Sofia Ormazabal Arriagada

Pachamama as an expression of Panpsychism in Andean thought

I. Introduction

In this paper I seek to draw an analogy between the Western notion of Panpsychism and the

Andean concept of Pachamama. Furthermore, I intend to answer if Pachamama is an expression of

Panpsychism within the framework of Andean cosmology. By Panpsychism I mean the philosophical

view that argues that all matter has a mind, at least in some degree. By Pachamama, I make use of the

Aymara-Quechua concept, which stands for both time and space. However, within that time and space

framework, Pachamama includes all physical things and phenomena, together with their spirits, minds,

or vital force.

I intend to provide an account of how Andean thought has sought to answer the mind-body

problem, and has arrived to a solution that has a strong resemblance to the Western philosophy doctrine

of Panpsychism. By pointing out common features between the two points of view, I will show that

Pachamama is perfectly consistent with at least one form of Panpsychism.

II. Western Panpsychism:

Panpsychism is normally defined as “the view that all things have a mind or mind-like quality”

(Skrbina 2007). However, as noted by Skrbina, Panpsychism does not define precisely what a mind is,

rather, it is the choice of the Philosopher endorsing or criticizing Panpsychism to propose a particular

concept of mind that accommodates to his or her version of Panpsychism. As a result, there can be

dualist, functionalist, or reductionist “flavors” of Panpsychism. Despite this lack of consensus,

Panpsychists define mind as something that can exist in very diverse kinds of organisms, a concept that

is broad enough to be applied to humans, animals, plants and other beings.

 There is no agreement among Panpsychists about the characteristics and abilities that a mind

should possess. However, some selected features seem to be present in most Panpsychism views. For

the sake of this paper, “Mind” (or mental qualities) is to be understood as an internal process, or a

united collection of processes, of an entity, that allow that entity to have subjective experiences

(Panexperentialism), qualia, will (Schopenhauer 1819, p. 37), feelings, and sentience (Pansensism)

(Diderot 1769, p.49).

Another issue that divides Panpsychists is the scope to which “all things” (Skrbina 2007)

applies. Some Panpsychists argue that “all things” applies to the whole cosmos, others, to closed

systems, such as the Earth, or to a particular biosphere. Other philosophers, such as Leibniz(Leibniz , )

endorse the view that even our constituent elements, such as atoms, or even electrons, have some

degree of mind. Some others impose more restrictive qualities and claim that “mind” only applies to

“all things” that are alive. David Chalmers goes one step further and proposes to draw a line between

Panpsychism and one of its particular variations, which he calls “Panprotopsychism.”

Panprotopsychism is a refined kind of Panpsychism in which all fundamental elements of

matter have certain properties that are prerequisites for something to have a mind. In his own words,

Panprotopsychism is “the view that fundamental entities are proto-conscious, that is, that they have

certain special properties that are precursors to consciousness and that can collectively constitute

consciousness in larger systems” (Chalmers 2012, p.2).

For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on a particular kind of Panpsychism named Spinozist

psycho-physical parallelism(Skrbina 2007). Spinoza's psycho-physical parallelism, or just Spinozist

parallelism, is the view by which all kinds of matter, inert or alive, have some degree of mind, or some

ongoing process that can be defined as mental (Spinoza, Ethics, II Prop 3). This definition of

Panpsychism is applicable to a “macro” scope: closed systems, conformed by entities that interact with

each other, and to a “micro” or “monadic” scope: the basic elements of matter, or “monads” in Leibniz'
theory of the Science of monads (Leibniz 1989, p139).

By accepting the proposition that the basic elements of matter have some degree of mind, and

that these basic elements can be added up and conform a united system, which also would qualify as

having a mind, we arrive at two powerful conclusions. First, we can conclude that mind is not an

emergent property, since mind is present in all level of matter. And second, we could say that mind

exhibits compositionality, that is, less complex elements can be combined and structured producing a

new and more complex element. It is important to know that the basic elements do not lose their own

degree of mind, they continue to exhibit mind-like qualities. In addition, when the system is

dismembered, the constituent parts do not lose their own mental qualities, it is only the system that

loses both its status of system and its mental attributes.

Panpsychism is theory about the presence and distribution of mind, mental states, or mental

capabilities in all matter, human and non-human organisms. Although Panpsychism is compatible with

both materialistic and dualistic theories of mind, it is in conflict with Emergentism. Mind is seen as a

fundamental property of all matter, thus, Panpsychism is in conflict with theories that conceive the

mind as a emergent property.

Andean thought's “Pachamama”:

Pachamama is an Aymara and Quechua word which usually refers to the Earth in a divine sense,

as in “Mother Earth.” However, Pachamama is not an anthropomorphic deity, rather, it is the

“fundamental explanatory principle of in the South American native people's cosmovision” (Merlino &

Rabey 1933). Pacha can stand for time, space, world, or cosmos. Thus, Pachamama is a time-space

material and spiritual dimension that encompasses all the humans, living creatures, material things, and

other phenomena in the cosmos. In addition, all of these elements have a spiritual and physical

dimension, which is also part of Pachamama. If we analyze the spiritual element of each entity that
belongs to Pachamama, we will find that the properties of this “soul” or “spirit”, such as sentience or

subjective experience, are also qualities that we would regard as mental. Thus, we can say that all the

entities that belong to Pachamama have a mind.

Pachamama can be regarded as a system conformed by the individual entities that are a part of

it. Each of these entities has a mind, and Pachamama has a mind herself. In Andean thought's

cosmology, we observe a case of both Panentheism and Animism. I shall proceed to explain why these

two aspects are not incompatible with Panpsychism.

First, lets take a look at Panentheism. Panentheism claims that there is only one god whose

spirit is present in all things. Every spirit is the god's spirit. In simple words, every entity shares the

single spirit of the god. This entails that the god's mind would be shared by all the things as well,

hence, there would only be one mind, and the individual elements would not have an independent

mind. In contrast, according to Panpsychism every entity has a mind of its own. These minds can

constitute a system which conforms a more complex mind. But still, this complex mind is a product of

the different simpler minds put together, and serves as a sort of “central processing unit”, rather than

one single mind that is shared by all.

On the other hand, Andean cosmology does picture the minds of the simpler constituents of

Pachamama in an Animistic way. Therefore, all matter is seen as having a human-like mind. This

entails that every object would be equally capable of sensing, feeling, hoping, and creating as a human

is. Although this vision is highly unlikely and difficult to defend, it is still perfectly consistent with

Panpsychism's basic requirements, although not with Protopanpsychism's.

Pachamama is one of the pillar concepts of Andean cosmology. As a product of Quechua and

Aymara thinkers, it provides a holistic approach to the mind-body problem, by proposing that there is a

god-like being that possesses a soul that is made out of all the individual souls of all material elements,

and acts as a intercommunicated system where all these souls interact and act as a whole.
 Is Pachamama a kind of Panpsychism?

Both Panpsychism and Pachamama propose that all existing things have a mind. However, there

are subtle differences between the two doctrines, in respect to the kind of things regarded as “minded”

and to the complexity of the mind attributed. Moreover, not every kind of Panpsychism is compatible

with Pachamama, as the later presupposes that the mind attributed to an object is equally complex as a

human mind.

In addition, both concepts belong to different philosophical frameworks. Panpsychism is an

unlikely offspring of the Western tradition, as Western philosophers tend to focus on analyzing

phenomena from the “divide et impera” (“divide and conquer”) point of view ( Estermann 2004, p.9).

Thus, Western though tends to look at systems from a “bottom-up” perspective, looking at fundamental

elements and properties first, and then focusing on the overall behavior or characteristics of a

phenomenon or a system. This particular way of thinking makes a view like Panpsychism, which

assumes some degree of universality among all matter, seem outrageous.

On the other hand, Andean though, like many Eastern philosophies, tends to look at events as a

whole, and then peels off the higher levels of complexity of the phenomenon, in order to understand the

less complex processes or components of the event. Andean thinkers evaluate systems from a “top-

down” perspective. This mindset fosters ideas such as Panpsychism, where the whole is more important

than the part.

In addition, Andean thought still preserves many elements from archaic cosmologies and

beliefs, which have been blended with Western notions in a process called Syncretism. As a

consequence, concepts like Pachamama are inherited by younger generations which are raised in a

Western-like environment. And these new generations give the old native cosmological terms

modernized definitions and interpretations, that are coherent with a Western-like framework. An

example of this situation would be certain kinds of Eco-Philosophy that base their beliefs in statements

such as “(Mind) was in nature in the very beginning” (Skrbina 2011), and refer to the Earth as “Mother
Earth”, or Pachamama in the communities near the Andes, even though they have no direct contact

with the people who regard Pachamama as a cosmological concept.

Another important difference is the fact that for Panpsychism to be a feasible theory, and stand

against more widely accepted theories of mind, it must let go of the idea that all entities have equally

complex minds, as Pachamama says. As Chalmers and Skrbina point out: as the complexity of the

organism or system declines, mental faculties should decline and be simplified too. According to these

philosophers' view, it would not be possible for an amoeba to have the same mental states that a college

student has. In contrast, according to Pachamama, these two beings would be able to have the same

kind of mental states.

Setting aside these differences, we can clearly see that Pachamama would correspond to an

early kind of Panpsychism, as the ones proposed by philosophers such as Leibniz, Spinoza or Bruno. I

pointed out the word “early” as a way to draw attention to the fact that these kinds of Panpsychism

refer to souls rather than minds, in contrast with the predominance of mind in the current concept of

Panpsychism. For example, Spinoza's parallelism refers explicitly to the presence of souls, and not

strictly to the presence of minds, as a contemporary Panpsychist would do so. Furthermore, early

Panpsychism shares the animistic characteristics present in Pachamama. For instance, in Leibniz'

science of monads, monads can have appetites and perceptions, abilities we would now attribute to a

human-like mind.

One criticism against the idea that Pachamama is a kind of Panpsychism could be the fact that

Andean thought would be normally classified as a religious cosmology, rather than a philosophy, on the

grounds that it refers more to the origin of the world and creatures, and proposes a whole theory of how

the world was created and how it is currently organized. But if we examine a theory like Leibniz' who

claims that the world is made of elemental, and “souled”, particles we also have an explanation of the

origin of the world. Furthermore, if we examine views like those of Empedocles, Anaxagoras or

Heraclitus we can notice the pattern: the formulation of a Panpsychist theory requires to make
cosmological statements. Panpsychism is not only a theory about minds, but also a theory about all

matter.

Conclusion:

The purpose of this paper is to point out common elements in two geographically, culturally,

and chronologically distant philosophies. This comparison focused on the topic of Panpsychism, and

intended to show that Pachamama can be considered as a specific kind of Panpsychism.

First, I gave a broad description of Panpsychism and its most salient features. As well, I

provided an account of the two fundamental questions in order to define a Panpsychist view: what is

considered a mind, and to which extent does the principle of “mind is present in all things” apply. Then,

I described one variety of Panpsychism, Spinoza's Psycho-physical parallelism, the view by which

every object has two modes: a mode of extension and a mode of thought. This idea entails that every

object has a mind, or something mind-like, and a physical extension. As well, if we ascribe to

Panpsychism, we have to assume that mind is not an emergent property, that mental states and systems

can be combined to form more complicated systems, and that the mental cannot be separated from the

physical.

Following the topic of Panpsychism I focused on identifying the main characteristics of

Pachamama. Pachamama is a basic principle in the Andean cultures' explanation of the origin of the

world, and its current structure and natural laws. As well, it proposes a view that addresses the mind-

body problem, by attributing a soul, hence a mind, to all matter. Like many early cosmologies, Andean

though has a strong Animistic view of matter, which leads this philosophy to attribute human complex

minds to much simpler elements of matter. Pachamama perceives every kind of matter, living or non

living as having a human-like mind.

In addition, Pachamama can be erroneously perceived as a kind of Panentheism. While

Pachamama has a religious component, and plays the role of uniting all existing matter, Pachamama is
not the only being endowed with a soul. Rather, Pachamama is the name for a system which establishes

relations, and serves as an “umbrella” soul for all the other, less complex souls. According to Andean

thought, every element has its own soul, while Panentheism discards this idea, and claims that God is

the only being with a soul. Moreover, God's soul is distributed along different levels of matter, so that

every material element has God's soul in it. In short, in Pachamama every object has its own soul, while

in Panentheism everything shares the same soul.

Pachamama can be seen as a subset of Panpsychism, as it complies with the basic requirements

of the later: it provides a soul for every living and non living being. In addition, Pachamama is also

compatible with Spinozist psycho-physical parallelism and Leibniz' science of monads. With the first

theory, because Pachamama does attribute mental qualities or an “extension of thought” to every

element in the cosmos. And with the second theory, because Pachamama conceives even the least

complex items as “minded”, allows compositionality, and the creation of more complicated systems

that behave as one when looked according to its macro-features.

By comparing Pachamama and Panpsychism, one is able to appreciate the distinct approaches

which different cultures give to the mind body problem. As a result of this comparison, I realized that

the native thinkers of the Andes were not so distant from their Western counterparts, and that the mind-

body problem has been always crucial for our understanding of the cosmos and our own nature. I this

paper I described how the topic of the distribution of the mind of different beings has been addressed

by different cultures, and that they surprisingly share many aspects of their respective visions.

As shown above, Pachamama complies, not with one, but at least with two kinds of

Panpsychism. And even more analogies can be found if we compare Pachamama with earlier theories,

such as those of the Pre-Socratic thinkers. As a result, I would encourage enthusiasts and critics of

Panpsychism to look at all the non commonly studied cultural frameworks that postulate theories about

the distribution of mind and matter, so that they can get a further understanding of the problems and

solutions a view like Panpsychism offers.

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