Towards a Multidimensional Concept of Rationality: The Sociological Perspective

Author(s): Nikolai Genov

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 206-211
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 Towards a Multidimensional Concept of Rationality:
The Sociological Perspective
NIKOLAI GENOV

In the works of Max Weber alone, one may come across more than a dozen meanings
of "rational." The term "rationality" can be easily replaced by terms like "logical
consistency," "empirical proof," "critical attitude," "effectiveness," "optimiza-
tion," and many others (Bunge 1987). Does the abundance of connotations imply
that there is no real problem of rationality? Is it in fact meaningless to speak about the
concept of rationality? Should we prefer to avoid the term?
This problem-situation is the background of numerous recent studies on rationality
in the fields of sociology and related disciplines (Agassi and Jarvie 1987; Barry and
Hardin 1982; Genov 1986a; Hindess 1988; Kizima 1985; Lash and Whimster 1987;
Schnadelbach 1984). The common message of the studies is that the available con-
cepts are not differentiated and systematic enough to cover this complex subject. I
will argue that the concept of rationality as a coherent, univocal idea which bears on
practice should not be abandoned; rather, it needs to be replaced by an adequately
multi-dimensional concept.

RATIONALLY DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY

Action is always a problem-solving activity. It is precisely in the co

problem-solving activity where the problem of rationality arises and whe
discussed (Kekes 1987). The rationality concept that is needed must
complex parameters of the problem-solving activity. At the highest l
ization, its causal chain of conditions, means, ends, and results has
elements:

Becoming aware of the objective problem situation and formulating the problem
requiring solution;
Defining the field of possible or desired solutions and making decisions about the
proper program for problem solving;
Implementing the program, and controlling and correcting its course;
Analyzing and evaluating results (cf. Kizima 1985, p. 70).

The next step is to elaborate on this general conceptual framework to reach the level of
theoretical concretization that is needed in sociological descriptions and explanations
and in the management of practical action.
Several dimensions may be identified. One may start with the obvious point that the
solution of any technological, economic, political, or cultural problem is achieved by
means of the direct or indirect interaction of individual and/or collective actors. The
model of the "economic man" making precise calculations about the types and degrees
of his or her utility and about the best choice among alternatives of action still
dominates a number of modern conceptions of rationality. In our age of

Sociological Theory 9:2 Fall 1991

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 207

organizations, however, it is difficult to deny the capacity of coll

problems and to exhibit all the features of rationality in planning and p
(Hindess 1988, pp. 42f). Yet there are good reasons to insist on the distin
the individual and the collective rationality-that is, between the r
individual and of collective actors.
The very definition of a problem situation and of the problem-solving strategy
depends closely on the structure of ends of the actors involved in the problem-solving
activity. Some ends are relatively autonomous (ultimate) and others are subordinate
(instrumental). In the course of every problem-solving activity is undoubtedly a con
tinuous interplay between the requirements of autonomous or strategic and instru-
mental or tactical rationality.
Another distinction arises between the current and the more distant time perspec-
tives. The prevalence of either the present type of rationality, oriented towards current
events and achievements, or of prospective rationality, oriented towards need satis-
faction in the more distant future, determines the goals and the course of every partic-
ular problem-solving activity, as well as the definition of the problem, the range of
possible or desirable solutions, and the choice of strategy and tactics.
Another crucial dimension of the problem-solving activity is the balancing of its
cognitive and its practical goals and means, and thus of its cognitive and its practica
rationality as well. Reaching cognitive and practical goals usually requires cognitive
and practical means together. Technological innovations require research, and research
needs practical experimental devices. The development of science is related not only to
technological efficiency but also to the internal rationality of culture. This situation
poses problems, such as the extent to which a cultural orientation may itself be regarded
as "rational," "irrational," or "non-rational" (Habermas 1984, pp. 218ff).
In the course of implementing an accepted strategy for problem solving, two more
dimensions of rationality come to the fore. The first is the distinction between proces-
sual rationality, characterizing the problem-solving process itself, and resultative
rationality, characterizing its intermediary and final results. The production of a
good might be rationalized by introducing a more effective assembly line, but the
satisfaction of a need might be rationalized by making a more sophisticated product
on the existing assembly line. The second dimension is the distinction between
synchronic rationality, rationality at a particular moment in a problem-solving activity,
and diachronic rationality, relating to the interchange between currents in the course
of the activity. The effort to reach the maximum efficiency of problem solving may be
quite detrimental if the complex of activities is unbalanced.
As a rule, many actors are directly or indirectly involved in a given situation. Hence
one may ask about rationality for a specific actor (from both an objective and a
subjective point of view) and rationality for the situation. What is highly rational for
one particular actor may undermine the rationality of other actors involved in the
situation and thus of the problem-solving situation itself.
This fact leads to a final pair of concepts. One can distinguish clearly between
subjective rationality, involving to the specific view point of any participant in the
situation of problem solving, and the objective rationality of the impartial observer,
usually associated with science in modern societies.
Problem-solving activity may be defined as fully rational only when it is prepared

The distinction is a focal point of intensive debates on the conditioning of individual rationality by the
requirements of collective action and on the aggregation of the more or less rational decisions and actions of
individuals into collective rationality. According to the theorem of possibility this cannot occur (Olson 1982).
Cases of well-prepared and effective collective action do occur, however, and they require a proper explanation.

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208 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

and carried out consciously and effectively at all stages of problem solving and in all
its analytical dimensions. The deviations from the maximum possible degree of aware-
ness during the preparation of activity because of illness, affect, influences of tradi-
tion, of other factors mark forms and degrees of irrationality of action in the given
context. Deviations from the ideal type of maximal effectiveness of the intermediary
and end results of problem solving mark the forms and degrees of its nonrationality.
Because the forms and degrees of irrationality and nonrationality of action are basi-
cally functions of the existing systems of social relations (social systems) and are
incorporated into such systems, rationality is a characteristic not only of social action
but also of social systems (Genov 1986b). It is the capacity to make and implement
decisions under the conditions of choice and risk in accordance with knowledge about
the actors and the situation and in accordance with the requirements of logical consist-
ency and effectiveness in the course of preparing, implementing, controlling, and eva-
luating the problem-solving activity, the result of which is the increase of the adaptive
capacity of social systems.
The point of the optimal action and adaptation is deliberately not included in the
above definition, although it is a common element in most conceptions of rationality.
I assume it is more important to focus on the divergent forms and degrees of problem
solving than on the ideal type of the optimal solution. This does not mean, however,
that the image of an optimal solution cannot be extremely helpful in specific cases of
research and practical evaluation.

SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE RATIONALITY CONCEPT

Concepts of rationality are used for various purposes. Despite their lack o
they reflect fundamental features of social reality. According to the intellectual
tradition, the concepts of rationality are typically used in cognitive contexts. The
concept developed in the present paper is designed to provide the framework for a
systematic analysis of achievements and failures in solving cognitive and practical
problems. Systematic description and explanation open the way to evaluative applica-
tions. The various existing concepts of rationality are used as normative standards,
often in the practical regulation of social processes. This revised multidimensional
concept may be put to the same uses.
All of the dimensions of rationality figure in the controlled change which is the
typical way of solving social problems in modern societies. Tensions and conflicts in
work organization, in education, or at the level of global development are approached
in basically the same manner as problems that require planned, organized change
(Bishop 1986; Genov 1990; Robert and Weiss 1988; Starke 1990, pp. 13ff). Thus the
problem of rationality in innovations is not a special and isolated field of research, but
is exemplary. It focuses on fundamental features of contemporary ways of thinking
and behavior, and on the achievements and tensions of modern social organization.
An influential tradition is linked closely with the idea of the prevalence of individual
rationality in innovation: the ideas and deeds of the great individual who takes the role
of the innovator and dramatically changes his or her social milieu. The same indivi-
dualistic assumptions dominate recent research on social innovations in the frame-
work of "rational choice" theory. The key idea in both cases is that the degrees and
the forms of rationality of individual actors determine the rationality in and of a given
innovation process.
The traditional rival to the individualistic approach holds that the course of a social

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THE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 209

innovation should be explained primarily by means of a model of

and conflicts in which the needs, interests, and actions of collective
porated. The topic of the rationality and irrationality of social struc
elaborated far less than the problem of the rationality of the individ
innovations.
Even sociologists who are predisposed to methodological individualism insist tha
the kind of change which will be brought about and routinized in a social system does
not depend exclusively on the decision of individuals and that the character of change
is a function of the system itself (Boudon 1984, p. 177). On the other hand, col-
lectivistic and structuralistic approaches tend to incorporate ideas of theoretical an
methodological individualism in their explanations of the making of histor
(Callinicos 1988), so there is a promising prospect of synthesis.
The same prospect of synthesis may be seen in the interpretation of rationality
for the actor and for the situation, in coordination between the individual or the
collective innovator and the other actors involved in the situation. The patterns of
thinking and behavior that are functional in developed countries may turn out to be
destructive for a less highly developed social system which is the target of a well-
intended "rational" innovator. Here the problem of rationality clearly has political
and moral implications, and pertains to decision-making and its management of
policy.
Also relevant is an adequate analysis and evaluation of the relationship between the
ultimate and the instrumental ends of the actors involved in the innovation. The
pragmatic avoidance of debate serves to concentrate analysis on the instrumental
ends of organizational change. Yet the pragmatic approach has its limitations. For
instance, the increase of organizational rationality in mass production is often fol-
lowed by a decrease in the level of conscious acceptance of decision and action on the
part of individuals. The result is the instrumentalization of work motivation. The
movement for humanization of work and the development of autonomous work teams
are intended to remedy the instrumentalization of work by strengthening individual
participation and responsibility in decision making and in implementing decisions
(Szell 1988).
The analysis of ultimate and instrumental ends unavoidably focuses on the cognitive
and the practical dimensions of social innovations. Indeed, without a rational cognitive
preparation there is no social innovation in the sense in which the term is used here.
Nor is there any social innovation without a practical change. The key point is the
influential tendency to identify criteria of rationality with the patterns of ration-
ality characteristic of modern science. The "strong" rationality concept is hardly
applicable in the realistic analysis and evaluation of innovations because the life-world
of controlled change is not necessarily governed by patterns of scientific argumenta-
tion. Yet it is also one-sided to opt for the practical effectiveness of change, notwith-
standing the quality of the cognitive preparation and the control of a given innovation.
In this context, one may insist on the "continuity of rationality" of cognitive and
practical action (Luhmann 1990, p. 494).
To determine the degree of cognitive and practical rationality of an innovation, one
also needs a proper time perspective. The point is not only that the innovation may be
"too little, too late," but also that it might satisfy current needs at the expense of
long-term strategic needs and goals of individuals, groups, organizations, or societies.
The problem is essentially that of balancing present and prospective rationality in
innovations and in sociological reflection on those innovations.
The distinction between synchronic and diachronic rationality offers a more

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210 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

specific perspective for approaching this task. What factors determine and modify
the course of the innovation? Do the preliminary results correspond to the strategy
of the innovation? Do the end results eliminate the problem that was to be solved
by the innovation? Do the results open or block the way to further innovations?
These questions may be answered most effectively where a clear-cut distinction may
be made between the subjective rationality of the actors involved in a given innova-
tion and an objective point of view based firmly on the requirements of scientific
rationality.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The discussion of rationality is not focused on a pseudoproblem. On t

rationality is of key importance for the explanation and the practical r
social action and social systems. Sociology consequently must contribute
ceptualization. It also should be said, however, that the sociological appr
development of a systematic and differentiated concept of rationality c
the contribution of other sciences. Indeed, the problem of rationality re
disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches.
When applied to substantive problems of sociological theory, the mult
concept of rationality is of great heuristic value, as shown here in connectio
problem of innovation. Whatever the specific field and content of a give
might be, its explanation must answer questions about the rationality of
uals, groups, and organizations involved in the innovation, about the sp
nality of the innovation process itself, about its preliminary and end result
Thus the concept of differentiated rationality provides the framework for
approach to the innovation under scrutiny. An internal coherence of descrip
explanations is achieved in this way.
Finally, in combining the cognitive and the practical parameters of
rationality concept developed and applied in this paper opens the way to the
mation of "rationality" explanations into rational social technologies. Th
may be able to exert a stronger influence on determining the criteria for s
lity and on their application (Lepsius 1989). I say not to announce the co
age of reason but to insist that the complex problems of our age could b
more effectively by means of a systematic concept of rationality, gu
sociological ideas.

REFERENCES

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Genov, Nikolai. 1986a. Rationality and Sociology. Sofia: Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of
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