THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1650. September 29, 2009.]

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1195-RTJ)

MARGIE CORPUS MACIAS , complainant, vs . MARIANO JOAQUIN S.

MACIAS, Presiding Judge, Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte , respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA , J : p

This involves an administrative complaint 1 led by complainant Margie C.

Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint
was led on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge of
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
Complainant alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit
liaison and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and
in her early 20s. The relationship continued until the time of the ling of the complaint.
Complainant enumerated some of the abuses committed by respondent, to wit:
(a) [Respondent] has been using court personnel, namely, Emmanuel
"Botiong" Tenefrancia, process server, as constant escort of his paramour in
going to their appointed trysts or in escorting back said woman to the place where
she is staying, and as errand boy seeing to their needs when respondent and his
mistress are together;

(b) Respondent has been using another court employee in the person
of Camilo Bandivas, court sheriff, as contact person to his young lover and in
summoning and bringing complainant's witnesses to respondent to be harassed
and threatened;

(c) Said Judilyn Seranillos, respondent's lover, has been brought many
times by respondent to his court in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte, thereby
scandalizing court personnel and lawyers, who sometimes must wait for the
session to start because respondent and his mistress are not yet through with
each other; That the scandalous relations of respondent with his mistress is an
open secret among lawyers, court personnel and litigants [in] Liloy, Zamboanga
del Norte; AHCcET

(d) Respondent has not been calendaring (sic) cases nor holding court
sessions nor court hearings on Mondays and Fridays so that he can have an
extended date with his paramour, to the great prejudice of public service;
(e) Respondent and his paramour had often met at the house of
Zoosima (sic) Ojano Carangan, aunt of respondent's paramour, [in] Taway, Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur, and the people of Taway know that respondent judge, who
usually arrives in his car, has been shamelessly and immorally carrying on an
illicit affair with said Judilyn Seranillos. Some inquisitive people usually go out of
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 their houses upon seeing respondent's car parked at the house of the aunt of
respondent's young mistress, and these barrio folks often watch respondent come
and go; [and]

(f) Respondent has one or two other women lovers whom he

shamelessly cavorts even in the presence of court personnel. 2

Complainant attached the a davits of Shem Tabotabo, 3 Zacarias Cordova, 4

Zosima Carangan, 5 Danny Layogue and Consolacion S. Layogue, 6 her son Marictibert
Corpus Macias, 7 Ruben Perater, 8 Roel Mutia, 9 and Aniceto Zozobrado. 1 0 However,
five of them — Tabotabo, 1 1 Cordova, 1 2 Carangan, 1 3 Danny Layogue, 1 4 and Marictibert
Macias 1 5 — later recanted their affidavits.
On August 20, 2001, this Court issued a Resolution 1 6 referring the complaint to
Court of Appeals Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. for investigation, report and
recommendation. On October 29, 2001, Justice Rosario issued an Order 1 7 setting the
initial hearing on November 27, 28 and 29, 2001 and requiring the parties to submit a
list of their respective witnesses and documentary evidence. The hearing was, however,
reset to January 28, 29, 30, and 31, 2002 upon motion of complainant. On January 28,
2002, the parties informed the Investigating Justice that they were exerting all efforts
for a possible reconciliation. Upon motion by both parties, the hearing was again reset
to March 11, 12, 13, and 14, 2002.
On March 11, 2002, the parties again informed the Investigating Justice of their
desire to confer in a last effort to settle. The request was again granted with an order
that both parties should be ready the following day if no settlement was reached. The
following day, March 12, 2002, the scheduled hearing proceeded after the parties failed
to reach any amicable settlement.
From a list of seven (7) witnesses, complainant manifested that only four (4)
witnesses shall be presented. The rst witness, Roel Mutia, testi ed that he was hired
by complainant's son, Marquinjo Macias, to tail Judge Macias after suspecting that his
father was having an illicit affair. In summary, Mutia testi ed that he saw Judge Macias
and Seranillos enter a house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of October 17, 1999, and
that both dined and spent the night there together inside one bedroom. 1 8 He said that
he accompanied Marquinjo and complainant the next day to the said house and that he
saw complainant pull Seranillos outside the house creating a commotion within the
neighborhood. 1 9 On cross-examination, Mutia admitted that he was not sure if
Seranillos did spend the night inside the said house, or whether she left that night and
just returned the following morning. Counsel for respondent also pointed to Mutia that
the spot where he positioned himself, while observing Judge Macias, was blocked by
leaves and tall trees. 2 0 TECIaH

The next witness for complainant was Aniceto Zozobrado. He testi ed that he
was hired by Seranillos to drive a motorcycle which, according to her, was a gift from
Judge Macias. He said that he saw Judge Macias visit Seranillos on three (3)
occasions; that he ran errands for both Judge Macias and Seranillos; and that he was
slapped once by Judge Macias for allegedly peeping at Seranillos. 2 1 On cross-
examination, Zozobrado admitted that he was not really sure if the motorcycle he saw
was actually owned by Seranillos, and that his statement was based merely on
presumption. 2 2 He also admitted that he had been residing with complainant's counsel
since the date he executed his affidavit against Judge Macias. 2 3
The third witness, Engracio Dialo, Jr., was not allowed to testify after
respondent's counsel objected because the intended testimony would cover an event
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 that took place after the ling of the complaint, and Dialo's a davit narrated matters
that were not covered by the allegations in the complaint. 2 4 Complainant manifested
her intention to le a motion to amend the complaint. 2 5 The Investigating Justice
ordered the direct examination of the fourth witness, complainant Margie Macias,
without prejudice to her presenting Dialo after the motion to amend the complaint shall
have been resolved. Complainant, however, refused, saying that she would testify only
after Dialo had testi ed. 2 6 The Investigating Justice warned complainant that her
refusal to testify shall be taken as a waiver of her right to present further witnesses and
evidence. 2 7 Despite the warning, complainant refused to proceed with her direct
testimony. The Investigating Justice ordered complainant to rest her case, but she
again refused.
The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied the allegations
of Mutia and Zozobrado. He said that complainant also led a complaint for
concubinage against him, but the same was dismissed by the Regional State
Prosecutor for lack of su cient evidence. He believed that complainant's accusations
were brought about by her psychiatric condition characterized as severe paranoia. 2 8
On April 25, 2002, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and
Recommendation 2 9 to this Court. He recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that complainant failed to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of immorality, or that
his conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating Justice,
however, recommended that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great
care and circumspection in his actions. 3 0
The case now comes before this Court for final resolution.
There are two basic questions that must be resolved. First, considering the
nding of the Investigating Justice, we ask: is it really necessary that administrative
complaints against members of the judiciary be disposed of only after adducing
evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? And second, do the acts
complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge? IcHDCS

I.
In several cases, 3 1 this Court has ruled that if what is imputed to a respondent
judge connotes a misconduct that, if proven, would result in dismissal from the bench,
then the quantum of proof necessary to support the administrative charges or to
establish grounds for the removal of a judicial officer should be more than substantial.
The rst case involving an administrative complaint led against a judge in this
jurisdiction was decided in 1922 in In re Impeachment of Horrilleno. 3 2 There, Justice
Malcolm explained:
The procedure for the impeachment of judges of rst instance
has heretofore not been well de ned. The Supreme Court has not yet
adopted rules of procedure , as it is authorized to do by law. In practice, it is
usual for the court to require that charges made against a judge of rst instance
shall be presented in due form and sworn to; thereafter, to give the respondent
judge an opportunity to answer; thereafter, if the explanation of the respondent be
deemed satisfactory, to le (sic) the charges without further annoyance for the
judge; while if the charges establish a prima facie case, they are referred to the
Attorney-General who acts for the court in conducting an inquiry into the conduct
of the respondent judge. On the conclusion of the Attorney-General's
investigation, a hearing is had before the court en banc and it sits in judgment to
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 determine if su cient cause exists involving the serious misconduct or
ine ciency of the respondent judge as warrants the court in recommending his
removal to the Governor-General.
Impeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in other
jurisdictions , to be in their nature highly penal in character and to be governed
by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. The charges must, therefore, be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 3

With Horilleno, it became necessary for every complainant to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt despite the fact that the case will only involve an administrative, and
not a criminal, complaint. The reason is explained, albeit scarcely, in Alcuizar v. Carpio:
34

While substantial evidence would ordinarily su ce to support a nding of

guilt, the rule is a bit different where the proceedings involve judges
charged with grave offense . Administrative proceedings against judges are, by
nature, highly penal in character and are to be governed by the rules applicable to
criminal cases. 3 5

In more recent rulings, however, the Court applied substantial evidence as the
normative quantum of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against
judges. In order to diffuse confusion, a clari cation has to be made. First, the
pronouncements in Horilleno and Alcuizar may be said to have been superseded by the
Court's recent rulings in Gutierrez v. Belen, 3 6 Reyes v. Paderanga, 3 7 and Naval v.
Panday. 3 8
Second, members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the
eld of public service as to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative
cases led against them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the
responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to a higher standard of integrity,
probity and morality. SaCDTA

When we dismiss a public o cer or employee from his position or o ce for the
commission of a grave offense in connection with his o ce, we merely require that the
complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we
require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish
liability. 3 9 There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof
when we deal with cases filed against judges.
Judges play a vital role in the dispensation of justice. In this jurisdiction, the
integrity demanded of a judge does not commence only when he dons the habiliments
of a magistrate or ends when he sheds off his judicial robe. The nature of the position
requires nothing less than a 24-hour daily obeisance to this mandate of integrity. Any
judge who cannot live up to this exacting requirement has no business sitting on the
bench. Considering the proliferation of complaints of abuses and immorality
committed by judges, it is only proper that the Court be ever vigilant in requiring
impeccable conduct from the members of its bench.
II.
However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove,
by substantial evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is
the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing
the averments of her complaint. 4 0 If complainant fails to discharge this burden,
respondent cannot be held liable for the charge. 4 1
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 Under Sections 8 and 11 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a judge found guilty of
immorality can be dismissed from the service, if still in the active service, or may forfeit
all or part of his retirement bene ts, if already retired, and disquali ed from
reinstatement or appointment to any public o ce including government-owned or
controlled corporations. 4 2 We have already ruled that if a judge is to be disciplined for
a grave offense, the evidence against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. 4 3 This quantum of evidence, complainant failed to satisfy.
The testimonies of Mutia and Zozobrado are specious and insu cient to
convincingly prove that respondent committed disreputable conduct. This considered,
complainant should not have refused to testify during the hearing. More than anyone
else, it was complainant who had a direct interest in making sure that the evidence
adduced met the necessary burden of proof, considering that the allegations in her
complaint involved charges that cannot be lightly dealt with. She should have been
more zealous in prosecuting her complaint.
Nevertheless, we agree with the ndings of the Investigating Justice that
although the charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be
completely exonerated. 4 4 Mutia's testimony that he saw Judge Macias having dinner
with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge
of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge
Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming
conduct, a light offense punishable by a ne not less than P1,000.00 but not more than
P10,000.00. 4 5 In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge
Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we nd it
reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00. ECTIcS

WHEREFORE , premises considered, the administrative complaint for immorality

and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against respondent Judge
Mariano Joaquin S. Macias of RTC, Branch 28, of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte is
DISMISSED for insu ciency of evidence. However, respondent is held administratively
liable for UNBECOMING CONDUCT and FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED .
Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 6-12.

2. Id. at 8-9.
3. Id. at 29-31.
4. Id. at 34.
5. Id. at 39-42.
6. Id. at 47-52.
7. Id. at 53.

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 8. Id. at 32-33.
9. Id. at 35-38.
10. Id. at 43-46.
11. Id. at 95.
12. Id. at 155-156, 157-158.
13. Id. at 159-160.
14. Id. at 165-167.
15. Id. at 220.
16. Id. at 309.
17. Id. at 350.
18. Rollo, Vol. 2, pp. 174-176.
19. Id. at 176-177.
20. Id. at 177-178.
21. Id. at 178-179.
22. Id. at 179-180.
23. Id. at 180.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 181.
27. Id. at 182.
28. Id. at 182-183.
29. Id. at 168-191.
30. Id. at 190.
31. Alcuizar v. Carpio, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2068, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 216; Duduaco v.
Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1601, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428; Reyes v.
Mangino, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1575, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 27; Layola v. Gabo, Jr.,
A.M. No. RTJ-00-1524, January 26, 2000, 323 SCRA 348; Castaños v. Escaño, Jr., A.M.
No. RTJ-93-955, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 174. But see Gutierrez v. Belen, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2118, June 26 2008, 555 SCRA 424; Reyes v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1973,
March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 244; Naval v. Panday, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1283, December 21,
1999, 321 SCRA 290.
32. 43 Phil. 212 (1922).
33. Id. at 215. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
34. Supra note 31.
35. Id. at 225. (Emphasis supplied.)
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 36. Supra note 31.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 673 (2002), citing Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente, 339
SCRA 154, 159-160.
40. Reyes v. Paderanga, supra note 31, at 252.
41. Id.
42. RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Secs. 8 and 11, provide in part:

SEC. 8. Serious charges. — Serious charges include:

xxx xxx xxx
8. Immorality;
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 11. Sanctions. — A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but
not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

43. Cañada v. Suerte, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1884, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 414, 423.
44. Rollo, Vol. II, p. 187.
45. RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Secs. 10 and 11.

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