its banks, becauſe it runs paralel, to the road that
paſs from the one country into the other; ſo that only the right or
left wing of an army camped between Lowoſitz and Auſg, can
be poſted on it, according as the front is placed.
On the Zaſlava, one poſition only of conſequence can be taken,
and that at Beneſchau, from whence you may cover the two
great roads that lead from Prague to Vienna. -

The Moldau, on which ſome poſitions may be taken, which

cover Bohemia, Upper and Lower Auſtria, in caſe any attempt
be made from Voigtland in Saxony. It was from theſe poſi
tions that the French, under marſhal Maillebois, were effectu
ally prevented from penetrating into Bohemia, and relieving
marſhal Belleiſle, then beſieged in Prague.
This is the ſtrongeſt place on the river; and indeed in the
whole country, and is well fortified; but being commanded by
the neighbouring hills, very extenſive, and divided by the Moldau,
it requires ſuch an immefiſe quantity of ſtores and artillery, and
ſuch a numerous garriſon, that it ſeems doubtful whether any
attempt ſhould be made to defend it or not, excepting by a
couple of battalions, meerly to protećt it, from plunder, by capi
tulating. The fate of this city, in the war of 1741, ſhews the
truth of this opinion. The firſt time, it was taken by aſſault,
with a garriſon of near 4ooo men in it; the ſecond time, it
reſiſted a very few days only ; and the third, it was aban
doned precipitately by the Pruſſians, on their quitting Bohemia.
In this laſt war, its fate would have been decided in a few
days more, and it would have been taken with an army in it.
The
 i

xxiv H is to R Y of the WA R
The Egra riſes in the circle of that name, and runs by the
town of Egra, thence by Ellenbogen, Saatz, Laun, and Budyn ;
and a little way from this laſt town it falls into the Elbe. :
The only town of ſtrength on this river is Egra, which is
well fortified; but being commanded by a hill, on the left of
the river, it cannot make any long defence ; and therefore in the
laſt war, it was debated, whether it ſhould be diſmantled, or not.
It is remarkable, that, in general, the banks on the right of
this river are higheſt; and conſequently furniſh eaſy means for its
defence. There are many good poſitions to be taken on it; the
firſt and principal however is, that, on the right of the river
behind Budyn, by which an enemy, coming from Saxony, by
the way of Auſſig, (which, as we have ſaid, is the principal
debouché into Bohemia) may be effectually ſtopped, if another
ſtrong corps is placed higher up, towards Laun, which at the
ſame time ſtops any column coming by the way of Commotau.
This body of troops muſt be ſtrong enough to diſpute the paſ
ſage, ’till the army poſted at Budyn has time to come up, which
may be done by an eaſy march on the left; and if in 1756 the
duke of Aremberg's corps had taken this poſition, inſtead of fall
&:
ing back to Mickovitz, the king of Pruſſia would have found it
difficult to paſs the Egra, and probably would have failed in
the attempt, as Gen. Brown could have oppoſed him with a
very numerous army.
This country, like moſt others in Europe, was formerly go
verned by the feudal ſyſtem; it is ſtill ſo, in ſome meaſure, and
notwithſtanding the vaſt power of the houſe of Auſtria, the
nobility have ſome privileges: for theſe reaſons there is an
infinite number of towns fortified, or rather ſurrounded with
an old wall, after the Gothic manner, whoſe uſe is very great
and
 z in G E R M A N v. XXV

and extenſive, as they furniſh effectual means to carry on

the petite guerre with ſucceſs, and conſequently harraſs an
enemy extremely, by rendering his convoys and ſubſiſtence pre
carious, which at laſt muſt force him to abandon the interior
part of the country, and approach the frontiers. They like
wiſe enable you, with a ſmall army, to diſpute every inch of
ground with your enemy, who will not preſume to ſeparate his
troops 'till he has forced you back on the Danube. For this rea
ſon, the Pruſſians, French, and Saxons, in the war of 1741, though
they were ſoon maſters of it, on the appearance of any ſmall
army againſt them, they were obliged to abandon it; and indeed
we don't think it can be preſerved, if conquered, unleſs you
include Moravia and Auſtria, as far as the Danube; then indeed,
having this great river for a barrier, it may be kept, otherwiſe
not.
Though the country, from what we have ſaid, will appear
ſtrong, and is really ſo ; it has, however, many inconvenien
cies, which make it impoſſible to hinder an invaſion, particu
larly on the fide of Sileſia. The mountains, which ſeparate
theſe two countries, make a part of Sileſia, and therefore belong
to the king of Pruſſia, who is thereby maſter of the defiles,
near which, he has the fortreſſes of Neiſs, Glatz, and Schweid
nitz, where he can, with eaſe and ſecreſy, make the neceſſary
preparations; and in one march, he may enter Bohemia in
three different columns, which nothing in the world can pre
vent, as no poſition can be taken near enough to the Debou
chés, to prevent his ſubſiſting, and encamping ſo advantage
ouſly, between your army and the mountains, that you cannot
force him to repaſs them. The neareſt and beſt poſitions that
- C - CàIl
 xxvi H1's To R Y of the WAR

can be taken to cover the country from an invaſion, on the

ſide of Schweidnitz and Glatz, are thoſe already mentioned,
behind the Elbe, at Königſhoff and Königſgratz, which, how
ever, you muſt abandon, unleſs you are ſtrong enough to hinder
him from entering Moravia on your right, by the way of Zuck
mantel, as it happened in the campaign of 1758, and out of
Bohemia on your left by Friedland and Gabel. If you fail in
this, you muſt inſtantly fall back into Moravia, to cover Wi
enna; or to the Moldau, to cover Prague. In the interior part
of the country, the beſt poſition, without doubt, is that in the
neighbourhood of Collin and Czaſlau, as you may from thence,
in a few marches, be either behind the Elbe at Königſgratz,
approach the Moldau, or fall back into Moravia, as the caſe
may require.
The poſitions to be taken in that part of the country, are
thoſe of Léutomiſchel, Müglitz, Littau, with ſtrong corps to
wards Zuckmantel and Troppau, to cover the debouchés on that
fide, where they are ſecurely poſted, and can be attacked only
in front : in which caſe they fall back on your army, or on
Olmutz. By taking either of theſe poſitions you cover Mora
via and Auſtria, and have your communication open with Bohe
mia, where no enemy dare ſeparate, while you are in force in
Moravia. Another great inconveniency in the defence of this
country, is, that no confiderable magazines can with ſafety be
placed, any where, but at Prague or Olmutz, which are too
far back from the frontiers, and your army muſt be ſupplied
from thence by land carriage, a thing very difficult at the end
of a campaign, particularly if the war continues long in the
country, and makes horſes and oxen ſcarce.
This
 in G E R M A N y. xxvii

of SIL E SIA and the County of G LAT z.

* H IS country lies from ſouth to ſouth-eaſt of Bohemia. It
extends in length from Liebenau, on the frontiers of Bran
deburg, to Upper Sileſia, on the frontiers of Poland and Hun
gary, near 240 miles. Its breadth, including the county of
Glatz, to Millitſch, on the frontiers of Poland, is near 120 miles.
It is peopled, by near a million and a half of inhabitants,
and produces an yearly avenue of about four millions of dol
lars, and is one of the moſt fruitful and richeſt provinces in
Europe. -

It has been already ſaid, that it is ſeparated from Bohemia,

by a chain of mountains, running from Zuckmantel, on the
frontiers of Moravia, to Greiffenberg on the river Queiſs. From
Luſace, it is ſeparated by this river, which runs by Greiffen
berg, Markliffa, and Lauban, and falls at Halbau into the Bober.
This laſt river ſerves as a barrier, on the fide of Upper Luſace,
'till it falls into the Oder at Croffen.
The advantageous fituation of this country, enables the king
of Pruſſia to invade Bohemia with facility and ſucceſs: whereas
any attempt from Bohemia againſt Sileſia would be attended with
much danger and difficulty. A ſmall army poſted, any where, in the
neighbourhood of Glatz, with two corps; the one between Frey
wald and Johanſthal, and the other about Trautenau, would, I am
perſuaded, render any attempts againſt it, vain and fruitleſs. An
army ſo poſted cannot be forced by any direct manoeuvre, be
cauſe the country is extremely ſtrong, and it might retire under
the cannon of Glatz : and though either of the two corps poſted,
as we ſuppoſe, on the right and left, were puſhed back; you
could not preſume to advance into Sileſia with an army, lea
C 2 ving
xxviii H is To R Y of the WA R

ving the enemy in the county of Glatz ; becauſe from thence, º

he could cut off your communication both with Bohemia and
Moravia; and conſequently, in a ſew days, would force you to
fall back into theſe countries, or periſh in the mountains, as the
country between theſe mountains and the fortreſſes of Neiſs and
Schweidnitz, could not ſupply an army for two days only.
Much leſs could you attempt any thing againſt theſe places, if
there be any troops in the county of Glatz ; or any corps, how
ever inconſiderable, in the neighbourhood of them, your army
muſt ſubſiſt from your magazines in Bohemia, which you can
not poſſibly bring into Sileſia, while the enemy is in force in
the county of Glatz. And though there be no enemy there,
your tranſports, however numerous, are ſoon wore out, particu
larly if any rain falls, which makes the roads abſolutely impaſ
ſable. Then you muſt not think of bringing up your heavy
artillery, ammunitions, &c. till the place is entirely inveſted,
and you have formed a confiderable magazine near your camp.
Such preparations require much more time than is neceſſary, to
enable the king to come to its relief. Hence it appears, how dif
ficult, the conqueſt of Sileſia muſt be, while there is any ſmall
army to cover it. The progreſs of the Auſtrians in the cam
paigns of 1757, 1760, and 1761, was, we think, intirely owing
to the bad condućt of the Pruſſian generals; which we ſhall
demonſtrate when we give an account of thoſe campaigns.
This country is watered by ſmall rivers, and, like Bohemia,
is covered with woods, and interſeóted with hills and valleys:
and conſequently furniſhes, every where, excellent camps. The
chief poſitions on this ſide, are thoſe in the neighbourhood of
Glatz, at Frankenſtein, Wartha, &c. of which we have given
an account. On the left is one near Otmoſchau, which covers
Neiſs.
 in G E R M A NY. xxix

Neiſs : on the right is that of Landſhut, which covers Schweid

nitz. There is another on the heights of Würben, between
Schweidnitz and Breſlau, which covers both : another, behind
the Reichenbachiſch Waffer, with the right at Púltzen, and the
left at Faulebrucken, which anſwers the ſame purpoſe: ano
ther between Liebenthal and Löwenberg, which is excellent,
and covers the country effectually againſt an army advancing by
the way of Görlitz, Markliſſa, and Lauban.
Further down the Queiſs, is a good camp between Naum
burg and Buntzlau, but it ſhould not be occupied, except in
ſome very particular caſe ; as the enemy could paſs the Queiſs,
and enter Silefia on your left, by Lauban; near which is a very
good camp for a ſmall corps to ſerve as a vanguard to the army
poſted at Löwenberg. Still further down, on the Bober, is a
good camp at Sagan, and at Chriſtianſtadt, which covers that
fide effectually.
The only navigable river in this country is the Oder, which
riſes in the mountains of Hungary, not far from Jablunka. It runs
by Rattibor, Koſel, Oppelen, Teſchen, Brieg, Breſlau, Groſs Glo
gau, Frankfort, Cuſtrin, and Stettin, a little below which it
falls into the Baltic.
The firſt place of any ſtrength you meet with, on this river,
is Koſel, which, though very ſmall, is ſtrong by its ſituation,
and could it contain a numerous garriſon, would be a reſpect
able bulwark againſt the Auſtrians and Hungarians. The other
places we have named, as far as Breſlau, are of no other uſe,
than to cover the country againſt the incurſions of light troops,
and to form magazines, and ſecure the fruits of the earth in
caſe of a war.
Breſlau,
xxx H 1 s To R Y of the WA R.

Breſlau, the capital of Sileſia, is a large and well-peopled

town; but though pretty well fortified, is not capable of ma
king any confiderable defence ; becauſe it is commanded by a
neighbouring height: it has no out-works of conſequence. Be
fides, great part of the town or ſuburbs are without the wall;
under the cover of which, you may begin your approaches very
near ; and the ditch not being protećted by a good glacis, and
a well-palliſaded covered-way, you may get into the town in a
very ſhort time. 'Tis however, in other reſpects, of great uſe;
as you may with ſafety form there magazines of proviſions and
ſtores: and you may lodge there a good body of troops to
recover themſelves during the winter quarters. It may likewiſe
cover a camp, if the ground is well choſen. Its garriſon, when
left to itſelf, ought to be numerous, in order to protećt the
country. From Breſlau, ſtill following the courſe of the river,
you come to Groſs Glogau, which may juſtly be eſteemed the
key and bulwark of Lower Sileſia. It is a ſtrong fortreſs, when
compared with thoſe of this country, though nothing at all.com
pared with thoſe in Flanders. -

There are generally immenſe magazines, and a numerous gar

riſon in this town. It covers the country ſo effectually, that no
enterpriſe of conſequence can be undertaken on that fide of
Sileſia, until you are maſter of it. The taking of it will be no
eaſy matter, as the king will always have an army in this neigh
bourhood, to obſerve an enemy coming from Poland, and if it
be too weak to keep the field, it will find a ſecure retreat under
the cannon of this fortreſs, from whence it cannot be forced
by any direct manoeuvre. Should the enemy attempt to leave
you behind, and march to Breſlau, you can be there before
him; or by ſending a body of huſſars into Poland, cut
off
-
 in G E R M A N Y. xxxi

off his ſubſiſtences ſo effectually, as to force him immediately

to abandon his deſigns and return to the frontiers of that coun
try: and as the king takes care to have all the corn of the
country depoſited at Breſlau and Glogau, the enemy finds no
thing but the growing crop, on which no army can ſubſiſt a
day; particularly in that part of the country bordering on the
Oder, which is generally ſandy, and therefore by no means fruit
ful. From hence it appears, that an army coming from Poland
cannot, however numerous, undertake any thing ſolid. No ma
gazine can be formed nearer the frontiers of Sileſia, than at
Poſen, fixty miles from Glogau. Such a magazine, however
abundant, can ſcarcely ſupply the daily conſumption of a nume
rous army, while it remains in that neighbourhood, much leſs
can it be tranſported to Glogau, and ſupply the army there for
at leaſt two months. How can the heavy artillery, an immenſe
quantity of ſtores neceſſary for ſuch a ſiege, be brought there 2
How, therefore, undertake it even ſuppoſing, what probably
will never happen, that it be left to the defence of a com
mon garriſon, and that there be no army to cover it. This
ſhews why the Ruſſians could not, for want of a ſufficient
magazine at Poſen, approach the frontiers of Sileſia till the month
of July ; and then their operations were chiefly regulated by
the neceſſity of making the army ſubſiſt, rather than with a
view to any military enterpriſe. As they could not ſubfiſt in
any one place, long enough, to think of undertaking any thing
<>f conſequence; they were, notwithſtanding their repeated vic
tories, obliged in the month of oétober, to abandon a country,
Tºwhich their own ravages, and the nature of the circumſtances,
He ad rendered incapable of ſupporting them during the winter.
TEThey muſt neceſſarily fall back on the Lower Viſtula, where
xxxii H is to Ry of the WA R

they have their magazines. For theſe reaſons, all the operations
of this army were reduced to marching from the Viſtula into
Sileſia, and after fighting and ravaging the country, to the return
ing again on the Viſtula.
We ſhall conclude this deſcription of Sileſia with obſerving,
that the greateſt advantage arifing from the favourable ſituation,
and nature of this country, in our opinion, conſiſts in this:
that the king, covered with the places of Sileſia, is enabled to º".

make all his motions with ſafety and celerity; that his armies
are abundantly ſupplied, on the ſpot where they encamp; that
a ſmall corps, protećted by theſe places, ſupply the place of a &

great army, and that ſo effeótually, that nothing of conſequence

can be undertaken in that country while they exiſt. Who
ever confiders attentively what we have ſaid on this ſubjećt, will
probably feel his admiration for the king of Pruſſia, and his
contempt for the Auſtrian and Ruſſian generals, confiderably
diminiſhed. - • *

Further down the Oder, in the marquiſate of Brandeburg,

lies the city of Francfort, a rich and populous place. It is of
no other uſe, however, when conſidered in a military view, than
s
to cover magazines, which you muſt form here, and at Croſſen, for
s
an army you may ſend on the Warta towards Poſen, and thoſe
parts of Poland.
Further down, at the confluent of the Warta into the Oder, is
Cuſtrin. This place is ſmall, and not at all ſtrong, yet the Ruſ
fians, who attacked it in 1758, failed in their attempt. It held
out till the king came and relieved it, by gaining the battle of
Zorndorff. This confirms what we have ſaid of the difficulties,
attending ſuch an enterpriſe, as the fiege of Glogau, or indeed
of any place of confiderable ſtrength, unleſs you can form your
magazines near ſuch places, or that the country itſelf ſhould be able
to
º

in G E R M A N Y. . . . xxxiii

to ſupply your army. But this can never happen as to ammu

º nitions and ſtores, nor even as to ſubſiſtences; if care is taken
to make the farmers depoſit their grain in thoſe places, where
a fiege is expected.
The fituation of Cuſtrin is very advantageous, and may be
conſidered as one of the chief keys of Sileſia and Brandeburg,
particularly the laſt, whenever an invaſion is expected from the
Lower Viſtula, that is, from Warſaw to Dantzig.
Some one column muſt paſs here, and it would be no ways
ſafe to penetrate into Brandeburg, without having previouſly
taken Cuſtrin and Stettin. It were to be wiſhed, that ſome

| means could be found to augment the fortifications of the for

mer, ſo as to make it capable of holding a numerous garriſon
of horſe and foot. This would add infinitely to its importance,
and it would then effectually cover the country on that
fide. Stettin, from its fituation chiefly, is capable of a long de
fence, as appeared when it was taken from the Swedes, in the
beginning of this century. It is of infinite conſequence to the
king of Pruſſia, as it covers Brandeburg and Pomerania, in ſuch
a manner, that though theſe provinces may be overrun and ra
vaged, they can never be conquered: and we doubt whether
any of thoſe powers, who may hereafter have views on this
town, will be in a condition to take it, without having made
a couple of ſucceſsful campaigns, there being ſo many things
to be done previous to the fiege of ſuch a place.
Colberg is on the ſea coaſt, and though many miles diſtant
from Stettin, it may be confidered as an outwork to that place,
it being the only poſt in that neighbourhood, where magazines
may be formed to beſiege that fortreſs. No confiderable ſup
Fly of proviſions can be got, from the produces of the country:
f it muſt
Xxxiv. H 1 s ºr 6 k y of the WA R

it muſt be brought from Livonia, Finland, Sweden, &c. by ſea.

So muſt the artillery, ammunitions, and ſtores, which cannot
be tranſported from the Viſtula by land. Hence it appears of
what conſequence Colberg is ; and we are therefore much ſur
priſed, that the king of Pruſſia ſhould have neglected this place.
its fortifications are ſmall and inſignificant beyond conception,
and could not, if properly attacked, have held out two days.
The defence it made redounds as much to the honour of the
governor, as it does the imputation of ignorance on the beſiegers.
If this place was made fit to hold a garriſon of 4000 foot,
and 26oo horſe, we think it would be impregnable to a Ruſſian
army; as they could ſcarce ever be provided with the neceſſary
means to reduce it. * Beſides, it would. effectually ſtop the
progreſs of an army coming that way; eſpecially if Cuſtrin was
likewiſe. put in the fituation we have mentioned. Glogau, Cuſ
trin, Colberg, and Stettin, may be rendered inſuperable barriers,
on this fide the Pruſſian dominións; as Neiſs, Glatz, and Schweid
nitz, are on the other. "The putting theſe places in a reſpect
able condition, is the more neceſſary, as Pomerania and Bran
deburg are open on that fide, and have abſolutely no interior
defence. . . . . . . . -

The frontiers of Pomerania, towards the Swedes and Meck

lenburgers, are ſtrong by nature, and do not require the help
of art; as the Pruſſians are too powerful to fear any thing from
that quarter. - - - -

Of Pruſſia I ſhall only ſay, it cannot be effectually defended

while it depends on the houſe of Brandeburg; becauſe thoſe
R
who attack it are borderers, and have therefore at hand all the
means that can inſure ſucceſs, and all the reſources neceſſary to
f(SOVCE
º

in . G E R M A N.Y., .. TXXXV

recover themſelves after a defeat: whereas thoſe who are to de

fend it, are deprived of every advantage, and were they ſubject
to no other loſs, than what naturally attends war, in one cam
paign, they would be reduced to the neceſſity of abandoning it,
as they could not poſſibly be recruited in time, receive horſes
for remounting their cavalry, or be ſupplied with ſtores, &c. we
are therefore ſurpriſed his majeſty ſhould attempt to defend it.
He, probably, held the Ruſſians in ſuch contempt, that he did
not doubt of their being eaſily beaten, and forced back into
their own country. But he ſaw his error, and therefore, after
his firſt campaign, abandoned the country. Could his majeſty
change this country with the Poles for that on the Lower Viſ
tula, it would be much for his advantage. I ſhall dwell longer
on the ſubjećt of defending a diſtant country, when I examine
the war. in Weſtphalia, and Portugal, independent of politics,
and merely in a military view. . . . .
To the left of Pomerania, the king has the ſtrong fortreſs of
Magdeburg on the Elbe, a place of great ſtrength, and of equal
importance; as he may form there in twenty-four hours, ſuch a
body of troops, as will keep in awe the Saxons on the one fide,
and Holſtein, Mecklenburg, and Hanover on the other. As to
the king's dominions on the Rhine, we rather think there ſhould
be no fortreſs: becauſe it would be almoſt impoſſible to defend
them againſt an enemy who is on that frontier; and it would be
tCO difficult to wreſt them from him, ſhould he become maſter

of them: whereas, if left open, he will be obliged to abandon

them. . . . . . - • * , * - a

The fate of Weſel in this laſt war confirms our opinion.

. . . . . . . . . . f. 2 ºz ºf . , , , , , In
xxxvi His T or y of the WAR

of S A X o NY and L Us A c E.
N ſpeaking of Bohemia and Sileſia, we have already ſaid, that
the firſt is ſeparated from Saxony by a chain of mountains
running from Egra to Pirna, and from Luſace by the ſame chain
of mountains running from Pirna to Friedland. From this place,

Luſace is ſeparated from Sileſia, by the Queiſs and Bober. In

all this, ſo extenſive, frontier, nor indeed on that towards Bran
deburg and Thuringue, C3Il any poſition be taken, by any army
the elector of Saxony can raiſe, ſo as to cover his country effec
tually, becauſe it is not ſtrong, either by art, or nature. How
ever, to preſerve the capital from an enemy, coming by the way
of Auſfig from Bohemia, a camp may be taken behind the ravin
of Ghiſhubel, or further back at Groſs Zedlitz: this indeed is a
reſource for a few days only, becauſe the enemy, by marching a
column on the right of the Elbe by Schandau, may come and
encamp on the heights near the Weiſenhirſch, from whence he
will ſoon deſtroy Dreſden, or force you to a compoſition: ſtill
more uſeleſs would any camp in Luſace be, becauſe you can
from no one place there, cover that country, or any part of
Saxony, either towards Bohemia, or on the fide of Brandeburg s
º

and lower Saxony. -

The ſituation of the Pruſſian dominions enables his majeſty

to form different points of attack from Magdeburg, Brandeburg,
and Sileſia, and his being ſo much ſuperior to the elector of Sax
ony, would render all the efforts of that prince in the defence
of his country vain. It is an unhappy fituation; but ſuch it is.
Saxony
 in G E R M A N Y. xxxvii

Saxony alone cannot withſtand either Pruſſia or Auſtria; and

therefore, by force, or perſuaſion, muſt be made a party in every
war between theſe contending rivals. And as the country is
intirely open on the ſide of Pruſſia, he can over-run it and be
at the capital, before it is poſſible for the Auſtrians to bring
an army to cover it. We think, therefore, that Saxony ſhould
unite herſelf to the houſe of Brandeburg. In the beginning
of the war, which happened at the death of Charles the ſixth,
Saxony was connected with Pruſſia, and certainly ſuffered no
thing from this conneétion; and had ſhe not altered her ſyſ
tem, it is my opinion ſhe might have reaped ſome advantages
from this union. In the laſt part of that war, ſhe was united
with Auſtria, and was the vićtim of it. In a few days, Saxony
was loſt, and could not be recovered, but by the mediation of
England, and on ſuch terms as the vićtor thought proper to
impoſe. - -

The tranſactions of this laſt war confirm our opinion, and

ſhews the abſolute neceſſity of changing her political ſyſtem.
She muſt forget that ſhe has been equal to the houſe of Bran
deburg: her jealouſy muſt give way to ſentiments of ſelf-pre
ſervation, which we think can be inſured only by entering into
ſtrong and cloſe connections with Pruſſia.
The interior of this country is interſeóted by many ſmall
rivers, and by an infinite number of ravins, generally ſo deep,
that they are almoſt impaſſable. Parallel to the Elbe runs the
Mulda; it riſes in the mountains called the Ertzgeburg, and
- it falls into the Elbe, near Deffau. Its fartheſt diſtance from
the Elbe, is about twelve miles: though it is no where very
sleep, yet as it runs through a deep ravin, whoſe banks are very
- high

º,
xxxviii H is to R Y of the W A R
high and craggy, it is impoſſible to paſs it, if you meet with
the leaſt oppoſition.
Between this river and the Elbe, are many good camps, but
no one poſition that can effectually cover the capital.
The firſt camp is on the right of the Weiſtritz, with, the
right wing at Plauen, and the left, on the mountain by Potch
apel. To make this camp ſecure, you muſt have a ſtrong corps
on the other fide of the ravin by Poſendorff, between Rabenau
and Dippoldiſwalda, to cover your flank and watch Friberg.
The enemy coming up the Elbe may encamp with ſafety, on
the heights of Keſſelſdorff. -

The ſecond camp is further down the Elbe, with the right at
Monzig, and the left at Rothſchönberg, with a deep ravin in
front, through which runs a marſhy rivulet.
On the other fide of this ravin, is another excellent camp,
‘called the Kattſenhauſer, which the Pruſſians have often occu
pied during the war. They likewiſe occupied one near Meiſſen;
which was as bad as poſſible, as will be evident, when we come
to give an account of ſome 'aétions which have paſſed there,
during the war.
The third is at Lomatch. The fourth is at Ochatz, which
may be made very ſtrong, by throwing up ſome few redoubts
before the center, and beyond the right. - º
The fifth is at Strehlen, which is good, whichever way it is
taken; but you muſt have a corps at Hubertzburg.
The laſt of any conſequence is at Torgau; which is a good
one whatever way you place your front. However ſtrong theſe
camps may be in front, no army can remain long in them, if
they are not ſecured by ſtrong corps, on the left ſide of the
Mulda, and on the right of the Elbe; but if this precaution
is neglected, an army, ſor example, deſtined to cover Dreſden
and
 in G E R M A NY. xxxix

and Bohemia, muſt inſtantly fall back on that town, to ſecure

its communication with Bohemia, if the enemy ſends a corps,
beyond the Mulda or the Elbe. The ſame thing will happen
to an army coming up that river; a corps poſted beyond thoſe
rivers will ſoon force him back to ſecure his communication
with the Lower Elbe, and with Brandeburg. This will be
confirmed by the operations of the war in that country.
Having explained the views of the different powers at war,
and given a proper deſcription of the country, wherein it was
proſecuted. We ſhall now proceed to give an account of its
various operations, hoping to make it an uſeful, and agree
able work to all military men; for whoſe uſe it was chiefly
undertaken.

H IS TO R Y
-
 H I S T O R Y
O F T H E

WAR in GERMANY.

.T E king of Pruſſia attempted to enter into a negotiation

with the court of Vienna, and by that means gain time,
by which he hoped to find ſome methods of diſſolving
the confederacy; or at leaſt to prevent its immediate effect. But,
finding all his propoſals rejected with diſdain, he reſolved to anti
cipate his enemy's deſigns, and carry the war into their dominions,
rather than wait their attacking him in his own. The poſſeſſion
of Saxony is not only convenient, but almoſt neceſſary, in order to
invade Bohemia with ſucceſs. His majeſty therefore determined
to occupy it ; he was the more confirmed in this reſolution, as he
knew the elector had tacitely concurred in all the ſchemes concerted
for his ruin, and waited only for a ſure opportunity to concur alſo
in the execution. - - - …’
WITH this view, an army, conſiſting of near ſeventy battalions
and eighty ſquadrons, divided into three different corps, entered the
<lećtorate on the 29th of Auguſt: the right wing compoſed one,
=and marched, under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic,
from the duchy of Magdeburg, by Hall, Leipſig, Borna, Chem
=>itz, Friberg, and Dippoldiſwalda, and thence towards Dreſden,
the place deſigned for the rendezvous of the army. The center,
B commanded
2: . HIS To R Y of the WAR
commanded by the king in perſon, compoſed the ſecond corps,
and marched on the left of the Elbe, by Wittenberg, Torgau,
Meiſſen, and thence by Keſſelſdorff to Dreſden. The left wing
formed the third corps, and was commanded by the duke of Bevern,
who marched from the neighbourhood of Frankfort on the Oder,
by Elſterwerda, Bautzen, Stolpen, and Lohmen, and there en
camped on the right of the Elbe oppoſite to Pirna. The whole
Pruſſian army aſſembled in the neighbourhood of Dreſden, on the
6th of September. His majeſty's intention ſeems to have been to
perſuade the king of Poland to join him in attacking Bohemia, or,
which is more probable, in caſe of a refuſal, to have a pretence for
ſeizing Saxony, as it really happened ſoon after. *

THE diſpoſition of the king's march into Saxony, we think véry.

fine, as there was not above I 5,ooo men in that country; which
were not aſſembled, as yet, in a body; and, even had they been ſo.
they were ſtill inferior to either of the king's columns, nor could
they advance againſt any one of them without being cut off from
Dreſden by the other two, as appears evident from the inſpection,
of the map of that country.
THE event confirmed the goodneſs of the diſpoſition; the Saxons.
were obliged to abandon the whole country; and at laſt they united, J

to the number of about 14, ooo men, in the well-known camp of

Pirna. His Poliſh majeſty had choſen this poſition becauſe it was,

thought impregnable ; and, as he imagined, ſecured a communi

cation with Bohemia; from whence only he could expe&t any ſuc
cours, and where he could retire in caſe of neceſſity. -

EN Cou RAGED by theſe conſiderations, he reſolved to rejećt the

propoſals made him by the king of Pruſſia; how honeſtly we will
not pretend to determine, but not wiſely, as will evidently appear
when we come to give our obſervations on this tranſaction. . . .

4- - THE
 , in GERMANY., , 1756. 3
The king of Pruſſia, who propoſed invading Bohemia, and re
ducing it to his obedience before the empreſs could ańemble her
troops, or any of the other confederates be in a condition to attack
him, had, on his entering Saxony, ordered marſhal Schwerin, at
the head of an army, conſiſting of thirty-three battalions and fifty
five ſquadrons, to enter that province by the way of Nachod and
Neuſtadt. But, finding the Saxons would not come into his terms,
and were ſo advantageouſly encamped that he could not force them,
he found it neceſſary to change his plan of operations,
He did not think it ſafe to penetrate into Bohemia and leave the
Saxons maſters of the Elbe behind him, as he had no magazines
in that country; nor could he convey, what little was to be found,
over thoſe immenſe defiles into Bohemia, not having tranſports ſuf
ficient for that purpoſe. For theſe reaſons he reſolved to reduce
the Saxons before he advanced any further; to prevent them from
receiving any ſuccours; ſecure a paſſage for himſelf, when found
neceſſary; and obſerve the motions of the Auſtrians. A conſide
rable corps, firſt under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunſ
wic, and afterwards under that of marſhal Keith, was ſent to take
poſt at Johnſdorff in Bohemia. Marſhal Schwerin was ordered to
keep his poſition at Aujeſt, oppoſite to Königſgratz. This, the
king juſtly imagined, would oblige the Auſtrians to ſend an army
orn that ſide to oppoſe his further progreſs; and, if they thus
*iivided their forces, their efforts to diſengage the Saxons, ſhould
**iey attempt it, as moſt probably they would, muſt be much leſs
-fºrmidable. º - -

THE empreſs, either with an intention to conceal her deſigns

* = ainſt the king of Pruſſia 'till ſhe and her allies were ſufficiently
F = <=pared to execute them, or from the uncertain, ſlow, and dila
**E*r-y counſels of her miniſtry, had not as yet affembled any confide
* = Exle forces in Bohemia: however, on the motions of the Pruſſians,
B 2 - {he
4- H1's To R Y of the WA. P.
ſhe ordered all thoſe that were then in the country to form two
camps: the ſmalleſt, commanded by prince Piccolomini, at Königſ
gratz, to oppoſe Schwerin : the greateſt, commanded by marſhal
Brown, at Kollin, which was deſtined to march as ſoon as poſſible.
to the relief of the Saxons.

THE king encamped at Groſs Zedlitz, in the neighbourhood of

Pirna : his whole care was to block up the Saxons, and reduce
them by famine, as he could not attack them with any probability
of ſucceſs. In this he ſucceeded to his wiſh ; for, before the end.
of September, they were reduced to the moſt deplorable condition,
and in want of every thing.
THE empreſs, informed of their ſituation, and knowing that it
depended on that army, whether Bohemia or Saxony ſhould be
made the ſeat of war, ordered M. Brown to march, and attempt
to relieve them at any rate. Upon this the marſhal quitted his
camp at Kollin, and arrived the 23d of September at Budyn on the
Egra, in order to be at hand to concert meaſures with the Saxons
for ſuccouring them. Here he was forced to remain 'till the 30th,
to wait for the artillery and pontoons, then preparing at Vienna.
IN this ſituation things continued 'till the 28th, when his ma-.
jeſty, accompanied by ſome general officers, went to marſhal Keith's.
camp, in order to examine that poſition, and change it, if any
motions of the enemy ſhould make it neceſſary, and then return.
to the camp at Pirna. But, while he was here, advice was brought:
him, that M. Brown, having at length got his artillery and pon
toons, was preparing to paſs the Egra; which ſhewed: plainly his
intention of relieving the Saxons. -

THE king thought he could not fruſtrate this deſign more.

effectually, than by advancing further into Bohemia, and force
M. Brown back, by a battle, if neceſſary. His majeſty, therefore,
erdered his vanguard, conſiſting of eleven ſquadrons, 4oo huſſars.
and
 in G E R MAN y, 1756. 5

and ſix battalions, to march on the 29th of September from the

camp of Johnſdorff, and occupy that at Tirmitz, beyond the ravin
and river at Auſſig. Being here further informed, that the enemy
was to paſs the Egra that very day, and encamp at Lowoſitz, he
thought it neceſſary to paſs the mountains of Baſcopol and Klet
chen, put the defiles behind him, and occupy the avenues leading
into the plain before M. Brown's camp; that he might, without
difficulty, advance and attack him, if he found it convenient ; and
therefore, as ſoon as the head of the army, which had been ordered
to follow to Tirmitz, appeared, he, on the 30th in the morning,
with the vanguard, ſet out for Welmina ; where the whole army
arrived, without any other difficulty but the badneſs of the roads,
at eight o'clock at might.
THE king fearing the enemy would march in the night, and
occupy the mountains of Radoſtitz and Loboſch, and, by taking
ſuch a poſition, not only make it impoſſible to attack them, but
force his majeſty to fall back to Auſfig, which could not be done
without the utmoſt difficulty, he reſumed his march, paſſed the
ravin, and occupied the mountains on the other ſide; the van
guard in C. C. and the reſt of the army in G. G. where they
remained the whole night, in the order they had marched; it
being too late to camp, and the more ſo as the ground had not.
been ſufficiently reconnoitred. -

The firſt of Oétober, in the morning, the Pruſſian army, con

fiſting of ſixty-five ſquadrons, twenty-fix battalions, and 102 pieces.
of cannon, was, formed in I. I. the infantry in two lines, and the
cavalry in three, behind; as well for want of ground, as from its
nature, which rendered it improper for cavalry to ad in. . .
The right wing of the infantry was poſted in the village of
Radoſtitz, at the foot of a hill of the ſame name. Before this is
another hill, called the Homolkaberg, which, though much lower
- than,
6 His Tory of the WAR
than the former, is however ſo high that it commands all the plain -

underneath, as far as the village of Sulowitz. The king afterwards.

advanced his right wing to this hill, and placed a battery of heavy
cannon upon it.
THE center occupied the valley formed by that mountain and
the Loboſchberg, on which the left wing was poſted : this laſt
mountain is prodigiouſly high ánd ſteep, and runs into the plain,
almoſt to Lowofitz. The fide of it is covered with vineyards,
which are ſeparated by ſtone walls; in theſe M. Brown had poſted
fome thouſand Croats, who were ſuſtained by ſeveral battalions of
Hungarian infantry; K. K. parallel to theſe mountains, and at
ſome few hundred yards diſtant from the foot of them, runs a
marſhy rivulet, which in many places ſpreads itſelf in the plain,
and forms ſeveral large lakes ; between this rivulet and the hills,
on which the Pruſſian army was formed, runs alſo a very deep
ravin, from Sulowitz to Lowofitz. The only paſſes over this rivu
let and ravin are at theſe two villages, and over a narrow ſtone
bridge between them. The ground behind this rivulet riſes a
little, particularly towards Sulowitz; on this the Auſtrian army
B. B. confiſting of ſeventy-two ſquadrons, fifty-two battalions, and
ninety-eight pieces of cannon, was poſted. It was formed in two
lines, and a corps de reſerve: the infantry was in the center, and
the cavalry on the wings, as uſual ; that on the right, however,
a little before the action began, marched forwards, and occupied
the plain N. N. on the left of the village of Lowofitz, L. L.
M. Brown had ordered this village to be fortified, and had placed
ſome of his beſt infantry in it, with a prodigious quantity of
artillery. He had likewiſe raiſed a large battery, and ſome re
doubts, on the plain before it. By this means he thought he
had rendered his right inattackable ; his center, and left, COVC
red by the marſhy rivulet, and the ravin above-mentioned, were
1I]
 in G E R MAN Y, 1756. 7
in reality ſo; and therefore he reſolved to wait the event in that
poſition.
As to the king's diſpoſition we have nothing to ſay; excepting
that from the beginning he ought to have placed his cavalry in the
center, from Loboſchberg to Kinitz; this would have enabled him
to leave more infantry upon the Homolka mountain, and to have
reinforced ſtill more his left, where he propoſed making his chief
effort. From this poſition he might have ſuſtained thoſe ſquadrons
he ſent to attack the enemy's horſe, whereas they could be of no
uſe behind the infantry, as they could not, in that ſituation, pro
tečt it, in caſe they were repulſed at Lowofitz.
THE king's activity in marching from Johnſdorff to Welmina
ſhews he knew how important it was to put the defile behind
him ; a general maxim, when you advance towards an enemy,
which we preſume to recommend, for reaſons too obvious, in our J
opinion, to require an explanation.
THE Auſtrians ſhould, we think, have ſent ſome heavy artillery
on the right of the Elbe, and have placed a battery, as we have
repreſented in the plan; this would have taken the Pruſſian infan
try in flank, while they advanced through the plain, from the
Loboſchberg, to attack Lowofitz. Why the Auſtrian horſe paſſed
the ravin to attack the Pruſſians in Q, Q, we cannot conceive ; as:
it could not ſerve any purpoſe whatever.
THE ačtion begun, about ſeven in the morning, between the
Pruſſian's left wing, and the troops which M. Brown had poſted
in the Loboſchberg; and was ſuſtained by an irregular fire, with–
out any conſiderable advantage on either ſide 'till near 12 o'clock:
then the day, which had been ſo foggy that nothing could be diſ.
tinguiſhed at the diſtance of a hundred yards, began to clear up.
A large body of Auſtrian horſe N. N. was diſcovered in the plain
by Lowofitz, as well as ſome infantry in and about that village,
and
8 His to R Y of the WAR
and at the redoubts and battery. As no regular line appeared then,
the king thought it was only the rear-guard; and he was the more
perſuaded of this, becauſe, from ſome motions heard the night
before, in the enemy's camp, he imagined the army had either
paſſed the Elbe at Leutmeritz, or was retired back to the old
camp at Budyn. To be certain, however, he ordered a regiment
of dragoons and ſome horſe O. O. to paſs through the intervals of
the infantry and attack that cavalry. They did ſo in Q, Q, and
drove them back beyond the ravin: in purſuing them, they ad
vanced ſo far, that they were expoſed to a heavy cannonade from
Lowofitz and Sulowitz, and it was with great difficulty and loſs
that they could retire under the protećtion of their infantry in R.
from whence they were commanded to reſume their firſt poſition
behind the line.

By this time the fog was intirely diſſipated, and the Auſtrian
army appeared very clearly, in the poſition we have ſhewn in the
annexed plan.
THE king, having examined it for ſome time, judged the right
to be the weakeſt for many reaſons, and chiefly, by its being com
manded from the Loboſchberg. He therefore ordered his ſecond
line to enter into the firſt, with the cavalry in the center, that he
might extend his front and occupy the Homolka and Loboſchberg
in force : this being ſoon executed, the whole army marched, in
clining always to the left; from whence he propoſed making his
attack. This left being reinforced, and protećted by the fire of a
very numerous and well-ſerved artillery, advanced down the Lo
boſchberg towards Lowofitz, and with great eaſe drove the Croats.
K. K. though ſupported by the beſt of the Auſtrian infantry, out
of the vineyards into the plain: this will appear very natural from
the deſcription we have given of this mountain, which overlooked
the vineyards in ſuch a manner, that the troops placed in them
could
 in G E R M A N Y, 1756. - 9
could not raiſe their heads high enough to direct their ſhot at the
Pruſſians while they came down, and conſequently made but a
feeble reſiſtance. -

M. BR own ſent ſeveral battalions of his beſt infantry from his

right to ſuſtain them in the mountains; and general Lacy, who
commanded them, made ſeveral vigorous, but fruitleſs, attacks at
the foot of the mountain, in one of which he was wounded. At
laſt he was convinced it was needleſs to renew the attempt, and
therefore fell back towards Lowofitz.
THE Pruſſians, being now quite maſters of the Loboſchberg,
were ordered to halt at the foot of it, in order to reform the line,
which had been a little diſordered, as well by the action itſelf, as
by the irregularity and difficulty of the ground, and to bring up
the artillery: a precaution ſo neceſſary, that the neglect of it has
very often been the cauſe of the loſs of many battles which might
have been won.
As ſoon as they were formed, they advanced in ſeveral lines S. S.
towards Lowofitz, keeping their left cloſe to the Elbe to avoid the
fire of the battery L. L. the right ſtill continued on the Homolka
mountain : by this diſpoſition the enemy's left and center were
prevented from attempting any thing on that ſide, and the king
was enabled to withdraw his left without danger, if it was repulſed
at Lowofitz: which indeed was not very probable; becauſe, from
the fituation of the ground, he could reinforce it with greater faci
lity, and in much leſs time, than the enemy could his right: con
ſequently could bring a greater number of men into action, at the
ſame time, which generally muſt decide the fate of it.
MARSHAL Brown, believing that the vićtory depended on his
being able to keep Lowoſitz, threw almoſt his whole right wing
into it, and about it ; the adtion therefore was here, long and
obſtinate; at length however it was determined in favour of the
C Piuſlians,
FO. H is roR Y of the WAR

Pruſſians, and chiefly by the help of their artillery, which had ſet
the village on fire. This circumſtance, and the want of ground
to form upon, put the Auſtrians in confuſion; and, as they could
not be ſuſtained by a proper line for want of room, the communi
cations not having been made broad enough to permit three or
four battalions to march up in front to ſupport them, they were
forced to abandon it, and fall back with precipitation on their
cavalry.*
MARSHAL Brown, ſeeing his right wing forced, ordered his left.
to advance through the village of Sulowitz W. W. and attack the
enemy's right: this they attempted to execute, but in vain; a
finall number only of the infantry could paſs the village; and thoſe
were unable to form on the other ſide under the fire of a numerous,
heavy artillery, which played on them from the battery on the
Homolka mountain, within a few hundred yards of the damm over:
which they were to paſs the marſhy rivulet at Sulowitz: the few.
who had paſſed were therefore obliged to fall back inſtantly into
the village, which they repaſſed in confuſion, as many houſes were
already on fire. -

This attempt of the marſhal's was too unreaſonable to have.

been undertaken with any other view, as we think, than merely
to draw the enemy's attention that way, and gain time to put his.
right in ſome order, and facilitate a retreat. -

THIs he executed in a maſterly manner, V. V. He ordered his

center and left to make a movement to the right, by which they
occupied the ground, in the inſtant the right quitted it, behind.
Lowofitz.
º

* When a village is intended to be ſupported, the retrenchment muſt be ſeparated from

the houſes by an interval, ſufficient for the troops to form in, between the houſes and re
trenchments; and the village muſt be cleared behind, that you may march two or more
battalions in front, otherwiſe you cannot defend it; the inſtant 'tis put on fire you muſt
abandon it in ſuch confuſion as ſometimes communicates to the whole line. º
 in G E R M A NY, 1756. I I

Lowofitz. This infantry, ſuſtained by the right wing of the ca

valry, covered the retreat ſo effectually, that no attempt was made
to trouble it. -

The marſhal took a new poſition a little further back: the left
and center continued at ſome diſtance behind the marſhy rivulets,
and the right formed an angle with the line, having the front to
wards the plain, behind Lowofitz and the Elbe. So that the enemy
could not paſs through Lowofitz and form on the plain, with his
rear immediately on the Elbe, under the fire of a numerous artil
- lery; and the leſs ſo, as, to form ſuch a line, his battalions and
ſquadrons muſt have preſented their flank in marching to take up
their ground.
These reaſons induced, or rather forced, the king to remain
ſatisfied with the advantage he had gained, and keep his line
behind Lowofitz, X. X. While marſhal Brown continued in this
poſition, the king had by no means effected his deſign. The action
was not any ways deciſive, and therefore had not made it impoſ
fible for M. Brown to attempt the relief of the Saxons. He was
now juſt as much in a condition to undertake it as before the
aćtion, his loſs having been inferior to that of the Pruſſians; nei
ther could the king attack him with any probability of ſucceſs, as
he muſt, in paſſing the marſhy rivulet, expoſe his army to thoſe
difficulties which M. Brown had, by experience, found unſur
mountable. -

From this very embarraffing fituation his majeſty's ſuperior

talents extricated him. He ſent the duke of Bevern with a large
body of horſe and foot to Tſchiſkovitz, as if he propoſed turning
the enemy's left flank, and hemm them in between the Elbe and
the Egra. This manoeuvre had its defired effect. Marſhal Brown,
fearing the event, haſtened to repaſs this laſt river, and occupy his
old camp at Budyn, which he did without any loſs.
C 2 THUS
I 2 His To R Y of the WAR
Tirus ended the battle of Lowoſitz, which begun at 7 o’clock,
and ended at three. Both parties claim the vićtory. It muſt how
ever be confeſſed that the Pruſſians have the beſt right to it, if we
judge from the conſequences of the action, which is the only cer
tain rule to go by in ſimilar caſes. -

THE Auſtrians did certainly intend to diſengage the Saxons, and

with that view advanced to Lowofitz. The king could have no
other objećt in view than to prevent their executing this plan.
This end was obtained by the battle of Lowofitz, and the ſubſe
quent manoeuvres, which forced the Auſtrians back behind the
Egra, and ſo hindered them from undertaking any thing of conſe
quence for the relief of their friends the Saxons. Had the Pruſſians.
gained a more compleat vićtory, they would have been enabled to
take their winter quarters in Bohemia. -

. The loſs of the Auſtrians on this occaſion amounted to 19 officers,

420 private men, killed: Io 5 officers, 1729 men, wounded : 711
miſſing, or taken priſoners: and 475 horſes killed and wounded:
in all, 2984. Among the dead was count Radicati,” lieutenant
general of horſe, who commanded the right wing. Among the
wounded and miſſing was major general prince Lobowitz, and
many field officers. Among the many who diſtinguiſhed them
felves, Marſhal Brown, in his letter to the empreſs, takes parti
cular notice of general Odonell, F who, after the death of Radicati,
commanded the right wing of the cavalry, prince Löwenſtein,
Lacy, &c. &c. The loſs of the Pruſſians, in the cavalry, amounted
toº,

* Count Radicati was born in Piemont. In 1739 he was lieutenant colonel in Vernes's
horſe; wounded at the battle of Grotzka; in 1740 was made a colonel; in 1745, a major
general; in 1751 he obtained a regiment; and in 1754 a lieutenant general. He had the
reputation of a good officer, and particularly for his talents in exerciſing the troops.
+ Count Odonell is born of a very good family in Ireland: he was for ſome time lieu
tenant colonel in Ollone's dragoons; in 1742 a colonel of Baleyra's ; in 1746 a major gene
ral, as a recompence for his bravery and conduct at the battle of Parma. In the expedition.
againſt
 in G E R M A NY, 1756. 13
to 11 officers, 281 private men, killed : 28 officers, 424 men,
wounded: 8 officers, 238 private men, priſoners. In the infantry,
5 officers, 423 men, killed: 53 officers, 1374 men, wounded :
5 officers, 458 men, taken priſoners. In all, 33.08. Among the
dead were major generals Oertzen,* Lüderitz, F and Quadt.; And
among the wounded was lieutenant general Kleiſt, who died ſoon
after of his wounds. -

MARSHAL Brown, having failed in his attempt to relieve the

Saxons on the left of the Elbe, reſolved to try his fortune on the
- right.

againſt Provence he commanded a detached corps with reputation. In this battle he com
manded the right wing during the greateſt part of the action, and diſtinguiſhed himſelf
very much, for which he had a regiment given him, and was made a lieutenant general.
We ſhall have occaſion to mention this gentleman often, in the courſe of this work, with
great applauſe. - -

* This gentleman was major general of horſe: he had in his youth ſtudied at Halle, in
Saxony: he was a long time a ſtandard bearer and ſubalter in the gens d'armes; in 1725 a.
captain of horſe; in 1739 a major; in 1741 a lieutenant colonel; and having diſtinguiſhed
himſelf at the battle of Soor he had the ordre pour le merite; in 1745 was a colonel; in
1750 a major general; in 1752 had a regiment given him: at this battle he received three
wounds in the head, of which he died the next day.
f Major general I,āderitz was born in 1699. In 1715 was an under officer in the Potſ
dam guard; in 1719 a cornet; in 1725 a captain of horſe; in 1740 a major; in 1743 a.
lieutenant colonel, and diſtinguiſhed himſelf very much at the battles of Hohenfriedberg
and Keſſelſdorf; in 1745 a colonel; in 1752 a major general. His body was tore to pieces.
by a cannon balſ.
1 Baron Quadt was in 1728 a major; in 1736 a lieutenant colonel; in 1743 a colonel;
in 1747 a major general ; and then obtained a regiment.
| Lieutenant general Kleiſt was born in 1688. In 1702 he was a cadet; in 1708 wounded
in the foot, which left the bone crooked for ever after; ſoon after he went into the Palatin
ſervice, and ſerved the war in Flanders 'till the peace in 1712; in 1716 he returned into
the Pruſſian ſervice; in 1724 was made a major; in 1729 he went as volunteer to Corfica;
* 738 was lieutenant colonel; in 1742 a colonel, and was in almoſt all the actions of that
war in Silefia; in 1745 a major general; in 1747 had a regiment; in 1756 a lieutenant
general. In the battle of Lowofitz he was wounded; he continued however on horſeback,
without binding his wounds, 'till 4 o'clock. Soon after the king gave him the order of the
black eagle. He died of his wounds in January following at Dreſden.
I4. History of the WAR
right. It was agreed that the Saxons ſhould paſs the Elbe, the
11th of Oétober in the night, near Königſtein; and that the mar
ſhal ſhould attack the Pruſſians at Ratmanſdorff and Borſdorff the
12th in the morning, while the Saxons did the ſame on their fide.
Accordingly he, at the head of about 8ooo men, paſſed the Elbe
near Raudnitz, and marched by Neuſtadtel, Romburg, and Hanſ
pach, and arrived at Lichtenhayn, where he encamped, waiting to
hear the Pruſſians and Saxons engaged, (which he knew muſt hap *

pen the inſtant theſe laſt paſſed the Elbe) that he might likewiſe
enter into ačtion, and execute his part of the concerted plan.
THE weather had been ſo remarkably rainy and ſtormy, that the -.

Saxons could not effect their paſſage over the Elbe 'till the 13th at
four o'clock in the morning, and then with much difficulty and
loſs of time. This gave the Pruſſians an opportunity of reinforcing
all their poſts on the right of the Elbe, ſo that the Saxons found
themſelves oppoſed by forces much ſuperior to what they expected.
The ground on the right ſide of the Elbe, about Pirna and König
ſtein, is interſe&ted by high mountains, covered with thick woods;
they are ſeparated by deep ravins, formed by the rain in autumn,
and by the melting ſnow in the beginning of ſummer; there are
conſequently very few practicable roads. Theſe the Pruſſians had
occupied, and fortified, with the utmoſt care, by retrenchments,
abattis, &c.
AMoNG theſe great mountains is the Lilienſtein, extremely high,
and ſo near the Elbe, that there is no room to form upon between
the foot of it and the banks of the river; and only one very narrow
road.
THE Saxons paſſed the Elbe oppoſite to this mountain, and en
deavoured to form; but the want of room did not permit it; and
therefore they lay together in confuſion, on and about a ſmall emi
nence, near the village of Ebenheit. From this ſituation, ſur
rounded
 in G E R M A N Y, 1756. I 5.
rounded by every difficulty which art and nature could oppoſe, it
was juſtly, as we think, judged impoſſible for them to extricate
themſelves. - -

The Pruſſians, in the mean time, had entered the camp of Pirna.
early in the morning of the 13th, where they found the rear-guard
of the Saxons, and moſt of the baggage; both fell into their hands,
the bridge having been broke before any conſiderable part of them
could paſs: deſtitute of every reſource, extenuated with hunger
and cold, having been under arms from the 12th at night 'till the
14th in the morning, deprived of all hopes of being ſuccoured by
M. Brown, who now informed them of his being only at Lichten
hayn, and that he could not advance any nearer, it was reſolved to
capitulate; he, on his part, having waited above two days without
receiving any intelligence from the Saxons, thought it neceſſary to
provide for his own ſafety, and therefore retired. He loſt no more
than 200 men in his retreat, which was trifling, if we conſider that
he might have been cut off entirely, had the Pruſſians, encamped
at Lowofitz, been a little more vigilant; becauſe they might have
paſſed the Elbe, behind him, near Lowofitz, or Leutmeritz.
DuriNG this tranſačtion the king arrived, the 14th in the morn
ing, at his army in Saxony, and, after much negotiating, a treaty
was concluded with the king of Poland on the 18th, by which it
was ſtipulated, that the Saxon army ſhould diſperſe, and engage
not to ſerve againſt the king of Pruſſia, who was to remain maſter
of Saxony; and that the king of Poland ſhould have leave to retire
into that kingdom. -

THE king of Pruſſia having thus accompliſhed his deſigns, for

this campaign, ordered his armies to quit Bohemia. This was
accordingly done before the end of the month. That commanded.
by marſhal Schwerin fell back into Sileſia, and cantoned on the
frontiers of Bohemia from Zuckmantel to Greiffenberg. That
under

I
I6 H is T o R Y of the WAR

under the king cantoned in Saxony, and formed a chain from Egra
to Pirna, and from thence through Luſace, as far as the Queiſs.
Thus ended the campaign of 1756, which laſted only two
months; the tranſactions of it however juſtly demand our atten
tion, as well for the reputation of the generals, as for the impor
tance of its event; we ſhall therefore give our obſervations on the
one, and the other.
THE king of Pruſſia ſeems to have committed ſome faults, both
as a politician, and as a general. He had known, a long time be
fore he entered Saxony, that a formidable confederacy was forming
againſt him; and yet it does not appear that he ever attempted to
make any alliance to counterballance it, and render its effect vain;
which, conſidering the great aſcendency he had acquired in Europe,
he might probably have done.
He confided too much in himſelf, and had too deſpicable an
opinion of his enemies, which might, and indeed ought, naturally
to have proved fatal to him.
The next fault that occurs is, that he did not begin the war in
1755, or at leaſt in April 1756; he was then as well prepared, as
in the month of Auguſt, when he entered Saxony; whereas his
enemies were infinitely leſs ſo.”
His negotiating with the king of Poland, before and after he
entered Saxony, we believe, was intended only to amuſe that prince,
and prevent him from taking any meaſures that might obſtruct or
retard his operations againſt the Auſtrians, who no doubt were the
only

* We think it a general rule that you ought to begin the campaign as ſoon as poſſible;
becauſe, if you are on the offenſive, you will have time to execute whatever you have pro
poſed to do: if on the defenſive, ’tis no leſs neceſſary to enter into the field as ſoon as poſ
ſible; becauſe, if you are beforehand with the enemy, you conſume the forage, and deſtroy
the country from whence he is to live. Add, that you gain time, and make him loſe the
campaign in driving you out of his country; and, when he has effected it, 'tis too late to .
undertake any thing againſt your’s.
 in G E R M A N Y, 1756. 17

only object of his projects at this time. Our reaſons for this opi
nion are, that, by the tenor and manner of this negotiation, there
does not appear the leaſt tendency to a compoſition, but on con
dition of his remaining maſter of Saxony, and of that army being
-diſperſed, which no doubt he was reſolved to accompliſh, that he
might proceed to invade Bohemia with greater hopes of ſucceſs.
WHETHER we conſider this tranſaction in a political, or a mili
tary light, it will appear to have been a prudent and wiſe meaſure.
He knew too much of the ſentiments of the Saxon court, with
regard to himſelf, and of the part they took in the confederacy
formed againſt him, to confide in any offers they made him. He
could not prudently leave an army of 14, ooo men behind him.
Tor, though the king of Poland promiſed to diſperſe them, he
could with eaſe aſſemble them, and augment them at pleaſure;
and ſoon be in a condition to make the Pruſſian monarch repent
of his imprudence.
THE poſſeſſion of Saxony, conſidered in a military light, is of
ſo much conſequence, that it is not poſſible to attack the empreſs,
on that fide of her dominions, with the leaſt probability of ſucceſs,
without it. Being extremely rich and populous, an army of 40,0co
men can be raiſed and maintained by this electorate. Magazines
may be formed on the Elbe, from whence an army in Bohemia
may be abundantly ſupplied; and, by its poſition, if you are maſter
of Sileſia, you ſurround Bohemia in ſuch a manner, that you force
the empreſs to ſeparate her armies into ſo many diviſions, that ſhe
cannot oppoſe your entering that country, any where, with ſucceſs,
as appears from the wars carried on there at different times: whereas,
if you are not maſter of Saxony, you can enter Bohemia on the ſide
of Silefia only. This enables the empreſs to unite, in ſome meaſure,
her forces, which are effectually covered by Cºlmutz and Prague,
when forced to fall back; from whence they cover Auſtria; 2nd
* D in
º

18 - His T of Y of the WA R

in this caſe the king of Pruſſia muſt always leave an army on the
Lower Elbe, to cover his own dominions on that ſide, leſt the
ele&tor of Saxony, by force or perſuaſion, ſhould be induced to
join the Auſtrians.
For theſe reaſons we think the invaſion of Saxony was a wiſe
meaſure; how far it may be conſiſtent with juſtice, thoſe, who,
are better acquainted with the laws of nations than we are, muſt
determine. - -

From what has been ſaid, it ſeems that the king of Pruſſia.
committed a capital fault, in not having marched into Bohemia,
the moment he ſaw the Saxons determined to defend their camp.
at Pirna, and rejećt the terms which he propoſed; becauſe he muſt
certainly know that the Auſtrian army was not aſſembled in any
confiderable numbers; and that it wanted artillery and ſtores; that.
it was poſted at ſuch a diſtance as made it impoſſible for M. Brown.
to oppoſe his entering into Bohemia, or ſtop his progreſs when he
ſhould be there; and therefore would fall back on the Danube, if
puſhed, as well to cover the capital, as to ſecure his communi
cation with the troops he expected from Flanders, Italy, and
Hungary. His majeſty therefore would have found Bohemia.
abandoned; and, during the winter, he might with eaſe have
reduced Prague and Olmutz; both which places being then quite
unprovided, and incapable of oppoſing any confiderable reſiſtance.
The conqueſt of theſe two places would have enabled his majeſty
to begin the next campaign in Moravia, at leaſt; and perhaps on.
the Danube; with the ſiege or blockade of Vienna: from whence.
he might, without any riſk, have ſent a confiderable corps on the
frontiers of Hungary; and the army, deſtined to guard Saxony,
into the empire, between the ſources of the Main and the Upper
Danube. The firſt would have hindered the empreſs from receiving
any ſuccours from thoſe countries: and the laſt would effectually
prevent.
 in G E R MAN Y, 1756. I9

prevent thoſe princes, who were his enemies, from uniting againſt
him ; encourage thoſe who favoured him ; overawe the French in
Alſace, and on the Main ; and raiſe ſuch contributions as would
have recruited and maintained his armies. Had his majeſty taken
theſe ſteps, he would have cut off all cohnmunication with
Flanders and Hungary; and even with the Tyrol, if the army,
which I ſuppoſe in the empire, ſent a ſtrong corps to occupy Paſſau
and its caſtle, at the confluent of the Inn and the Danube; one of
the moſt important poſts on that river; which cuts off all commu
nication between Vienna and the empire, overawes Upper Auſtria,
as well as the Tyrol. The few reſources left her imperial majeſty
would have been ſoon exhauſted.
MARSHAL Belleiſle, on the death of Charles VI. formed a plan
for dividing his dominions. *

THE French and Bavarians were to march down the Danube,

through Upper Auſtria, to Vienna. The Pruſſians and Saxons
were to enter Bohemia, and, having reduced it, proceed to Vienna
likewiſe. -

In the firſt campaign the French and Bavarians entered Upper

Auſtria, which they laid under contribution to the gates of Vienna.
The Pruſſians and Saxons conquered Bohemia; and nothing could
have prevented the entire and compleat execution of M. Belleifle's
plan, but the ignorance of ſome of the chiefs, the weakneſs of
cardinal Fleury, and the diviſions among the allies.
The king of Pruſſia being maſter of all the places on the Elbe,
by leaving a ſmall corps to watch the camp of Pirna, he made it
impoſſible for the Saxons to undertake any thing againſt him,
Suppoſing they quitted their camp, they could not ſubſiſt in
Saxony, having neither places nor magazines of any kind; being
at the ſame time continually harraſſed by the corps, which we
ſuppoſe, left there to obſerve them: much leſs could they advance
D 2 into
 -

20 H IS To R Y of the WA R.

into Bohemia, in order to join the Auſtrians; becauſe they would

find themſelves incloſed between the king's army, and the corps
left in Saxony. In the end, therefore, they muſt have diſperſed
of themſelves.
His forces at this time were numerous, and he might with eaſe
have brought 1 Io, ooo men into the field; 20, ooo of which were
more than ſufficient to block up effectually the Saxons in their
camp at Pirna, as appeared from the fact itſelf; for there was no º

more under prince Maurice when they were forced to capitulate.

The remaining 9o, ooo were certainly more than ſufficient to drive. •*

the Auſtrians to the Danube.

As the army under M. Schwerin was far ſuperior to that under
prince Piccolomini, and better provided with artillery, we think
he ought to have attacked him; and, if he thought the camp of
Königſgratz too ſtrong, he might leave him there, and march, on
the right of the Elbe, towards Brandeiſs, or even approach Prague.
This manoeuvre would infallibly force M. Brown to quit his poſi
tion on the Egra, and fall back to cover that place. M. Schwerin
riſk'd nothing by this motion, becauſe Piccolomini was too weak.
to execute any ſolid enterprize in Sileſia: and, as to ſubſiſtance,
the marſhal could never be in want; the country, being very fruit
R
ful, would have furniſhed him abundantly. Had what we here
propoſe been executed, the Auſtrians muſt have abandoned the
circles of Saatz, Leitmeritz, Buntzlau, and Königſgratz, in order.
to aſſemble their forces about Prague, and keep open their com
munication with the Danube; and, if we confider the very bad
ſtate of that army, it is probable they would have been forced back
as far as Moravia: ſo that the king, even without coming to an
aćtion, would have been maſter of the greateſt part of Bohemia,
2nd have taken his winter quarters in that kingdom, Beſides, the
Saxons,
 in G E R MAN Y, 1756. 2 I

Saxons, on ſeeing their friends forced back, would not have pre
fumed to make any ſtand in the camp of Pirna. -

As to the Auſtrians, they ſeem to have committed many faults,

and theſe ſuch capital ones, as might have decided the fate of
their empire, had the king of Pruſſia taken the meaſures already
indicated. -

It was well known, even in the month of June, that the king
intended attacking the Auſtrian dominions. From the motions
then made in the duchy of Magdeburg and the adjoining country,
it was more than probable that part of his troops would march.
through Saxony. This ſhould have determined the Auſtrians to
ſend an army there, in order to ſuſtain the Saxons in that country,
or at leaſt facilitate their retreat into Bohemia. This being neg
lečted, they ſhould have occupied the defiles as far as the ravin of
Ghiſhubel, and thoſe by Altenberg, by which a communication
with the Saxons was kept open. Half the troops then in Bohemia,
poſted properly in thoſe mountains, would have made it impoſſible
for the Pruſſians either to reduce the Saxons, or to penetrate into,
Bohemia. ... • -

THE reſt of the army, deſtined to ad on this ſide, ſhould have

encamped, any where between the Egra and the abovementioned
defiles, and have thrown, bridges over the Elbe, in order to ſend
their light troops, on the right of that river, as far as Schandau.
and Hohenſtein.

THIs would have forced the king to fall back to Dreſden. The
next campaign the ſame difficulty would have occurred; and there
fore, at laſt, he muſt have renounced to the hopes of entering Bo->
hemia on that fide; left an army to guard Saxony; and limit his
operations to the fide of Sileſia only. By thus ſecuring the moun
tains with 20, ooo Auſtrians, and the 14,000 Saxons, they could
always enter Saxony, and probably re-occupy it, confidering that
*. - the
22 H1's To Ry of the WAR

the army of the empire could aſſemble on the Saala, and with eaſe
penetrate into that country by Voightland, on the Pruſſians right
flank; who, not being covered by any fortreſs on that fide, muſt º

fall back towards Wittemberg, and perhaps farther down. This

furniſhed an opportunity of retaking all the places on the Elbe;
and of ſending a corps, through Luſace, into the marquiſate of
Brandeburg. The poſition of Groſſenhayn cuts off all communi
cation between Sileſia and Saxony, and rendered that between Sileſia
and Brandeburg precarious; becauſe the light troops, ſuſtained by
the army at Groſſenhayn, could have made incurſions as far as the
Oder. Piccolomini's corps, if properly poſted, was ſtrong enough
to oppoſe Schwerin, and prevent his undertaking any thing of con
ſequence; which probably he had no intention to do, while the
king was hindered from entering Bohemia.
HAv1NG negle&ted to occupy the defiles leading to Pirna, it
became impoſſible to relieve the Saxons, at leaſt on the left of the
Elbe; becauſe twelve or fifteen battalions, which the king poſted
any where between Lowofitz and Pirna, could not be forced by
an attack on their front; and, if you attempted to turn their right
wing, by ſending a corps over the mountains at Altenberg, it is ſo
far off that the enemy might, either from his troops in Bohemia,
or from thoſe in Saxony, anticipate you. We cannot, therefore,
conceive why marſhal Brown did not occupy ſome of theſe defiles,
as, in our opinion, the ſucceſs of this campaign, and perhaps of
the war, depended on this ſtep.
SINCE theſe precautions were not taken, it was certainly in vain
to attempt any thing on that fide of the Elbe. The only thing
remaining to be done, in our opinion, was to have left 20,000
men in the camp at Budyn ; with a corps, compoſed chiefly of
Jight troops, to puſh into the mountains beyond Lowofitz, and -

into thoſe of Altenberg, to draw the Pruſſians attention that way;

- and t
 in G E R M A N Y, 1756. 23.
and with the remainder paſs on the right, (leaving ſomething to
maſk the bridge at Leutmeritz, and obſerve the enemy in the
| mountains, between Lowofitz and Auſſig) and march on that ſide
to Schandau and Hohenſtein, and attack the Pruſſians poſted at
IRatmanſdorff, and on the Lilienſtein.
These poſts were very weak on that ſide, and fortified only
towards the Elbe, to oppoſe the Saxons, and therefore could not
Phave reſiſted one inſtant; eſpecially if, at the ſame time, the Saxons
Inade any conſiderable effort. By this manoeuvre the communi
cation would have been eaſily opened; and the Pruſſians on that
fide, if purſued with vigour, could not have retired without loſs,
having no more than one bridge, at Pirna, by which they could be
füccoured; on which a falſe attack might have been made through
the foreſt of Löhmen, as well to prevent ſuccours, as to alarm the
Pruſſians; this probably would have made them abandon their
ether poſts, for fear of loſing their communication with the army
encamped on the other fide of the Elbe.
THE junétion with the Saxons being once effected, and all the
right of the Elbe, as far as Pirna, occupied by the Auſtrians, his
najeſty muſt have fallen back inſtantly into Saxony, or have
Periſhed in the mountains with cold and hunger.
MARSHAL Brown riſqued nothing by this manoeuvre, as the
king, with the ſmall army he had then in Bohemia, would not
have preſumed to paſs the Egra and attack the 20,000 men left
there; becauſe, by ſuch an attempt, he would give the Auſtrian
§eneral an opportunity of repaffing the Elbe, and occupy the defiles
*ehind him, relieve the Saxons, and probably reduce his majeſty
to the melancholy neceſſity of ſeeing his own army and that of
Prince Maurice, thus ſeparated, beat in detail. -

HE attempted, as we have ſaid, to relieve the Saxons with 8ooo.

*Ren only, and could not ſucceed.
W. E.
 24 H Is To R Y of the WAR
WE now come to examine the battle itſelf, wherein the condućt
of M. Brown does not ſeem, by any means, equal to the reputation
he had acquired.
FROM the deſcription we have given of the ground, it appears
evident, that the marſhal could not poſſibly obtain any other ad
vantage, than perhaps to repulſe the enemy; which, from the bad
choice of his camp, was very improbable. But, even ſuppoſing
he had beat him back as far as the vineyards on the Loboſchberg,
he certainly could never have forced him from thence, and from
the Homolka mountain ; becauſe, to form theſe two attacks, he
muſt have filed through the villages of Lowofitz and Sulowitz, º
and have formed between thoſe villages and the mountains upon
which the Pruſſian army, with above ico pieces of cannon, was
poſted, and in many places within muſket-ſhot of the ground
where the Auſtrians muſt have formed. I appeal therefore to
all military gentlemen, whether in theſe circumſtances ſuch a
manoeuvre was poſſible. *

ADD to this, that the king, though repulſed, could without any
danger have ſent a ſtrong corps on M. Brown's left, which would
Have rendered his communication with the Egra ſo precarious, that
he muſt have fallen back behind that river, as it really happened
the night aſter the aëtion; for it was the ſending the duke of
Bevern with a corps to Tſchiſkovitz, rather than any advantage
gained in the battle, which forced M. Brown to repaſs the Egra.
From whence it appears, that, though the Auſtrians repulſed the
king, it contributed nothing at all to the relief of the Saxons;
becauſe they could not detach, from that or any other camp be
rween the mountains and the Egra, 20, ooo men, and leſs would
not do without expoſing the remainder to certain ruin.

HAvLN G.
 in G E R MAN Y, 1756. - 25
FIAviNG neglected to occupy the mountains of Loboſch and
Homolka, which he might have done, many hours, before the
eremy appeared, the only thing remaining to be done, was to
have paſſed the Elbe, the night before the battle, with the whole
army, leaving ſome light troops to amuſe the king ; theſe, on
being puſhed, retired to Budyn.
IN this caſe M. Brown might have detached ſuch a corps to
Schandau, as would certainly have opened a communication with
the Saxons, and probably have deſtroyed all the Pruſſians on that
fide of the Elbe: with the remainder he covered the whole country
effectually, excepting thoſe few villages between the mountains
and the Egra, which the king would not have dared to paſs, be
cauſe, having no magazines in the country, and ſubſiſting only, at
leaſt chiefly, from what came from Saxony, he could not advance,
with an army of about 25, ooo men, into an enemy's country,
leaving one ſuperior maſter of the defiles, between him and his
other army, ſubſiſtance, ſtores, &c. without expoſing himſelf to
certain ruin.
THE poſition, therefore, taken at Lowoſitz, was, in our opinion,
as bad as poſſible; nothing could be more inconſiſtent, with the
general theory of war, than to occupy a camp commanded by any
neighbouring hills, and where it was impoſſible to bring as many
men into action, at the ſame time, and in the ſame point, as the
enemy; who, on the contrary, had ground enough to form two
thirds of his army to attack Lowofitz; whereas the Auſtrians could
bring a very few battalijns, only, to ſuſtain it.
THE left and center were inattackable; the only point to be
ſuſtained was Lowofitz. This the marſhal ſaw ; but did not ſee .
that it could not be defended, becauſe it was commanded by the .
Loboſchberg. -

º E IF
26 - H Is To R Y of the WA R
If the enemy
was repulſed, you could not purſue him, either
with cavalry or infantry.
If we conſider this poſition, relative to the relief of the Saxons,
the only objećt then in view, none could be leſs proper; becauſe,
by no one manoeuvre poſſible, could M. Brown relieve them,
though he had repulſed the enemy, who might have taken fifty
camps between that place and the Saxons, from whence they
would have hindered all communication between them and the
Auſtrians.
WE ſhall therefore conclude, that, in the choice of this camp,
M. Brown ačted inconſiſtent with the general rules of war; and
with the particular ones, which the nature of the country, and the
obječt he had in view, preſcribed.
WE hope our readers will not ‘accuſe us of preſumption, for
having, thus freely, given our opinion of the actions of thoſe men,
whoſe reputation is ſo well eſtabliſhed. What we have ſaid is:
certainly founded upon facts, and conſiſtent with the nature of
the country; and, as we think, with the principles of war: we
therefore ſubmit our refle&tions to thoſe who are acquainted with
the one and the other. For this purpoſe, we have furniſhed them.
with an exact plan and deſcription of the ground where the battle.
was fought.
THIS, with their own knowledge of the military art, will enable:
them to decide how far our hiſtory of this campaign, and our re
marks upon its various operations, are reaſonable, or otherwiſe.
GREAT preparations were made, on both ſides, for the enſuing:
campaign: the empreſs ordered the troops that lay in Hungary,
Italy, and Flanders, to march into Bohemia: all the regiments of
huſſars were augmented to 1 500 men; and thoſe of the cavalry to.
1 ooo : two of the former, and one of Hungarian infantry, were
new raiſed: to theſe were joined, two regiments of infantry, ſent
by
 in G E R MAN Y, 1756. - 27

by the eleētor of Magence and the Biſhop of Wurtzburg, ſeveral

pulks” of Uhlans, F and three regiments of Saxon light horſe: all
which, with what was already in Bohemia, formed an immenſe
army, which, according to many gazettes, amounted to above
180,000 men, and was to be commanded by prince Charles of
Lorrain. -

THE Pruſſians, on their ſide, were no leſs diligent and active.

The king found it abſolutely neceſſary to get ſome light troops, to
oppoſe thoſe of his enemies, which were extremely numerous, and
had given him much trouble, both in this and the preceding war;
and therefore orders were given to raiſe four battalions of light
infantry, which were augmented very much during the courſe of
the war.
THERE happened in the winter ſome conſiderable ačtions be
tween the light troops; which, though conducted with much
valour and prudence on both ſides, do not deſerve any particular
detail; becauſe, in general, they have little or no influence on the
ſucceſs of a war, however neceſſary in an army: and, though they
do not contribute eſſentially to the good or bad iſſue of a campaign,
there is no doing without them. We ſhall therefore proceed to give
an account of the operations of the campaign of 1757.

* A pulk amounts to about 8oo men.

+ Uhlans are inhabitants of the Uckraine, and chiefly Mahometans. In perſon, dreſs,
and manner of fighting, they reſemble the Tartars, Calmucks, &c. They are armed with
piſtols, ſabres, a lance 15 foot long, and ſometimes with a bow and arrow, inſtead of a
carabine.

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 y O R D E R of BATTLE of the PR Uss 1 AN ARMY, October 1, 1756.
The K I N G.
Marſhal Keith.
Gen. of Infant. Prince of Pruſſia.
Lituſ, Gen. Pr. of Bevern. Kleiſt. Pr. Ferdin. of Brunſwick.
Mj. Gen. Hulſen. Zaſtrow. Quadt. Itzenplitz.
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 - His Tory of the WAR, &c. 29
- w

C A M P A I G N of 1757.
HE confederacy, formed againſt the king of Pruſſia, was now
augmented, by the acceſſion of Sweden and the Germanic,
body; whoſe united forces amounted to 700,000 men; whereas.
thoſe of his majeſty, and his allies, did not exceed 260,000.
As many of his enemies could not begin their operations until
the ſeaſon was far advanced, his majeſty reſolved to take the field
as ſoon as poſſible ; that he might, with his united forces, attack.
the neareſt, and indeed the moſt confiderable of them, the empreſs
of Germany. If he had the good fortune to ſtrike ſome blow of
conſequence in the beginning of the campaign, it was very pro
bable this would retard, at leaſt, and perhaps put an intire ſtop to,
the operations of the other confederates. s

THESE motives, which made it.neceſſary for his Pruſſian majeſty

to bring matters immediately to a concluſion, made it equally ſo
for the empreſs to embrace a contrary ſyſtem.
She therefore determined to remain on the defenſive, until her
allies took the field, which ſhe knew would oblige the king to
divide his forces into ſo many parts, as would make it impoſible
for him to oppoſe, any where, a conſiderable reſiſtance. This
favourable circumſtance ſhe propoſed waiting for, in order to begin
her operations. In the mean time, nothing more was intended,
than to provide for the defence of her dominions.
WITH this view M. Brown diſtributed the army into four diſ-,
ferent corps: the firſt, commanded by the duke of Aremberg, was
poſted at Egra; the ſecond, under the marſhal himſelf, at Budyn 3.
the third, under count Königſeg, at Reichenberg; and the fourth,
under count Serbelloni, in Moravia,
Bx.
3o. ... History of the WA Riº
By this diſpoſition the marſhal thought he could effectually cover
Bohemia; as each of theſe corps was very confiderable, and might
with eaſe be aſſembled in ſome central poſition, to {top the pro
greſs of the enemy, ſhould he attempt to advance; which it ſeems
the marſhal did not expect he would or could do; otherwiſe, we
think, he never would have permitted his magazines to be formed
almoſt on the frontiers, againſt the moſt common rules of military
prudence. - - - - - -

His majeſty, having reſolved to penetrate into Bohemia, ordered

his army to aſſemble in four different corps likewiſe: the One,
under prince Maurice, at Chemnitz; the other, under himſelf, at
Lockwitz; the third, under the prince of Bevern, at Zittau; and
the fourth, under marſhal Schwerin, in Sileſia.
As theſe corps were very ſtrong, his majeſty thought he might
with ſafety order them to enter Bohemia ſeparately ; but, for fear
of expoſing them to be beat in detail, the two firſt were to unite,
the moment they paſſed the defiles, between the mountains about
Lowofitz and the Egra; and the two laſt were to do the ſame on
the Iſer, about Turnau : then it was thought, that the four corps,
thus united into two, might proceed, without any riſk, towards
Prague; where the whole was to join. -

THE king, fearing that the enemy ſhould ſend a body of infan
try to occupy the defiles in the mountains, between Lockwitz and
Lowofitz, which might make it difficult, and perhaps impoſſible,
for him to paſs them, ordered prince Maurice to penetrate into the
circle of Saatz, and inſtantly occupy them on the fide of Bohemia,
which would neceſſarily force the enemy to abandon them, for fear
of being hemmed in between the two corps. - --

THINGs being thus concerted, prince Maurice quitted his ſtation

at Chemnitz, in the beginning of April, and marched by Zwickau
and Plauen towards Egra; as if he intended attacking that place,
OT
 in GERMANY., 1757. 31
or at leaſt penetrate that way into Bohemia. To confirm the duke
of Aremberg in this opinion, he ordered his light troops to engage
ſome confiderable action at Wildſtein, the duke's quarters. Upon
which this general threw himſelf into Egra, and ordered his corps
to aſſemble in that neighbourhood. In the mean time prince
Maurice returned in haſte back to Auerbach; where, for greater
celerity, he divided his corps into two columns; the one of which
marched by Eibenſtock Schwarzenberg to Gotteſgabe, and from
thence over the Kupferberg to Commottau; the other went over
the Schneeberg Schlettau, Annaberg, and Baſberg, likewiſe to
Commottau ; from whence he marched by Brix and Bilin to
Linay, where he joined the king, on the 23d of April, who had
likewiſe paſſed the mountains without meeting any confiderable
obſtacle: the few Auſtrians who were poſted at Auſſig, under
general Draſkovitz, having been forced to quit that place on the
approach of the king's army.
As the camp of Budyn is very ſtrong, being covered by the
Egra, his majeſty did not think it adviſeable to attempt any thing
againſt it in front; he therefore marched higher up the river, to
wards Koſchtitz, where bridges were thrown over it, and on the
26th in the morning the whole army paſſed. -

HERE the light troops, and vanguard, met thoſe of the duke of
Aremberg, who was then coming from Egra, and propoſed either
encamping there, or go and join M. Brown at Budyn 3 but, on
meeting the king here, he fell back towards Welwarn.
M. BRow N, finding the king had paſſed the Egra, and was en- .
camped on his left flank, thought it neceſſary to quit his poſition.
at Budyn and retire to Prague, which was executed without any
loſs.

UPost
32 History of the WAR
Upon which the king ordered the bridge at Budyn to be re
paired, that he might with greater eaſe receive his convoys; and
then dire&ted his ſteps likewiſe to Prague, where he arrived the
2d of May, and took his camp on the Weiſſenberg, on the left

of the Moldau, which the Auſtrians, now commanded by prince

Charles, had quitted, and paſſed on the other fide of the river.
WHILE theſe things were paſſing on the fide of Saxony, the
prince of Bevern put his corps in motion on the 20th of April,
and marched the ſame day from Zittau to Reichenberg, where he
found count Königſeg, with a body of near 20,000 men, encamped
in a valley formed by two very high mountains; the breadth of it,
in this place, does not exceed three Engliſh miles; through the
middle of it runs the river Neiſs ; into which many rivulets, or
rather torrents, coming from the mountains, fall. Theſe moun
tains are covered with thick woods, which make it very difficult
for any kind of troops to paſs them; for which reaſons the Auſtrian
general occupied the valley from one ſide to the other, having each
wing extended only to the foot of the mountains: the right was on
a riſing ground, which was fortified with ſome redoubts, and cove
red by a deep ravin on the right of the Neiſs: the center was on
the left of the river, and alſo covered by a deep ravin, and ſome
ledoubts: between the left of this ravin and the foot of the moun
tain, on that ſide, is a ſmall plain; here the cavalry was poſted in
three lines, there not being room to extend them. On the left of
this cavalry was a wood, in which they placed ſome few battalions,
and had begun to make an abattis, which was not compleated.
i rom this deſcription it appears, that the right and center were
very ſtrong, and ſcarce to be attacked at all in front. The prince
%f Bevern, who, by taking that route, had put himſelf under the
neceſſity of fighting, in order to join M. Schwerin, had now no
choice left but as to the manner of doing it: his corps was poſted
-
behind
 in G E R MAN X, I757. 33

behind a marſhy rivulet, which, towards his left, ran ſo cloſe to

the enemy's line, that he could not pretend to paſs it, and form,
under their fire; he therefore reſolved to attack the enemy's left;
and ſent general Leſtewitz over the Neiſs, to attack, or rather amuſe,
their right. Things being thus concerted, he ordered his cavalry
to advance and attack that of the enemy; this was executed with
great bravery, but without ſucceſs; they were repulſed every time;
no wonderſ becauſe, in advancing towards the enemy, their left
flank was expoſed to the fire of the artillery of the redoubts, and
that of the infantry behind them ; and their right to that of the
infantry poſted, as we have ſaid, in the wood, to the left of the
enemy's horſe. The prince, perceiving, at laſt, it would be in
vain to renew the attack, while the enemy's horſe was thus pro
tečted by the infantry and artillery on both flanks, ordered it back,
and at the ſame time ſent ſeveral battalions from his right, as high
as was poſſible into the mountain, in order to come on the flank
and rear of thoſe which the enemy had poſted in the wood, at the
foot of it: this was punctually executed ; the enemy abandoned
the wood, and gave the prince's cavalry an opportunity to renew
their attack, which muſt naturally ſucceed; that of the enemy,
being unable to bear its ſhock, and the fire of the Pruſſian infan
try, which had now got poſſeſſion of the wood on their flank.
On the retreat of the Auſtrian cavalry, the prince ordered his
whole right to advance, and occupy the ground they had quitted;
ſo that he was on and behind the enemy's left wing, and had,
beſides, the advantage of the riſing ground, from whence he could
with eaſe rake them from the left to the right. In this ſituation
nothing remained for the Auſtrians to do, but to retire as ſoon as
poſſible, for fear the enemy ſhould puſh on towards Liebenau, and.
cut them off intirely; wheh he might do, as, in purſuing the left
wing, ſome of his troops were already behind them. The retreat
F WaS
34- H1's To R Y of the WAR
was made in good order: count Lacy, who commanded the right,
covered it; at Liebenau they took a new poſition, where they were
reinforced by ſome troops, who, on the march of prince Bevern,
had quitted the frontiers, and fallen back to join the main body
under count Königſeg.
Thus ended the combat of Reichenberg, in which the Auſtrians
loſt one general, and about I ooo men killed, wounded, and taken;
beſides ſome cannon left at Reichenberg. The loſs of the Pruſſians
was not much inferior. -

R E F L E c T 1 o N s.

As the only objećt the prince of Bevern could have in view,

was to join M. Schwerin, we cannot conceive why he ſhould
march by Kratzau, and Reichenberg, where the road is much
more difficult than that by Gabel and Böhmiſch Aycha, which
was equally proper to effectuate his junction with Schwerin;
and, moreover, was guarded only by ſome light troops, at Gabel,
which he might force, or leave behind, as he pleaſed, without
any difficulty or riſk. In taking this laſt road, he was certainly at
:

liberty to avoid an action ; and, if the enemy remained at Reichen

berg, he might find twenty poſitions behind them, and hinder
them from retiring to Prague. It is always a great fault to fight,
when nothing can be got by it ; as in this caſe. The prince
wanted to join Schwerin; he might have done it without fighting,
and he could obtain no more by a ſucceſsful action, as appears
from the fact itſelf. He forced the enemy to quit their camp at
Reichenberg; they took another at Liebenau, which he could not
have forced, in all probability: he muſt therefore have remained
in the mountains, without any poſſibility of joining Schwerin, if
the march of this general had not determined count Königſeg to
quit
 ORDER of BATTLE of the PRussi AN ARMY under the Command of Marſhal Schwer IN, May 4, 1757.
Marſhal S c H w E R 1 N.
| Lieut. Gen. Bn. de Schönaich. Fouquet. Hautcharmoy. Leſtewitz. Pr. of Bevern Pr. of Schönaich
Maj. Gen. Krockow. Katt. Kourſel. Treſkow. Kleiſt. Schöning. Pr. of Wurtemberg. Blankenſee.
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Caval. 4o Sq.

Infant. — 47 Bat.
Canons. – 116 Pieces.

- - - …, -
-----
 in G E R M A NY, 1757. 35
quit Liebenau and retire. All which ſeems to prove, that the
prince engaged in an action without any kind of reaſon, and from
which he could not reap any advantage, whatever was the event.
An immoderate defire of acquiring glory, makes men ſometimes
undertake things without ſufficiently weighing the conſequences.
In the aaion he ſeems likewiſe to have been guilty of ſome faults:
he formed parallel to the enemy, whoſe line could not be attacked,
with any probability of ſucceſs, excepting on the left; which,
being once beat, the reſt could not keep their ground; yet the
prince did not reinforce his right, but left his troops nearly equally
diſtributed throughout the whole line: his left, towards the Neiſs,
where it could be of no uſe at all, was as ſtrong as where he
formed his attack.
His attack with the cavalry was certainly ill-adviſed ; for,
though it ſucceeded, he could not proſecute his advantages; for,
while the enemy had infantry in the wood, and their center kept
its poſition, his cavalry could not occupy the ground on which
that of the enemy ſtood. From the beginning he ſhould have
formed his right as high up the mountains as poſſible; brought
the greateſt part of his infantry there; and have done then what
he was forced to do at laſt. The taking ſuch a poſition would
have forced the enemy to retire without fighting. His ſending
general Leſtewitz to attack the enemy's right was needleſ. By
\occupying the wood, and part of the hill, on his right, the action
was won; and all the manoeuvres the enemy could make, on their
right and center, would have been fruitleſs.
The Auſtrians camp ſeems, from our deſcription of it, very
ſtrong; yet, on examination, it will be found otherwiſe; becauſe
the whole was not equally ſo; and therefore, properly ſpeaking,
no part of it. The right and center were ſtrong by nature and
art; being, as was ſaid, fortified with redoubts, &c. but, as the
- F 2 left
36 H1 story of the WAR

left was weak, they could reap no benefit from them; unleſs they
ſuppoſed the enemy ſo ignorant as to attack them there. From
the general poſition of the ground, it was evident, that, if the left
was forced to retire, the enemy, by occupying it, would be in the
rear of the center and right, and force them to quit their advan
tageous poſition, and fall back inſtantly towards Johanniſthal, for
fear of being cut off from Liebenau : on this point, to their left,
depended, no doubt, the ſucceſs of the action. They ſhould, con
ſequently, have ſent ſome of their beſt infantry into the wood on
their left, and have placed ſome heavy artillery at the ſkirts of it;
which, with that they had already, in the redoubts before their
center, would have made it impoſſible for the enemy to paſs the
village of Bartzdorff, and the marſhy rivulet they had before their
front; much leſs form on this ſide of the rivulet. The Auſtrians
could bring, againſt that point of attack, their artillery, their in
fantry, and their cavalry, to ſuſtain them. In ſuch circumſtances
prince Bevern could not certainly have formed his attack at all.
WHEN the Auſtrians ſaw the enemy prepare to attack their left,.
Why not make a general motion on that fide, and carry their line
up into the mountain This manoeuvre would have decided the
aćtion in their favour; and, by neglecting it, they were beat.
THEIR cavalry was too far advanced; which deprived them, in
ſome meaſure, of the advantage of their artillery on the right, and,
of the infantry on the left, in the wood.
THEY ſhould not have poſted their whole army in the valley;
for, though the mountains which formed it, ſeemed impaſſable,
yet it happened otherwiſe : for the Pruſſian infantry did march,
through that on the left; gained the higher ground; and forced,.
conſequently, the Auſtrians to abandon the wood at the foot of it.
No corps whatever muſt be placed in a valley, unleſs you are
maſters of the mountains which form it; and, if you cannot
occupy.
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 37

occupy both ſides, you muſt, at leaſt, one : for, though at firſt
fight, mountains, rocks, and woods, may appear impaſſable; yet,
upon a diligent inquiry, the contrary will be always found: for,
in every country that is well peopled, there are, and muſt be,
communications between the villages; at leaſt, for infantry: you
muſt, therefore, occupy the mountains and woods with your
infantry; the valley underneath with your cavalry; which will
hinder any enemy from paſſing through it. From all which, it
appears, that it was a bad camp, and a bad poſition ; becauſe,
having neglected to occupy the mountains, it could not be
defended ; and the troops, poſted in the valley, were not only
expoſed to be defeated, but likewiſe to be cut off from Prague,
and their magazine at Buntzlaw, either by the prince of Bevern's
corps, or by that of marſhal Schwerin.
THE prince of Bevern marched, on the 23d, towards Liebenau;
where, as we have ſaid, he found the enemy ſo advantageouſly
poſted, that he did not think it prudent to attack them : and the
leſs ſo, as he knew the march of Schwerin's corps would neceſſarily
force them to retire.

THIS laſt general aſſembled his army, on the 18th of April, at

Trautenau ; from whence he marched, on the 19th, to Konigſhoff,
where he paſſed the Elbe. His intentions were to proceed towards
Turnau and Liebenau, in order to facilitate the march of prince
Bevern's corps; and, being joined with it, go to Prague. This
plan was founded on the ſame principles as that of the king's.
Whatever troops the Auſtrians might ſend on the frontiers of
Luſace, they could not remain there, even though they had beat.
the duke of Bevern ; becauſe the march of Schwerin, behind.
them, muſt force them to retire, for fear of being taken between
two fires; as it really happened : for, on the 24th, they quitted.
their camp at Liebenau, and marched with precipitation towards
- Brandeiſs ;
(
 38 H1's To R Y of the WAR

Brandeiſs ; and from thence to Prague, where they arrived the 3d

of May. M. Schwerin, in the mean time, marched from Königſhoff
to Giltchin, where he was informed of the aëtion of Reichenberg,
and of the enemy's retreat. Upon which he wiſely changed his
route, and marched on the Iſer; hoping ſtill to cut them off from
Prague: and, though he did not ſucceed in this, he arrived at
Jungbuntzlau, in time to ſeize an immenſe magazine which they
had formed there. -

HAviNG been joined by the prince of Bevern's corps, he pro

ceeded to Brandeiſs ; where he continued 'till the 4th of May:
then he paſſed the Elbe, and encamped on the other ſide, not
thinking it prudent to advance ’till he had concerted meaſures
with the king. - -

His majeſty, having thrown a bridge over the Moldau, near

Podbaba, paſſed that river, with part of his army, on the 5th;
leaving the remainder, under marſhal Keith, on the Weiſſenberg.
The 6th, at 5 in the morning, marſhal Schwerin's army arrived;
and, having reconnoitred the enemy, the whole marched on the
left, and ſoon after the battle begun. We will give here the
different relations, that were publiſhed by authority, of this
memorable ačtion.

THAT publiſhed at Vienna is as follows:

; “His royal highneſs prince Charles of Lorrain was informed,
“ on the 4tm of May, that the king of Pruſſia had thrown bridges
“over the Moldau, near Roſtock and Podbaba, in order to join
-
“ M. Schwerin's army, by Winorz, and then attack our right,
“ or cut off the communication with our magazines at Kollin and
“Kuttenberg. His royal highneſs changed his poſition ſo, that
“ the left came to the town of Prague, and the right towards
• Maleſchitz and Biechowitz. The 5th the Pruſſians vanguard
“ paſſed the Moldau : we ordered ſeveral batteries to be raiſed
*- “ before
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 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. 39.

“before the front of our army: at 11 o'clock, in the night, the

ge

4&
king ordered his whole army to paſs that river, leaving only a
&4
ſmall corps, and a great quantity of artillery, on the Weiſſenberg.
The junction of his, and Schwerin's army, was made on the
tº

6th, at break of day. Immediately afterwards the whole Pruſ

&&
fian army, amounting to above 100,000 men, advanced againſt
us. M. Schwerin ordered the left wing, which he commanded,
44

44
to attack our right, and endeavour to break it; while the king
alarmed our left. His royal highneſs prince Charles of Lorrain,
6&

&4
whoſe army conſiſted of 55,000 only, ſaw himſelf obliged, by
the motions of M. Schwerin, to order his ſecond line to enter
4t
into the firſt, and place it ſo as to cover the right wing; the
(e.
left being already covered by the cannon of Prague. His royal
4&
highneſs left only two regiments of horſe there, and placed the
(4
other thirteen, in three lines, on our right, the better to ſuſtain
44
it. All theſe motions were made according as the Pruſſians
44
extended themſelves, in order to take us in flank; which
{g
M. Schwerin had principally in view. We occupied ſeveral
heights; and M. Schwerin had likewiſe ſome before him, which
{g
he muſt occupy before he could approach us. Our artillery
began to fire about 7 o'clock; which, as well as that of the
infantry, produced ſo great an effect, that the whole line of
M. Schwerin, which, according to the report of the deſerters,
had orders to attack us, with their bayonnets fixed, was totally
overthrown : while our cavalry attacked Schwerin's ; beat it.
back three times; and diſperſed it. As the Pruſſians firſt line
was thrown back in confuſion on the ſecond, this fired upon
them, and marched over their dead and wounded companions
towards us. They were, however, received as the firſt time,
and again beat back. Our right wing, profiting of their vićtory,
*ſ

followed the flying enemy, in good order, above 6co paces;

“ took
4-O H1's To R Y of the WAR
&4
took ſeveral pair of colours; 16 pieces of cannon; and a great
&º
number of priſoners. Our right, having thus advanced, left
&&
a great opening between it and the left. The king of Pruſſia
«&
marched, in the greateſt haſte, with ſeveral columns, and occu
gº
pied this vacant ſpace ; and, at the ſame time, ordered a freſh
4&
body of horſe to advance, full gallop, and occupy the ground
&&
where his left had ſtood, and thereby come behind our right,
4 &
which was purſuing the enemy; ſo that this right wing, which
& ſº
had been vićtorious for three hours, was of a ſudden ſurrounded:
&&
by the enemy: and, to augment our misfortunes, there raiſed
&4
ſuch a cloud of duſt, as hindered us from knowing each other;
4&
and ſuch a confuſion enſued, that it was impoſſible for us toº
“
aſſemble the men, and put them again in order. Part of our
g-g
infantry did, however, all that was poſſible to join our left
& &
wing; in which they ſucceeded; and retired, ſtep by ſtep, under
& c.
a continual fire, to Prague ; where they entered together. Two
& 4
thouſand of our right wing ſtopped near the field of battle, and
4&
thereby ſuſtained the reſt of the troops that were in confuſion.
&º
All our artillery of reſerve, the heavy baggage, pontoons, mili
4&
tary cheſt, and 16ooo men from our right wing, aſſembled, the
& Cº.
8th, at Beneſchau. In two days 3000 Pruſſian deſerters are
& &
come to the army, who all declare, that the Pruſſians have loſt,
&4
killed, wounded, and miſſing, above 20,000 men. In dead,
«g
and wounded, we have loſt, at moſt, 4ooo men; and 25 co
£4.
taken priſoners ; and no more than 20 field pieces are loſt.
- «
During the battle, major general Beck, with a corps of Croats,
4 &
attacked the town of Brandeiſs, ſword in hand; beat a Pruſſian
&4
battalion, that was there in garriſon, of which he killed Ioo men;
&4
and, after he had broke the bridge over the Elbe, retired with 5
&4
pair of colours, 2 cannon, 5oo horſes, a rich booty, and 678
44
priſoners, among whom was the lieutenant colonel Mardefeld,
“ and
 in GERMANY., 1757. 41
ºf
and all the officers of the battalion who were alive; all which
he brought to M. Daun's camp. On our ſide M. Brown was.
gº
wounded. On that of the Pruſſians M. Schwerin, and five or
tº.
ſix other generals, are killed ; and general Winterfield mortaliy
wounded.” -

THE Pruſſians account of this battle is as follows:

“The king joined M. Schwerin's army the 6th of May, in
&g
the morning; and it was reſolved to attack the enemy imme
©a
diately. The imperial army was encamped, with the left, on
cº
the Ziſkaberg; and the right, on a hill, near Sterboholi. It
º
was determined to attack the enemy's right; the Pruſſian army,
(t
therefore, marched, on the left, through the village of Potſ
&4
chernitz. M. Brown, having obſerved this motion, ordered
(&
his army to march on the right, that he might not be taken
4&
in flank. The Pruſſians were obliged to paſs through ſome
(*
hollow ways, and over ſome marſhy ground, on the other ſide
of the village of Biſchowitz, which threw the infantry into
ſome diſorder; and, the attack having been made in too much
haſte, they were repulſed. Marſhal Schwerin, the greateſt
general of his time, was killed, with the colours in his hands,
at the head of his own regiment. As ſoon as our infantry was
formed again, they renewed the attack againſt the enemy's
right wing. Prince Henry, the king's brother, alighted from
his horſe, and put himſelf at the head of his brigade ; with
which he mounted, or rather climbed up the mountains; and,
having beat off the enemy, took ſeveral batteries. The cavalry
of our left wing, after three attacks, forced that of the Auſtrians
to retire. Our center, in the ſame manner, beat the enemy's
infantry, and purſued them through their camp, which was
44

ſtill ſtanding. Our left wing, to which ſome cavalry was

º:
joined, marched to Michele ; and we ſeparated the Auſtrian,
4.
army; the right wing of which fled to the Zaſſava. Upon
G. “.. which:
42 HIS To R Y of the WAR

“ which our right attacked the enemy's left, and took ſucceſſively
“ three batteries, placed on the hills. Our right wing of horſe had"
“ no opportunity to come to action. Prince Ferdinand of Brunſ
“ wic attacked the enemy's left in flank; and, as the king, with
“ his left, and a body of horſe, had already reached the Moldau,
“ all the Auſtrian infantry was forced to throw themſelves into
“ Prague. They attempted to march out, on the ſide of König
“ ſaal, but were drove back by M. Keith's corps. We have taken
“ above 4oco priſoners; among whom are 3o officers : beſides
“ 60 cannon, and Io ſtandards. On our fide we have loſt, 3099
“ men, 54 officers, 340 horſes, killed: 8208 men, 397 officers,
“ and 246 horſes, wounded : and 1557 men, 6 officers, miſſing.”
Among the dead were M. Schwerin,” and major general Amſtel.
Among
* M. Schwerin was born the 26th of Ośtober, 1684. He ſtudied at Leiden, Roſtock,
and Greifswalde. In 1699 he ſerved in a Dutch regiment belonging to his uncle; in 1705
he had a company. His uncle having quitted the Dutch ſervice, he did the ſame ; and in
1706 was made a lieutenant colonel in the duke of Mecklenburg's ſervice; in 1707 a colo
nel. The duke Charles Leopold ſent him in 1712 to the king of Sweden, Charles the 12th,
at Bender, with whom he continued a year. On his return he was made a brigadier; and
in 1718 a major general; in 1719 he commanded the Mecklenburg troops, at the battle of
Walmſmoelen, againſt the Commiſſion’s army, and beat them: and, the duke having reformed
the greateſt part of his troops, the marſhal entered into the Pruſſian ſervice as major general ;
in 1723 he had a regiment given him; in 1724 was ſent as miniſter to the court of Poland;
in 1730 was made governor of Peitz; in 1731 a lieutenant general; in 1732 knight of the
black eagle; in 1739 general of infantry; in 1740 a field marſhal. He diſtinguiſhed him
felf much at the battle of Molwitz, the 16th of April, 1741; where he received two con
ſiderable wounds: in 1744 he marched with a great army into Bohemia; where he joined
the king, at Prague, and commanded the ſiege of that place; where he diſtinguiſhed him
ſelf very much; in 1756 he commanded, as we have ſaid, the army in Sileſia; and, during
that campaign, gave great proofs of his ſuperior abilities in the art of war; and was killed
with the colours of his regiment in his hand. He was rather a little ſized man; he had,
however, a martial look; loved the ſoldiers; and was very careful of them; and was there
fore much beloved by them: and, though he on ſome occaſions was very hot, in all his
expeditions he knew how to combine the greateſt bravery with the greateſt prudence. After
the battle of Lowofitz the king wrote to him to act cautiouſly (d’aller bride en main.)
He was twice marricq, and has left children of both ſexes. -
 ORDER of BATTLE of the Austri AN ARMY, under the Command of his Royal Highneſs Prince CHARLEs of LoRRAINE, May 6, 1757.
Prince CHARLEs of Lop R. A. IN E.
Marſhal Broune.
Genly, of Horſe, Eſterhazy. Grand Maſter of Artillery, Königſegg. Gen. of Horſe, Lucheſ.
Lieut. Gen. Odonel, Sprecher Forgatz. Arberg. Dourlach. Spada.
Maj. Gen. Löwenſtein. Stampa. Voiſin. Stolberg. Materni. Wolfen. Wurben. Peroni. Wolfersdorf. Urſel. Bretlach. De Ville,
S. S. Sº S > * > * > * * : * * * * * * * S Sº S. Sº
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 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. 43

Among the wounded were lieutenant generals Fouquet, Hautchar

mois, and Winterfield; and major generals Plettenberg, Schöning,
and Blankenſee. Theſe two accounts of the battle are far from
being clear and explicit, and give but a very confuſed idea of the
aćtion. We ſhall therefore add another, wrote by count Schwerin,
general adjutant to the marſhal of that name, which ſecms to be,
by far, the beſt that appeared on that occaſion.
“IN conſequence of the meaſures concerted with M. Schwerin,
“his majeſty paſſed the Moldau, at Seltz, the 5th of May, 1757,
“ at 8 o'clock in the morning, with the corps he propoſed joining
“ to the marſhal's army; of which he gave us notice, as had been
“ agreed, by a twelve pound ſhot, to which the marſhal anſwered.
“with the ſame ſignal. At 2 o'clock in the evening his majeſty
“ſent Stutterheim, one of his adjutants, to the marſhal, with
“ orders, that we, and the column commanded by general Win
“terfield, ſhould break up at 12 o'clock that night, and compaſs
“our march, ſo that the head of our columns ſhould arrive, ex
“ačtly at 4 in the morning, upon the heights of Broſz, where
&4
his majeſty promiſed to be, on the right, by Tſchimniz. Theſe
4-g

orders were executed with ſuch preciſion, that our three columns
&t
arrived, at the place of rendezvous, at 4 o'clock; and, at ſuch
“a diſtance from each other, as to leave only the ſpace neceſſary
“to form the line. We did not meet with any obſtacle, on our
“march, 'till we came to the heights before Brofiz; where Mo
«
dena's regiment of horſe, two of dragoons, and Feſtetitz's huſ
&g
ſars, were poſted that night. Theſe fired upon our vanguard,
&c.
and retired immediately, through Broſz, to the left wing of
---
their army. *

tº
“As ſoon as the king had wiſhed the marſhal and general.
Winterfield a good morning, he rode, with theſe two generals,
£c
any other eſcort than two of his adjutants, captain
without
“Platen, lieutenant colonel Oelſnitz, and myſelf, to one of the
G 2. “higheſt
4-4- H1's To R Y of the WAR
*&
higheſt hills on the other fide of Broſz. From hence we could
<.
diſcover all the enemy's camp very plain; the firſt and ſecond
< &
line from one end to the other. His majeſty reconnoitred it
4&
with his ſpying glaſs. When the enemy perceived ſeven or
& 4
eight perſons on the hill, he ſent us ſome four pounders, but
&&
without effect. His majeſty continued above an hour here, to
c. c.
examine their poſition, and how they were to be attacked.
74
The enemy was poſted, with the left wing towards Prague,
& Cº.
on the Ziſkaberg, behind the Invalides : the right extended
& c.
about 2000 paces beyond the village of Conradiz, near Ster
&&
boholi. Two hundred paces before their front, the mountains
&&
were ſo ſteep and craggy, that no cavalry or artillery could poſ
& c.
fibly aſcend them. At the foot of theſe mountains is a deep
&&
valley, which was intirely occupied by ſome huſſars and Hun
4&
garian infantry. The mountains on our fide of the valley were
&&
no leſs ſteep and craggy than the others: notwithſtanding theſe
&&
difficulties, his majeſty was inclined to attack the enemy in
&&
front. The marſhal, on the contrary, repreſented to him the
4&
difficulty of the ground; the great march the troops had made;
&
and the ſtrength of the enemy's poſition; who had covered the
4.4
heights before their front with a prodigious quantity of heavy
cº
artillery. His majeſty, convinced by theſe reaſons, permitted
&g
the marſhal to go and ſeek out ſome more convenient place to
&4
form the attack. Upon which his excellency rode, full gallop,
gºg
before the enemy's right, where the ground on both fides falls
&4
gradually, and where he perceived a plain, before the enemy's
gº
right wing, near the village of Mieſz, where the infantry could
gtº
paſs over the meadows, and the cavalry and heavy artillery over
gº
the damms. As ſoon as the marſhal had reconnoitred the
&4
ground, and given an account of it to the king, orders were
&4
immediately given to the three corps to move on the left. This
** Was
 in G E R M A N Y, 17 57. 4-5
wº
was executed with ſuch celerity, that the army, which had
* -
received the orders about nine o'clock, marched above four
wo
miles through very bad roads, and at half an hour paſt ten was
*.
formed; and at eleven the battle begun on the left wing. All
&4
our cavalry was paſling the damm, when that of the Auſtrians
&C
firſt turned out, and formed itſelf in order of battle, without
* -
taking down one tent. They did not probably perceive that
&4
our intention was to attack their right flank, 'till they ſaw two
tº c.
regiments of our cavalry paſs the damm, and form direétly
qc
on it. This manoeuvre drew their attention that way: they
tºº
then ordered all their cavalry from the left; which, with great
&C
celerity, came and formed itſelf, on a fine plain, on the right,
gº
in 104 ſquadrons, in three lines, with intervals equal to the
4&
front of a ſquadron. This manceuvre was executed with ſuch
ºt
promptitude, that our lieutenant general, the hereditary prince
&4
of Schönaich, who had only 65 ſquadrons, fearing to be out
flanked, reſolved inſtantly to attack the enemy, without waiting
&4
for the right wing which the king had ordered to come and
reinforce him. Accordingly the attack was made in the beſt
(g
order. The enemy ſtood ſtill 'till we came within 5o paces of
them, then they fired their carabines; and at 3o they advanced
with a ſtrong pace againſt us. We were outwinged by 8 ſqua
ºc
drons, and therefore 'tis no wonder our cavalry had ſuch a hard
tº

4.
taſk, and was twice repulſed. In the third attack, Stechow's
regiment of dragoons, commanded by colonel Winterfield, and
tº
general Ziethen, with 20 ſquadrons of Ziethen's and Putkam
g

ºx
mer's huſſars, advanced with ſo much bravery, that not only
the enemy's cavalry was intirely defeated, but part of it was
puſhed on their own grenadiers, on the right wing, which
--

threw them back in the utmoſt confuſion. During this attack of

the cavalry, the grenadiers of our left wing, and the regiments
“ of
46 H Is T or y of the WAR
&&
of Fouquet, Kreutzen, and Schwerin's infantry, having paſſed.
**
over ſome meadows, were forced to advance through a very
gº
narrow road, in order to join the reſt of the line, which was
&C
already formed. As ſoon as the grenadiers appeared on the
gº
other fide of the defile, they were received with twelve poun
&c.
ders, charged with cartridges, in ſuch a manner, that they
& c.
were inſtantly forced to retire, and quit the defile in the
&c.
greateſt confuſion. In the mean time the enemy's fire grew
& Cº.
ſtill more violent, and at laſt obliged the grenadiers to retire
&&
back over the damm. They were followed by Fouquet's and,
«&
Kreutzen's regiments; and, as the ſecond battalion of Schwerin's-
&4
begun to do the ſame, the marſhal, who had been continually
&©
on the other ſide of the defile, took the colours out of the
&&
officer's hands, and rode before the regiment; doing all that
&&
was poſſible to make them advance. He drew the troops, as:
&4
well as he could, out of the defile; and, having put them again,
& 4
in order, advanced with a ſtrong pace towards the enemy.
4&
Scarce had he marched 12 ſteps, when he received ſeveral.
&&
ſhot; one in the ear, another in the heart, and three in the
«&
body: he fell inſtantly from his horſe, without the leaſt ſigns
4&
of life. General Manteufel took the colours out of his hand,
& 4
and gave them to the enſign; who had ſcarce received them,.
4&
when a cannon ſhot came and killed him on the ſpot. Imme–
&&
diately after this the whole line advanced. Our artillery did.
&4
great execution. The lines were at above 60 paces diſtant from
c4
each other ; when the enemy's infantry, on the right, was ob-.
«
ſerved to be in the greateſt confuſion. Their center kept their
&&

ground much longer ; being protećted by a great quantity of

&&.
artillery. His majeſty, obſerving that the enemy's right wing
4&
purſued our left with great vivacity, inſomuch that it was ſepa
&&
rated from the reſt of the army, laid hold of this favourable.
“ opportunity ;
 in GERMANY., 1757. - 47
“ opportunity; and, with the greateſt celerity, marched, with his
“ right, to occupy the ſpace which the enemy, by advancing,
“ had left open : and, by this means, ſeparated the two wings
“ from each other. Now the confuſion was general in the ene
“my's army. Our left wing, being again formed, attacked the
“ purſuing enemy, and drove them back: and, when they chdea
“voured to retire to the army, they found the ground occupied
“ by the king. His majeſty ordered an attack to be made, with
“fixed bayonnets, on the enemy's left wing, that was likewiſe
“ flying. Here a great carnage enſued; particularly in taking
“ the redoubt; where the ſecond battalion of prince Henry's did
“wonders. The enemy's left fled into Prague; and the right,
“ in confuſion, towards Maleſchitz and Biſchowitz.”
Before we give an account of what followed this memorable
battle, it is neceſſary to examine the various operations which
preceded it, as well as the condućt of the action itſelf, that the
reader may be able to form a proper judgment of them, as they
are in themſelves, and independant of the events. For theſe do
not always proceed from fine diſpoſitions ; nor are prudent and
wiſe meaſures conſtantly attended with happy ſucceſſes. In gene
ral, however, it muſt be confeſſed, that few or no enterprizes
fail, but by ſome error, which might have been forcſecn, and
conſequently avoided. -

The plan, formed by the Auſtrians, to remain on the defenſive

'till their allies took the field, and thereby give them a favourable
opportunity to ačt with vigour, was certainly wiſe and prudent :
but they ſeem to have failed in the execution. Two thirds of the
enemy's troops were cantoned in Saxony and Luſatia, and the re
mainder in the neighbourhood of this laſt province; which indi

cated, very plainly, that, in caſe he propoſed to invade Bohemia,

it would be on that ſide ; particularly as the king was there in
- - perſon.
48 History of the WAR
perſon. Beſides, by eatering Bohemia from the fide of Saxony,
this laſt would be covered by that very manoeuvre; whereas, if it.
was done from Sileſia, another army muſt be left to guard Saxony.
They ought to have known the king better, than to ſuppoſe he
would act with part of his forces only, when he had it in his

power to do it with the whole. Moreover, if, contrary to all

appearances, aswell as to the nature of things, he attempted to
invade Moravia, he could not, in leſs, than a month, bring his,
armies on that ſide ; and the Auſtriens did not require half that
time to bring all their forces there. If his majeſty ſent a corps.
there only, the garriſon of Olmutz, ſuſtained by ſome Croats, a.
regiment of dragoons, and another of huſſars, would have been
ſufficient to cover the country. -

FROM all which, it appears, that the Auſtrians ačted very im

prudently, in poſting a corps of above 20,000 men in Moravia,
where they were quite uſeleſs. What augments this firſt fault,
was the leaving it there even after the Pruſſian army was in
motion, as well in Saxony and Luſatia, as about Schweidnitz;.
which demonſtrated their intention was to penetrate that way into,
Bohemia.
This corps ſhould, no doubt, have been placed, during the
winter, ſo as to form a chain from Moravia to Königſhoff; and,
in the month of March, their quarters ſhould have been drawn.
nearer each other; and the center placed about Pardubitz. This,
would have enabled them to aſſemble, on the leaſt notice, either.
on the right, towards Leutomiſchel ; or on the left, behind the
Elbe, about Schurtz. -

WHEN the Pruſſians were in motion, this corps ſhould have

aſſembled at Schurtz ; becauſe, from thence, it was at hand to .
join count Königſeg; and, being united, were much ſuperior to
the duke of Bevern's, or marſhal Schwerin's ; and therefore might
attack -
 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. 49

attack either of theſe generals, if they preſumed, which was not

probable, to penetrate into Bohemia, and hinder them from join
ing their forces. But this was neglected, and the corps in Moravia
quite forgot; as one may imagine : for, though the enemy had
entered Bohemia at the other extremity, about the 2 oth of April,
yet this corps, on the 6th of May, was only arrived at Böhmiſch
Brodt, within twenty miles of Prague. As to count Königſeg's
corps, it has been already obſerved, that it was poſted too far in
the mountains, and expoſed to be taken in between the prince of
Bevern's corps, and that of M. Schwerin.
The Auſtrians committed the ſame fault cxaćtly, in the diſtri
bution of their troops on the frontiers of Saxony.
IT was by no means probable, that the king would order a
confiderable corps to enter Bohemia, near Egra; beccuſe, being
at ſo great a diſtance from his other columns, it would be expoſed
to be cut off by the ſuperior forces of the Auſtrians; who muſt
neceſſarily take a central poſition between that corps and the
king's, as they had the greateſt part of their forces in the circles
of Saatz and Leutmeritz.

It was ſtill leſs probable the enemy would undertake any thing
againſt Egra; which, if provided with a common garriſon, cannot
be taken without a fiege; which moſt certainly he would not un
dertake, as it cannot, from its ſituation, facilitate the operations
againſt Bohemia: and, if againſt all rules of war, he did lay fiege
to it, they might in four days have brought their army to its
relief. From whence it appears evident, that the placing a corps
in the neighbourhood of Egra was of no uſe, and ſubječt to be
cut off from the main army at Budyn, whenever the enemy en
tered Bohemia by the defiles of Kupferberg and Baſberg; as it
really happened : becauſe M. Brown was forced to quit the po
ſition at Bduyn, in order to join the duke of Aremberg: whereas,
H if
59 His To R Y of the WAR

if this general had taken a poſition at Commottau, with all his

light troops, ſuſtained by ſome battalions of good infantry, in the
two laſt mentioned defiles, it is plain prince Maurice could not
penetrate that way, as he did; and, though he had, he could not
join the king until he beat the duke, who might have been ſuſ
tained by the whole army under the marſhal at Budyn. This laſt
was likewiſe ill poſted, being too far back to ſuſtain any body of
troops he might ſend to occupy the defiles beween Pirna and Lo
voſitz; which we think is the only method that can effectually
hinder an enemy that attempts to penetrate that way into Bohemia.
The marſhal ought, therefore, to have aſſembled his quarters be--
yond the Egra, in ſuch a manner as to be able, in one march, to.
be behind the Bila at Auſfig: from whence he might either ſuſ--
tain the light troops placed behind the ravin of Ghiſhubel, or, as:
he thought moſt convenient, let them fall back on his army, and,
defend the poſition at Auſſig, which, if occupied by an army, can
not be forced. Even, perhaps, it would have been more advan
tageous to advance with the whole army, behind the ravin of
Ghiſhubel, and have ſent the duke of Aremberg, with his whole:
corps, into the mountains of Baſberg; becauſe theſe poſitions not:
only covered Bohemia, but alſo enabled the Auſtrians to penetrate
into Saxony, if it was thought proper: whereas the different poſi
tions, taken by the Auſtrian army, in order to cover Bohemia, didi
not anſwer that end, and moreover expoſed the different corps to
be beat in detail, and hindered from joining each other; as it:
happened to that in Luſatia, under count Königſeg; and that in:
Moravia, under marſhal Daun ; the firſt having been beat, and
the other hindered from joining the reſt of the troops at Prague.
There is ſcarce any operation of war more delicate and difficult:
than the diſtribution of the troops into winter quarters: it requires,
a perfeót knowledge of the country, and muſt be regulated by a.
- - prodigious
 in GERMANY., 1757, - 55
prodigious variety of circumſtances: 1. regard muſt be had to the
enemy's diſpoſition ; 2. to his general plan of war, and to the
particular objećt he has in view the enſuing campaign; S. to the
obječt you have yourſelf in view for the following campaign.
If you propoſe to be on the defenſive, the diſtribution of the troops
muſt be made in ſuch a manner as to be able to unite in different
points, without leaving even a poſſibility of their being intercepted
in their march to the place of rendezvous: that theſe points be
choſen as near the frontiers as poſſible, in order to cover the coun
try; and that they be ſo well choſen, that the enemy can neither
force you in them, nor leave you behind. If you propoſe being
on the offenſive, the troops muſt be ſo diſtributed, that, in one
march, or two, they form ſeveral great corps on the enemy's
frontiers, and paſs them ſo as to ſeparate his quarters, and run no
riſk of being intercepted before they join, and form one body in
the enemy's country. Above all things, care muſt be taken that
they are not expoſed to be inquieted, during the winter, which the
troops muſt enjoy in peace and ſafety, as well to refreſh themſelves,
as to form the recruits, &c.
IT muſt be acknowledged that the king of Pruſſia excells in
this, as in many other parts of war: no general has ever openca
the different campaigns with more greatneſs or preciſion. IHis
quarters were ſo diſpoſed, that it was ſcarce poſſible, from thence,
to gueſs at his intentions; as he could, ſeemingly, with equal faci
lity, form very different enterprizes: from whence it always hap
pened that he begun his operations with great views, celerity, and
exačtneſs: and, when his troops were attacked in their quarters,
they always aſſembled in the places appointed, without ever having
ſuffered any confiderable loſs ; which is the more extraordinary, as
he had very few light troops, eſpecially in the beginning. His.
diſciple, prince Ferdinand, has likewiſe ſhewn himſelf infinitely
H 2 ſuperior
52 H 1 s To R Y of the WAR

ſuperior to all the French generals, in this point, as appeared evi

dently on every occaſion.
THE Auſtrians negle&ted all the rules abovementioned, and were
therefore forced to abandon the country, in order to unite the
different corps, and moreover expoſed to be beat in detail; as we
have ſeen.
HAving at laſt aſſembled their army at Prague, they were at
liberty to attack either the king or marſhal Schwerin, who were
ſeparated by a great river, and a moſt difficult country for military
operations. They were much ſuperior to either, and therefore
ought to have riſked an action in thoſe circumſtances; otherwiſe it.
is in vain to make war. If they thought themſelves unequal to the
king, or Schwerin, ſeparately, they ſhould not, certainly, have
fought them both when united. They ſhould not have permitted:
the king to paſs ſuch a river as the Moldau, in a moſt difficult:
place, and within fight of their camp, and remain with a very
inconſiderable body of troops, compared to theirs, a whole day.
and a night on the ſame fide of the river. They ought, no doubt,
to have attacked him, either before he paſſed, or after, before he
joined M. Schwerin; or, if they choſe rather to attack this laſt, ,
they ſhould have left:20 battalions on the heights of Brofitz, oppo
ſite Potbaba, to hinder the king from paſſing, and march to,
Brandeiſs, againſt Schwerin, without delay.
THE enemy having joined all his forces the 6th in the morning, .
in their preſence, and his leaving M. Keith on the other fide of:
the Moldau, in the fight of Prague, indicated very plainly, he
propoſed bringing things to an iſſue there. The Auſtrians ſhould:
not therefore have been ſo confident in their numbers, and poſition,
as to ſend their cavalry to forage, while the enemy was actually,
making ſome motions in their preſence.

WHEN.
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 53

WHEN they ſaw the enemy march on his left, they certainly
did right to change their poſition; but this was only part of what
they ſhould have done. They ought to have brought all the artil
lery poſſible to bear againſt the village of Podſchernitz, and have
attacked him as he was advancing in columns through that village,
and over the meadows, without giving him time, or ground to.
form upon. They ſhould have put their horſe in two cloſe lines,
which would have enabled them to extend their right quite up to
the fiſhponds, which covered their flank effectually, and deprived.
the enemy of the ground, on which only he could form his cavalry;.
and, if they kept back their center a little, ſo as to form a curve,
concave towards the enemy, which they certainly might have done,
their right being covered by the ponds, and their left by the artil
lery and infantry of the right wing, in this caſe, the enemy could
not advance at all, without preſenting his left flank; which muſt
always be decifive in every action, and particularly in cavalry.
But the Auſtrians neglected all theſe precautions, and moreover
ſuffered the enemy's horſe, though leſs numerous, to take them.
in flank; and were conſequently, defeated. When M. Brown.
repulſed and purſued the enemy, he ought not to have broke the
line, and ruſhed forward, like a young ſoldier, who ſees, and,
obſerves only what paſſes direétly before him, without attending
to the whole, and thereby regulate this or that particular
manoeuvre. When he advanced, he ſhould have ordered the
whole line to make the ſame motion; and, if he did not, chooſe to.
quit the heights, where his center and left ſtood, he ſhould have
advanced his right, ſo as to form an oblique line with the right:
forwards. By this manoeuvre, he was at liberty to bring all his
reſerve, and the right of the ſecond line, to ſuſtain the point of
attack on which the vićtory depended; and, by keeping the line:
cloſe, gave the enemy no, advantage, how much ſoever he advanced
with:
S4- His To R Y of the WAR
with his right to purſue them to Podſchernitz. Even this oblique
formation neceſſarily enabled him to take the enemy's whole line
in flank, and rake it from one end to the other. The marſhal, by
advancing with the right only, broke the line, and thereby left an
opening, which the enemy occupied, cut the army in two, and
defeated it.
THERE is in every camp a certain point, which may very properly
be called, the key of it, and on which depends the ſucceſs of an
action ; while you keep this, the enemy has nothing ; and when
you loſe it, all is loſt. The talent of finding out this point, is
perhaps the moſt ſublime, and the moſt rare, of any in the whole
art of war. On this talent depends the ſcience of camps, and the
methods of attacking and defending them. In the preſent caſe, this
point was, no doubt, that ſpace of ground between the point of the
right wing of infantry, and the pond near Sterboholi, where the
cavalry ſhould have been poſted, as it is marked in the plan,
with the light troops and ſome regular infantry in Sterbo
holi, and a battery on the height, before the right wing of horſe.
While the Auſtrians occupied this ground, they could not be
defeated ; but they had ſtudied ſo little the ſcience of camps, that
they did not perceive this point, and formed their cavalry a great
way behind it; and were beat.
FROM all the preceding remarks, it appears, that M. Brown
either did not know the country, or did not know how to occupy
it properly, in the diſtribution of his army into winter quarters;
and that he committed numberleſs faults, as well before, as during
the action; which neceſſarily were followed with the loſs of it.
As we know that he was a good ſoldier, and by no means a con
temptible general, it is far from being impoſſible, that ſome pri
vate motives might make him leſs careful and clear-fighted than is
conſiſtent with a perſon of his genius. He was, no doubt, little
pleaſed
-- -

in G E R M A NY, 1757. 55
pleaſed to ſee prince Charles at the head of the army; and, being
under the command of another, was, probably, leſs anxious about
the event. Had he been alone, perhaps he would have a&ted
otherwiſe. This ſhews, how imprudent it is to employ, together,
men whoſe private views of ambition can ſcarce ever coincide.
As to the king's diſpoſitions, they will, no doubt, appear very
fine to thoſe who are not ſufficiently acquainted with the nature
of military operations, or who have not attended to the deſcription
we have given of the country wherein theſe tranſactions happened.
Events, like an impetuous torrent, hurry people away, without
giving them time to refle&t on their cauſes, or examine the various
circumſtances which contributed to produce them ; and therefore
their opinion of things is ſeldom eſtabliſhed on clear and exact.
ideas.

BEING ſeparated from the enemy by a chain of mountains, and.

moreover protećted by many ſtrong places, he could diſtribute his
troops into winter quarters as he pleaſed, without any riſk; be
cauſe the nature of the country enabled him to aſſemble them, be
fore any confiderable body of the enemy could penetrate. The
diſpoſition of his march into Bohemia, was ſubject to a prodigious:
number of obſtacles ; many of which were, at leaſt might have
been, inſurmountable. -

PRINCE Maurice's column was ſeparated from that under the

king by an interval of 50 miles; and, moreover, by a moſt diſſi-.
cult country, full of mountains, woods, ravins, defiles, &c. The
enemy had, in this very ſpace of ground, an army much ſuperior
to either prince Maurice's, or the king's ; they might conſequently
have taken forty poſitions. that would have effectually hindered
their junétion; and, if they preſumed to advance one ſtep into the
country, attack either of them ſeparaetly ; and, being much
ſuperior, probably defeat them.
Even:
56 - H1's To R Y of the WA R

Eve N after their junétion, M. Brown, with the duke of Arem

berg, was ſtill equal to them, and might have taken ſeveral poſitions
between the Egra and Prague, which would have hindered them
from approaching the Moldau, and joining Schwerin. Being at laſt
aſſembled at Prague, they might have attacked either the king or
Schwerin, with forces much ſuperior to either. As theſe were
ſeparated by the Moldau, they might have been hindered from .
joining at all. When the king paſſed that river, leaving
M. Keith * on the other fide, the enemy were at liberty to deſtroy
either of them, having more time than was neceſſary for that
purpoſe. The ſame reaſoning holds good with regard to the
other two columns under prince Bevern and marſhal Schwerin.
They were ſo far ſeparated, that the enemy might have taken ſuch
poſitions as would have hindered them from joining; and might,
with ſuperior forces, have attacked either. From whence it
appears, that the king, by thus ſeparating his columns at ſuch
an immenſe diſtance, expoſed them to be beat in detail, and his
whole army to deſtruction. His paſſing ſuch a river as the Moldau,
in fight of an immenſe army, his ſtaying eighteen hours, at leaſt,
with a handful of men, in their preſence, ought to have been
fatal to him; and, if it happened otherwiſe, he muſt thank his
good fortune.
* Marſhal Keith, knight of the black eagle, of St. Andreas, and Alexander Newſki’s
orders in Ruſſia, was born of the illuſtrious family of Marſhall, in Scotland. In 1730 he
was a major general in Ruſſia; in 1734 a lieutenant general, and went with the Ruſſian
troops into Germany; in 1737 he ſerved againſt the Turks, and diſtinguiſhed himſelf greatly
at the taking of Oczakow, where he was wounded; in 1741 and 1742 he commanded againſt
the Swedes, and got the battle of Williamſtrand; in 1747 he quitted the Ruſſian ſervice,
and entered that of Pruſſia; in 1749 was made knight of the black eagle, and governor of
Berlin, with a penſion of 12,000 dollars, beſides his pay. He was killed in 1758, at the
battle of Hochkirchen, at the head of the Pruſſian infantry, who had repulſed the Auſtrians,
and were purſuing them. He was middle ſized; had a very martial countenance; and was
an humane and benevolent man. -

His
 in G E R MA NY, 1757. 57
His attacking the enemy in ſuch a ſtrong camp, and in the
neighbourhood of a fortreſs, was certainly very raſh, becauſe it
was very improbable that he beat them : and, though he did, he
could not reap any great advantage from it; as they could always
retire into Prague, and from thence march inſtantly out, and
deſtroy marſhal Keith in his preſence, even after he had ſeparated -

the two wings. "Tis, in general, very imprudent to attack an

army near a fortreſs; becauſe, in caſe of ſucceſs, 'tis impoſſible to
proceed with cavalry, which alone can deſtroy a defeated army;
whatever advantages the infantry may gain, they cannot proſecute
them with ſuch vigour and celerity, as to hinder an enemy from
making a retreat, and get ſoon together again. Had the king got
ſuch a battle, 20 miles from any fortreſs, the whole Auſtrian
army would have been deſtroyed. He was the leſs. obliged to
attack the enemy in this poſition, as, by directing his march
towards Kollin and Kuttenburg, where the enemy had their
magazines, they would have followed him, and given him a more.
favourable opportunity to attack, them; and, in all probability,
he would have met M. Daun, then coming from Moravia,
whom he might have cruſhed. This manoeuvre would have
enabled him to deſtroy the enemy's magazines, and force them to
fight on his own terms, or ſubmit to be cut off from Vienna. As
to the aëtion itſelf, he had no choice in his attack; it could be
done only on the left; but his ſeeing, and ſeizing the critical and,
decifive moment that. M. Brown gave him, by breaking his line,
is ſuch a ſtroke of ſuperior genius, that few, very few, are capable:
of. His prudence, in re-eſtabliſhing the line, continually, as he
advanced, and his whole condućt during the action, moſt juſtly,
deſerve the greateſt approbation. What appears raſh, in the
which immediately preceded it, muſt, probably, be:
Iana Il CeuVICS

attributed to the neceſſity of his affairs, and to the knowledge he

H. had:
58 His To R Y of the was
had of thoſe generals who oppoſed him. His majeſty ſeems too
great a general to commit a common fault.
PRINCE Charles, with near 50,000 men, having been forced
to throw himſelf into Prague, the king formed the extraordinary
proječt of blockading him in that place. As it is very populous,
the addition of near 60,000 men, including ſervants, and the fol- .
lowers of the army, would, he hoped, ſoon force them to ſur
render for want of ſubſiſtence. .

DURING this celebrated blockade, nothing happened, but what

is common; and therefore, we think, a detail of the operations
would be no leſs inſipid, than uſeleſs. In ſuch an operation of war,
nothing more is to be done, than to occupy ſuch poſts, in the
neighbourhood of the place, as moſt effectually prevent any ſuc
cours, proviſions, or intelligence, to enter. Thoſe who are ſhut
up, on the contrary, endeavour to open the chain as often as
poſſible, that their wants may be relieved. The nature of the
ground, the number and ſpecies of the troops on each fide, are
the only matters to be conſulted, as to the methods to be uſed on
theſe occaſions : no rule can be given as to the manner of occupy
ing properly a piece of ground ; genius alone can do it, and
-

precepts are vain. . . . . . .

*
- - - -
*

IT is, no doubt, a thing worthy remark, and will appear a fable

to poſterity, that near 50,000 men, with a train of artillery, arms,
&c. ſhould ſubmit to be ſhut up for fix weeks, and reduced to
extremity, by an army of equal force. That of the king did not
certainly, at the end of May, exceed that of the Auſtrians; which
will appear evident, if we confider how many men he had loſt in
the battle, by fickneſs, deſertion, and the numberleſs detached
corps. This army, ſmall as it was, formed a chain of poſts,
which extended many miles, and was moreover, ſeparated by the
Moldau; over which they communicated by two bridges only 3.
- - the .
 in G E R MAN y, 1757. 59
the one above, and the other below the town: ſo that, in fact,
the Auſtrians, had they choſe to march out of the place, would
have had no more than half the Pruſſian army to contend with :
why therefore they did not, no man, that has the leaſt idea of
military affairs, can ever comprehend. A torrent carried one of
the bridges away; yet did they continue quiet, and let flip this
favourable opportunity, without making any attempt to go out.
We have been very often on the ground about Prague, and muſt:
own, it is, and will be, a matter of wonder and aſtoniſhment, that
no effort was made to march out. Had they attacked the Pruſſians,
thus ſeparated by a great river, and divided into ſo many ſmall de
tachments, they could not fail in their attempt; they muſt have -
deſtroyed their army. It is no leſs ſurprizing, that ſo great a gene
ral as the king of Pruſſia ſhould think it poſſible to reduce an army.
of 50,000 men, in ſuch an extenſive town as Prague, with one of
equal force. The ſupineneſs of the Auſtrians juſtified this attempt,.
and ſaved his army from inevitable deſtruction. -

WHEN the king ſummoned prince Charles to ſurrender, marſhal

Brown, then fick in bed, being conſulted, anſwered, with no leſs.
ſpirit than amazement, “Eſt ce queſa majeſté croit que 11OUIS •

“ſommes tous des C—ll—ns. Dites au prince que mon avis eſt,
“que ſon alteſe aille ſur le champ attaquer le M. Keith.”
The celebrated marſhal Belleiſle, who knew Prague perfeótly
well, had, in the preceding war, with 15,000 men, defended it
for many months againſt the Auſtrians ; and, being at laſt reduced:
to the greateſt extremity, quitted it with 12,000 men, and retired
to Egra, with ſafety and glory. This general wrote a letter, while.
the king was blockading that town;. which I have ſeen ;, wherein
he ſays, “ Je connois Prague, ſi jºy etois, avec la: moitié des.
*.
“ troupes, que le prince Charles y a ačtuéllement: je detruirois,
“I’armée Pruſſienne.”
. . .. . . . I 2. WHILE:
60 History of the WAR

WHILE the king was occupied before Prague, he ſent out ſeve .
ral detachments, in order to raiſe contributions, and ſecure, or º
deſtroy, the magazines which the enemy had formed in different
parts of Bohemia. General Oldenbourg and colonel Meyer were
fent into the empire with the ſame view, and to hinder, or at leaſt
retard, the operations of the army of the empire. But all their
operations are of too inſignificant a nature to deſerve any particular
detail; none of them had, nor indeed could have, any confiderable
influence on the general plan of operations. We ſhall therefore
paſs them in filence. - * -

MARSHAL Daun, who now commanded the army in Moravia,

which had been the preceding campaign under the orders of prince
Piccolomini, having received orders to join the main army at
Prague, quitted Moravia, and directed his march for that purpoſe.
However, on the 6th of May, he was only arrived at Böhmiſch
Brodt, within 12 miles of that place, where he was informed of
the battle. He continued here for ſome days, and then retired to
Koilin, as well to avoid an action, as to join the right wing,
which, as we have already ſaid, had retired to Beneſchau.
The king, fearing that this army, which amounted to above
40,000 men, might not only diſturb his operations before Prague,
but likewiſe, by ſome manoeuvre or other, give prince Charles an
opportunity to get out of that place, thought it neceſſary to drive
them further back. For which purpoſe, the prince of Bevern,
with about 25,000 men, was ordered to execute this plan.
As this general advanced, the marſhal very wiſely retired, in
order to receive the reinforcements which were in march to join
him, and fell back ſucceſſively tº) Kollin, Kuttenberg, Goltzjen
kau, and Haber. . . . . . . . . . * - -

HAVING
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 61
HAviNG at length received all the reinforcements, artillery, &c.
which he expected, he gave orders, the 11th of June in the even
ing, to march next morning. Accordingly the army quitted the
camp of Jenikau the 12th, and marched the ſame day to Janovitzy,
The next day general Nadaſti was attacked at Pikan; but, being
ſuſtained by the whole army, the Pruſſians were repulſed with loſs.
This general, having been reinforced, was ordered to march by
Maleſchau, and take poſt at Suchdol, while general Beck, with
about 6000 men, was commanded to occupy Kuttenberg; which

the Pruſſians had quitted on the 12th, and retired to Kollin. On

the 14th the marſhal marched to Gintitz, and on the 16th to Kri
chenau, where he encamped as in A. A. This whole march was
condućted with much prudence and vigour; inſomuch that the
enemy was more than once on the point of being attacked, and
probably defeated ; being much inferior. The marſhal, by the
direction of his march, ſeems to have intended to bring prince
Bevern to an action before he was joined by any reinforcements,
or to have cut him off from Prague; the difficulty of the roads
and the good conduct of the prince prevented it. -

The king, being informed of the enemy's approach, quitted his

army before Prague on the 13th, and marched towards Kollin;
where he propoſed uniting the ſeveral corps, he had detached, to
the army under prince Bevern, and then attack the enemy without
delay. On the 14th he marched by Schwartz Koſteletz, and Zda
nitz, intending to encamp at Malotitz; but, on approaching that
Place, a large body of troops was diſcovered marching behind Zaſ
muck. Being no ways prepared for an action, having only a few
battalions with him, his majeſty threw them into the village of
Zdanitz, with the cavalry on the plain before it, and continued in
this poſition 'till he was joined by the different detachments he

expected.
THE

º
*
62: - History of the WA R
THE camp occupied by the enemy, at Krichenau, was judged;
too advantageous to be attacked in front, with any probability of
ſucceſs: nor could it be approached on the left, without marching,.
a great way up, to the ſource of the ravin which covered it. This
would give the marſhal time to change his poſition, as he thought.
moſt convenient, and perhaps afford him an opportunity to. give “
the king the ſlip, and march to Prague. For, which reaſon his.
majeſty reſolved to occupy the hills, of Chotzemitz, , behind the
enemy's right. Accordingly, on the 18th in the morning, the
army was ordered to march on its left, along the great.road that:
goes from Prague towards Kollin. During the march, advice was .
brought that the enemy was. retiring; which was ſoon found. toº,
be a miſtake; for he had only changed his poſition, and was ob
ſerved to beputting his army in order of battle, on the very
ground which the king propoſed to occupy. t

| THE marſhal, ſeeing the enemy's army move on its left, eaſily,
perceived the king's intentions were to attack him on his rights
flank: to avoid which, he ordered his army to move on the right, ,
firſt to B. B. the reſerve in D. D. then to G. G. with the reſerve.
in E. E. and general Nadaſti's corps in F. F. His army, confiſting:
of 60,000 men, was formed in two lines; the infantry on the
wings, and the cavalry in the center. The right of the infantry
was poſted on a high hill, quite cloſe to an open wood occupiedº
by the light troops. At a ſmall diſtance before the front was the .
village of Krzeczor, in which ſome battalions were placed very:
properly, as they could with eaſe be ſuſtained by the line. The
hill, on which this village ſtands, preſents, towards the right, very,
high and ſteep precipices, which cannot be paſſed by any ſpecies:
of troops. At the bottom of this hill is another village, which,
was likewiſe occupied by ſome infantry. Out of the hill, a little.
behind this laſt village, runs a rivulet almoſt perpendicular to the
enemy's
 in GERMANY., 1757. 63
enemy's line; the banks of it are very high and craggy. Behind
this rivulet Nadaſti's corps was at firſt placed, and then in F. F.
ſo that the enemy could not advance to attack the line, without
preſenting his flank to this corps. On the left of Krzeczor, on a
high and ſteep hill, is the village of Brziſt, a little before the line,
alſo occupied by ſome infantry. The left was likewiſe on a very
high hill, which commands all the plain about it. Near the left
is the village of Podhorz; through which runs a marſhy rivulet,
which effectually covered that wing. All the ground before the
front was very unequal; this obliges a line, marching to attack it,
to ſtop often, in order to cloſe and form again; which is a great
diſadvantage, particularly being near the enemy, whoſe artillery
cannot fail doing great execution.
The king ordered his army to halt in the plain near Slatiſlunz and
Novimieſto, while he reconnoitred the enemy's poſition; whom,
notwithſtanding the ſtrength of it, he reſolved to attack. The
army was again put in motion, and ſoon after the battle begun:
of which we ſhall give the different relations that were publiſhed.
By which means the reader will be enabled to form a proper judg
ment of this great and deciſive action. The firſt is that publiſhed
by the court of Vienna; the ſecond is that of the Pruſſians; and
the laſt, which is more extenſive than the others, was wrote by
a French officer, who was at the Auſtrian army by order of his
‘CQuſt. - - . -

“As ſoon as the imperial and royal army quitted the camp of
“Gintitz, on the 16th of June in the evening, in order to oc
“cupy that which had been marked out at Krichenau, his Pruſ
“ſian majeſty quitted likewiſe that of Kaurzim, and poſted his
“ army on the heights behind Planian. Upon which the Auſtrian
army changed its poſition that ſame evening, and was poſted, in
order of battle, between two heights, that were to the right
- “ and
64 History of the WAR
«
and left. On the 18th, in the morning, the enemy marched,
& c.
towards Planian, and halted between that place and the Inn,
<* called Slatiſlunz. At 1. o'clock, however, his army was put
&c.
again in motion, in four columns. As ſoon as his excellency,
&4
marſhal Daun, perceived that the enemy's intention was to come.
4.4
on his right flank, he ordered the reſerve, and all the ſecond,
44
line, to march there, and form a flank to cover the right, wing.
&4
General Nadaſti, with his huſſars and Croats, was likewiſe or-.
4*
dered there for the ſame purpoſe. The firſt line continued in:
4&
its firſt poſition 'till the enemy's left wing was ſeen to advance,
&g
in ſeveral columns, againſt the flank and right wing of the:
&4
Auſtrian army ; then it was ordered, to march on its right, -
4&
quite cloſe to the abovementioned flank; and, at two in the
&4
evening, it was at length formed upon the heights. Then the
& 4
heavy artillery, on both ſides, began to play. The enemy's at
4 &.
tack on our right wing was ſo violent, that it threw the cavalry,
gº
into confuſion: it was, however, put again in, order, by the
&4
bravery and good conduct of the generals Serbelloni, Daun,
&&
Odonell, Trautmanſdorff, and Aſpremont; and then they re
&&.
pulſed the Pruſſians. Notwithſtanding which, the enemy ad
&_&
vanced on the heights of the village of Krzeczor, ſtill nearer.
4 &
our flank. As ſoon.as, they reached the village, they burnt it;
46.

&&
which was the fignal to their right wing to attack our left. At
half an hour after three they made a moſt violent attack on our
&&

&4
flank, and immediately after on our right and left-wing. Some
hundred men, formed in half a ſquare, penetrated through the
6&
flank; they were, however, drove back by our cavalry and the
*&

4&
Saxon carabineers. The enemy renewed his attacks ſeven dif
ferent times; in each of which he was repulfed ; and at laſt
<&
forced to abandon us a compleat vićtory. Upon which the
&4
“ Auſtrian army took its third poſition on the heights, where it.
* remained.
 in Ge RMANY., 1757. 65
& ſº
remained all night, in order of battle; and, on the 19th, retired
&&
to the old camp of Krichenau. During the aëtion, the king was
4&
on a hill behind his left wing, from whence he gave his orders.
&&
The enemy, in their retreat, burnt the villages of Brzaſam and
&4
Kutliers: their left wing went towards the village of Welin;
ge
and their right towards Nimburg. This battle, which laſted
& c.
from 2 o'clock 'till nine, may be reckoned among the moſt re
&4
markable and bloody that have happened for a long time. It
&&
was condućted, on both fides, with no leſs valour than pru
-G
dence; 'till the Pruſſians were, at length, thrown into the
4&
greateſt confuſion, and forced to take a precipitate flight, by
gº
two different ways, and in ſmall diviſions; as chance brought
tº a
them together. Their loſs, on this occaſion, may be certainly
&4
reckoned at 20,000 men: 6500 were found dead on the field
&4
of battle; and above 7ooo priſoners: among which are lieu
*-
tenant general Treſkow, major general Pannewitz, and 120 ſtaff
4&
officers; beſides 3ooo deſerters. We have taken 22 pair of
c4
colours, and 45 pieces of cannon. The loſs of the Auſtrian
army amounts to above 6000 men, killed, wounded, and miſ
ºt
fing. Among the firſt is lieutenant general Lutzow ; and among
gº
the ſecond were count Serbelloni, general of horſe, lieutenant
&4
general Wolwart, and major generals prince Lobkovitz, and
Wolf. The vićtory, after God, muſt be aſcribed to the wiſe
and valourous condućt of marſhal Daun.” Count Stambach, ge
Gº
neral of horſe, who commanded the left wing, contributed very
much to the vićtory, by the vigorous attack he made on the
K - “ enemy's
* Leopold count Daun was born in 1705. He was, in the beginning, a knight of Malta,
and colonel of his father's regiment: in 1736 lord of the bed-chamber; in 1737 major ge
neral, and ſerved againſt the Turks; in 1739 a lieutenant general; in 1740 he obtained a
regiment; in 1745 he was made a general of infantry; in 1748 a privy councillor; in 1751.
commandant of Vienna; in 1753 knight of the golden fleece; and in 1754 a field marſhal.
He
 66 History of the WAR º

* g. enemy's right. Lieutenant generals Kolowrat, Wolwart, Wied,

“ and Sincere; major generals Schallenberg, Le Fevre, and Niclas
“ Eſterhaſi, diſtinguiſhed themſelves very much : as did general
“ Nadaſti, * with the Saxon light horſe, and the other troops
“, under his command. The regiments that formed the reſerve,
“ and the grenadiers, ſuffered very much ; having been continu
“ally in action. Among the infantry, the regiment of Botta,
“ commanded by prince Kinſky, diſtinguiſhed itſelf; having fired
“ all their cartridges, they however continued in the line, with
“ their bayonnets fixed, and repulſed the enemy. Among the
... cavalry, the four regiments of Savoy, Ligne, Birkenfeld, and
“Wurtenberg, diſtinguiſhed themſelves in a particular manner.
º The artillery, commanded by colonel Feuerſtein, was remarkably
“well ſerved. Among the volunteers, the duke of Wurtenberg,
“ and major general count Czernichew, likewiſe diſtinguiſhed
“ themſelves.” -

He had, in the preceding war, ſhewn no leſs bravery than prudence; and was wounded in
the battles of Grotzka and Freidberg, in 1749. He formed the new exerciſe, and com
poſed the inſtitutions for the new military academy. In 1745, having quitted the order of
Malta, he married the counteſs Fuchs, (a favourite of the empreſs) by whom he has many
children. He is a middle fized man, and has the moſt engaging countenance that can be
ſeen : is uncommonly brave, and cool in ačtion: a degree more of that vigor animi,
would make him one of the greateſt men of his age.
* General Nadaſti is a Hungarian born: he ſerved at firſt as lieutenant colonel in Baro
niai’s regiment of huflars; and in 1736 colonel; in 1741 major general; in 1744 lieutenant
general; in 1753 a privy councillor; in 1754 commandant of Buda, and general of horſe;
in 1756 bann of Croatia; and in 1758 a field marſhal. He ſerved in Italy, Sileſia, and
on the Rhine; and diſtinguiſhed himſelf greatly in the paſſage of that river, in the pre
ceding war; and by the taking of Schweidnitz in 1757. To recompence his ſervices, her
imperial majeſty reſtored him his grandfather's eſtates; and, though a Hungarian, conferred
upon him the government of Buda. He was married in 1745, and has ſeveral chiſdren.
Some diſguſt happened between him and the other commanders, after the battle of Iiſſa,
and he never appeared more in the army.
+ Count Czernichew is a Ruſſian born : he was firſt an enſign in the Semonowſki life
§uards; and in 1756 a major general. He is a man of great parts, which have contributed
to advance his fortune. At preſent he is ſecretary of war.
- THE
 in GERMANY., 1757.
-- * * *
67 s

The Pruſſians account of this battle is as follows:

“Immediately after the battle of Prague, colonel Putkammer,
“ with his buffars, was ſent to purſue the enemy; who was fol
“ lowed, on the 9th of May, by the the prince of Bevern and
“ general Zeithen,” with 20,000 men. The firſt remarkable
“ ſkirmiſh happened at Suchdol, where the Auſtrians great ma
“gazine of meal was taken. Lieutenant general Ziethen, and
“ major generals Krochow and Manſtein, with four battalions,
“ and 11oo horſe, were ſent from the camp at Kollin Oil this
“expedition. They ſucceeded in taking this magazine, notwith
“ ſtanding there was a camp of huſſars and Croats behind Such
“dol, and the heights by St. John's chapel was occupied by the
“ Auſtrians. General Nadaſti ſent lieutenant colonel Ballaſti,
“with ſome hundred huſſars, to attack lieutenant colonel Var
“nery, of Putkammer's regiment, but they were repulſed with
“ loſs. Colonel Werner, being ſent to obſerve the Auſtrians, was
“ attacked, near Krattenau, by, colonels Zobel and Luſinſki, with
“ 6oo horſe, which he repulſed, and took 43 priſoners. On the
“;th of June, the prince of Bevern quitted his camp at Kollin,
“in order to attack'general Nadaſti's corps, who was encamped
“ on the heights near St. John's chapel; but this general made
“no ſtand, either there, or on the heights by Kank; which he
“ quitted, as well as the town of Kuttenberg. We took 73 pri
“ſoners : and the enemy loſt, killed and wounded, above 156
K 2 “ men
* This general is greatly favoured by the king. In 1740 he ſerved as major of herº.
in Sileſia; in 1741 was lieutenant colonel, and decorated with the order pour le merite ; and
in the ſame year a colonel, and had a regiment given him ; in 1744 a major general; in
1756 a lieutenant general. After the battle of Prague, in which he diſtinguiſhed himſelf,
he was made knight of the black eagle. He has commonly commanded the vanguard.
After the battle of Breſlaw, he made a fine retreat. In the battle of Torgau he gained
immortal glory, by occupying the heights of Süptitz, ſter the king had been forced to
quit the field, which tore the vićtory out of M. Daun's hands. He is row above 62
3 ears old. -

-
 68 H. Is To R Y of the WAR

men more. The prince of Bevern, on this occaſion, took two

magazines of forage and proviſiens, at Kuttenberg and Neuhoff,
grº
and encamped by Neſchkarziz, a village between Neuhoff and
Kuttenberg. This poſition forced M. Daun to quit his ſtrong
gº
camp at Czaſlaw, and fall back firſt to Goltzjenkau, and after
&4
wards to Haber. The great number of defiles hindered us
6&
from attacking the enemy's rear-guard, ſo that this march was
gº
made without any ſkirmiſh, excepting that which happened on
g&
the 7th of June, at the defile of Czărckwitz, which alarmed
ge
general Nadaſti, who was encamped behind Czaſlaw, with his
&4
corps reinforced by the four regiments of Saxon horſe. In the
4&
mean while, the army under M. Daun, having been reinforced,
-G
amounted to 60,000 men; and it appeared, his intentions were
&4
to march, with the greateſt part of his troops, againſt that part
G. &
of the king's camp, before Prague, on the other fide of the
gº
Moldau; and, to cover this manoeuvre, to attack the prince of
4&
Bevern with Nadaſti's corps. The prince of Bevern had only
&6
70 ſquadrons and 18 battalions, and conſequently was in need of
4&
a reinforcement. The king, therefore, having drawn his poſts
4&
before Prague nearer together, broke up the 13th of June, and
&4
marched with Io battalions and 20 ſquadrons, by Koſteletz, to
4&
wards Zaſmuck. On the ſame day, count Daun ordered gene
6g
ral Nadaſti to attack prince Bevern's fore-poſts, and at the ſame
4&
time made a motion with his whole army on the Pruſſians flank,
which forced them to retire towards Kollin, and on the 14th
&4
to Kaurzim, where the king's corps joined them. The 15th
4&
and 16th were employed in reconnoitring the roads towards the
&4
village of Wiſocka, where the Auſtrian army ſtood; which was
4 &
not perfeótly executed on account of the great number of the
-&
enemy's light troops. Four thouſand pandours and huſſars
&4
attacked a tranſport coming from Nimburg, but the eſcort,
- “ conſiſting
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 69
confiſting of 200 men, under major Billerbeck, defended them
gº
ſelves above three hours; and, having received a reinforcement,
& 4
arrived ſafe at the camp with the loſs of ſeven men only. On
& ©
the 17th, as we propoſed marching to Schwoyfitz, we perceived
º
the enemy's army formed on the heights, in a half ſquare,
&&
with the right wing extending towards Kuttenberg and Kollin,
&4
and the left towards Zaſmuck; the front was covered by a
&&
chain of fiſhponds and moraſſes. We made a motion, ſo that
&4
our right came to Kaurzim, and our left towards Nimburg
« .
and Planian, before it. On the 18th we occupied ſome hills
&&
before this place. The army marched on the left, in order to
« C.
attack the enemy as ſoon as the neceſſary diſpoſitions could be
made; and our light troops had poſted themſelves oppoſite thoſe
&&
of the enemy, who endeavoured to form on our left flank; we
&4
drove them back beyond Kollin, as far as the heights, which
& c.
we muſt neceſſarily occupy to be able to attack the enemy's
4&
right flank. Major general Hulſen,* with ſeven battalions,
tº c
was ordered to render himſelf maſter of them. The infantry
was to form a line to ſuſtain this attack, without engaging its
4 :

right, which was ordered to remain ſomewhat further back.

Our grenadiers climbed up the heights, occupied a village the
enemy had abandoned, and took two batteries, each of 12 or
&4
13 pieces behind it ; and, of a ſudden, our infantry, without
giving time to ſtop them, advanced and attacked all the enemy's
4.
firſt line, which hindered us from ſuſtaining the attack of the
“heights : four battalions would have ſufficed, and the vićtory
“ was ours. The enemy, taking advantage of this fault, ordered
“ ſome

* This general was major in 1740; in 1743 lieutenant colonel; in 1745 colone!; in
1754 major general, and knight of the order pour le merite; in 1756 he had a regiment;
and in 1758 was made a lieutenant general. He commanded a confiderable corps in
Saxony, againſt the army of the empire, with much reputation, particularly in the ačtion
by Strehlen.
 7o H 1 s To R Y of the WAR
<*
ſome infantry to file behind the line, and attack our ſeven
&&
battalions; who, though they had ſuffered very much in three
46 ſucceſſive attacks, and from the fire of 4o pieces of cannon,
«
repulſed them. Norman's dragoons attacked the enemy's in
4*
fantry, diſperſed ſeveral battalions, took 5 pair of colours, and
44
then advanced againſt the Saxon carabineers, whom they beat
&&
back and purſued as far as Kollin. While our infantry was
4&
engaged with the enemy, it ſuffered greatly from the heavy
4&
artillery: the battalions were full of large openings. The regi º
&g
ment of cavalry of the prince of Pruſſia took poſt oppoſite the
4&
interval between the regiments of prince Bevern and prince
&©
Henry, in order to cover the abovementioned openings, and
&&
attacked an Auſtrian regiment of foot that ſtood over againſt
4&
them, and no doubt had penetrated, if it had not been expoſed,
4&
at the ſame time, to a battery charged with cartouches, which
&g
threw them back on Bevern's regiment. The Auſtrian cavalry
4&
purſued them ; whereby prince Bevern's and prince Henry's
&&
regiments ſuffered ſo much, that they were obliged to be
&&
-

ordered out of the line. This produced an opening that cut

&&
off our communication with the attack of the heights, and we
- c.
were forced to retire. The battalion of guards, on the right,
4&
repulſed four battalions, and two regiments of horſe, who at
<< tempted to ſurround them. Our left wing remained on the
4&
ground, where the enemy was poſted before the action, 'till
4-g
about 9 o'clock, and then retired. The army marched towards
&&
Nimburg without being followed at all. Several cannon have
4&
been left behind, the carriages being broke, and for want of
4&
horſes. The loſs of this battle obliges us to raiſe the ſiege of
&4
Prague. The army on the right of the Moldau marched to
4&
wards Brandeiſs, and joined that which came from Kollin; and
&&
M. Keith, with his, marched to Budyn.
* - “ THE
 in G E R MAN y, 1757. 71
“ The Pruſſians account of their loſs, is 1450 men, and 1667
“ horſes, killed, in the cavalry; 87.55 men, killed and miſſing,
“ in the infantry; and 3568 wounded: in all, 13,773. The liſt,
“ publiſhed at Vienna, of the loſs of the Auſtrians, is 819 men
“ killed, 36.16 wounded, in the infantry; 163 men, 414 horſes,
“ killed, 825 men, and 748 horſes, wounded, in the cavalry.
“Among the wounded were 23 ſtaff officers, and marſhal Daun
“ himſelf." " ' " . . . . . . . .

Though the two preceding accounts, particularly the laſt, are

very clear and explicit, I will add that ſent to France, becauſe it
is impoſſible that ſo important
- -
an ačtion ſhould be too much ex
. ... . . . " - * *

plained and examined. -

“ MARSHAL Daun, having received orders, on the 11th of

“June, to march to the relief of Prague, with full power to act
“ as he ſhould think moſt advantageous for the empreſs's ſervice,
“ quitted his camp the next morning, and, after a difficult march
“ of ſome days, arrived on the 15th at Gintitz. His excellency
g
‘propoſed marching, the day following, to Kaurzim, which was
“ the moſt commodious road to Prague. The king of Pruſſia had
“joined the prince of Bevern, with a confiderable reinforcement,
“ the preceding evening ; and, as he had a perfect knowledge
“ of the country, he no doubt believed, that, by occupying the
“camp of Kaurzim, he would very much embarraſs marſhal Daun.
“Effectively, when the marſhal was informed of it, he perceived
“, very well the great inconveniency in which the king had put him
“ by taking this poſition, while it reduced him to the neceſſity of
“marching on his right, or on his left. It was extreamly dan–
“gerous and difficult to march on the left, on account of the
“defiles, moraſſes, and woods; and, if he marched on his right,
“he muſt neceſſarily paſs near Kaurzim, and preſent his flank
“to the enemy; and laſtly, if, to avoid this, he would march
** a
72 . His To R Y of the WAR
Gé
a great way about towards the right, he would be the next day
&&
farther from Prague than at preſent; and moreover would, by
gº
that means, afford the enemy an opportunity to take twenty
&&
other poſitions, equally proper to hinder him from approaching
&4
that place; which is very eaſy in this country, where advan
&&
tageous camps can be found on every ſpot. The marſhal, ſeeing
&&
therefore that he muſt neceſſarily come to an action, in order
gº
to deliver Prague, reſolved to encamp the next morning in the
&&
enemy's preſence, and reduce him to the neceſſity either of
&&
attacking, or give a proper opportunity of being attacked.
g&
Accordingly the army marched to Krichenau. On the 17th,
&&
the marſhal, being informed that the enemy marched towards
gº
Planian, mounted inſtantly, and went to reconnoitre their mo
&&
tions, in perſon. Perceiving that the king direéted his march
&6
towards the Auſtrians right, he thought it neceſſary to change
ºf g
the poſition of his army. It was formed with Planian before
“
the front: the left wing was placed, in two lines of infantry,
&4
with a great quantity of artillery, on a high hill, that ſtood
tº g
quite alone, in the plain. On the right was another hill, ſome
& c.
what lower than the former; on this the reſt of the infantry
&4
was poſted, likewiſe in two lines, with two lines of cavalry
& 4
on their flank. At the bottom of the hill, between theſe two
&4
heights, is a plain of about 25oo paces long; here the marſhal
&&
put two lines of horſe, and a third in reſerve; becauſe, as the
& Cº.
king was equally ſtrong in cavalry, it was imagined he would
gº
make his greateſt efforts againſt the center, in order to cut the
- «
army in two. His excellency uſed all the poſſible precautions
& c.
to elude the king's intention: artillery was placed on the flanks,
4 &
and before the cavalry. Things continued in this fituation the
&&
17th. On the 18th the king ordered his army to march on the
44
left, along the great road that goes from Prague to Vienna, and
- ** he
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 73
*: he endeavoured, continually, to come on the right flank of the
&4
imperial army. M. Daun, perceiving the king's intentions,"
-«
ordered the corps de reſerve to march on the right wing, in *

tº c
order to cover the flank. Between 9 and 10 o'clock in the
«&
morning, the head of the king's army appeared near Slatiſlunz,"
gº
about a mile and a half off, where he continued 'til midday,
*&
in order to give his columns time to aſſemble: then all was put
*&
again in motion, and always direéted their march towards the
&4
Auſtrians right flank. The marſhal, who expected this, ordered
& G.
his ſecond line to march there, and cloſe up with the reſerve.
g4.
At half an hour paſt one, the head of the Pruſſian columns,
&&
both infantry and cavalry, appeared oppoſite the imperial army;
& c.
which was prepared to receive them. The Pruſſian infantry
gº
formed immediately, and advanced, in good order, to attack
gº
the marſhal; who likewiſe marched to meet them. About
-a
2 o'clock, the attack, ſupported by a numerous artillery, began
•4 &
with ſuch incredible vivacity, that an eye witneſs only can form
4&
a proper idea of it. The imperial army anſwered with a con
“
tinual fire, both of ſmall arms, and heavy artillery. The king
&4

4&
of Pruſſia had poſted ſome heavy cannon on a hill, behind his
infantry, which did the imperial army much damage. This
“firſt attack laſted about an hour and a half; then the fire of the
4&
imperial army began to be ſuperior to that of the Pruſſians,
and forced them to quit the field of battle, that they might
reſt, and put themſelves in order to renew the aëtion. This
-- -

was executed ſoon after; but they were repulſed, as in the firſt.
&&
Seven ſucceſſive attacks were made from 2 o'clock ’till half an
-4 &
hour paſt ſix, when the laſt and moſt violent was made. This
*4 &
attack was general, and laſted 'till paſt 7 o'clock, when the
-- &
Pruſſians were forced to give way on all fides, and retire in
confuſion. The marſhal ſent ſome infantry and cavalry to
L. . purſue
 74. H is To R Y of the WAR

purſue them. The corps of light troops, under general Nadaſti,

followed them a great way, and brought in many priſoners.
The Saxon carabineers ſtood over againſt ſome Pruſſian infantry,
from which, as well as from the artillery, they ſuffered very
much: they deſired leave to attack them; which, having ob
tained, they executed it with much bravery, cut the enemy's.
g4.
infantry to pieces, and took ſeveral cannon and colours. This,
&g
is what happened on the right wing, where the battle was
hotteſt. About two hours after the firſt attack on our right,
&g
that of the Pruſſian army advanced againſt the left of the
&g
Auſtrians, in order to attack it; which, confidering the ſtrengths
&4
of its poſition, ought never to have been undertaken. It ſtood:
&&
upon a hill, which was almoſt impoſſible to aſcend, and which,
&º
was covered with artillery that did the Pruſſians great damage.
gº
The Pruſſians right wing, being arrived at the bottom of the
gº
hill, ſtopped : upon, which, the Auſtrians left, ſeeing the ene
gº
my did not advance, being defirous to attack them, and par
&© .
take of the glory of the day with the reſt of the army, quitted
&g
their poſition, and deſcended to the foot of the hill. The
&4
Auſtrian infantry attacked that of the Pruſſians with much:
&4
bravery ; and, after an hour's combat, obliged them to give:
&g
way. The Auſtrian cavalry advanced likewiſe, in order to,
gº
attack that of the enemy, but theſe immediately retired to--
& 4.
wards their infantry. The Auſtrians were prudent enough not:
gº
to purſue their advantages on this ſide, for fear of being ſepa
&&
rated from their right wing. In about an hour after, the Pruſ--"
&4
fians right wing attacked the Auſtrians left again; but, in leſs."
&4
than half an hour, they were beat back in confuſion. They
&4
reſumed their former poſition, and fired from all their artillery."
&&.
upon the Auſtrians, during the whole ačtion. While the ſeconds'
“ attack was made, fix battalions, commanded by count Niclass
Eſterhaſi,

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 in GERMANY., 1757. 75
“ Eſterhafi, having ſhot all their cartridges, advanced againſt the
“ enemy with fixed bayonnets, and, with great bravery, forced
“ them to give way. This battle was general, and all the corps
“ were more than once engaged, &c.”
As this remarkable action makes a conſiderable epoch in the
hiſtory of the war, being the firſt the king of Pruſſia ever loſt,
we ſhall here give our reflections upon it, and upon the different
manceuvres that preceded it.

R E F L E c T 1 o N s on the battle of Kollin.

IT has been already obſerved, that the fiege of Prague, with

about 50,000 men in it, was an imprudent and dangerous enter
prize. Sieges are attended with ſo great expence, and ſo much
loſs of time, and men, that they ought never to be undertaken
without the utmoſt neceſſity. The king of Pruſſia was then in
circumſtances that required ſome decifive ſtroke; and that as ſoon
as poſſible; and therefore he ſhould not, by any means, amuſe
himſelf with fieges, which he knew would give the Auſtrians
time and means to provide for their defence, whatever was the
event of that of Prague. Sieges muſt never be formed, unleſs,
1. when the fortreſſes are placed on the paſſes which lead into the
enemy's country, and in ſuch a manner that you cannot penetrate
'till you are maſters of them; 2. when they are on your communi
cations, and the country does not furniſh the neceſſary ſubſiſtence;
3. when they are neceſſary, in order to cover the magazines you
form in the country itſelf, to facilitate your operations; 4, when
they contain confiderable magazines of the enemy, and ſuch as are
eſſentially neceſſary to him ; 5. when the conqueſt of them is ne
ceſſarily followed by that of ſome confiderable diſtrićt, which en
ables you to ſeparate your armies into winter quarters in the enemy's
- L 2 - country.
76 History of the WAR
country. In theſe caſes, your firſt operation muſt, no doubt, be
the fiege of ſome ſuch place; which in all others muſt be avoided.
Not one of theſe circumſtances concurred with regard to Prague:
it covers no eſſential paſs into the country, neither contained any
confiderable magazine, nor was neceſſary for the king in order to:
form one there, becauſe the country itſelf furniſhed abundantly all
kind of ſubſiſtence; and, though it did not, his armies could be
ſupplied from Sileſia, without any riſk; for prince Charles could
.not, if he remained at or about Prague, prevent it. If, inſtead of
befieging this town, his majeſty had ſent 20,000 men, the next:
morning, after the enemy's right wing, which, as we have ſaid,
had fled to Beneſchau, and, with the remainder, marched to Bóh
miſch Brodt againſt M. Daun, it is more than probable he would:
have deſtroyed both : they certainly could not have retired without
loſing their artillery, baggage, &c. and muſt have fell back, with ,
the utmoſt expedition, on the Danube. Then the king was at
liberty to befiege Olmutz ; which would have given him all Bo
hemia; becauſe prince Charles muſt likewiſe have marched on the
T)anube, in order to join the remainder of the army, as he could
not, in the ſituation in which he then was, without any magazines:
or artillery, undertake any thing himſelf: he could not even ap
proach the king at all, without expoſing his army to deſtruction.
His majeſty might have taken twenty poſitions that would have
covered the fiege of Olmutz, maſked the Danube and the capital,
and forced prince Charles to march up to Lintz, in order to paſs.
it, and join the reſt of the troops. This would have given him,
all the time neceſſary to reduce Olmutz, and even Prague itſelf, ,
which would have been left to a common garriſon. His majeſty, ,
allured by the uncertain and vain, but flattering, hopes of taking.
5o,ooo men priſoners, loſt fight of Daun and the right wing, and.
with it an opportunity of giving ſome decifive blow. When he
WàS
 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. 77
was informed of the enemy's approach, it was ſtill time to repair
the fault he had committed. He might, and ought to have raiſed
the fiege of Prague, and, with his whole forces, attack M. Daun;
if he ſucceeded, it was very probable that prince Charles, in ſo
long a march as he muſt make from Prague to the Danube, would
give an opportunity to attack him alſo ; and he could ſcarce ap
proach the Danube at all, while the king was with an army near
Kollin, as is evident from the inſpection of the map.
His majeſty knew that prince Bevern narrowly eſcaped being
oppreſſed by the ſuperior forces of the enemy; How could he
think that the addition of a few battalions and ſquadrons would.
inſure the vićtory His whole army was ſearce ſufficient to con
tend with Daun, and yet he perfiſts in his firſt projećt of taking,
Prague, and thereby expoſed himſelf to certain deſtruction, if the
enemy had done part only of what might have been eaſily executed,
as well by the garriſon of Prague, as by M. Daun after the battle.
It is one of the moſt eſſential qualities of a general, not to be in
fatuated with a paſſion for ſome favourite and ſtriking project, be
cauſe it expoſes him to many, and ſometimes fatal, conſequences.
It is difficult to renounce to an enterprize once embraced, becauſe
it in ſome meaſure expoſes one to the cenſure of want of forefight,
or conſtancy, both very mortifying to ſelf-love. However, there.
is more glory in mending a fault, than to perſevere in it. His
majeſty, confiding too much in his own ſuperior talents, too little.
in thoſe of his enemies, or preſſed, perhaps, by the neceſſity of his
affairs, has been obſerved, very often, to undertake things much
above the means he had to accompliſh them; and therefore no
wonder that many of his projećts, though in appearance plauſible,
wanted ſolidity, and conſequently have not been always attended.
with ſucceſs. Being arrived at Kaurzim, and finding the enemy

too ſtrongly poſted to be attacked with any probability of ſucceſs,

his
 78 History of the War
his majeſty might have fell back, and taken ſome other poſition,
which perhaps would have induced them to advance, and give him
an opportunity to fight upon more equal terms: if it be objećted
that prince Charles, informed of his abſence, would attack the
-army left before Prague, it only proves he was ſenſible he had ex
poſed that army to deſtruction, as it depended on the enemy's
knowing a thing, which he might have done by a thouſand means.
When he reſolved to occupy the heights on the right flank of the
enemy, he ought not ſurely to have marched at broad day, becauſe
they muſt neceſſarily perceive his intention, and in time to make
their diſpoſitions accordingly, as it happened. Poſſibly if the king
had ſent in the evening a great corps of cavalry, which he could
ſpare in that mountainous country, towards the enemy's left flank,
it would have drawn their attention that way, and given him an
opportunity to march unobſerved in the night, and occupy the
height of Chotzemitz: the attempting it by day made it impoſ
ſible from the firſt inſtant. His majeſty in marching formed a por
tion of a circle; the enemy marched on the Chord, and therefore
could with eaſe bring more men into action, at any one point of
attack, and in leſs time, than he could do, though the armies had
been equal, which muſt be decifive ; as his majeſty was in propor
tion much ſtronger in cavalry than in infantry, he ought no doubt
to have choſen the moſt convenient ground on the enemy's front for
that ſpecies of troops; and, as he had given them an opportunity
to reinforce their right, and its flank, where they had brought two
thirds of their army, he ought to have refuſed both his wings, and
make an effort with his cavalry, ſuſtained by infantry and artillery,
on the center, between Chotzemitz and Brziſt, where the enemy
had only cavalry; and therefore moſt probably would have been
forced to give way, and their two wings, being thus ſeparated, ea
ſily defeated; whereas, by perſiſting to attack their right, he could
- bring
 in GERMANY., 1757. 79
bring only his infantry to aćtion, the ground being very improper
for cavalry, as well on account of the ravins and woods, as of the
villages before the enemy's front. Having reſolved to attack this
wing, his majeſty ſhould have brought here all his infantry, leav
ing only a line of horſe on his right, which would have been ſuf-.
ficient, as the enemy's left could never quit their advantageous po
fition and deſcend into the plain. This would have enabled him.
to ſuſtain his vanguard properly, and at a convenient diſtance;.
whereas he left it expoſed, and quite in the air, his line being
too far back: the more ſucceſsful his vanguard was, the more cer
tain to be deſtroyed, becauſe the more they advanced, the more:
they expoſed themſelves to be attacked on all fides, as it really
happened: for, having pierced the firſt line of the enemy, and at
tacked the flank of the ſecond, they found themſelves engaged.

with the greateſt part of the army in front; and the whole reſerve,
compoſed of infantry and cavalry, on their flank; and at the ſame
time expoſed to the fire of a very numerous and well ſerved ar
tillery: and, being ſo far advanced that they could not be ſuſtained.
by the line, were obliged to give way. If they had been properly
ſupported, and a body of troops ſent on their flank, oppoſite the
enemy's reſerve, to keep it in awe, the battle was won : the ene
my's line was already broke, and had no convenient ground behind
to take a new poſition upon ; ſo that the whole army would have
been taken in flank; nor could the reſerve quit its poſition to
attack this vanguard in flank, without preſenting their own, and.
loſing the advantage of their fituation. But, as theſe diſpoſitions.
were not made, the enemy's reſerve, without any riſk, quitted its
poſt, and took the king's vanguard in flank, which, as has been
ſaid, being unſupported by any other troops, was forced to give:
way, and the battle was loſt. The general faults therefore of the
king's diſpoſition, before, and during the action, were, I. to have
manoeuvred:
|
8C History of the WAR

manoeuvred by day, which gave the enemy time to change their

poſition, according to their circumſtances; 2. to have formed an
attack where he could not conveniently combine the different
ſpecies of arms; whereas the enemy had both infantry and cavalry,
with a great quantity of artillery, to ſuſtain the point attacked;
3. to have let general Hulſen advance ſo far, that he could not be
ſupported by the line; and, 4. to have attacked with too little
infantry, conſidering the nature of the ground. - * -

As to the condućt of M. Daun, it appears uniform, and founded

upon reaſonable principles: after the battle of Prague, it was very
judicious ; he retired before the duke of Bevern, though ſtronger -

than him from the beginning, as well to give his men time to . .
recolle&t themſelves, as to be able to receive the reinforcements he -

expected. Theſe being arrived, his condućt changes according to

the circumſtances; he is now as vigorous and active, as he ſeemed
before ſlow and dilatory. His march was calculated to cut off the
prince of Bevern, before he could join the army at Prague, or be
reinforced by it; and, though this projećt did not ſucceed, it was
certainly well laid. His conduct, during the aćtion, appears no
leſs prudent. The enemy made no fault of which he did not take
advantage: one only he himſelf ſeems to have committed, which
was to have kept his line too far back: this gave Hulſen an op
portunity of taking the villages, before the front, from between
them and the front, and then penetrate through the line, which
would certainly have occaſioned the loſs of the battle, had he been
properly ſupported. Whenever your line is placed behind vil
lages, it muſt be at a proper diſtance to ſuſtain them, otherwiſe
they, being taken, will be of great prejudice to you, and advan
tage to the enemy, whoſe motions are covered and ſuſtained by
them; whereas, if you ſuſtain them properly, he cannot poſſibly take
them, nor advance, leaving them behind ; becauſe not only they
break
 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. 8I

break his line and throw it into ſome degree of confuſion, which
favourable opportunity, if improved, will neceſſarily be attended
with a defeat, and alſo expoſe it to be taken in flank by the troops
poſted in them. The poſſeſſion therefore of villages, provided
they are at a proper diſtance to be ſuſtained, is one of the moſt
advantageous circumſtances that can occur in a field of battle ; but
all theſe advantages are loſt, and turn againſt you, if you do not
ſuſtain them. They are ſo very advantageous that I would never
adviſe any general to attack them, if he ſees they will be ſuſtained,
but rather maſk them, and put them on fire with haubitz, and
chooſe ſome other point of attack, which, though in appearance
leſs proper, will, generally ſpeaking, ſucceed better.” If the mar
ſhal had marched the 19th with his whole army towards Prague,
it is probable that of the king, before that place, would have been
deſtroyed. In war a general muſt think he has done nothing,
while ſomething remains unfiniſhed; he ought to conſider all his
ſucceſſes as means only that lead to greater, but never make an
epoch of them, or pauſe to meditate, while in the full career of
vićtory and glory. - -

ON the 19th his majeſty quitted the army, which had fought
at Kollin, and went to Prague, in order to raiſe the fiege :
this was executed the day following without any loſs worth
mentioning; that part of the army which was on the right of
the Moldau, marched down that fide as far as Leutmeritz,
M while

* We have a fine example of this given by the famous Marlborough, at the battle of "
Hockſtedt; he had attacked ſeveral times the village of Oberklaw, but was each time re
pulſed with great loſs; his lordſhip, very judiciouſly having left a body of infantry to maſk
the village, advanced, and broke the enemy's line, which got the battle. The French
had garniſhed all the villages before their front, particularly Oberklaw and Plentheim,
with a prodigious quantity of infantry, expe&ting that the generals of the allies would at
tack them, and by no means preſume to advance and leave them behind; but they were
diſappointed, beat, and loſt all their infantry poſted in the villages.
82 His To R Y of the WAR
while that under M. Keith took the road of Welwarn and
Budyn, where he paſſed the Egra, and went to encamp between
Liboſchowitz and Lowofitz, oppoſite the king's diviſion ; ſo that
the whole formed only one army, ſeparated by the Elbe, over º

which they had the neceſſary communications, and could eaſily be

on either fide, according as circumſtances might require. With
the remainder of his forces his majeſty had formed another con
fiderable army, amounting to above 30,000 men, under the
eommand of the prince of Pruſſia, who took poſt about Böh
miſch Leipa. By this means it was thought they could effectu
ally cover Saxony and Luſatia, and keep open the communication
through this laſt province with Sileſia: for, if the enemy marched
down the left of the Elbe, and attempted to penetrate into Saxony,
by the way of Auſſig, the king could, with his army encamped about
Leutmeritz, paſs the river, and take ſuch poſitions between Lowo
fitz and Auſfig, as would effectually put a ſtop to their progreſs;
and, if they directed their ſteps towards Luſatia, the prince's army
could eaſily take ſome advantageous camp in that mountainous
country, which would enable him, though inferior, to oppoſe
them with ſucceſs, at leaſt till the king had time to make ſome
manoeuvre in his favour. -

WHILE his majeſty was thus occupied in making diſpoſitions -

to continue in Bohemia as long as poſſible, the Auſtrians were no

leſs ačtive in forming their plan to drive him out of it. This
could be accompliſhed in three different ways: the firſt was to fol
low M. Keith down the left of the Elbe, and endeavour to pene
trate into Saxony, the conqueſt of which would open the way to
carry the war into Brandeburg, and probably furniſh ſome op
portunity to put a happy end to it; and the more ſo, as the Ruſ
ſians and Swedes would be at hand to act in concert, and conſe
quently with more vigour: the ſecond method propoſed, was to
leave
 in GE RMANY., 1757, 83
leave an army to obſerve the enemy, and to ſend the remainder
into Sileſia, either to befiege Neiſs or Schweidnitz, which, it was
imagined, would force the enemy to quit Bohemia, in order to
cover theſe important places, on which the preſervation of Sileſia
ſeems very much to depend : the third and laſt method that of.
fered, was to keep the army together, and march towards Luſatia,
which would force the enemy to retire, or come to an adion: and,
as this laſt was moſt probable, from the known charaćter of the
king, it would be adviſeable to have the whole army united, rather
than ſeparate it, to undertake many things at once, and ſo expoſe
it to be beat in detail. This plan was preferred to the others:
accordingly, the whole Auſtrian army paſſed the Elbe on the 1ſt
of July, and encamped at Liſſau, which the enemy had quitted
the 26th of laſt month, and marched ſucceſſively to Jungbuntzlaw
and Tſcheditz, on the right of the Iſer.
PRINCE Charles ſent general Nadaſti, with a conſiderable corps,
likewiſe on the right of that river, as well to obſerve the enemy's
motions at Leutmeritz, as to cover the march of the army to
wards Jungbuntzlaw. General Morocz was ſent alſo, with a ſtrong
body, on the left of the Iſer, to obſerve the prince of Pruſſia's
motions, and to prepare every thing for the march of the main
army. The firſt of theſe corps having taken poſt at Mſchno, be
tween the prince's army and that of the king, while the other
paſſed the Iſer at Bakehofen, on the prince's left flank, his royal
highneſs thought it full time to quit Tſcheditz; and, as theſe
two corps were continually on his flanks, he found it neceſſary to
fºll back ſucceſſively to Hirſchberg, Neuſchloſs, and Leipa ; from
whence he ſent general Putkammer, with four battalions and 5oo
huſſars, to occupy Gabel, that ne ñigº ſecure that important
paſs which leads into Luſatia.
M 2 IN
84. His To R Y of the WAR

IN the mean time the Auſtrians grand army advanced with ſlow,
but cautious and ſure ſteps, to Munchengratz, and from thence to
Hunnerwaſſer. The enemy's poſition at Leipa, covered with the
Poltz, was thought too ſtrong to be attacked; it was therefore re
ſolved to turn his left flank and attack Gabel, which would ne
ceſſarily force him to retire, and at the ſame time open a ſure way
into Luſatia. Accordingly, general Macquire, with a confiderable
detachment, ſuſtained by the vanguard, was ſent on this expedi
tion. The army advanced to Nimes, in order to cover it. The
place was taken the 15th, after a defence of thirty-ſix hours, and
the army immediately paſſed the Poltz. All theſe manoeuvres
forced the prince of Pruſſia to quit Leipa ; and having, with Ga
bel, loſt the neareſt communication with Zittau, where he had a
ſtrong garriſon, and a very conſiderable magazine of every kind,
he was obliged to make ſeveral forced and difficult marches by
Kamentz, Georgenthal, Kreywitz, Rumburg, and Unterhennerſ
dorff, in order, if poſſible, to anticipate the enemy; but he was diſ
appointed; for, on the taking of Gabel, they had directed their
march to Zittau, where they arrived the 19th, and were then
bombarding the town with the moſt unrelenting fury. They had
however negle&ted to inveſt it entirely; the prince ſeized this fa
vourable opportunity, approached the place with his army, and
having, during the preceding night, withdrawn the greateſt part
of the ſtores, baggage, &c. on the 23d he retired, by Löbau, to
wards Bautzen, without any other loſs than that of colonel Diereck,
<nd about 200 men, who ſtill endeavoured to defend themſelves in,
that general conflagration, which conſumed one of the moſt I
pulous and rich cities of Germany.
Tºp Auſtrians having thus drove a conſiderable pºſt of the
• -

enemy's forces out of Echenia, and ſecured their communica

tions with that country, by occupying Zittau and Gabel, they
reſolved
 in GERMANY., 1757. 85
reſolved to advance farther into Luſatia, and endeavour to cut off
the enemy intirely from Sileſia. Accordingly, the grand army
marched the 25th from Zittau to Eckartſberg ; from whence ſeve
ral detachments were ſent on the left, to obſerve the motions of"
the enemy; and on the right, down the Neiſs, in order to ſecure
the paſſes into Sileſia. A ſmall corps of light troops, commanded
by colonel Janus, had already penetrated into that country by the
way of Trautenau; but it was too inconſiderable to undertake any
thing of conſequence. -

His royal highneſs prince Charles reſolved to continue in the

neighbourhood of Zittau until the enemy quitted the frontiers and
fell back into Saxony; which he knew they would ſoon be forced to
do, in order to oppoſe the combined army, that was then forming in
the empire, and preparing to march towards the Saala and Leipſig,
While theſe things paſſed between prince Charles and the prince
of Pruſſia, the king, with near 40,000 men, remained at Leut
meritz in great tranquility, as if he had been no ways concerned
in the event. At length, however, the taking of Zittau rouſed
him from his lethargy, and ſhewed him the unfavourable ſituation
of his affairs, which nothing but ſuperior condućt and ačtivity
could reinſtate. On entering Bohemia, at the beginning of the
campaign, Sileſia had been left without any troops, excepting ſome
weak garriſons to cover it. The enemy had taken ſuch a poſition
as made it difficult to ſend any ſuccours there: they could, there
fore, enter that country, and perhaps take ſome place of conſe
quence before it could poſſibly be relieved. -

To remedy theſe evils, his majeſty quitted Leutmeritz the 20th,

and marched ſucceſſively to Pirna, where he paſſed the Elbe, Biſ
choffſwºrda, and Bautzen, where he arrived the 29th, and joined
the army commanded by the prince of Pruſſia, who retired, and
never appeared more in the field, and died ſoon after.
- - FROML
86 H is to R Y of the WAR
From hence his majeſty marched to Weiffenberg, and there
waited 'till the arrival of marſhal Keith; who, having left a ſmall
corps to protećt Saxony, followed with the remainder, and joined
him in the beginning of Auguſt. Having thus aſſembled a very
conſiderable army, he reſolved to open the communication with
Sileſia; and, if poſſible, bring the enemy to an action; which
might, if ſucceſsful, retrieve his affairs.
WITH theſe views, his majeſty quitted Weiſſenberg on the 15th,
and marched to Oſtritz. His vanguard took general Beck's bag
gage at Bernſtadtel; and ſome of the light troops, puſhing on to
Oſtritz, they there ſurprized general Nadaſti, at table; who, with
the utmoſt difficulty, found means to eſcape. All his equipage
was taken: ſome letters were found in it that indicated a deſign
to betray Dreſden to the Auſtrians. This ſerved as a pretext to
treat the queen of Poland with ſome hardſhip. On the 16th he
advanced within cannon ſhot of the enemy, in order to give them
battle; but he found them ſo advantageouſly poſted, that he did
not think it prudent to attack them. However, he continued here
'till the 20th; and then, finding they would not quit their poſition,
returned to his former camp behind Oſtritz. Though his majeſty
had not been able to execute his plan intirely, he had gained an
important point by opening a communication with Sileſia; which
he reſolved to keep ſo, if poſſible, that his forces might act in
concert, at leaſt, if not united. He left, therefore, in this neigh
bourhood, a confiderable part of his army, under the command
of the prince of Bevern; and, with the remainder, returned to
Dreſden, in order to march againſt the combined army, which
was advancing towards Saxony. -

Before we proceed to give an account of the ulterior operations

of the reſpective armies, we think it may be uſeful to examine thoſe
which happened after the fiege of Prague. In the deſcription We

have
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 87
have given of this country, it appears, there are three roads that
go out of it into Luſatia: the firſt, near the Elbe, goes by Leipa,
Kamentz, and Rumburg, towards Bautzen; the ſecond, along the
Iſer, by Munchengratz, and Gabel, towards Zittau ; the third,
by Reichenberg, and Friedland, towards Litiban: all which are
intercepted by many and great defiles, eſpecially the firſt and laſt,
where a corps, compoſed of a few battalions, would ſuffice to ſtop
an army. The plan, formed by the Auſtrians, to act on the right
of the Elbe, preferable to the left, was certainly well adviſed;
becauſe they could, with greater facility, drive the enemy out of
Bohemia, than if they attempted it on the other fide, where he
could take many poſitions between Lowofitz and Pirna, from
whence they could not force him by any direct motion; and, if
they endeavoured to get on his flanks, it would be attended with
loſs of time, and perhaps would fail in the execution. This plan
was attended with another great advantage, that, in forcing the
enemy to retire out of Bohemia, by gaining his left flank, they
cut him off from Sileſia, and opened a ſure way into it for them
ſelves. -

As ſoon as the army paſſed the Elbe, a large corps, under Na

daſti, was ſent to obſerve the king; and another between that and ,
the prince of Pruſſia's army. Theſe two corps were ſo ſtrong,
that when united they formed a ſmall army, and could with ſafety
keep cloſe to the enemy, and render the communication between
their two armies very precarious. A third was ſent on the prince's
left flank; and, within a march of theſe different corps, the main
army advanced under prince Charles. By this admirable diſpoſition
he could ſuſtain them, if neceſſary; and they had a ſure retreat by
falling back on his army: he was covered by them ; and, keeping
on the left of the Iſer, could not be forced to fight againſt his will.
His meaſures were ſo well taken, and executed with ſo much
vigour
58. H1's To R Y of the WAR
vigour and prudence, that in 20 days he forced the enemy to
abandon Bohemia with great loſs, and cut off his communication.
with Sileſia.
If, after the taking of Zittau, his royal highneſs had marched
to Stromberg, beyond Löbau, or to Reichenbach, or, laſtly, to
Jauernick, with a ſtrong corps on the Landſcron, and the light
troops in the woods behind Löbau, the enemy could never have
opened a communication with Sileſia. The poſition of Kleinſchönau
was too far back, and left the road between Bautzen and Görlitz
open; ſo that the king could always enter Sileſia without any op
poſition. The method, purſued by prince Charles, of ačting with
ſtrong corps, rather than with the whole army, is attended with
infinite advantages: 1. it facilitates the means of ſubſiſting, which,
in every country, is difficult, when the army is very numerous ;
2. it enables you to engage every day ſome important combat,
without bringing affairs to a deciſion ; 3. they revive the ſpirits
of the ſoldiers, whom former misfortunes have rendered timid;
4. by taking poſt on the enemy's flanks you force him to quit
every camp, however ſtrong, and conſequently to abandon the
whole country. All which truths are deduced clearly from the
condućt of prince Charles on this occaſion.
THAT of the king does not, on the whole, appear in the ſame
favourable light. His activity in raiſing the ſiege of Prague is
much to be commended; the leaſt delay would have been fatal to
him: his dividing the army into ſeveral ſtrong corps, after the
battle of Kollin, very much facilitated the retreat. Theſe pre
ſented ſo many objećts to the enemy, that he could not immedi
ately determine which was moſt worthy his attention; nor could
he undertake any thing againſt them ’till he had aſcertained their
number, ſpecies, and poſition: in the mean time they retired with
ranquility and ſafety. From the king's conduct, on this occaſion,
may
 in G E R Aſ A N Y, 1757. 89
may be deduced a general rule for retreating after an action loſt.
That an army retreating muſt be divided into as many ſtrong corps
as the nature of the country will admit of ; becauſe, in this caſe,
the enemy can do you no very eſſential damage: if he ſeparates
his army likewiſe into many corps, neither of them will be ſtrong
enough to undertake any thing of conſequence; even, if they keep
too cloſe, they may receive ſome conſiderable check. Another
advantage, ariſing from this method of retiring, is, that the ene
my cannot intercept any one of your corps; becauſe he can neither
puſh between them, nor go ſo far about as to come before them,
without expoſing his own troops to be hemmed in between your
different corps. If he follows you with his whole army, one only
diviſion can be in danger, which may be eaſily avoided by forming
a ſtrong rear-guard, who will get time for the remainder to march
off in ſafety; and the more ſo, as a ſmall corps marches much
more lightly than an army. Care muſt be taken not to engage the
whole corps; becauſe, if the enemy is near, and ačts with vigour,
it will be loſt intirely.
WHEN prince Charles paſſed the Elbe, it was evident he pro
poſed to advance towards Luſatia, conſequently the king ſhould
have left M. Keith, with a few battalions and ſquadrons, in the
mountains between Lowoſitz and Pirna, to cover Saxony, againſt

the enemy's light troops, and with the remainder have taken a
poſition behind the Poltz, about Leipa or Nimes, with a ſtrong
corps on his left, towards Liebenau, and another ſmaller on his
right, between him and the Elbe, on the road to Rumburg. This
would have made it impoſſible for the enemy to advance one ſep
'till they had diſlodged him : they could not think of entering
thoſe great defiles, through which the road leading to Ruinburg
paſſes, having a corps, as I ſuppoſe, in front, and the whole army
on their flank and rear; nor could they enter thoſe of Liebenau
N and
 go f{ is To R Y of the WAR
and Reichenberg on his left, for the ſame reaſons: they muſt com
ſequently either force him to retire, or ſtop ſhort. It was ſtill
more improbable that they would ſeparate their army and ſend a
confiderable part of it to make an efficacious diverſion in Sileſia.
Such is the ſtrength of this country, and ſo many good camps to
be found in it, that, if the prince of Pruſſia, even with his army,
had taken the road of Gabel and Zittau, inſtead of that of Rumburg,
it is probable he might have ſtopped prince Charles, for ſome time
at leaſt. The enemy did not chooſe to venture between his right
• flank and the king's army, and they could not eaſily take a poſition
on his left, that could force him to quit Gabel and Zittau, if he
had taken his camp on the mountains between theſe two places,
which he ought to have done, rather than take the road of Rum
burg, by which he loſt them both, and his communication with
Sileſia. When the enemy arrived at Hunnerwaſſer, Why did not
the king march inſtantly from Gaſtorff, and come on their flank.
and rear, while the prince his brother attacked them in front ?
Nothing in the world could hinder them from ačting in concert.
This, however, and many other favourable opportunities, which
the enemy gave him, were loſt. His majeſty continued, as we
have ſaid, all this while, near Leutmeritz, in perfect tranquility.
THE prince's army was, no doubt, too weak to withſtand the .
efforts of the enemy, who were more than double his number 5.
yet we think he might have taken ſuch camps as would have ſtop
ped them. When a general has the misfortune to command an
army that is much inferior to that of the enemy, he muſt certainly
retire before them, if they ſend very ſtrong corps on his flanks, as .
well becauſe his ſubſiſtance becomes precarious, as becauſe they
may, by a judicious uſe of theſe corps, attack him with united
forces in front and rear, and intirely defeat him, particularly if the
country has many defiles. A general, in ſuch circumſtances, has
but
 in GERMANY., 1757. " 91
but one way to extricate himſelf; which is, to attack, with his
whole forces, whatever corps may be ſent on his flank: if he ſuc
ceeds, once or twice, the enemy will ſcarce attempt a third time.
The prince, having neglected to do this, was, as we have ſaid,
forced to retire from camp to camp, and at length to abandon the
whole country. -

Du RING theſe tranſačtions in Bohemia, the army of the empire,

conſiſting of 32 ſquadrons, 32 battalions, 23 companies of grena
diers, 2 regiments of huſſars, and 52 pieces of cannon, commanded
by the prince of Hildburgſhauſen, aſſembled in the circle of Fran
conia, in the month of Auguſt. Theſe were to be reinforced by
30,000 French, under the command of prince Soubiſe, who had
been for ſome time on the Main. Accordingly, they united at
Erfurth on the 21ſt of Auguſt, and aſſumed the title of the com
bined army; the obječt of which, was, to drive the Pruſſians out
of Saxony. This, it was thought, could be executed without any
conſiderable difficulty. The country was in ſome meaſure defence
leſs, there being nothing to guard it but ſome few weak garriſons,
which, though united, could form but an inconfiderable corps,
incapable of keeping the field againſt ſuch ſuperior forces; and,
being thus feparated, were ſtill leſs capable of making any effectual
reſiſtance. The king, being wholly taken up in obſerving the
Auſtrians, had not, as they imagined, either time or means to
coine and oppoſe their operations.
For theſe reaſons, it was reſolved to march down the Saala and
begin the campaign with the fiege of Leipſig, preferable to any
other enterprize, becauſe they would be at hand to receive all kind
of ſuccours from Richlieu's army, now intirely at liberty by the
convention of Cloſterſeven, and moreover could, in caſe of ſuc
ceſs, take their winter quarters in this part of Saxony, and the
-- next campaign proceed to the intire conqueſt of it, and of Magde
burg and Brandeburg.
N 2 THE
 92. H Is To R Y of the WAR

THE king knew perfeótly well, that, if the progreſs of the com
bined army, and that of M. Richlieu, was not immediately ſtop
ped, they would ſoon be on the Elbe ; the conſequence of which
muſt be fatal to him. Having, therefore, left an army of 40 bat
talions and 70 ſquadrons, under the prince of Bevern, to defend.
Sileſia, he quitted Bernſtadtel the 25th of Auguſt, and marched to,
IDreſden, where he aſſembled an army, and proceeded without de- -

lay to the Saala. On the 12th of September he arrived at Erfurth,

which the enemy abandoned on his approach, and retired to Eiſe
nach. His majeſty followed them, intending to give them battle,
but he found them ſo advantageouſly poſted, that he did not think.
it adviſeable to attack them; and, ſeeing they declined coming to
an action as much as poſſible, he reſolved to fall back on the Saala,.
as well to make his army ſubſiſt with more eaſe, as to be at hand
to ſuſtain a detachment which he propoſed ſending under prince
Ferdinand, to cover Halberſtadt and the neighbouring country,
againſt the incurſions of the light troops, which infeſted them,
daily from Richlieu’s army; and another, under prince Maurice,
between the Moldau and the Elbe, to cover that part of Saxony.
and Brandeburg. Accordingly, he retired firſt to Buttelſtadt, and
from thence to Naumburg, where he arrived the 13th of October.
This retreat encouraged the combined army to advance; they re
£umed their former poſition at Erfurth, where general St. Germain.
was poſted, with a conſiderable detachment, to obſerve the king's
motions, and cover the remainder of the army, who, not being.
able to ſupport the cold, were put into quarters of cantonment.
PRINCE Charles, ſeeing the enemy's forces thus ſeparated at an
immenſe diſtance, and the road into Brandeburg quite open, reſol
ved to ſend a conſiderable detachment to Berlin; and, to cover this:
expedition, another great corps, under general Marſhal, was ſent
upon the Elſter. His royal highneſs propoſed, by this enterprize,
- tº.
º
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 93
~

to raiſe the credit of his arms, which the taking of the enemy's
capital could not fail to do ; to make a diverſion in favour of the
combined army, becauſe it was not doubted but the king would
quit Saxony for ſome time, and haſten to the ſuccour of his reſi
dence; and laſtly, to oblige the prince of Bevern to make ſcine
conſiderable detachment, which would facilitate the means to drive
him out of his preſent advantageous poſition.
Accor DING LY, general Haddick, with about 4oco men, was,
ſent to Berlin ; which he took, and ranſomed, and then retired
behind the Spree with ſafety and honour. - -

PRINCE Maurice, who, as hath been ſaid, had been detached

towards the Elbe, was on his march there when he was informed
of the enemy's enterprize againſt Berlin; he immediately paſſed
that river, and directed his march towards Berlin, in hopes ſtill to
anticipate the enemy, or at leaſt intercept him in his retreat; but,
on his arrival at Schwelinz, advice was brought that Haddick had,
been at Berlin, and, having ranſomed it, was retired into Luſatia.
The king, having been informed of this enterprize againſt his
capital, and believing at firſt that the enemy had concerted ſome
ſolid plan with the Swedes, who were likewiſe advancing that
way, thought it neceſſary to go and defeat their deſigns in perſon.
For which purpoſe, having left about 6000 or 7ooo men, under
M. Keith, to guard the Saala, and obſerve the combined army,
he quitted Leipſig on the 16th of Oétober, and on the 20th arrived.
at Annaberg, on the right of the Elbe, where he was informed of
Haddick's retreat. Upon which he ordered prince Maurice to re
fume his poſition between the Elbe and the Moldau, and with part
of the troops returned to Leipſig. -

The generals of the combined army, now reinforced by a very

ſtrong corps, commanded by the duke of Broglio, reſolved to ſeize.
this favourable opportunity which the king's abſence afforded them,
-
and,
94. H1's To R Y of the WAR

and once more penetrate into Saxony: accordingly, they put their
troops in motion, paſſed the Saala on the 25th, and on the 27th.
had their head quarters at Weiſſenfels. From hence count de Mailly
was ſent to ſummon Leipſig, which M. Keith refuſed to ſurrender.
Things were in this fituation, when the king arrived with about
jo,ooo men; and, being joined by the corps under M. Keith, and
prince Ferdinand, an army of 22, ooo men was aſſembled, with
which he reſolved to march againſt the enemy.
Thou GH the combined army was much ſuperior to that of the
king, it was thought prudent to decline coming to an action, with
the Saala behind them; and probably they meant to concert ſome
new plan with M. Richlieu, now intirely diſengaged. Accordingly,
the whole army repaſſed that river on the 29th ; 4 battalions, and
18 companies of grenadiers, were left to defend Weiſſenfels; and
14 battalions, with ſome cavalry, under the command of the duke
of Broglio, were ſent to occupy Merſeburg; which ſhews they
then propoſed defending the banks of the Saala.
THE king quitted Leipſig on the 30th, and arrived the day fol
lowing at Weiſſenfels, which he ordered to be attacked inſtantly;
and, after ſome reſiſtance, took it ſword in hand. The enemy,
having for the moſt part paſſed the river, put fire to the bridge,
which intercepted ſome of them, who were made priſoners. Their
army was divided into two parts: the one, commanded by the
prince of Hildburgſhauſen, remained oppoſite to Weiſſenfels; and
the other, under prince Soubiſe, approached Merſeburg, to ſuſtain
M. Broglio, or cover his retreat, in caſe it ſhould be thought con
venient to abandon that place.
His majeſty knew, that, while the enemy had ſuch confiderable
forces on the frontiers of Magdeburg and Saxony, he could not
link of ſeparating his army, to put the troops in winter quarters
when the ſeaſon required it, even ſuppoſing he could keep the
whole
 -*-

in G E R MAN y, 1757. 95
~

whole in that country: it was therefore reſolved to give the com

bined army battle, and, if they declined it, drive them ſo far back
that they could not reſume their operations, at leaſt for this can:-
paign. Accordingly, bridges were thrown over the Saala, at
Weiſſenfels, Merſeburg, and Halle, where the army paſſed in
three columns, and aſſembled, the 2d of November, near the vil
lage of Roſbach, as in A. A. The enemy, having abandoned the
defign of defending the banks of the Saala, quitted Merſeburg,
and united their whole forces in B. B. The king examined their
poſition the 3d, and reſolved to attack them the next morning.
Accordingly, he advanced at the head of his cavalry, in order to
occupy thoſe poſts which ſhould be found moſt proper to cover the
infantry, and at the ſame time form his diſpoſitions for the attack.
Being arrived in D. D. he perceived they had, in the preceding
night, changed their poſition, and taken another in C. C. which
appeared too ſtrong to be attacked: upon which the army was or
dered to march on the left, and encamp in E. E. with the left at
Roſbach, the center at Schartau, and the right towards Bedra,
with the cavalry in the third line.
THE commanders of the combined army attributed this retro
grade motion of the king to fear. This, and the great force of their
army, elated their courage in ſuch a manner, that they reſolved to
attack him next morning, and ſo finiſh the campaign; the fatigues
of which their troops ſeemed no longer able or willing to endure.
The king's right and center were deemed too well poſted to be
attacked with ſucceſs, conſequently they propoſed attacking the
left on the flank and rear; and at the ſame time general St. Ger
main was ordered to take poſt, with a conſiderable corps, in N. N.
as well to amuſe the enemy, as to cover the march of the army: «
at 1 1 o'clock it was put in motion, in three columns; the van
guard was compoſed of Auſtrian and imperial cavalry, followed by
- the
06 H is r or y of the WAR

the French and imperial infantry; the whole was cloſed by the
French horſe. Being arrived on the hill, oppoſite the enemy's
left flank, they halted, and ordered the French horſe to advance,
and join the reſt of the cavalry at the head. * *

A Bou T 1 o'clock the king was informed that they were in

march on his left flank; but, not being able as yet to diſcover
their intentions, he remained quiet for the preſent, and obſerved
them. At 2 o'clock he perceived they had paſſed his flank, and
continued marching towards Merſeburg; upon which he ordered
his cavalry and artillery to march on the left, behind the hills, and
occupy that near Lunſtadt and Reichertſwerben, while the infantry
followed in all haſte.

THE generals of the combined army, ſeeing the enemy quit their
camp with an appearance of precipitation, thought they were re
tiring; which ſeemed the more probable, as they could not diſco
ver any thing of the march, being covered by the hills. Anxious
left the enemy eſcaped, and they loſe the fruits of their fine diſpo
ſitions, they advanced in great haſte with their cavalry, followed,
at a conſiderable diſtance, by their infantry, hoping to overtake the
rear-guard, and, by attacking it with vigour, either deſtroy it, or
force the enemy to a general action. Being arrived near Reichertſ
werben, ſome of the enemy's horſe appeared on the heights behind
the village; they continued, however, to advance, thinking they
were only poſted there to gain time, and cover the retreat. This
illuſion ſoon vaniſhed; all the Pruſſian horſe was then forming,
under the protećtion of ſome heavy artillery, poſted on the hill,
which did great execution, and contributed effentially to the ſuc
ceſs of the battle. As ſoon as they were formed, his majeſty or—
dered them to attack that of the enemy; this they executed with
promptitude and vigour, broke them, and drove them back in
confuſiº to the village of Buſendorff, where they attempted to
rally 5
 in GERMANY., 1757. 97
rally; but the Pruſſians renewed their attack, without giving them
time to execute it, broke them again, and ſo effectually, that they
quitted the field. In the mean time the generals of the combined
army endeavoured to form their infantry; but the king, who had
as yet fix or eight battalions only come up, ordered them inſtantly
to advance, and attack the enemy, while they were occupied in
forming the line. This was immediately executed; and, being
'ſupported by the cavalry and artillery, they eaſily broke thoſe
few troops which had formed at the head of the columns, and
drove them back in confuſion.
PRINCE Soubiſe, however, did not give up the affair as loſt;
the reſerve, conſiſting of five regiments of cavalry, was ordered
to advance and ſuſtain the infantry, in order to form the line, if
poſſible. Theſe were inſtantly attacked, broke, and drove off the
field; upon which the infantry, unſupported by its own cavalry,
taken in flank by that of the enemy, and moreover expoſed to a
heavy fire of the artillery and ſmall arms, were unable to keep their
ground, much leſs form a line forwards: they attempted once more
to form it behind, between the village of Buſendorff and the
Luftſchiff, under the protećtion of ſome French cavalry; but theſe
being over-powered, and forced to retire, after a vigorous combat,"
the infantry was likewiſe obliged to quit the field with precipi
tation. Count St. Germain covered the retreat. -

THUS ended the battle of Roſbach; where 22, ooo men, con
dućted with prudence and vigour, defeated above 50,000, with the
inconfiderable loſs of about 3oo men, killed and wounded; whereas
that of the combined army amounted to about 8oo killed, and
6000 priſoners, including 11 generals and 300 officers, together
With 72 pieces of cannon, and other military trophies. Many re
lations of this battle were publiſhed by authority: that of Vienna
is too general, and gives a very imperfeót idea of it; we ſhall,
therefore, omit it, and give that of Berlin, and another wrote by an
O officer
n8
-*
His To Ry of the WAR
officer in the combined army; which, with what we have ſaid on
the ſubjećt, will enable the reader to form a proper judgment of
this extraordinary tranſaction.
THE Pruſſians account of the battle is as follows:

&4
“ IN the beginning of September, the army of the empire, and
the corps commanded by prince Soubiſe, aſſembled at Erfurth,
& c.
intending to penetrate into Saxony, and render themſelves maſters.
cº

*
of the Elbe: upon which part of the Pruſſian army marched
&c.
towards Naumburg. Our light troops had a ſkirmiſh with thoſe
& Cº.
of the enemy, over which they gained a confiderable advantage.
&g
The army paſſed the Saala, and advanced as far as Buttelſtedt.
&&
About this time the convention of Bremerforde, between the
&&
French and Hanoverians, was made, and a ſtrong corps from the:
&&
duke of Richlieu's army entered the principality of Halberſtadt:
«
‘ prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic was ſent there; he ſoon delivered
4&
“ the country from the French, of whom he took 20 officers and,
& 4
4oo men; but, as the duke of Richlieu advanced with his whole:
« .
army, prince Ferdinand retired to Wanſleben, from whence he
&4
could intercept their convoys. His majeſty's army marched to,
gº
* Erfurth, which the enemy quitted and retired into the moun
&&
tains behind Eiſenach. We had a poſt at Gotha ; prince Hild
&c.
burghauſen attacked it, but was repulſed with loſs. Both armies
&c.
continued in this ſituation 'till the end of Oétober, when a corps.
&&
of Hungarian troops marched through Luſatia into Brandeburg :
*
it was thought that general Marſhal's corps would follow them,
4 c.
which obliged his majeſty to ſend prince Maurice to oppoſe.
&C
them, and he himſelf followed, and advanced as far as Annaberg,
& &
to intercept them; but the enemy's expedition had no other ob
“, jećt than to raiſe contribution, and, on the approach of prince
c&
Maurice, they retired without having collečted it at all. While
º

“, part of our army marched to ſuccour the elečtorate, M. Keith,

“ with
 in GERMANY., 1757, c. 99
º
with the reſt, retired into Leipſig. The generals of the con
*&
bined army believed this a favourable moment to put their pro
*&
jećts in execution: accordingly they marched cantonwiſe, part
g&
by Naumburg and Zeitz, and part by Weiſſenfels, in order to
&4
take Leipſig, and our great magazine at Torgau. Our army
tº &
was ordered to aſſemble at Leipſig, where the different corps
&&
arrived the 26th of Oétober. On the 31ſt we marched, intend
&4
ing to attack the enemy's quarters; we made ſome priſoners,
&g
but went no farther than Lutzen. His majeſty, being informed
c&
that the enemy retired on all ſides, marched with the vanguard
º4
to Weiſſenfels. This city was defended by ſome of the Bava
*&
rian and Circle's troops : we attacked it, and took it, with about
<&
3oo priſoners: the enemy burnt the bridge over the Saala to
gº
facilitate their flight. The troops of the empire encamped on the
4&
other fide of the river, over againſt Weiſſenfels, poſted behind
*&
-
the encloſures and the houſes, in order to hinder us from re
*:
pairing the bridge : they formed a chain on the left ſide of the
< c,
river; and marſhal Keith, who, with the greateſt part of the
*g
army, was marched to Merſeburg, found the bridge burnt, and
&g
the town occupied by 14 French battalions, a detachment of
tg
which broke down the bridge at Halle. The field marſhal went
**
with a detachment to this laſt place, and ordered the bridge
*:
to be repaired, which obliged the enemy to abandon their poſts
tº g
on the Saala, and retire towards Micheln. We repaired im
tº c
mediately the other bridges, and paſſed the river by Merſeburg,
*&
Halle, and Weiſſenfels: the three columns aſſembled on the ſame
* g.

tº g
day near the village of Roſbach. His majeſty, having recon
noitred the enemy, found that they could be attacked on the
*:

wº
right flank with advantage, which was reſolved to be executed
wº
the following day: accordingly we marched, the cavalry having
the vanguard. When we arrived on the heights, from whence
O 2 . “ the
(IOO His To R Y of the WAR

“ the day before we had examined the enemy's poſition, we

“ found they had changed it: their front was not only parallel
“ to ours, but was covered by a deep ravin; their right was in a
“ wood, on a high hill, covered alſo with three redoubts and an
“ abbattis. * It was not thought prudent to attack them in this
“ advantageous poſition, and ſo we returned to our old camp. "
“ The enemy, perceiving we did not attack them, ordered ſome
“ detachments to follow us ; they fired a few cannon ſhot at our
“ cavalry, but without effect. The 5th, in the morning, we were
“ informed the enemy were in motion on their right; and, ſoon
“ after, that their whole army was in march: about noon we
“ perceived the heads of their columns oppoſite to the flank of
“ our left wing: we would take no reſolution 'till we knew per
“ fečtly their intentions. About 3 o'clock we perceived they
“ had paſſed our left wing, and direéted their march towards
“Merſeburg: upon which our army was formed in order of battle,
“ and, having made a motion on the left, we coſted them : we
“ reached the heights, which our cavalry occupied in ſuch a man
“ ner, that they came on the flank of that of the enemy, and
“ after ſeveral attacks broke and diſperſed them. Our infantry
“ reached the village of Reichertſwerben, where our left was
“ poſted; and, as we perceived the French infantry form in co
“ lumns, in order to attack us, we anticipated them. The bat
“ the laſted about an hour and a half: ſix battalions only of our
“left wing came to ačtion. We followed the enemy to Burgwer
“ben : the night hindered us from reaping ſtill greater advantages
“ from our vićtory. The day following our army marched to
“wards Freidburg: the 7th a ſtrong detachment paſſed the Saala,
“ and advanced to Eckartſberg, &c. &c.”
* Trees cut down, and placed ſo as to form a parapet; behind which the troops, parti
cularly infantry, are placed.
THE
 -
-

º
in G E R M A NY, 1757, IOI

The next was wrote by a French officer in the combined

army. . -

“. It was reſolved to attack the left flank of the Pruſſian army:

gº
accordingly, at nine in the morning, our's marched in two co
ge
lumns. General St. Germain was ordered to take poſt before
&g
our camp, with 9 battalions and 14 or 15 ſquadrons, in order
«
to attack the enemy in front, when he perceived that we did
&4
the ſame on his flank. The king, having been informed of
&&.
theſe motions, which he ſo much deſired, left his camp ſtand
º
ing, with part of his army in it, to oppoſe St. Germain,
&g
and to make us believe he was in perfeót ſecurity. The left
&g
wing of his army was hid behind a hill, and covered by ſome
g&
marſhy ground, and a village: part of his army was formed be
«g
hind the above-mentioned hill, on which was a great quantity
46
of artillery. Not far from this hill is another, which joins it,
44
and extends far into the plain. . Behind this hill the enemy had
&4
his infantry in columns, a great quantity of artillery, and almoſt
ge
his whole cavalry. Our army, having marched about two hours,
“
was now oppoſite the enemy's flank; we had a fine plain before
gº
us, and, perceiving no enemy, we haſtened our march. It
&g
looked as if we feared the enemy ſhould eſcape us, and only
44
reconnoitred his front, without taking any notice of his left
44
wing; ſo were we heartily chaſtiſed for it. About half an hour
- ºt
after three our cavalry ſtruck in with that of the enemy, which
&4

ſtood at the bottom of the ſecond hill, and advanced in good

sº
order againſt ours, whom they could eaſily break; becauſe the
cavalry of the empire was ſo cloſe to them, that they could
“not fire freely, nor could they form in good order. When the
“enemy firſt appeared, the cavalry of the left wing was ordered
gº
to advance, which they executed full gallop; but they found
&g
-
that of the right wing retiring in confuſion. Notwithſtanding
“ this,
I O2 His to Ry of the WAR
“ this, the Auſtrian cavalry, and the regiments of Bourbon, La
“ meth, and Fitzjames in particular, fought with ſucceſs. Scarce
“ was the combat between the cavalry engaged, when the enemy
“ direéted his artillery to play on the front and flank of our ca
“ valry and infantry. Our infantry was immediately formed, but
“ in ſome places they were too cloſe, and in others had large open
“ ings; they moved to the left, where ſome brigades were ſoon
“ repulſed by the fire of the Pruſſians: that of Mailly followed
“ them ; that of Wittmer, of which was the regiment of Dieſ
“ bach, kept its ground, the longeſt ; and prince Soubiſe was
“ obliged to go himſelf and order it to retire.” . . .

ALL the other accounts concur in the principal circumſtances, .

and therefore it ſeems needleſs to add any more. . * -
2
.

R E F L E c T I o N s. .

THE generals of the combined army do not ſeem to have formed

any fixed plan of operations, as if they propoſed acting according
to circumſtances, as they occaſionally aroſe: at firſt they ſeem wil
ling to occupy Saxony, provided it might be done without any
riſk; they avoid coming to an action during the whole campaign,
and at laſt, when it was leaſt proper, they engage it. When the
king quitted the Saala, having there only 12,000 men in two dif
ferent corps, then was the time to advance and attack Leipſig ;
they might have taken many poſitions, which would have made it
difficult, and perhaps impoſſible, for the king to relieve it; as he
had no more than 10,0co men with him, and about 6000 men
under prince Maurice; ſo that they would have had only theſe
16,ooo men to contend with. As to the corps under prince Fer
dinand, he might eaſily have been forced under the cannon of
Magdeburg; any ſmall detachment from the right of Richlieu's
army
 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. 1o 3

army would have been ſufficient for that purpoſe. Having ſuf
fered the king to unite his different corps at Leipſig, it was pru
dent, no doubt, to repaſs the Saala, becauſe it is of too dangerous
a conſequence to engage an aćtion with a great river behind the
army ; but they ſhould have defended the banks of that river.
As they were much ſtronger than the king, he could not paſs it
without their knowledge: if they left a ſtrong detachment over
againſt Weiſſenfels, and another at Merſeburg, and with the army
had taken a central poſition between theſe two places, they could,
by an eaſy march, ſuſtain either of them ; and therefore, in all
probability, have hindered the enemy from paſſing at all. If they
propoſed fighting, they could not have a better opportunity than
while the enemy was paſſing the river; and, if they did not, they
ſhould have gone behind the Unſtrut, and covered themſelves with
that river. It is agreed upon, by every one, that the king's army
paſſed the Saala in three columns; one at Weiſſenfels, another at
Merſeburg, and the third at Halle; by which means they were
ſeparated from each other about ſeven miles; and that they united
at Roſbach. We cannot conceive why the generals of the com
bined army permitted the enemy to commit ſo great a fault, with
out puniſhing him for it: they could have taken many poſitions
to prevent the junétion of theſe columns; and could, with their
united forces, attack either of them ſeparately ; as appears evident,
from the inſpection of the map. Having, during the campaign,
declined coming to an ačtion, they ſhould have perfiſted in that
reſolution a few days longer; becauſe, from the fituation of affairs
in Sileſia and in Weſtphalia, it was probable the king would be
forced to go againſt the Auſtrians in perſon; and, though he did
not, it was impoſſible for him to oppoſe effectually the combined
army, and that of Richlieu, now diſengaged, becauſe he muſt ne
ceſſarily have one or the other upon his flank; and, having about
º 3.
I C4 H1st of y of the War
a fifth part of their forces only, he muſt have abandoned the coun
try, or fell a vićtim to ſuperiority, if he perſiſted to wait for them;
ſo that in this very campaign he would have loſt either Saxony
or Sileſia, and perhaps both, had M. Richlieu and the generals of
the combined army ačted with more judgment. . .

The plan they formed to attack the enemy's left flank was in
conſiſtent with all the rules of military prudence ; becauſe, in caſe
of a defeat, there was no retreat at all for them: they had a river
behind them, and the enemy between them and the country to
which they muſt neceſſarily retire. The condućt of the action
was no leſs imprudent; they could not think the enemy would
permit them to invelope his left wing, and cut him off from the
Saala; and, as they marched at mid-day, he could not be deceived
as to their intentions. No general will ſuffer an enemy to attack
him in flank and rear : How could they imagine ſuch a general
as the king of Pruſſia would commit this fault When they re
ſolved to attack his left flank, they ſhould have made ſome de
monſtrations on his right, to draw his attention that way: and,
by marching in the night, approach his left flank, and attack it,
without giving him time to change his poſition. This was the
only probable means to bring their plan to bear. The method
they took made it impracticable from the firſt inſtant they put the
army in motion. -

WHEN the king quitted his camp with an air of precipitation,

St. Germain ſhould have followed him; and a ſtrong detachment of
cavalry have been ſent on the road to Merſeburg, in order to recon
noitre his motions; and, if they found he was retiring, theſe two
corps would have ſufficed to beat his rear-guard; and, if it was
found he only changed poſition, they would have kept him at bay,
and give time to form the army, or retire into their old camp. Surely ,
it was unpardonable to march with the whole army without any
- - vanguard,
 in G E R M A NY, 1757. Io 5.

vanguard, which muſt never be done, particularly if near the

enemy. When at length they were undeceived, and found that
the enemy was forming on the heights of Reichertſwerben, Why
perfiſt in advancing They ſhould inſtantly have formed their line
as far backwards as poſſible, and by no means attempt it under
the enemy's fire, and ſo near him ; becauſe ſuch manoeuvres can
never ſucceed, if the enemy has either condućt or vigour.
The king appears in a very different light: though he ſees the
enemy in motion all the morning, he is eaſy and quiet; no ways
agitated, as too often is the caſe; waits 'till he perceives their in
tentions, and then inſtantly makes his diſpoſitions. His march
ing behind the hill was attended with many great advantages:
that appearance of a flight elated the ſpirits of the enemy ſo as
to make them neglect the neceſſary precautions; they haſtened ſo
much that their army was thrown into ſome diſorder while in
march; and they were ſo perfeótly deceived, that they found
themſelves, all at once, with the head of their columns, under
the fire of the enemy's line; and ſo near, that they could not form
their troops. The king ſaw this favourable moment, and ordered
his cavalry to attack directly; and, though ſcarce any of the in
fantry was come up, he ordered thoſe few battalions to advance
before the enemy could make any diſpoſition. One inch of ground,
or one inſtant of time loſt, would have given the enemy time and
room to form their line; but the king's diſpoſitions were ſo exact,
and ſo well calculated, that neither happened; and he was moſt
deſervedly crowned with vićtory; which put an end to the cam
paign in Saxony. -

We have already ſaid, that his majeſty the king of Pruſſia,

on leaving Luſatia, had left there the duke of Bevern,” with a'
P conſiderable

* Auguſtus William duke of Pevern was born in 1715; in 1733 he ſerved againſt the
French; in 1735 he entered the Pruſſian ſervice, as lieutenant colonel; in 1739 he was
- - - - made
roð. His T or y of the WAR.
confiderable body of troops, to obſerve prince Charles; and, above.
all things, hinder him from making any ſolid enterprize againſt
Silefia. Accordingly, the duke, having received a convoy from
Bautzen, quitted Bernſtadtel, and encamped on the mountain,
called the Landſcron, near. Görlitz; and the better to ſecure the
paſſes of the Neiſs and Queiſs, that he might enter Sileſia, if ne
ceſſary, he ſent general Winterfield, with a ſtrong corps, between ,
thoſe two rivers, at a place called Moys, near Górlitz.
PRINCE Charles, advanced with the main army as far, as Bern--
ſtadtel, and ſent general Nadaſti with a confiderable corps to Sei-.
denberg, alſo between the Neiſs and Queiſs, as well to obſerve
Winterfield, as to ſecure a paſſage over the Neiſs, and be ready to .
follow, or anticipate the duke of Beyern, whenever he went to--
wards Sileſia. -

His royal highneſs was defirous to force the enemy to quit their
preſent poſition, and carry the war into Sileſia; becauſe not only.
the army would be maintained at their expence, but, being much .
ſuperior, could undertake ſomething ſolid: whereas, if he con-.
tinued there, the campaign would ſoon be at an end, and the fruits
of their preceding good manoeuvres loſt. For theſe ſame reaſons, ,
it was incumbent on the duke of Bevern to keep things in the
preſent .

made a colonel, and wounded at the battle of Molwitz; in 1741 he had a regiment given.
him; in 1743 was made a major general ; in 1747 governor of Stettin; in 1750 knight of
the black eagle, and lieutenant general. He diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the battles of Hohen
friedberg, Lowoſitz, Prague, Chotzemitz, and Breſlaw : after which he was made a priſo
ner, while he went with a ſervant only to reconnoitre the enemy. He was in 1758 releaſed,
without any ranſom, for his affinity to the empreſs. The king ſeeming offended at his con
dućt, he retired to his government of Stettin; where he remained ’till 1762; when he was
called to the army in Sileſia, and had a corps confided to him, while the king was beſieging
Schweidnitz. The Auſtrians, intending to relieve that place, attacked him with an army
under the command of generals Lacy, Laudhon, and Odonell, whom he repulſed ſeveral
times, though they were three times ſtronger than he was, and gave the king time to come
to his aid. He may, no doubt, be numbered among the firſt generals of this age.
 in GERMAN Y, 1757. ro7

preſent fituation, and draw on the war, without permitting the

enemy to gain any confiderable advantage. His poſition ſeemed
ito enable him to obtain this end. The Auſtrians could not, he
thought, enter Sileſia, and leave him behind, becauſe he could
return into Bohemia, and, by cutting off their ſubſiſtence, make
it impoſſible for them to do any thing of conſequence in Sileſia;
and, having a garriſon in Bautzen, he was at hand likewiſe to
favour, or be favoured, by the king's operations in Saxony; and,
no doubt, could he have kept his poſition 'till the king had deli
vered that country from the combined army, the enemy muſt have
been forced back into Bohemia, without even attempting any thing
againſt Sileſia. .
PRINCE Charles, perfeótly acquainted with all theſe reaſons,
reſolved to force the enemy to quit their poſition, and march to
Sileſia; but, it having been judged too ſtrong to be attacked, it
was neceſſary to obtain by dint of proper manoeuvres what could
not be done by force. Wherefore, he ſent a corps to drive the
garriſon out of Bautzen, and ſo cut off the enemy's communication
with Saxony, and determined to attack general Winterfield, which
would likewiſe cut them off from Sileſia. Theſe reſolutions being
taken, Nadaſti's corps was confiderably reinforced, and on the 7th
of September the attack was made on that of Winterfield's. This
general had poſted, on a hill called Holtzberg, at a ſmall diſtance
from his camp, two battalions; againſt which the Auſtrians
direéted their attack, and came upon them before they could
either be ſuſtained or called back. They defended themſelves
with uncommon bravery; inſomuch that Winterfield had time to
‘come with ſome troops to their relief, and facilitate their retreat:
upon which the combat became more violent than ever, in hopes
“of being able to keep their ground; but, having loſt a great number
- P 2 of
Io9 History of the WAR
of men, and their general mortally wounded, they were forced
to quit their poſt, and retire to their camp. The Auſtrians took
poſſeſſion of the Holtzberg; which, however, they abandoned
the next morning; having loſt, in this bloody action, killed and
wounded, about 2000 men. -

• THE duke of Bevern, having loſt Bautzen, and with it his

communication with the king in Saxony, and moreover fearing
the Auſtrians would now, after the defeat of Winterfield, paſs the
Neiſs with their main army, and ſo hinder him from entering
Sileſia, reſolved, while it was in his power, to march thither; and
the more ſo, as he could not poſſibly ſubſiſt in his preſent poſition,
becauſe he could draw nothing from his magazines in Saxony, and
what could be had from Sileſia was ſubjećt to be intercepted by the
enemy's light troops, who were extremely numerous, and had a
very favourable country, full of woods, ravins, hills, &c. to act in.
Accordingly, not daring to paſs the Neiſs at Görlitz, ſo near the
enemy, he fell down that river to Naumburg, and there paſſed it;
and from thence marched ſucceſſively, by Buntzlaw and Hainau, to
Lignitz, where he arrived the 19th. -

PRINCE Charles, having received information of the enemy's

march, put his army inſtantly in motion, and took his route by
Lauban, Löwenberg, Goldberg, Hundorff, Jauer, Nicolſtad,
and Greibnig, where he arrived on the 25th. By taking this
poſition he had cut off the enemy from Breſlaw, Schweidnitz, and
all Upper Sileſia. On the following day, he ordered the village of
Barſhdorff, where the enemy had poſted ſome infantry, to be can
nonaded; which, having put the houſes on fire, forced them to
retire, and take a new poſition behind it, where they could be ſuſ
tained by the whole army. Prince Charles intended to attack
them, but the duke of Bevern, propoſing, if poſſible, to regain
his communication with Breſlaw and Upper Sileſia, quitted his
camp
 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. Io9

camp in the night of the 27th, and direéted his march towards
Glogau, that he might paſs the Oder in ſafety, if he was followed
by the whole Auſtrian army; but, finding that only the vanguard
purſued him, and that only on the right of the Katzbach, towards
Parchwitz, he reſolved to paſs it near Lamperſdorff; which was
executed on the 29th ; and, having marched up the right of the
Oder, he repaſſed it at Breſlaw, and on the 1ſt of October tool;
his camp on the banks of the Lohe, with the city behind him.
By this fine march he once more opened the communication with
Upper Sileſia, and covered the capital with his army, which was
reciprocally covered by it.
PRINCE Charles found it would be uſeleſs to purſue the enemy
on his quitting Lignitz, becauſe he could only drive them undes
the cannon of Glogau, where they could remain in ſafety, and be
provided with all the neceſſary ſtores and ſubſiſtence: whereas he,
on the contrary, had no magazines in the country; nor could he
form any, having the enemy in front, and their ſtrong places be
hind him; ſo that he muſt neceſſarily fall back, and approach the
frontiers of Bohemia; from whence only his numerous army could
be nouriſhed. For theſe reaſons, inſtead of fatiguing his troops in
a vain purſuit of the enemy, he direéted his march towards Breſlaw;
hoping, no doubt, to take that place before the enemy could come
near it, being in itſelf very weak, and moreover had then an in
confiderable garriſon.
BEING arrived on the Schweidnitzwaſſer, a ſmall river within
three miles of Breſlaw, he found the enemy had anticipated him,
and was encamped, about two miles off, between him and that
town. Theſe circumſtances made it neceſſary to concert new mea
fures. His royal highneſs could not poſſibly continue long in that
fituation, as well for want of ſubſiſtence, as becauſe the winter
was growing ſharp, and would ſoon make it impoſſible for him to
keep.
"I-I-O - IH Is To R Y of the WAR

keep the field; nor could he preſume to ſeparate his army in the
middle, of an enemy's country, where they had an army, and all
the ſtrong places, in their power. It ſeemed likewiſe rather diſ.
honourable to retire into Bohemia without having attempted any
thing, and ſo loſe the fruits of their paſt labours; and the more ſo,
as his army was much ſuperior to that of the enemy already, and,
beſides, his royal highneſs expected a conſiderable body of Bavarians
and Wurtemburgers, who were on their march, to join him. Theſe
motives made him determine to undertake the ſiege of ſome fortreſs,
that he might have a place of arms in the enemy's country, and
put part, at leaſt, of his army in it, with ſafety, during the win
ter, and ſo be enabled to enter it the enſuing campaign without
difficulty; and, having the neceſſary ſtores and proviſions in this
place, proſecute the war with more eaſe and ſafety than hitherto
had been done.
This reſolution being taken, the next object was, to fix upon
the place that would beſt anſwer the end they had in view:
Neiſs, being near the frontiers of Moravia, could be attacked with
more facility than any other; becauſe they could be ſupplied with
every thing neceſſary for ſuch an undertaking from Olmutz, and
the taking of it would ſecure a paſſage into Upper Sileſia; and,
beſides, they would, the enſuing campaign, from thence attack the
country of Glatz with more eaſe than from any other place what
ever. To this it was objećted, that Neiſs was at ſuch a diſtance, that
the army could not arrive there 'till the ſeaſon would be too far
advanced to carry on the ſiege without infinite pains, and probably
without ſucceſs; and the more ſo, as the duke of Bevern could be
there with his army long before them, and take ſuch a poſition as
would effectually cover the place; and laſtly, that, though they
ſhould take it, the advantage that would accrue from it was tri
fling; becauſe they would get ſcarce any part of the country with
it,
 in G E R MAN y, 1757. III.

it, while the enemy had Koſel, Brieg, and Glatz, all about it; and
that it only covered Moravia, leaving Bohemia quite open to the
enemy. *

It was next propoſed to attack the enemy before Breſlaw : if

they beat him, not only that fortreſs would fall, but they would.
be at liberty to attack any place in Upper Sileſia; which, being
left to their own weak garriſons, would ſoon be reduced: by this
means the whole Auſtrian army, covered by theſe places, could.
with ſafety be ſeparated, and put into winter quarters. This pro
poſition was very plauſible, but thought dangerous; becauſe, in .
caſe they did not ſucceed in this attempt, it would be extreamly
difficult to retire into Bohemia, from whence they were ſeparated.
by many high mountains, and had very bad roads to paſs through 5.
and, moreover, the town of Schweidnitz, with a ſtrong garriſon
in it, behind them. Theſe reaſons being well weighed, it was re
ſolved to attack Schweidnitz, preferable to the two others above
mentioned; becauſe they would be maſters of the principal defiles
which lead to Bohemia on that ſide, and of all the towns and vil
lages behind Schweidnitz; which would enable them to keep the
greateſt part of the army in Sileſia during the winter; and, more
over, if they took it without great loſs of time, they could then,
with ſafety, attack the duke of Bevern, having a place to retire to
in caſe of misfortune, or undertake ſome other enterprize. .
Accor DING LY, general Nadaſti, with a very confiderable corps,
was ſent to beſiege Schweidnitz; where he was joined by the Ba
varians and Wurtemburgers. This town lies in a fine plain, about .
three miles diſtant from the mountains which ſeparate Sileſia from
Bohemia, is rich and populous : originally, when it firſt came into ,
the power of the Pruſſians, during the preceding war, it was ſur
rounded only by an cid wall, with round towers, in the Gothic
tranner; but his majcſiy, conſidering the advantageous ſituation of
15, ,
 II 2 His To R Y of the WA;
it, as well to facilitate any projects he might hereafter form againſt
Bohemia, as to cover Sileſia, reſolved to fortify it: accordingly,
on the concluſion of that war, he ordered ſeveral redoubts, called
ſtar redoubts, becauſe they reſemble a ſtar, to be built about it:
theſe were joined by a curtain ; and in the intervals, between the
redoubts, were placed ſome ſmall lunettes, or half moons: the
whole covered by a ditch, with a covered way palliſaded.
i. Of all the ſpecies of works uſed in fortification, the ſtarry re
doubt is the worſt; becauſe, by the nature of its conſtruction, it
can have no flank; and the re-entering angles take up ſo much of
the ground within, that they cannot contain the number of men
and artillery ſufficient to defend them; and are, moreover, expoſed
to be enfiladed from one end to the other; ſo that it is impoſſible
they ſhould make any conſiderable defence, when properly attacked.
GENERAL Nadaſti ordered two true attacks, and one falſe one,
to be made ; and the trenches were opened in the night of the 27th
of Oétober; and, a breach having been made in three of theſe re
doubts, the 11th at night, they were carried by aſſault; which
forced the governor to capitulate the next morning. The garriſon,
conſiſting of 4 generals, and about 6000 men, were made priſoners
of war : a vaſt quantity of proviſions, artillery, and ſtores, were
found in the place, and 300,ooo florins. -

DURING all this time, prince Charles, and the duke of Bevern,
remained quiet in their camps by Breſlaw ; the firſt to cover the
fiege of Schweidnitz, and the other to fortify his camp; becauſe
he did not dare quit it, and march to relieve Schweidnitz, for fear
of loſing Breſlaw, and be hemmed in between the prince's army,
and that before Schweidnitz. -

PRINCE Charles, having ſucceeded to his wiſh, in his under

taking againſt that place, was encouraged to attack the enemy,
- though now very ſtrongly fortified; and, therefore, general Nadaſti
WaS -
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757, I I3
was ordered to come and join the main army with that under his
command. Accordingly, that general arrived on the 19th, and
encamped on the right, as marked in the plan. The two following
days were taken up in making the neceſſary preparations for the
attack. Every thing being ready, on the 22d in the morning, the
battle begun; of which we give here the different relations, as
publiſhed by authority; which, with our refle&tions on the ground
and the action, will be ſufficient to give a clear idea of it.
THAT publiſhed at Vienna is as follows:
“THE imperial and royal army was encamped, with the right
at Strachwitz, and the left at Groffmaſſelwitz, in two lines,
&4
and a reſerve. The grenadiers were poſted at Groſſmochber,
&&
to cover the right wing ; and ſome regiments of infantry at
tº a
Kleinmaſſelwitz, to cover the left. The army under general
&g
Nadaſti ſtood on our right, beyond Operau, on the left of the
-«
Lohe, with ſome light troops at Hartlieb, on the other ſide of
&a

&&
it. The Pruſſian army was likewiſe poſted in two lines; the
‘ infantry in the firſt, and the cavalry in the ſecond; both ex
&4
tending from Coſel to Kleinmochber, and from thence, in a
4.
ſtrait line, towards Breſlaw ; ſo that it formed a half ſquare,
&4
with the angle at Kleinmochber: but, when they perceived our
&4
diſpoſitions, they changed their poſition, and that part of the
4g
army which extended from Kleinmochber towards Breſlaw, was
46
ordered to advance towards the Lohe, and occupy ſome hills,
4&
as well as the villages of Kleinburg and Kreitern, in order to
4&
make a front againſt general Nadaſti. They were covered by
-«
the Lohe, which is not broad, but the banks of it are very
44
marſhy; and had thrown up a great many redoubts and re
trenchments. Their right wing was covered by an abatis, or -

parapet of trees cut down; behind which they had poſted their
Q “ h; nters
-
--
1 I 4. H is to Ry of the WA r
“ hunters or markſmen, and ſix battalions of grenadiers, to cover
“ their right flank, The village of Pilſnitz, through which the
“ Lohe paſſes, was well fortified with redoubts, before and behind
“ it, which preſented continually ſome new defence. The ſame
“ was done at the villages of Schmiedfeld, Hoflichen, Klein
cº
mochber, and Grabiſchen, with breaſtworks, ditches, and three
“ rows of wolf-holes;* ſo that it was almoſt impoſſible to paſs.
“ them. Beſides theſe works, there were likewiſe, between and,
“ behind the villages, other redoubts and batteries, with parapets,.
“ as far as the ſuburbs of the town. On the other ſide the Oder.
“ they had put ſome infantry in the villages of Protſch, Weida,
“ Hunnern, Simſdorff, and Roſenthal; and ſome cavalry between.
“ the villages. Upon the left wing they had moreover two re--
“giments of Huſſars.
“Such was the ſituation of both armies: the Auſtrian amounted:
“ to 60,000 men, and the Pruſſian to about 40,0co.
“ IN conſequence of the meaſures concerted between his royal
“ highneſs and his excellency marſhal Daun, batteries were raiſed.
“ the 21ſt at night, the pontoons brought near the places where:
“ the bridges were to be laid, and all the other neceſſary prepa
“ rations for paſſing the river and attacking the enemy's works:
“ being compleated, the army marched the 22d, before day, and
“ was formed, in two lines, on the banks of the Lohe 3. the firſt.
“ was compoſed of infantry, and the other of cavalry. The bag
“gage was ſent back behind the Schweidnitz, and the ſurgeons.
“ ordered to follow the army, and to ſtay at certain places, where:
“ the wounded were to be brought. -

“THE 22d, the day appointed for the attack, there was a great
* fog, which prevented us from ſeeing the enemy's diſpoſitions.
- && At;

* Round holes, generally about two feet in diameter at the top, one at the bottom, and
ačar two deep.
------------ ---------- *.**
 in G E R MAN Y, T, 757. - *,;
te At nine in the morning we raiſed four batteries, in which 4o
<<
pieces of cannon were placed, which played on the villages of
sº
Pilſnitz, Schmiedfeld, Hoflichen, Kleinmochber and Grabiſchen,
*&
and the redoubts, 'till 12 o'clock. In the mean while, the fog
gº
began to diffipate ; upon which we advanced to lay the bridges
-- c.
over the river; and, in leſs than three quarters of an hour, ſeven
*&
were made in the enemy's preſence, and under their fire.
“ His royal highneſs and M. Daun were at Groſſmochber, and
&g
the ſignal agreed upon being, given by their orders, general
Sprecher, who had under his orders major general Richlin,
advanced with 35 companies of grenadiers, ſuſtained by 12 com
panies of horſe grenadiers, commanded by prince Lowenſtein,
and paſſed the bridge by Groſſmochber. Theſe troops were
ſupported by the right wing of the firſt line of infantry, under
the command of lieutenant general Andlau, and major generals
duke of Urſel, and baron Unrhue; and, moreover, by the corps
de reſerve, commanded by lieutenant generals count Wied, and
Nicholas Eſterhaſi, and major generals Blonquet, Wolf, and
Otterwolf; and, laſtly, by the right wing of the ſecond line,
commanded by lieutenant generals Minulph, count Stahrem
berg, and major generals Wulfen, and Buttler.
“At the ſame time and place, count Lucheſ, general of horſe,
gº
and lieutenant generals Spada, and Wolwart, and major generals
4&
Deville, Kolbel, and Aſpremont, with the right wing of the
*&
firſt line of horſe, likewiſe paſſed. All theſe troops formed, in
*&
two lines, on the other ſide the Lohe, untier the fire of the
4&
enemy's artillery, and attacked their cavalry and infantry
*g
that were advancing. At 1 o'clock the fire of the ſmall arms
&4
began, and laſted very hot, and in good order, about half an
4&
hour, without being able to force either ſide to cede an inch.
Q_2 ** At
I 16 History of the WAR
&
At laſt, the enemy's horſe and foot were obliged to give way:
64.
upon which our infantry took the village of Grabiſchen, and
&4
the great battery behind it. Our troops advanced ſtill forwards
&&.
to the retrenchment by Kleinmochber; and, though the enemy
&4
had ſent there both infantry and artillery, they were, however,
&4
drove further back. -

“ The next attack was commanded by lieutenant general count

&4
Arberg, and under him major general Lacy, and was ſuſtained,
&4
by the infantry, commanded by lieutenant general Macquire,
and by the left wing of the ſecond line of horſe, commanded by
6&
count Stambach, general of horſe. This column was to attack.
gº
the villages of Schmiedfeld and Hoflichen; and, at 3 o'clock
<&
paſſed the Lohe. Counts Arberg and Macquire attacked the
&4
redoubts by Schmiedfeld, and, after a moſt bloody combat, drove
«&
the enemy out of them. At the ſame time, count Wied, who
4 &
commanded the reſerve, advanced againſt Hoflichen; and, not
&4
withſtanding it was covered by breaſtworks, ditches, and wolf
4&
holes, he took it, as well as the redoubt that was near it.
“ THE third attack againſt Pilſnitz was more violent, and laſted,
& 4
longer than any of the others. This village is cut in two by
& 4
the Lohe, whoſe banks are very high here, and the ground.
*&
all about is very cloſe and difficult to be paſſed; and, beſides;.
4&
the entry and the iſſue out of it were covered by redoubts.
4&
General Keuhl, with the left wing of infantry, ſuſtained by the
- «
left wing of the ſeeond line of horſe, commanded by count.
Serbelloni, was ordered to attack this village, and the neigh
&c.
bouring works ; but, by the difficulty of the ground, the
4&
ſtrength of the works, and the bravery of the enemy, he was
repulſed, with great loſs, three ſeveral times. At laſt, however,
$4.
though it was now near ſix o'clock, and quite dark, he re
&g.
newed the attack with ſo much courage and bravery, that the
- “ enemy,
 in GERMANY., 1757, 17.
º
enemy was forced to give way, and abandon ſucceſſively the
º
village and the redoubts.
“We thought that, with the day, the battle was likewiſe at
&4.
an end. The enemy, however, appeared again, and a columa
44;
advanced againſt Kleinmochber, endeavouring to come on the
&&.
flank of the archduke Joſeph's and Leopold's regiments of horſe:
&4.
Theſe being ſuſtained by fix companies of grenadiers, poſted in
&&
the redoubts, commanded by general Sprecher, made ſuch good
&g
manoeuvres, as kept the enemy at a diſtance, till prince Charles's
&4.
regiment of foot, and Lucheſi's regiment of horſe, had time to
gº
come up, which obliged them to retire for good and all.
“ Not far from Pilſnitz, on the right of the Lohe, the enemy
&4.
had a great abatis, which reached quite to the Oder. Colone!
&4
Brentano, with his Croats, ſuſtained by Looo men of regular
&4
infantry, was ordered to attack it. He had the good fortune
g4.
to ſucceed, and paſs it ; but, as we had not then got poſſeſſion
44.
of Pilſnitz, he was forced to retire with ſome loſs. Soon after,
&4
however, he renewed the attack; and, as our left wing was
44.
then advanced to Pilſnitz, he paſſed the abatis,. and threw the
44
enemy into no ſmall confuſion.
“ MAJoR general Beck, with a conſiderable corps, was ſent
*&
over the Oder; and, having drove the enemy out of ſeveral vil
<&
lages they occupied, he cannonaded the enemy's right wing;
over the Oder, at Coſel, in flank and rear. - -

“WHAT we have hitherto related was performed by the army

which had always remained in this neighbourhood during the
fiege of Schweidnitz. Befides theſe ſeveral.attacks, general Na
daſti, with the army he had commanded at the above ſiege,
(excepting a few battalions) and reinforced by four regiments
of horſe, was ordered to divide his troops in three columns,
at the head of which were the grenadiers, ſuſtained by battalions.
“- and
 I 18 H1's To R Y of the war
&&
and brigades, and having paſſed the Lohe, to attack the ene
& 4
my's left wing, that was poſted againſt him. Accordingly, he
g&
occupied the village of Hartlieb the 21ſt, which the enemy
*&
held with infantry and cavalry; and, on the 22d, at break of
4&
day, he paſſed the Lohe, and formed his army with the right
*&
at Oltaſchin, and the left towards Kreitern, where the artillery
of reſerve was likewiſe poſted. The enemy, whoſe cavalry ex
tended on the plains of Durjahn, endeavoured to take our corps
in the flank, which the good diſpoſitions of general Nadaſti
prevented.
“ In the mean time, general Wolferſdorff, with 16 companies
x&
of grenadiers, attacked the village of Kleinburg, drove the ene
4 &
my out of it, took one cannon, and advanced to Woiſchwitz.
&&
The Saxon light horſe, who were on the right, were preparing
4&
to advance; but, the evening coming on, and the enemy's horſe
&©
being advantageouſly poſted on a hill, behind ſome redoubts,
4&
general Nadaſti thought it would be needleſs to attempt any
4&
thing farther. -

“ DURING this time, the enemy attacked Kleinburg with ſeven

4&
battalions, and ſome cavalry; and, having put it on fire, retired
& 4
on the hills behind the redoubts; where they continued 'till
.& 6
they found that the reſt of their army was retiring ; then they
& c.
followed them, and paſſed the Oder, through Breſlaw. We
& c.
have taken 36 pieces of cannon, and about 6oo men priſoners,
44
with above 3ooo deſerters.”
THE Pruſſians account of this battle is very little exact; parti
cularly where it ſays, that the Auſtrian's right wing had not only
been repulſed, but that it quitted the field, and retired to Neu
mark, many miles off, which is both falſe and ridiculous. It is
as follows:

“WHEN
 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. T 1 9.

“When the Auſtrians had taken Schweidnitz, and the corps.

* employed in that fiege had joined the main army at Liſſa, they
“ reſolved to attack the prince of Bevern's corps before the king
“could come to ſuccour him. They knew that, in ſpite of
“Marſhall's and Haddick's corps, he had already paſſed through
“ Luſatia. Accordingly, on the 22d of November, the attack
“ was made, at nine in the morning. The enemy's army was, at
“ leaſt, three times ſtronger than ours, as appears by the gazettes
“ they have often publiſhed: and general Nadaſti had a particu
“ lar corps oppoſite the flank of our left wing. The attack ſuc
“ ceeded ſo ill to the Auſtrians, that their right wing was totally
“ defeated, and forced to retire towards Neumark. Lieutenant
“general Ziethen, who commanded our left wing, likewiſe en
4.
“ tirely defeated Nadaſti's corps, and the enemy thought the bat
“ the loſt; having been forced, in moſt places, to fly ; but, as on
“our right ſome of our regiments had ſomewhat ſuffered, the
“ prince of Bevern thought it beſt to quit the field of battle,
“ which we had kept till 5 o'clock, and retire into our camp,.
“ and the following night to paſs the Oder, over the bridge that:
“ is in the town of Breſlaw. The Auſtrians, finding that every
“thing was abandoned as far as Breſlaw, returned, and occupied,
“ the field of battle; which, to their great aſtoniſhment, we had
“ quitted. Our loſs is midling: that of the Auſtrians, according.
“ to accounts worthy of credit, amounts to above 20, ooo men.
“The 23d we remained behind Breſlaw. The 24th, the duke.
“ of Bevern rode out at 4 o'clock in the morning, with one ſer
“ vant only, in order to reconnoitre the enemy, and fell in with
“ ſome of their advanced poſts, who made him priſoner. The
&4
ſame day, having waited in vain the duke's return, lieutenant.
º
general Kyow took upon him the command of the army. Ge
6&
neral Leſtewitz, who, by the king's orders, was left commander
- * off
*-- - -- - -
Y2C, His To Ry of the WAR

“ of Breſlaw, could not poſſibly defend long ſo extenſive a place,

“ and ſo ill fortified, againſt ſuch a confiderable army as that of
“ the enemy ; and ſo he muſt be content to have leave to re
“ tire, with his garriſon, and the fick we had left in Breſlaw, to
“ Glogau.”
THE Auſtrians loſt in this action 666, among which one gene
ral, killed: 4620, of which five generals, wounded: 437 miſſing:
and about 4oo horſes killed, wounded, and loſt.
No account appeared of the loſs of the Pruſſians.

R E F L E c T I o N s on the battle of Breſlaw, and the

preceding operations.
IT has been already obſerved, that there is, in every camp, ſome
one eſſential point, or hinge, which may be called the key of it,
and on which the ſtrength of it moſt immediately depends: the
ſame holds good as to poſitions. In a whole country there may
not, perhaps, be one found which will enable a general to obtain
his ends. The choice of this point, with regard to poſitions, de
pends entirely on, and muſt be regulated by, the objećt he has in
view ; by the ſituation of his magazines; and by the number and
ſpecies of his troops; that he may not only have a good poſition,
but likewiſe a good field of battle, in caſe he is attacked. -

The duke of Bevern had two obječts in view: the firſt and
principal one was to cover Sileſia; and particularly Breſlaw,
Schweidnitz, and Neiſs ; againſt which alone the enemy could
dire&t their operations: the other objećt was only ſecondary, and
of much leſs conſequence; and was to keep open a communication
with the Elbe, as well to act in concert with the king in Saxony,
as becauſe he drew his ſubſiſtence chiefly from Dreſden. The
camp he had taken at Bernſtadtel, though a little too far back,
anſwered, in ſome meaſure, theſe ends: he could be on the Elbe,
OT
 in G E R M A NY, 1757. I2+

or in Sileſia, ſooner than the enemy, by marching on his right,

by Löbau and Bautzen; or on his left, by Lauban and Löwenberg,
and ſo on to Schweidnitz or Breſlaw. The only inconveniency of
this poſition, was, that the enemy, being much ſuperior, could
ſend ſtrong corps towards Bautzen, and thereby render his convoys,
coming from the Elbe, precarious. This, however, might have
been remedied by occupying Bautzen with a conſiderable detach
ment of cavalry, and ſome light infantry, and poſting another of
the ſame ſpecies about Löbau ; which would have formed a chain
from his right quite to the Elbe ; ſo that he might, and, as we
think, ought to have kept this poſition as long as poſſible; which
would have ſtopped the progreſs of the enemy. -

INSTEAD of which, he abandoned it, and took another, ſtill

farther back, on the Landſcron, near Görlitz: the conſequence
of which was, that he inſtantly loſt his communication with the
Elbe, and rendered that with Sileſia very difficult; nor could he
remain in his preſent ſituation for want of ſubſiſtence: he might,
however, ſtill have anticipated the enemy's march into Sileſia, and
towards Breſlaw and Schweidnitz, if, inſtead of marching by
Langenau, Naumburg, Buntzlaw, IHainau, and Lignitz, he had
marched by Lauban, Löwenberg, Goldberg, al.d Jauer; which
the king did, the year following, after the battle of Hochkirchen,
in much more difficult circumſtances: for the whole Auſtrian army
was encamped on the Landſcron, within fight; yet he paſſed the
Neiſs and Queiſs, and, in ſpite of the enemy, went into Upper
Sileſia, and raiſed the fiege of Neiſs. If, therefore, the prince of
Bevern had taken this route, and even gone to Liebenthal, between
Greiffenberg and Löwenberg, with a ſtrong corps on the right of
the Queiſs, between Markliffa and Grieffenberg, it would have
been impoſſible for the enemy to advance one ſtep farther: they
could not paſs between his left and thoſe immenſe mountains,
R …” called
1 22 H is To R Y of the WAR

called the Rieſengeburg, having no road; much leſs could they

march on his right, towards Löwenberg and Lignitz, leaving him
maſter of thoſe immenſe defiles and mountains which ſeparated
them from Bohemia, from whence only they could draw their ſub
fiſtence, without expoſing their army to certain deſtruction. They
muſt, therefore, either ſtop ſhort, or come to an action; which
he could accept, much to his advantage, in that ſtrong camp of
Liebenthal, or decline it, and retire ſucceſſively to Lahn and Jauer,
and laſtly to Striegau and Schweidnitz. In all which places there
are ſuch camps to be taken, as cannot eaſily be forced. The coun
try is extremely cloſe, and therefore numbers are of little uſe, be
cauſe they cannot be all brought to action: whereas, by taking
the march he did, he left that very road open which he ought to
have taken, and by that means gave the enemy an opportunity to
anticipate him ; ſo that, on his arrival at Lignitz, he found they had
taken a poſition between that town and Jauer, and by that means
cut him off from Schweidnitz, Neiſs, Breſlaw, and all Upper Si
leſia. Indeed he got afterwards to Breſlaw, but this ought to be
attributed to his extraordinary good fortune, that the enemy com
mitted a greater fault than he had done. Being arrived at Breſlaw,
we think he ought to have drawn the principal effects and ſtores
out of it, and ſent them to Glogau, and have gone with his army
to Schweidnitz, where the enemy muſt have followed him; be
cauſe they could not keep Breſlaw, even if they had taken it while
he was maſter of Schweidnitz, and of the defiles which lead into
Bohemia; nor could they force him, by any manoeuvre, to aban
don that town, and the neighbourhood; nor, ſuppoſing they were
maſters of Breſlaw, could they put their army into winter quarters,
while he was in poſſeſſion of a chain of fortreſſes behind them,
and had an army between them and their own country, with
which they could not have the leaſt communication, not even with
the
 in GERMANY., 1757. 1 23

the capital; ſo that they muſt neceſſarily be forced to quit Sileſia,

and endeavour to gain Bohemia; which was by no means an eaſy
undertaking; becauſe, as we have ſaid, they were ſeparated from
that country by an enemy's army, and three ſtrong fortreſſes, as
Schweidnitz, Glatz, and Neiſs, on the very defiles where they
muſt paſs; and, in which, in all human probability, their army,
in that advanced ſeaſon, and harraſſed by the enemy, would have
periſhed. By ſtaying at Breſlaw, and ſuffering Schweidnitz to be
taken, he gave prince Charles an opportunity to take firſt a poſt in
the country, and by that means enabled him to proſecute his ad
vantages with ſecurity; which brought on the loſs of the battle
of Breſlaw, and with it Breſlaw itſelf; and might, if theſe advan
tages had been properly improved, occaſioned that of all Sileſia.
WHENEveR the Auſtrians attempt any thing againſt that coun
try, by the way of Luſatia, the Pruſſians may, we think, by
taking the above poſitions, even with an inconfiderable army,
effectually ſtop their progreſs. :

As to the condućt of the aëtion of Breſlaw, we think that the

Pruſſians, to the many works, which, during ſeven weeks, they
had raiſed, ſhould have added an inundation, if poſſible, by means
of the Lohe. This would have effectually covered them. The
choice of the camp does not appear to have been well made ;
becauſe the left wing and its flank were not ſo ſtrong as the front;
ſo that, if the enemy had made the principal attack where Nadaſti

was, the Pruſſians muſt have abandoned their ſtrong camp, and
loſe the fruits of their long labours, in order to make a front
where Ziethen ſtood; and, moreqver, if the enemy ever got poſ
Kleinburg and Grabiſchen, the whole
ſeſſion of the hills behind
Pruſſian army would have been hemmed in between the Lohe and
the Oder, with general Beck in their rear on the other ſide, and
the enemy in front, without ſufficient ground to manoeuvre upon ;
- - R 2 and,
 I. 24. H1's To Ry of the WAR
and, in ſuch circumſtances, it would have been difficult even to.
get into Breſlaw. It would, I think, have been better to place the
right on the town of Breſlaw, and occupy the villages that were.
near and under the protećtion of it. The left ſhould have been
extended to the hills by Kleinburg and Grabiſchen, which ought
to have been fortified with care, and redoubts raiſed all along the
front, from right to left. The army, ſo poſted, could not, we
think, have been forced at all; nor could the town be attacked
while it was there. When the enemy paſſed the Lohe at Groſſ
mochber, we think that general Ziethen, inſtead of extending his
left, ſhould, on the contrary, have lengthened his right as far as
Grabiſchen, with his infantry and all the heavy artillery on the hill.
it, and his cavalry at the bottom of it; and the prince of Bevern's
diviſion ſhould have cloſed its left with the right of this. By which
means, the enemy, who had paſſed the Lohe there, would have
been taken in flank, whether they attacked Gräbiſchen or Klein
. .” mochber: whereas, by the diſpoſitions made, there was an inter
val between Ziethen's right, and the prince of Bevern's left, where.
the enemy entered, and met with no other difficulty than that at
Kleinmochber. This interval was the key of the camp; and, the
inſtant the enemy got poſſeſſion of it, the prince of Bevern could
not continue where he was, though he had been vićtorious on
his right and center; becauſe, being maſters of this interval,
if they reinforced that attack, which they might have done, they
were on his flank, and would ſucceſſively have puſhed him into
the Oder: whereas, if he repulſed the enemy here, the battle was
won ; becauſe, though they ſucceeded in their attacks at Pilſnitz:
and Schmiedfeld, they could not continue in that ground between:
the Lohe, the Oder, and his army, with Breſlaw juſt before them;.
and muſt, therefore, have abandoned thoſe villages, and repaſs the .
Lohe,
THE
 in GERMANY., 1757. I 23

The event confirms my opinion: for the enemy had got no

very great advantage on the right and center; yet it was neceſſary
to retire, becauſe they had taken Grabiſchen and Kleinmochber,
and were, conſequently, on prince Bevern's flank; and might, if
he continued in the ſame poſition, cut him off from Breſlaw, and
throw him into the Oder. - -

As to the condućt of prince Charles, it ſeems to have been no

leſs prudent than vigorous. By ſending two corps on the enemy's
flank, he forced them to quit their ſtrong camp on the Landſcron,
and go farther down, in order to paſs the Neiſs and Queiſs; which
was an eſſential advantage to him, becauſe he had, by that means,
a nearer road than they to Breſlaw and Schweidnitz. When his
royal highneſs came to Lignitz, we think he ſhould have attacked
the enemy; and, if that was thought dangerous, he ſhould have
ſent 20,000 men to beſiege Breſlaw, then defended by a very weak
garriſon; and, with the remainder of the army, have covered the
fiege; which he could eaſily have done, being ſtill very much ſupe
rior to the enemy, who could not poſſibly approach Breſlaw, with
out previouſly coming to an action.
WHEN the prince of Bevern quitted Lignitz, and marched
towards Steinau, on the Oder, prince Charles ſhould have ſent
a ſtrong corps after him, and with the army have gone to Dyher
renfurth ; and there throw as many bridges as poſſible over the
Oder, in order to be on either fide, as circumſtances might, require.
By this means he could cover the ſiege of Breſlaw, and effectually.
hinder the enemy from diſturbing it. Why he permitted the
prince of Bevern to march near twenty leagues, and paſs the Oder
twice, and come to Breſlaw before him, while he had only ten
leagues to march, and no river to paſs, is what cannot eaſily be
conceived. As to the condućt of the aëtion itſelf, it does not ſeem
to have been intirely prudent and blameleſs. The three attacks
were made preciſely againſt the ſtrongeſt part of the enemy's camp,
and.
1 26 IH Is To R Y of the WAR
and were, moreover, expoſed to great difficulties in paſſing the
Lohe under the fire of their works: whereas, if his royal highneſs
had only made a falſe attack on the enemy's center and right, and
have poſted his left by Neukirchen, with ſome heavy artillery and
haubitz near it, and have paſſed his line by Groſſmochber, between
Operau and the Lohe, where the bridges muſt have been laid, and
Nadaſti's left quite cloſe to the prince's right, ſo as to form a kind
of curve about the enemy, as marked in the plan, he would have
avoided the villages and works, in which the enemy placed the
greateſt hopes, and the difficulties that muſt occur in paſſing a river
ſo near them; and, moreover, would have forced them to abandon
theſe very works, in order to take a new poſition, with their right
on the Lohe, and their left towards the hills behind Kleinburg,
which would have expoſed it to be enfiladed from one end to the
other, by the artillery placed at Neukirchen and Groſſmochber.
When the enemy's right and center quitted their ground, as
they muſt have done, nothing could hinder the light troops from
occupying it, and taking them in the rear. For all which rea
ſons, I think, the Auſtrians ſhould have made their attack where
Nadaſti was, by which they would have avoided all thoſe great
difficulties they met with. Even, if this general, inſtead of ex
tending his right, had ſtretched his left ſo as to cloſe with the
right of the army which paſſed at Groſſmochber, and have acted
with his uſual vigour, it is probable the Pruſſian army was loſt,
and thrown into the Oder. -

THE immediate conſequence of this battle was the taking of

Breſlaw, with about 300,ooo florins, and a prodigious quantity of
ſtores in it. -

THE Auſtrians, thinking the campaign finiſhed, were preparing

to enter into winter quarters; when news came, that the king, at
the head of a confiderable body of troops, was advancing towards
Sileſia.
 in G E R MAN Y, 1757. 127

Sileſia. Upon which all thoughts of ſeparating the army were laid
aſide, and proper meaſures taken to go and oppoſe the enemy.
With this view, colonel Bulow, with about 3000 men, was ſent
to occupy Lignitz, in hopes, by that means, to ſtop the king for
ſome time; as it was thought he would paſs near that place.
Prince Charles, having reſolved to go and meet the enemy, paſſed
the Schweidnitz on the 4th of December, intending to advance
further on towards Glogau ; but the arrival of the enemy, the day
following, prevented it, and occaſioned a general action, near Liſſa:
of which we ſhall, as uſual, give the different accounts, as pub
liſhed by authority.
THAT of the Auſtrians is as follows:
“THE king of Pruſſia, having quitted Saxony, and paſſed
“ through Luſca, he arrived, with a conſiderable corps, at
“ Parchwitz, on the Oder, where he was joined by the army
“ which had been under the command of the prince of Bevern;
“which, with what he had conducted, amounted to 4O,Ooo men,
“ provided with a fine train of artillery, faſcines, gabions, &c.
“ and, having paſſed the Katzbach, it was eaſy to foreſee that his
intentions were to take Neumark and Lignitz; and then, either
attack the imperial army before Breſlaw, or march to Striegau.
and the frontiers of Bohemia, in order to cut off our communi
&t
cation with that country. /

44
“For which reaſons, it was reſolved by his royal highneſs
prince Charles, and his excellency M. Daun, with the unanimous
“
conſent of all the generals, to advance, and paſs the Schweidnitz.
&6.

“
without delay, and ſo ſecure Lignitz; and, above all things,
44.
endeavour to fruſtrate the deſigns of the enemy. Accordingly,
4&
the garriſon of Lignitz was reinforced, and a large corps of
Bannaliſts, huſſars and picquets of horſe, ſuſtained by the Saxon
“light horſe, were ſent to Neumark.
** THE
1 28 His to R Y of the WAR
<< THE army, having been provided on the 3d of December,
& G.
for four days, with every thing neceſſary, and prepared for all
&&
events, broke up the 4th in the morning, and paſſed the Lohe
« .
and the Schweidnitz, in order to cncamp there. While it was
< &
filing over the bridges, advice was brought, that the king of
&&
Pruſſia had quitted Parchwitz the 4th in the morning, and was
« .
advanced to Neumark, from whence he had forced our troops
c&
to retire. Upon which the baggage was ſent back behind the
&4
Schweidnitz, and the columns ordered to haſten their march,
gº
that the army might be formed; which was accordingly done,
in two lines. General Nadaſti, with the corps under his com
&4
mand, made a third, which was deſigned to cover the flank of
&4
the left wing; and the corps de reſerve that of the right. The
&4
army was poſted with the right at Nypern, the left at Leuthen,
&4
and the center at Frobelwitz: all theſe villages were occupied
&&
with infantry, and provided with artillery. In Frobelwitz were
&4

eight companies of granadiers, with many picquets: in Leuthen

4. &
ſeven companies of granadiers, with ſeveral picquets: and ſeve
4&
ral picquets alſo in Nypern. All the companies of granadiers,
4 &
and the picquets of the reſerve, were poſted on the right of the
4&
cavalry, at the point of a wood that joined it.
“ General Lufinſki, with two regiments of huſſars, and ſome
4 &
granitzers, ſuſtained by the Saxon light horſe, commanded by
&&
count Noſtitz, was poſted ſo as to cover the left wing ; and
4 4

general Morocz, with two regiments of huſſars, and ſome gra

4&

nitzers, on the right, for the ſame purpoſe. Whilſt we were

& c.
making theſe diſpoſitions, the enemy advanced on this ſide Neu
44

& 4
mark, with his right at Krintſch, and the left at Biſchdorff,
with his forepoſts at Borna. In this ſituation both armies con
4&
tinued under arms the whole night. The 5th in the morning,
before day, general Nadaſti, whoſe corps had made a third line,
“ went,
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. 129

went, as had been concerted, and poſted himſelf near the ca

4
• valry of the left wing, and extended his troops to a hill, that
“ was on the fide, upon which ſome artillery was placed, and an
“ abatis made before it. The Auſtrians under his command
“were next the left of the army, and the Wurtemburgers and
“Bavarians came to be on the flank, and behind the abatis.
“ At break of day, the enemy made ſeveral motions, ſometimes
“ to the right, and ſometimes to the left, which laſted 'till 12
“ o'clock; and it appeared he intended to attack the right wing
“ of the imperial army; inſomuch that general Lucheſ, who
“commanded there, ſent ſeveral times to demand ſuccours. The
“reſerve was deſtined for that purpoſe; yet the ſending of it
“was poſtponed ’till the enemy's intentions were fully known :
“but, as the count repeated his inſtances, and the enemy's mo
“tions behind the hills not being diſcovered, the reſerve was ſent
“ him, and M. Daun went there himſelf, in order to be at hand
“in caſe of need. Scarce had the reſerve marched, when the
“enemy's cavalry appeared on our left; which ſhewed they pro
“poſed attacking that wing, and the flank adjoining: upon which
“his royal highneſs and his excellency M. Daun ordered prince
“Eſterhafi, general of horſe, and generals Macquire and Angern,
“with the cavalry and infantry under their command, and all the
“ſecond line, to march and ſuſtain that flank. About 1 o'clock
“ the enemy approached it, and the fire of the ſmall arms began
“ againſt the Wurtembergers; which being very hot, forced them
“back in confuſion, leaving their artillery behind them ; which
&6brought the Bavarians, who formed the flank, likewiſe into
“confuſion. Theſe auxiliary troops immediately threw the other
“regiments of the Imperials in diſorder, and hindered thoſe that
“were coming to ſuſtain them from doing anything to the purpoſe.
“Every poſſible means was uſed to bring the troops into order,
S “ but
ºr go Hiſ sºr opy of the WAR

but in vain. During this time, the enemy attacked the village
gº.
of Leuthen, and the left wing of the army, and had brought
gº
there the greateſt part of his forces; but he was repulſed three
“ ſeveral times with great loſs; ſo that the vićtory was dubious
“ for a long while. At length, however, the Pruſſians penetrated
<< in the opening between the left wing and the flank, and ſo.
were in the rear of our army. We were forced to abandon.
& Gº
Leuthen, and retire towards the Schweidnitz and the Lohe.
This was executed in good order, and under a continual fire.
4-4.
In this manner the battle, which laſted from 1 o'clock 'tiſt.
gº five, finiſhed.” y -2
-
-- - *
THE Pruſſian's account is as follows:
“AFTER the battle of Roſbach, his majeſty turned his thoughts
towards Sileſia, in order to oppoſe vigorouſly the progreſs of
the Auſtrians. Accordingly, his majeſty, at the head of 33.
&&.
ſquadrons, and 19 battalions, quitted Leipfig the 12th of No
&4
vember, and arrived the 13th at Eulenberg, the 14th at Tor
&&.
gau, the 16th at Muhlberg, the 17th paſſed the Roder at
6&
Groffenhayn, where general Haddick had been with 2000 men,
6&
but was retired to Konigſbruck. He had left ſome huſſars be
<<
hind the Roder to obſerve us; but they were drove back by
4&
ours, who took about 40 priſoners. *

“ The 18th his majeſty marched by Polſnitz to Konigſbruck,

4.4
where the pandours under general Haddick ſtopped once more;
&&
whom he forced to retire towards the corps under general Mar
4&
ſhal, in Luſatia, who likewiſe retired towards Löbau, and ne
&4
ver appeared again during our whole march. The 20th his
<&
majeſty paſſed over the Black Elſter to Camenz; and the 21ſt
&4 over the Spree to Bautzen; from whence Marſhal's corps had;
&c.
retired towards Bohemia: the 22d his majeſty paſſed the Old
Spree, and went to Maltita; the 23d to Gorlitz; from whence:
w * Haddick's
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 in GERMAs y, 1757. 131
-*
Haddick's corps likewiſe retired towards Bohemia: the 24th
4&
he paſſed the Queiſs, and went to Naumburg in Sileſia; the
&g
26th to Deutmanſdorff; the 27th to Lobethau; and the 28th
&4
to Parchwitz; where we arrived at 6 o'clock in the evening,
&&
juſt
and there found the Auſtrian colonel Gerſdorff, who was
**
come with about 1 Ioo horſe and foot. His majeſty ordered
4&
him to be immediately attacked, and killed about 80 men, took
&4
150 priſoners, and diſperſed the reſt. The army paſſed the
4&
Katzbach, and remained ſome days at Parchwitz, to reſt after
&4
ſuch a ſtrong march. The 1ſt of December, the huſſars, be
44
longing to the army of prince Bevern, came to us; and the 2d
ºrg
that whole army joined ours. On the 4th we marched to Neu
&4
mark, where we found ſome thouſand Croats and huſſars, who
4&
kept the gate oppoſite to us ſhut, and endeavoured to get out
**
on the ſide of Breſlaw. In the mean while, ſome of our dra
<< goons and huſſars went about the town, and others opened the
&c
gate by force ; ſo that, having drove the enemy out, they fell
“
into the hands of thoſe who had gone on the other fide. We
&4
killed about 3oo, and took 6oo priſoners, with the bakery of
& 4
the whole army, a ſmall magazine, and two cannon. Here ad
4.
vice was brought, that prince Charles had quitted Breſlaw, and
gº
was advanced to Liſſa, with his right at Nypern, and his left at
&4
Golau, with the Schweidnitz behind him. His majeſty thought
“ proper to go and meet him; and therefore ordered the army to
“break up on the 5th, at 5 o'clock in the morning. At break of
“ day we diſcovered, on a hill behind the village of Borna, about
“half a mile from Neumark, a ſtrong corps of cavalry, which, in
“the twilight, was thought to be the enemy's whole army. Upon
“our approaching them, we found it was only two regiments of
“huffars, and the Saxon light horſe, commanded by general
Gº
Noſtitz. Our vanguard attacked them immediately; drove
S 2 “ them
 I 32 History of the WAR
gº
them back into their camp; and took 500 priſoners. We
&&
continued our march, in wet and thick weather, about four
&&
miles; and, near 12 o'clock, we diſcovered the enemy's whole
&&
army, in order of battle, behind the village of Leuthen. All
&&
the hills before their front were covered with artillery; and
gº
the left wing had, beſides a great hill with artillery upon it.
&©
an abatis likewiſe. The right had alſo a great many batteries
&&
before it. The king reſolved to attack the enemy's left, as
&&
ſoon as our army reached the heights before it. We marched on
&&
the right; ſo that our right wing came up to the Schweidnitz
&&
river. We firſt attacked the wood; and very ſoon drove the
&&
enemy's infantry out of it. When they perceived that we out
&&
winged them, and took them in flank, they were forced to
&&
change their poſition; and, as we were on their flank, they had
4&

nothing more to do, than to take the firſt new poſition they
&c.
could find, to hinder us from enfilading their army from one.
a &
wing to the other. They therefore ſent ſome brigades of in
& c.
fantry on the heights abovementioned, behind the wood : our
&4
right wing attacked it ; and, after an obſtinate combat, took.
4&
it. The enemy formed a new line by Leuthen, and defended.
4.4
themſelves with much bravery , but, at laſt, were forced to
4 &
give way. Here our cavalry of the right wing attacked that
&4
of the enemy, and defeated it. They were, however, afterwards,
-«
drove back by the enemy's artillery charged with cartridges:
46.
but, being again re-eſtabliſhed, they attacked their infantry.
4&
and took many priſoners. During theſe ſeveral attacks, the
* &
enemy's right advanced. The cavalry of our left attacked that
-&
of the enemy, and entirely defeated it: then our regiment of
&&
dragoons Bareuth attacked a body of infantry, that was on a
4.
hill, behind, while our infantry did the ſame in front; which
gº
ſoon forced them to fly. His majeſty purſued the enemy to:
- - * Liſſa.
 in G E R M A NY, 1757. 133
&4
Liſſa. The battle began at 1 o'clock, and finiſhed at four.
gº
If we had had a few hours more day light, the enemy's loſs
gº
would have been ſtill much greater. Prince Maurice com
gº
manded the right wing under the king, and major general Ret
“
zow the left. Our loſs conſiſts in 500 men killed, and 23co
“
wounded : among theſe is general Roehow, who was alſo taken
gº
priſoner. The enemy's army, which amounted to 80,000 men,
&4
never fought with more bravery than this time. Ours amounted
gº
to 36,000 men only. The enemy ſtood in a plain, with ſome
&&
ſmall hills on it, which they covered with artillery. There
“
were likewiſe many buſhes on the plain, of which they took.
&g
advantage. On their left wing was a confiderable wood, where
&4
they made an abatis, and took all the meaſures poſſible to hin
(g
der us from coming on their flank. General Nadaſti, with his.
&g
corps, was likewiſe poſted there, with intention to come on
44
our flank. For which reaſon, his majeſty placed four battalions,
gº
behind the cavalry of our right; which wiſe diſpoſition was
4x
afterwards of great ſervice to us: for, when Nadaſti attacked our
&g
right wing of horſe, and had thrown ſome regiments in con
gº
fuſion, the fire of theſe battalions threw the enemy back in
ºrg
great diſorder, and by that means cleared our flank, and ena
46
bled our right to act with vigour againſt the enemy's left, which
gº

gº
in a ſhort time was forced to retire. The right wing of our
infantry continued to advance in the fineſt order, though it was,
64
expoſed to a prodigious cannonading, and the fire of ſmall. arms.
º
Our artillery, of which we had no ſmall quantity, did great
º ºg
ſervice, and ſuſtained our advancing infantry; and by degrees.
gº

º
filenced that of the enemy, which was at laſt abandoned.
Though the enemy had fought with great bravery during the
“ whole a&tion, yet they ſeemed to redouble their forces and
* Sourage at Leuthen, which was fortified with redoubts and
* “ retrenchments.
I 34. H1's T of y of the WAR º

<<
retrenchments. The combat laſted here above an hour; and
4&
our brave battalions made ſeveral attacks, one after another,
“ before they got maſters of the village. This decided the battle;
“
for the enemy, on loſing this village, retired with great pre
&G
cipitation, and never attempted again to make any conſiderable
4 &
ſtand. Our cavalry, and particularly the huſſars, purſued the
&&
flying efiemy; killed many; and took ſome thouſands priſoners.
& Cº
His majeſty purſued the enemy to Liſſa, where he ordered the
&4
army to remain that night under arms. Our infantry did won
“
ders. We thought, in the beginning, that our left would have
“
no opportunity to come to action, as our right advanced ſo
&&
much before it ; however, at 4 o'clock, the battle was gene
&&
ral : even our ſmall reſerve was ordered to advance into the
«&
line. Our cavalry had many difficulties, in the beginning, to
& c.
encounter, from the ditches and encloſures: at laſt, how
“
ever, by the activity of our brave general Ziethen, it had alſo
“
an opportunity of ačting. The 6th we followed the enemy,
“
and the 7th inveſted Breſlaw. General Ziethen, with a great
“
corps of infantry and cavalry, was ſent after them. He has
&4
taken ſeveral cannons, and above 3ooo waggons. We have
“
taken, in and fince the battle, to the 12th of December, 29 I.
&©
officers, and 21,500 men, priſoners, among whom are generals
“
Noſtitz, and Odonell, 116 cannon, 51 pair of colours, and 4ooo
&g
waggons.”
The loſs of the Auſtrians, not including the Wurtembergers
and Bavarians, amounted to 6574, killed and wounded. Among
the firſt were generals Lucheſ, Otterwolf, and prince Stolberg:
and among the wounded were generals Haller, Macquire, Lacy,
Lobkowitz, and Preyſac. That of the Pruſſians conſiſted of about
5°oo men, not including the cavalry. . . * º

" ** *
-

.. . . - PRINCE
 in G E R M A NY, 1757. I 35
Prince Charles left a very confiderable garriſon in Breſlaw,
under the command of general Sprecher, and retired to Schweid
nitz; and, having provided for the defence of that place, he
made his diſpoſitions to retire into Bohemia; which was accord
ingly executed: and, before the end of the month, the Auſtrians.
entirely evacuated Sileſia, excepting only the town of Schweidnitz.
IN the mean time, the king opened the trenches before Breſlaw;
and, a bomb having fallen into a powder magazine, the 16th in
the evening, the attacked baſtion, and near half the adjoining
curtain, was blown up, and above 8oo men of the beſieged. This
misfortune obliged the commandant to capitulate the 19th at night.
The garriſon, conſiſting of above 17,ooo men, including 13 gene
rals, and the fick and wounded at the two laſt battles, were made.
priſoners of war. -

GENERAL Drieſen had been ſent the 16th, with a body of

troops, to befiege Lignitz; and, on the 26th, took that place by
capitulation. Colonel Bulow, the governor, obtained leave to re
tire into Bohemia, with his garriſon, conſiſting of near 3.Coo men.
Thus one vićtory, improved by a vigorous and active genius,
enabled his majeſty to recover, in one month, all, excepting
Schweidnitz, that he had loſt during the whole campaign.
It has been already obſerved, that, when the king left Saxony,
in order to go to Sileſia, M. Keith, with about 8ooo men, had
been ſent into Bohemia, with a view to draw general Marſhal,
then in Luſatia, there; and, by that means, facilitate the march of
the king. This end having been happily accompliſhed, M. Keith,
after he had burnt ſeveral magazines, and the bridge at Leutme
ritz, returned into Saxony; where he put his troops into winter
quarters.

REFLEcTIONS:
136 His to Ry of the WAR

R E F L E c T 1 o N s on the battle of Liſſa, and the

preceding operations.
PRINCE Charles knew, even before the battle of Breſlaw, that
the king, with about 1o or 12,Coo men, at moſt, was coming
into Sileſia: the only objećt his majeſty could have in view, was
to join Bevern's army, without which he could attempt nothing
at all; nor even, with ſo inconfiderable a force as that he brought
with him, approach the Auſtrian army, without expoſing himſelf
to certain deſtrućtion.
Wherefore, the only objećt prince Charles
ſhould have had in view, was to prevent him from effectuating
this junction. His royal highneſs ſhould therefore have marched
to Parchwitz, and take a poſition between that place and Lignitz,
with a ſtrong corps, on the heights of Pfaffendorff, which would
have hindered the king from approaching the Oder; nor even could
he have gone to Glogau, without giving them an opportunity to
attack him, and conſequently defeat him, conſidering the Auſtrian
army was, perhaps, fix times ſtronger than he was.
The only meaſure taken by the Auſtrians, was to ſend a gar
riſon to Lignitz, which could anſwer no end whatever, and ex
poſed ſo many men to be loſt. It was by no means probable
that the king would amuſe himſelf with a ſiege of that miſerable
place, when all Sileſia was at ſtake. -

WHEN the Auſtrians had permitted the king to unite all his
forces, and provide them with the neceſſary artillery, &c. we can
not conceive why all of a ſudden they reſolved to quit Breſlaw,
and go to meet him. I know very well, that flattery, too prevalent
in camps, as well as courts, had raiſed their ſpirits and confidence
much above what prudence preſcribes: but they could then have
no motives to deſire an action ; becauſe, if vićtorious, they could
not, in that advanced ſeaſon, purſue the enemy further than Glo
gau ; and, if vanquiſhed, it might prove fatal to them.
HAvi NG
 in G E R MANY., 1757. 137
HAviNG paſſed the Schweidnitz the 4th, they were informed
the enemy was advancing towards them; Why not inſtantly repaſs
that river, and put it before them, rather than behind Though
this river is but ſmall, yet its banks, for the moſt part, are very
marſhy; inſomuch that an army cannot paſs it without the greateſt
difficulty, and ſcarce at all if they meet with any oppoſition. If
the Auſtrians had done this, and have ſent, a ſtrong corps higher
up on their left flank, with their light troops on the ſame ſide as
the enemy, on the road that leads to Striegau, we do not think
his majeſty would have attempted to paſs the river; and, if he did,
the corps abovementioned would have been on his flank during the
paſſage and the action; and, as they were much ſtronger than he
was, having their army covered by the Schweidnitz, they could
have poſted 20,000 men on their flank; which would have made
it impoſſible for the enemy to paſs the river. He would, there
fore, in all probability, have marched to Striegau, in order to
bring the Auſtrians from their advantageous ſituation, by endea- .
vouring to cut off their communication with Bohemia. In this
caſe, the corps, poſted, as we ſuppoſe, on their left, would have
been at Striegau before the enemy; and the whole army muſt have
marched behind Schweidnitz, with the right at Hohen Gierſdorff,
and the left towards Friberg; which would have ſecured the road
by Landſhut to Bohemia, and their communication with that
country. This poſition is very ſtrong, and we do not think they
could have been beat in it; nor, in that advanced ſeaſon, by any
manoeuvre on their left, be forced out of it; nor could the king
continue in the neighbourhood of Striegau, having no magazines
within a hundred miles of him. He muſt, therefore, have given
up the point, and retire to Glogau, in order to refreſh his troops,
who were much in need of reſt. Theſe meaſures being neglected,
or never thought of, they ſhould have advanced, and occupied all
- * T the
138 H1's To R Y of the WAR
the hills before them, particularly that by Lobetnitz, as well to
take this advantage from the enemy, as to have room enough be
hind them to manoeuvre upon; but, from the moment they heard
of the king's approach, they ſeem ſtupified; they neither advance
nor retire. It is impoſſible for a ſuperior army to be outwinged,
but by ſome fault; yet this happened. The king made great de
monſtrations againſt their right, by which they were deceived ſo
long, that he, covered by the hills they had neglected to occupy,
had time to bring his whole army on their left. The only remedy
then, was to order their right and center to march againſt his left;
and, as they were much ſuperior, and this wing weakened, to re
inforce the right. They would have inveloped it, and in all pro
bability deſtroyed it; nor could the king purſue his advantages on
the right, while his left was thus attacked, for fear of being in
cloſed between the enemy's right wing and the river, where there
was not ground enough to act in. They ſhould, at the ſame time,
have formed a line or two behind the flank attacked, with inter
vals to let the troops repulſed paſs, and then advance againſt the
enemy, whom they would have found broke, and in confuſion,
and, therefore, eaſily have defeated him.
INSTEAD of which, they ordered the whole army to make a
motion on the left, to ſuſtain that wing; ſo that the columns met
their companions retiring, and the enemy advancing in order of
battle; which hindered them from being able to form at all; and
thus the whole army was defeated, one battalion after another,
as muſt neceſſarily happen. Troops marching in ſmall and long
columns can never open, and form themſelves in a line, when near
the enemy, and under his fire; and, therefore, ſuch a manoeuvre
muſt never be attempted. They ſhould have endeavoured to keep
the enemy back 'till they had formed a line, and then advance,
or wait his coming. This not being executed, the battle was loſt,
and nothing could prevent it.
IT
 in GERMANY., 1757. - I 39
It was likewiſe a capital fault to have put the auxiliary troops,
who had never ſeen an enemy, on the flank. If they had thrown
their light troops, and 8 or Io battalions of Auſtrians, ſuſtained by
Nadaſti's corps, and the whole left wing, into the wood, before
the village of Sagſchutz, and ordered their right and center to
advance, and attack the enemy's left, we think they would have
gained the vićtory. -

THE king's condućt was founded on the moſt ſublime principles

of war. Though his army was much inferior to that of the enemy,
yet, by dint of ſuperior manoeuvres, he brought more men into
aćtion, at the point attacked, than they ; which muſt be deciſive
when the troops are nearly equal in goodneſs. Wherefore, generals
muſt make it their ſtudy, to eſtabliſh, in time of peace, ſuch evo
lutions as facilitate the manoeuvres of armies; and, in time of war,
chooſe ſuch a field of battle, if poſſible, as enables them to hide
part of their motions, and ſo bring more men into action than the
enemy; and, if the ground, either by its nature, or by the vigi
lance of the enemy, does not permit them to cover their motions,
then a greater facility of manoeuvring will anſwer the ſame end,
and enable them to bring more men to the principal point attacked
than the enemy. The only advantage of a ſuperior army, in a day
of ačtion, conſiſts in this only, that the general can bring more
men into action than the enemy; but, if they do not move with
facility and quickneſs, and are not all brought to action at the ſame
time, that ſuperiority of numbers will be of no uſe: on the con
trary, will ſerve only to increaſe the confuſion. From whence we
will deduce a general rule: “ That general, who, by the facility
of his motions, or by artifice, can bring moſt men into action,
at the ſame time, and at the ſame point, muſt, if the troops are
equally good, neceſſarily prevail; and, therefore, all evolutions,
which do not tend to this objećt, muſt be exploded.”
T 2 OPERATIONS
 -

º
º

-
-
 H is to R Y of the WAR, &c. K4. I
*

op ERATIONS of the War in Pruſſia,

between the Pruſſians and Ruſſians.
HE king of Pruſſia, being informed of the Czarina's acceſ
fion to the treaty of Verſailles, ordered general Lewhald,
with about 30,000 men, to march on the frontiers of Pruſſia,
and oppoſe the march of the enemy. Accordingly, this general,
having aſſembled his army in the month of June, advanced to
Inſterburg, with a corps further on towards Memel, to obſerve
their motions. 1

In the mean time, the Ruſſian army, conſiſting of 31 regiments

of foot, 14 of horſe, 5 of huſſars, and about 16,ooo Tartars, Cal
mucks, and Coſacks, amounting in the whole to 62,000 foot,
19,000 horſe, and the abovementioned Tartars, &c. broke up in
May, and advanced, in four columns, towards the frontiers of
Pruſſia. . . . . - -

THREE of which paſſed through Poland, and the fourth through

Samogitia, towards Memel. This laſt was commanded by general
Fermor, and deſtined to beſiege that town. To facilitate which
enterprize, admiral Lewis, an Engliſhman of reputation, in the
Ruſſian ſervice, ſailed with a confiderable fleet from Revel, with
about 90oo men on board, in order to land, and attack Memel on
the ſea fide, while general Fermor did the ſame on the land fide.
Accordingly, they arrived before Memel at the end of June, and,
on the 5th of the following month, they took that place by
capitulation. - - -

This conqueſt was of infinite conſequence to the Ruſſians,

becauſe they could make a convenient place of arms of it, and,
by means of their fleet, provide it with proviſions and ſtores ſuf
ficient to ſupply the whole army, (who could not poſſibly be pro
vided otherwiſe) and conſequently proſecute the operations of the
campaign. - -

THIS
 * *

142 ." History of the WAR

This expedition being happily executed, the whole army, under
the command of M. Apraxin, united in the month of Auguſt, on
the river Ruſs ; and from thence advanced towards the Pregel.
Upon which general Lewhald quitted the camp at Inſterburg, and
retired towards Wehlau ; where he continued 'till the 30th of
Auguſt, and then advanced to attack the Ruſſians, who had
paſſed the Pregel, and were encamped at Groſs Jagerſdorff. This
occaſioned a great battle ; of which the Pruſſians give the follow
ing account.
“ Lieutenant general Schorlemmer having reconnoitred the ene
Grc
my's poſition, it was reſolved to attack them the 30th. We
& c.
firſt attacked their left wing. Prince Holſtein's regiment, under
&4
his own command, Rueſch's, and the ſecond battalion of Schor
&g
lemmer, diſtinguiſhed themſelves very much. They took ſeve
&&
ral batteries, and totally defeated the enemy's cavalry. We
& c.
advanced, over a prodigious number of dead bodies, againſt the
ge
center and right wing of the enemy's army, that was protećted
&&
by various batteries and retrenchments. We took three of them .
&&
in the wood, each from Io or 12 cannons: in one of which the
tº €
marſhal himſelf gave quarter to a Ruſſian colonel; and in ano
&&
ther we made general Lapuchin priſoner. We ſhould probably
-4 &
have kept the field of battle, if, unfortunately, our ſecond line
.6 &
had not fired on our firſt; the great ſmoak of the artillery, and
<<
of two villages which the enemy had put on fire, having hin
-&
dered our people from ſeeing their companions; ſo that our firſt
&©
line was expoſed to the fire of the enemy's infantry, ſuſtained
•*
by 1.5o pieces of cannon, and that of our own ſecond line. We
<<
therefore quitted the field of battle, and retired in good order,
4&
without being followed. ‘Our loſs, in all, amounts to about
-&c.

2coo men. That of the enemy much above 90oo. Among

<g
whom are generals Lieven, and Lapuchin.” This account, as
generally
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. I 43

generally happens with the loſers, is very little exact, and no ways
worthy to be printed, but impartiality required it.
THAT of M. Apraxin, to the Czarina, is as follows: .
“I HAD the honour to inform your majeſty, that numberleſs
“ and invincible obſtacles hindered us from approaching the ene
“ my on the right of the Pregel. Wherefore, I reſolved to paſs
“ this river, and force them to come to an action ; which was
“ accordingly done on the 28th; and, as the enemy perceived, by
“ this manoeuvre, and our ulterior march, that we could cut off
“ their communication with the countries from whence they drew
“ their ſubſiſtence, they found it neceſſary to abandon their ſtrong
“camp, and likewiſe paſs on our fide the Pregel on the 28th.
“The 30th your majeſty's army, in conſequence of the order
“given the preceding night, was ready to march; and the van
“guard, and part of the army, were already in motion ; when, at
“4 o'clock in the morning, we perceived that the wood, before
** Our front, was filled with the enemy's troops, whoſe motions

“had been covered by it. We were not as yet formed, when

“ the enemy came out of the wood in the fineſt order, and be
“gan to fire upon us with their artillery, and ſoon after with
“ ſmall arms; which continued without intermiſſion the whole
“ action. They attacked our front with great fury; and it re
quired uncommon firmneſs to reſiſt their efforts. The firſt and
chief attack was againſt our left wing. They advanced in co
lumns, within gun ſhot, and then formed the line. When both
gº

armies were formed, with the front againſt each other, the
“fire of artillery and ſmall arms continued for three hours, and
“ the vićtory was all this while doubtful. The enemy made all
in
“ the efforts poſſible to break our front, but were repulſed
“each attempt with great loſs. While theſe things paſſed on our
“left, they attacked our right and vanguard (who, from the
nature
144 History of the WAR
“ nature of the ground, were ſomewhat more advanced than our
“ left) with two ſeparate corps of cavalry, ſuſtained by infan
“ try; but were repulſed in both places. Our artillery, particu
“ larly thoſe called the Schwalows, did great execution; and
“ contributed much to throw the enemy's cavalry in confuſion.
“Though they met every where with the ſame bad ſucceſs, they
“made one effort more. On our left wing ſeveral openings were
“ found in the line, becauſe the marſhy ground made it impracti
“ cable to cloſe it. The enemy attempted to penetrate through
“ theſe intervals, in order to cut our line in two, and ſo take it
“ in flank; but they were miſtaken: for we had poſted there
“ ſome troops out of the ſecond line; ſo that, ſcarce had they
“ entered the wood, when they were received with fixed bayon- -

“nets, and ſoon forced to fly with precipitation: which put an

“ end to the battle, &c.” º

The reſt of general Apraxin's letter contains nothing more than

compliments, no wiſe neceſſary to give an idea of the aëtion.
THE Ruſſians took 29 cannons, and about 600 priſoners. Their
loſs conſiſted in 8oo killed, among which were generals Lapuchin,
Sybin, and Kapniſt; and 426o wounded, among whom were the
generals Lieven, Tolſtoi, Boſquet, Villeboy, Manteuffel, Weimarn,
and Plemannikow. That of the Pruſſians in about 3000 killed,
wounded, and miſſing.
THE Pruſſians retired to Wehlau, and the Ruſſians continued
in their camp, by Norkitten, 'till the 7th of September; when

they made ſome diſpoſitions, as if they intended paſſing the river

Aller, at Friedland, on the enemy's right flank; but it was not
executed. They attempted likewiſe to diſembark ſome troops in
the Curiſh bay, but were repulſed by the militia. On the 17th
the whole Ruſſian army broke up, and retired in haſte towards
the frontiers; ſo that, by the end of the month, they had entirely
abandoned
 in GE Rx: A N Y, 1757, #45
abandoned the kingdom of Pruſſia, excepting Memel; where they
left 1o or 12, coo men. This put an end to the campaign in
Pruſſia.

R E F L E C T I o N s.

WHEN the Pruſſians knew that the enemy was in march, they
ſhould, one would think, advance to the frontiers, and have made
incurſions into Poland, to deſtroy the proviſions, or carry it off;.
which would have retarded very much the progreſs of the enemy,
who had abſolutely no other means of ſubſiſting, but what they
found on the ſpot, as they paſſed; which was rendered ſtill more
difficult, by the terror the Tartars inſpired, by their uncommon.
ravages and cruelty. Another advantage would have accrued ; that
the inhabitants of Pruſſia would have had time to withdraw them
ſelves, and their cattle, and retire to Konigſberg, or ſome other
places of ſurety: whereas, by ſtaying on the Pregel, the beſt part
of the country was left at the mercy of the enemy.
As to the condućt of the aëtion itſelf, nothing can be obječted.
to M. Lewhald. He had, no doubt, orders to fight, though much
inferior. He formed his army in a line, facing the enemy, which
may be confidered as a fault, being ſo much weaker than they ;
becauſe he could not make any confiderable effort, in any one
Point; his troops being equally diſtributed throughout the line;
ſo that the enemy had every where a greater number of men in
action than he could have. As the Ruſſians were then little
known, 'tis no wonder the Pruſſian general ſhould think his
troops ſuperior to theirs, and therefore did not think it neceſſary
to oppoſe any thing but infantry to infantry, and cavalry againſt
“avalry. But experience has proved, that the Ruſſian infantry is by
far ſuperior to any in Europe; inſomuch that I queſtion whether
UI it:
3.146 His To Ry of the WAR

it can be defeated by any other infantry whatever; and, as their

cavalry is not ſo good as that of other nations, reaſon dićtates, that
a mixed order of battle alone can conquer them. They cannot
be defeated; they muſt be killed ; and infantry, mixed with great
corps of cavalry, only can do this.
- If the Ruſians intended to remain in Pruſſia, their firſt care
ought to have been to form magazines at Memel, in order to ſup
ply the army; becauſe they muſt know, that it was impoſſible for
the country, even had they obſerved the moſt exact diſcipline, to
furniſh enough for that purpoſe. The want of this precaution,
both this and all the following campaigns, rendered their vićtories
uſeleſs. They made war, and always will, in all probability, like
the Tartars. They will over-run a country, ravage and deſtroy it,
and ſo leave it ; becauſe they can never, according to the method
they now follow, make a ſolid and laſting conqueſt. They put
themſelves an inſurmountable barrier to it. Their own light
troops, and the want of a ſolid plan of operations, will one day
ruin their army.

* * OPERATIONs
 in G E R M A N Y, 1757. I47

OPERATIONS of the War in Pomerania,

between the Pruſſians and Swedes.

HE Swedes, under pretence of guarrantying the treaty of

Weſtphalia, ſent an army of about 17,ooo men, under the
command of general Ungern Stornberg, againſt the Pruſſians.
This army paſſed the Peen, and, having ſoon taken Demmin,
Anclam, and the iſlands of Uſedom and Wollin, they advanced
into the Pruſſian part of Pomerania; where they raiſed contri
butions, without meeting any obſtacle: for the garriſon of Stettin,
conſiſting of about Io, ooo men, under general Manteuffel, could
not quit that important place, in order to oppoſe the progreſs of
the Swedes. At length, however, the army, which had been in
Pruſſia, arrived under general Lewhald; and, before the end of
December, forced the Swedes to abandon all they had taken,
except the Penamunder and the Anclamer retrenchments, and
retire under the cannon of Stralſund. -

Thus ended the campaign of 1757, the moſt important for

the number of great ačtions, the variety of events, and the uncer
tainty of its iſſue, of any recorded either in antient or modern
hiſtory.
WE hope our account of it, and our refle&tions on its various
operations, will prove no leſs agreeable than uſeful to our readers.

The END of the FIRST Volu ME.

 E. R. R. A. T. A.
Preface, page 1, line 3, and 21, for Didacktical, read Didactical.
-
page 6, line 8, after two, add parts.
Page v, line # for Etries, read Etrečs.
Page xxxiv, line 9, for on, read in.
Page 3, line 15, for any further; to prevent, read any further: To prevents.
Page 3, line 17, for Auſtrians. A confiderable, read Auſtrians, a confiderablet.
Page 31, line Io, after Schneeberg, add by.
Page 38, line 3, for Giltchin, read Gitchin.
Page 49, laſt line, for Bduyn, read Budyn.
Page 55, line 30, for ſeparaetly, read ſeparately.
Page 8o, line 23, for from, read form.
Page ico, line 17, for coſted, read coaſted.
Page 123, line 13, for occaſioned, read occaſion.
Page 127, line 14, for Luſca, read Luſatia,
Page 135, line 22, dele It has been already obſerved, thats.
Page 147, line 3, for Stornberg, read Sternberg.
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*

c o N T 1 N U A T 1 O N
o f T H E

H I S T O R Y
O F T H E L.A. T E

-
WAR IN G E R MAN Y, B E T W E E N T H E

K I N G O F P R U S S I A,
A N D T H E

EMPRESS OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES.

J LLUSTR AT E D W IT H A N U M B E R OF

MAP S AW D P L A W S.
P A R T I I.
C O N T A I N I N G

F I R st. {*} ANALysis of THE GREcIAN, Roman, AND MoDERN MILITARY

| Institutions, together with A New System; &c.
S Of the Rise AND PRocress of the PAssions, AND THEIR APPLI
ECOND. CATION RELATIVE to The Conduct of AN ARMY ; &c. The .
Philosophy of w AR.
THIRD. {9, THE AN Alogy Between MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE
DIFFERENT SPECIEs of Gover NMENT ; THE Policy of WAR.
Fourth. The PRINciples of WAR DEMonstrated.
The Application of those PRINciples to the Military Constitu
TION OF THE DIFFERENT Powers of EURope; with MAPs of FRANCE,.
Fifth. HungARY, Poland, Turkey, GERMANY AND Russia, witH AN
ANALysis of their DIFFERENT FRONTIERs, whereIN we ExAMINE
WHETHER AND How THEY MAY BE ATTAcked witH ADVANTAGE.

"-

*Y M A J O R-G E N E R A L L L O Y D,
WHO SERVED SEVERAL CAMPAIG N S in The Au ST R i AN SERVICE.

"-m-m-m-

I, O. N. D. O. N.
PRIN
*ED For THE A UT H o R, AND so LD B r S. Hoop ER, THE corn ER CF
MAP’ſ B UILDINGS, St. MARTIN’s LAN.E.

M DCC LXXXI.
 R O Y A L H I G H N E S S

GE or GE AU GUST US FRE DE RICK,

P R I N C E or w A L E S.

MAY IT PLEA's E You R Roy AL HIGHN Ess,

Tº exact attention which your Royal Father has

given to, and the uncommon knowledge he has ac
quired, in every Department that can affect the in
*t and happineſs of his People, and the honour of his
Country; equally attentive to the minuteſt, as well as to
* moſt extenſive and important Objećts in the Military
Line; encourages me with the utmoſt humility and diffi
dence to lay this Treatiſe at your Royal Highneſs's Feet,
from the pleaſing view that your Highneſs is animated
| by that great example: humbly hoping that it will be
received
 f

ID E D J C A T I O N.

received as a mark of my zeal and gratitude to my

Gracious Sovereign, and of the moſt profound reſpect
for your Royal Highneſs; happy, ſhould it prove, in
the leaſt amuſing, uſeful, or explanatory of the great
events of ſo remarkable a period in the HiſtoryMilitary
of Europe; and during which, the abilities, courage, and
aćtivity of the Monarch of a ſingle Country, reſiſted the
efforts and baffled the views of many hoſtile Nations.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,

You R Roy AL HIGH N Es's,

Moſt devoted Servant

Bruſſels, -

20th. May 1781. H. L L oY D,

 AD v E R T is EMENT,
*.

Th; Author has been adviſed to publiſh this Part

of his Work as mentioned in his Propoſals, for the . .
Continuation of the Hiſtory of the late War in Ger
many, &c. In the mean while the Remainder of that
Work is going on with all Expedition; the Author being
now reviſiting the ſeveral Countries (the Subjećt of the
Hiſtory) in order to locate the Scenes of Aétion with
more Preciſion.

The Preface to the former Volume being ſo immedi

ately conneded with the Subjećt of the preſent Publica
tion, that the Author flatters himſelf will apologize to
the Purchaſers of that Work for its being prefixed to this.
 N order to elucidate in one View the particular Refle&tions and
Deſcriptions contained in this Work, as well as in Military
Hiſtory in general, a Map on a large Scale is now engraving, that
will comprehend the countries between the Meridian of Paris and
that of Peterſburg, and from the Latitude of the laſt mentioned Place,
to that of Conſtantinople; on which will be traced the natural
Lines of Operation, leading from the Frontiers of the reſpective
Countries; as alſo the Lines on which the reſpective Armies did
really ačt in the ſeveral Campaigns during the War we-deſcribe,
which will enable the Reader to ſee and judge of the Propriety of
their Operations.

This Map will be given to Purchaſers of the Work; it is

therefore requeſted, that Gentlemen will give their Names and
Addreſs to each reſpective Bookſeller of whom they buy it, which
will entitle them to the Map on producing this Note.
 P R E F A C E.

HE various and numberleſs authors who have

| wrote on the art of war, may be divided into
two claſſes, Dida&tical and Hiſtorical : the firſt
are of great uſe, no doubt, but by no means comparable
to the others; particularly ſuch as Xenophon, Polybius,
Caſar, and Arian, who had not only ſeen, but executed
great things.

This enabled them to write on thoſe tranſačtions with

judgment and propriety; and their works will ever be re
garded, by military men in particular, as a pure ſpring
from whence the general principles of war may be dedu
ced, much better than from any ſyſtematical author.

THE moderns, who have undertaken to write the hiſ.

tory of different wars, or of ſome renowned Commanders,
being chiefly men of learning only, and utterly unac
quainted with the nature of military operations, have given
us indeed agreeable but uſeleſs produćtions.

Both ſpecies of compoſitions are uſeful and neceſſary to

thoſe who make war their profeſſion : they are, however,
in my opinion, in many reſpects imperfect. The didaćtical
3. kind.
ii P R E F A C E.

kind communicates its precepts purely and ſimply, without

any application: ſo that they make but a weak and tran
ſitory impreſſion on the mind, which time ſoon effaces.
From whence it is become a proverb, that the road to
ſcience, by means of rules and precepts, is long and te
dious; that by example, ſhort and agreeable.

A Reader, no doubt, is much more attentive to real,

than to imaginary tranſačtions. He believes that it is poſ
ſible, at leaſt, to imitate what others have executed.
There is beſides, in every elevated mind, an emulation
which encourages and animates us to tread the footſteps
of thoſe great men, whoſe ačtions and chara&ters are juſtly
the objećt of our love and veneration. For which reaſon,
hiſtory has been ever recommended as the beſt, eaſieſt,
and moſt effectual method to inſtruct mankind.

Those hiſtorians, both ancient and modern, who have

given us an account of different wars, though in many
reſpects extremely valuable, are not as accurate as they
might, and ought to be.

They do not deſcribe, with ſufficient preciſion and ex

actneſs, the countries wherein the wars were carried on;
nor the particular ſpots upon which ſome great tranſaction
happened; the number, ſpecies, and quality of the troops
which compoſed the reſpective armies are generally omitted,
aS
 P R. E. F. A C E. iii,

as well as the plan of operations; and the operations them

ſelves, excepting thoſe which appeared extraordinary.
They do not explain minutely, as they ought, why, how,
and where every operation was tranſačted. They only,
in general terms, give the hiſtory of a campaign, without
explaining ſufficiently the motives by which the generals
were a&tuated, how the various operations of it were con
dućted; and laſtly, what was the nature of the ground
where they happened. -

THE knowledge, however, of theſe points is ſo neceſ

ſary, that it is impoſſible to form an exact opinion of the
propriety or impropriety of any military tranſačtion with
Out 18,

The author of the following hiſtory has compoſed it

upon a new plan, which he hopes will meet with the ap
probation of the learned. He propoſes to give a clear and
exact account of the moſt eſſential tranſačtions which have
occurred during the courſe of this important war. Theſe
will ſerve as a baſis and foundation upon which he will
write a commentary, wherein the various principles of war
will be occaſionally explained.

THAT the reader may be enabled to form a proper judg

ment of the condućt of the generals who commanded the
reſpective armies, the author will, firſt, give ſome general
a 2 thou ghts
ar
1W P R E F A C E.

thoughts on the principles of war : ſecondly, he will ex

plain the plan of operations of each campaign : thirdly,
he will give a military deſcription of the ſeat of war: and,
fourthly, a particular one of the ground where any extra
ordinary ačtion happened, with the plan of it, together
with an account of the condućt of the aëtion itſelf, and en
deavour to point out the manoeuvres that contributed eſſen
tially to the gain or loſs of it.

By this means the reader will be able to form a proper

and exact judgment, not only of ſuch tranſačtions, but
likewiſe of the refle&tions and opinions of the author. It
is with reluctance he finds himſelf obliged to ſpeak of
himſelf; it is however neceſſary, left he may be thought
to advance things without a proper foundation.

He has had the good fortune to ſerve ſeveral campaigns.

under the orders of general Count Lacy, now inſpector
general of the Auſtrian army, while quarter-maſter gene
ral of it, by which means he has been enabled to acquire
an exact knowledge of the country, of which he has given
a deſcription, and to be acquainted with the motives and
motions of the reſpective armies. In the campaign of
1760 he was intruſted with the command of a very conſi–
derable detachment of infantry and cavalry, with orders
never to loſe fight of the Pruſſian army; which he punc
tually complied with, and was never unfortunate.
THE
 P R E F A C E. V

THE two laſt campaigns he had the happineſs to ſerve

near the perſon of a prince, whoſe ſocial and military qua
lities have gained him the love and veneration of the pre
ſent age, and will, no doubt, tranſmit a glorious and im
mortal name to poſterity.

The author is perſuaded, that his ſtyle is full of foreign

idioms and expreſſions; and therefore hopes the critics will
not give themſelves the trouble to convince him of it, par
ticularly, if they underſtand his meaning.
- * - - - f

As to his opinions he believes them reaſonable, but does

not preſume to think himſelf infallible; and, conſequently,
does not pretend to impoſe them upon others. He will
think himſelf happy if his labours are attended with any
advantage to his country.

REFLEC
 I will

R E F L E C T I O N S
on the
G E N E R AL PRINCIPLES OF WAR ;
A N D O N T H E -

C O M P O S IT I O N A N D C H A R A C T E R S

O F T H E

D IF FE RENT ARM I E S IN E U R O PE.

T is univerſally agreed upon, that no art or ſcience is

more difficult than that of war; yet, by an unaccount
able contradićtion of the human kind, thoſe who embrace
this profeſſion take little or no pains to ſtudy it. They
ſeem to think, that the knowledge of a few inſignificant
and uſeleſs trifles conſtitute a great officer.

This opinion is ſo general, that little or nothing elſe is

taught at preſent in any army whatever. The continual
changes and variety of motions, evolutions, &c. which the
ſoldiers are taught, prove evidently, they are founded on
mere caprice.

THIS art, like all others, is founded on certain and

fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable, the
appli
 P R E F A C E. vii

application of them only can be varied : but they are in

themſelves conſtant.

This moſt difficult ſcience may, I think, be divided

into two ; one mechanical, and may be taught by pre
cepts; the other has no name, nor can it be defined or
taught. It conſiſts in a juſt application of the principles
and precepts of war, in all the numberleſs circumſtances
and ſituations which occur; no rule, no ſtudy, or appli
cation, however aſſiduous, no experience, however long,
can teach this part ; it is the effečt of genius alone. As
to the firſt, it may be reduced to mathematical principles;
its objećt is to prepare the materials which form an army,
for all the different operations which may occur : genius
muſt apply them according to the ground, number, ſpe
cies, and quality of the troops, which admit of infinite
combinations. -

In this art, as in poetry and eloquence, there are many

who can trace the rules by which a poem or an oration
ſhould be compoſed, and even compoſe, according to the
exačteſt rules ; but for want of that enthuſiaſtic and di
vine fire, their produćtions are languid and inſipid : ſo in
our profeſſion, many are to be found who know every pre
cept of it by heart; but, alas! when called upon to apply
them, are immediately at a ſtand. They then recall their
rules, and want to make every thing, the rivers, woods,
ravins,
viii P. R. E. F. A C E.

ravins, mountains, &c. &c. ſubſervient to them; whereas

their precepts ſhould, on the contrary, be ſubjećt to theſe,
who are the only rules, the only guide we ought to follow;
whatever manoeuvre is not formed on theſe, is abſurd and
ridiculous. Theſe form the great book of war; and he
who cannot read it, muſt for ever be content with the title
of a brave ſoldier, and never aſpire to that of a great
general.

THE firſt objećt of the mechanical part is to form the

ſoldier, relative to the uſe to be made of him, and to pro
vide him with thoſe inſtruments of his profeſſion which
are of moſt general uſe, becauſe he cannot be loaded with
many of different kinds; and that he be inſtructed relative
to the aëtions he is to perform, and nothing more. This
is ſo evident, and conformable to reaſon, that I will preſume
to eſtabliſh, as the firſt laws or principles of the art of war,
what is already admitted in every other ; firſº, that a ſol
dier be cloathed and armed relative to the ačion he is to
perform : ſecondly, that he be taught nothing but what is
of uſe to him, in the different /ituations which can occur,
before the enemy - thirdly, that he be taught every thing
that is abſolutely neceſſary for him to know, in every caſe
that may happen.

MANY will exclaim againſt theſe propoſitions, particu

larly thoſe whoſe whole ſtudy has been applied to learn the
Illl IIl
 P. R. E. F. A. C. E. ix

numberleſs and inſignificant trifles with which all the ar

mies in Europe abound, and whoſe only ſcience is reduced
to adjuſt a hat, a button, &c. and ſuch other important
matters in which the merit of an officer intirely confiſts,
according to their opinion of military deſerts. They at
tribute the glorious vićtories of the king of Pruſſia to theſe
and the like puerilities; and have therefore, with great
care and diligence, even with a degree of madneſs, intro
duced the Pruſſian exerciſe into all the troops of Europe—
nothing but Pruſſian will go down.

Short cloaths, little hats, tight breeches, high-heeled

ſhoes, and an infinite number of uſeleſs motions in the ex
erciſe and evolutions have been introduced, without any
other reaſon than their being Pruſſian; as if really theſe
things could contribute to gain one battle, make a fine
march or manoeuvre, carry on the operations of a ſiege,
chooſe a fine camp or poſition, &c.

It is impoſſible, one would think, that men can be ſo

blind as not to perceive, that what makes the objećt of
their ſtudy and veneration, has, in fact, no kind of con
neétion with, or influence on the events of war; yet are
they ſo infatuated with them, that they judge of every
man as he appears to be expert in them, and eſteem the
reſt of mankind ignorant, and worthy their contempt ;
but as, in my turn, I have no great regard for men who
& b arC
X P. R. E. F. A C E

are attached to ſuch trifles, 1hall be very indifferent as

to the opinion they may be pleaſed to form of me, and of
my produćtions.

If the form of dreſs, now in uſe among the ſoldiers,

be examined by our canon, it will be found, I think, very
unfit for the purpoſe it is made for ; can any thing be
more troubleſome and uſeleſs than the hat?, it anſwers no
one end : the -face is expoſed to the ſun, the neck and
ſhoulders to the cold and rain, which in a very little time
ſends numbers of the poor men to the hoſpitals.

The coat and waiſtcoat are equally uſeleſs, becauſe they

leave the body totally expoſed to the inclemency of the
weather, and being tight, hinder the men from moving
with eaſe and facility.

To theſe inconveniencies, which ſend every campaign,

particularly if carried on in the winter, at leaſt one fourth
of the army into their grave, may be added, that if it
rains for any conſiderable time, the ſoldier can with diffi
culty make uſe of his arms; and ſometimes, in preparing
them, he loſes the happy and decifive moment. I would
therefore recommend it thoſe who have it in their power to
invent ſome better form of dreſs, as well out of humanity,
as for the ſervice of their country, which is connected with
theſe things much more than is generally imagined.
As
 P= R E. F. A. C. E. xi

As to the arms made uſe of, the gun is, no doubt, the
beſt that has been invented for the infantry, being of more
general uſe than any other. It were to be wiſhed, pro
vided the muſket is to continue ſolely in uſe, and without
lances, that it was lengthened two feet, including the bay
onet, which, it is thought, may be done without any ſen
ſible inconvenience to the ſoldier.

If it was conſtructed ſo as to be loaded at the breech,

and the center of gravity thrown further back near the
lock, it would not be ſo top-heavy as at preſent, and
would be much more advantageous in aétion.

M. SAxE invented one of this kind, which he gave to

his regiment of Uhlans; but it had many inconveniencies,
which may be eaſily remedied. This ſpecies of guns will
be particularly uſeful to the cavalry.
The infantry ſhould have caſks and cuiraſſes, made of
ſtrong leather, which would laſt for ever, and defend them
effectually againſt the ſabre and bayonet, and even againſt
balls, at a certain diſtance.

The French have offered a great premium to any one

who will prepare leather, ſo as to reſiſt the effect of fire
3III].S.

b 2 Not
&ii P R E F A C E.

Notwithst ANDING the uſe of lances be exploded, I

confeſs, I think it a very uſeful weapon on many occaſions;
and particularly in the attack and defence of retrench
ments, and againſt cavalry 3 wherefore I would not have
it entirely negleáed.
If what is commonly called Tačick, or the formation
of battalions, was founded on other principles, which
poſſibly may be done with advantage, the lance might be
employed with great ſucceſs. - -

According to our ſecond canon or principle, the whole

exerciſe of the firelock muſt be reduced to ſix or eight
articles at moſt ; becauſe it can be demonſtrated, that in
all the different caſes which occur before the enemy, the
ſoldier can want no more. . . -

The third principle is very extenſive, and comprehends

all that can be taught in the art of war. I ſhall point out
thoſe objećts which ſhould moſt immediately engage the
attention of thoſe who profeſs it.

Of all the mechanical parts of war, none is more eſſen

tial than that of marching. It may juſtly be called the
key which leads to all the ſublime motions of an army;
for they depend intirely on this point. A man can be
attacked in four different ways: in the front, on both
flanks,
 P. R. E. F. A C E. xiii

flanks, and in the rear : but he can defend himſelf and

annoy the enemy, only when placed with his face to
wards him. It follows, that the general objećt of
marching is reduced to three points only, to march for
wards, and on both fides, becauſe it is impoſſible to do it
for any time backwards, and by that means face the enemy
wherever he preſents himſelf.
THE different ſteps to be made uſe of are three ; flow,
faſt, and oblique, which may be called traverfing,
The firſt is proper in advancing, when at a conſidera
ble diſtance from the enemy, and when the ground is
unequal, that the line may not be broke, and a regu
lar fire kept up without intermiſſion.
The ſecond is chiefly neceſſary, when you want to an
ticipate the enemy in occupying ſome poſt in paſſing
a defile; and above all, in attacking a retrenchment, to
avoid being a long while expoſed to the fire of the artillery
and ſmall arms; and laſtly, when you come near the
enemy; then you muſt advance with haſty ſteps and
bayonets fixed, and throw yourſelves on them with vigour
and vivacity.

The third ſtep is of infinite conſequence, both in the

infantry and cavalry; columns may be opened and formed
into lines, and vice verſa, lines into columns, by this kind
of ſtep, in a leſſer ſpace, and conſequently in leſs time
than
xiv. P R E F A C E.

than by any other method whatever. In coming out of

a defile, you may inſtantly form the line without preſent
ing the flank to the enemy, which muſt happen if you do
it as the Pruſſians, by a converſion on either flank, in
order to give room to thoſe who follow to form upon the
line, without danger.

The line may be formed, though ever ſo near the

enemy, with eaſe, becauſe you face him, and can with
eaſe and ſafety protećt and cover the motions of the troops,
while they are coming out of the defiles and forming:
and the ſame thing may be equally executed when a co
lumn is to be formed, in order to advance or retire;
which is a point of infinite conſequence, and ſhould be
eſtabliſhed as an axiom, that no manoeuvre whatever be
executed, eſpecially when near the enemy, unleſs it be
protećted by ſome diviſion of the troops. -

It is in the human heart to fear the dangers we do not

fee, and for which we are not prepared, more than thoſe
we do ſee, which is the caſe of all converſions; the ſol—
dier does not ſee the enemy, and by preſenting his flank,
is deprived of all means of defence.

MO movement therefore ought to be made near the enemy

by converſion, excepting only to form the line on either
flank, ſhould they be attacked. As to the different evo
lutions
 P R E F A C E, X7

lutions now practiſed, I ſhall not here examine them; but

will eſtabliſh as a rule, that muſt be generally obſerved,
and by which alone it is poſſible to compare one evolu
tion with another, and judge of their propriety.

THAT evolution is beſt, which with a given mumber of

men may be executed in the leaſ; ſpace, and conſequently in
the leaſt time poſſible.

THERE is ſcarce any figure, geometrical or ungeometri

cal, which our modern tačticians have not introduced into
the armies, without ever conſidering how far ſuch forms
were uſeful in practice.

It is very poſſible to point out all the caſes that may

occur in war, as to the manner of fighting, which muſt
finally be reduced to that in columns or in lines; conſe
quently that form or figure is beſt, which is beſt calculated
for offence and defence, marching in all kind of ground,
and may be ſooneſt changed into a line or column, as the
caſe may require.

It is a general opinion, founded on the practice of all

the troops in Europe, that a column cannot march with
out taking up twice the ground it occupied while ſtand
ing, becauſe the laſt man cannot move till the firſt
has advanced the length of the whole column. This
1S,
xvi. P R. E. F. A C E.

is, no doubt, true in pračtice, and Marſhal Saxe thought

it irremediable without the tačí nothing, however, is ſo
eaſy to be remedied, nor deſerves it more; becauſe, as we
have already ſaid, marching is the moſt important point
in all the military art.

A MAN poſted in a line occupies nearly two feet, from

one elbow to another, and not quite one foot from front
to rear; that is, a man is not quite one foot thick, con
ſequently, when the lines make a motion to the right or
left, the diſtance between each man is above a foot, which
is augmented by near two more, if they all begin the
march with the ſame foot ; ſo that all the difficulty con
ſiſts in making the men march with the ſame foot, and
keep time conſtantly, which is eaſily done, if the ſpecies
of ſtep you would have them march is marked by the
drum, or any other inſtrument. This is often neceſſary
after paſſing defiles, and when they march in irregular
and unequal ground, which is apt to throw them in con
fuſion.

The article of marching is ſo eſſential, that it requires

and deſerves the greateſt care and attention : it may be
aſſerted, that the army which marches beſt muſt, if the
reſt is equal, in the end prevail. If what I here propoſe,
and what is aétually executed by the Portugueſe army,
with great preciſion, be once taught, ſo that ſeveral regi
InCInts
 P R E F A C E. xvii

ments formed in one column can pračtiſe it, an army of

forty battalions, for example, will make a given march
in leſs than half the time, which they now require, as
may be demonſtrated. -

As to the different kind of firings made uſe of, they

are for the moſt part dangerous or impracticable.

THE platoon firing is ſuch, as muſt neceſſarily produce

a general confuſion, as well by the noiſe of thoſe who
command them, as by the breaking of the line and
kneeling, which are three of the greateſt inconveniencies
that can poſſibly happen, and cannot be executed without
imminent danger when near the enemy, and therefore
, muſt be totally excluded. Even the King of Pruſſia him
ſelf is of the ſame opinion; for he ſays, the platoon fire
would, no doubt, be the beſt, if it could be executed.
This is ſo dangerous and impračticable, that I will pre
fume to eſtabliſhthe follwing rules on quite contrary
principles.

FIRST, The utmoſt filence muſt be obſerved ; and

therefore the commanding officer of the battalion ſhall
alone command the different firings. -

SEcondly, That a battalion, or regiment, in advanc

ing to the enemy, muſt never be broke, unleſs forced

thereto by the nature of the ground.
- C THIRDLY,
xviii P R E F A C E.

THIRDLY, That the firſt rank muſt never kneel under

pretence of giving the third an opportunity to fire with
ſafety, becauſe it is very dangerous if near the enemy;
and moreover, fatigues the ſoldier in ſuch a manner, that
he is ſoon uſeleſs. To theſe many other things may be
added, which are neceſſary for the ſoldier to know, as
to retrench himſelf, make faſcines, gabions, condućt a
ſappe, &c.

WHAT has been hitherto ſaid, regards the ſoldier as

well as the officer : what follows regards the laſt only.

As all kind of evolutions is founded on calculation,

being a combination of ſpace and time, it is morally im- .
poſſible for a man to compute theſe two objećts, without
ſome knowledge of geometry and arithmetic.

The firſt thing to be conſidered, in order to reduce all

evolutions to a geometrical preciſion is, that a man occu
pies from elbow to elbow, when he has a gun on his
ſhoulder, near two feet; and that when he marches a
regular pace, he will make in every minute one hundred
and ten ſteps, and that he meaſures each ſtep about
twenty inches; conſequently as the ſpace which a certain
number of men occupy in order of battle is known, and
the common velocity with which they move, it is eaſy to
calculate
 P. R. E. F A C E. , xix

calculate the ground, and time required, to perform any

evolution, with a given number of men.
A Little experience, and a certain coup d'ail, aided
by this theory, will enable a man to judge with great
preciſion of the time and ſpace neceſſary to execute any
evolution whatever: a thing of the utmoſt conſequence in
a day of ačtion; becauſe you will be able to make a thou
ſand motions in the preſence of the enemy, which are ge
nerally deciſive, if done with preciſion and exačtneſs,
which you dare not even attempt, unleſs you are certain
of being able to execute them.
The ignorance of generals in this ſublime and delicate
part of war, is the reaſon why you ſee them quite ſuſ
pended in time of ačtion, incapable of changing their
plan, according as new circumſtances riſe (which always
do riſe) becauſe as the enemy approach, they very juſtly
fear to make any motion in his preſence, as they do not
know, whether they have ground, or time enough to
execute this or that manoeuvre, though convinced of their
uſefulneſs. Hence it ſeldom happens that an action is
won in conſequence of the general's diſpoſitions; and that
chance has generally much more influence on the events
of battles than human prudence.
GENERALs form their diſpoſitions in the cabinet, and
ſuppoſe many circumſtances which never happen, at leaſt
C 2 juſt
XX P. R. E. F. A C E.

juſt as they fuppoſe them; and during the aëtion, few

men have that ſublime talent to ſee the new circumſtances
that occur, and take advantage of them. -

The knowledge of geometry is equally uſeful and ne

ceſſary, in order to determine the impulſe that bodies, ani
mate or inanimate, make on each other, as this is in pro
portion to the maſs and velocity: if your cavalry is of a
leſſer ſize than that of the enemy, you may render it ſu
perior, by giving it a greater degree of velocity. Upon
this principle the Spaniſh cavalry, though very light, has
generally beat the German, in their different wars with
the houſe of Auſtria; and upon this principle our great
and heavy horſe is certainly inferior to the hunter, parti
cularly if you make theſe work more on their haunches
than at preſent.

Nothing contributes more to facilitate the evolutions

of cavalry than this ; they will be enabled in one inſtance
to ſet out on a gallop, without being obliged to paſs ſuc
ceſſively from ſtanding to trotting, and then to gallop.
While this is performing, the light-horſe is on your flanks,
or ſhocks yours with a ſuperior degree of velocity ; and
therefore gains what he loſes in the maſs, and beats you.

The march of armies cannot be calculated with any

degree of preciſion without the help of mathematics: be
cauſe
 P. R. E. F. A C E. xxi

cauſe whatever is not reduced to ſpace and time, will in

pračtice turn out very uncertain.

The choice of camps depends on two principles; the

one geometrical, and the other is the effect of genius :
the firſt conſiſts in calculating the diſtances relative to the
number and ſpecies of troops which compoſe the army.
THE other, in ſeeing all the different combinations that
may be formed on a given piece of ground, with a given
army, and in the choice of that preciſe combination which
is moſt advantageous. This inacquirable and ſublime
talent is much ſuperior to the other, and independent of it.
GREAT geniuſes have a ſort of intuitive knowledge,
they ſee at once the cauſes, and its effect, with the diffe
rent combinations which unite them: they do not pro
ceed by common rules, ſucceſſively from one idea to an
other, by ſlow and languid ſteps: no, the whole, with all
its circumſtances and various combinations, is like a pic
ture, all together preſent to their mind; theſe want no
geometry, but an age produces few of this kind of men:
and in the common run of generals, geometry and expe
rience will help them to avoid groſs errors.

For TIFICATION, another very extenſive branch of war,

is purely geometrical in the execution. The conſtruction
of every ſpecies of works ought to be reduced to geometri
cal
xxii P. R. E. F. A. C. E.

cal preciſion, and may therefore be learnt by any one;

but the chooſing the ground advantageouſly is here, as in
the choice of camps, the gift of genius alone, and ſubjećt
to no rule. As the prattice of fortification depends on
one principle alone, we ſee a remarkable uniformity in

the works of all engineers, which proves they knew only

what they learnt, and indeed what alone could be taught
them ; but that they had not one grain of genius, which
varies infinitely, and forms new combinations relative to
the new circumſtances which muſt and do occur.

It is with the ground as with the features of men;

there are not perhaps in the whole world two features per
feótly alike, nor two pieces of ground of a given extent
perfeółly ſimilar; and conſequently, where the ſame ſpe
cies of works, or the ſame order of battle, would be
equally proper for both. Genius alone can diſtinguiſh the
moſt minute and imperceptible difference to the vulgar
eyes, there is between different grounds, and occupy them
accordingly. From hence appears how inconſiderate thoſe
great engineers and Ta&ticians are, who attempt to ſubjećt
every kind of ground, though infinitely different, to one
general rule.

THE perfeótion of our art would be, no doubt, to find

a conſtruction, or an order of battle, equally proper for all
kind of ground; but this being impoſſible, the only thing
remain
 P. R. E. F. A. C. E. xxiii

remaining for them to do, is to find ſuch a conſtruction,

and ſuch a formation of the troops, as may, with the
greateſt ſimplicity, and conſequently velocity, be adapted
to thoſe numberleſs circumſtances which occur. This
ought to be the conſtant objećt of their ſtudies, but can
never be attained without geometry. -

The artillery, now become the ſoul of military opera

tion, is nothing without geometry. The dimenſions of
pieces, as Mr. Muller very juſtly obſerves, ought to be re
gulated by the uſe you propoſe to make of them; and I
will add, by the nature of the country where they are to
• be uſed. For want of attending to this natural reaſon,
imitation and caprice have been the only rules followed in
determining the dimenſions of pieces.
As the French, during the reign of Lewis the XIVth,
gave birth to moſt of the cuſtoms and faſhions of Europe,
ſo in this important article were they imitated by every
body; 24 pounders of immenſe length and weight were
made by princes who had neither places to attack or de
fend ; whoſe countries, for want of roads, did not permit
the uſe of ſuch heavy machines; they were even intro
duced into armies, though no fiege was expected.
It ought to have been confidered, that the French
made war in a fine open country, where the roads are
good, and where there is a great deal of water carriage.
THAT
xxiv. P R E F A C E.

THAT Lewis the XIVth and XVth were, from the

proximity of their own fortreſſes, enabled to form their
magazines near the ſcene of a&tion: and laſtly, that in
Flanders they could not make one ſtep, without be
fieging ſome important place. -

The French artillery was formed relative to theſe cir

cumſtances. But why we, and other princes, that are not
ſituated in ſimilar circumſtances, ſhould imitate the French,
I do not know. I am very glad to ſee Mr. Muller's
opinion prevail, and hope that artillery, and every other
machine relative to military operations, will hereafter be
made in the moſt advantageous manner poſſible, for the
uſe we can in our circumſtances make of them. This
gentieman has propoſed many excellent things in his
works, which makes it needleſs for me to ſay any thing
on the ſubjećt.

I wish, for the ſake of the public, he may give us the

doćtrine of ſieges in all its parts, including the theory and
pračtice of mines, in order to complete his moſt uſeful
works ".

The next, and indeed moſt important objećt of any,

to thoſe who aſpire to the command of armies, is geo

* The Author did not know that Mr.Muller had already executed this.
graphy;
 P R E F A C E. - XXV’

graphy; not only that which conſiſts in a general know

ledge of a country, but a local one: a man muſt be
thoroughly acquainted with the face of the country, and
its produćtions; and particularly with thoſe objećts which
are immediately connected with military operations, as the
ſpring, courſe, breadth, depth, velocity, windings, banks,
fords, bridges of rivers, whether they are navigable or
not; whether they run into your country from that of the
enemy, or on the contrary : in the firſt place, you muſt
have a fortreſs as high up as poſſible, in order to hin
der the enemy from taking advantage of the naviga
tion, which is a very great one, and facilitates much the
operations of an army; inſomuch, that all great generals
make it a point never to quit them if poſſible : and it is
remarkable that the Auſtrians have generally been worſted
by the Turks, whenever they have quitted the Danube.

If the river runs out of your country, you muſt have

likewiſe a fortreſs, as low as may be, in which you muſt
form your magazines, that you may at once enter your
enemy's country. -

If the river runs along your frontier, as the Rhine does

with regard to France, you muſt endeavour to occupy two
or three capital points upon it, with good and exten
five fortreſſes; ſo that you may not only cover your own
country, but alſo make it impoſſible for an enemy to pe
- d -
Iletrate
xxvi P R. E. F. A C E.

netrate without giving you an opportunity to enter his,

and cut off his ſubſiſtences: though the river be not navi
gable, it may however be of great uſe in military opera
tions, particularly if it runs parallel to the enemy's fron
tier, and croſſes the principal roads that lead into his
country, becauſe then they furniſh good poſitions on their
banks. If you make war on any river, you muſt be maſ
ters of both ſides, if poſſible, otherwiſe they are of little
uſe, excepting only to take poſitions behind them. When
you have a ſtrong place on a navigable river, you may
with a handful of men embarraſs a great army.

THE paſſing of rivers is juſtly conſidered as one of the

moſt delicate and dangerous operations of war; and yet
it generally ſucceeds for want of being perfeótly acquainted
with them; and for want of diligence and activity in
thoſe who oppoſe it, otherwiſe it cannot ſucceed; for
though an enemy cannot prevent your throwing a bridge
under the protećtion of your artillery, if properly placed,
he can, however, hinder you from occupying ſuch an ex
tent of ground as is neceſſary to develop your army, and
may, without expoſing himſelf to your artillery, attack
any part of it that has paſſed.

This method ought to be embraced rather than attempt

to prevent a paſſage. A remarkable inſtance of this hap
pened in Italy, in the war for the ſucceſſion of Spain.
PRINCE
 P R E F A C E. xxvii

PRINCE Eugene wanted to paſs a certain river, which

the vigilance of his antagoniſt, the duke of Vendome,
had for a long time prevented: at length, however, the
prince having ſtole a march, threw over a bridge, and
even a great part of his army had paſſed and intrenched
themſelves under the protećtion of the artillery on the
other ſide, ſo that Vendome could not attack them with
out much loſs and danger: he therefore poſted his army
as near as poſſible, ready to attack them, if they offered
to quit their retrenchments, in order to form and extend
their front, but it was found quite impračticable; for the
Duke had placed his troops in ſuch a manner, that they
formed a portion of a circle concave towards the enemy,
ſo that the whole fire, both of artillery and ſmall arms,
could be direéted and concentred upon the retrench
InêntS.

PRINCE Eugene having obſerved the duke's diſpoſi

tions, was too wiſe to riſk an action in theſe circumſtances,
with a river behind him ; he therefore ordered his troops
to repaſs the river, and broke the bridge after them.

This example is the beſt leſſon that can be given on

the defence of rivers; if the courſe of the river is convex
to you, it will be extremely difficult to hinder an enemy
from paſſing; becauſe, marching on the chord of the
circle, he has much leſs ſpace to go than you: he labours,
a d 2 how
 xxviii P R E F A C E.

however, under one difficulty, which is, that generally

ſpeaking the banks of every river are higher on the ſide
where its courſe is convex: if the banks are in the leaſt
elevated, no bridge can be thrown over the river; and
they are always high alternately, if the river has a winding
courſe; high on the convex ſide, and low on the concave
of the curve it forms.

In defending the banks of rivers, the army muſt be ſe

parated into two or more great corps, as the nature of the
river admits, and diſpoſed in ſuch a manner as to be able
to diſcover where the enemy paſſes, and ſtrong enough to
hinder him from occupying any poſts far from the banks;
becauſe he will then have ground to form his whole army
upon, and there is no advantage in fighting him. A due
attention to what we have ſaid, and a perfeót knowledge
of the river, will make it impoſſible for an enemy to
paſs it.

I AM ſurprized that no uſe is made of ſmall rivers and

rivulets to make inundations to cover camps, which may
be executed on almoſt every ſpot with very little expence,
and would render them no leſs ſtrong than fortreſſes. All
capital poſitions ſhould, if poſſible, be covered by inun–
dations, which are much more efficacious than all the re
trenchments in the world. The ſluices muſt be made as
low as poſſible, and, morcover, covered with ſome good
work or other.
IF
 P R E F A C E. xxix

If the country is mountainous, the roads muſt neceſ

ſarily paſs through many defiles, formed by the ravins,
torrents, rivers, &c. conſequently advantageous camps and
poſitions are to be found on every ſpot.

THE knowledge of all this, when improved by fuperior

talents, will enable a ſmall army to make a ſucceſsful war
againſt one infinitely ſuperior, as appears evident from the
example Duke Ferdinand has given us in his glorious cam
paigns in Heſſia,

Most particular care muſt be taken to occupy all the

mountains without exceptions, before you approach them
with the army; for though there are few great roads in
ſuch a country proper for cavalry and artillery, you may
however be certain, that if the country is well peopled,
there is no mountain, however it may appear ſteep and
craggy, nor any wood, though in appearance impracti.
cable, but what, on diligent enquiry, will be found to
have roads at leaſt for infantry; and therefore you muſt
never encamp in ſuch a country without occupying all
the mountains; which will not only ſecure your army,
but will enable you to obſerve the enemy's motions, and
prevent him from obſerving yours; a thing of ſo much
conſequence, that I will eſtabliſh it as a rule never to let
an enemy ſend a patrole near your army; on the con
trary, you muſt always ſend yours on his flanks.
WHEN.
XXX P R E F A C E.

WHEN the ground has been well reconnoitred, and

the mountains occupied, you muſt always camp be
hind them, ſo that the enemy cannot ſee you, and that
you may keep him in a ſtate of incertitude, which is a
great advantage in military operations: upon this ſame
principle you muſt never camp near a wood, unleſs you
occupy it entirely, otherwiſe the enemy covered by it,
may make ſome decifive motions againſt you, which you
cannot perceive till it is too late to prevent it. Had this
maxim been obſerved at Malplaquet, Haſtenbeck, and
Torgau, things would have turned out otherwiſe in all
probability.

Never approach a wood or a mountain, unleſs you

occupy it entirely, is a rule that muſt be for ever ob
ſerved, and cannot be tranſgreſſed without imminent
danger.

Not only an exact knowledge muſt be had of all for

tified towns, but even of all the villages; particularly
thoſe through which the high roads paſs, becauſe they
form defiles; which being occupied, put an effeótual ſtop
to an enemy, and give you time to make any diſpoſition
that may be judged neceſſary.

The ſcience of poſition, camps, marches, and even the

projećt of campaign or plan of operations, muſt be regu
lated
 P= R E F A C E. xxxi

lated by theſe points: it is on this knowledge only you

can determine the number and ſpecies of troops that muſt
compoſe the army; and conſequently the quantity and
quality of your magazines, and where they muſt be made;
and every plan that is not founded on theſe principles,

muſt fail in the execution, if your antagoniſt has common

ſenſe; ſo that the great and important parts of war, as
well in the formation as in the execution, depend on the
knowledge of the country; and wiſe generals will always
chuſe to make them the foundation of their condućt, ra
ther than truſt to the uncertain iſſue of battles. If you
poſſeſs theſe points, you may reduce military operations to
geometrical preciſion, and may for ever make war without
ever being obliged to fight. Marſhal Saxe calls battles
the reſource of ignorant generals; when they do not know
what to do they give battle.

Next to this local geography of a country, the natural

hiſtory and political conſtitution of it is an objećt that
deſerves the utmoſt attention; the quantity and quality of
its produćtions, ſoil, climate, food, and form of govern
ment; becauſe on theſe the phyſical and moral qualities
of the inhabitants entirely depend. Thoſe who inhabit
the plains and rich countries, are generally effeminate and
bad ſoldiers, impatient under the leaſt fatigue, are ſoon
ſick, require too much food, and are leſs active than thoſe
of
xxxii P R. E. F. A C E.

of the mountains, and in every reſpect inferior to them.

What did not the poor Highlanders do? What did they
not ſuffer? They will live where an Engliſhman, though
animated with equal courage and love of glory, will
periſh; merely from the difference of their ſituations be
fore they become ſoldiers.

THE Croats in the Empreſs's ſervice, ſeldom or ever

camp, and are expoſed to all the inclemency of the wea
ther; yet, in proportion, much fewer of them die than
among the reſt of the troops, which can be attributed
only to the difference of the countries from whence they
COIIl C.

THE inhabitants of great towns are ſtill worſe than

thoſe of the plains, being long enervated with vice and
its conſequences, they are unable to ſupport any fatigue;
and moreover, too talkative ever to form a good and
obedient ſoldier. The form of government produces no
leſs variety in the charaćters of men than the phyſical
qualities of the country.

The ſubjects of a deſpotic prince being from their birth

taught obedience and ſubordination (two eſſential quali
ties to form a good ſoldier, if not entirely alienated and
weakened by oppreſſion and poverty) are preferable to
thoſe
 P R E F A C E. xxxiii

thoſe of republics, unleſs theſe are animated by the en

thuſiaſtic fire of liberty; of which they are very ſuſcep
tible, if condućted by an able hand, and become invin
cible; but if deſtitute of this principle, they make but
indifferent ſoldiers; becauſe their pretenſions to liberty
claſhes continually with that blind ſubordination which
conſtitutes the very foundation of a good army.

As the ſubjećt of a deſpote cannot poſſibly be anima

ted with a paſſion for liberty, that can raiſe any degree
of enthuſiaſm, their leaders muſt endeavour to ſubſtitute
that of religion, which is ſuperior to the other. When
theſe two principles are united, the ſoldier is invin
eible. If we confider the force they have on the human
heart, and how eaſily raiſed, we moſt be ſurprized to ſee
the generals of our age neglect them entirely: this proves
they want the moſt infallible and muſt ſublime art of con
duéting mankind.

THERE is another ſpecies of enthuſiaſm much weaker

than the former, and may be rather called a ſtrong paſ
fion, whoſe objećt is the love of glory and riches; both
theſe principles are ingrafted in the human heart, and if
cultivated with care, will produce wonderful effects, eſ
pecially among the officers, who, by their ſituation, have
the means of enjoying the fruits of them. Theſe prin
C ciples -
xxxiv. ' P R E F A C E.

ciples are to be found chiefly among the ſubjećts of a

mixed and monarchical government, where glory and
riches are attended with a real ſuperiority and diſtinétion.

From theſe moral and phyſical principles are formed nati

onal charaćters, whoſe influence is ſeen more or leſs in
every army, as it is more or leſs ſubjećt to military diſcipline.
If this is ſtrong, and founded only on the principle of
fear, it deſtroys national charaćters, and does not ſub
ſtitute any thing that is equivalent to it. Diſcipline ſhould
be founded on national charaćters, and both are improved
by it: but as thoſe who have the formation and condućt
of armies, ſeem wholly unacquainted with human nature
in general, and with its various modifications, according
to the difference of countries and government, they find
themſelves incapable to form a code of military laws,
founded on national charaćters; and are therefore forced
to deſtroy theſe, and eſtabliſh it on the weak, uncertain,
and ſlaviſh principle of fear, which has rendered our ar
mies much inferior to thoſe of the antients, as appears
evident from the hiſtory of mankind.

THE French are gay, light, and lively, governed rather

by an immediate and tranſitory impulſe, than by any
principle of reaſon or ſentiment: their ſenſations, from
the nature of their climate, are very delicate; and there
fore objećts make a very ſtrong impreſſion, but momentary,
becauſe
 P R E F A c E. XXXV

becauſe a new objećt, producing a new impreſſion, effices

the former : from whence follows, that they are impetu
ous and dangerous in their attacks; all the animal ſpirits
ſeem united, and produce a ſort of furious convulſion,
and gives them a more than ordinary degree of vigour for
that inſtant, but it exhauſts the whole frame: the inſtant
following they appear languid and weak, and changed
into other men.

To this national charaćter may be added, that their

armies are recruited from the claſs of men that inhabit
the towns, who of all others are the leaſt proper for ſol
diers, being vain, impatient, talkative, and effeminate;
they advance as aſſured of vićtory, having a great opinion
of themſelves and contempt of others; but if repulſed,
their ſpirits are exhauſted, ſhame ſucceeds, and humbles
them to ſuch a degree, that they are not eaſily prevailed
upon to renew the attack; and as their vanity will never
let them confeſs they are in the wrong, they throw the
fault on their leaders, become mutinous, and deſert.

WHERefore it ſhould be a maxim, in making war.

againſt the French, to keep them continually in motion,
eſpecially in bad weather, always attack them, never per
-
mit them to follow their own diſpoſitions, force them to
obſerve yours; their impatience will ſoon reduce them to
© 2. com—
 xxxvi P. R. E. F. A. C. E.

commit ſome capital error. If their leader is wiſe and

prudent, and refuſes to comply with their unreaſonable
requeſts, they will treat him with contempt, grow turbu
lent, and deſert.

The preſent miniſtry endeavours to introduce the

German diſcipline among them, without confidering the
difference there is between their national charaćters; and
I doubt whether it will produce the effects they expect
from it; Nature muſt be improved, not annihilated.

THE Auſtrian army is compoſed chiefly out of the

claſs of labourers, vaſſals of the great lords ; they are
obedient and patient, and bear without a murmur the
greateſt hardſhips; and though their religion does not riſe
to any degree of enthuſiaſm, probably for want of being
excited by an able leader, yet it keeps them ſober and free
from vice: objećts muſt ſtrike hard to make any ſenſible
impreſſion, which once received laſts long, becauſe not
eaſily effaced. By education and temper little diſpoſed
to reaſon about cauſes and events; and therefore very
proper to form a good ſoldier, and ſuperior to any other
who are not raiſed by ſome ſpecies of enthuſiaſm.

The Ruſſians have all theſe qualifications, in common

with the Auſtrians; and beſides, ſuch a fund of religion
and reſpect, or rather veneration for their prince, which
* inſpires
 P R E F A C E. xxxvii

inſpires them with a degree of enthuſiaſm, that muſt ne

ceſſarily render them ſuperior to every other army that is
not animated with fimilar principles. Their courage alone
has rendered them vićtorious, in ſpite of all thoſe difficul
ties in which the general ignorance of their officers in
volved them.

The Pruſſian army, being compoſed chiefly of ſtrangers

of different countries, manners, and religion, are united
only by the ſtrong chain of military diſcipline; this and
a moſt rigid attention to keep up all the forms and diſci
pline eſtabliſhed, conſtitutes a vaſt and regular machine,
which being animated by the vigorous and powerful genius
of their leader, may be juſtly accounted one of the moſt
reſpe&table armies in Europe; but ſhould this ſpring, how
ever, languiſh but for an inſtant only, the machine itſelf,
being compoſed of ſuch heterogeneous matter, would pro
bably fall to pieces, and leave nothing but the traces of its
antient glory behind.

They have a facility in manoeuvring beyond any other

troops whatever; and their vićtories muſt be aſcribed to
this chiefly; for all the genius of the leader can do no
thing without it, and almoſt every thing with it.

THE Spaniards are brave and patient; and have beſides

a point of honour, which being improved, would make
them
xxxviii P R. E. F. A C E.

them good ſoldiers. Their army at preſent would make

but an indifferent figure, for two or three campaigns, as
their generals have neither that knowledge, founded on
ſtudy and application, or that produced by experience.

The Engliſh are neither ſo lively as the French, nor

ſo phlegmatic as the Germans; they reſemble more how
ever the former, and are therefore ſomewhat lively and
impatient.

If the nature of the Engliſh conſtitution per

mitted ſome degree more of diſcipline, a more equal diſ
tribution of favours, and a total aboliſhment of buying
and ſelling commiſſions, I think they would ſurpaſs, at
leaſt equal, any troops in the world. -

The Turks, and every government founded on military

force, muſt neceſſarily decay, unleſs. the ſame fanaticiſm.
which gave it birth be kept up by continual wars.

MAHOMET underſtood this principle ſo well, that he

has made a religious precept of it, commanding his fol
lowers never to make peace with their enemies. -

As the force of this army depends entirely on numbers

and enthuſiaſm; if this laſt is ever extinguiſhed, which
now ſeems to be much the caſe, the other will avail them
Il Q
 Tº R. E. F. A. C. E. xxxix

nothing; and that immenſe fabric being no longer anima

ted with the only ſpirit which could ſupport it, muſt ſink
under its own weight.

The principles which are only curſorily mentioned in

this preface, will be examined and demonſtrated in the
following work.
，– ！ *** º; ae
 T . A B L E
c O N T E N T S.
Page
TH E Preface, containing general Reflečtions on War,
- * vi-xxxix

PA RT THE FIRST.
C H A P. I.
Of the Compoſition of different Armies, ancient and modern, 1–4
C H A P. II.
Of the Compoſition of an Army, - m 4, 5, 6
C H A P. III. -

Of the Phalanx, - - - 7, 8, 9
C H A P. IV.
Of the Legion, - - - 9, Io, I I

C H A P. V.
of the modern Inſtitution of an Army, - 12–16
c H A P. VI.
Of the Advantages and Defe&ts of Miſfive and Hand-weapons,
17–20
C H A P. VII.
Of the Formation of Battalions and Squadrons, - 20–23

C H A P. VIII.
Of Cavalry, * ** - º 23–26
C H A P. IX.
Of the Modern Order of Battle, - - 26–3;
Of a Battle, - - 30–3
C H A P. X. - -

A new Syſtem, -
- - 35, 36, 37
f C H A P.
 TA B L E O F C O N T ENT S.
Page
C H A P. XI.
Of the Dreſs of the Soldier, . . .. — 37, 38, 39
- C H A P. XII.
Of Defenſive Arms and Armour, - 39–43
C H A. P. XIII.
Of the Formation of Battalions, 43–46
C H A P. XIV.
Of the Cavalry, 47, 48, 49
- C H A P. XV.
Of the Formation of a Squadron, 49, 50, 51
- C. H. A. P. XVI. º ſº

Of the Conſtitution of an Army, - - 51–56 §

w C H A P. XVII.
Of the Order of Battle, - *- 56–64
General Refle&tions, - 65, 66,67
Of Contračtors, *- — 67,68

P A R T T H E S E C O N D.
C H A P. I. -

Of the Philoſophy of War, - - 69–83

Of the Paſſions, - 80–83

C. H. A. P. II.
Of Animal Fear, . — *- 83, 84
- C H A P. III.
Of Honour and Shame, 8.5, 86, 87
C H A P. IV.
Of Riches, — - — 88, 89
- C H A P.
 TABLE of co NT ENT S.
- Page
C H A P. V.
Of Liberty, 89, 9o, 91, 92
- C H A P. VI.
Of Religion, 92, 93
C H A P. VII.
of Women, and their Influence over the human Heart, 94, 95,96
C H A P. VIII.
Of Muſic, - - * - 96

PA R T T HE T H H R D.
C H A. P. I.
Of the Conneétion between the different Species of Government
and Military Operations, 97, 98.
-

C H A P. II.
Of Deſpotic Governments, - - 98–106
C H. A. P. III.
Of Monarchical Governments, - Ioé–114
C H A P. IV. -

Of Republican Governments, I 14–119

C H. A. P. V.
Of an Ariſtocracy, - - - 12O, I 2 I

C. H. A. P. VI.
Of Civil Wars, - I 22, 123, I 24, 125

P A R T T H E Fo U R T H.
- C H A P. I.
Of the Camp, - - - 126, 127
C H A P. II.
Of the March of an Army, and the Front of the March, 128–132.
C H A P. III.
Of the Line of Operations, - 133–137.
-- - C H A P.
 Tº A B L E OF C O N T E N T S.
Page
C H A P. IV.
Of an Offenſive War, 138–143
C H A P. V.
Of a Defenſive War, 143-149

C H A P. VI.
Of light Troops and their Utility, I49, I 50
C H A P. VII.
Qf the Frontier Line, -
-
I 5 I, I 52

PAR T T HE FIFTH.
Application of the Principles of War to the Frontiers of the different
Sovereigns in Europe, -
153–161
C H A P. I.
Of the Frontier of France, -
153–161
C H A P. II.
Of the Frontier of Auſtria, 161–171
Of the Frontier of Pruſſia, 171–173
C H A P. III.
Of the Turkiſh Frontier, 171-173
C H A P. IV.
Of the Frontier of Poland, 171—173
-
Of the Ruſſian Frontier towards Europe, 174–182
Of the Coaſts of France and England, -
179–182
C H A P. V.
Of North America, 174–186

N. B. The Maps of France, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Germany, and Ruſſia,

and the Plans, N° 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, to be placed at the End of the Book.
 O F T H E

C O M P O S I T I O N
O F

D IF F E R E N T A R M I E S,

ANC I ENT AN D M O D E R N.

P A R T T H E F I R S T.

C H A PT E R L.

7A R is a ſtate of a&tion. An army is the inſtrument

W with which every ſpecies of military action is per
formed: like all other machines it is compoſed of
various parts, and its perfection will depend, firſt, on
that of its ſeveral parts; and ſecond, on the manner in which they
are arranged; ſo that the whole may have the following properties,
viz. ſtrength, agility, and univerſality; if theſe are properly com
bined, the machine is perfeót. Care muſt be taken that not any
one of theſe properties be increaſed by diminiſhing another, but that
the whole may be in proportion.

By ſtrength in an army, I do not mean that force which ariſes

from numbers, but that which proceeds from the mode in which
troops are ranged and armed. This ſtrength muſt be adequate to
every purpoſe of war; equally proper to reſiſt or attack an enemy,
whether cavalry or infantry, in an open or in a cloſe country.
A BY
 2 OF D I FF E R E N T ARM IES,

By agility I mean, the celerity with which an army marches and

performs the various motions required in the condućt of a campaign.
This property is the moſt eſſential, and cannot be acquired but by
continual exerciſe, nor even then, unleſs the original conſtitution of
the troops be calculated for a facility of motion.

The firſt problem in Tačtics ſhould be this: how a given

number of men ought to be ranged, ſo that they may move and
aćt with the greateſt velocity; for on this chiefly depends the ſuc
ceſs of all military operations.

AN army ſuperior in ačtivity can always anticipate the motions

of a leſs rapid enemy, and bring more men into ačtion than they
can in any given point, though inferior in number. This advantage
muſt generally prove deciſive, and inſure ſucceſs.

. A BATTLE is a changeable ſcene, in which every circumſtance

is inſtantaneous and tranſitory, without ačtivity, thoſe favourable
opportunities, which always occur in days of ačtion eſcape, and
perhaps do not return in twenty campaigns.

By univerſality I mean, that the mode and form in which the

troops are ranged, ſhould be equally proper to act in different kinds
of ground, and againſt every kind of troops, to attack or defend;
becauſe an army once formed into a line, and near the enemy, can
not without much difficulty change the order in which it is formed,
or indeed make any motion, but forwards; therefore when any
change is required, recourſe muſt be had to the ſecond line or
reſerve, and generally without ſucceſs: it is therefore highly ne
ceſſary that the firſt formation of the troops ſhould be ſo general
as to be applicable to every particular caſe, and require no change
during the ačtion, unleſs in employing more or fewer men againſt
any given point.
IF
 A NT I E N T A N D M O D E R N. 3

If ſuch are the properties (I mean ſtrength, agility, and univer

ſality) which render an army perfeót, it is evident that the arms
made uſe of, the manual exerciſe, and the different evolutions in
which the ſoldier is to be inſtructed, ought to be analogous to theſe
principles, and whatever is not conformable to them ſhould be
exploded as vain and inſignificant at leaſt, if not, as very often
happens, dangerous and impračticable.

I KNow that it is much more eaſy to conceive and point out the
principles which ought to guide us in the conſtruction of a machine
than to put them in practice; for whatever paſſes through the hands
of man participates of his imperfeótions. We ſhould not however
deſpair; if the perfection we aim at is not attainable, to approach
it is a great merit, and will in ſome meaſure anſwer the end
propoſed.

For want of certain and known principles in the conſtitution of

an army, caprice and imitation ſeem to have been our only guides;
whence innumerable changes and novelties are continually intro
duced into our modern armies. Error and folly ſucceed each other
like modes and faſhion in dreſs; what is to-day an objećt of applauſe
and admiration, is to-morrow exploded, and ſucceeded by ſome new
chimera equally abſurd and tranſient. -

A cer TAIN great prince, in the courſe of his reign, has undoubt
edly performed ſome very extraordinary ačts; and therefore our mi
litary gentlemen have implicitly adopted the dreſs, exerciſe, evolu
tions, &c. uſed in his armies; I believe without ſufficiently weighing
the matter, or conſidering that the ſucceſs of his operations ought
principally to be attributed to his ſituation, as a ſovereign of uncom
mon abilities at the head of his armies, and to the particular cir
cumſtances of his enemies; advantages which are but rarely com
A 2 bined
4. O F T H E CO M P O S 1 T I O N

bined ſo as to produce that unity and vigour on which ſucceſs in

war almoſt intirely depends.

The continual attention paid to the diſcipline of his troops,

gives them a facility in manoeuvring ſuperior to that of his enemies,
which certainly contributed to his vićtories; his head and heart did
the reſt. Mode of dreſs, and a thouſand inſignificant obječts with
which he torments his army, had nothing to do in the matter. To
obviate this phrenzy of imitation, and if poſſible to fix ſome certain
principle for the compoſition and direétion of an army, is the objećt
of the following diſcourſe. -

C [H A P T E R II.
**

OF TH E C O M P O S IT I O N OF AN ARMY.

THE different operations of war, and the variety of the

ground in which they are performed, indicate a neceſſity of
different ſpecies of arms as well as of troops; accordingly we find
at all times armies compoſed of infantry and cavalry, and theſe
armed with different kinds of weapons ; ſome carried miſſile wea
pons, others hand-weapons: by miſfile weapons, I mean thoſe
inſtruments with which a man throws darts, ſtones, balls, &c. at
an enemy when at a certain diſtance. By hand-weapons (I cannot
otherwiſe tranſlate what the French call AR ME-BLANCHE) I mean
thoſe weapons which a man holds in his hand while he ſtrikes the
foe with the other end; ſuch as ſwords, pikes, bayonets, &c.
IT is needleſs to obſerve that there is a conſtant and invariable
connexion, or at leaſt there ought to be, between the ſpecies of
arms made uſe of by the troops (infantry or cavalry) and the mode
of
 O F A N A R M. Y. - 5

of ranging them; becauſe they muſt be formed in ſuch a man

ner as to be able to manage their arms with advantage : though
this principle is ſelf-evident, and eſſentially neceſſary to be obſerved
in the compoſition of an army, yet we ſhall find in the ſequel it
has been almoſt totally negle&ted by the moderns.

The miſfile weapons of the antients were extremely weak, if

compared with ours; the ſhield was ſufficiently ſtrong to parry,
or at leaſt diminiſh their effects; however they were found neceſſary,
and generally adopted. It is evident that men armed with miſſile
weapons could not be formed into one maſs, or in a deep order of
battle, becauſe in that caſe they could not poſſibly have made uſe
of their arms with any advantage; they were therefore left to
themſelves, that is, they choſe the time, place, and obječt; and
advanced or retreated only upon a general ſignal.

THE uſe of ſuch troops was very conſiderable ; they could in

terrupt and harraſs the motions of more maſſive bodies, though for
want of conſiſtency and ſtrength they could not break them. No
ſpecies of ground could be abſolutely improper for thoſe light troops,
and a cloſe country was particularly favourable to them; plains
and cavalry were to be avoided ; in every other circumſtance they
could ačt with advantage ; but cavalry and maſſive bodies could
neither move nor ačt but in plains and open countries.

No army could therefore be complete unleſs it was compoſed of

three ſpecies of troops, viz. infantry, cavalry, and light troops; and
accordingly we find the antients and moderns have adopted them
in the conſtitution of their armies.

Of the antients the Tartars, and all the Aſiatic people, thought that
velocity was the peculiar advantage of the cavalry, and that this
property might be exerted to advantage; it ſeems they fought
pell-melt
 6 C O M P O S IT I O N OF AN A R M. Y.

pell-mell looſely, A LA DeBond ADE : at leaſt the Romans did ſo

very often ; for we are told that the cavalry diſmounted in heat of
ačtion, and fought on foot, which they could not have done had
it been formed into great ſquadrons, and attacked in a line in the
modern European way.

A cAvALRY thus conſtituted was of great and general uſe, par

ticularly in purſuing a broken enemy, who were neceſſarily exter
minated, which is now the caſe with the Tartars and Spahi’s.
Their extreme ačtivity and velocity prevent all diſpoſition in the
infantry for a retreat, unleſs they are favoured by a very broken
ground, where cannon may be placed. As they move ſeparately,
and in very ſmall bodies, they penetrate every where; and as no
road is impervious to them, they in an inſtant ſurround their enemy,
whom they generally cut to pieces.

We have endeavoured to unite maſs and ſolidity to the velocity

of the horſe, but I think without ſucceſs; ačtivity, the peculiar
property of the horſe, is diminiſhed, and almoſt totally deſtroyed
by the mode in which our cavalry is formed ; all bodies loſe their
velocity in proportion to the augmentation of their maſs: though
the advantages derived from cavalry and light troops, made the
uſe of both abſolutely neceſſary, yet as their manner of fighting
was neither general nor deciſive, the principal force of an army was
thought to conſiſt in a good body of infantry, and with reaſon if it
is properly formed: its operations are, or may be more general,
folid, and deciſive, than thoſe of the other bodies.

ALL troops, I believe, have been formed into ſquares, or

parallelograms; becauſe theſe are the only figures or forms in
which a body of men united can move or ačt. The circle which
was uſed by Caeſar, and which is ſo much admired by Puyſegur,
could be proper only when it was ſurrounded, and confined to a
particular ſpot, which was the caſe when it was uſed by Caeſar.
C H A P.
 I

C H A P T E R III.

O F T H E P HAL AN X.

HE Greeks ranged their infantry in a maſs called a phalanx;

it conſiſted of about 16,ooo men; whether it was a ſquare or
an oblong figure is not material. This maſs moved and ačted in one
body, when the mature of the ground permitted: neceſſity only
made them divide it into ſmaller ſeótions. It is evident,

FIRST, That ſuch a maſs could be armed only with hand

weapons, becauſe none but the foremoſt ranks could poſſibly make
uſe of any other, and even of theſe with little effect, the whole
maſs being formed in a cloſe order with ſmall if any intervals.

Second, The leaſt inequality of the ground interrupted, or totally

ſuſpended its motions, and conſequently by driving the phalanx
into broken ground, and avoiding its ſhock and impulſe, any troops
formed upon more a&tive principles would ſoon throw it into con
fuſion, break and defeat it. The phalanx vanquiſhed the Perſians,
becauſe they, confiding in their numbers, fought in plains; they
were indeed likewiſe vanquiſhed by the Romans; but that was
becauſe the legion was formed on more ačtive principles than thoſe
which modelled the Aſiatic armies.

Hence it is that no mafive bodies, ſuch as a phalanx, or the

column propoſed by Folard, can ačt or defend themſelves againſt
much ſmaller numbers armed with muſkets, and that the uſe of
miſſile weapons is incompatible with every deep and maſſive order.
THE
S O F T H E P H A L A N X.

The advantages of maſſive bodies ariſe from their natural weight

and ſtrength, and from the hand-weapons which they muſt neceſ
farily uſe : the foremoſt ranks preſſed by thoſe behind are forced to
advance; the ſlain and wounded are inſtantly ſucceeded, and though
the number is diminiſhed, the front is equally cloſed and extended,
and the action is proſecuted with the ſame vigour, ſo that if the
ground permits them to ačt at all, they muſt act with ſucceſs when
they can approach the enemy. t

The uſe of hand-weapons brings the men ſo cloſe together,

that no alternative is left but to die or conquer. Hence the
vićtories of the antients were ſo complete and deciſive, that a
battle or two concluded a war.

The length of the Peloponneſian and Punic wars aroſe from

other cauſes, which we ſhall explain hereafter. The phalanx could
not abandon its original inſtitution, nor deviate from the line on
which it ačted to purſue a broken enemy; this was left to the
cavalry and light infantry, which generally did the buſineſs ſo
effectually that few eſcaped. -

The Grecian cavalry ſeems to have been good, but ſmall in

number. The country in general was improper for cavalry, and
beſides as it was divided into a great number of ſtates, the terri
tories of the contending powers were too contraćted to admit of a
numerous cavalry. Their wars were confined to excurſions of a
few days, and produced rather ſkirmiſhes than battles. The
weaker kept within the walls of the capital; the ſtronger ravaged
the ſmall dominions and retired ; and thus ended the campaign.

IN the courſe of the Peloponneſian war, ſo well deſcribed by

Thucydides, which laſted above twenty years, no great battle was
fought, which was the cauſe of its duration; and the face of the
country
 O F T H E L E G I O N. 9

country was ſuch, that an enemy could not be forced into action:
to this we may add, that the armies on both ſides were com
poſed of confederates, which neceſſarily weakened or deſtroyed
their own ačtivity and vigour.

C H A P T E R IV.

O F : T H E L E G I Q N.

HIS body of men formed a complete army; it was com

poſed of heavy infantry, light infantry, and cavalry, armed
with miſſile and hand-weapons; it was ranged like our troops in
a rečtangle, the more extended faces of which fronted the enemy.
The legionary infantry was placed in the center, the cavalry on
the wings, and the archers and ſlingers were diſtributed along the
front of the line, and fought where they could, without interfering
with the heavy infantry. They were very ačtive in a day of battle,
often mixed with the cavalry, and ſupported it, let no opportunity
eſcape where they could annoy the enemy ; very unlike the light
troops in Germany, who generally diſappear on a day of battle,
and very often cannot be colle&ted in two or three days after.

MoNTE cucul. I ſays, that it is abſolutely neceſſary to intermix

ſmall detachments of forty or fifty foot with the horſe, and that
at the battle of Saint Gothard fought upon the Theifle, in Hun
gary, againſt the Turks, theſe detachments contributed much to
his vićtory.

I AM ſo far perſuaded of the utility of this method, that I am

ſurprized it is not generally adopted, becauſe a company of foot may
be formed in ſuch a manner as to oppoſe cavalry with ſucceſs in a
plain, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter.
B THE
Io O F T H E L E G I O N.

The legionary infantry were ranged nine or ten men deep.

Authors vary on this point, which is not material. Each man
had three feet ſquare to ağt in, that he might uſe his arms offen
five and defenſive with advantage. The ſubdiviſions of the legion
correſponded exactly with our brigades. I do not know how their
cavalry was formed, whether in great or ſmall diviſions, though
I believe in the latter, nor in how many ranks. It ſeems they
fought in ſmall parties of about thirty or forty men, and in four
ranks, but on this point I am not certain.

THE infantry being formed nine or ten men deep, a Roman

army of equal ſtrength with a modern one, occupied only a third
part of the ground which is requiſite for the latter: it follows,
that the motions of the whole line were more rapid in that propor
tion. The nature likewiſe of their arms did not require that the
aćtion ſhould be at all interrupted ; conſequently a battle was
begun, proſecuted, and concluded, in leſs time than ten of our
battalions would take to paſs in review on Wimbledon-Common.
The advantage of the phalanx was in its impulſe and ſhock only,
that of the legion in its ačtivity, ſufficient ſtrength and ſupe
liority to the phalanx in velocity, the legion prevailed over the
phalanx, and every other arrangement.

I AGREE with the illuſtrious and ſagacious Polybius, that the

legion was the moſt perfeót order then known, or perhaps that can
be invented. It was ſtrong, and formed for ačtivity, analogous to
the arms it bore, and therefore was ſo far perfeót; yet in the diſtri
bution of the whole, it had, I think, one capital defečt common to
the phalanx, and to our modern armies. Its cavalry was placed on
the wings of the infantry; indeed it could not be otherwiſe in
the Grecian order. This I preſume is a very great defe&t, and I
think I ſhall prove it in the ſequel of this work. The cavalry thus
diſpoſed was too weak, ſo that it could not act an independent part ;
and
 O F T H E L E G I O N. II

and being placed at the extremities of the lines, it could not be

ſupported by the infantry; the horſemen were obliged to alight and
fight on foot; accordingly we find that the Roman cavalry never
made any figure in the numberleſs battles which that military
republic fought. It might, like our huſſars, render a vićtory more
complete; but it ſeldom contributed to gain one. Whenever the
infantry was broken, it was generally cut off; this in ſuch a diſ
poſal of troops muſt always be the caſe, if the enemy is ſuperior
in cavalry, and if the ground permits that cavalry to ačt. The
ſame event muſt likewiſe enſue to the cavalry if it is broken, and
vigorouſly purſued, unleſs it be protećted and ſupported by ſome
infantry properly poſted. Theſe confiderations evince the neceſſity
of placing both cavalry and infantry in the line, in ſuch a manner
that they may afford aid and ſupport to each other, and that their
efforts may be combined, and direéted to the ſame point, in which
we think the perfeótion of an order of battle conſiſts. It is the
unity of ačtion which can alone inſure vićtory, and this unity is, I
apprehend, totally incompatible with the ancient and modern mode
of ranging cavalry. The cloſe manner in which the Roman cohorts
and our battalions are formed, with very ſmall intervals, obliged
them and us to place the cavalry on the wings; but I would aſk,
is it abſolutely neceſſary they ſhould be ſo placed I think not : in
fuch a diſpoſition I ſee many defečts, and not one advantage.

Ba C H A P.
 C H A P T E R V.

OF THE MOD E R N INSTITUTION OF AN ARMY.

NUSTOM is a tyrant, who governs mankind with more deſpo

C tic ſway than an Eaſtern monarch. To oppoſe him is treaſon
and rebellion. An opinion, well or ill founded, is not to be irra
dicated by any direct argument; it can only be extirpated by time,
and favourable circumſtances. The modern philoſophy, though
for the moſt part founded on mathematical principles, has not in
the courſe of more than a century been able to expel entirely the
dreams and viſions of Plato and Ariſtotle. It is no leſs odious than
difficult to convince a man he is in the wrong, and that his opi
hions are abſurd. Few have inclination to inveſtigate their grounds,
and ſtill fewer have the capacity to inveſtigate them effectually.
Hence they prefer travelling in the known path, to the trouble of
enquiring after a new one. In matters of religion and politics, I
ſhould not hazard any new opinion, becauſe true or falſe it might
produce doubt and diſcord, which a good ſubjećt ought to avoid.
Peace and harmony ſhould be the guide and principles of his ačtions;
but in military affairs my errors can do no harm; they will be
treated with contempt and vaniſh. I have therefore only to requeſt
the reader to examine impartially what I ſhall ſay on this import
ant ſubjećt, before he pronounces judgment on my labours, º

We have already ſhewn, that the mode in which a body of

men, whether infantry or cavalry, is formed, ought to be analogous
to the ſpecies of arms they carry, and that the whole machine
ſhould be ſtrong, ačtive, and univerſally adapted to every operation
of war. The phalanx was properly armed, and poſſeſſed the firſt
property,
 OF THE MO DE R N INSTITUTION, &c. 13

property, ſtrength, in an eminent degree. The legion was like

wiſe well armed, and was both ſtrong and ačtive; but as we ob
ſerved before, it was defective in the arrangement of the whole:
the cavalry placed on the wings could not ſupport, nor be ſup
ported by the infantry. -

We can by no means determine whether or not our troops are

properly ranged, till we have carefully examined the nature and
effects of fire-arms, which are now the only weapons made uſe of
by the infantry. The ſword is a uſeleſs burthen to the ſoldier;
and therefore it ought to be reječted.
OUR fire arms are certainly ſuperior to the miſſile weapons of
the antients ; and if we conſider only their force, and the facility
with which they are managed, it will appear ſurprizing that whole
armies are not totally deſtroyed in a few hours; it is certain,
however, that the muſket is by no means ſo dangerous and fatal as
the ſword and pike. When the infantry was armed with theſe
they came neceſſarily to cloſe fight; the greater part of the van
quiſhed, and many of the vićtors were of courſe ſlain or wounded,
and the vićlory was more deciſive ; for a regular retreat was im
poſſible. But the uſe of miſfile weapons and fire-arms has intro
duced a new mode of waging war, leſs bloody and decifive. A
confiderable diſtance generally intervenes between the two armies
during a great part of the action, and ſometimes during the
whole; for the two lines very rarely join, and engage with ſwords
and bayonets. This reciprocal fituation enables the whole, or any
part of an army frequently to change its poſition, or quit the field
entirely, as circumſtances may require, without difficulty or dau
ger, and with little loſs. -

A MUSKET, and every ſpecies of fire-arms, are the moſt delicate

inſtruments of war, and moſt uncertain in their effects. Indepen
dent of the quantity and quality of the powder, the manner of
-
loading
14 OF TH E M O DE R N INSTITUTION

loading the piece, the ſtate of the atmoſphere, the agitation of the
ſoldier, &c. cauſe ſuch variations in the direction of the piece, as
renders its effečt very uncertain; inſomuch, that by calculation it
appears, that not above one ſhot in four hundred takes place. The
diſtance between the two armies, and the uncertainty of the effeóts
of fire-arms, are the cauſes why our battles are never deciſive ;
few are ſlain, and the remainder have time to retire. Wars are
not now as formerly terminated by battles, and complete vićtories.
An army, though much inferior in number to the enemy, and
even in point of goodneſs, when commanded by an able leader,
will occupy ſome advantageous poſt, ſtop the progreſs of the
mighty and vićtorious for years, till vićtor and vanquiſhed are
almoſt equally exhauſted and ruined, and peace is become ne
ceſſary to both parties, for want of means to proſecute the war.
Hence, in our days, no kingdoms are overturned, no nation is en
ſlaved. The ſubjećt alone feels the weight and calamities of war.
The monarch, ignorant of their miſeries, fits down in peace, enjoys
his pleaſures, regardleſs of the ultimate event, becauſe it ſeldom
affects his throne. He makes war or peace to gratify his own ca
price, or that of a favourite. -

If the natural defeóts of fire-arms are ſuch, and ſo many, that a

good markſman, left entirely to himſelf, cannot once in ten times
hit an obječt placed at any confiderable diſtance, what can be ex
pected from an ordinary ſoldier in the ranks, preſſed before, behind,
and on every ſide, his motions continually interrupted by thoſe of
his comrades; agitated by the cries of the dying, and by the terror
of death floating before his eyes, himſelf and the objećt he aims
at, if any, in perpetual motion ? Very little can be expected from
this man, as we have already ſhewn. When to all this you add
the motions of the horſe, it will appear evident that fire-arms,
excepting a pair of piſtols, when the enemy is near, are totally
incompatible with cavalry, as well as with all maſſive bodies; be
cauſe
 O F A N A R M Y. - I5

cauſe neither can uſe them with advantage. It is difficult, and

perhaps impoſſible to find out a method to range the infantry, ſo as
to make uſe of fire-arms with any degree of ſucceſs. If it is formed
of ſeveral ranks, three or more deep, and likewiſe with the ranks
and files cloſe, as is now the mode, they cannot make uſe of their
arms; and if formed in few ranks, with ranks and files open,
they cannot fire at all; and being thus diſunited, they can neither
move nor ačt for want of ſtrength. On the whole, therefore, it ſeems
impoſfible to range a body of men armed with muſkets ſo that they
may have the properties required, viz. ſtrength, ačtivity, and uni
verſality. Theſe difficulties have obliged the moderns to try ſeveral
methods to diminiſh them, by introducing different manners of
firing. Some have thought it was beſt to fire by ranks, others by
files, as platoons, diviſions, &c. Count St. Germain, in a valuable
treatiſe publiſhed fince his death, rejects both methods, and propoſes
it ſhould be done by ſingle files, beginning at the right or left. The
firing by ranks, if you begin with the laſt, then the ſecond, and
firſt ſucceſſively, is undoubtedly the moſt ſimple mode of any, and
the leaſt ſubject to difficulties and confuſion. The laſt rank having
fired falls back three ſteps, the ſecond one, and the firſt remaining
in their place. Then they cloſe the ranks, and begin with their
third rank as before, advancing gradually ten or twenty paces,
and then halt to fire as before. The platoon firing, eſpecially
if done in ſmall diviſions, does not continue two minutes, it is all
confuſion, to which the noiſe of the officers in giving command
does not a little contribute. The method propoſed by St. Ger
main is ſubjećt to the ſame and greater difficulties. Whence it
appears that a muſket, and indeed every other ſpecies of miſſile
weapon, can be uſed with advantage only by men placed ſingly.
The firing by ranks in the manner propoſed approaches the neareſt
to it, and therefore ought to be preferred to all others. It might be
continued for ſeveral hours regularly, and without any interruption
or confuſion, which cannot be done in any other method. I do not
propoſe
16 MOD ERN IN STITU TI O N, &c.

propoſe this method as perfeót; I believe it is impoſſible to find any

that is not ſubjećt to numberleſs difficulties. This ſeems to me to
have fewer than others.

IN whatever manner the troops are ranged, and in whatever

manner they fire, it is certain the effect is confined within a very
narrow compaſs. When the ground between you and the enemy is
very cloſe, ſo that they cannot approach you without much diffi
culty, or not at all, then indeed, the uſe of fire-arms is indiſpen
ſible, and very advantageous; the enemy muſt overcome the obſta
cles which they throw in his way, and which hinder him from mak
ing any great uſe of his arms, while yours are more or leſs covered,
are fired with eaſe, and generally with ſucceſs. But when the enemy
can and will approach you, which he ought to do if he attacks, it
is evident that the uſe of the muſket ceaſes, and the combat muſt
be finiſhed by ſome other weapon, unleſs your troops are frightened,
and run away before the enemy approaches. w

FRoM theſe premiſes I draw two concluſions: 1ſt. That the muſket
is not adequate to all the purpoſes of war: 2d. That the uſe of fire
arms is particularly adapted to a defenſive war. In a plain and open
country, where the enemy's cavalry or infantry can approach you,
fire-arms ſoon become uſeleſs; and in a cloſe country you can find
a thouſand ſtrong camps, which neither cavalry nor infantry can ap
proach without much difficulty : then fire-arms are of infinite uſe,
and the only arms which can be of any ſervice.
BUT, as in war, it is neceſſary to attack as well as defend; and it
was found that the muſket was proper only for the latter, and that
every inſtitution would be imperfeót, unleſs a troop was armed with
hand weapons as well as miſſile; we have attempted to unite the ad
vantages of both by adding the bayonets, but without ſucceſs: for
the whole is too ſhort and cumberſome as a hand weapon, and the
bayonet ſerves only to render the uſe of the muſket more difficult,
and its effects leſs certain.
C H A P.
 [ 17 º

C H A PT E R VI.

OF TH E A D W A N TA G E S AND DE FECTS
O F

M I SS I L E AN D HA N D W E A P O N S.

T ET us examine and compare the advantages and defeóts of

miſfile and hand weapons: this will lead us to conclude,
that both are abſolutely neceſſary to form the inſtitution of a
complete body of men. Fire-arms are calculated for a defenſive
war, and to keep the enemy at a diſtance, which prevents a total
overthrow; but are of no uſe when he can approach you.

HAND-we A Pons, on the contrary, can be of no uſe at a diſtance;

but are abſolutely neceſſary when the armies approach each other.
The former are proper for a cloſe country, the latter for an open
one. The effects of the one are precarious and undeciſive ; thoſe
of the latter certain and complete. The muſket is the reſource of
prudence and weakneſs; hand-weapons are the arms of valor and
vigor.

AN able general, at the head of troops armed with fire

arms, though inferior in number to the enemy, may protračt a
war many years, and finally prevail over a leſs able leader; which
cannot be effected if the armies carry hand-weapons: for they muſt
neceſſarily ſoon come to an aćtion, and that ačtion muſt, from the .
nature of the arms, be deciſive: hence the art of war, among the
ancients, was ſimple and deciſive; and hence it is complicated and
ſcientific among the moderns.
C THE
18 OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DEFECTS

THE art of war of the ancients was confined to what we call

evolution, direéted to the purpoſe of fighting only, which they
conſidered as the ſole means of finiſhing a war. In ſhort, their
whole attention was directed to diſcipline, to the exerciſe of the
troops, and to the field of battle.

But we ſtudy camps, poſitions, and lines: our plans of opera

tions are very extenſive, and often embrace a hundred leagues,
which we cover by occupying a given poſition: thoſe of the ancients
were contračted and confined within a narrow compaſs; ſeek the
enemy, and fight him, was their favorite military maxim : they
did not ſeem to think it poſſible to protract a war by ſkilful man
oeuvres: accordingly, their wars were of very ſhort duration, unleſs
ſome exterior circumſtances, ariſing from the nature of the
ground, that of the troops, and finally, from the different political
ſyſtems of the contending parties, tended to protračt them ; which
we have ſhown to be the caſe in the Peloponneſian war, and
which, we ſhall hereafter ſee, was the cauſe that made the Punic
wars ſo long. - -

THE principles of an active and defenſive war were little known

to the ancients. Jugurtha and Sertorius ſeem to have been the only
generals of antiquity who underſtood and pračtiſed them: but
none of theſe wars can be comparcd, for vigor and activity, with
the late war in Germany; in which more battles were fought in
two campaigns, than in any century among the ancients.

THE reſult was very different from the uſual effect of ancient
wars. A great part of the globe changed maſters during the fixth
century of the Roman republic; whereas the empire of Germany
remained in its former ſtate, at the peace of Hubertſburg: this dif.
ference aroſe, we think, entirely from that of the ancient and
modern
 O F M I SS I LE AND HAN D WE APO N S. 19

modern arms, and conſequently from the different mode of con

ducting a war.

WE are often obliged to act a defenſive part to cover and protećt

an immenſe tract of country againſt a ſuperior enemy : prudence
requires that we ſhould avoid a general action; and when we think
it adviſeable to riſk one, aided as we are with fire-arms, a thou
fand ſtrong camps may be found where we may engage an enemy
with advantage.

A GIvEN poſition will enable a good general to harraſs and check

the progreſs of an enemy during a whole campaign, whereas the
ancients, armed with hand-weapons, came ſo near each other, that
it was almoſt impoſſible to avoid a general ačtion, which, from the
nature of their arms, was deciſive.

FABIUs, aided by a very cloſe and mountainous country, with

difficulty protracted one campaign without coming to a battle, be
cauſe Hannibal's forces conſiſted chiefly in cavalry, which, in ſuch
a country, could not ačt with advantage.

THE reſult of what I have ſaid is, that an army armed with
fire-arms only, is ſlow in its motions, and undeciſive in its aćtions;
it is charaćterized with ſcience and art, and particularly adapted to
a defenſive war.

TRoops, armed with hand-weapons, are rapid in their motions,

and deciſive in their ačtions; leſs ſcientific than the former, but
ſingularly proper for an attack.

IT ſeems, therefore, that to render an army perfeót, and ade

quate to every purpoſe of war, it ſhould be provided with both
kinds of weapons.
C 2 If
2O O F THE FOR M AT I O N OF

If one ſpecies of arms cannot be made ſo as to ſerve the purpoſe

of a muſket and a hand-weapon, which I believe is the caſe, a
body of men muſt be ſo formed as to manage both kinds of arms;
or, finally, different bodies of men armed differently, muſt be
ranged in ſuch a manner that they can aid and ſupport each
other. We ſhall examine this theory hereafter. How far mo
dern armies are endowed with the perfeótion we aim at, will appear
in the courſe of our inveſtigation. I beg the reader's pardon for hav
ing dwelt ſo long on this ſubjećt, and for having uſed ſo many repe
titions; but I confider what I have been advancing as the foundation
of all taétics, which alone can offer us fome certain and fixed prin
ciples to form and condućt an army: I hope, therefore, and recom
mend to all military men, that what has been ſaid in this chapter
may be examined and weighed with the attention it deſerves.

C H A P T E R VII.

O F T H E F O R M A T I O N

O F

B A T TA LI o N S AND S Q_U A D R O N S.

H E moderns have adopted the muſket as an univerſal wea

pon, and, of courſe, endeavoured to range the infantry rela
tively to its form and uſe; but without ſucceſs: for we have already
proved, that a body of men, ranged three deep, cannot make uſe
of fire-arms with advantage, which the experience of every battle,
and the millions of ſhot fired without effect, prove to a demonſtra
tion. Befides, this mode of ranging the troops is attended with
many inconveniencies, and is ſubject to ſome capital defects.
FIRST,
 BATTAL I O N S AND S QUADR O N s. 2 I

FIRST, A line of three ranks wants ſtrength : it cannot with

ſtand the ſhock either of horſe or foot, if the former ačt with vigor,
and if the latter are formed on more ſolid principles, and are pro
perly armed. This extreme weakneſs is the cauſe that two or
three battalions cannot advance half a mile on a plain, on a day of
review, without floating: one part or other always proječts; and
you are forced to ſtop continually to reëtify the line, and make it
proceed regularly.

Second, This very thin order neceſſarily obliges you to extend

the front, whoſe motions become more difficult in proportion ; ;
and ačtivity, the moſt eſſential quality an army can poſſeſs, is en
tirely loſt.

A LINE, conſiſting of thirty battalions and fifty ſquadrons, occupies.

five or fix miles from one end to the other. It is eaſy to conceive,
that however open the country may be, ſo extenſive a line muſt
move with great ſlowneſs and difficulty ; and if the ground is .
cloſe, and interſe&ted with hedges, ravins, &c. it can neither move
nor ačt at all ; and the whole is continually ſtopped, ſometimes for
many hours, before you can advance a ſingle mile : and when at
length you come near the enemy, your attacks are weak and par
tial, confined to ſome particular points, which are often not the .
moſt favorable: whereas a general effort ſhould be made againſt the
enemy's whole front, while at the ſame time particular ones are
carried on againſt thoſe parts which offer the greateſt advantages.

The ſlowneſs of your march gives the enemy time to prepare

themſelves for your reception, to change their poſition, or to retire
ſo prudently, that theſe mighty preparations finiſh in a few incon
ſiderable ſkirmiſhes.

JT
22 O F T H E F O R M A TI O N, &c.

It matters not how numerous an army is, unleſs, by ſuperior

aćtivity and diſpoſition, you can and do bring more men into ačtion
againſt the different points you attack, than the enemy can oppoſe
to you.

IT was to this advantage only that the king of Pruſſia owed

many of his victories in the laſt war; for his army, except at the
battle of Prague, was always inferior to thoſe of his enemies: add
to this, that ſuch an extenſive line muſt neceſſarily have many
weak parts from unfavorable ground, of which an able general
will avail himſelf, and attack you there with advantage.

FINALLY, your diſpoſition being once made, it muſt be proſe

scuted, and the line muſt advance on its original track; for its ex
treme length and natural ſlowneſs do not permit any alteration to
be made near the enemy, however neceſſary it might be; and if a
brigade or a regiment is thrown into confuſion, the whole line
muſt ſtop ; and if ſome remedy is not inſtantly applied, drawn from
the ſecond line, the battle is loſt: for the enemy penetrates through
the interval, attacks your army, thus cut in two, on both flanks,
and beats you ; which happened exactly in this manner at the battle
of Prague, as we ſhall relate hereafter. Much more might be ſaid
to prove, that the modern method of ranging the infantry three
deep, renders it totally defective in two eſſential properties—ſtrength
and ačtivity.

THIS method of ranging the infantry three deep is likewiſe ſo

far from rendering it univerſally proper for all operations of war,
that it can march in that order only in a plain, at the riſk of being
cut to pieces by a reſolute cavalry, or by infantry formed on more
ſolid and active principles; and it can fight only, when covered by
a ſtrong country, by intrenchments, &c. where an enemy can ap
proach it with difficulty: ſo that, upon the whole, it ſeems defec
tive
 O F T H E C A W A L R Y. 23

tive in three points, viz. ſtrength, ačtivity, and univerſality; in

which we think the perfeótion of an army, and indeed of every
machine, doth principally confiſt. This we give as our opinion
only, without the leaſt pretenſions to infallibility: let the more
able examine and decide.

C H A P T E R VIII.

O F T H E C A V A L R Y.

HOUGH I have not ſerved in the cavalry, yet, as I have

ſeveral times commanded confiderable detachments of horſe,
I hope it will not be thought impertinent, if I preſume to give my
opinion upon this ſubjećt.

CAvALRY are generally, like the Infantry, ranged three deep,

and armed with muſkets, piſtols, and ſwords. The difficulty with
which the infantry manage the muſket, proves that the cavalry
cannot uſe it at all, particularly the two laſt ranks.

THE Huſſars, and ſuch troops as generally act fingly, may be

permitted to continue the uſe of muſkets; but thoſe who are
formed and ranged to ačt in a maſs, and ſword in hand, ought
not to carry them, becauſe they are expenſive, troubleſome, and
totally uſeleſs.

IT will be objećted, that if the cavalry do not carry a muſket,

a few Huſſars, or other troops who do, will be able to harraſs, and
Perhaps
 24 :O F T H E C. A. W. A. L R Y.

perhaps beat double the number of the beſt cavalry, who can nei
ther remain quiet on the ſpot, nor purſue in a line ; the only me
thod they have in ačting againſt a ſcattered and light enemy. The
muſket, therefore, is neceſſary in the cavalry.

THIS argument appears plauſible; but in fact has, in my hum

ble opinion, little weight: for whether they carry muſkets, or not,
they will loſe their labour if ever they pretend to ſkirmiſh with the
light horſe ; their men and horſes will be harraſſed; and they will
be finally beat back to their line, from which they ought never to
depart.

CAv ALRY neither can, nor ought to fight but with ſword in
hand; when the ground, or the troops they contend with, do not
permit this to be done, they muſt be kept back, or elſe mixed with
ſtrong detachments of infantry, formed in ſuch a manner as to be
able to reſiſt the charge of the enemy's cavalry; of courſe the
muſket muſt be laid aſide.

THE ranging of the cavalry three deep is intended, no doubt, to

enable them to reſiſt the ſhock of an enemy; but as we have ſaid
before, they ought not at any time to wait for the ſhock, becauſe
even a light and weak cavalry, on full gallop, will break through
any line of horſe, however maſſive, if it waits the ſhock.

The ranks being cloſed, the firſt overthrown, neceſſarily falls on

the ſecond, this on the third, and ſo on; and the whole runs
away; but if the ranks were kept at ſome diſtance from one another,
when the firſt was broken, the ſecond might advance and attack the
w

enemy, already checked and in diſorder, and eaſily put them to flight.
But being formed, ranks and files cloſed, there is no remedy at
all for a diſaſter, except from the ſecond line or reſerve, as in the
infantry:
 O F T H E C A V A L R Y. 25

infantry : and even this reſource will fail of ſucceſs, if the enemy
purſues his advantages with vigour. For the firſt line will probably
throw the ſecond alſo into confuſion, becauſe there are not
ſufficient openings in the ſecond for the firſt to paſs through, which
there ought to be : then indeed the ſecond line, on ſeeing the
firſt in confuſion, ought to advance ſword in hand, and might thus
probably gain an eaſy vićtory. The broken line in the mean
time recolle&ts itſelf, and forms again behind the ſecond, which
is now become the firſt.

The ſword is too ſhort, and particularly, as the ſoldier is taught

to fit with long ſtirrups; he kills the horſe by a dead weight, al
ways bearing without intermiſſion on the ſame parts: this may be
graceful for aught I know, but it is very oppreſſive to the horſe,
and hinders the man from reaching the enemy. Piſtols are ne
ceſſary in caſe the man loſes i.is ſword, that he may not remain
totally defenceleſs.

People talk very much of the ſhock of the cavalry. If they

mean that two horſes puſh each other, and ſtrike with their breaſts,
which the French, who abound in unmeaning words, call coup
DE Poit RAIL, it is an abſurdity; for the head and neck being
projećted in a right line before the horſe's breaſt, it is impoſſible to
ſtrike with it ; ſomething, however, conſiderable is, and may be
done, when a ſquadron either waits for, or encounters another.

The horſes being puſhed on vigorouſly, and finding themſelves

checked by the head of thoſe in front, endeavour to paſs between
them ; and in ſuch caſe, it is certain that the cavalry, which moves
with the greateſt velocity, whatever may be the oppoſite maſs, will
undoubtedly penetrate and overthrow it. Hence it is that velocity
is every thing in the cavalry : if you are deficient in this, your
D crvalry
 26 O F T H E C A V A L R Y.

cavalry is not worth keeping. I ſaw once an example of this

kind during the laſt war near Gourlitz in Luſitatia.

ZIETHEN's regiment of huſſars fell in with the Auſtrian ca

rabineers, and was repulſed; but on ſeeing the king's army
arrive they rallied, attacked the carabineers (who imprudently
waited quietly on the ſpot) broke them, drove ſome hundreds into
a moraſs, where they were killed or made priſoners in fight of the
Auſtrian vanguard, conſiſting of eight or ten thouſand men, who
could not relieve them; for the action laſted only a few minutes.

C H A P T E R IX.

of THE MO DE RN or DER of BATTLE.

Y order of battle, I mean the diſtribution of the different

ſpecies of troops of which an army is compoſed, not including
thoſe which paſs under the denomination of light troops, as they
never enter the line.

In general, the whole is ranged in two or more lines; becauſe,

firſt, the being formed only in three ranks, it would take up ſo much
ground, that it would be impoſſible to range or manage a nume
rous army. Secondly, to ſupply the defečts and weakneſs of the
firſt line, by ſupporting it, and replacing the whole or any part of
it, which may be broken and thrown into diſorder, by the ſecond.

THE cavalry and infantry form ſeparate bodies; the former are
generally placed on the flanks of the latter.

THE
 OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE. 27.

The perfeótion of an order of battle conſiſts, as we apprehend,

firſt, in placing each body of men, where they can act with moſt
advantage. Secondly, in bodies of different ſpecies, being ſo placed
as to be able to ſupport each other that the vićtory may be com
plete; otherwiſe it often happens, that while your cavalry are vic
torious, the infantry are beat, and the battle loſt, or vice verſa.
Thirdly, in your armies being ſo ranged as to be univerſally ad
apted to different ſpecies of ground, ſo as to require no material
alteration in marching up to the enemy, or during the aëtion.

FIRs T, It is evident, that if the cavalry are placed on the flanks

of the infantry, they can neither ſupport, nor be ſupported by it,
which diſpoſition I therefore conceive is a moſt capital defečt.

Secon D, Both in marching, camping, and fighting, it may and

generally does happen, that the infantry and cavalry are placed on
improper ground, where, however, they muſt ſo remain; becauſe
it is in general impoſſible to change the original diſpoſition; there
fore, upon the whole, it ſeems deficient in all the points, which
conſtitute a ſolid and ačtive order of battle.

MoREover, as both lines are formed in a cloſe order, if the firſt is

broke and vigorouſly purſued, it overthrows the ſecond for want of
ſufficient openings. This cannot advance with celerity, and in a firm
order to ſtop the enemy; ſo that both generally go off together,
and the battle is loſt. Whereas, if at leaſt the ſecond line had in
tervals to let the firſt paſs through them, and at the ſame time
advanced in good order, while the enemy is in ſome degree of u0.1 .
fuſion, they would not only check them, but probably would gain
an eaſy vićtory. -

The reaſon given for placing the cavalry on the wings is, to
protećt the flanks of the infantry, which I think is the moſt ab
D 2 ſurd
28 OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE.

furd reaſon that can be alledged, becauſe this may in a moment for
tify its flanks againſt infantry or cavalry, by forming a ſquare or a
column, which the cavalry cannot do ; its flanks are naturally ſo
weak, that they offer no kind of defence.

M. st. GER MAIN, in a work publiſhed ſince his death, for this
very reaſon adviſes, that the cavalry ſhould camp behind the in
fantry, becauſe, ſays he, if it is attacked in the night, it is totally
defeated before it can be put in a ſtate of defence.

NUMBERs, beyond a certain point, can add nothing to the force

of an army, unleſs they can be made to act together ; they increaſe
its inačtivity, and render it altogether unmanageable. By thus ſe
parating the cavalry from the infantry, it very ſeldom happens that
they can be brought to ačt in a proper place, and in a proper mo
ment: they really, in a day of ačtion, form two different armies,
and ačt ſeparately, and very indire&tly contribute, if at all, to the
ſupport and ſucceſs of each other.

If either is beat, the other muſt fall back and retire : whereas
if they were formed on other principles, the whole muſt be van s
quiſhed, or none, becauſe they would form only one army, though
compoſed of different ſpecies of troops, and mutually ſupport each
other.

BEFoRE I conclude this diſcourſe, I muſt, firſt, beg leave to re

capitulate, briefly, what we have ſaid, that the reader may ſee it
at one view, and be enabled to examine and form a clear judgment
of it. Secondly, to give a deſcription of a battle, which will
corroborate and illuſtrate the opinions and arguments that I have
endeavoured to eſtabliſh.

FIRST, The general uſe of fire-arms, and of every kind of miſfile

weapons, is not adapted to all the various operations of war, but is
finguarly
 OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE. 29

fingularly proper for a defenſive war, and conſequently for a cloſe

country, where the troops being covered and protećted by the ob
ſtacles which ſuch a country offers, the enemy can with difficulty
approach you. .

SecondLY, That the uſe of miſfile weapons has rendered the

art of war much more ſcientific than it was among the ancients,
when it was confined chiefly to the arrangement of the troops, the
exerciſe, and evolutions: what we call manoeuvres, on an extenſive
line, ſeem to have been little known to them ; and fighting was the
only method adopted by them for finiſhing a war, which the na-.
ture of their arms ſoon brought to a concluſion.

THIRDLY, That our battles neither are nor can be deciſive, and
may be confidered rather as great ſkirmiſhes than general adions,
very few being ſlain in compariſon with what happened when hand
weapons alone were uſed.

Four THLY, Though our infantry were formed three deep, with.
a view to the muſket they carry; yet can they make but a very
imperfeót uſe of it, and the cavalry cannot uſe it at all.
z

FIFTHLY, That by forming both infantry and cavalry in three

ranks, they are too weak to march with firmneſs and conſiſtence,
to attack or defend themſelves againſt troops formed on more ſolid
and ačtive principles.

Sixthly, This method of forming the troops neceſſarily

lengthens the line, ſo that it cannot march with any velocity in a
plain, much leſs in a cloſe country.

SEvent HLY, That a line of five or fix miles, does of courſe

meet with improper ground for the kind of troops which may hap
pen
3o . OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE.

pen to be placed there; yet no alteration can be made in the line,

however neceſſary it may be.

EIGHTHLY, That the whole front muſt advance together, which

renders it totally ina&tive, and gives the enemy time to take their
meaſures for fighting or retreating at their pleaſure, which reduces
the battle to an inconſiderable ſkirmiſh.

NINTHLY, That the general cannot poſſibly ſee and condućt all
the operations of ſuch an extenſive line, ſo that, by the negle&t,
ignorance, or malice of the officers under his command, the action
is always very imperfeótly carried on, and fails of ſucceſs in more
than one point; which may render that of the other attacks uſeleſs.
It wants, in ſhort, unity of ačtion and ačtivity in the execution.

TENTHLY, To prevent the line from being protraćted without

end, we are obliged to form ſeveral; ſo that if we confider the few
men who act together in the firſt, and that none at all ačt in the
others, unleſs ſucceſſively, and when it is commonly too late ; we
ſhall find, that not a ſixth part of the army is engaged at one time,
and of that fixth part not one, perhaps, at the moſt eligible point
of attack or defence. -

ALL theſe defeóts, and many more which could be enumerated,

proceed originally from our making the muſket the general inſtru
ment; and from our adapting both the formation of the troops”
and order of battle to that inſtrument, as we have clearly proved
in the preceding chapters.

O F A B A T T L E.

I can no way better expoſe the defečts of our military arrange

ments, than by relating in a few words, how this great machine,
an army, is brought into action, how a battle is fought and con
cluded,
 OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE. 31

cluded, and what are, in general, its conſequences, which I have

ſeen in the courſe of ſeveral campaigns.

After many marches and counter-marches, which often take

up the moſt favourable part of a campaign, a battle is at length
reſolved on : all thoſe who are informed of this reſolution, and too
many always are, put themſelves in motion to ſolicit ſome com
mand, or to carry the news of the expected vićtory; in obtaining
which favour and intrigue generally prevail, to the prejudice of
the truly brave and deſerving officer.

Sever AL days are employed in examining the poſition of the

enemy, which might be done in five minutes; for a general who
cannot, in one inſtant of time, ſee and determine the manner of
attacking any camp, is unworthy to command an army: during
ſuch delay, the enemy prepare themſelves to receive you, fortify
themſelves, change their poſition, or retire ; ſo that you have freſh
and great difficulties to encounter, or perhaps you loſe your labour,
and muſt follow the enemy to ſeek another opportunity, which may
not offer in a whole campaign; eſpecially if under an able general,
who wiſhes to avoid an ačtion.

THE mode of attacking is at length fixed, which, ten to one,

muſt be altered, becauſe the enemy, while you loſe your time in
preparing yourſelf, have materially altered their poſition. If you
are not apprized of this in time, and you march up to them, your
original diſpoſition is loſt, and you are unable to form another that
may be proper to anſwer the preſent circumſtances, which may re
quire that your cavalry or infantry ſhould change the ground, and
replace each other. Nothing of this can be executed before the
enemy, without offering your flanks, and conſequently expoſing
yourſelf to a total defeat. When any alteration in the order of
battle is required, it ſhould be done a day or two before you quit
your
32 OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE.

your camp, otherwiſe ſuch confuſion will enſue as cannot be

remedied.

The battle of Lignitz, in 1 60, was loſt, and the brave Laudhon
facrificed to malice or ignorance, becauſe the quarter-maſter general
of M. Daun's army would, the evening before the battle, change
entirely the original order of battle withou any apparent reaſon. The
conſequence was, that the main army arrived upon the ground about
ten hours too late, when we found Laudhon had been well beat,
and the king ready to receive us; but as our original plan was fruſ
trated, we could not form another, though we had ſufficient time,
and though with Laudhon's army we were above twenty thouſand
men ſtronger than the enemy, whom we permitted to continue
his march to the Oder unmoleſted : the reader will pardon this
digreſſion.

The different brigades of artillery generally precede the columns,

to favour their developement; that is, to prevent the enemy from
oppoſing the forming of the line, and becauſe the general and the
ſoldier think nothing can be done without it, though in truth it
produces more noiſe than any real advantage. This prodigious train
of cannon, and its concomitants, continually ſtop and retard the
march of the troops by ſome accident or other, ſo that ſeldom or
ever they arrive together, and in time, on the ground where the line
is to be formed.

This is a very critical moment, if the enemy knew how to

avail himſelf of it: for if he is perfectly acquainted with the ground
between his camp, and that which you have left, he will know all
the roads by which you march, and conſequently by advancing to
meet you, in order of battle, he can attack the heads of your co
lumns, and defeat them all fingly, without giving them an oppor
tunity of ever forming the line, in the ſame manner as one attacks
* a rear
 OF THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE. 33

a rear-guard: but happily for you, he confides in the ſtrength of

his poſt, and ſuffers you to do what you pleaſe.

His army is like a ſet of china-ware on a chimney-piece, it muſt .

not be touched or moved, for fear of breaking it: after three or
four hours cannonading and ſkirmiſhing your army is formed, and
advances towards the enemy preceded by the artillery, which retards
the march very much, and occaſions the loſs of many men, which
could be avoided by marching rapidly to the enemy.

Supposing the army conſiſts of ſixty thouſand men, the firſt

line will occupy five or fix miles; in this extent of ground a thou
ſand obſtacles both by art and nature occur, which neceſſarily retard
your progreſs, becauſe the whole line muſt advance together; for
if ſome parts precede at any, though ſmall diſtances, the others, a
vigilant enemy, by marching rapidly through the intervals, cuts
your army aſunder, takes you in flank and gains the battle; which
ſo happened exactly at the battle of Prague.

To avoid ſuch an inconvenience, by keeping your army together,

and advancing in a line parallel to that of the enemy, you are ſome
times ſeveral hours in getting over a mile of ground, which ought
to be executed in a few minutes. If by the firmneſs of your troops,
and the inačtivity of your enemy, you come up with him, and
ſucceed in one or two points of attack only, the battle is won,
though perhaps only two or three battalions have been diſplaced;
and if you fail in what you ſuppoſe the principal attack, you retire
almoſt unpurſued, and you have loſt the battle.

In the former caſe, the enemy has no reſource in his firſt line,
which can make no movement but forwards or backwards; ſo that
if you can maintain yourſelf on the ground you have gained, the
E enemy
34 of THE MODERN ORDER OF BATTLE,
enemy retires ſucceſſively, and goes off. This is a critical moment
alſo, if the enemy knew what to do. -

If inſtead of endeavouring to regain the points loſt, he advanced

part of his ſecond line to prevent your going farther, and oblige
you to bring the greateſt part of your forces to maintain the ground
gained, which is generally done ; and if with the reſt of his army
he made ſome conſiderable effort on the reſt of your line, in all
probability he would ſucceed, and force you by this means to relin
quiſh the advantages you had gained to prevent this part of your
army from being cut off, which would certainly happen, if any
other part of your line was driven back and defeated: ſometimes,
indeed, ſuch a movement is made, but generally with a view only
to favour a retreat, and ſeldom or ever to gain a vićtory.

As your attacks are ſucceſſive, ſo muſt your advantages be, and

you gain one part after another, or rather the enemy abandons them,
you can make no general effort in attacking or purſuing the enemy,
who has time to retire at his leiſure.

You R army who have, perhaps, been twenty-four hours under

arms, are ſo fatigued with that fituation and with the combat, that
they are unable to move, and much leſs to proſecute the advan
tages they have gained with any vigour.

The light troops are ſent after the enemy, but with ſmall ſuc
ceſs, for they are generally attentive only to plunder; and more
over, a few battalions thrown into a wood or village put an end to
the purſuit; and the enemy, who probably have loſt only a few
cannon and priſoners, occupy a neighbouring hill, and your vićtory
is reduced to nothing more than barely the field of battle.

SU cra
 A N E W S Y S T E M. 35.

Such have been the vićtories I have ſeen, and ſuch the conſe
quences, which I can attribute only to the natural ſlowneſs and
ina&tivity of our armies, which proceed, as we have ſhewn, from
the uſe of fire-arms, and from the conſequent mode of ranging
the troops.

SoMETIMEs, indeed, a commander of very ſuperior abilities may,

from ſuch an imperfect vićtory as I have deſcribed, draw great and
fignal advantages, as it happened after the battle of Liſſa, where
the Auſtrians, in the courſe of a month, loſt ſucceſſively the greater
part of their army, without any apparent neceſſity for the loſs.

But when the commanders are nearly equal in abilities, a whole

war may paſs in ſkirmiſhes, without their ever coming to a general
and concluſive action, which happened on the Rhine when Monte
cuculi and Turenne were oppoſed to each other.

INDEED our battles, as we have ſeen, are commonly nothing

more than great ſkirmiſhes; and therefore, as I have ſaid before,
wars are not now, as formerly, concluded by battles, but for want
of means to protract them.

C H A P T E R X.

A N E W S Y S T E M.

TAVING ſhewn, in the preceding chapters, that the uſe of

fire-arms excluſively; the arrangement of our infantry and
cavalry in three ranks in conſequence of uſing thoſe arms; and
finally, the order of battle, are imperfeót, and render an army in
adequate to almoſt every operation of war; it remains, that we
- E 2 ſhould
 36 A N E W S Y S T E M.

ſhould examine, whether and how a given number of men, horſe

or foot, may be armed and formed, and the order of battle ſo con
trived, that it may be free from thoſe defečts to which our modern
inſtitutions are ſubjećt; and that it poſſeſs ſtrength, ačtivity, and
univerſality, in which we make the perfeótion of an army to
confiſt.

WHILE we make uſe of fire-arms alone, as is now the caſe in

the infantry (for the bayonet and ſword are of no uſe to the ſoldier)
it is evident, that no ſyſtem can be formed which will in any de
gree diminiſh the imperfeótions of our armies: if you range the
men in two ranks, for example, that they may uſe the muſket
with more advantage, the line will be ſo extenſive and weak, that
it cannot be managed at all, or ſcarce be put in motion; much
leſs will it be able to reſiſt the ſhock of the enemy: and if, on
the contrary, you range the troops in four or five ranks, all the
arms they can carry will become totally uſeleſs.

IT follows, therefore, that a certain number of men ſhould be

armed with pikes : this alone can enable us to form a number of
men in ſuch a manner, that they ſhall have ſtrength to refiſt the
ſhock of an enemy, horſe or foot, and to act in every kind of
ground with equal advantage; it muſt combine and unite the ſoli
dity of hand-weapons with the advantage of fire-arms. If this can
be accompliſhed, we approach very near the perfeótion we aim at ;
and undoubtedly render an army, formed on theſe principles, ſupe
rior to any other now exiſting.

The uſe of hand-weapons neceſſarily requires defenſive weapons,

ſufficiently ſtrong to parry or diminiſh their effeółs; they are ſo con
neéted, that they ought never to be ſeparated, particularly in the
cavalry, where the action paſſes ſword in hand.
ARMoUR
 OF THE DRESS OF THE SOLDIER. 37

ARMour of any kind in the infantry, oppoſed to infantry, armed

as it is at preſent, is leſs neceſſary, though always uſeful; it gives
confidence to the men, and likewiſe diminiſhes, and ſometimes
deſtroys entirely the effects of a muſket-ball when fired from a cer
tain diſtance, or with a conſiderable angle, above or below the hori
zon and direét line. And as infantry may be, and very often is op
poſed to cavalry, and cloſes with infantry, I think it ought to be
provided with ſuch an armour as we ſhall propoſe hereafter.

It is well known, that a third or fourth part of an army, in

the courſe of a few months, by death or fickneſs, goes off; of which
diminution many cauſes may be aſſigned, as bad and ſcanty food,
and neglect of the fick in the hoſpitals. The principal cauſe how
ever is, I think, the dreſs, which does not cover the ſoldier againſt
the inclemency of the weather, and ſeems calculated only for pa
rade and ſhew, in a ſunſhiny day, before the ladies, like the dreſs
of other petit-maitres. Whereas it is evident, that both the dreſs,
arms, and exerciſe, ſhould be made with a view only to health,
and to the purpoſes of war: and it being impoſſible for the ſoldier
to carry every thing which may, once in an age, be uſeful to him,
we muſt fix upon ſuch equipments only, as he will find always
neceſſary and uſeful.

C H A P T E R XI.

O F TH E D RES S OF TH E S O L D I E R.

E muſt have three ſhirts of ſtrong cloth, without thoſe gew

gaws ruffles; two pair of drawers; two pair of breeches
made of ticking, and long enough to come almoſt to his ancles,
ſuch as the Huſſars, Croats, and Hungarian infantry wear; two
pair
35 of THE DRESS OF THE so LDIER.

pair of ſtrong thread ſtockings; and four pair of ſocks, to keep

his feet clean, and prevent them from galling and bliſtering, which
is always the caſe when the wool is next the ſkin.

He muſt have two waiſtcoats of the ſame ſtuff with the breeches,
and two under-waiſtcoats, unleſs the upper ones are lined, which
I would prefer.

He muſt, for the winter, have the ſame number of woollen

{tockings, a pair of breeches, waiſtcoat, and coat of ſtrong and thick
woollen cloth. The coat muſt have a lapelle to come to the waiſt
band of his breeches, and to button from top to bottom. The
flaps of the coat and waiſtcoat muſt not be ſo open and gallant as
the preſent mode. - -

He muſt alſo have a good great coat, with ſleeves, to come be

low the calf of the leg, with a ſmall cape or collar to button
about his neck, and a hood to come over his head, under his hat.

ALL the winter apparel may remain with the depot of the re
giment until September, excepting the great coat: that will keep
him warm enough, though the reſt of his cloaths are only of
linen or cotton.

HE muſt have a black leather ſtock, quilted within, to keep

him warm, and at the ſame time to keep the ſtock in a proper
fhape.

He muſt, finally, have half boots, which are handſome, and

much better than ſhoes ; they prevent the wet in a great meaſure,
and the duſt, ſand, and gravel, which always get into the ſhoes,
and gall and cripple the man.
I would
 of DEFENSIVE ARMS OR AR MoU R. 39

I would have a button fixed on the waiſtband of the breeches,

and a loop to the waiſtcoat, to keep the former up, without tying
it too hard, which heats the loins, and hinders the free motion of
the limbs. As part of the dreſs always remains at the regiment's
depot, the ſoldier may carry the reſt, and what he really wants, with
eaſe. I have omitted ſpeaking of the hat, that very uſeleſs, if not
ridiculous piece of dreſs, becauſe I intend ſubſtituting in its place
another, which will both cover and protećt the head, neck, and
ſhoulders.

C H A P T E R XII.

of DEFENSIVE ARMS OR ARM O U R.

H E firſt part naturally to be covered is the head. For this,

purpoſe, I would have a hat made of ſtrong leather prepared
in the ſame manner as that of which jack-boots are made, ſuch as,
the couriers abroad uſe : it muſt be quilted within to make it fit
eaſy. The brim muſt be three inches broad to cover the face and
carry off the rain: to this brim I would have fixed five or fix
ſmall chains, made of ſtrong wire, to hook to the breaſt-plate or
cuiraſs, which he muſt alſo have. Such a hat will effectually
protećt the upper part of his body againſt the ſabre, in whatever
manner it is uſed, either by ſtriking as the Europeans, or puſhing
horizontally, as the Turks and Aſiatics do. t

I wou LD recommend that a plate of braſs be put on the hat,

fignifying the number or name of the regiment, battalion, and
company, all which muſt be numbered. It is incredible how much
this trifling circumſtance would contribute to enforce diſcipline and
valor.
THE
4O OF DEFENSIVE ARMS OR ARMOUR.

The impoſſibility of eſcaping a deſerved cenſure would pre

vent men from becoming obnoxious to it. There muſt be no diſ
tinótion in the dreſs and hat between the private man and the
officer.

The next piece of armour is the cuiraſs, which muſt be made

likewiſe of leather, and of that leather of which the ſoles of our
ſtrong ſhoes, called double channel, are made. It muſt be long
enough to cover the body from the neck to the waiſt; ſo that with
this and the hat, all the mortal parts are effectually covered and
protected againſt the efforts of all ſpecies of hand-weapons, and
diminiſh confiderably the effects of many muſket ſhots.

So much for the dreſs and defenſive arms of the ſoldier: let us
now proceed to his offenſive arms; and firſt of the infantry.

We have already ſhewn that the muſket or bayonet is cumber

ſome, top-heavy, and too ſhort as a hand-weapon ; and that the
ſword is totally uſeleſs, and ſhould therefore be laid aſide. I would
have the barrel of the muſket ſhortened ten or twelve inches, made
much ſtronger towards the breech, which would throw the center
of gravity between the two hands when preſented, and conſe
quently render it infinitely more manageable and leſs top-heavy
than at preſent. -

GENERAL Clerk has invented one which I much approve of,

and recommend it as a good model. Inſtead of the bayonet, I
would have a ſhort lance, four feet long, made of light and tough
wood : ſix inches of which ſhould be of good ſteel, about two inches
broad, tapering into a point, the reſt of the wood muſt be covered
with two thin plates of iron, to prevent its being cut. This
lance is ſlung under the left arm, with the point downward. It
muſt
 OF DEFENSIVE ARMS OR ARMOU R. 4I

muſt be made to fix on the barrel of the muſket, with two little
ſockets inſtead of one, which will make it firmer than the bayonet.

WHEN the ſoldier has loſt his muſket, or if it is damaged in the

ačtion, or when he mixes with the enemy, and firing of courſe
ceaſes, this lance will be of infinite uſe to him alone, as well as
when fixed to the muſket, to attack or to defend himſelf againſt
cavalry or infantry. It may be objećted, that if the barrel is ſhort
ened, the fire of the laſt ranks may injure the firſt ; but this objec
tion is invalid. If you fire by ranks, which can be done with
more temper and ſafety than by files, and particularly if the lance
is not fixed to the muſket, which I think ought not to be done,
until you come within a hundred yards of the enemy, then, ac
cording to our inſtitution, you march up to the enemy.
THREE fourths of the infantry muſt be armed with this muſket
and lance. The other fourth part muſt be armed with a pike,
twelve feet long, a good ſabre and a pair of piſtols, which they are
to carry at their belt.
The cavalry ſhould be dreſſed in every reſpect like the infantry,
excepting that they ſhould wear good boots inſtead of half boots.
Their arms muſt be a lance of ſeven feet long, which they are to.
carry, ſlung to the ſaddle, on the right ſide, ſo that the horſe
man can inſtantly ſeize and uſe it. Their other arms muſt be a
ſabre, four feet in length, and a pair of piſtols.
The light cavalry and Huſſars muſt be armed in the uſual way;
becauſe as they are often ſent a reconnoitering, where infantry
cannot follow them, they muſt have muſkets, that they may be
on equal terms with the enemy. The light infantry muſt be
armed, like the reſt, with a muſket and lance, without any ſword
or piſtol.
F HAvi NG
42 OF DEFENSIVE ARMS OR ARMOUR:

HAviNG thus cloathed and armed our ſoldiers, we muſt now

proceed to range them, and in ſuch a manner, that they may
make uſe of their arms to advantage. I would have the infantry
formed in four ranks, and the three foremoſt armed as I have
directed with a muſket and ſhort lance only; the fourth and laſt
rank with the long pike, ſword, and a pair of piſtols.
THE ſhorteſt men to be placed foremoſt, and the others ſucceſ
fively, according to their ſize ; ſo that the fourth rank be the tall
eſt. This diſpoſition will greatly facilitate the uſe of their arms;
whereas the method uſed has a contrary effect; it is abſurd, and
calculated for ſhew only. * * *

"THE three foremoſt ranks, protećted by the pikes when they

approach the enemy, will, if they fire by ranks and with temper, do
it effectually, and when at a diſtance, before they have fixed on the
lance to their muſket, can manage it with great eaſe, and conſe
quently with effect.

It is needleſs to obſerve, that a body of men ranged in four

ranks march more ſteadily than in fewer, and faſter. It is true the
line will be ſhorter by a fourth part ; but this circumſtance is ſo
far from being a defečt, that on the contrary, it renders the line
ſtronger and more a&tive, which we reckon the greateſt of all advan
tages. But it may be ſaid, if your line is ſhorter, the enemy will
attack one if not both your flanks. This objećtion will fall to the
ground by the general arrangement of the whole, as will appear
hereafter. -

For the preſent let it ſuffice to prove, that a body of men formed
three deep cannot reſiſt the ſhock of one that is four deep, and
armed with lances, muſkets, and pikes, and the quantity of fire
is nearly equal; for that part of the enemy's line, which extends
beyond your flanks, is of no uſe while at a diſtance, as the men in
a line cannot be brought to fire on the right and left, ſo their fire is
loſt;
 of THE FORMATION OF BATTALIONS. 43

loſt; and when you approach the enemy, you muſt march rapidly
up to him, which will ſoon put an end to the diſpute. But this
oUT-FLANKING of you cannot happen, by the mode in which we
propoſe to range our battalions.

C H A P T E R XIII.

O F THE FOR MATION OF BATT A LION S.

WOULD have a battalion conſiſt of five companies, one of

which is to be called light infantry ; the other four heavy
infantry, all armed alike, excepting that the lance, which is to ſerve
inſtead of the bayonet, may be made a foot longer for the light
than for the heavy infantry, becauſe they generally act ſingly,
and therefore can manage it with eaſe.

EAch company of the heavy infantry is to conſiſt of one hundred

and twenty-eight men, rank and file, not including officers and under
officers; the company of light infantry being much oftener called
upon duty, ſhould be much ſtronger, they might even amount to
two hundred, for they would decreaſe probably much faſter than
the others. -

EAch company of heavy infantry will form a front of thirty

two men, the battalion conſiſting of four companies, one hundred
and twenty-eight files, to whom I allow one hundred yards or
ſomething more of ground; becauſe I would not have the files
cloſe and preſſed, as that ſituation hinders them from uſing their
3III].S.

Four companies of heavy infantry will make - 5I2

One of light infantry we will ſuppoſe - - 2 OO

71.2
F 2 A REGIMENT
44 OF THE FORMATION OF BATTALIONS.

A REGIMENT of two battalions will make eight companies of

heavy infantry, and two of light, which in the whole amount to
about one thouſand four hundred. It will be aſked, why ſo many
light infantry My anſwer is this: -

LET the regiment be formed as in the annexed plate, with an

interval of one hundred yards beween each battalion, who muſt
have on their flanks, one three or four pounder, and one ſeven or
eight inch howitzer.

THE two companies of light infantry will be placed oppoſite the

opening between the two battalions, and on the flanks. As theſe
may extend thmſelves at leiſure fifty yards to the right and left or
more, and even the interval between the two battalions may be
made to extend one hundred and fifty yards without inconvenience
or danger, it is evident that the whole ground occupied by our re
giment, though formed in four ranks, greatly out-flanks the ſame
number of men in three only.

The fire of our two light companies will alone produce a

greater effect than that of the enemy, for this obvious reaſon, that
our light infantry ačts where and how they pleaſe, aims at their
leiſure, croſſes their fire along the enemy's whole front, goes upon
their flanks, &c. in ſhort, it ačts with all the advantage of real and
expert chaſſeurs. If to this you add the ſolid fire of the heavy infan
try, it will appear undoubtedly true, that upon the whole, we ſhall in
this be ſuperior to the enemy, as we ſhall be in the extent, ſtrength,
and activity of the line. Vide Pl. I. fig. 4. & 5.

I Ask, what will the enemy do Will he advance within that

portion of circle, and come to the ſhock What chance has he
with his ſhort muſket and bayonet againſt my muſket and lance,
and a row of pikes, which projećt fix feet beyond the firſt rank,
and
 OF THE FORMATION OF BATTALIONS. 45

and prevents him from approaching it, and much more from break
ing it If he waits your approaching him, he is overthrown in a
moment: when you can come up to him you muſt conquer.

SUPPos ING the country is much incloſed, it is evident that here

likewiſe you have the advantage; for he cannot poſſibly drive you
from behind a hedge, ditch, or an entrenchment; and if you attack
him, having come ſo near, to be within reach of your pikes, he
muſt fly: and finally, if you cannot approach him with your line,
the two companies of light troops may get on his flanks, and force
him to abandon his poſt, however ſtrong: therefore, in whatever
ſpecies of ground you ačt, you muſt neceſſarily prevail over the
enemy.

So much for infantry oppoſed to infantry. Let us now examine,

whether formed and armed on our principles, it may not likewiſe
be oppoſed with equal ſucceſs to cavalry, in a plain and open coun
try. If this can be done, then we may declare, that our inſtitu
tion is perfeót.

LET each company be divided into four parts, and form a column
of eight men in front, and fixteen deep , and let the companies,
thus thrown into columns, be ranged as in the plate, with the light
infantry and cannon. Vide Plate I.

I suppose this battalion is attacked in a plain by ten ſquadrons.

My light infantry and cannon keep off the cavalry, probably effec
tually; particularly, if the firſt and ſecond ranks advance one after
the other, and fire like the light infantry, which they may do with
out any riſk, at the diſtance of twenty or thirty yards; becauſe if
they are preſſed they reſume their poſt, and the light infantry fills
up the intervals between the companies.
I will
46 OF THE FORMATION OF BATTALIONS.

I will let the cavalry advance full gallop, undiſmayed by the

fire of the columns; and I oppoſe to them eight ranks, the three
firſt armed with the muſket and lance ; the fourth and fifth with
long pikes, while the fixth, ſeventh, and eighth can fire at the
enemy, who is ſo much higher, without any inconvenience to them
ſelves, or danger to the preceding ranks, as is evident.

Now I would aſk Seidlitz, were he alive; I aſk Wagnitz

in the Heſſian ſervice; I aſk Sir William Erſkine in ours, Whe
ther they think they can, at the head of two thouſand Elliots,
break this column They can. Well, I will join the four com
panies, and form a complete ſquare; can they break this No:
they will not ſay they can : for, excluſively of the muſket,
lances, and pikes, I will venture to ſay, that no body of horſe,
with any degree of velocity, is able to break through a body
of infantry of fixteen ranks, becauſe the quantity of ačtion
produced by a horſeman on full gallop (for one only ſhocks at a
time) is not equal to the 1eſiſtance of fixteen men placed behind
each other, ſo near as to ſupport in a maſs the ſhock of the horſe
In all.

I conclude therefore that, armed as I propoſe, a battalion of

infantry will beat in the open field twice the number, or indeed
any number of horſemen formed and armed as they are at
preſent.

C H A P.
 [ 47 J

C H A P T E R XIV.

O F T H E C A V A L R Y.

H E more I conſider the cavalry, the leſs I am able to ſay or

write any thing which can ſatisfy myſelf, much leſs thoſe
who are better informed than I am in this branch of military
knowledge.

WHETHER it is ranged in three or in thirty ranks, it is always

certain that the firſt rank alone can act, be they armed with fire
arms, or with ſwords, or with both. And if the firſt rank is
broken, and thrown into confuſion, the whole muſt give way.

Secondly, That if a body of horſe remains on the ſpot, any

troop, cavalry or infantry, armed with a muſket, will beat it, and
force it to retire, or to advance ſword in hand, which avails no
thing againſt infantry covered, or againſt light cavalry which ſkir
miſhes, becauſe it cannot approach the former, nor reach the latter,
without breaking the line: then it is inferior to them ; becauſe
their ſuperior velocity enables them to baffle every purſuit of heavy
cavalry. If theſe charge, the foremoſt rank alone can uſe their
weapons; the others are of no uſe, but to ſupply the place of the
ſlain or wounded in the firſt; ſo that a third part only of your cavalry
can act at the ſame time, and two-thirds remain idle ſpectators.
Aétivity is the moſt eſſential property of the horſe: in the preſent
mode of forming it there is none. -

IT is an axiom, that you ought to bring as many men into ačtion

at once as poſſible; but though the ground is quite favourable, you
can bring only a third part. How is this to be remedied ? I don't
know. In whatever mode the cavalry is ranged, it is impoſſible to
diminiſh
48 O F T H E C A V A L R Y.

diminiſh the defečts above-mentioned ; and if to theſe you add thoſe

which ariſe from the difficulty of the ground which the enemy
may chuſe, ſo as to render your cavalry uſeleſs for a whole cam
paign, one would be tempted to abandon it almoſt entirely, except
ing ſuch a number as is required to patrole, keep guard before the
camp, &c. becauſe the expences of it are immenſe, and its utility
inſignificant.

If the infantry, ſuch as we propoſe, is ſuperior to the cavalry

even in open ground, it ſeems evident that a much ſmaller number
of cavalry, than what is commonly uſed in our armies, would be
ſufficient, and we ſhall eſtabliſh the proportion between the one !
and the other accordingly. But whether the cavalry be few or
many, how are they to be ranged and diſtributed º

We have ſhewn that the preſent mode is bad. Muſt they then,
like the Turkiſh and Aſiatic cavalry, ſcatter and diſperſe themſelves
over the whole country, ſkirmiſh with the enemy's line at a diſ
tance, ſurround it, draw it into improper ground, wait till it is in
motion and broken, and then attack it ſword in hand

I cANNot reſolve this queſtion; but certain it is, that in ſuch a

caſe, ten ſquadrons ačting in this manner produce more real action
than fifty formed and acting like ours.

Nor do I ſee how a line of horſe can extricate itſelf from troops
who act like the Spahis, whether it remains on the ſpot, or advan
ces: this light cavalry will not reſiſt the ſhock of our line: granted.
It will not wait for the ſhock, but diſperſe itſelf, harraſs you, and
wait for a more favourable opportunity.

But it will be objećted, when the light cavalry retires, ours may
attack the enemy's infantry, and defeat it: No ; if it is formed as
We
 OF THE FORMATION OF A SQUADRON. 49

we propoſe ; but if the enemy's infantry is broken, a few of our

ſquadrons will drive them off the field. Very well; but light ca
valry will do that much more effectually ; ſo that which-ever way
I conſider this ſubjećt, I am at a loſs what to determine.

I Lay it down, however, as a maxim, that the cavalry ſhould

be ranged, and diſtributed ſo, that it may ačt more or leſs in every
kind of ground. Secondly, That whenever any part advances to
attack, each individual horſeman ſhould really ačt, and not the
foremoſt rank only, as now is the caſe.

I AM conſcious I walk on a ſlippery path ; however, I think the

order of battle I ſhall propoſe will, in a great meaſure, procure us
the advantages we aim at.

C H A P T E R XV.

O F THE FORMAT I o N o F A s Q_U AD Ro N.

WOULD have a ſquadron conſiſt of 160 men rank and file,

not including officers and under-officers; becauſe, if it is leſs
numerous, it will ſoon be reduced to nothing, either the horſe or
man, or both, being ill, you will have no force to take the field.

A REGIMENT ſhall conſiſt of four ſuch ſquadrons, and of one

of light cavalry, which may amount to 200 men, as theſe are ob
liged to greater duties than the others; ſo that the whole regiment
will amount to ſomething more than 8oo men. Each ſquadron,
armed as we have already propoſed, ſhall be formed into four ranks,
which make forty files; and theſe ſhall be divided by eight : ſo that
- G - each
50 OF THE FORMATION OF A SQUADRON.
each ſquadron is divided into five parts, whoſe front is eight, and
depth four men.

I HAve preferred this diviſion to any other, becauſe the front

will be nearly equal to the depth ; ſo that when they march in co
lumns, they can with eaſe form the front any way, when it is dou
ble to the depth: beſides, ſuch a front can march almoſt in what di
re&tion they chuſe; and though the ground may force the ſquadrons
to ſeparate in advancing, yet the being from this ſquare figure very
aćtive, and at the ſame time ſtronger than in the uſual form, a divi
fion may manoeuvre, and chuſe its ground till the others come.
I wou LD have ſome intervals left between theſe diviſions and
ſquadrons, as well in advancing as attacking, which will give them
a ſuperiority in ačtivity. Theſe intervals, beſides the advantage in
velocity, offer another no leſs important, which is, that the divi
fion can always out-flank the enemy, though ſuperior in number:
they being, as uſual, formed in a cloſe line, when they approach
to charge, cannot avail themſelves of the intervals; and where the
action really paſſes, they are inferior in ſtrength and velocity.

THE intervals between each diviſion muſt be of few yards only

to diſtinguiſh them, becauſe they muſt be condućted, in marching
and fighting, by a particular officer, and the whole ſubjećt to the
commander of the ſquadron. The interval between the ſquadrons
muſt be nearly equal to the extent of the whole front, which will
give them a great facility in moving forwards, or on either fide, as
circumſtances may require ; whereas, as we have ſhewn, a line of
cavalry, formed as it is in a cloſe manner, can move only in front, and
then very ſlowly, being continually ſtopped by ſome obſtacle :
and ſhould they come to the charge, my ſquadrons being ſo much
ſtronger and more active, muſt break through the enemy's line;
- and
 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AN ARMY. 51

and if once broken, purſue them with a ſuperior activity: I do

not think they can ever rally.

, If the enemy pretends to detach ſome of his ſquadrons to paſs

between the intervals, his line will be broken, and offer you the
ſame advantages; and to ſuch ſquadrons I oppoſe all my light ca
valry, which, fighting pell-mell like the Huſſars, will give them
ſufficient employment.

MoReover, the order of battle which I ſhall propoſe hereafter,

will remove every objećtion which may be raiſed to this mode of
ranging the cavalry in four ranks, with intervals: therefore I ſhall
omit ſaying anything more at preſent on the ſubjećt.

C H A P T E R XVI.

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AN A R MY.

Y the conſtitution of an army I mean, firſt, the number of

troops of which an army (adequate to every purpoſe of war
in the field) ought to be compoſed; and, ſecondly, the proportion
between the different ſpecies of troops, as heavy infantry, light
infantry, heavy cavalry; and light cavalry, to which we ſhall add
the artillery. -

According to our plan, a battalion of infantry conſiſts of about

700 men, of which let a fifth be light infantry. The number of
the latter may appear too great; and in fact it is ſo, if they are
confined to that kind of ſervice only in which they are now em
ployed, viz. in watching the enemy, and patroling between the
G 2 piquets
52 OF THE constitution OF AN ARMY.
piquets of both armies, and diſappearing when theſe come to a
battle.

But according to our plan, they will perform all the duties
commonly done by light troops; and likewiſe in a day of ačtion,
they ſhall be employed in ſuch a manner, as will enable them to
render more real ſervice than the heavy infantry, as will appear
from the inſpection of our order of battle. The ſame reaſoning
will equally hold good for the great number of light cavalry; and
it is therefore unneceſſary to repeat it. -

My army ſhall conſiſt of fixty battalions and forty ſquadrons.

The former will amount in all to about 42,000, and the latter to
above 6500 ; conſequently, the whole army will be 48,500 men,
which number we think equal to every operation of a campaign.
What it may want in numbers, is amply compenſated by ſtrength
and ačtivity; in which properties we place the greateſt advantages
an army can poſſeſs.

As we ſhall employ the light cavalry, and the infantry of the

fame ſpecies only to patrole and reconnoitre the enemy, and always
together, very few men will be ſufficient for that duty. A hun
dred foot and forty horſe will do it more effeótually than ten times
the number; becauſe a few may approach the enemy unnoticed,
which cannot be done by a corps conſiſting of thouſands.

A few may know always where you are, maſk your great
corps, and perform any manoeuvre they pleaſe without your know
ledge; whereas, if a thouſand men are placed properly before your
front in the moſt hidden and covered places, they muſt inevitably
be obſerved. They muſt carefully avoid being ſeen on the high
roads,
 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AN ARMY. 53

roads, but muſt place themſelves ſo as to be able to obſerve what

ever paſſes there.

GREAT corps, like an army, are more anxious to prevent the

enemy from obſerving them, than to obſerve him; they are afraid
of being attacked, which their whole attention is directed to pre
vent: but the ſmall detachments which I propoſe cannot be at
tacked ; for when they ſee a ſuperior force approach, they diſperſe
and retire to the right or left, or to any quarter. The enemy can
not purſue them.

I Est ABLISH it as a maxim, that light troops are not to fight

when placed before the front of the army, but to ſee what the enemy
does, and give notice in time. If this doćtrine is followed, very
few of them will be neceſſary, and even theſe muſt be made uſeful
in a day of ačtion.

THE author of this work, at the head of two hundred chaſſeurs

and a hundred dragoons, did, during the whole campaign of 1760,
keep ſo near the king of Pruſſia's army, that he never loſt fight of
it for an hour, though the Auſtrian army, and the corps he belonged
to were generally two or three marches off: and though he was
always in fight of the enemy, and ſcarce a day paſſed without ſome
ſkirmiſh; yet, in the courſe of the campaign, he did not loſe
twenty men; and one only was taken priſoner, who got drunk,
and ſtaid behind.

THE author does not give this military anecdote to ſhew his par
ticular merit, far from it; he confiders it as a matter of courſe,
which any man of common ſenſe, with ačtivity and vigilance, can
equally perform : in fact, there is nothing more ſimple. Detach
thirty or forty chaſſeurs, who place themſelves in ſmall parties along
the road to the right and left, covered with hedges, woods, walls,
&c.
54 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AN ARMY.
&c. then ſend twenty horſemen, who advance by two or three, ſo
that the foremoſt goes far enough to view the enemy by day, and
hear his coming by night. Theſe turn a little out of the road,
and liſten; if they hear any thing approach, they retire without
noiſe to the infantry, and wait behind: a ſhot or two from theſe
will ſoon ſtop the patrole : and, if it is not ſtrong, let them paſs,
and make them priſoners.

MoREov ER, you can always know the different roads by which
the enemy can march from his camp; and likewiſe gueſs, with
certainty, what will be the direétion of his march. You muſt have
ſome intelligent perſon placed, ſo as to obſerve inſtantly when he
commences his march, and whither it tends: all which may be
eaſily done, if you have few men only, and if they are employed
as we propoſe.

BUT if you are at the head of thouſands, you move and adt with
the ſame difficulty as the enemy; you cannot change the poſitions
of a corps, as you do thoſe of a company of chaſſeurs, and a hun
dred light horſe, nor place yourſelf covered, and in the proper
ſituation for reconnoitring : you muſt have a camp, and that camp
is inſtantly diſcovered, which makes it difficult to watch the enemy
with ſucceſs.

THIs camp is the center from which all detachments muſt be

ſent, and to which they muſt return ; the enemy, apprized of all
this, ſtops them ſhort, occupies ſome commanding hill, makes a
ſhew of attacking you, amuſes you a whole day; in the mean
while his army has performed its march unknown to you.
-

I HAVE ſeen a thouſand examples of this. In the morning a

report comes from a corps of Io or 12,000 : the enemy is gone,
detachments are ſent after him ; in eight or ten hours, per
haps,
 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AN ARMY. 55

haps, you have ſome intelligence, and perhaps not; but always too
late: whereas, if ſmall parties were employed in the manner we
propoſe, the enemy could not move unperceived; and I can with
truth aver, that I have ſeen ſuch ſmall parties accompany the enemy
during a whole campaign, and often within twenty yards of his
columns, and never out of his ſight. -

I BEG the reader's pardon for having dwelt ſo long on this article;
but it ſerves to prove, that fifteen hundred men will perform this
kind of ſervice much better, than ſo many thouſands which are now
employed. I am ſo convinced of this, that I would undertake to
do it, though the enemy's army amounted to a hundred thouſand
II].CII.

Fol ARD, and many other judicious writers, obſerve, that in

proportion as the infantry is bad, and the military art declines, the
number of horſe increaſes in our modern armies; becauſe, ſay they,
an able general at the head of a good infantry can do any thing,
and wants but a ſmall cavalry. It is certain that when the infantry
is good, much may be done with it; and if it is bad, you muſt
increaſe your cavalry, to keep the enemy at a diſtance, as you muſt
have a great quantity of heavy artillery for the ſame purpoſe.
IN a numerous, and particularly in a heavy cavalry, I find three
capital inconveniencies, viz. The prodigious expence; the difficulty
to provide ſubſiſtence ; and, laſtly, that it is not of general uſe.
For in a cloſe country, ſuch as is a great part of Europe, ten cam
paigns may paſs without an opportunity for your cavalry to come
to a general ačtion, if the enemy is able, and chuſes to decline it:
whereas it is our opinion, that no ſpecies of troops or arms ſhould
be employed, but in proportion to the general advantages which
they procure.

For
56 O F THE O R D E R OF B A TTL E.

For theſe reaſons, I do not by any means approve of the mo

dern faſhion of employing ſo many horſe. Generally a fourth or
fifth at leaſt of the army muſt be compoſed of cavalry; I think an
eighth will be ſufficient, provided the infantry is good, and formed
on the principles we have propoſed, and that the cavalry be ranged,
and placed where it can act; and where it is always ſupported by
artillery and the infantry, which we have endeavoured to combine
in our order of battle.

C H A P T E R XVII.

O F THE O RD E R OF B A TT L E.

E.T any given number of infantry be divided into twenty

battalions, and let each of theſe, formed into three ranks,
occupy one hundred fathoms: theſe will have a front
of - - tº
2OOO

Let three thouſand horſe be formed likewiſe in three

ranks : theſe will amount to a thouſand files, each at
half a fathom, which will amount to *
5oo
For the ſmall intervals generally left between the batta
lions and ſquadrons, I allow - -
3oo
The whole extent of ſuch a line will amount to - 28oo

Let the ſame number of foot be ranged in four ranks,

each battalion will occupy only ſeventy-five fathoms:
the twenty will occupy -

I leave an interval equal to the front, which will be con

ſequently - e

Out of which dedućt ſeventy-five, becauſe there are only

inineteen intervals -
 of T H E or D E R of BATTLE, s,
My line of twenty battalions, confiſting of the ſame number of men,
will ſurpaſs the other by one hundred and twenty-five fathoms.

THE Plate Nº II. repreſents the two orders of battle; the one,
fig. I. according to the uſual mode, the other, fig. II. according
to our principles. Let us analyſe them.

IN the firſt place, ours outflanks the other by one hundred and
twenty-five fathoms, which enables us to attack the enemy's flank,
while it is likewiſe attacked in front. . -

Secondly, Our intervals are filled by three or four thouſand

light infantry, who fire at their eaſe, chuſe their time and object;
and if they are direéted to fire obliquely along the enemy's line,
and fix the officers in particular, it is probable that the fire of theſe
alone will produce a more real effect than that of the enemy's
whole line. If to this you add the fire of the battalions by ranks,
as we propoſe, they will undoubtedly have a very great ſuperiority
over the enemy.

THIRDLY, When the two lines approach each other, and come
to hand-weapons, it is not preſumed that our modern battalions,
armed with their bayonets, and three deep, can reſiſt a moment
the impulſe of four ranks armed with pikes and lances, and like
wiſe protećted by their defenſive armour, ſo that in the uſe of miſ.
file and hand-weapons, ours have moſt certainly the advantage.

I can Not imagine any mode by which a modern line can be put
on an equality with that which we propoſe. If it abides by its
fire alone, it is unequal; if it comes to a ſhock and the uſe
of hand-weapons, it is ſtill much more ſo. Will it break its
H line
58 OF T H E O R D E R O F BATT I. E.

line and ſend detachments after our light infantry? This is in

fačt adopting our plan, and confeſſing it cannot be beat but by one
fimilar.

In our caſe this will not avail, becauſe ſhould they ſend ſuch a
detachment, our two companies to the right and left of our batta
lions will form a column, which will take ſuch detachments on
both flanks, while the company of light infantry, placed as in
fig. 2. attacks them in front, and when they are thrown into
confuſion, which muſt ſoon happen, a ſquadron or two placed
oppoſite the interval, as marked in the plan, will advance ſword
in hand and attack them pell-mell, that is, ride through them,
which muſt in a few ſeconds exterminate them. - -

I saw at Siliſtria, in Turkey, two ſquadrons attack a column

or maſs of above fix thouſand Turks, in this manner, whom they
defeated and diſperſed in leſs than three minutes; and had they not
covered themſelves under the banks of the Danube, whither the
cavalry could not purſue them, they would have been all cut to
pieces. Colonel Carleton was preſent at this event.

It may be objećted, that it is not eaſy for the two companies to

form the columns propoſed; to which I anſwer, that ſuch an ope
ration does not require twenty ſeconds : and moreover, ſuppoſing
it was not done at all, my company of light infantry, ſupported
by a ſquadron of horſe, armed with the muſket and lance, will
be more than a match for the enemy's detachment, which, in fact,
admits not of the leaſt difficulty till a flank is formed ; for the
operation is made under the fire of the two remaining companies,
and one of light infantry.

I conclude, therefore, that a modern Ine is in every reſpect

inferior to that which we propoſe. I may be prejudiced in favor
of
 \

OF THE ORD ER OF B A TT L E 59

of my principles; I therefore earneſtly intreat experienced gentle

men of my profeſſion, to examine this ſubjećt with attention, and if
they differ in opinion, I ſhall be extremely obliged to them if they
will communicate their ſentiments. Truth is my objećt.

So much for infantry oppoſed to infantry. Let us now

examine that part of the line which is oppoſed to the
enemy's cavalry. Many people will ſuppoſe that our four
ranks, though armed with lances and pikes, are not ſufficiently
ſtrong to reſiſt the ſhock of a line of horſe in three ranks; I am of
a different opinion, and fully convinced that they are ; becauſe one
horſe alone can come to the ſhock at once; and if killed,
wounded, or ſtopped, the other two behind cannot advance,
ſo that the united force of our four men is in fact oppoſed to that
of one horſe only, and if theſe forces are mechanically computed,
it will be found that the latter is by much inferior to the former;
and if to this you add the effects produced by the fire firſt, and then
by the lances and pikes, no doubt can remain; for the horſe
has nothing but his weight and velocity. However, be this as it
may, I will admit that my infantry is in fact too weak; I will,
therefore, form a column of each company, whoſe front is eight
men, and flank fixteen. I hope no one will think this too weak
to reſiſt a line of horſe, or rather, as we have ſhewn, one rank,
which alone can act.

Accor DING to our propoſed plan, ſeven battalions, and as many

ſquadrons, are oppoſed to twenty ſquadrons; theſe battalions have
ſeven howitzers, and as many field pieces. The light infantry is
placed before the intervals, and my ſeven ſquadrons behind them.
The firſt and the artillery keep up a conſtant fire againſt the cavalry.
Now I aſk, will it ſupport this fire, and for how long? I believe
not long, it muſt either advance or retire when you approach it;
I ſuppoſe the former, which can be done only between my inter
H 2 vals.
60 O F T H E O R D E R O F. B A TT LE.

vals. My light infantry and my cavalry poſt themſelves as marked

in the plan. Only part of the enemy's cavalry can paſs at once,
and theſe will receive the fire of two columns in their flanks, and
when they have paſſed will be fired at by the light infantry in their
backs; in that inſtant my ſeven ſquadrons will attack them in
flank and rear, and I think totally diſperſe them.

INDEED, I am ſo perſuaded of the ſuperiority of my infantry

ranged and armed in the manner propoſed, that I do not think any
cavalry, however reſolute, can approach, much leſs break it; in
ſomuch, that I would venture to attack it in an open country.
If the enemy's cavalry retires, you muſt ſend yours after them,
who purſue them, not in a line, but like our huſſars.

THE ſecond plate ſhews our order of battle advancing to the

enemy, and whoever confiders it with attention, will perceive,
that though there are intervals between our battalions, the enemy
cannot avail himſelf of them, for he dares not penetrate between
them without ruin, as he will be oppoſed by our light infantry and
cavalry. Moreover, he muſt break his own line, and leave an in
terval, which cannot be guarded but by the ſecond line, which is
generally too far off. In the mean time the diſpoſition of our line
enables it to advance without any interruption, as no inconvenience
can ariſe from one part's being more advanced than another, for
that part is protećted by the cavalry and light infantry. Even, if
many of our companies or battalions were broken, the enemy
cannot purſue them without breaking his line, and expoſing ſuch
detachments as he may order to advance, to be attacked in front
and flank. And laſtly, the march of the whole is infinitely more
rapid than if the line was cloſe as uſual. I therefore conclude, that our
order of battle is much ſuperior to any other, and probably is that
which has the feweſt defečts of any which can be invented, and in
- - - " which
 OF THE ORD ER O F B A TTL E. 61

which are combined the many advantages of miſſile and hand

weapons.

THE next plate ſhews our order of battle, when our troops ap
proach within thirty or forty yards of the enemy, which they can
get over in as many ſeconds.

The meaning of this diſpoſition is obvious. The two columns

on each flank of the battalions, when they have broken the enemy's
line, fire on the flanks, while the other two companies continue
to fire before them on thoſe who run away, and purſue them with
out intermiſſion, while the cavalry purſue thoſe who fly, with
vigour. The light infantry advances very little before the in
tervals, and leaves the purſuit to the cavalry.
*

If our line advances in this manner with rapidity, the enemy's

firſt line will be cut to pieces, and the ſecond ſhare the ſame fate,
if it does not retire in time. The ſame ſuperiority of force and
aćtivity will always prevail, and the vićtory muſt from the mode of
attacking be complete and deciſive. -

By my order of battle, all the infantry is placed in one line,

and all the cavalry in the ſecond: different in this as in many other
things from the modern, as appears from the inſpection of the plan
in plate N* II. My reaſons for this arrangement are ;

FIRST, That I think it ſufficiently ſtrong to overturn a modern

hine formed and armed on weaker principles.

SEconDLY, Becauſe all my infantry ačts at once, and my ca

valry is brought into ačtion only when the enemy's line, infantry,
or cavalry is thrown into diſorder, when mine can act with advan
tage.
f THIRDLY.
62 of T HE o R D E R o F B A TT LE.

THIRDLY, That every ſpecies of troops, infantry, cavalry, light

infantry, and artillery, ſupport and aſſiſt each other: ſo that the total
quantity of ačtion produced by my line is greatly ſuperior to that of
the enemy, and conſequently muſt conquer. As according to the
conſtitution of our army, it conſiſts of fixty battalions, and forty
ſquadrons, if the firſt are formed in one line, it will be extremely
long and difficult to manage ; we therefore propoſe, that forty bat
talions only ſhould be united in one corps; theſe will occupy a ſpace
ſomething more than forty battalions and forty ſquadrons of the
enemy. º

THE remaining twenty battalions I would have formed into

ſeparate corps, as marked in the plan, plate III. fig. 1. to attack
the enemy in flank, while the forty attack him in front. The
advantages of ſuch a diſpoſition are too obvious to require an ex
planation.
If notwithſtanding what we have ſaid, our order of battle is
thought too weak, being in one line only ; then we propoſe that
the twenty battalions ſhould be divided; viz. Seven ſhould be
placed behind the right wing, ſeven behind the left, and fix behind
the center, as it is marked in the plan, No III. fig. 2. with the
cavalry in the ſecond line. This diſpoſition will ſatisfy thoſe who
are accuſtomed to two lines and a reſerve: but I prefer the other
diſpoſition for many reaſons, which will occur to every perſon who
will examine the two plans with attention. I ſhall only obſerve,
that the firſt diſpoſition is moſt proper for attacking, and the ſecond
for defending. The firſt has however two great advantages. Firſt,
That all your infantry ačt at the ſame time, and not ſucceſſively
as in the ſecond. Secondly, That you neceſſarily attack the enemy
on both flanks, as appears by the plans themſelves.

IT ſeems needleſs to obſerve, that if the enemy oppoſes cavalry,

as probably he may, to the corps, A. B. This muſt be thrown
inte.
 OF T HE OR DER OF BATTL E. 63

into columns, as we direéted, and as is marked on the firſt plan,

N° I. but if oppoſed to infantry, no alteration to this reference is
required.

We have already ſhewn, that the modern mode of ranging an

army, and the uſe of miſfive weapons, renders it totally ina&tive,
and proper only for a defenſive war, and to fight at a diſtance, to
receive an enemy rather than attack him. To increaſe this inac
tivity, the general, as well as the ſoldier, ſeem to place all their
confidence in the artillery, rather than in the valour of the ſoldier;
accordingly the cannon is become the ſoul of our military eſtabliſh
InelltS.

At the battle of Prague there were above five hundred pieces.

of heavy cannon, which at a moderate computation, with the
train, coſt more than forty thouſand foot would have done; and
yet they did not produce any effeót proportionate to ſuch an im
menſe expence. I have three capital objećtions to this abuſe of
artillery—the expence of it, the number of horſes required to
attend it, and the great delays it always occaſions in the motion
of the army.

In ſieges there cannot be too much, nor in the field too little
artillery. In this laſt caſe, the uſe of heavy cannon is very much con
tracted, it can be carried but in few roads, cannot advance with the
line, and muſt be employed only to protećt the heads of the columns
while they come out from a defile, and form the line, to form a
battery againſt ſome point of attack, or to defend an intrench
ſment.

If the enemy is at all acquainted with his buſineſs, he may order

his men to lie flat on the ground till your troops advance, and then
attack them, or wait till they come up, in which caſes the artil
lery has little or no effect; and by a quick motion he comes up to
- your
64 O F 'I H E O R D E R OF BAT T L E.

your intrenchment, and attacks it ſword in hand, which will ren

der your cannon uſeleſs. When a battery is direéted againſt a
defile, you may almoſt always avoid it, by turning to the right or
left.

A Good van-guard with the field pieces will protećt the heads of
your columns better than all the batteries you can raiſe; beſides,
if the defiles you paſs through are within reach of the enemy, he
may either oppoſe artillery to artillery, or, which is much better,
advance rapidly and attack them. The inſtant he approaches, the
cannon ceaſes to be of any uſe.

Upon the whole, therefore, I conclude, that when you propoſe

waiting for the enemy in ſome fortified poſt, as in a fortreſs, you
muſt have abundance of heavy artillery: but as we place the
greateſt perfeótion of an army in its velocity, and our ſyſtem is, we
think, particularly calculated for that, and the uſe of hand
weapons, which renders miſfive weapons of every kind leſs uſeful,
we reječt of courſe that prodigious quantity of artillery, and we
think thirty or forty twelve pounders more than ſufficient for an
army of fifty thouſand men.

IN ten campaigns, you may not find an occaſion where theſe are
neceſſary, and where common field pieces would not do the buſi
neſs equally well. As we have ſaid already our troops have much
confidence in a numerous artillery; merely to indulge them in
this opinion, though erroneous, I conceive that each battalion
ſhould have a field piece, and a ſeven inch howitzer, until they
are accuſtomed to the uſe of hand-weapons, and to face the enemy,
then they will perceive, that artillery in general is ſo far from being
uſeful, that it retards their marches, and expoſes them, during
theſe delays, to much greater loſſes and danger, than if they left
their artillery behind them, and thus diſincumbered advance rapidly
to the enemy.
G E N E R A L.
 O F : T H E O R D E R O F B A TTL E. 65

G E N E R A L R E F L E C T I O N.

WHAT we have ſaid regards an army in the field. It remains

we ſhould examine how ſuch an army is to be prepared for action
during peace, and how ſupported while in the field.

ONE of the greateſt difficulties which occur, is in ſupporting the

army in the field, I mean in furniſhing recruits and cloathing. In
a campaign or two, recruits are wanted, and the troops are almoſt
naked.

The firſt are raiſed in the country, very often at a great diſtance
from theſe at of war; ſo that many periſh before they arrive; others
are totally unfit for ſervice, and the few remaining placed in regi
ments, are quite raw, and before theſe can be rendered uſeful, many
go to the hoſpital ; hence one may ſafely affirm, that not one
fourth part ever arrives to a ſtate of maturity and become real and
uſeful ſoldiers. What a waſte and deſtruction of men Forty
years peace and a good government will not atone for the calami
ties and loſſes of a ſix years war.

DURING the late war in Turkey, the Ruſſians raiſed above three
hundred thouſand recruits, and yet the principal army under
M. Romanzow, at the concluſion of it, did not amount to above
thirty-ſix thouſand; and that in Crimea, under Prince Dolgorouki,
to about twelve thouſand, and all were in want of many neceſſary
articles, which is always the caſe, particularly if contračtors are
any way concerned.
WHAT prevention of theſe evils can be found, it will be natu
rally aſked : The beſt I can think of is as follows:
I LET
66 OF T HE O RDE R OF B A TTL E.

LET the regiments have what we call perpetual quarters; that

is, they muſt always during the peace, remain in one fixed place:
and theſe places muſt form a chain on that frontier, which moſt
probably may hereafter be the ſeat of war. For each regiment
muſt be built a ſmall town in ſeparate caſerns, to prevent fire from
communicating to the whole. A certain quantity of land muſt be
aſſigned to them. If the frontier is ſubjećt to ſudden attacks from
ſmall parties of the enemy, I would have a good intrenchment
drawn about the caſerns or barracks, with a good ditch well pali
ſaded, where the peaſants may remain in ſafety with their
cattle, &c.

THE recruits muſt be delivered to the regiments who are to take

care to have them exerciſed. All the materials which ſerve to cloath
the troops, muſt likewiſe be delivered into this depot, and there
worked and made up by the ſoldiers and their wives, which would
produce a vaſt ſaving to the ſovereign, and the ſoldier would be
better cloathed.

IN time of war, a battalion remains here to train the recruits,

and provide the cloathing for the whole regiment.

All the fick and invalids, wounded, &c. officers and ſoldiers,
muſt be ſent to this depot, where they can always be of ſervice,
though unfit for military duty in the field. If a ſufficient quantity
of land is aſſigned, it will maintain them comfortably with their
pay ; and the ſtate is not burthened with half pay, or to turn num
berleſs poor creatures adrift, which is now the caſe.

IN this ſyſtem, the ſoldier may and ought to be permitted to

marry, that his children may ſupply the immenſe loſſes occaſioned
by the war. The women may help to cultivate the lands, and ſup
port the community, whereas they are now the peſt of the army.
The
 of T H E or D E R of BAT TI, E. 67
The army will receive the recruits formed and healthy, and will be
always complete and fit for action; whereas now half the campaign
paſſes in exercifing them, before you dare approach the enemy :
and in caſe of a confiderable defeat, a battalion may be ſent to the
depot, and replaced by that which was there. -

Each male child, when he arrives at ten years of age, muſt

have a portion of land allotted him, and he becomes a ſoldier. In
ſhort, by this method, the whole army becomes military colonies;
and each ſoldier having, by this means, a certain, honourable and
good retreat in his old age, ſerves cheerfully and well, becomes a
member of the ſtate, and has ſomething to loſe. No greater miſ
fortune can happen to him than to be turned out of his regiment,
which, in fact, is diſpoſſeſſing him of his inheritance. Moreover,
a man accuſtomed to live in a certain community, is more upon his
guard than when he is continually ſtrolling from one quarter to ano
ther; inſomuch, that a regiment ſeldom paſſes through a village
in its march, without leaving traces of inſolence and diſorder be
hind it. -

WHAT I have ſaid of the infantry holds equally good for the
cavalry; each regiment of which ſhould be compoſed of fix ſqua
drons; one remains at the depot, and performs exactly the ſame
duties as the battalions; ſo I need not dwell any longer on the
ſubječt.

O F C O N T R A C T O R. S.

THERE is nothing performed by contračtors, which may not

be much better executed by intelligent officers. I objećt to con
tractors for the following reaſons :

I 2 FIRsr,
68 O F THE ORDER OF B A TT L E.

FIRST, They make immenſe fortunes at the expence of the ſtate,

which ought to be ſaved.

Secondly, They deſtroy the army, horſe and foot, and even the
hoſpitals, by furniſhing the worſt of every thing.

THIRDLY, It is always in the power of the contračtors to check,

and intirely ſtop the progreſs of an army.

AND, finally, Men ſo extremely covetous, may be eaſily induced

to take money from the enemy, for revealing the ſecret, which they
can gueſs at from the diſpoſition of the depots, or for not furniſh
ing the proviſions in time.
IN an army, there are always men of honour and ačtivity to be
found, who would do all the contraćtors do much better, ſave mil
lions, and ſerve the troops effectually. Theſe muſt be employed,
and theſe only.

P A R T
 PA R T T H E S E C O N D.

OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF WAR.

C H A P T E R I.

O F T H E G E N E R A L.

I. the preceding part, we have conſidered an army as a ma

chine, with which the different operations of war, are to be per
formed; and endeavoured to point out the method which
appears to us moſt adapted for the conſtrućtion of it, ſo that it may
have the properties required to render it perfeót. An army, how
ever, differs eſſentially from a pure machine: this is formed in ſuch
a manner, that when applied, it muſt neceſſarily produce a given
effect, in proportion to its ſtrength. It can have but one principle
of motion, whereas in an army, each individual part has, within
itſelf, the ſpring and ſource of ačtion, which it may exert or not at
pleaſure. It follows, therefore, that however advantageouſly the
parts, that is, the men are ranged, the whole will remain motion
leſs, if the leader, who has the direétion of their forces, cannot
offer ſuch motives as will induce them to act, and in the manner
he preſcribes. He cannot create ačtion in individuals, he cannot
force them to ačt, he can only perſuade and direct. His orders
are ineffectual, the inſtant an army, or a great part of it, chuſes to
diſobey. Coercion can have no room againſt ſuperior forces. Au
thority, in which alone the ſtrength of the general conſiſts, vaniſhes
the
7o O F T H E G E N E R A L.

the inſtant it is not acknowledged ; he muſt not therefore rely upon

it intirely. In the common courſe of things, as our armies are con
ſtituted, it does very well; but upon many, and indeed upon all extra
ordinary occaſions, he will find it deficient, unleſs he poſſeſſes the art
of perſuading, which can be done only, by offering ſuch motives to
the troops as naturally tend to raiſe their courage when depreſſed,
and check it when violent or inſolent, ſo that he becomes intirely
maſter of their inclinations, and diſpoſes of their forces with un
limited authority. This is what I call the philoſophy of war,
which, in my opinion, is the moſt difficult and ſublime part of
this or of any other profeſſion. It ſuppoſes a perfeól knowledge of
the paſſions, becauſe it is from that ſource, a general muſt draw
his arguments to perſuade or diffuade, as circumſtances may
require.

No author has treated this ſubjećt ſo far, as it regards the con

dućt of an army, though it appears evident from hiſtory, that all
the great captains of antiquity pračtiſed it; of which we ſhall
give ſome examples in the ſequel. If, as the matter is new, we
ſhall diſcuſs it imperfeótly, we hope the reader will excuſe it, over
look our errors, and avail himſelf of the few truths we ſhall pro
poſe to his confideration.

AN army, like the ſea, is ſometimes calm and ſlothful, at others,

furious and outrageous, wholly ungovernable ; both extremes are
to be equally avoided. It muſt have ſuch a degree of motion as is
required to perform whatever is preſcribed, and no more, that it
may be confined and direéted to a certain end.

ExTREME rapidity is incapable of direčtion, and often over

whelms thoſe who attempt to moderate it. When the whole, or
a great part of an army is diſaffected, ſullen, or breaks out into
open diſobedience, it is obvious that compulſion is impračticable:
this
 O F T H E G E N E R A L. 71

this reaches only individuals; you muſt have recourſe to perſuaſion,

which ſuppoſes uncommon abilities and perſonal authority in the
leader: if deficient in theſe points, he will find, that his olders
will be ineffectual.

ARMIEs are corrupted equally by good and bad ſucceſs, and

by idleneſs; from whatever cauſes the corruption and diſcontent
proceed, a general muſt know how to calm the fury, as well as
raiſe the ſpirits of his men : he muſt above all take care, that no
cauſe of complaint can be imputed to him, nor even the leaſt ne
gle&t, for both deſtroy his credit with the men; and it will be ex
tremely difficult to pacify them, if they are perſonally prejudiced
againſt him : it is no leſs dangerous to impute the evil complained
of to them, unleſs they have, by ſome ſhameful ačt of cowardice
or diſobedience, brought it on themſelves.

IN that caſe, even the general muſt have great perſonal authority
over them, and reprimand them with much delicacy and circum
ſpection; for a harſh expreſſion will exaſperate them, and aggra
vate rather than cure the evil. It is difficult to know what to ſay
to an enraged multitude, animated perhaps againſt their leader, who,
notwithſtanding his probity and abilities, may be ſuſpečted and
hated, and fall a vićtim to their wild and ungovernable fury.

CIcERo, in deſcribing the charaćter of a perfeót orator, ſuppoſes.

him a complete maſter of every ſcience. If ſuch extenſive abilities
are required to controul and guide the paſſions of an unarmed and
peaceable aſſembly, ſubject to no fears, nor intimidated by the pre
ſence of any immediate danger, ſurely much greater wiſdom, for
titude, and abilities are neceſſary to allay the fury of an armed mul
titude, to inſpire the depreſſed and unfortunate with freſh courage,
bring him unreluctantly, and even with confidence, to face and
engage the vićtorious enemy, affront the greateſt danger with
alacrity,
 72 () F T H E G E N E R A L.

alacrity, court the toils and perils of war with the ſame aſſiduity
others do their pleaſure.

To induce men to act a dangerous part, is much more difficult

than to perſuade them to adopt an opinion, which, for the moſt
part, does not engage in any hazardous enterprize.

IN the ſenate, the orator is prepared, and his auditors more or leſs
diſpoſed to hear him, his mind free and undiſturbed ; whereas a
general is ſurrounded with difficulties and dangers. The ſoldier is
a rude, ignorant, untračtable being ; and when many are united,
an expreſſion miſunderſtood puts them in a flame ; argument, and
a long chain of reaſoning, have no influence over them. No fault,
words, or actions eſcape their notice and cenſure; whence, if once
diſaffected, misfortunes, which proceed from the cowardice of the
ſoldier, neglect or ignorance of the officers, even thoſe cauſed by
accident, a torrent, breaking of a bridge, &c. are all imputed to
the general. His reputation and his authority over the ſoldiers
depend entirely on ſucceſs, which, notwithſtanding the moſt ex
tenſive abilities, wiſdom, and heroiſm, does not always anſwer our
expectations; becauſe the concurrence of a great number of perſons
is required ; and if one or two only of the principal officers, from
malice or ignorance, fail in executing the part affigned to them,
the whole proječt miſcarries. What penetration in the choice of
his principal officers, what dignity and popularity to conciliate their
eſteem and affection, as well as thoſe of the army in general

It is not enough that they know, and can perform what is pre
ſcribed to them, they muſt be defirous and anxious to ſecond your
intentions at the riſk of their lives; they muſt be determined to
ſucceed or periſh in the attempt.

To infuſe ſuch ſentiments into all ranks of men under your

command, from the general to the ſoldier, demands uncommon
qualities,
 O F T H E G E N E R A L. 73

qualities, ſome of which we ſhall endeavour to trace, and give an

imperfect idea of what we think the leader of an army ſhould be.

I TAKE it for granted he is perfestly maſter of the mode in

which men ought to be armed, and ranged to the greateſt advantage;
and that he knows how to dire&t and execute every operation of
war without exception. The objećt we have here in view, is to
ſhew, how he muſt acquire that degree of perſonal authority, as
will enable him to gain the reſpect, confidence, and affection of thoſe
under his command ; and render him ſo entirely maſter of their
inclinations, that his will is the only rule of their actions.

HIs condućt muſt be irreproachable, and free from all kind of

vice, and even of any remarkable weakneſs either of body or mind.
If he is given to women, gaming, or debauchery, his example
will be followed, and a general diſſipation will enſue, which will
ſpread, infect, and corrupt the whole army. Theſe vices are not
only pernicious and ſhameful in themſelves, but very often lead
men into crimes in order to procure the means to purſue them.
They weaken the mind and corrupt the heart, render him unable
to perform the duties of his employment, lay him open to the
wicked deſigns of bad men, expoſe him in a fond or jovial hour to
betray the ſecret of his projećts, by which they miſcarry ; and
above all deſtroy his credit, reputation, and influence on the troops,
whoſe good opinion, however, is the only ſolid foundation of ſuc
ceſs and glory. Theſe are not only vices, but fatal in their conſe
quences, when a commander is infected by them: avarice and rapa
ciouſneſs are crimes of the deepeſt die, at leaſt are the ſource of
them. They cannot be ſatisfied but at the expence of ſomebody,
and probably of ſuch as are leaſt able to ſupport the fraud; and
when gratified at the expence of the poor ſoldiers little pittance, or
conniving at the abuſes and frauds of the contractors, to partake
of the plunder, there is no puniſhment adequate to it. The perſon
K guilty
74. O F T H E G E N E R A L.

guilty of it ought to be baniſhed from the fight of men. It would

ſeem incredible, if daily examples did not prove it, that a general
ſhould be ſo abſurd as to prefer ſuch unlawful gain, which he cannot
want but for his vices, to the ſatisfaction and advantage of being
reſpected and beloved by his army, whoſe affections he moſt cer
tainly forfeits, if once ſuſpected on this head.

PRIDE is an affectation of ſuperiority over others, which always.

offends, and makes men enemies : they will obey no farther than
they muſt, to avoid cenſure or puniſhment; and ſo far from exert
ing themſelves to obtain the vićtory, will ſecretly rejoice at your
defeat, and perhaps contribute to it, when they can do it without
danger. It is inconceivable, that any man in his ſenſes ſhould ačt
in a manner which, upon the leaſt reflection, he muſt know will
give offence to thoſe very people, on whoſe good-will ſucceſs de
pends: however elevated his rank and ſtation may be, he can offend
no man with impunity, particularly in an army, where the affec
tion of all is more or leſs neceſſary. Pride ariſes from immoderate
ſelf-conceit, and an opinion of our ſuperior abilities. Be it ſo, you.
are what you imagine yourſelf to be. Avail yourſelf, however, of
what talents your inferiors poſſeſs, encourage them, they will im
prove by your inſtructions and example, and gratefully acknow
ledge the ſuperiority of a modeſt and humane commander. Oſten
tation and pride are no proof of merit; ačtions alone ſhew it. No.
man is ſufficiently impartial to judge of himſelf; he muſt abide
by the ſentence of the army, which, I believe, is always juſt; it
is madneſs to pretend to force men to reſpect and love you, if your
condućt is weak, irregular, and inſolent. Benevolence and affection
create ſimilar ſentiments; pride is ſullen and diſdainful; vanity is
open, and loquacious to intemperance; both proceed from the ſame
origin ; a high opinion of one's ſelf, and contempt of others, both
are equally pernicious, hateful, and equally to be avoided in every
ſtation
 O F T H E G E N E R A L. 75

flation of life, and moſt ſo in a perſon placed at the head of

others.

ENvy and jealouſy are inherent to low minds, and to men of

moderate abilities, who aſpire to great commands, incapable of
doing any thing that is praiſe-worthy, which can intitle them to
the eſteem of mankind, they are continually plotting againſt men -

of merit. When princes, and perſons inveſted with great power,

are infected with theſe paſſions, they degenerate into open cruelty.
In perſons of lower rank, calumny and intrigue are the weapons
they uſe to deſtroy thoſe they hate, for no other reaſon than be
cauſe they have merit, and deſerve their eſteem and friendſhip.
Theſe paſſions are more common than one would imagine, info
much, that few are exempt from them. There is ſomething ab
ſurd in this paſſion, that a general officer ſhould be jealous, and
conſequently endeavour to cruſh and deſtroy thoſe men who are
moſt capable of promoting his deſigns, appears to me the exceſs of
folly; yet ſo it is, few men have magnanimity enough to ſuffer,
much leſs acknowledge, equal or ſuperior merit in others. This
vice makes a man unhappy in himſelf, obnoxious to others, and for
the moſt part leads him to injuſtice, which finally becomes fatal to
him. It throws him intirely into the hands of artful, baſe, and
low people, who can be of no ſervice to him, and alienates the af
feations of all good and ſenſible men, and in time thoſe of the
whole army, in which chiefly we lay the foundation of ſucceſs. -

A sulleN, ſulky, and moroſe temper is totally unfit for any

command, it will ſoon produce an univerſal hatred, as levity, affec
tation of wiſdom expreſſed by the nods of the head, or other ſuch
grimaces, expoſe him to contempt and derifien. Above all things,
a general muſt avoid warm, harſh, and intemperate expreſſions, or
any word or motion which ſavour of inſolence or contempt, which
generally give greater offence than the moſt ſevere treatment.
K 2 Such
76 O F T H E G E N E R A. L.

Such is human nature, particularly in men of ſentiment and edu

cation, nothing hurts more than the idea of being deſpiſed: it is
an inſult never to be forgiven, and waits only for an opportunity to
revenge itſelf. A warm temper blinds a man of his judgment,
and expoſes him to ſay and do a thouſand raſh and inconfide
rate things, which will involve him in dangers and inextricable
difficulties.

Thus far we have only ſhewn what a general ſhould not be, if
he pretends to deſerve that name; it is not ſufficient he ſhould be
free from the vices and crimes above-mentioned ; every man ſhould
be ſo for his own ſake; he ſhould be poſſeſſed of eminent and uſe
ful virtues, great qualities, by which alone he can acquire true dig
nity, that perſonal authority and ſupreme aſcendancy over the minds
of men, which the ſcepter cannot give.

HoNours and riches may be conferred on any man, though un

deſerving of them; but reputation and glory can proceed only from
ourſelves. High birth, and other accidental circumſtances, if pro
perly applied, contribute much to acquire and eſtabliſh perſonal
conſequence, becauſe they place a man in a ſituation where he can
give ſcope to his genius; whereas another, though poſſeſſed of the
moſt extenſive abilities, if deprived of theſe advantages, is conti
nually checked and kept under by the ſuperior influence, jealouſy,
and malice of the great, who think they have a right to every
thing, without being at the trouble to acquire the knowledge and
ſcience neceſſary to fulfil the duties of the employments they aſpire
to. Hence it is that obſcure merit, particularly in monarchies,
ſeldom or ever raiſes a man to any very eminent poſt, unleſs the
extreme diſtreſſes of the ſtate call him to the helm, which he is
permitted to guide only while the ſtorm and danger laſt; when
theſe ſubſide, tranquillity and vigour reſtored to the ſtate, he muſt
give
 O F T H E G E N E R A L. 77
º

give way to ſome intriguing courtier, retire and fink into oblivion,
of which we have too many examples, antient and modern.

WHEN a general has acquired perſonal authority, is eſteemed and

beloved by his army; when they have confidence in his wiſdom
and abilities, experienced his valour, and ſeen his condućt crowned
with ſucceſs, there is no enterprize, however difficult, above his
reach ; whereas, deſtitute of theſe advantages, though otherwiſe a
man of merit, he can undertake nothing of conſequence without
trembling for the event.

But how is this perſonal authority, this aſcendency over the ſol
diers to be acquired I anſwer, firſt, by being free from vice:
ſecondly, by ſhewing, by his words and ačtions, he is as much
ſuperior in merit as in rank, and in every reſpect worthy their con
fidence and affection; brave without oſtentation, as a thing of courſe;
unmoved by the preſence of the moſt imminent danger; calm, ſe
rene, a chearful and open countenance at all times, chiefly in a day
of battle—This inſpires the ſoldiers with courage and confidence,
and inſures a vićtory.

IN any very great danger, the ſoldier looks up to his officer, and
if he perceives the leaſt ſign of timidity, anxiety, or doubt, he
concludes all is loſt, and generally conſults his ſafety by flight.
The general muſt ſhare the toils and dangers of war with his men
as circumſtances may require, and they ought to ſhare the advan
tages of the vićtory with him: but, alas ! they have bothing to
expect; above all things, he muſt be juſt in the diſtribution of
thoſe favours which paſs through his hands ; if merit alone is at
tended to, he conciliates the affections of all good men, and even
the bad will endeavour to deſerve his protećtion; a general emu
lation will enſue: whereas, if he ſuffers himſelf to be influenced
by any authority whatever, or ſeduced by the intrigue of courtiers,
his
;8 O F T H E G E N E R A L.

his followers, and ſycophants, a general diſcontent will follow;

he is deſerted, abandoned, and hated by every one ; the ordinary
duties of the army are performed with reluctancy; murmurs
and mutiny are not ſeldom the conſequences of the injuſtice of a
general.

FAvoRITISM is always, ſooner or later, fatal to every man who

gives himſelf up to any individual, becauſe, independent of the
weak or wicked counſels, a favorite may give his ſuperior, it makes
him odious, and deprives him of the ſupport of good men. If he
conſults the opinion of his army, he will ſeldom be deceived in
the choice of his friends and adviſers; they never love or eſteem
any man that is not in ſome degree deſerving of it: but a general,
like a ſovereign, is ſurrounded by a claſs of men, whoſe intereſt and
influence depend on keeping him in the dark, and preventing the
leaſt ray of light from penetrating into his receſſes; he employs
this or that man, not from any perſonal knowledge he has of his
abilities, but from the recommendation of ſome artful and ignorant
favorite. If, in ſpite of fate, and the malevolence of theſe people,
an officer's endeavours are crowned with ſucceſs, all is in an uproar;
his vićtories are depreciated, his condućt criticized and calumniated,
until he falls a vićtim to their jealouſy.

MANY things muſt be connived at and diſſembled, others are

remedied by private reprimand, if few are concerned, and publickly
if many. None but great and capital crimes muſt be puniſhed
rigorouſly; and in that caſe I would have it done publickly in the
Roman manner, in the preſence of the whole army, or at leaſt, in
that of the corps to which the delinquents belong, and not by an
obſcure court-martial, where a brave man is often ſacrificed to the
envy and jealouſy of ſome great perſon, and many a villain eſcapes.
Rewards ſhould go rather beyond, and puniſhments below the mark.
No man is infallible, and errors muſt be forgiven.
- EveR Y
 O. F. T HE G E N E R A L, 79

EveRY man under your command muſt partake of your kind

neſs and generoſity, when he is in want and needs it, particularly
the poor ſoldier, and poorer ſubalterns, who often have nothing
but their pay to ſubſiſt upon, to whom the loſs of a horſe is a capi
tal misfortune; the general ſhould have a particular liſt of theſe,
and ſhould omit no opportunity to relieve them; he muſt pay the
moſt ſcrupulous attention to the management of hoſpitals, where
ſome general officer of humanity ſhould preſide; muſt not ſhut
himſelf up like a ſultan, and appear only in ſtate and pomp to diſ
play his greatneſs : on the contrary, he muſt not fail to appear be
fore the line every day, if poſſible, with one or two adjutants only ;
ſtop at each regiment, enquire into, and ſee the ſtate of it (I do
not mean that they are well curled); but whether they have their
allowance of bread, proviſions, &c. and that theſe are of the beſt
kind which can be procured; and if he finds there is the leaſt pre
varication on this head, puniſh the authors, contračtors, and colo
nels with the utmoſt rigour, and force them to refund their cri
minal gain, hang or diſmiſs them for ever. It is a certain.
truth, benevolence creates affection. The poor ſoldier is beyond
all men grateful, and repays a thouſand fold the kindneſs ſhewn
him by his ſuperiors. It is the duty and intereſt of the general to
be juſt, humane, and kind to thoſe he commands, and particularly
to thoſe of the lower claſs,

I Hope the reader will excuſe the length of this diſcourſe, which,
gives ſome, though very inadequate idea of the qualities which a
general ſhould poſſeſs; theſe applied properly will enable him to
perform great things, and on many occaſions, ſupply the want of
military ſkill, and repair errors to which all men are ſubject:-
whereas the moſt extenſive knowledge of the art of war will miſ
carry in its projects, if the army does not heartily concur in the
execution.

I:
8o OF T HE G E N E R A L.

In the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to point out ſome

of the moral qualities which a chief ſhould poſſeſs: we proceed
now to ſhew what men are, and from what ſources he muſt draw
ſuch arguments and motives, as may induce them to exert their
faculties to the utmoſt of their power ; it is not enough they know
how to perform this or that operation ; they muſt be willing and
deſirous to do it; ſucceſs will be the conſequence.

O F T H E P A S S I O N S.

IT is needleſs to diſcuſs minutely and metaphyſically the num

ber and variety of the paſſions. Suffice it to trace their ſource and
origin, and indicate thoſe motives which appear beſt adapted to
raiſe and excite, ſoothe and calm them, as circumſtances may re
quire; ſo that an able commander, by applying them properly, be
always maſter of the actions of the troops committed to his care.

FRoM ſenſibility ariſe agreeable or diſagreeable feelings, and

from theſe pleaſure and pain; ſuch as are indifferent to us produce
only a tranſitory, or no impreſſion at all, and conſequently leave
man, or other animal, in the ſame ſtate he was before : whereas
agreeable or diſagreeable feelings neceſſarily put him in motion, or
at leaſt inſpire him with a deſire to ačt. Fear of, and an averſion
to pain, and the deſire of pleaſure, are the ſpring and cauſe of all
aćtions both in men and other ſpecies of animals. They have two
origins, interior and exterior. The firſt is inherent to all animals
without exception, becauſe it proceeds from ſenſibility. The ſe
cond is peculiar to man, and proceeds from his poſition in ſociety
with his fellow creatures; were he alone in a deſart, he might
perhaps differ from other animals, perhaps in ſagacity, and perhaps
not. -

PAIN
 of T H E PASSI on S. 81

PAIN and pleaſure, ariſing from interior and mechanical cauſes,

and the gratifications of theſe wants, I call ſenſual or animal; and
thoſe which proceed from the position of a man in ſociety, I call
ſocial. The firſt are few and limited, and may without much dif
ficulty be gratified, which reduces animals of all kinds to a ſtate of
ſloth and indolence, until their wants are renewed, and pain forces
them to action.

IN proportion as ſociety is imperfect and uncivilized, man will

be found to reſemble the moſt common animal; a ſavage and a
ſlave differ very little from animals, being moved to adt by their
ſenſual wants alone; however, as man is always placed in ſome kind of
ſociety, natural or civil, where his animal wants are ſatisfied, there
is in him a principle of ačtion, not to be found in other animals,
which charaćterizes and diſtinguiſhes him from all others; this
principle of ſocial action is, I think, general, and to be found in
every man, more or leſs: it is the deſire of pre-eminence and ſupe
riority; though the means, by which it is obtained, may and do
vary according to the different ſituations in which men are placed;
yet is pre-eminence the ultimate objećt of ſocial ačtion, and ope
rates upon him when his animal wants are gratified; whether it is
coveted as a means to ſatisfy ſenſual pleaſures, as Helvetius ſup
poſes, or, as I think, more probable, to ſecure our independence,
which cannot be done otherwiſe, than by a real ſuperiority, or both,
is not material; it is certain we affect and deſire to hold a ſuperi
ority over men much more than over women, though the former *

cannot contribute to gratify ſenſual pleaſure.

GLoRy, acquired by great ačtions, ſtudy, mathematics, elo

quence, &c. do not tend to gratify the ſenſes, yet are more anxi
ouſly ſought after, than thoſe objećts which do; this proves, that
intelle&tual pleaſures and pains affect the human heart more than
thoſe which proceed from the ſenſes alone. The deſire of pre
L eminence
82 -O F THE P A S S I O N S.

eminence increaſes, as man riſes in ſociety: in whatever poſition

a man is placed, if above want, he aims at ſome advancement in
that claſs, of which he is a member ; when arrived at the top, he
wiſhes to enter into a ſuperior claſs, and ſo on to the end of his
CàICCI,

When a man is placed low in ſociety, and intirely taken up in

procuring food and raiment, he is precluded from the hopes of
obtaining ſocial advantages, and approaches to the condition of
animals: alſo a rich and powerful man at the head of ſociety,
enabled to gratify his wants without labour, his defires, ačtivity, and
principles of ačtion are ſtifled in their birth, his attention is di
rećted to vary his pleaſure of ſenſe, or ſome trivial amuſements, as
gaming, hunting, drinking, &c. In the midſt of plenty and
ſuperfluities, he is unhappy, and is ſurprized at it; whereas he
ſhould confider that pleaſure derives from ſome degree of pain,
which creates in us ſome want or deſire, and therefore the imme
diate gratifications of them, whether they proceed from animal
or ſocial origin, neceſſarily deſtroys the pleaſures of enjoyment,
and conſequently that ačtivity by which they muſt be obtained 5
for this can be exerted only during the interval, which intervenes
between the time we wiſh for ſuch a thing, and the enjoyment of
it : hence it is, that the greateſt degree of ſocial ačtivity is always
in the intermediate claſſes, between the extremes of poverty and
of riches. -

By ſocial ačtivity, I mean that which tends to advance our rank

in ſociety: by animal ačtivity, that which tends to gratify thoſe
wants on which our preſervation, or that of the ſpecies depends: it is
vain to preach ambition, glory, honours, &c. to a man oppreſſed
with miſery; heroiſm, valour, courage, are incompatible with
extreme poverty, conſequently theſe and other ſuch affections of
the mind can be found only in men placed above want, on whom
alone
 OF ' A NIM AL FE A. R. 83 *

alone the deſire of pre-eminence operates; the mode of acquiring

it, and the objećt vary, according to the different poſitions of men; ,
in order to increaſe their ačtivity, you muſt propoſe means and ob
jećts, analogous to their different ſituations: the ambition of a
merchant is different in its objećts from that of the ſoldier, clergy
man, philoſopher, &c. whence the ſeveral claſſes, in which ſo
ciety is divided, have their peculiar charaćteriſtics.

C H A P T E R II.

O F A N I M A. L. P. E. A. R.
*

NIMAL fear ariſes from the apprehenſion of ſome danger,

which man and other animals feel inimical to their preſerva
tion, and therefore avoid it with the utmoſt care and caution : the .

natural effect of fear is flight, unleſs reſtrained by ſuperior fear. No"

animal can be induced to encounter danger without compulſion;
when the danger is great, and the hopes of eſcaping it entirely.
loſt, then deſpair inſpires courage, which produces the utmoſt ex
ertion of our forces, and generally is crowned with ſucceſs.

ANIMAL wants always produce ačtion in ſome degree or other.

Extreme fear and pain, ariſing from want, produce extreme exer
tion; it is dangerous to contend with man or other animal ani- *

mated by ſuch powerful motives.

WHEN the ſoldier really is, or thinks himſelf, placed in a dan

gerous ſituation, without a poſſibility of eſcaping, every thing may
be expected from him; placed between death and vićtory, he be
comes a hero; but if you expoſe him for a long time to great dan
ger, and there remains a poſſibility of avoiding it by flight, he will
L 2 fly;
84 of ANIMAL FEAR.
fly; becauſe the idea of preſent danger will prevail over the fear of
a more remote puniſhment, which he may hope to elude. More
over a confiderable body of troops are not ſuſceptible of the fear of
puniſhment, becauſe they cannot be all puniſhed, and individuals
ſuppoſe each in particular is, that they are not to be ſacrificed:
hence it appears, that fear is not a powerful nor effectual principle
of exertion, unleſs extreme and deſperate; whereas the defire of
gratifying our wants is ; I am therefore ſurprized to ſee generals
aćt upon the contrary ſyſtem; they ſuppoſe fear the only principle
of ačtion in the ſoldier, as if he were an animal of a different ſpecies;
for, ſurely,
own ačtions.they will not acknowledge it as the motive of their
w

IN our armies, the ſoldier is in fact reduced to the condition of

an animal, and like them moved to ačtion by bodily fear and ani- .
mal wants, being totally excluded from the advantages of ſociety:
I aſk, is it neceſſary it ſhould be ſo : No, every man is by nature
ſuſceptible of paſſion, his poſition in ſociety may increaſe or dimi
niſh the ardour with which he purſues a given objećt; but all
men, when free from danger, and their animal wants gratified, are
perpetually in ſearch of ſomething, from whence they expe&t to
derive pleaſure; no claſs of men is exempt from the general influ
ence of ambition, conſequently all by ſome motive or other, ana
logous to their ſituation, may be excited to perform great ačtions,
if the claſs to whom a man belongs is ſuſceptible of it, and in
proportion as it is elevated above others.
\

C H A P T E R.
 [ 85 J

C H A P T E R III.

O F. H. O N O U R AND S H AM E.

ONOUR proceeds from a defire to gain the public eſteem;

ſhame from the fear of loſing it. The particular qualities.
eſteemed honourable are peculiar to each claſs; valour and con
tempt of danger in a ſoldier; wiſdom in a ſtateſman; piety and
learning in eccleſiaſtics, &c. becauſe theſe in each claſs are moſt
uſeful to the community at large. -

When the principle of honour and a ſenſe of ſhame are firmly

eſtabliſhed in the human heart, they operate more forcibly than
the fear of death, and are the ſource of all great and heroic ac
tions: the more elevated the claſs to which a man belongs, and
his poſition in it, the greater will be his exertions to gain the eſ
teem of the public. A man buried in obſcurity is little affected
by honour or ſhame; the deſire of pleaſing ceaſes, and he degene
rates into a ſavage, and approaches to the ſtate of animals: hence
it is that gentlemen are in general more anxious and delicate in
what they ſuppoſe concerns their honour, than members of other
chaſſes; inſtead of depreſſing that claſs of men called ſoldiers, as
we do at preſent, every method poſſible ſhould be uſed to raiſe and
exalt it : as the difference of claſſes produces more or leſs ačtivity
in the purſuit of thoſe objećts which are peculiar to them, ſo does
that of government, which ſtamps on the whole nation a certain
charaćter different from that of others; ſome tend to promote ho
nour and virtue, others to depreſs them.
IN deſpotic governments, there is but one claſs of men, viz.
that of the ſoldier, the reſt are an aggregate of individuals, whoſe
COll
£6 of Honou R AND SHAME.
condition is nearly on a level with that of animals, and like them
is totally occupied in procuring the neceſſaries of life.
The ambition of the ſoldier, confined to his claſs in time of
peace, having no motive or opportunity of exerting itſelf, finks
into ſloth and indolence; hence that lethargy and inačtion which
prevail in this kind of government, where a man cannot, by any .
exertions, obtain the public eſteem; where it is dangerous to attempt
it, fear will be the only ruling principle which tends to ina&tion ;
honour and ſenſe of ſhame are utterly unknown.

IN monarchies the ſubjećts are divided into ſeveral claſſes, more

or leſs diſtinguiſhed; all may, however, partake of the public
eſteem in ſome degree. A man is excited to exert himſelf by the
emoluments peculiar to his claſs and fituations, and by thoſe which
he may reap from ſociety in general, and conſequently many and
powerful motives concur to promote honour, virtue, and ačtivity,
when the ſovereign is a man of genius; but if weak and indolent,
the activity of the ſubjećt will be direéted to parade, and extrava
gancy, art, and intrigue will ſupplant virtue; the talent of pleaſing
will be deemed the moſt important; that which is agreeable pre
wails over what is uſeful.

GREAT exertions are ſeldom found in monarchies, becauſe they

are not always the moſt ſure means to obtain the eſteem of the
prince; that of the public, which is the moſt powerful incentive
to great actions, is unknown : the prince is every thing, the reſt
are nothing; the eſteem of the former is the only objećt of atten
tion, and may often be obtained by very inconſiderable exertions,
and by means inconſiſtent with honour and virtue.
The claſs of ſoldiers being conſidered as the moſt honourable,
thoſe of the higher rank in it are reſtrained from committing any
unworthy
 O F HON O U R AN D S H A M E, 87

unworthy ačtions by the ſenſe of ſhame; but as the great emolu

ments and rewards are peculiar to the nobility, they exped them
from their conneétions, the favour of the prince and his miniſters
or favourites, rather than from any exertions of their own ; hence
it is, that the certainty of obtaining them in the nobility, and the
equal certainty of not obtaining them in the other claſſes, dimi
niſhes, or rather extinguiſhes the principles of heroiſm in all.

IN republics, where all are equal, pre-eminence can be acquired

only by perſonal and ſuperior merit; public eſteem is the reward
of great and uſeful ačtions: hence it is that republics, antient and
modern, have produced more great men than all the monarchies
put together.

IN theſe, favour procures every thing; in thoſe, nothing. In

republics the utility of the whole is confidered as worthy of re
wards. In monarchies the pleaſure of the prince and of his favou
rites is the path which leads to pre-eminence. From the different
modes of obtaining pre-eminence ariſes the prodigious difference we
obſerve in the charaćters, manners, and exertions of men, as they
are influenced by the different ſpecies of governments. - *

WE have ſeen that motives ariſing from bodily fear, and the
neceſſity of gratifying our animal wants, unleſs extreme, do not
produce any great effects, and that they are not either conſtant or
general; and therefore cannot be always applied with advantage.
Thoſe which ariſe from the poſition of a man in ſociety, are indeed
numberleſs and permanent, but not applicable to all ; pre-emi
nence, and the means by which it is obtained, are within the
reach of few perſons and claſſes only ; thoſe of inferior rank are
excluded entirely; ſo that like animals, it is by fear and want
they can be compelled to act; we muſt therefore ſeek for a more
general motive which operates on every claſs of men, and on every
individual.
C H A P.
 I 88 J

C H A P T E R IV.

O F. R. I C H E S.

H E N a people is corrupted by luxury, vice, and folly,

- the influence of riches is ſuperior to that of every other paſ
ſon, becauſe they are an univerſal medium, by which they may all
be gratified. Whoever poſſeſſes great riches, is the maſter of others
in proportion as he can and will ſatisfy their wants, according to
the expreſſion of Virgil, “Nam Deus, mihi ſemper erit, qui,” &c.
The rich and powerful are treated and adored like a divinity by his
worthleſs votaries: as the influence of riches increaſes, that of
honour and virtue declines; inſomuch, that not the leaſt traces
of them are to be found. However, as we cannot form men to
our wiſhes, and muſt take them as they are, it is neceſſary to
apply that motive which is analogous to their ideas of good and
evil, that we may ſecure their ſubmiſſion, and induce them to
exert themſelves in over-coming difficulties and dangers to which
the ſoldier is particularly expoſed. As in our ſyſtem he is ex
cluded from the advantages of ſociety, viz. honours, rank, &c.
we muſt apply that only medium left us, which can excite him to
perform great ačtions, pecuniary rewards; they muſt however be
tranſitory, and the recompence of vićtory and ſome extraordinary
aćt of valour; they muſt not be exceſſive, and ſuch as put the ſol
dier above want. Lands ſhould never be granted to a ſoldier, but
when he retires from the ſervice; when by ſucceſſive vićtories an
army is become rich, loaded with ſpoils, baggage, &c. it is ſoon
corrupted and ungovernable. I approve of the example of Alexan
der; Burn them all, diſmiſs the old ſoldier, and ſend him home
rich. The toils and dangers of a ſoldier are great, his rewards and
enjoy
 O F L I B E R T Y. 89

enjoyments muſt alſo be great and intenſe, but of ſhort duration;

his hopes muſt for ever be kept alive, and his wants ſometimes
gratified, even to exceſs.
THE Greek and Roman ſoldier, was animated to encounter dan
gers, by the hopes of plunder, and the proſpect of obtaining all the
honours of the ſtate, to which military virtue moſt certainly led
him; the Mahometans by plunder and enthuſiaſm; the Tartars
and free-booters, in the American ſeas, by plunder alone; all have
performed ſuch ačtions of valour and heroiſm, as appear incredible
to us.

WHEN we compare the motives which inſpired the different

nations, with thoſe applied by us, we cannot be ſurprized at the
prodigious difference we find in the effects: the cane may make a
tolerable ſlave, but can never form a hero ; beſides theſe motives of
exertion, drawn from fear of bodily pain, from the advantages of
ſociety, as honours and pecuniary rewards, there are others leſs
general, but more powerful in their effects, viz. Liberty and
Religion.

C H A P T E R V.

O F L I B, E R T Y.

H E love of liberty and independence is inherent to all

animals without exception; their exiſtence depends upon
it; they muſt all enjoy it in ſome degree; they muſt ſeek their
food, and be able to preſerve themſelves by reſiſtance or flight.
Man has ſubdued a great part of the animal ſpecies to his domi
aion; the greateſt, or rather all the human ſpecies, is alſo brought
M to
96 O F L I B E R T Y.

to ſubmit to the yoke of the few whom nature had made equals:
habituated to his ſituation, man ſubmits with patience, becauſe he
knows not the advantage of liberty. In the animal creation thoſe
individuals, who are not ſubdued by man, enjoy abſolute liberty;
but the human ſpecies, conſtituted in natural or civil ſociety, can
not enjoy that degree of liberty, nor yet be reduced to abſolute
ſlavery; he muſt like other animals have ſome degree of liberty to
preſerve his life, but he can never attain to abſolute independence;
born and bred in ſociety, he is neceſſarily connected with many
perſons by the reciprocal wants and ſuccours, which each in par
ticular ſtands in need of: no man, however low or exalted his
ſtation may be, can live abſolutely independent; their wants, both
natural and ſocial, chain them together, and this is the cauſe and
origin of ſociety, of which man alone is ſuſceptible; other animals
aggregate, but are independent of each other : man aſſociates be .
cauſe his wants cannot be gratified by his own induſtry alone: our
wants and our dependence increaſe together, and produce a volun
tary ſubmiſſion to the will of him or them, who are enabled to
gratify them; he obeys unreluctantly, becauſe it is a medium by
which alone he obtains what he wiſhes for; but when he expe&ts
no advantage from his compliance, every command is confidered as
an oppreſſion, in proportion as it tends to deprive him of liberty,
property, honour, &c. he will hate the authors, and embrace the
firſt opportunity of ſhaking off the yoke, and reſume his natural
liberty. There is in the nature of man a certain degree of ſuffer
ance only, beyond which power cannot be exerted with impunity;
it produces deſpair, which, if ſupported by any, the moſt trifling
means, and condućted with wiſdom, is invincible: tremble, ye
mighty monarchs, and beware, the effects of deſpair are terrible.
. A people reduced to the neceſſity of taking up arms againſt
their ſovereign, is obliged to exert itſelf by the fear of a re
-
-
-
- -
vengeful
 O F L I B E R T Y. 91

vengeful maſter, death and ſlavery, and by the hopes of indepen

dency, and all the advantages which attend it; ſuch powerful
motives generally render their efforts ſucceſsful.
The firſt cauſe and objećt of a revolt is to repel injuries, real or
ſuppoſed; the ſecond is to provide for future ſecurity, which can
never be effectually done than by deſtroying the ſovereign autho
rity: it is during this conteſt that the greateſt efforts are made,
becauſe there is no alternative ; freedom or ſlavery is the reſult of
it. In proportion as the revolters ſucceed in their attempts, and
their danger diminiſhes, their exertions will alſo decline, and if
left to themſelves, will probably go no farther ; but if you per
ſevere in attacking them, and treat them with cruelty and con
tempt, they will not be ſatisfied with any conditions you may
grant them, but, moved by revenge, which is a very ačtive prin
ciple, purſue their oppreſſors to deſtrućtion.

HAD Tarquin, had the Spaniards given the revolters time, and
diſſembled their reſentments, a more favourable opportunity of
regaining their loſt power would have offered, and perhaps the
Roman and Dutch republics would never have exiſted. It was the
ſenſe of danger, with which they were threatened, which ren
dered them invincible, and finally crowned their endeavours with
ſucceſs.
-

FRoM all we have ſaid, it follows, that the ſovereign in con

dućting ſuch a war ſhould, by a moderate conduct, diminiſh the
idea of danger, and leave room to a ſolid and hearty reconciliation;
and that the leaders of a revolt, on the contrary, ſhould ſhew, that
no confidence or reliance can be had in the promiſes.of an irritated
maſter, which are only ſhares to divide, and then puniſh and en
ſlave thoſe whom he cannot conquer. Men truly animated with
the enthuſiaſtic fire of liberty, if properly condućted, are always
- M 2 ſuperior
92 OF R E L TGI ON,

fuperior to thoſe who fight for the power and emoluments of a

maſter; the difficulties are all in the beginning of the conteſt.
When on one ſide is an army diſciplined, and abundantly provided
with every thing which may render its operation ſucceſsful and
vićtorious; on the other, nothing but courage and deſpair, which
ariſe from a ſenſe of injuries.

C H A P T E R VI.

O F. R. E. L. I. G. I.O. N.

* L L. religions are not equally calculated to produce a ſpirit

of enthuſiaſm, ſome lead to an ačtive, others to a ſpeculative
life; the Mahometan is among the firſt, and the Chriſtian among
the latter. No religion, I know of, offers more powerful motives
to action than the Mahometan, none leſs than the Chriſtian. The
former promiſes rewards, analogous to the nature and inclination of
men in general, and particularly adapted to the manners and mode
of living of the oriental nations.
Victory is rewarded with the ſpoils of the enemy; death in
the combat expiates all crimes, and, moreover, leads to pleaſures,
which in this world, are confidered the greateſt man can enjoy, and.
in the next, are believed to be infinite in intenſity, variety, and
duration, embelliſhed with every beauty which a heated imagina
tion can beſtow on them. Inſpired with ſuch powerful motives, it
is no wonder the Arabs performed ſuch wonderful atchievements.

The rewards propoſed by the Chriſtian religion are vague, in

determined, and incomprehenſible, no way analogous to the wants.
and ſituation of a human being : the general tenor of it is peace and
:
ſubmiſſion,
 OF R E L T G I O N. 93

fubmiſſion, and therefore extremely well adapted to promote the

deſigns of tyranny and deſpotiſm in whomſoever power is lodged.

The Chriſtians take not arms, like the Mahometans, to propa

gate their dogma which prohibits it.

THE ambition of the clergy has, however, covered the earth.

with blood and ſlaughter; violated rights, oppreſſion real or ſup
poſed, were the pretext, but generally ambition was the true
cauſe. Whenever religion is made a motive of war, the effects
are more vigorous and deciſive , than, when it proceeds from other
cauſes.

ETERNAL pains, and pleaſures are motives which ačt more

forcibly than any other derived from human and tranſitory origin.
Theſe wars are generally cruel, and every means to deſtroy the
enemy are eſteemed lawful; hence treachery, aſſaſſinations, breach
of faith, &c. are common in ſuch wars. They fight for the ho
nour of the Divinity; to murder his enemies is a grateful ſacri
fice: againſt men animated by religious enthuſiaſm, much caution
is required, particularly againſt the attempts of individuals; avoid
the firſt impulſe, vićtors or vanquiſhed, truſt them not.

IGNoHANCE, the only foundation of clerical power and influ

ence, is greatly diminiſhed in Europe, and a ſpirit of toleration,
prevails. If the people are ſuffered to enjoy their opinions in
peace, they will no longer be made the tools of the ambitious,
and intriguing clergy, to diſturb and ſubvert the ſtate. The
clerical order, in moſt religions, is very dangerous, and muſt be
watched with a vigilant eye; unleſs he is totally ſubordinate to.
the civil power, he will diſturb and uſurp it if he can; he muſt
be ſtrićtly confined to the exerciſe of his paſtoral funètions, and,
never ſuffered to interfere in public affairs. -

Ç H. A. P.
 [ 94 |

C H A P T E R VII.

O F W o M E N,
A N D T H E I R.

IN FLU E N C E ON TH E H U MAN HEART,

HE origin and foundation of that attachment, which the two

ſexes feel for each other, is without doubt in our animal
wants, and if confined to this alone, would upon gratification, as
in other animals, be immediately diſſolved; but our ſocial wants
cement that union by habit, and in proportion as they can, will
aid and ſupport each other. It is obſervable, that this reciprocal
attachment and friendſhip are much ſtronger in the lower and mid
dling claſſes of ſociety, than in the more elevated. The firſt by
their ſituation are, in a great meaſure, precluded from the pleaſures
and amuſements derived from general ſociety, being chiefly em
ployed in procuring the neceſſaries of life; confined within a
domeſtic circle, it is there alone they muſt find content and hap
pineſs. They ſtand in need of each other continually for the ſup
port and pleaſure of life; habit confirms the union, friendſhip,
calm and peaceable friendſhip, ſucceeds that tumultuous and tran
fitory paſſion called love.

People of high rank, are much leſs attached to each other, be

cauſe they ſtand leſs in need of each other; ſo that when their ſen
ſual wants are gratified, they do not feel that mutual dependence,
which is the only chain by which man and woman, as well as
ſociety in general, are tied and linked together; hence it follows,
that they recur to foreign aid (if I may ſo call it) for pleaſure; the
domeſtic
 O F W O M E N, &c. 95

domeſtic chain is broke, a general diſſipation and reciprocal cool

neſs enſue, and nothing but the appearance of an union between man
and wife ſubſiſts. The great have ſuch a facility in obtaining the
objects of their wiſhes, that they anticipate pleaſure, and by that
means debilitate; and finally deſtroy the powers of enjoyment,
which reduces them to a ſtate of apathy and inſenſibility; hence
that ennui and melancholy is the cauſe and origin of ſuicide.

There are two periods in a man's life, in which the influence

of women is great and almoſt irrefiſtible; youth and old age: in
the former our ſenſual wants, and the paſſion ariſing from them,
make the gratification of them a phyſical neceſſity, which, like
other paſſions, increaſe in proportion to the obſtacles we meet with,
ſo that it may produce rage, fury, and madneſs.

The paſſion of love, that is, the defire of enjoying a particular

woman, ariſes fiom the difficulty of obtaining her; would ſhe in
ſtantly comply and gratify our wiſhes, our attachment would ceaſe,
unleſs by her art in managing our other paſſions, ſhe can ſubſtitute
ſocial wants, which never die, to thoſe extinguiſhed by a too.
eaſy gratification.

MEN advanced in years are thruſt out of general ſociety,

which obliges them to live within the compaſs of a narrow cir
cle of acquaintance, much at home, man is in continual want
of ſupport to prop him up like an old tree. In theſe circum
ſtances, his wife, or ſome other favourite, has a powerful influ
ence over him, and dire&ts all his meaſures. The reſult of all
this is, that if women lived more retired, their influence would
increaſe in proportion, as they keep men at a diſtance, as we
ſee in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, &c. Our manners
in Europe are incompatible with the power which women
- might
96 O F M U S I C.

might enjoy in the ſtate; could they be made the recompenſe of

honourable ačtions, we ſhould ſee great exertions to deſerve their
eſteem and favour.

c H A PT E R VIII.
O F M U S I C.

H E power of muſic, over the heart, is very great and might

therefore be made uſe of to raiſe or calm the paſſions. It
were to be wiſhed ſome able muſician and philoſopher would make
experiments, by executing different pieces, to a promiſcuous audience
of men and women of different ages, ſoldiers in particular; the
reſult would ſhew what ſpecies of harmony was moſt adapted to
raiſe courage in the troops. I would recommend this to Mr.
Harris of Saliſbury, whoſe abilities and penetration are known and
eſteemed by all : a treatiſe, the philoſophy of muſic, would be a
new and important work worthy his pen.

P A R T
 PA R T T H E T H I R D.

O F T H E

c on NECTION BET W E E N T H E D 1 FFERENT

S P E CI E S OF GOVE R N M E N T S

A N D

M I L IT A R Y O P E R A T I O N S.
-

C H A P T E R I.

S our armies are armed and diſciplined in the ſame manner,

it is natural to conclude, that the final ſucceſs of a war
depends intirely on the goodneſs of the troops, and the
abilities of the commanders. Though this may be true in general,
there are, I think, other cauſes which muſt concur with thoſe
above-mentioned; for, in the hiſtory of various wars, I find that
ſome very extenſive and apparently powerful empires have been
eaſily ſubddued; whereas other inconſiderable ſtates have made an
incredible, and often ſucceſsful reſiſtance,

WHEN I conſider the wars carried on by the Perſians in Greece,

with thoſe of Alexander the Great in Aſia, between the Romans
and Carthaginians, thoſe of the Tartars in China and other parts
of Aſia, thoſe of the Mahometans in Aſia and Europe, 1 perceive
a prodigious difference in the duration and final ſucceſs of them ;
N from
98 O F D E S P OT I C G O W E R N M R N T S.

from whence I infer, that the difference of government contributed

as much towards it, as the goodneſs of the troops, or the genius of
the commanders.

We muſt inveſtigate the reaſon, why in ſuch circumſtances,

and againſt ſuch an enemy, a vićtory or two have been followed
by the conqueſt of an empire, whereas twenty obtained againſt a
much weaker in appearance, have produced no deciſive advantage.
For want of examining this ſubjećt, we conſider all enemies as
perfeótly alike, we have but one mode of ačiing, though ſurely
there is an eſſential difference, both in theory and pračtice, between
deſpotic, monarchic, and republican governments, which operates
continually on every branch of adminiſtration, civil and military;
it will therefore be highly neceſſary to ſhew, that this difference
ought to be confidered as a principal circumſtance in forming a plan.
of war, becauſe on weighing it maturely, we ſhall find it to be the
main ſpring of military operations, and that, as this is ſtrong or
weak, ačtive and rapid, ſlow or languid, ſo will finally be the re
ſults of them,

C H A P T E R II.

OF D E SPOT I C G O V E R N M E N T S,

T is by no means eaſy to define the meaning of words, and

without exact definitions, our reaſonings will be vague and
unconcluſive. Monteſquieu defines this ſpecies of government,
“ a government by caprice,” as if the edićt of a monarch, a ple
biſite, or an ačt of parliament might not equally be the effect of
caprice, as an order of the ſultan. This definition, like many
ethers of the ſame author, ſignifies nothing.
THE
 -

O F D E S P OT I C G O W E R N M E N T S. 99.

The ſovereign power, whether placed in one or more perſons,

is by its nature arbitrary and abſolute; the mode in which it is ex
erciſed varies, which gives a peculiar charaćter to each government.
This difference in the mode of adminiſtering the ſovereign power
ariſes, firſt, from the different manner by which it was acquired,
and muſt be analogous to it, varied more or leſs, according to the
phyſical and political mode of exiſtence of the ſubjećts.

DoMINIon is acquired ſometimes by diſpoſſeſſing the ſovereign

only; the conqueror aſſumes his place, the people ſubmit, and the
conqueſt is complete. This always happens in deſpotic govern
ments, where the whole power of the ſtate, or rather, I may ſay,
the ſtate itſelf, is centered in the perſon of the ſovereign: when he
is deſtroyed, the war is finiſhed; for there is in the power of no
other man, or body of men, a right, or a ſufficient power to col
led new forces capable of making the leaſt reſiſtance. Submiſſion
is the common lot of all. In ſuch circumſtances there can be but
two claſſes of men, the one ſlaves, and the other armed, compoſed
of the conquerors, comparatively leſs numerous.

THE country can be no otherwiſe kept in ſubječtion, than by

diſtributing the troops in the different provinces, whoſe firſt object
is to deſtroy whatever may give ſuſpicion of a revolt, the next is
to raiſe tributes. The manner of putting theſe inſtructions in prac
tice, muſt neceſſarily be arbitrary, and depend totally upon the will
of the Pacha, in whom, like the Roman proconſuls, in conquered
provinces, all power, civil and military, is veſted. The people poſ
ſeſſing nothing by any ſpecies of right, there is no room for laws,
or any tribunals to interpret them ; the will of the governor is the
law, from whoſe deciſion there is no appeal, for this ſuppoſes
rights, laws, tribunals, &c.
N 2 THE
'ice of Des Portc G ovK R NMENTs.
THE different provinces, are not in Afia, as in European govern
ments, united to the throne by the ties of general laws and mutual
obligation, which form a common center, to which all tends, and
a general ſyſtem of union and intercourſe between the different
parts enſues, which makes what is called a NATION. It is not a
ſociety political or civil, but a ſimple aggregation of individuals, like
a flock of ſheep, whoſe exiſtence depends on the will of the Pacha
or governor. Hence it is, that the deſpot does not himſelf, and by
general laws, govern his dominions, nor do the different provinces
form one political empire, but ſo many tributary provinces, whoſe
chiefs, under different chara&ters, govern them with an abſolute
ſway, on condition of keeping them in ſubjećtion, and paying
yearly a certain tribute.
THE ſituation of the Pacha being precarious, he has no intereſt
in the welfare of the ſubjećt, his adminiſtration tends only to enrich
himſelf, that he may ſecure an intereſt at court, which often pro
duces a contrary effect; he is ſacrificed to appeaſe thoſe whom he
has plundered ; his treaſures are his real crime.

FRoM conqueſts aroſe every where a kind of foedal ſyſtem:

hence the nabobs in India, the timariots in Turkey, and barons,
counts, &c. in Europe, among whom the conquered lands were
diſtributed on different conditions; at firſt at the pleaſure of the
prince only, as now in Turkey, but in other parts, as in Germany,
and the reſt of Europe, they became hereditary ; we make acqui
ſitions, but no conqueſts.

IN making, as well as in ſecuring conqueſts, it is evident that

the whole force of the ſtate is placed in the military, which, in
deed, is the only claſs of men, united by ſome general rules
whoſe objećt can be no other than military diſcipline and ſubor
dination.
IN
 OF DES P OT IC Gove RNMENTs. IOI

IN time of war the ſoldiery is kept in order by the fear of the

enemy, and the hopes of plunder, induced to obey, and execute the
commands of his ſuperiors unreluctantly; but when the conqueſt
is made, and the country totally ſubdued, no longer awed by the
preſence of an enemy, nor kept together by any ſenſe of danger,
he feels himſelf the maſter, both of the enſlaved people, and of his
ſovereign, grows ſlothful, inſolent, and formidable to both. An
attempt to inforce order and diſcipline is followed by a mutiny;
the commander's head muſt be taken off to appeaſe it. That once
formidable and vićtorious army is now degenerated into a tumultu
ous rabble. The ſultan is indeed perfeótly ſecure againſt the ſub
jećts, but expoſed to much greater danger, which continually
threatens him from his own troops.

THE governors of the diſtant provinces, cannot by force, be kept

in due ſubordination, and from fear of puniſhment, which they
know they deſerve, are often tempted to revolt. In this caſe, the
ſultan is obliged to diſſemble, and recur to aſſaſſination, or oppoſe
a ſucceſſor; he dares not march in perſon at the head of his guards
to quell a revolt, being equally afraid of an armed force, wherever
aſſembled, and by whomſoever it is commanded.

To preſerve the tranquillity of the ſtate, and keep danger far

from the ſeraglio, is in this government a maxim of ſtate; for this
purpoſe, the troops are diſperſed in ſmall bodies over the empire;
ſo that there is no where any conſiderable force, excepting in the
capital, who, feeling themſelves the maſters, are dangerous to the
prince and his miniſters, and intirely corrupted by ſloth and in
dolence.

AN army cannot acquire ſtrength, diſcipline, and ſubordination, .

unleſs the troops are kept together in time of peace, continually
exerciſed
io2 O F D E S P OT I C G O W E R N M E N T S.

exerciſed in the garriſons and in the field, and often engaged in

aćtual war; all which is incompatible with the principles of a
deſpotic government. All armies degenerate by a long peace, and
chiefly thoſe of a deſpot. Diſperſed, as they are, over an im
menſe country, it is with great difficulty they are colle&ted toge
ther and brought into the field, which is always very late, and
never until the corn is grown, to feed their numerous cavalry. For
the ſame reaſon they cannot continue long in any given ſpot, and
the campaign laſts only a few months; they muſt retire for want
of proviſions.

THE greateſt part of the Turkiſh army, like our ancient militia,
ſerve only for a certain time, when this is elapſed, they go home,
and abandon the poſts confided to them, whether they are relieved
by other troops or not, which happened at Georgowa and Ibrai
low, on the Danube, a few days after they had repulſed the Ruſ.
ſians with very conſiderable loſs. Unaccuſtomed to the diſcipline
and ſubordination of a regular army, they do not act on a conſtant
and regular plan ; they march, camp, and fight in a looſe and diſ
orderly manner, inſomuch, that if attacked briſkly, they can never
form, ſo as to make any tolerable reſiſtance.

CHANCE, the caprice of a Pacha, or of a few men who ad

vance to ſkirmiſh, very often bring on a general engagement, or
rather a multiplicity of partial actions, without any unity of objećt
or deſign. In their attacks, from ignorance and the irregularity
with which they are made, totally unconnected with each other,
they are the more violent and impetuous, and extremely dan
gerous, if not oppoſed with vigour and firmneſs. The defeat of
this or that body does not, as with us, prevent the others from
advancing and breaking your line if they can ; and if they ſucceed
in one or two points, the great number of horſe, who ačt fingly,
gives
 OF D ESPOT I C G O W E R N M E N T S. Io3

gives them a prodigious ačtivity. They over-run and ſpread

themſelves over the whole country; no ground is impervious to
them ; ſo that an army, once broke, can ſcarcely avoid a general
deſtruction, unleſs favoured in its retreat by ſome particular cir
cumſtances, and an uncommon firmneſs and conduct of the ge
neral. For theſe reaſons ſuch troops are formidable and dangerous
in their aſſaults ; but weak, when attacked, and eaſily thrown into.
confuſion, broke, and totally diffipated if purſued with vigour,
but with great order and caution ; for ſometimes ſtrong parties
will ſtop ſhort, and if they perceive you are in diſorder, will attack
you with impetuoſity, and often with ſucceſs.

THE Aſiatic troops generally carry into the field all they
poſſeſs, which greatly embarraſſes them, and in caſe of a defeat,
makes their loſs irretrievable; for not being able to make any kind
of diſpoſition for a retreat, camp, artillery, equipage, &c. is aban
doned to the vićtors, and all without exception ſeek their ſafety in
flight; a great part goes home and returns no more. At preſent,
that enthuſiaſm, which rendered them for the moſt part vićtorious,
is totally extinguiſhed; plunder is now the only motive which
ſpurs them to action; if ſucceſsful, they are extremely formida
ble; if otherwiſe, they deſpond, and can with difficulty, and ge
nerally not at all, be brought a ſecond time to face the enemy.
A defeat, for the moſt part, is followed by the diſgrace and baniſh
ment or death of the Vizir, to appeaſe the troops who cannot be
puniſhed, and muſt not be ſuppoſed guilty. A new general, a
new army, much worſe than the former, is collected with diffi
culty, and brought into the field very late in the ſeaſon. This,
intimidated by the defeat of the former, ſcarce can be induced to
approach the enemy, and far from attacking or oppoſing him with
vigour, retires, or rather flies as he advances, abandoning one poſt
afrer another, and finally the whole province ; ſo that you have
nothing,
104 OF DE SPOT I C G OVERNMENTS,

nothing to do but march to the capital, which you will certainly

find deſerted.

THE Sultan, corrupted by ignorance, flattery, and a falſe opi

nion of his greatneſs and power, is terrified at your approach, inti
midated by the clamours of the rabble and a mutinous army, has
no other reſource for his perſonal ſafety, but in a precipitate flight.
The inſtant the deſpot diſappears, reſiſtance is at an end; as the
whole force of the ſtate is placed in the army. This being de
feated, if purſued with vigour, the conqueſt of the empire is rapid
and complete, which nothing can retard but want of proviſions;
theſe being ſecured, proceed with confidence and be aſſured of
ſucceſs.
IN general, deſpotic empires are very extenſive, from whence
ariſe two bad conſequences: firſt, their frontiers muſt be weak, in
proportion to its extent. Secondly, That their armies come late
into the field, and being loaded with equipages, and moreover ac
companied by a crowd of followers under different denominations,
ſubject to no order or diſcipline. The country is ſoon exhauſted,
ſo that they cannot keep the field above three months; if you can
check their operations in the beginning, they retire and leave you
at liberty to proſecute your plan without any oppoſition.

From ignorance, or rather from deſign, they have no ſtrong

places; ſo that nothing can retard your operations but their army,
or want of ſubſiſtence, and that being defeated, and this ſub
ſiſtence provided, you meet with no other obſtacles but ſuch as
ariſe from the nature of the country. As theſe armies are very
numerous, particularly their cavalry, it is dangerous to act againſt
them by detachments, unleſs they are intimidated by a previous
defeat, then indeed it may be done with leſs danger, but never
with
 O F D E S P O TI C G O V E R N M E N T S. Io 5
*

with ſucceſs, and you are prevented from ačting vigorouſly in any
part if you pretend to act in many at the ſame time.

RoMANzow followed another plan, and loſt many detachments,

and if the Turks had known any thing of war, his whole army
would have been deſtroyed ſeparately. By this prepoſterous mode
of making war, it was protracted till the Ruſſian empire was in
tirely exhauſted, inſomuch, that the whole force, which could be
colle&ted againſt the Turks in 1774, did not exceed 50,000 men,
though above 3oo,ooo recruits had been raiſed during the
courſe of the war. When the peace was concluded, there was
ſubſiſtence only for fix weeks. Poland was totally ruined.

IN the winter previous to the laſt campaign, the author of this

work, then a general officer in the Ruſſian ſervice, had the honour.
to preſent a plan for the enſuing campaign, to the empreſs, ſhew
ing the neceſſity of paſſing the Danube, as the only means of ob
taining an honourable peace, which a battle or two at moſt would
procure.

The plan was adopted, and had the moſt complete ſucceſs.
Two vigorous actions, the one condućted by lieutenant-general
Kamenſkoi, and his ſubſequent operations, and the other by the
author of this hiſtory, forced the Vizir to conclude a peace within
a month from the opening of the campaign; had not ſome political
reaſons, and the interior diſturbances raiſed by Pugacheff interfered,
the Ruffian army might in a few weeks have been in poſſeſſion
of Conſtantinople.

THE concluſion of what we have ſaid is, that a defenſive war

cannot be made with ſucceſs againſt this ſpecies of troops, and con
ſequently you muſt always attack them with all your forces, guided
O by
to: OF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS,

by prudence and caution, and ſupplied with proviſions, ſucceſs and

conqueſt will be your reward. In deſpotic governments reſiſtance
diminiſhes as you approach the capital, where it vaniſhes intirely.

C H A P T E R III.

O F M O N A R C H ICAL GO V E R N M E N T S.

HOUGH in this ſpecies of government, as well as in thoſe

called deſpotic, the whole power of the ſtate, legiſlative and
executive, are united in one and the ſame perſon; yet they differ
totally in the mode of exerciſing the ſovereign authority. This
difference ariſes from many cauſes.

FIRst, From the different ſtate of the conquered people; if

theſe are civilized, enjoy fixed and hereditary property, and of
courſe are governed by known and permanent laws, the civil go
vernment will be in a great meaſure preſerved, as in China, India,
and England, in the conqueſt of which countries the ſovereign was
diſplaced rather than the nations conquered; for in all of them pro
perty was fixed in ſomebody, and the civil government more or
leſs preſerved. If the ſubjećts of a conquered country were ſlaves,
they continue in that ſtate becauſe the vićtors are more intent on
ſecuring their conqueſts, than in forming a code of laws.
Secondly, From the different condition of the conquerors, if
theſe were ſlaves and mercenaries, the new government will be
military and arbitrary; the chief will be confidered as ſole and uni
verſal proprietor of the country and the people ſubdued; but if
the vićtors were a free people, a certain degree of freedom will
prevail in the government of the conquered country.
THE s
 OF MONARCHICAI, GOVERNMENTS. Io.7

The northern people, who ſubdued the ſouthern parts of

Europe, were an aggregate of free tribes, or ſmall nations, each
condućted by its particular chief, ſubjećt in the field to one ele&tive
general. When the conqueſt was made, the lands were divided
among theſe chiefs, and ſub-divided by them among their fol
lowers; the vanquiſhed were made ſlaves. The vićtors preſerved
their ancient rights and liberties, exerciſed every ſpecies of juriſdic
tion within their reſpective domains.

THE king had ſcarce any authority over the lords, nor could
any public meaſure be adopted without the conſent of parliament.
The king, like them, lived on the revenues of his private patrimony;
for it ſeems there was not then, as now, a conſtant and public reve
nue; wherever the property is fixed and hereditary, civil liberty muſt
ſubſiſt, and be an inſurmountable barrier to deſpotiſm, and, vice
verſa, a military government will neceſſarily enſue, when property :
is flučtuating, uncertain, and dependent on the will of any one per
ſon. This is the true and only chara&teriſtic by which theſe dif
ferent ſpecies of governments are diſtinguiſhed. In the firſt caſe,
the ſovereign authority is adminiſtered by known and general laws.
In the other there can be none ; and every operation of government
is particularly iſolated, and adapted to a given circumſtance, with
out antecedent, or conſequent, in the ſame manner as in the conduct
of an army in the field.
THE clergy, by their great poſſeſſions, and their influence over
the people, became very powerful and formidable, when their reli
gion was embraced by the conquerors. As they alone poſſeſſed
the little learning then known, they were placed every where at
the head of affairs.

THE Roman law was introduced into all courts of juſtice, and
it may be truly ſaid, that the popes were the univerſal legiſlators
O 2 of
Io9. OF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS.

of the chriſtian world. Having acquired fiefs, the heads of the

clergy of courſe had ſeats in the national aſſemblies, like the temporal
lords, and exerciſed the ſame juriſdićtions within their domains.

As all the landed property was in the lords and their followers,
it is evident that the government was an ariſtocracy, like that of
Poland, where the king is nothing, and the people in general are
ſlaves; ſo far from encroaching on the rights of others, the king
could not preſerve his own, but by oppoſing parties to parties, and
fomenting the quarrels then very frequent among the great, becauſe
the executive power was too weak to controul them.

It is eaſy to perceive, that the military art was then at a very

low ebb : in this anarchy Europe remained for ſome centuries; at
length induſtry produced a new order of men; the people became
free, acquired riches, privileges, and power; towns were incorpo
rated, and ſhared in the legiſlative power; a ſyſtem of rights was
eſtabliſhed; the influence of the crown increaſed with that of the
people, while that of the lords was diminiſhed and reduced within
proper bounds; violence and diſorder vaniſhed, a certain degree of
vigour in the adminiſtration of affairs prevailed, which of courſe
produced peace and tranquillity in the ſtate.
Such a diſtribution of the ſovereign power in king, lords, and
commons, ſeems the moſt perfeót of any which human wiſdom
can invent, provided they are kept feparate and independent of each
other; whereas nothing could be more abſurd and inconſiſtent with .
the happineſs of mankind, than the foºdal ſyſtem, which ſuppoſes.
the ſlavery of the greateſt part, and where the violence and oppreſ
ſion of the few could not be checked, puniſhed, or controlled.

THE happy ſyſtem of government above-mentioned continued

for ſome centuries throughout all Europe; a juſt diſtribution of
power
 OF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS. rog

power ſecured political and civil liberty to all in ſome degree. At

length, however, the king, in whom the executive power was
lodged, by time and perſeverance, deſtroyed in moſt ſtates the
foedal and hereditary juriſdićtions; by keeping ſtanding armies, in
troducing pomp, parade, and expence, he reduced the nobility to
want and a total dependence on the crown; what would never,
have been executed by force, was imperceptibly and peaceably done
by luxury alone; neither nobles nor burghers participated any longer
of the legiſlative power, they retained their civil rights and ſome
perſonal privileges, ad honorem only ; ſo that the whole power of the
ſtate, legiſlative and executive, was made hereditary in one family,
and of courſe political liberty vaniſhed.

Thus a free government, the moſt perfeót of any that ever ſub
ſiſted, was deſtroyed, and that of one man ſubſtituted in its room,
which muſt generally happen, “ becauſe the executive power ačts
“ conſtantly and ſyſtematically againſt the legiſlative, and being
“ in poſſeſſion of the forces and revenues of the ſtate, will, by force
“ or ſedućtion, reduce it to dependence and ſervitude, which is
“ proved by the hiſtory of all republics.” -

Though the monarch poſſeſſes all the powers of the ſtate, like
the ſultan, yet he cannot exerciſe them in the ſame manner; for in
monarchies the ſubjećts enjoy the ſame civil rights, privileges, and
immunities, which they poſſeſſed while the government was free,
excepting thoſe by which they partook of the ſovereign power:
hence it is, that the different mode of acquiring the ſovereign,
power, and the different fituation of the people in Europe and Aſia,
neceſſarily oblige the monarch to exerciſe his powers by general
laws; whereas, the deſpot muſt ačt occaſionally as circumſtances.
require, that is, in a military manner.
WHILE:
I IO GF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS.

WHILE the foedal ſyſtem prevailed, and even for ſome time
after, the third ſtate, or the burghers, participated of the legiſla
tive power. The militia was conneéted with the ſtate, but raiſed
and armed only at certain times when thought neceſſary. The
revenue of the crown was not ſufficient to maintain an army con
ſtantly, nor did the nature of that kind of government admit it.
The crown or executive power, which in every government is ini
mical to liberty, pretended to find that the militia was ineffectual
to defend the ſtate; every method was uſed to aboliſh it, and ſub
ſtitute a ſtanding army in its room, which ſhould depend intirely
on the will of the king.

THIs ſcheme ſucceeded, and from that moment political liberty

vaniſhed, and civil liberty became often precarious. The army as
ſuch, is no longer a claſs in the ſtate, but a mere inſtrument of
power in the hands of the crown, and the more dangerous when
compoſed of men without birth or fortune, becauſe they depend
more intirely on the will of their leader. It is now formed of two
ſpecies of men, the higheſt and loweſt in the ſtate.

THE nobility deprived of that conſequence, which they enjoyed

by the foedal ſyſtem, very naturally reſumed the profeſſion of their
forefathers and took to arms; they retained many of their ancient
privileges, and by attaching themſelves to the ſovereign, acquired
new honours, employments, and riches; he alone was therefore
confidered as the fountain of all advantages which could be acquired
in the ſtate.

THE manners of a court naturally produce great expences,

which render thoſe connected with it totally ſubſervient to the
will of the prince.

THE
 *

OF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS. I I I

The nobility and gentry form the firſt claſs in this ſpecies of
government, and are immediately conneéted with the monarch.

The claſs of the law derives its importance from the laws, and
is therefore attached to their due execution in oppoſition to govern
ment, who always conſiders them as an obſtacle to arbitrary admi
niſtration: whenever this claſs of men are reduced to few, eaſily in
timidated or corrupted, a civil tyranny (the moſt barbarous of all
tyrannies) will enſue, as in Rome during the government of the
Caeſars.

The other claſſes of the ſtate look up to this as the only pro
te&tor of their rights and liberties; individuals may be ſeduced, but
this whole body cannot be ſo for any conſiderable time; it is againſt
its intereſt, becauſe it would be deſtroying the ſource of their ºft.
ence and importance.

Though in monarchies the armies are mere mercenaries, yet

will they concur to enforce arbitrary power only to a certain length,
becauſe the greateſt part of the officers, choſen from the nobility
and gentry, enjoys privileges which give them conſequence inde
pendent of the prince, and unite them in ſome degree to the ſtate;
theſe are perpetual and hereditary, whereas the advantages they
derive from the prince are temporary and perſonal, and when put
in oppoſition to each other, they firſt prevail, particularly if any
attack is made, which affects the body of the nobility and gentry.
These circumſtances, we conceive, prevent a monarchy armed
with a numerous band of mercenaries from degenerating into a mi
litary and deſpotic government, which always happens in thoſe
ſtates, where the ſoldier is unconnected with the fiate, and intirely
dependent on the monarch.
IN
Y 2 of MON ARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS.

In the preceding chapter, we have ſhewn, that a mercenary

army is equally fatal to the nation and to the ſovereign; it is there
fore ſurprizing princes ſhould be ſo defirous to eſtabliſh an arbitrary
and military government.
WHEN we conſider, that all power is centered in the monarch
alone, one would conclude, that he ſhould ačt with more vigour
than is uſually ſeen.

The adminiſtration of all civilized governments, where the

people are divided into various claſſes, and enjoy certain privileges,
will be found intirely republican, being divided into many ſeparate
departments, and the mode of adminiſtering the provinces various,
there cannot be that unity and energy as in deſpotic governments,
the wheels of this complicated machine are neceſſarily clogged, and
with difficulty can be brought to act together uniformly and vigo
rouſly. The different departments have not an equal ſhare of a&ti
vity; intereſt, ignorance, and intrigue interfere, ſo that the whole
moves more ſlowly than could naturally be expected from this kind
of government; for which reaſon, military operations, whoſe ef
ſence is celerity and vigour, are not attended with the ſame ſucceſs
as in deſpotic governments, unleſs the ſovereign is an able man,
and leads his armies in perſon. In this caſe, they are nearly equal
in vigour, and much more conſiſtent than in any other ſpecies of
government.

The ſovereign and his officers are, however, chained to the em

pire; they have a home, where they expect the reward of their
astions and enjoyment of life. Hence it is, that after a few
months campaign, they continually look back, and with impatience
wait the happy moment to retire ; there is nothing ſo arduous but
the troops will execute, provided it leads to a concluſion. The
Wallt
 OF MONARCHICAL GOVERNMENTS. 113.

want of ſucceſs and long wars diſguſt them intirely, a general ill
will, murmurs, and want of ſubordinations enſue.

Such armies, therefore, are not calculated for extenſive con

queſts, they grow tired and want perſeverance. In this, however,
they reſemble thoſe of deſpotic governments, they are very violent
and rapid in their motions at the beginning of a war, and therefore
muſt be oppoſed with much caution; they grow languid more and
more in the proſecution of it, wear out, and are eaſily ſubdued by a
more firm and patient adverſary. In other reſpects they are like
republican armies, much reſiſtance is to be expe&ted, as you ad
vance into the country, becauſe there is no man, or any claſs of
men, who does not feel that the preſervation of the ſtate is cloſely
connected with his own.

To men accuſtomed to a particular mode of government to one

family, a ſimilarity of religion, manners, &c. and enjoying civil
liberties, the idea of being ſubdued, and dependent on the arbitrary
will of a conqueror is terrible, and generally excites them to per- .
form extraordinary exertions. However, it is generally true, that
in monarchies the nobility and great men fill the court with in
trigues, where men of merit and probity have ſeldom the advan
tage, which greatly weakens the operations of monarchs.

THERE is as little unity here as in democracies ; a great ſenſe of

danger only can calm the ſtorm, which agitates the ſtate, and make
room for the able pilot; but no ſooner does the tempeſt ſubſide,
than he is removed and replaced by ſome inſignificant favourite;
ſo that this government, which ſhould be poſſeſſed of great vigour
from its principle of unity, is in fact weak and fluctuating, as the
charaćters of the favourites, which rapidly ſucceed to each other,
- P differ.
1 14 OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT.
differ. Their wars, when carried into diſtant countries, are with
out plan or vigour; parry only the firſt impetuoſity, their efforts
will ſucceſſively diminiſh, and at length vaniſh intirely.

C H A P T E R IV.

O F RE PU B L I C A N G O W E R N M E N T.

ROM what we have ſaid of the military ſtate, it appears that

republican governments are not in general analogous to it, par
ticular circumſtances may however give them the aëtivity required
to operate with vigour abroad and at home; if preſſed they ſeldom
Want 11.

IN democracy there can be no ſtanding army, nor mercenaries,

ſuch power lodged in the hands of one man, which we think effen
tial for the command of troops, is incompatible with the ſafety of
the ſtate; the military force muſt be formed out of a militia of ci
tizens, who from their fituations cannot act far from their country,
nor for any confiderable time. An offenſive war is, therefore, con
trary to the principle of exiſtence of a democracy; even a defenſive
war, unleſs the dominions are extenſive, would ſoon exhauſt the
ſtate, becauſe the taking great numbers from their daily labours
would ſoon reduce them for want of ſubſiſtence.

THE wars of ſuch a people are generally of ſhort duration, and

confined to an excurſion of a month or two, which may be repeated
for many years, as in the Peloponnefian war, a great battle, which
feldom occurs, puts an end to the conteſt, if the dominions are
much contračted, which was the caſe in Greece and in Italy; during
the
 OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT. - II 5.

the firſt five hundred years of Rome, we read often of a war be-,
ing finiſhed in a very few days.

FROM what we have ſaid, it appears, that a republican govern

ment is by no means calculated for long and diſtant wars; the main
ſpring is too complicated to produce that vigour, unity, and per
ſeverance required to condućt military operations; accordingly we
find that ſuch enterprizes have been generally fatal. But as every
citizen conſiders himſelf as cloſely united to the ſtate, they concur
heartily in its defence, and always exert themſelves in proportion
as they are preſſed, aud diſpute the laſt inch of ground with more
vigour than the preceding. The idea and advantage of liberty re
cur in their full force, and very often excite an ardour and enthu
fiaſm not to be overcome, which is verified by a thouſand exam
ples; a democracy, therefore, is of all others the beſt calculated for
a defenſive and the leaſt for an offenſive war. Particular circum
ſtances, and for the moſt part local, determine and ſtamp a charac
ter on each republic, according to its mode of exiſtence.

CARTHAGE, ſituated on a barren ſhore, confined on the land ſide

by various and powerful nations, was neceſſarily forced, like the
Dutch in our own times, to turn their thoughts to induſtry, com
merce, and navigation, which led them by degrees to explore, and
then to conquer, or acquire ſettlements in Spain, Portugal, Sar
dinia, Minorca, &c. which often involved that republic in wars,
which could not be carried on at ſuch a diſtance without ſtanding
armies, the people almoſt wholly employed in arts and trade could.
not compoſe thoſe armies, which in time became a checkered
multitude of mercenaries and allies, of various nations, which
wanted unity, on which chiefly the force of armies depends: they,
were, however, ſufficient againſt the different people they contended.
with, particularly when their operations were confined to the
P 2 iſlands
I 16 OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT,

iſlands and the coaſt, becauſe their fleets could co-operate with
ſucceſs, and had they carried their views no farther, they might
probably have exiſted many ages longer; but long and diſtant wars,
fupported only by money and mercenaries, brought on neceſſarily
their diſtreſs and final deſtruction.

THE power of a republican government being very complicated,

loſes its force in proportion as it is extended, like the ſpring of a
watch, and acquires vigour as it is compreſſed ; moreover, diſtant
and military commands require and aſſume greater powers than are
compatible with the ſafety of the ſtate : hence thoſe eternal jealou
fies and intrigues againſt their commanders, which always weaken
his operations, and often render his vićtories uſeleſs, becauſe in.
fact they might become dangerous.

It is eaſy to ſee, that confederate republics being more com

plicated, are ſtill leſs proper for war, either offenſive or defenſive;
their total want of unity, or rather total ſeparation of views and
intereſts, render their reſolutions ſlow, and their operations languid;
inſomuch, that if any member of the confederacy is preſſed or ſub
dued, he ſeeks his ſafety in ſubmiſſion, rather than expect the ſup-.
port of his confederates.

SwitzERLAND, aided by the nature of the country, and by a.

good militia, formed in the arts of war at the expence of European,
princes, is an exception to this rule, and, I am perſuaded, would,
make ſucceſsful efforts againſt any invader.

Such being the mode of exiſtence of a confederate republic, I

am ſurprized Rouſſeau ſhould think it poſſible to give it a force
and energy equal to that of the moſt powerful ſtate. If many, or
all, are placed in a country acceſſible at all, by occupying any poſt,
you
 OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT. 117

you will cut off the communication between them, and prevent
them from ever uniting their forces, and by preſſing one member
alone ſoon break the confederacy, which is proved by the examples.
of the ſeveral Grecian confederacies.

THE reſiſtance and final ſucceſs of Lewis the Fourteenth aroſe

from the nature of his enemies, the defection of a principal ally.
rendered ten ſucceſsful campaigns fruitleſs, in the war 1740. The
languor and fear of the Dutch, the nature of a confederate army,
oppoſed to a monarchical one, independent of the difference of abi
lity in the commanders, gave that war the iſſue it had.

THE ſuperior talents of a chief may give force and unity to an

army compoſed of troops of various nations, as Hannibal did ; but
liothing can for a conſiderable time, particularly if unſucceſsful,
give it to a confederate army, when the numbers of the confede
racy are nearly upon an equality.

THE views of the different parties ſeldom coincide in the various

points, which occur in a long and extenſive war; when oppoſed to
ſuch an army, temporize, uſe inſinuations and ſedućtions; ſome
one or other of the parties will grow tired and fall under the temp
tation, or attack vigorouſly the dominions of one of the members;
this will create a powerful diverſion, and probably bring on his
defečtion, which will ſoon break the confederacy.

It is dangerous to oppoſe ſuch an army in front the firſt cam

paign; emulation and hopes of ſucceſs give them vigour; it were
expedient to anticipate their union by occupying ſome capital poſt,
and prevent them from joining at all, which is eaſily done, as the
motions of ſuch troops are generally very ſlow, and recruits, ſtores,
&c. brought from different places, and often from a great diſtance.
Rome
I 18 OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT.
RoME in its infancy, ſurrounded by many different people, was
placed in that critical ſituation, where it was neceſſary to periſh or
conquer. It happened, as it generally does with men thus ſituated,
they conquered ſucceſſively all their adverſaries; they acquired by
the ſword, and muſt preſerve their acquiſitions by the ſword.

This celebrated people, if placed at the mouth of the Tiber,

thirty miles from the ſpot they occupied, would have become fiſh
ermen at firſt, and perhaps a ſmall commercial republic, and diſ
appeared ; but placed where it was, their exiſtence depended on
the ſword alone.

AFTER the expulſion of their kings it became a democracy, and .

every citizen was bred and trained a ſoldier; it was the only trade;
the time not employed in war was given to agriculture; the chief
occupation was war, which continued without intermiſſion for near
five hundred years, attacking or attacked ; ſcarce a year paſſed
without ſome military operation.

Necessity firſt made that republic purely military, their par

ticular form of government rendered it ſo afterwards; the right
was in the people, but the power really in the ſenate; the continual
abuſe of it occaſioned thoſe diſputes and contentions which diſturbed
the tranquillity of the ſtate, and more than once orought it on the
brink of deſtruction.

The ſenate, far from defiſting from encroaching on the people,

became daily more wanton in their oppreſſions; to ſecure their uſur
pations the moſt proper method was, to engage the people in conti
nual wars, and thus keep numbers of them at a diſtance.

THIS
 OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT. 1 19

This was a temporary remedy, but in the end proved fatal to

the republic; for the force of the people was great, and wanted
only a head to direct it, which, ſooner or later, muſt be found.
Marius and Caeſar, or any leader with ſuperior talents and ambition
-
-
*

muſt, aided by ſuch forces, eaſily overcome the ſenate, whoſe power
was founded in opinion, art, and cunning only.

A people thus coſtituted, trained in the pračtice of war during

the ſpace of ſix hundred years, muſt acquire a degree of art and
addreſs infinitely ſuperior to that of other nations, who made war
only occaſionally. The neceſſity of a vigorous diſcipline and ſub
ordination muſt appear evident; from being always in the preſence
of the enemy, it became a habit, and continual exerciſe made every
operation of war familiar and eaſy. To their ſuperior knowledge
were added ſuperior motives to exert their talents. Victory was a
means which led to pecuniary advantages, to a pre-eminence and
advancement in the ſtate.

THE virtue and proweſs of the ſoldier exalted the condition of

the citizen, no human reward was refuſed to great military merit.
With that knowledge the fruit of ages, and with every motive
which can excite a man to a vigorous exertion of his forces; ſuch
a people muſt neceſſarily become finally ſuperior to every other
people placed in different circumſtances.
This difference alone rendered Rome a military republic ſupe
rior to Carthage, a commercial one. The firſt ſpecies of repub
lics muſt probably fall by the hands of a citizen, the laſt by thoſe
of a foreigner.

C H A P T E R
 I 120 j

c H A P T E R v.

O F AN A R IS TO C R A C Y.

H IS ſpecies of republics, whoſe authority is ſupported by

opinion, rather than force, is obliged to adopt many of the
rmaxims of deſpotiſm, particularly if confined within narrow limits.
Jealous and ſuſpicious, private executions are employed oftener than
public. They fear each other, the people if numerous, and like
wiſe their neighbours.

THE command cannot with ſafety be committed to the care of

an eminent citizen, nor even to a ſtranger of ſuperior abilities; he
muſt be watched and environed with ſpies as well in peace as in
Waſ. *

The neceſſary powers to condućt an army with vigour, and en

force diſcipline and ſubordination, cannot be granted him, both him
ſelf and the troops muſt be kept low in the opinion of the public.
Hence it is that ſuch troops do not deſerve the name of ſoldiers,
being calculated only for ſhow and parade, are totally incapable of
aćtion. However, if the people have been governed with modera
tion and wiſdom, they may be induced to exert themſelves ſtrenu
ouſly in the cauſe of their maſters, and more than once have ſhewn
uncommon vigour, when the republic has been threatened with º
great and imminent danger. *

WARs in general, and particularly thoſe carried on at a diſtance,

conqueſts, &c. are incompatible with an ariſtocratical republic. In -

&
this ſort of government the people muſt be careſſed, protećted, and
- treated
 º

O F A N A R IS T O C R A c Y. I2 I

treated with humanity and an equal diſtribution of juſtice, the no

bles awed by fear, and the neighbouring powers kept friendly by
policy: to theſe maxims the ancient and moſt illuſtrious republic
of Venice owes its glory and duration.

MIXED and limited monarchies are in fact republics, muſt be

governed on the ſame principles; as the executive power is here
much more uniform, ſimple, and ſtrong, ſo the ſtate has more vi
gour abroad and leſs convulſions at home. Sooner or later the
equilibrium is loſt, and the balance intirely on the ſide of the exe
cutive power, which, contrary to the opinion of Monteſquieu,
ought for ever to be ſeparated from, and dependent on the legiſla
tive power, and in no caſe whatever be made a part of it; that is
to ſay, the ſame perſon or perſons entruſted with the executive
power muſt not be likewiſe a part of the legiſlative, otherwiſe it
will finally become an abſolute monarchy.

ALL general aſſemblies centre finally in few, and perhaps in one

perſon. The army is commonly mercenary, and totally dependent
on the chief magiſtrate, yet the complicated principles of the go
vernment puts the executive power often in oppoſition to the legiſ
lative; ſo that the meaſures of the former, however wife and juſt,
are thwarted, and the operations clogged with ſo many reſtrictions,
that it wants the neceſſary vigour to proſecute a war with ſucceſs,
particularly in the beginning. A common and preſſing danger,
however, gives them unity and conſiſtency, ſo that, contrary to
what happens in deſpotic and military governments, more vigour
appears in the proſecution of a war than in its beginning. When
by great ſucceſſes it draws towards a concluſion, new intrigues,
factions, and diſputes ariſe, the principle of a&tion ſubſides, every
body grows tired, and peace at any rate, even a bad one, muſt be
had.

- Q_ C H A P T E R
 [ 122 )

C H A P T E R VI. -

O F C IV IL W A R S.

HILE the foedal ſyſtem prevailed in Europe, it was almoſt

a continual ſcene of civil wars, diſcord, and contention; the
great lords were too powerful, and the crown too weak to preſerve
the peace or reſtore it when diſturbed. Within theſe two centu
ries induſtry has raiſed a new order of ſubjećts; the crown has con
tinually increaſed in ſtrength.

THE foedal ſyſtem and a national militia have diſappeared, and a

regular army ſubſtituted in its room. The nobility, formerly the
tyrant of the vaſſal, and a terror to the prince, is now become the
moſt abjećt tool of unlimited prerogative, which can be checked
and controled by no one. The whole force of the ſtate being cen
tered in the prince alone; his authority, thus ſupported, knows no
limits but his own diſcretion; it is therefore almoſt impoſſible there
ſhould be any civil wars in Europe. º

º
ON the leaſt appearance of an inſurrečtion, troops may be in
ſtantly diſpatched to diſperſe and diſſipate the few who have had
the temerity to aſſemble. The nobility having no longer any in
fluence over the people, and by exceſſive luxury reduced to a blind
obedience to the court, neither can nor will diſturb or oppoſe its
operations, and the people in general diſperſed, and without a
chief, cannot be united or brought to ačt on any regular plan of op
poſition. - -

SoME
 OF CIVIL W A R S. I23.

SoMe tranſitory efforts and diſcontent may ariſe in great cities,

but on the appearance of a regular army muſt vaniſh. The rabble
aćts for a moment only, there is no poſſible means of keeping them
together, or to direct them on a given plan: thoſe who poſſeſs any
thing recur to the protećtion of the ſtate, and are happy, if per
mitted to enjoy what they have in peace.

VARIous circumſtances may occaſion a revolt, and render it

dangerous, when the motives are permanent and of great impor
tance to the whole community. Such as religion and liberty, men
will unite in the defence of both, and exert themſelves in propor
tion to the danger with which they are threatened. It is not a
partial or tranſitory evil, but a general one, and the greateſt of all
calamities they fear, and, therefore, while the leaſt probability of
a ſucceſsful reſiſtance appears, they will to the laſt moment defend
themſelves, and the more ſo, as a war carried on upon theſe prin
ciples leaves no room for a reconciliation.

THERE is no medium between eternal happineſs and damna

tion, a total ſubmiſſion or a total independence; the one or the
other of the parties muſt be intirely conquered. Notwithſtanding
ſuch powerful motives, it would be very difficult they ſhould pro
duce unanimity and come to a head, if in the beginning govern
ment ačts with vigour: on one ſide there are ſtrength, authority,
opinion, armies ready collečted and prepared for action ; on the
other a total want of all theſe. It would therefore ſeem impoſſible
that in ſuch circumſtances any rebellion ſhould be formed at all,
much leſs become dangerous, unleſs neglected at firſt, particularly
if the province is contiguous and within reach of goverinment, but
when they are placed at a very great diſtance, intercepted by the
ſeas, or any very difficult mountains, the people numerous, and
animated by the motives above-mentioned, they will have time to
- Q_2 - confer
124 OF CIVIL WARS.

confer together, unite, form ſome plan of government, and ačt

upon ſome certain line. They are prepared in ſome meaſure to
oppoſe in any attack to be made on them; the more extenſive the
country, the more eaſily defended, becauſe thoſe who attack muſt
aćt on one line only, whereas they who defend themſelves may
oppoſe you on many.

THERE is ſcarce a point in the whole country, from whence

ſupplies of ſome kind may not be drawn, whereas the affailant can
draw it from one alone. Theſe advantages are ſo very confiderable,
that in the end, thoſe poſſeſſed of them muſt finally prevail, if they
confine their views to a defenſive war; unleſs you contračt your
line of operation by a great and deciſive vićtory (which gives you
a ſufficient tract of country to ſubfiſt upon, that you may proceed
gradually to ſubdue the whole) no ſolid operations can be exe
cuted. They will be confined merely to fruitleſs excurſions, and
at the end of every campaign you will find yourſelf leſs able to
proſecute the war, which grows languid, is neglected, and finally
abandoned for want of means to continue it, and the people are
ſeparated from you for ever.
Such has been, and generally muſt be, the iſſue of wars proſecuted
at a great diſtance, unleſs the firſt campaign gives you a decifive
ſuperiority; it follows of courſe, that the ſucceſs of ſuch enter
prizes depends intirely on the vigour of your operations: if in the
beginning they are not deciſive, they never will be ſo hereafter.

V1 croRY, terror, and a general pardon may force the people

to ſubmiſſion, re-eſtabliſh union and the public tranquillity. If
the people in general have not from perſonal motives revolted, but
have been excited by the ambition and authority of a few conſide
rable men, means may be found to ſow diffenſion among them ;
a pardon may then incline them to diſperſe.
FRom
 O F C IVIL W A R S. - I25

From whatever motives the revolt proceeds, the authority of

the ſovereign muſt be ſupported ſword in hand. There can be no
*. negociation between the ſovereign and the ſubjećt; the firſt muſt
never ſpeak in vain, nor the laſt reſiſt with impunity, otherwiſe
government is at an end. With what caution then ſhould the
ſovereign avoid every meaſure which may poſſibly bring his autho
rity in queſtion, when the conteſt muſt finiſh in the ruin of his.
fubječts or himſelf. It is a ground ſown with difficulties and pre
cipices, deſtrućtion is unavoidable; all other wars leave ſome open
ing to a reconciliation and peace; this none, it is inexpiable.

- - P A R T
 P A RT T H E F O U R T H.

C H A P T E R I.

O F T H E C A M P.

T Oto judge of a Camp, you muſt draw a line from one wing
another, extending it a mile beyond them which will
mark the front of it, and ſhew you all its advantages and
imperfeótions at one view, and the points which command : any
one of thoſe being carried, forces the enemy to retire, and inſures
the vićtory.

SecondLY, You muſt draw three more lines, perpendicular to

the camp line above, toward both wings and the center, which
gives you the profile of the ground before the camp. The con
fideration of theſe four lines will ſhew you what points you ought
to attack, and how, and with what ſpecies of troops, as in
fig. 4.

SoMETIMEs an army is not encamped on a right line, but forms

an irregular one, as in fig. 5. It is evident that the parts of it
which projećt muſt be attacked, becauſe you can invelope them,
whereas if you leave them behind you, and advance againſt the
inward parts, the enemy invelopes you, and attacks one or both
your flanks. This rule is equally true, whether the line be natu
ral
 - O F T H E C A M P. 127

ral or artificial, as thoſe of a fortreſs. The baſtion muſt be at

tacked before the curtain : the firſt being taken, the other parts
cannot reſiſt. The ſame thing will happen in every ſpecies of irre
gular lines.

If on examining the four lines, which give the front and pro
file of the enemy's camp, you find it too ſtrong, and you cannot
force him by any direét attack to abandon it, you muſt leave him.
there, and place yourſelf on the one or the other of his flanks, as
in fig. 6. and extend your line, ſo that it may ačt on his line of
communication, which will ſoon force him to change his poſition,
and fall back. The leaſt delay or negle&t on his part will enable
you to attack him with advantage, and, if you act with vigour, to
defeat him intirely, particularly if his other flank is poſted on a
river, a moraſs, a precipice, &c. which is generally the caſe, to
ſecure, as they ſay, the flanks. A very dangerous method, be
cauſe, if an enemy poſt himſelf on the other wing, you cannot
avoid a total overthrow, if he attack you with vigour; where
fore, contrary to the general opinion, I adviſe that your flanks
may be ſecured by the natural ſtrength and diſpoſition of them,
which may be eaſily effected rather than by ſuch adventitious and
dangerous methods.

If inſtead of ačting on the enemy's flanks and line of operation,

you advance in front againſt him, it is plain, that though you are
much ſuperior to him, yet if the country is cloſe and favourable
to him, you may not in a whole campaign have an opportunity to
attack him with advantage; and thus no action can in ſuch circum
ſtances be either general or deciſive, which muſt ever be the main
object of a general who ačts on the offenſive, as that of him on the
defenſive muſt be to avoid it. No ſolid and important operation
can be executed while the enemy can keep the field ; you muſt
therefore by a deciſive vićtory, or by good manoeuvres, force him.
º to retire, and give you room to ačt uncontrolled.
(C. H. A. P.
 [ 128 ) * -

C H A P T E R II.

OF TH E MARCH OF AN A R MY ;
A N D

O F T H E FR O N T OF T H E M A R C H.

HERE is quackery in every thing. A quarter-maſter gene

ral is very proud, if he can put in the Gazette that the army
has marched in a great number of columns, as if that was the re
ſult of his wiſdom. The number of columns on which an army
marches, depends intirely on the number of practicable roads.

IN a populous and cultivated country there are many roads, be

cauſe there muſt neceſſarily be communications between the vil
lages, towns, &c. whereas in a cloſe country, interſe&ted by narrow
paſſes, mountains, ravins, valleys, torrents, rivers, woods, &c.
there are few praćticable roads, and thoſe not very good, which of
courſe oblige an army to march in few columns.

IF in ſuch a country you pretend to march in many, the army

cannot eaſily be formed in order of battle in front, or on the flanks.
A vigilant enemy may oppoſe it in front, and prevent the forming,
while at the ſame time he attacks the columns on the flanks, retards
your march, and perhaps defeats your army intirely, which has
frequently happened. Much caution is required in making war
in a cloſe country. In an open country you march in ſeveral co
lumns, ſee the enemy at a diſtance, and therefore have time to
form your line, and prepare for his reception.
IN marching, as well as in every other operation, it is an
axiom, that you muſt perform them in the leaſt time poſſible.
THE
 OF THE MARCH OF AN ARMY. . 129

The purpoſe and direétion of your march muſt determine the

mode and manner of executing it.

Supposing you are oppoſite the enemy, in a parallel line, as in

fig. 7.

IT is evident, that the direétion of your march muſt be either

towards him, from him, on one or other of your flanks, or in an
oblique direction, to place yourſelf on one or other of his flanks.

THE mode in which your army is encamped, will facilitate the

execution of your march : I therefore recommend that repreſented
in fig. 6. which is that in which I would have you fight, for the
reaſons aſſigned in the preceding chapter. Your march muſt be
always analogous to the mode in which you encamp and fight, and
be regulated by them.

The facility and celerity of the march depend on the mode of

forming the columns.

FIRST, The line is divided into ſo many columns as there are

roads; then by a demi-tour to the right or left, each column
marches by the road affigned to it.

THE line being formed in three ranks, it follows, that the front
of each column has only three men in front, which renders the
march ſlow and difficult, in proportion to the length of the co
lumns. A column of horſe will, according to this method, occupy
in marching more than double the ground it does in order of battle,
becauſe the length of a horſe is more than double his breadth Or
thickneſs; for which reaſons, an army ſhould never march in this
manner, excepting in two caſes only; that is, when you propoſe
placing yourſelf on the enemy's flank, as in fig. 7, or that both
R enemies
13o . OF THE MARCH OF AN ARMY.

enemies march in parallel direétions; becauſe in whatever point

of the march the enemy approaches you, your army is in order of
battle in a moment, by making the front to the right or left, as
the enemy ſtands. Your march in this, as in every other caſe,
muſt be covered by your light troops, placed between you and the
enemy, particularly towards that flank of the enemy where you
intend going, and the rear of your march, that he may not attack
either the head or rear of your columns, both which are very weak,
having no more than three men each in front, and being as near as
may be to each other. They are all eaſily enveloped, even by a
ſmall body, and defeated. You can never form a line in the front
or rear of your march, capable of making the leaſt reſiſtance.

SF condly, The ſecond method of forming a column is, by

dividing the battalions into ſeveral parts, each conſiſting of eight
or ten men in front, more or leſs, as the roads permit. Then
each diviſion wheels to the right or left, as in fig. 8. and marches
off to the roads aſſigned them, leaving an interval between each
Jiviſion.

This method is generally made uſe of by the Pruſſian; though

improper for all marches in whatever direétion they are made. In
a review they do very well, becauſe you can thereby diſcover the
poſition and march of the ranks.

A column formed in this manner with intervals, occupies the

ſame ground as in order of battle, ſo that nothing is got by it.
After a march of a few miles, the diſtances are loſt; ſome will be
found greater, others leſſer, than they ought to be; therefore it is *,
*
impoſſible to reſtore the order of battle, if the enemy approaches
either flank; and if you intend to form the front, perpendicular
to your line of march, it is evident that operation requires equal §
time, whatever may be the front of your ſeveral diviſions, becauſe
the
 of THE MARCH OF AN ARMY. 131

the diſtance from the van to the rear will be the ſame, whether
i
their fronts be of three or thirty men, as the intervals between
them are equal to the front they occupy, when ranged in order of
battle, in three ranks. From whence it follows, that this method
has no one advantage, and is attended with many difficulties, both
in marching and in forming the line, and therefore muſt be entirely
exploded.

THIRDLY, The third method of forming the column of march

is the ſame as the ſecond, viz. by diviſions, wheeling to the right
or left, with this difference, that the ſeveral diviſions cloſe and
leave no interval between them, excepting very ſmall ones, to diſ
tinguiſh the battalions and regiments, as in fig. 9.
By this method it is plain, that if the front of each diviſion is
nine or twelve men, the length of your column will be only the
third or the fourth part of what it will be if formed in the firſt or
ſecond manner above-mentioned, though compoſed of an equal
number of men, and conſequently requires only a third or fourth part
of the time to be reſtored and formed in order of battle; therefore
I prefer it to all others, excepting in the two caſes above-mentioned,
viz. when you march on the enemy's flank, or when both armies
march on parallel lines, and ſo near, that an attack on either ſide
may be intended, or poſſible, becauſe in ſuch circumſtances it is
neceſſary that an army ſhould in an inſtant be in order of battle.

VARIous methods may be adopted to form columns of march,

that is, ſuppoſing a battalion is divided in five or more parts, it is
plain that either of them may be made the van of it, fig. 10, 11,12.

M. GUIBERT, whoſe writings do him and his country honour, if

I remember well, propoſes the diviſions on the right and left ſhould
R 2 - march
132 OF THE MARCH OF AN ARMY.

march by the diagonals, as marked in fig, Io, thoſe of the right

before that of the center, and thoſe of the left behind it; becauſe
he ſuppoſes this the ſhorteſt and moſt expeditious method of doing
it, which is true only in part; that is, it is ſhorter than if the
right or left diviſion was made the head of the column, as in this
caſe the other diviſions muſt march double the ground.

This method is ſubjećt to one very great inconvenience, both

in forming the column and in opening it. The diviſion which
forms the head, marches before the front to take its place, covers
it ſo intirely, that no part of it can act if the enemy advances,
which is a capital fault, becauſe every motion made near the enemy
muſt be ſupported by ſome corps in order of battle. Moreover,
thoſe different motions, ſome forward and others backward, will
eaſily produce confuſion.

THE beſt methods I know is, either to order the diviſion of the
center to advance briſkly, and the other diviſions to the right and
left, as in fig, I I, to march behind it alternately, or rather from
the right or left, which is the beſt of all.

WHEN the columns come to the ground, where they are to per
form the line, the head marches ſlowly, and the other diviſions.
march to the right and left alternately, or to the left in the ſecond,
cafe, as in fig. 12. to take up their ground, which is done with ſim
plicity and quickneſs. -

C H A PT E R
 [ 133 l

C H A P T E R III.

OF T HE L IN E O F O P E R A T I O N S.

- H E N, like the Tartars, you enter an enemy's country,

with an intention only to ravage and plunder it, you muſt,
like them, be mounted on light cavalry, enter at one part, ſweep
all before you, and retire with your booty by another as faſt as you
Call.

If this cruel and inhuman method of making war was adopted,

hundred thouſand horſemen, ſo equipped, would in a ſhort time lay
all Europe waſte, and cover it with deſolation, in ſpite of your fine
armies, artillery, heavy ſquadrons, &c. becauſe aétivity is everything
in war, in which our armies are totally deficient, being chained to
ſome fortreſs where their depots are lodged, they cannot advance a
hundred miles, and are continually turning about in a narrow circle,
of which the magazines are the center.

The Tartars neither have, nor want depots; by the rapidity of

their motions they muſt and do find every thing on the ſpot. But
when we penetrate, with our great and very heavy armies, into an
enemy's country, it is with a view to conquer ſome provinces,
fortreſſes, &c. and finding nothing upon the road to ſubſiſt upon,
we have fixed and determined points to lodge our ſtores and provi
fions, from whence they are tranſported to the army, which muſt
proceed from thoſe given points to other fixed and determined
points in the enemy's country, if you carry on an offenſive war; or
- from
I 34. OF THE LINE OF OPERATIONS.

from a given point in your own, towards another on the frontiers,

if you are on the defenſive.
The line which unites theſe points, on which every army muſt
ačt, is called The Line of Operation; and, of all thoſe we have men
tioned, is the moſt important. For on the good or bad choice of
this line the final event of the war chiefly depends. If it is ill
choſen all your ſucceſſes, however brilliant, will, in the end, be
found uſeleſs.

LET us illuſtrate this doćtrine by an example; we will ſuppoſe

an army of forty thouſand foot, and ten thouſand horſe, beſides
thoſe required for the train of artillery, bread waggons, officers
horſes, &c. which will amount to as many more. This army is
at Exeter, and propoſes to advance to London, and has its maga
zines all at Exeter. I have only thirty thouſand men: I encamp
as near Exeter as I can, and by occupying advantageous poſts, I
will force him to employ a fortnight in marching to Dorcheſter or
Blandford; till then I oppoſe the enemy in front with ſmall parties
only in his flanks, but when he is arrived thirty or forty miles
from Exeter, from which place alone he draws his ſubſiſtence, in
ſtead of oppoſing him in front with all my forces, I place ten thou
ſand on his line of march, ten on his left flank, and the remaining
ten along his line of operation, which goes from his camp to his
depots at Exeter. The laſt will be diſtributed in four or five corps
along that line, and form a chain from one end to the other, ſo that
a ſingle waggon cannot paſs unobſerved, and conſequently will be
taken or attacked by ſome one or other of theſe parties. A hun
dred men will deſtroy as many waggons by diſperfing the drivers,
taking away or killing the horſes, breaking the carriages, &c. The
enemy muſt, therefore, ſend a ſtrong body of troops, ten thouſand
men for example, to eſcort a great convoy. I then make a mo
tion
 OF THE LINE OF OPERATIONS. 135

tion to the right with my whole army; ſo that my left comes acroſs
his left, my center and right go many miles beyond it. In whatever
manner the eſcort is diſtributed, as part in the front, part in the
center, and part in the rear of the convoy; I ſay, that neither
ten nor even twenty thouſand can preſerve it; becauſe theſe are
chained to their convoy, and cannot quit it, nor the ſtation they
occupy ; whereas my troops can engage and attack, how, when,
and where they pleaſe : they can attack and amuſe the eſcorts in
a paſs or a wood, which of courſe obliges the whole to ſtop, while
two or three thouſand men, diſperſed in ſmall parties, attack the
chain of waggons from one end to the other. If they ſucceed in.
ſome places only, the whole will be ſoon diſperſed.

It would be adviſeable to attack that part, which proceeds at the

head of the convoy, with the greateſt part of your forces, if it goes
ten or twelve miles from the camp; becauſe you may then cut it
off intirely, and the whole convoy and the remaining part of the
eſcort, unleſs the enemy falls back immediately to aſſiſt them,
which is no eaſy matter, as you have the center and left of your.
army on his flank and rear in his retreat; and moſt certainly he
will arrive too late to prevent the ruin of his convoy, which is our
objećt.

IF inſtead of being only thirty or forty miles from Exeter, as

we ſuppoſe, he is a hundred, at Saliſbury, for example; I always.
ſuppoſe that all his proviſions, without exception, come from
thence, or from any where elſe, a hundred miles off. I ſay, that
ſuch an enemy as we ſuppoſe, cannot remain a fortnight in that
camp, though the convoys meet with no other difficulty, but ſuch
as ariſe from the length of the road, bad weather, accident, &c. &c.
|r
|
136 OF THE LINE OF OPERATIONS.

it is impoſſible to collečt and maintain a ſufficient number of

horſes, carriages, &c. to ſupply an army of fifty or fixty thouſand
men, including thoſe who follow the camp, with proviſions, ſtores,
forage, &c. and to ſupply the convoy, drivers, &c. in their jour
ney to and from the camp : two hundred miles, we ſuppoſe,
which cannot be performed in leſs than twenty days. I am ſo
convinced myſelf of this, that if you place twenty thouſand foot,
and five thouſand horſe, on any ſpot, ſo that they ſubſiſt only upon
what is brought from one given point, a hundred miles off, they
muſt in a week go and meet their convoy, diſperſe, or periſh.

Now, if to theſe natural and inſurmountable difficulties, you

add thoſe which an able leader can create by ačting on the principles
we have eſtabliſhed above, it will appear evident, beyond contra
dićtion, that no army, great or ſmall, can act in a line of operation
cf a hundred miles, provided you can keep the field; of courſe you
muſt avoid a general action.

The more the country is incloſed and interſeóted by woods,

mountains, rivers, paſſes, &c. the more difficulties the enemy will
meet with : the more croſs roads, the more advantageous for you ;
becauſe they enable you to ačt continually on his line of operation.
In ſuch a country, you may in almoſt every ſpot lay ſhares
for his parties, even for his whole army, with ſucceſs. Who
ever weighs what we have ſaid, will be convinced that the ideas
and fears of an invaſion were vain and abſurd.

THIS reaſoning, which from experience we are perſuaded is

juſt, will ſhew why our efforts in America have not been crowned
with ſucceſs; and why, though in every reſpect infinitely ſuperior
to the Rebels, we have never been able to penetrate fifty miles into
the country, nor keep any one given point, though but twenty or
thirty
 OF THE LINE QF OPERATIONS. 137

thirty miles within land. From all which we deduce the following
concluſions.
- -

FIRst, That in the choice of your line of operation, when the

nature of the frontier you intend to attack, and the poſition of your
depots, leave you any choice, you muſt chuſe the ſhorteſt and the
leaſt difficult.
Secondly, That the direction be ſuch that the enemy cannot
aćt on your flanks, and of courſe on your ſaid line, which muſt
happen if the provinces on the right or left of your march are in his
poſſeſſion. The longer you proceed on ſuch a ſeries, the more cer
tain is your deſtrućtion; for in a little time you will have no line at
all; you will be intirely ſurrounded, and you are loſt. -

THIRDLY, That it leads you to ſome decifive obječt, otherwiſe

ten campaigns, however fortunate, will give you nothing worth
having. - - - - * , , ,
*

If the difficulties are always in proportion to the length of your

line of operation, it follows, that when other circumſtances are
nearly equal to that army which ačts on the ſhorteſt lines, muſt from
that circumſtance alone prevail; even though much inferior, pro
vided it is condućted with prudence and ačtivity.

FRoM theſe concluſions we deduce the principles of an offenſive

War.

..S CHA PTER

 [ 138 J . .

C H A P T E R IV.

of A N of FENSIVE w A R.
*

H E N you enter an enemy's country, it is with a view to

raiſe contributions, deſtroy his magazines, &c. or make a
diverſion to favour and facilitate the operations of an army which
aćts in another line; or finally to conquer ſome province.
The mode of aćting, in theſe three different caſes, will be diffe
rent of courſe, and muſt be regulated by the different obječts you
have in view. In the two firſt caſes, prudence, and above all, ce
lerity: in the laſt, prudence, ačtivity, and ſolidity muſt be em
ployed.
IN order to explain what I have to ſay on the ſubjea We are diſ
cuffing, I muſt propoſe the following queſtions.
First, Is the province you propoſe to conquer fortified or not?
Secondly, Is it ſeparated from the other provinces of your
enemy, by ſome confiderable river which never freezes, or by ſome
very high and difficult mountains, which have few roads and nar
row, as is uſually the caſe ?

THIRDLY, or finally, Has it no fortreſs, river, or mountains, but

is like the provinces contiguous to it, open more or leſs

ALL provinces whatever come under one or other of theſe deno

minations, and therefore your mode of carrying war into them,
and the reſult of your operations, will be analagous to them.
IN
 O F : A N - O FF E N S I V E W A R. I39

IN the firſt caſe you muſt take the fortreſs, becauſe that alone
can enable you to ſeparate your army, and take your quarters
ºthere during the winter. -

If the place is conſiderable, and your enemy has a good army in

the field, it will be a very difficult enterprize, and require much
vigour and ſagacity to execute it with ſucceſs, particularly if the
country is cloſe and favourable for a defenſive war; and your line
of operation is long and interſected by rivers, mountains, paſſes, &c.

To facilitate your undertaking, I adviſe you to march up to the

enemy, and force him to a battle ; or by ſkillful manoeuvres drive
him ſo far beyond the fortreſs, that he cannot trouble you in the
ſiege. - -

THIS ſuppoſes you are much ſuperior to the enemy, and that
you can keep him at a diſtance with one part of your forces, while
with the remainder you proſecute the fiege, eſcort the convoy, &c.
If you are ſuperior to him. only by a third part, and he is an

able man,
fiege ten to one
with ſhame and you
loſs. will miſcarry, and be obliged to raiſe the
- s -

. . .. . . . t

If the place is ſituated cloſe on the frontier, then by marching

eight or ten miles into the country, you put it behind you, and
carry on your ſiege, without any great obſtacle on his part, becauſe
your line of operation is ſhort and eaſily guarded. He cannot force
you to abandon your enterprize, but by a vićtory.
BUT if the place is ſituated thirty or forty miles, within the
country, by avoiding a general action, and acting with the greateſt
part of his forces on your line, he will probably take your convoys,
S 2 and
 . . . .

14o OF AN OF FE N S IV E W A R.

and cut off your communication with your depots, and by that
means oblige you to abandon the enterprize; and your retreat will
be attended with great difficulties, becauſe your army will or may
be attacked in front, flank, and rear.

From this I draw one concluſion; if your fituation is ſuch, that

in general you mean to attack your enemy on a given frontier,
your fortreſſes can never be too near them, becauſe your line of
operation will be the ſhorter. -

But if ſuch places are intended to cover the country, they muſt
be placed thirty or forty miles from the frontier, unleſs ſome par
ticular circumſtances intervene, as a great river, a paſs, &c.

If you attack a place forty miles within the enemy's country, I

would adviſe forming a camp in the Roman manner, about half
way, with ſome redoubts before your entrenchments, to prevent
the enemy from approaching them, and throwing ſhells and com
buſtibles into your camp, and burn your ſtores, while you are
employed in keeping the enemy at a diſtance and foraging the
country. All your ſtores, proviſions, artillery, &c. are placed in
this camp, and from thence brought to that you occupy about the
place without danger or difficulty, which could not be done if they
were brought forty miles off, becauſe a line of that length cannot
be guarded. -

In order to force your enemy to a battle, or to abandon the

country, you muſt naturally employ all your forces united. De
tachments, excurſions, &c. muſt of courſe be avoided, becauſe they
weaken your army, are expoſed to be cut off, and ruin the coun
try, which you thuſt preſerve, if you mean to ſtay there.
* Instead
 o F A N OF FE N S IV E w A R. I4 I

INSTEAD of attempting to ruin his ſmall depots, ſcattered about

the villages, which are the only your detachments can attack, pre
ſerve your own, and ſecure all that lays behind you in ſome place
as you advance. You can act only on one line, which muſt be
determined by the poſition of the enemy, until you have drove
him beyond the place you propoſe beſieging. From that moment
you ačt in the defenſive, and your line is then determined from the
camp you occupy to your depots : your whole attention muſt be
direéted to carry on the ſiege, protećt your convoys, &c. It is then,
that the enemy changes his ſyſtem from a defenſive to an offenſive
war: you are chained to your line, whereas he is perfeótly at liberty,
and will employ that liberty to adt againſt you day and night, how,
when, and where he pleaſes.

It is probable the enemy may have ſeveral lines of operation

drawn from his camp, wherever it is, to the different fortrefles and
depots which he may have behind him. In this caſe he will play
with you a whole campaign, ſhifting from one line to another,
without a poſfibility of bringing him to a battle, or of driving him
out of the country. Your army will be ſoon exhauſted and wore
out with marching and counter-marching, continually changing
your line to follow him, till your proviſions fail, and oblige you to *

retire without attempting any thing with an army now half ruined.
This is exactly the caſe in America.

In ſuch circumſtances nothing remains for you to do, but to

march againſt the place you intend beſieging, which of courſe will
force the enemy to follow you; and if you can ſecure your line of
operation, he muſt riſk a battle, or ſuffer you to take the place,
which is the objećt you have in view, -

If
I42 of A N of FENSIVE WA R.
If the enemy has ſeveral lines behind him, you muſt endeavour
to force him to act in one only, which muſt be done, if it can be r
done at all, by ačting on one or other of his flanks, which will force
him to leave his camp and take another. Suppoſing the enemy has
three lines behind him, and that he is encamped on the middle ;
while he is on that line he laughs at you, and conſequently you
muſt force him to take that on the right or left. If that on the
right appears more advantageous to your views, of courſe you en
camp athwart his left flank, and act in his rear, as is marked in
Plate IV. fig. 6.

This will force him to quit his camp, and retire on his right
flank: by repeating this operation, you will drive him where you
pleaſe. The ſucceſs, however, depends on ſuperior velocity, which
you cannot have, if the line you ačt upon is longer than his, and
he is in any degree an able man ; ſo that unleſs you are much ſupe
rior to the enemy in numbers, goodneſs, and your army ſo con
ſtituted, as to be alſo ſuperior in velocity, he will undoubtedly
baffle all your attempts, and oblige you to return home.

If the country has no fortreſs, but is ſeparated from the other

provinces by a great river or mountains, as we have ſuppoſed, is
not very extenſive and open, and you are ſuperior in cavalry, you
may, by ſkillful manoeuvres, force him to paſs the river or moun
tains, and by placing your troops properly, keep poſſeſſion of it,
otherwiſe not; of courſe, if the country has neither fortreſs nor rivers,
&c. you may, like Barbarians, ravage and plunder the country, and
like them abandon it in haſte, but you can never make war on a
ſolid foundation.

THESE are, in my opinion, the principles of an offenſive war,

deduced from reaſon and experience. Whenever generals have
been
-
 OF A D E F E N S IV E W A R, I43

been regulated by them, for the moſt part they have been crowned
with ſucceſs; and on the contrary, have generally been unfortunate,
when they have deviated from them, which is confirmed by hiſ
tory. It remains with the general to know how to ſupply them.
as circumſtances require.

cHAP T E R v.

O F A D E FE N S I W E W A R.
f

F the principles of an offenſive war are ſuch as we have indica

ted in the preceding chapter, it follows, that thoſe of a defen
five war are exactly the reverſe. If he who attacks you muſt im
mediately bring you to a general action, that he may be enabled to
befiege ſome place of importance, form new depots, and advance
further into the country, until he forces you to abandon the whole,
or make peace on the terms he preſcribes, it is your part to avoid
a general ačtion; for while you have an army in the field, and know
how to manage it with advantage, he may, though much ſuperior,
be forced to abandon his projećt, and retire with a ruined army.
Were you in a condition to venture an engagement with probable
hopes of ſucceſs, you muſt not do it, becauſe if you are beat, the
conſequence may be fatal, and by conquering you only force him
to retire, which you may do without any riſk, if you adhere to
what I ſhall ſay on the ſubješt. The enemy has choſe his line of
operation, which of courſe determines yours; you advance as for as
you can to meet him : if you can anticipate his motions, paſs your
frontier, deſtroy his ſmall depots, carry off the horſes and cattle, and
the corn if threſhed; when he advances, you retire gradually from
* ©1A:
 I44 o F A DEFENSIVE WAR.

; Oil C ſtrong camp to another, ſkirmiſh often, but never fight a battle.
If there is a river in your country, or in his beyond the frontier,
place yourſelf behind it, and encamp with three-fifths of your army
-

in the center, and the two-fifths to your right and left, ſo that the
whole of it conſiſts of 40,000 men, will occupy at leaſt fifteen miles,
within which diſtance he muſt paſs: for if you place yourſelf acroſs º
his line of operation, he cannot deviate from it twenty miles to look
for a paſſage. This diſpoſition being made, and patroles ſent from
the extremity of your wings, he cannot throw a bridge, and paſs
Runobſerved. If the ground is at all favourable to you, the eight
thouſand men we ſuppoſe on your right or left, will be ſtrong
enough to prevent his paſſing, by attacking vigorouſly ſuch as have
paſſed, or check him till you advance with your center. If he has
paſſed, and is entrenched on your ſide, then encamp on ſome
neighbouring hill, in three corps as uſual, in a circular form. For
tify your right and left, and place your heavy artillery on them. I
ſay, he dare not leave his entrenchments and attack you, and muſt
therefore repaſs the river, as it happened to Prince Eugene on the
Adige, which we have already mentioned.
The only method the enemy has to paſ, a river thus guarded,
will be to ſend a ſtrong detachment thirty miles off to throw a
bridge and fortify it. This is a very long operation, and will give
you time to oppoſe it. When finally the enemy has paſſed, which
I think impoſſible, if you act as we preſcribe, you retire of courſe
to another ſtrong camp. *

If the country has many paſſes in it, you may oppoſe his pro
greſs with ſucceſs on almoſt every ſpot, and force him to ſend a
corps on your flanks and rear, which by acting on your line of ope
ration, will force you to abandon a thouſand camps ſucceſſively,
unleſs you attack and beat this corps, which you may eaſily do, if
the
-
 OF A D E FE N S I W E W A R. I45

the country is mountainous, for you may probably cut off his com
munication with the main army, and deſtroy it totally, which I
have ſeen done. In ſhort, one way or other, you muſt get rid of
this corps, becauſe no man, or body of men, can long withſtand
an attack in front, and another in flank at the ſame time, or re
main in any given poſt, if a powerful corps is placed ſo as to be able
to act on its line of operation.

AN enemy may be ſituated with regard to you, in three different

manners; 1ſt, in front; 2dly, in front and flank; 3dly, in front
and rear. In the firſt caſe, you may find numberleſs ſtrong camps,
where you can ſtop him, though much ſuperior, and where you
may riſk a battle, becauſe as our armies are conſtituted, a defeat is
dangerous only to a certain degree, whereas in the ſecond and third
caſes they muſt be fatal; if you remain on the ſpot until the enemy
approaches and attacks you. No army conquers merely by reſiſt
ing; you may repel an enemy, but vićtory is the reſult of ačtion.
*
We have ſaid already that when an enemy advances againſt you
in front and flank, you muſt beat that body which comes on your
flank, preferable to the other in front, becauſe you can always op
poſe this with ſucceſs, but not the other: if you drive the army
back a march or two, and leave the corps on your flank or behind
you, ſo far from reaping any advantage from your ſucceſs, it may
be fatal to you, becauſe the corps in your flank may occupy ſome
paſs behind you, and cut off your army intirely, inſomuch, that
the enemy ought to fall back and draw you after him, that his
corps may act in the manner we hinted at.
If you are incloſed by two armies, you muſt march by the right
or left, and ſlip away if you can, if not, you muſt fight. Ancient
hiſtory furniſhes us with two events of this nature, from whence
- T we
 --

146 of A D E FENSIVE w AR.

we ſhall draw a general rule for the conduct of a general who may
happen to find himſelf in ſuch an unhappy fituation.
THE Gauls had invaded Italy, and having plundered it, were as
uſual returning homewards loaded with ſpoils. A conſular army
followed them, in hopes of ſome favourable opportunity to attack
them and retake the plunder. Being arrived in Tuſcany, they
were alarmed by the approach of another army coming accidentally
to meet them. Thus on the point of being attacked in front and
rear, they formed their army, ſo that it preſented a double front,
and waited the event. They were attacked, and all cut to pieces.
THE other is in the hiſtory of the Jews; Jonathan and his bro
ther, I think (no matter who) commanded the Jewiſh army,
which was in the ſame fituation as that of the Gauls. Jonathan
divided his army in two parts, formed a line of chariots, waggons,
&c. behind which he placed the weakeſt part under his brother to:
oppoſe one army; with the other, and beſt part, he advanced againſt
the other army of the enemy, which he attacked with that vigour
and fury, which ſuch a fituation inſpires, and of courſe defeated the
enemy totally; that part oppoſed to his brother, on ſeeing this
event, gave over attacking the chariots, and ran away. There is
not a finer manoeuvre recorded in hiſtory: imitate this noble ex
ample. - º . . . . . . . .. -

WHEN two armies march againſt you, in the manner juſt men
tioned, and come from a confiderable diſtance; if your country is
ſtrong, and has ſome good fortreſs in it, where your depots Jay,
occupy a ſtrong camp and be quiet ; fuch numerous armies in.
ſuch a ſituation cannot remain a fortnight; they muſt ſeparate for
want of proviſions. In this manner the king of Pruſſia baffled the
attempts of the Auſtrians and Ruſſians for four campaigns.
*

IF
 OF A D EF ENSIVE W A R. 147

If your country has no ſuch fortreſs to cover you, of courſe you

muſt either beat one of the armies which marches againſt you, or by
placing yourſelf on the outward flank of one of them; force them
to unite, and ačt upon one line: avoid a battle, which you may
then do as long as you pleaſe. They muſt ſeparate and retire, be
cauſe two ſuch armies cannot ſubſiſt on the ſtores provided for one
only.

If finally two armies ačt in different lines, and attack diſtant provin
ces, you muſt of courſe oppoſe an army to each of them. If you cannot
do it, abandon that which is far off, colle&t your forces, and attack
that which is neareſt to you, and moſt dangerous. When your
forces do not permit you to oppoſe your enemies at once in every
point, you muſt ačt in part on the defenſive, and in the other offen
fively. If you are too weak to act in many points at once, you muſt
abandon ſome of them, that you may ačt with more vigour in others.

HAviNG pointed out all the different fituations in which an enemy,

with one or more armies, can be with regard to yours, and ſhewn
what you are to do in ſuch different circumſtances, we now return to
our ſubjećt; and we will alſo ſhew, how you may check the progreſs
of the moſt powerful adverſary. - - *-

WHEN he has penetrated thirty or forty miles into your country,

and you cannot or will not oppoſe him in front; when you cannot
defend your own line, you muſt either retire as he advances, till he
has drove you out of the country, or attack his. The method of
doing this with ſucceſs, we ſay, is, to leave on your line, to oppoſe
the enemy in front, a fifth of your army, chiefly cavalry; three
fifths on the flank of his march ; the remaining fifth, all of light
troops, horſe and foot, muſt be placed along his line of operation in
ſmall bodies of one or two thouſand men, who occupy the moſt
T 2 advan
148 O F A D E FE N S I W E W A R.

advantageous ſpots, as woods, paſſes, &c. where they remain con

cealed. Parties muſt be ſent from one to the other of about a
hundred men, ſo that there is not a ſingle point of the enemy's line
which you cannot attack with ſucceſs in an inſtant. Half his army
cannot protećt his convoys on a line of thirty miles. If he ſends
two or three ſtrong detachments to eſcort a capital convoy, perhaps
of three thouſand waggons, becauſe you have taken or diſperſed
his ſmall ones, ſuch a convoy will occupy near thirty miles: I ſup
poſe the eſcort to conſiſt of twenty thouſand men; theſe will be
poſted in ſeveral corps, in front, rear, and along the flanks of the
march; you are informed of his diſpoſition, you may reinforce that
part which we ſuppoſe already placed on his line, whether you do
or not. I ſay, that the ten or twelve thouſand light troops may
unite in a ſhort time, and be ſuperior to the enemy's eſcort in any
given point, and beat it; ſtop the front of the convoy, while your
ſmall parties break the carriages, take away the horſes or kill them.
If a hundred only of the carriages are deſtroyed, all thoſe which are
behind muſt ſtop. The eſcort is chained to the convoy, even to
particular points of it. If you cannot beat it, amuſe it by ſkirmiſh
ing; your parties in the mean time do the buſineſs.
By adting exactly in this manner, the Auſtrians took or deſtroyed
a great convoy going from Neiſs to Olmutz, which obliged the
king to raiſe the fiege of that place next morning, and to abandon
Bohemia in a few days. -

IF in the condućt of a defenſive war you adhere to the principles

we have laid down, and the enemy's line of operation is only thirty
or forty miles long, much more if it is a hundred, you will triumph.
in the end, and enjoy the fruits of your prudence and aćtivity,
which is every thing in war, particularly in a defenſive one, where
they muſt ſupply the want of force.
FRoma ‘.
 OF L I G-H. T. T. R O OPS. 149

FRom the nature of a defenſive war ariſes the utility and neceſ.
fity of light troops, of which we ſhall treat in the following
chapter.

C H A P T E R VI.

O F L I G HT TRO OPS.

UR IN G the wars which we deſcribe, the Auſtrians had,

I believe, near thirty thouſand of this kind of troops diſtri
buted in the different armies and corps. The only uſe I ever ſaw
made of them was to obſerve the enemy placed, as they generally
were, before the front of our armies, they could do no more, and
even this they did very imperfectly, becauſe they were too nume
rous, encamped in ſuch confiderable bodies, that they were totally
deficient in aétivity, and preſerved nothing but the names of light
troops. Obſerved by the enemy, he maſked them whenever he
choſe to march by his flanks, or to retire, ſo effectually, that for
the moſt part we had no intelligence of his motions, till it was too
late to avail ourſelves of any favourable circumſtance which might
offer, inſomuch, that I do not remember we ever attacked his
rear guard with ſucceſs, though great bodies of light troops, and
very often the main army, were near enough to do it with advan
tage.

WHEN the enemy advanced towards us, after ſkirmiſhing a little,

theſe light troops diſperſed and retired where they pleaſed; and if a.
battle enſued, they diſappeared, and were loſt for ſeveral days.
Many of theſe corps obſerved ſo ill, that very often they were ſur
prized, made priſoners, or totally diſperſed. From whence I con
clude, that a regiment of Huſſars, and a few hundred Croats, will
obſerve
^
 :

150 OF LIGHT T R O OPS.

obſerve an enemy much better than ſo many thouſands, for this plain
reaſon, they are or ought to be inviſible, and ſo poſted near the
high roads, before the enemy's front, and on his flanks, that he
cannot move without their knowledge. It is therefore abſurd to
employ ten thouſand to do that which a thouſand can do much
better.

THE number and uſe of light troops depend on the nature of the
war chiefly. In an offenſive war, whoſe principles is to ſeek and
fight the enemy, you muſt concenter your forces, and by no means
diſperſe them, and loſe time in fruitleſs and laborious excurſions:
your enemy is before you, advance in front : your army muſt have
ſtrength and conſiſtency, of courſe it muſt have a heavy cavalry,
infantry, and artillery, ſo that your real and phyſical force is ſupe
rior to that of the enemy. -

IN ſuch circumſtances, you can want no more light troops than are
neceſſary to explore the front and flank of your march : but if you
are on the defenſive, you muſt avoid a battle, becauſe you are too
weak, and muſt ačt on his flanks in the manner we have preſcribed,
which can be done only with light troops, as is evident from the
nature of this ſervice; you cannot therefore have too many of them.
An army of forty thouſand men, half of which being light troops,
*
if ably condućted, in a cloſe country, when the enemy's line is of
any confiderable length, will moſt certainly force him to abandon
his projećts and retire.

C H A PT E R
 [ 151

C H A P T E R VII.

of T H E FR on TIER LINE.

U P PoS IN G this line to be like that marked in Plate V.

J z. z. z. &c. which as moſt lines of any conſiderable extent
proječts in many parts: I ſay, that however extenſive ſuch a line
may be, the points on which it can be attacked are determined by
the number and quality of the roads which lead to it, and by the
poſition and diſtance of the reſpective capitals, and other ſtrong
places within a hundred miles of it, beyond which no army can
ačt with advantage; that is, no army conſtituted as ours are, can
aćt, if its depots are diſtant above a hundred miles, unleſs there is
water-carriage.

If there are no ſuch places of arms at all, or on the one ſide of

the frontier line only, it is evident, that no ſolid operation can be
executed, and that they can tend only to ravage the country and
retire, or to facilitate the operations of ſome other army, ačting on.
another line, which was the caſe with the Ruſſians, during this.
whole war we are deſcribing. They could not, and the Auſtrians
would not avail themſelves of the vićtories the former had gained
at Palrig and Franckfurt on the Oder; ſo that the Ruſſians, unable
to fix themſelves on or near that river, were always obliged to re
tire after a ſhort campaign, becauſe their line of operations was too
long.

we ſappoſe the frontier before us to be three hundred miles in

length; yet the enemy can act againſt it from three points only,
where his depots are lodged, as in F. G. H. and even from theſe
he
I 52 OF THE FR O N T I E R L IN E.

he can attack the two points C. E. on our frontier alone; when he

has taken either of them, he muſt proceed next to B. or D. and
from thence to the capital A. and not before. I have already
ſhewn, in treating of a defenſive war, how you muſt counteraćt
and check his progreſs, ſo ſhall conclude the ſubjećt.

We can no way better explain our principles, than by applying

them to the different frontiers of Europe and America, accordingly,
in the following part, we ſhall give a military analyſis of them, viz.
of that of France, Auſtria, the Pruſſian dominions, Turkey, Ruſſia,
Poland, England, and North America.

P A R T
 PA RT T H E FIFT H.

Q F T H E

FRONTIERS OF THE DIFFERENT SoverEIGNs of EUROPE.

C H A P T E R I,

of T H E FRONTIER OF FRANCE.

* T N deſcribing this and other frontiers, we do not pretend to

| point out the different poſitions and camps which may be
T taken on either ſide, becauſe it would require a more perfeót
knowledge of the countries than we are maſters of; and moreover,
would be uſeleſs, becauſe theſe muſt be determined by the motions
40f the enemy, and many other occaſional circumſtances, by which
a general muſt regulate his operations: what we ſhall ſay will,
however, enable the ſovereigns, miniſters, and generals, to form
their plans of war, offenſive and defenſive; theſe laſt muſt know
how to condućt them. -

We have already ſaid, that the abſolute force of a frontier con

fiſts in natural obſtacles, which an enemy would find in approach
ing, and attacking it. Theſe ariſe from numberleſs cauſes, as
- U - mountains,
f 54. O F THE FR ON TIER OF FRANCE.
|
mountains, rivers, woods, defiles, the greater or leſſer fertility of
the ſoil, the dire&tion of it, &c. &c.

The relative force of a frontier fine depends on the diſtance of

the capitals and fortreſſes, where the depots are lodged, of thoſe
who attack or defend it, from whence their different lines of ope
rations muſt proceed; as theſe are long or ſhort, the operations
will be more or leſs difficult; inſomuch, that it may, I think, be
eſtabliſhed as an axiom, that when the reſpective forces and abili
ties of the commanders are nearly equal, thoſe who act on the
ſhorteſt line, muſt from that circumſtance alone prevail in the end,
becauſe being nearer their depots, they can open the campaign
ſooner, ačt with more vigour and ačtivity, and for a longer time
than thoſe whoſe line of operation is at a greater diſtance.

THE frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Baſil, in

Switzerland, and runs in various direétions from thence to Dunkirk,
in French Flanders. I ſhall divide this long line into three parts,
and confider each of them ſeparately. The firſt part goes from
Bafil to Landau, and covers Alſatia; it is near 130 miles in length.
The ſecond part goes from Landau to Sedan, on the Moſelle,
covers Lorrain on the ſide of the eleētorate of Treves, the dutchies
of Deux-Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in
length. From Sedan down the Meuſe to Charlemont in French
Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about
150 miles; ſo that this whole frontier is about 470 miles.

The firſt part of this line is covered by the Rhine, on which

are placed Hunninghen, New Briſac, Straſburg, and Landau, all
which are very ſtrong. Straſburg has a bridge over the Rhine; on
the back part of Alſace runs a chain of mountains, which ſeparates
it from Franche Comté and Lorrain; - the diſtance between theſe
- mountains
 O F THE • FRONTIER OF FRANCE. iss
mountains is from ten to fifteen miles. An army encamped near
Straſburg, covered by the Rhine and the fortreſſes above-men
tioned, could with eaſe prevent an enemy from paſſing that river,
or at leaſt from beſieging any of them, and without taking them
all, he could not poſſibly ſeparate his army and take his winter
quarters in Alſace, while the French have any confiderable force
encamped or cantoned in the mountains above-mentioned. I am
therefore ſurprized the Auſtrians ever made any attempt on that fide,
and much more ſo, that the French were ſo very much alarmed
at it. For my part, I am confident, that an able general, at the
head of thirty or forty thouſand men, ſo far from being terrified
at the approach of an enemy, or oppoſing his paſſing the Rhine,
would wiſh to ſee him ſhut up between the mountains, the river,
and the fortreſſes; becauſe he would ſee the facility of preventing -

his repaſſing it at all, and of cutting him off intirely. Look at

the map and judge.

The ſecond part of the French frontier, viz. the line which goes
from Landau to Sedan, is very ſtrong both by nature and art, hav
ing ſeveral ſtrong places on it; and the country before it is no leſs
difficult, being wery mountainous, and conſequently full of narrow
paſſes. The direétion of this line is concave towards that part of
Germany; ſo that an enemy who advances on that ſide muſt have
2.
his depots on the Rhine, at Mentz, or Coblentz, or at Maeſtricht
and Namur on the Meuſe; in both caſes the army, which I ſuppoſe
encamped at Landau, can hinder him from advancing from the
Rhine, by ačting on his line of operation on that ſide, while ano
ther of forty thouſand men, placed on the Meuſe near Sedan, will
prevent any army from advancing into Lorrain or Champaign on
that fide, as is evident from the inſpection of the map.
J. : s

U 2 WHETHER
 i

136 of T H E FRONTIER OF F R A N C E.
WHETHER we confider the ſtrength of this line, the direétion: º

of it, or finally, the obſtacles which the country before it offers, i.

it will appear that no enemy can approach it, much leſs attack it º:
with any proſpe&t of ſucceſs: a ſmall corps poſted at Luxemburg,
might indeed advance from thence, and ravage a few villages in |
haſte, but no ſolid enterprize can, we think, ever be executed on s
that ſide. - 3

The third and laſt part of the French frontier runs from Sedan.
down the Meuſe to Charlemont, and from thence to Dunkirk, and
is 150 miles in length. It has been the ſcene of ſucceſſive wars for
near two centuries, the moſt expenſive, bloody, and durable of any
recorded in the annals of mankind, of which the author propoſes.
giving the hiſtory on the ſame plan this work is wrote.
This line is ſtronger by art than nature, having a prodigious.
number of ſtrong fortreſſes and poſts upon it; moreover, it projećts.
in many places, ſo that an enemy can enter it no where, without
having ſome of them in front and on his flanks, his depots muſt be
at Namur, Mons, and Tournay. An army of forty thouſand men
placed on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will
ſo bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a ſtep without im
minent danger ; for that, which we ſuppoſe on the Sambre, by
maſking Namur, penetrates into the country to Bruſſels, &c. which
will force the enemy to retire and abandon his own frontier. In
the preſent ſtate of Auſtrian Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Hol- “
. land, nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the
above-mentioned countries in one campaign.

In the war for the ſucceſſion of Spain, at the beginning of this

century, ten ſucceſsful campaigns brought the Allies no farther than
Landrecy, not thirty miles from the Auſtrian frontiers, a very in
confiderable
 of T H E FR O N T I E R O F FRAN c E. 137
confiderable defeat at Denain obliged prince Eugene to raiſe the fiege
of that place, and in a ſhort time abandon his conqueſts, the fruits.
of many vićtories.

I Know moſt people ſuppoſe, that this was owing to the defec
tion of the Engliſh: had this never taken place, perhaps the Allies.
might in time have advanced to the Marne, and ſent parties to the
Seyne: but will any officer ſuppoſe, that any army marching that line
from Mons, Tournay, &c. could ſeparate and take winter quarters
on the above-mentioned rivers, while the French were in poſſeſſion
of Picardy, Normandy, and Champaign : No, it is impoſſible:
the great fault of the French generals, when on the defenſive, was
to oppoſe the enemy in front, whereas they ſhould have operated.
againſt their flanks.

The final event of this long and bloody war ſhews the ſtrength.
of this frontier, and the prodigious reſources of the houſe of Bour
bon. From the deſcription we have of the French frontier, to
wards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears,
that an enemy, though his dominions were on the Upper Rhine,
oppoſite to Alſace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather im
poſſible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could pe
netrate into Lorrain, &c.

THAT the ſecond part of the French-frontier, from Landau to:

the Meuſe, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up,
the Moſelle, between the Rhine and the Meuſe, the event of the
different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the ſuperiority of the
French, I mean the ſuperior, advantages they poſſeſs in acting on.
that frontier, which are indeed ſo very great, that no forces can
be colle&ed and ſupported in Flanders by the houſe of Auſtria,
the Engliſh, Dutch, and the German princes, which can preſerve
that
158 OF THE F. R O N T I E R OF F R A N C E. ,

that country againſt the efforts of the French; moſt certainly the
Auſtrians alone cannot do it.

So much for the abſolute force of the French frontier: let us

now examine its relative force. . This, we have ſaid, depends on
the length of the enemy's line of operation, direction of it, good -:
neſs and number of the roads, ſituation of his depots, &c.
º
Of all the powers in Germany, the houſe of Auſtria alone is
in any degree able to contend with France ; we ſhall therefore con 1.

fine our obſervations to a war, which the firſt might undertake againſt
the latter. Vienna is the point, from whence the Auſtrians muſt
part, the diſtance between that place and the neareſt part of the
French frontier, viz. Alſace on the Rhine, is above 300 miles,
which alone gives the French a decifive ſuperiority. In adting on
the Rhine they have their depots on the ſpot; in a whole campaign
their army need not march twenty miles, inſomuch, that the ex
pences of maintaining it in the field would be very little more than
in time of peace, becauſe it would require no train, equipage, &c.
which retard the operations of an army, and are ſo very expenſive to
the ſtate: whereas an army ačting on a line of 300 miles, requires
ſuch a prodigious train of equipages as would exhauſt the moſt power
.
ful ſtate. The difficulty and expence of forming depots, as you
advance, for ſuch a number of horſes as are neceſſary for a great
army, would retard its motions, and finally put a ſtop to them alto
gether. Moreover, ſuch an army could not be brought to the ſcene.
of ačtion till very late in the ſeaſon, and if by a decifive vićtory it
does not acquire a ſufficient tract of country in and near the enemy's
frontier to take up its winter quarters, it muſt ſoon retire; while the *:

enemy, abundantly ſupplied with proviſions and ſtores on the ſpot,

..Call
 OF TH E FRONT I E R O F FRA N C E. I 59

can purſue you in the retreat, and render your future attempts ſtill
more difficult.

WHAT we have ſaid, regards the Auſtrian's line of operation only,

as to its length and the obſtacles which ariſe from thence alone; we
ſhall now conſider thoſe that proceed from the nature of the coun
try, through that the different lines, on which it can march to act
on the Rhine.

PARALLEL to this river, on the German ſide, at the diſtance of

ten or fifteen miles, runs a chain of very high mountains, called
the Black Foreſt, from Switzerland to Heidelberg on the Neckar,
and from thence to the Main. Through the firſt of theſe moun
tains there goes from the Rhine to the Danube only one capital
road; it paſſes over the Neckar, goes by Stutgard, the capital of
the dutchy of Wirtemberg, along the Neckar to Ulm : it is one
continual paſs or defile, between fifty and fixty miles in length, and
of courſe offers numberleſs poſitions, where a ſmall army can ſtop
the moſt numerous.

The country between the Rhine and the ſaid mountains belongs
to the Elečtor Palatine, ſeveral leſſer princes, and free cities. The
mountains themſelves comprehend the dutchy of Wirtemberg,
ſome other principalities and free cities. On the eaſt ſide of theſe
mountains lies Bavaria, which now likewiſe belongs to the Elector
Palatine, and ſome free cities. This prince, by the acquiſition of
Bavaria, is now ſo very powerful, that in conjunction with the duke
º of Wirtemberg, or even alone, he can hold the balance of Germany
between the Auſtrians and the French, and hinder them from ap
proaching each other.
THE
162 of T H E F R O N TIER OF FRAN CE.
The ſecond road goes from Francfort on the Main to Wurtzburg,
Nuremberg, and Ratiſbon on the Danube, and is no leſs difficult
than the former. The Auſtrians can approach the Rhine only by
the one or the other; if they advance by the firſt, the French may
paſs the Rhine, and by occupying ſome poſts in the dutchy of
wirtemberg, ſtop their progreſs and force them back into Bavaria;
and if they go on the other road, by occupying the heights on the
left of the Rhine, between Mentz and Offenburg, prevent their
paſſing that river, and force them down towards Coblentz and Co
logne, or by paſſing the Rhine, and marching to Wurtzburg, pre
.vent their approaching the Rhine at all; or finally, let them advance
towards Coblentz and the Lower Rhine, and then paſs to the Main,
and cut off all communication between the Low Countries and the
Auſtrian dominions in Germany and Italy, which would prevent
them from making any confiderable efforts in Flanders.

We have already ſhewn, that France has great advantages in

attacking Flanders, from the proximity of its depots, which are
greatly increaſed, by the Auſtrian's line of operation, from Vienna
to Bruſſels, which makes it impoſſible for them to preſerve that
country. It was, no doubt, owing to this circumſtance chiefly, if
not intirely, that the houſe of Auſtria could not preſerve Alſace,
Franche Comté, and Lorrain, which finally will bring on the loſs
of Flanders.

THE French would find nearly the ſame difficulties in paſſing

from the Rhine to the frontiers of Auſtria and Bohemia, and in all
probability would loſe their army, as they have always done, when
ever they went as far as the Danube. The French have however
ſome very conſiderable advantages over the Auſtrians: they can in
vade and over-run Flanders, before it is poſſible for the Auſtrians
to collect any forces there, capable of oppoſing their progreſs; and,
..moreover,
 OF THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERs. 161

moreover, can form ſuch alliances in Germany, as would greatly

embarraſs the Auſtrians; whereas theſe can form none that could
in any degree affect the ſafety of the French monarchy.
It would therefore ſeem adviſeable, and perhaps neceſſary, that
the houſe of Auſtria ſhould exchange all its poſſeſſions from Luxem
burg to Flanders for Bavaria, the preſent poſſeſſor of which might
find it very eligible, as he might draw a line from Manheim to
Deux Ponts, Luxemburg, and Namur, and eſtabliſh an eaſy com
munication between the whole: the Auſtrians no longer engaged in
ſuch diſtant provinces, might turn their thoughts elſewhere with
more advantage.

THE French frontiers towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain,

are too ſtrong to be invaded by thoſe powers: the idea of paſſing the
War, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deſerve a ſerious
diſcuſſion. We ſhall conſider the coaſt of France on the Britiſh
channel and the ocean on another occaſion.

C H A P T E R II,

of T H E A U S T R I A N F Ro N T 1 ERs.

"HE frontiers of the houſe of Auſtria are of prodigious extent,

having many ſeparate provinces, as thoſe in Flanders and
Italy. Here I ſhall confider only that frontier line, which begins
in the Tirol, goes along the biſhopric of Brixen, Carinthia, Stiria,
Auſtria, round Bohemia, Moravia, the new acquiſitions in Poland,
Tranfilvania, and paſſing the Danube near Belgrade, goes up the
Save, along Sclavonia and Croatia, which ſeparates thoſe provinces
from Boſnia in Turkey.
X - . For
162 OF THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER S.
For greater accuracy, we ſhall divide this immenſe line in ſeve
ral parts, relative to the different points, on which it may be at
tacked by the neighbouring powers.
The firſt part is that which goes from the county of Tirol to
Paſſau on the Danube, and from thence to Egra in Bohemia. All
this line, as far as the Danube, runs along and through the Alps,
and is therefore impervious to any army, even light troops could
not adt againſt it with ſucceſs. The remaining part, from the
Danube to Egra, is nearly as ſtrong, being covered by very high º

mountains almoſt inacceſſible. Over this line go three great roads,

one from Inſpruck into Bavaria, towards Augſburg; another from
Vienna up the Danube, to Paſſau and Straubing, &c. The third
from Egra into the Upper Palatinate, towards Nuremberg in Fran
conia; from each of which there runs a few croſs roads that
lead into the adjacent countries. It is, however, on theſe three
only that an army can act; though an enemy cannot pretend to
enter the firſt road, nor could any operation on that ſide be of uſe
to him; yet the Auſtrians might aſſemble a very confiderable force
at Inſpruck, and behind the Inn, and from thence penetrate into
Bavaria as far as the Danube. -

The ſecond road, which goes along that river, is extremely dif
ficult; a ſmall corps, poſted on the left of the Inn, near Paſſau,
would ſtop an army, while the light troops would paſs that river
higher up, and ačt on the enemy's flank and rear. All this coun
try is moſt particularly adapted to light troops; moreover, the road
runs cloſe to the Danube in many places, and as this river is there
very narrow, and contraćted by high mountains, a few troops on
the oppoſite ſhore ſtops the march of an army as well as the navi
gation, ſo that while the Auſtrians have any force at all, and par
ticularly light troops on the above-mentioned line, no enemy can,
however
 O F T H E A U S T R I A N F R O N T IE R.S. 163

however numerous, attack it with ſucceſs, ; nor could he march

down the left ſide of the Danube, leaving Egra and that part of Bo
hemia behind him, and on his flank: moreover the direction of this
frontier line being concave towards the enemy, is extremely favour
able to the Auſtrians, for independent of the prodigious ſtrength of
the country, which alone enables them to oppoſe him in front with
ſucceſs, he cannot advance againſt any given point of this circle
without expoſing one or both his flanks, he would ſoon loſe his
communication with his depots, muſt retire and change his line of
operation.

From what we have ſaid, it appears that Egra is the only point
of this line which can be attacked; this place neither is nor can be
made ſtrong. It were adviſeable to build a capital fortreſs on that
frontier ſo placed, that an army poſted near it might advance and
take a central poſition between the ſource of the Maine and Ratiſbon
on the Danube, ſo as to be on either river immediately, as circum
ſtances might require. Whatever enemy approaches this frontier,
can have no other line of operation than one drawn from Nurem
berg, Ratiſbon, or ſome other place on the Danube to Egra. s.

AN army covered by ſuch a fortreſs, as we propoſe, would un

doubtedly render every attempt on that ſide fruitleſs, particularly
if a body of fifteen or twenty thouſand men of light troops and Huſ,
ſars would enter Bavaria from the Inn.

At the death of Charles the Sixth, the French and Bavarians

entered Bohemia by Egra, which confirms our obſervation on this
frontier; had there been ſuch a fortreſs as we propoſe, it is proba
ble they could not have taken it, nor could they have left it behind
them.

X 2 THE
164 O F THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERS.

THE relative force of this line conſiſts in this: the Auſtrians can
in a very little time colle&t ſuch forces as are able to defend it;
whereas the Bavarians and French (for the firſt alone cannot con
tend with the Auſtrians) cannot be on that frontier in a year; theſe
laſt can draw nothing from France at ſuch a great diſtance; the
Bavarians cannot ſupply them with ſubfiſtence and ſtores for any
confiderable time, they muſt ſeparate and will be beat in detail: the
French will loſe their army, and Bavaria will be ravaged and
ruined. - -

The hiſtory of the war of the ſucceſſion, and of that begun in

1741, carried on in this country, ſhews, that any future attempts
againſt the houſe of Auſtria on this fide will be equally unſucceſsful.

FRoM Egra to the Elbe there is but one line of operation, viz.
that which goes from Dreſden to Prague, from the Elbe to the
Queiſs, which ſeparates: Bohemia from Luſatia, no line can be
drawn from the one to the other. From Friedland to the road,
which goes from Olmuts in Moravia towards Neiſs, there are two
lines of operations, one from Schweidnitz to Prague, the other from
Neiſs to Olmuts : Glatz is a poſt rather than a fortreſs, from
whence a line of operation might be drawn into Bohemia. How
ever, if a confiderable body of troops were placed in the county of
Glatz, they would greatly, facilitate the operations from Schweid
nitz to Prague, and thoſe from Neiſs to Olmuts; and on the con
trary, very much retard and check thoſe which the Auſtrians might
carry on thoſe lines into Sileſia. This advantage ariſes from the
fituation of this province, which projećts into Bohemia, and is the
vertex of a triangle formed by lines drawn from Glatz to Neiſs and
Schweidnitz, and another between theſe two laſt places. i
IN
 OF THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER S. 165

IN the preceding part of this volume, which was printed in 1766,

I gave a military deſcription of this frontier, pointed out the three
lines of operation above-mentioned, and indicated the camps which
the Auſtrians might occupy to fruſtrate the attempts of the Pruſ:
fians: I there ſaid, by occupying the paſſes on the road, between
Lowofitz and Dreſden, no army coming from thence could enter
Bohemia. Secondly, that by camping behind the Elbe, between
Königſgratz and Königſhoff, the Pruſſians coming from Schweid
nitz would be ſtopped there: and thirdly, that an enemy coming
from Luſatia by Rumburg and Gabel into Bohemia, would alſo be
!.
ſtopped by an army poſted behind the Iſer.

The king of Pruſſia, in alliance with Saxony, reſolved to enter

Bohemia, from Scweidnitz with one army, and from Dreſden with
another. The firſt, very numerous, he commanded in perſon; the
ſecond, compoſed of Pruſſians and Saxons, was no leſs ſo.

The Auſtrian forces were likewiſe divided into two armies,

ſomething inferior to the Pruſſians; the emperor commanded that
oppoſed to the king, and marſhal Laudon that deſtined to act againſt
prince Henry. The reſult of all theſe diſpoſitions was, that the
king entered Bohemia, and advanced to the Elbe, where he found
the emperor encamped behind that river, exačtly as we propoſed,
in ſuch a manner, that the king could neither bring him to an
ačtion, nor by any manoeuvre force him to quit his poſition. Prince
Henry advanced towards the paſſes above-mentioned, but the diſ
poſitions of marſhal Laudon were ſo juſt, that he could not attempt
..*..
forcing them. Thus theſe two mighty armies, conducted by ſuch.
:º able generals, as the king of Pruſſia and prince Henry, were ſtop
ped ſhort in their careers unable to advance a ſtep.

THE:
166 of THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERs.
The king naturally impatient, grew tired and aſhamed of his
ſituation; the only probable means to extricate himſelf, and proceed
in the execution of his plan, was to order prince Henry to leave
Saxony, and enter Bohemia from Luſatia by the paſſes of Rumburg
and Gabel, which would bring him on the emperor's flanks, and
of courſe force him to abandon his ſtrong camp, retire, and ſo leave
the king an opening to advance and purſue his plan. Accordingly
prince Henry entered Bohemia by the paſſes above-mentioned: in
the mean time marſhal Laudon, informed of the prince's motion,
iikewiſe quitted his camp, paſſed the Elbe at Leitmeritz, and ad
vanced to the Iſer, behind which he encamped, with his right ex
tended towards Turnau, by which means he ſtopped once more
prince Henry, and effečtually covered the Emperor's left flank.
The king was again diſappointed, but did not deſpair; he formed
another projećt, which he hoped would diſplace the emperor, the
obječt of all his manoeuvres: higher up the Iſer, in the mountains,
is a place called Arnau, which the emperor had occupied, becauſe
it covered his left; this the king propoſed attacking; accordingly
he ordered his army to march on his right, while that of prince
Henry marched on its left. -

THE emperor reinforced this poſt, and the Pruſſians were re

pulſed. The ſeaſon was far advanced, and every attempt of the
Pruſſians baffled, the king reſolved to put an end to the campaign;
accordingly his army retired in ſeveral columns, that on his left, or
rather on the right in his retreat, was iſolated. The emperor availed
himſelf of this circumſtance, and ordered general Wurmſer to attack
it, which he did with ſuch ſucceſs, that he defeated, killed, and
made priſoners above 2000 men.
IT
 OF THE A U S T RIAN FRONTIERS. 167

It was natural to ſuppoſe, that prince Henry ſhould have re

treated into Luſatia by the ſame roads he came ; but to the aſtoniſh
ment of every officer, a little acquainted with his profeſſion, he
choſe another route, long, difficult, and extremely dangerous ; he
marched by marſhal Laudon's left flank, advanced to the Elbe,
paſſed that river at Leitmeritz, and from thence through the paſſes.
into Saxony, and executed his retreat with ſucceſs, becauſe nobody
offered to moleſt him : why ſuch a general as Laudon, at the head
of a numerous army, did not cut him off intirely at the paſſage of
the Elbe, is a myſtery which cannot be explained, and the more.
ſo, as prince Charles of Lichtenſtein commanded a corps at Melnick,
which could have oppoſed this paſſage in front, while marſhal Lau
don with his whole army attacked his rear.

Thus ended this campaign and the war, as glorious to the em

peror as it was ſhameful to the Pruffians. Barren of events, it
offers only one obſervation, which is this ; in Bohemia, and I be
lieve in moſt other countries, there are certain points, which being.
occupied, will baffle the attempts of much fuperior forces. It is.
furprizing that in the ſeveral great wars carried on in Bohemia,
theſe points ſhould have eſcaped the eyes of ſo many able generals.

THE Auſtrians, by their acquiſitions in Poland, have formed a.

new frontier on that fide ; it runs from Teſchen in Sileſia, cloſe by
Cracow on the Viſtula, and from thence almoſt in a right line to
the Nieſter, within a few miles of Chotzim in Moldavia, on the
ſame river; its length is about four hundred miles, its breadth
Tºarious. - -

THIS country, like all Poland, is plain and open, has no fortreſs, .
nor any enemy, which for the preſent can render it neceſſary: how
ever, as Poland may probably hereafter become the field of battle be-,
tWeen ,
 - Y
º

168 o F THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERS.

tween thoſe great powers, who divided a great part of it among

them. The Auſtrians, like the Pruſſians, who are building a capital
place on the Viſtula, ſhould likewiſe build one on their new frontiers.

This country is no otherwiſe uſeful to the Auſtrians, than by its

produćtions; we muſt examine, however, whether it may not fur
niſh means to carry on any future war againſt the Pruſſians with
more advantage than heretofore.

The wars between theſe two powers have been chiefly carried .
on on the frontier which ſeparates Bohemia from Sileſia; and as
things then ſtood, could not be proſecuted on any other lines than
thoſe before-mentioned. That frontier is more advantageous to
the Pruſſians than the Auſtrians, for the reaſons we aſſigned in the
deſcription of that country, to which we refer; the back part of Si
leſia towards Poland, from the Oder to the Warta, as far as Cuſtrin,
is intirely open, having no one place of ſtrength on it, excepting
Gros-Glogaw on the Oder and Cuſtrin: this line is near 300 miles
in length. It is well known that the king of Pruſſia draws infinite
advantages from Poland—horſes, cattle, recruits, corn, &c. without
which he could not maintain his armies in Sileſia, nor form ſuch
depots there as enable him to wage war in Bohemia.

THIs being premiſed, it ſeems clear, that if the Auſtrians built

a place of arms on the line, between Teſchen and Cracow, a little
further back, and opened a communication from thence to Hun
gary, through the paſſes of Tablunka, and ſome other roads through
the mountains, which ſeparate that country from Poland, a power
ful army might be aſſembled near the fortreſs, we ſuppoſe, to ade
on the back part of Sileſia along the Oder to Francfort, a very in
tereſting point to the Pruſſians.
IT
 of THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERs. 169

It is needleſs to point out all the advantages which the Auſtrians

would reap from the operations of ſuch an army; I will therefore
only ſay, that unleſs they find out a new line of operation, their
attempts on Sileſia will be fruitleſs; and I ſee not how it is poſſible
for them to eſtabliſh any other, but that which we propoſe.

The next part of the Auſtrian frontier runs from the Nieſter to
, the Danube, and ſeparates Tranſilvania and the Bannat of Temeſ
waer, from Moldavia and Walachia: it is a chain of prodigious high
mountains almoſt impenetrable, inſomuch, that there is but one
paſs, through which wheel carriages can go; it leads to the Pruth.
The Auſtrians have acquired here a tract of land, and have built a
bridge over that river, a few miles behind Chotzim, and of courſe
:
will open a good communication into Moldavia. They ſhould open
twe more roads through theſe mountains, the one from Herman
ſtadt, the capital of Tranſilvania, cloſe by the river Alut, which
runs into Walachia; and a third from the Bannat of Temeſwaer,
through the paſs of Meadia into Walachia, cloſe to the Danube,
oppoſite Widin. - -

This being done, nothing can hinder the Auſtrians from con
quering Moldavia and Walachia in one campaign. The Turks
have in thoſe countries only Giurgewa and Ibrailow on the Danube,
Chotzim and Bender on the Nieſter, neither of which can reſiſt a
fortnight's regular fiege. As things now are, Auſtria holds the
balance between the Turks and Ruſſians; for neither can paſs the
Nieſter without her conſent.

The laſt part of the Auſtrian frontier runs from the Danube up
the Save, and ſeparates Sclavonia from Boſnia. The country on
both ſides of this river, particularly Boſnia, is extremely moun
tainous, inſomuch, that a regular army cannot move without great
Y difficulty.
,, of THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIERs.
difficulty. The direétion of this line is very favourable to the Turks.
It is, I think, impoſſible to advance beyond Belgrade towards Con
ſtantinople, while they are maſters of Boſnia : whereas they may
paſs into Sclavonia, and by forcing a paſſage over the Drave, open
a communication into Lower Hungary, the Bennat of Temeſwaer
and Tranſilvania; with ſuch fruitful countries behind them, they
might proceed into Upper Hungary and Auſtria, as formerly.

In the preſent ſtate of the two empires, nothing of this can hap
pen; on the contrary, the Auſtrians are in every thing infinitely
ſuperior to the Turks: the line of operations of the firſt goes from
vienna down the Danube to Peterwaradin, where, and at Temeſ.
waer, depots may be formed without trouble, and with very little
expence, becauſe they would require ſcarce any horſes, carriages, &c.
whereas the Turkiſh line muſt come from Conſtantinople, is 450
miles long, in many places very difficult; ſo that this diſtance
may make an effential difference in the operations of the two
armies.

Is caſe ſuch a war ſhould happen, I would propoſe placing one

army on the Save, with the left towards the Danube, and a ſtrong
body of cavalry on the other fide of that river; another, conſiſting
of 30,000 men, chiefly light troops, two regiments of Huſſars,
ſome howitzers and field-pieces, ſhould aſſemble in Croatia, and
enter Boſnia on that fide: this would oblige the Turks to abandon
the Save, and fall back towards Servia, which will give the army,
we ſuppoſe placed on the other ſide the Save, room to paſs it ; and
by thus acting in front and flank of the enemy, you will force him
to abandon every province ſucceſſively, or fight you on your own
terſ Il S. .

IN
 O F T H E T U R K IS H F R O N T I E. R. 171

IN a war with the Turks, I beg leave to recommend the uſe of

the pikes, the order of battle propoſed in the preceding part of this
work, with a numerous artillery and howitzers. The Turks always
aćt in front with all their forces, and often with ſuch impetuoſity,
that it is no eaſy matter to reſiſt their attacks; and if they ſucceed, it
is no leſs difficult to avoid a total overthrow, which makes the order
of battle we propoſe abſolutely neceſſary as well as the mode of ačting
on their flanks; more eſpecially at the time they are occupied in
front: in this manner a column of near eight thouſand Turks, while
engaged in attacking a redoubt, where there were ſeven hundred men,
were totally diſperſed in five minutes time by three hundred horſe,
who attacked them in flank in a looſe manner a la debandade.

C H A P T E R III.

OF T H E T U R K IS H F R O N TIE R.

E have already deſcribed that part of this line towards the

Auſtrian dominions, it remains we now examine, that which
confines on Poland and Ruſſia. If the Poles, like their anceſtors,
the Tartars, made war with I oo, ooo horſemen, far from being d

prey to their ambitious neighbours, they would make them trem

ble: all Poland, and the countries adjacent, from the Oder to the
Dwina and Nieſter, on the frontier of Ruſſia, and even beyond the
latter to the Wolga, are intirely open and defenceleſs, and abundantly
provided with corn, horſes, cattle, &c. Ioo,ooo horſe, divided into
ſmaller bodies, would over-run this immenſe ſpace in a few months,
and leave not a living creature behind them to cultivate the ground,
which would become a deſart, and theſe mighty monarchs ſhut up
with a few ſubjects in and about their fortreſſes. What would you
Y 2 d ,
* +2
f
O F THE TU R K IS H. F. R O N TI E. R.

do with your immenſe armies of infantry, heavy ſquadrons, and

your thouſand cannons againſt ſuch an enemy Nothing: their
ſuperior velocity gives them every thing, and leaves you nothing
but the ground on which you encamp, which you muſt ſoon aban
don, if you can, or periſh.

REMEMBER Peter the Great on the Pruth ! By following this

method, the Tartars under Genſis Chan and his ſucceſſors made
greater conqueſts than any people in the world; but all this is a
viſion, the Poles are nothing: a bad government deſtroys the re
ſources of the moſt powerful kingdoms; we ſhall therefore confider
the Turkiſh frontier ſo far as it relates to a war with Ruſſia.

THIs frontier runs from Chotzim on the Nieſter to the Black º

Sea, and from thence to Oczakow on the Nieper, along the Crimea
towards the Don. It is true, that the Tartars, who inhabit the
country from the Nieſter to the Don, along the Black Sea, are not
ſubject to the Grand Seignior, but they are ſo far dependent on
him, that they have always ačted with him, and always will. On
this frontier the Turks poſſeſs Chotzim, Bender, Oczakow, and
Precop on the Iſthmus, which ſeparates the Crim from Little Tar
tary; in all which he can form his magazines with eaſe from Afia
and Europe.

THE Ruſſian frontier runs, on this ſide, from Kiow on the right of
the Nieper as far as Kinſburn, oppoſite Oczakow, on the mouth of
that river. On this frontier the Ruſſians have only one fortreſs,
Pultawa, where Charles the Twelfth found the term of his vićto
ries and glory. This line is above five hundred miles in length.

THE Turkiſh and Ruffan's principal line of operation muſt

from Chotzim to Kiow, which is two hundred and fifty miles:
t
if
either
 O F T HE T U R K I S. H. F. R O N T I E R. 173

either did not occupy Poland, and draw their ſubſiſtence from
thence, it would be impoſſible for either to ačt on this line, and of
courſe their wars would be confined to Little Tartary and the Crim,
in which the Ruſſians have the advantage, as well from the poſition
and direétion of their frontier, which enables them to attack that
country in different parts, as from the proximity of their reſources,
the courſe of the rivers, &c. &c.

BUT as Poland has, and ever will be the property of thoſe who
occupy it, both powers will ačt on the principal line from the
Nieſter to Kiow. From the direétion of the Turkiſh frontier, it is
evident, that the Ruſſians cannot approach the Nieſter, if the
Turks order thirty or forty thouſand Tartars to advance into Po
land, between the Bog and the Nieper, and between this river and
the Don, even the Tartars of Cuban might be made to act between
the Don and the Wolga. If ſuch a diſpoſition was made and exe
cuted, the Ruſſians, far from advancing into Moldavia, would find
it difficult to preſerve their own country, which is plain and open,
and therefore cannot be defended by any armies whatever, conſti
tuted as ours are, againſt the incurſions of a hundred thouſand
horſemen. We ſaw lately a miſerable vagabond, at the head of a
few thouſand rabble, over-run a great part of the Ruſſian empire:
our armies, I repeat it, are formed to ačt only on a very contraćted
line, and in a cloſe country they never can perform great things, or
make extenſive conqueſts.

C HA PT E R
 I. 174 J

C H A P T E R IV.

OF THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TO WA R D S E U R O P E.

HIS line begins at a ſmall river called Kymen in Finland, and

is the limit between the Ruſſians and the Swedes; it runs
along the gulph of Finland, and part of the Baltic as far as the
mouth of the Dwina, on which is Riga, a very ſtrong place, and
confiderable for its trade: from hence it goes up the above ſaid river.
to its ſprings, and then to Smolenſko on thoſe of the Nieper, from
whence finally it follows the courſe of that river to the Black Sea,
oppoſite Oczakow; the Ruſſians have appropriated ſome provinces
on the right of it. We ſhall divide this line into three parts. Firſt,
that in Finland oppoſite the Swedes. Secondly, that from the mouth
of the Dwina to Smolenſko. And thirdly, that from the laſt place
to the Black Sea.

Russi AN FINLAND is quite a ſavage country, having nothing

in it but foreſts, marſhes, lakes, rocks, and mountains, is extremely
poor, and does not furniſh wherewith to feed the inhabitants, though
few in number, and do not excced a hundred thouſand perſons. This
country is ſo very ſtrong, that three or four regiments, which ge
nerally are quartered here, are ſufficient to defend it againſt four
times that number; and the more ſo, as the Ruſſians can from
Cronſtadt ſend any number they think proper over the gulph, and
land them behind the Swediſh army, that would advance towards
the Kymen: in whatever poſition the Swedes place themſelves, the
Ruſſians may act againſt them in front and on either flank, and force
them into the ſea, as in the laſt war in this country, or to abandon
1t
 OF THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TOWARDS EUROPE. 175

it and retire up the gulph of Bothnia towards Torneo, where they

muſt periſh for want of ſubſiſtence.

The Ruſſian's line of operations goes from Peterſburg through

Wyburg; the capital of Finland to David's Stadt, a new fortreſs,
and thence to Frederickſham near the Kymen; all which places are
well fortified: the Swediſh line goes from the ſame Kymen to
Abo, and from thence over the gulph of Bothnia to Stockholm on
the Baltic: the firſt line is about 150 miles in length, and the
ſecond near 4oo. The firſt is a good road by which the army
may be ſupplied, as alſo by water from Cronſtadt, Nerva, Revel, &c.
whereas the Swedes muſt bring every thing from Stockholm and
other places beyond the gulph of Bothnia.

Whoever confiders theſe circumſtances, the great difference

there is in the length of the reſpective lines of operations, and finally,
the ſuperiority of the Ruſſian forces, will conclude that the Swedes,
ſo far from being able to attack the former with advantage, cannot
preſerve their poſſeſſions on this frontier a month, if they are at
tacked : it would therefore ſeem prudent to give them up rather
than keep them on ſuch precarious conditions; ſuch a meaſure
would greatly increaſe the power of the Swedes, who would
have the Danes only to contend with, to whom in every reſpect
they are much ſuperior. It was to the circumſtances above-men
tioned only, we can attribute the loſs of the Swediſh provinces, on
that fide of the Baltic, by Charles the Twelfth : how could that
prince ſuppoſe it was poſſible, with any forces Sweden could raiſe
and maintain, to preſerve them at ſuch a diſtance, over a very dif
ficult ſea, frozen for fix months in the year, againſt the ſuperior
forces of the Ruſſians, who were limitrophes, and able to act con
tinually, almoſt during the whole year : The event of that, and I
- - believe
 176 OF THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TOWARDS EUROPE.
believe of moſt wars, carried on on ſuch an extenſive line, confirms the
doćtrine we have eſtabliſhed ; that is, they miſcarry and ruin thoſe
who undertake them.

FRom Peterſburg to Riga, on the Dwina, there are Narva and

Revel, which are ſtations for the Ruſſian ſquadrons; the coaſt is
high, and by no means ſafe for great ſhips, which dare 'not ſhut
themſelves in the upper part of the Gulph of Finland, where a
weſterly wind would keep them longer than they would wiſh; ſo
that the Ruſſians have nothing to fear on that ſide, and the leſs ſo
as they have from Finland along the coaſt to Riga, at leaſt fifty
thouſand men always in quarters.

THE country on the Ruſſian ſide of the Dwina, from Riga, is

ſomething better than Finland, though like it, for the moſt part
covered with lakes, foreſts, marſhes, &c. and of courſe is very
thinly inhabited. On all this frontier an enemy can only advance
towards Riga, and from thence to Peterſburg, or towards Pleikow,
which is the key into Novogorod and Moſcow; the loſs of Pleſkow,
on the lake Peipus, brought on that of the Swediſh provinces. Had
Charles the Twelfth been able to keep it, he might have prevented
the Ruſſians from ſupporting themſelves on the Nieva in Ingria,
and by ačting on their line from Moſcow to Novogorod, have
forced them to Tweer behind the Wolga. This Pleſkow is a very
important poſt, if theyhad a powerful enemy to contend with on that
frontier, but they have none: for the Pruſſians, however formida
ble, were they totally diſengaged on the fide of Germany, can never
advance to the Dwina: their main forces are behind the Oder, and
muſt be ſupported from thence, and by land, becauſe the Pruſſian
- monarch has no fleet,

THE
 OF THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TOWARDS EUROPE. 177

The Ruſſians can, firſt, ſend a fleet to ravage the coaſt from
Memel to Stetin. Secondly, can advance in front into Pruſſia, and
occupy it before the Pruſſians can ſend a ſufficient army to prevent
it. Thirdly, they can ſend a confiderable body of troops, particu
larly light troops, to act on the Pruſſian's line, from Koningſberg
to the Viſtula, and even paſs this river and advance towards the
Warta—ſuch troops want no magazines. -

SMoleNskow is fortified, but not ſo as to be able to make any

confiderable reſiſtance; this is the moſt important point on all the
Ruſſian frontiers, it is only two hundred miles from Moſcow,
through which the communication between Peterſburg and the
ſouthern provinces paſſes; by occupying Moſcow, the empire is
overturned. It was through this paſs the Poles always entered
Ruſſia, and for a long ſeries of years contended with ſucceſs with
the Ruſſians, and even ſet up an impoſtor on the throne of that
empire. - -

If Charles the Twelfth, being maſter of Poland, inſtead of

going to Puttawa, had taken Smolenſkow, and from thence advanced
to Moſcow, a vićtory would have given him that important place,
and for ſome time the empire. He could not however have preſerved
it while connected with Sweden, for the ſame reaſons he could not
preſerve his provinces on the Baltic; one unfortunate event, which
muſt finally happen at ſuch an immenſe diſtance, would neceſſarily
have ruined him.

IN ſpeaking of the Turkiſh frontiers, we have already deſcribed

that which goes from Smolenſkow to Kiow, and from thence to the
Black Sea. We ſhall conclude what we have to ſay on this ſubject,
by obſerving, that however deſirous the Ruſſians may be to inter
fere in the affairs of Germany, they can only ačt an auxiliary part,
Z and,
 \!º,f -

ºº ºs of THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TowARDs EUROPE.

-s
; º
! ----
and that for a few months only in the year; they can never maintain
any conqueſts beyond the Viſtula, ſo far they may proceed, becauſe
their fleet might co-operate with ſucceſs, even this would become
--- difficult, ſince the Pruſſians have made acquiſitions in Poland,
which unites Pruſſia with the other provinces of the houſe of Bran
***
denburg, and this communication is ſecured by a capital fortreſs now
-:
*.-
*.
eº
building on the viſtula, near Marien Werder: when we confider
--

the map, we ſee that the Turks and Pruſſians are the only powers
º--.-- that can approach the Ruſſian frontier, and that Auſtria muſt be
-º-
attentive to their motions; it ſeems that an alliance between the
two empires would be uſeful to both.
*
-

.ºz The reſt of the Ruſſian frontier, from the Don to the Wolga,
along the provinces of Orenbourg, Siberia, and Irkutch, has for
the moſt part ſeveral hordes of Tartars in the neighbourhood, who
º: now and then make incurſions into the Ruſſian provinces to plun
der, which having accompliſhed, they retire with the utmoſt ex
pedition.

THE Chineſe are on the limits of Irkutch, and ſeparated from it

by a ſmall river, which runs through a Town called Kiachta, in
habited by the ſubjećts of both empires. They could by means of
~ the Tartars of Great Tartary be troubleſome to the Ruffians, but
|
are afraid of them, averſe to war in general, and do not wiſh to ſee
; the Tartars armed. -

: ON the north of Siberia, towards the Frozen Sea, the inhabitants

are ſavages, and live by hunting, pay a ſmall tribute in ſkins, which
is all they have to pay.
º
The Perſian monarchy has for many years been torn by civil
diffenſions, which ſubſided during the reign of Gherim Khan, a
very
!
iº, *

-ºw

*
%: |
f
º, l
º: i
* al
 of THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TowARDS EUROPE. 179
very able and juſt prince, who died lately; and the civil wars, as
uſual, are broken out afreſh, ſo that the Ruſſians have nothing to
fear on that fide: moreover, the mountains of Cauſacus, which
run from the ſea of Aſoph to the Caſpian, preſent ſo many difficul
ties, that neither can make war beyond them.

HAviNG deſcribed the frontiers of the principal European

powers on the Continent, we muſt now return to confider that of
France on the Britiſh channel. This frontier extends from Dun
kirk to Uſhant, and round that point, along the Bay of Biſcay, to
Bayonne; on this line, however, there is but one harbour, where
a great fleet can be built, equipped, and ride in ſafety, which is
Breſt; ſhips of the line are alſo built at Rochfort, and equipped
there, but few in number, and only few can be kept there with
ſafety; they ſoon periſh, becauſe the water is ſweet, though
the tide runs very high and violent up the Charante.

IN ſpeaking of the line of operation, on which an army ačts, we

have laid it down as an axiom, not to be controverted, that if it
is of any confiderable length, or interſe&ted by mountains, paſſes,
and rivers, and of courſe, if it goes over a confiderable branch of
the ſea, no ſolid enterprize can be executed on ſuch a line, though.
your forces are much ſuperior to thoſe who oppoſe you. A pirate
may land twenty men on the coaſt of France, or any other, rob a
hen-rooſt, burn a few houſes, and run away to their ſhip, in ſpite
of France and its two hundred thouſand men, becauſe ſuch an expe
dition is executed in a few hours. -

In the late war, England, at a prodigious expence, made ſeve

ral attempts on the coaſt of France, the reſult was burning ſome
fiſhing-boats, and, by accident, I believe, ſome houſes, and were
happy to come off. Their laſt exploits at St. Cas, was, we know,
Z 2. very
 180 of THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TOWARDS EUROPE.
very unfortunate. Whoſe fault was it? No doubt it was the fault
of thoſe who planned theſe fine expeditions. Could we have burnt
the enemy's docks, ſtores, &c. at Breſt and Rochfort, it would
have been of great importance and worth trying; but every other
objećt was by no means equal to the riſk or the expence, and never
ought to be undertaken. No forces the Engliſh can bring on the
coaſt will be ſufficient to take Breſt, or any other capital place:
but for a moment I will ſuppoſe the French are aſleep; that the
Engliſh fleet and fifty thouſand men are at Breſt. What then
Why, then they muſt in a ſhort time return home, if they can;
for ſurely they cannot remain at Breſt, which in a ſhort time will
--

be ſurrounded by a French army, who will beſiege you in it, you

muſt therefore abandon it, or advance into the country: advance,
in the name of God! you are at Rennes, the capital of Britany;
What then, I aſk once more ? Why, you will be ſurrounded,
your communication with Breſt and your fleet cut off, and your
army periſhes by the ſword or by famine.
WHAT I ſay of Breſt, which indeed is the only place on the
coaſt where a fleet can for any confiderable time ride with ſafety, is
equally applicable to every other point on this coaſt, or any other
coaſt whatever. If your army meets with any, though very incon
ſiderable reſiſtance; for while your enemy can keep the field, and
aćt on your flanks, you cannot remain on any given ſpot; and if
you advance, you only precipitate your ruin.

On the coaſt of England there are three harbours, where a great

fleet may ride with ſafety. The enemy muſt take one of them.
Suppoſe it done, and that the Engliſh have not a ſhip left. Suppoſe
further, that there is a French army of fixty thouſand men en
".fº
camped on Black-Heath, and off London bridge.
I ſay,
f
 º

OF THE RUSSIAN FRONTIER TOWARDS EURORE. 181

iº
I
:

I ſay, there are two hundred thouſand men in England who have i
bore arms ; I will put the half on horſeback, and the other half |
remains on foot; mix them as circumſtances may require, then I
place fifty thouſand men in Surry and Suſſex, and as many in Eſſex, f
º
who act on the enemy's line, which on that ſuppoſition muſt go
towards the Downs, there being no other place where his fleet can
anchor; ſuch a diſpoſition being made, and only half the number
of men we propoſe employed, I aſk any officer, any man of ſenſe, -

what will become of the enemy's army on Black-Heath, or in any

other given point, fixty or ſeventy miles from the coaſt It muſt
º|
periſh; for undoubtedly no army can ſubſiſt on a line of ſuch length
i
as is that, from France to Black-Heath, over a branch of the ſea, and -s-

penetrate into the country, while we have an army of thirty or forty

thouſand men only to oppoſe their ſupplies. No army can ſubſiſt in
a country, unleſs it draws all, or the greateſt part of its ſubſiſtence
from the country itſelf, and of courſe poſſeſſes a great tract behind
it, and on every fide to the right and left; for if you can act on the
enemy's line, he muſt retire; and though he ſhould be in poſſeſ. º
-

ſ
. 2.
*
º
-

s
fion of ſuch a tract of country as we ſuppoſe, he cannot keep it, sº
| :
unleſs he is maſter of one or more ſtrong places, to enable him to º

ſeparate his troops and put them into winter quarters. º

*
4. Y
WHEN the combined fleet appeared on our coaſt, the nation un
accuſtomed to ſee an enemy ſo near, ſeemed much alarmed, I then
thought it my duty to examine the poſſible reſults of an invaſion,
and pointed out the means of defeating it, determined and fixed the
lines on which the enemy muſt have ačted, had he landed, and the
!
different poſitions the Engliſh army muſt have occupied on ſuch -

, a
lines to prevent him from advancing into the country, or keeping \
the poſt he had taken on our coaſt. When I confider this ſubject
in a military light only, I wiſhed almoſt that the enemy had made j
. ſuch º

.
-

*~
…tº
 º

182 OF AM E. R. I CA.

ſuch an attempt; becauſe once for all they would have ſeen the
-
abſurdity and danger of it, and we ſhould for ever have been cured
of our fears.

C H A P T E R V.

-
--

O F A M E R I. C. A.
--

TAKE it for granted, that every body has or may have a map
of the ſeat of war in this country, and therefore have not given
3
:
it here. Politics have not in the leaſt contributed to bring this
important war to a happy concluſion, probably have retarded it. In
**
general I have obſerved, that when they interfere with military
operations, they have rather retarded than accelerated them: when
an army is once in the field, and the plan of the campaign ſettled,

4.
: let the general go on his own way, he is on the ſpot, and with the
aſſiſtance of his officers alone, can determine what is to be done,
and how it is to be done.

: As I am totally unacquainted with the face of the country, it is

ſ: '. impoſſible for me, even ſuppoſing I was a competent judge, to form
. § - any opinion of the different actions which have happened there, dur
º ing this long war; moſt, if not all of them, have been ſucceſsful ; it
t is therefore juſt to conclude, they were condućted with wiſdom and
ſ valour: why, the reſult of them did not anſwer the expectations
of the public, will appear from what we ſhall ſay on the ſubječt.
* -

We muſt beg the reader will recolle&t what we have ſaid in

ºf ſ * -
Chap. III. pag. 133 to 137, on the line of operation, and Chap. IV.
| - * Pag. I 38 to 143, on the nature and principles of an offenſive
- war,
º
* \; ->
º
º | º
-

| -- tº
p

#
* {
ſº
 -
-
------ *
º

of AM ER I ca. 183

war, and compare the doćtrine therein eſtabliſhed with the manner
in which the American war was condućted : it will, we think, ap
pear, that the want of ſucceſs did not ariſe from want of honour,
valour, or of wiſdom, in planning or executing the various ačtions
which happened; but from thoſe difficulties which aroſe from the
nature of the country, and perhaps likewiſe from the defečts in the
general plan of war, that was adopted and purſued with ſo little
ſucceſs.

THE country is open, that is, it has no fortreſs excepting Boſton,

New-York, and Charles-Town; it is very extenſive, and very
thinly inhabited in proportion to its extent; ſo that there is no one ;
province, I believe, which could maintain a fleet and an army for
a month, which of courſe muſt be ſupported from England, that
is, on a line of above three thouſand miles. Whoever conſiders this
circumſtance only, and calculates the infinite difficulties in tranſ >*
porting and maintaining an army of forty thouſand men, at ſuch an
immenſe diſtance, will find many reaſons, which have concurred to
retard and fruſtrate the progreſs of our arms. Poſterity will admire
the a&ivity and vigour of our counſels, and be aſtoniſhed at the ;;f.-
reſources of our country. The miniſtry could do no more than
place and maintain a prodigious army on the ſpot where it was de
ſtined to act: no fault can juſtly be imputed to them ; they are
acquitted by every wiſe and moderate man, who conſiders their
condućt as to this point with impartiality. Though the country has ! . *

no fortreſs, it is however very ſtrong by nature, and has very few

good roads; it is ſtill in its infancy. -

Let us now examine, what ſeems to me, the real cauſes of our
little ſucceſs in this long and unhappy war. - *_Y -

New

- & *s

† –
- †: "4 F.
 *,t

w
º

184. of A M E R T CA.

.
*
-.-

ºs--
--

New-York is the point from whence our army muſt advance

into the country; from this point, with a radius of a hundred miles,
for example; deſcribe a ſemi-circle, whoſe diameter is the ſea coaſt;
as there is not, within that circumference, any one fortreſs whoſe
poſſeſſion will render you maſter of a certain tract of country between
it and the coaſt, it follows you cannot eſtabliſh a certain line of
operation; the enemy is encamped on that portion of circle, and on
|- whatever direétion you proceed, he meets you, and if you preſs
him, retires where he pleaſes, having an immenſe country behind
him, which furniſhes him with proviſions from every point of the
compaſs; whereas you are chained to New-York, you cannot fol.
low the enemy too far, becauſe you have not a ſufficient number
of horſes and carriages for that purpoſe; and moreover, the enemy
may attack your line behind you and cut off your army, or force
*.

i
º
you to retire. While he has an army in the field, you cannot ſº
parate yours, without the greateſt danger, twenty miles from New

º
J : York. If within the ſuppoſed circle, or any other circle, there
was a capital fortreſs, your line of operation is of courſe determined
4.
; between New-York and ſuch a fortreſs, in which caſe you march
and ačt on that line, the enemy muſt follow you or anticipate you,
he muſt fight you or let you take the place : , whereas, as things
!ºº 4. now are, you are reduced to marching, and counter-marching, ad
ſ
*
! vancing and retiring within a circle a whole campaign, even for
twenty campaigns, without a poſſibility of bringing the enemy to a
deciſive ačtion, which the principles of an offenſive war require, or
of fixing yourſelves on any one point. After much trouble and loſs
you muſt neceſſarily return to New-York, and ſo on for twenty
campaigns, unleſs you or the enemy, totally exhauſted, give up
the quarrel for want of means to keep it up.
Z

WHAT
-f}

: ſ
º
*
;
º º

ſºº T
 O F: A MERICA. 185

What I have ſaid of New-York, is equally applicable to any

other point from Boſton to Georgia, and, indeed, to every other
coaſt in the world. If your enemy can keep the field, if the country
is open, extenſive, and deſtitute of fortreſſes, within reach of the i *

ſhore and the harbour you occupy, you can never carry on a war
with ſucceſs. The hiſtory of all wars, and of all expeditions, the º -

ſix fruitleſs campaigns we have made in America, confirm the truth !

of our principles. - - - º

Yet by the fingular poſition of this country, the poſſeſſion of -

Canada, the ſuperiority of our fleet, and the activity of his majeſty's
miniſters, I think, that notwithſtanding the difficulties which ariſe - - i -

from the diſtance, the face of the country, and the nature of the
war, it might with the forces, which have been ſent into that coun
try, have been concluded in one campaign with glory and ſucceſs.

The head, the heart, and ſupport of that rebellion, revolt, in

ſurre&tion (do not diſpute with me about names) are the four pro
vinces included between. Hudſon's River arid Boſton: if we could
or can ſubdue theſe four provinces, the war is at an end. . . . . . *

Ler us therefore examine, whether with an army of thirty or

forty thouſand men, ſupported by a powerful fleet, we could or can
conquer theſe provinces I ſay we could, and always can ; if we.
can be maſters of Boſton; from that harbour draw a line to Albany,
-

or ſome given point on Hudſon's River, not far from it, which
is 150 miles, a corps, of ſix or eight thouſand men advance from
Canada towards Albany, leaving Hudſon's River always on the
right; take poſſeſſion of Rhode-Iſland and of Newport on the Con
tinent, with as many men; chiefly light troops, with very few
field-pieces, and ſome howitzers, and as few carriages as poſſible;
the more light horſe the better, becauſe they can forage at a great.
A a. diſtance - -
 . 186 OF AM ER IC A.

diſtance, and ačt with vigour and celerity. The main army,
twenty thouſand men, at Boſton. If this army advances to Hud
ſon's River; I ſay, that another of equal goodneſs and force cannot
º -

prevent it, if the enemy leaves that river, and goes to meet you to
wards Boſton, one or both of the above-mentioned corps from taking.
poſſeſſion of Albany, and of ſome other poſts upon it, and by mov
ing about and avoiding a general action, he is ſurrounded and muſt
periſh. If he beats your main army, or quits his line of operation,
to purſue either of the above-mentioned corps, he cannot avoid his
fate. It is evident, that the more he advances on the line, from
Hudſon's River towards Boſton, the more certain is his ruin, for
this reaſon; an army ačting upon one line muſt relinquiſh it, if the
| enemy can oppoſe it in front, and at the ſame time on its flank and
reaſ,

IN ſhort, to conquer America, you muſt draw a line from Boſton

to Albany, and ad on that line in the manner we have propoſed: all
operations on lines, drawn from the coaſt into the country, from
Boſton to Charles-Town, will prove hereafter, as they have already
done, unſucceſsful. -

B N D of T H E S E CO. N. D. PART,
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