COCA-COLA v BACOLOD SALES FORCE

In the context of labor law, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial
third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by such
parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and
binding. However, in view of the nature of their functions, voluntary arbitrators act in a
quasi-judicial capacity; hence, their judgments or final orders which are declared final
by law are not so exempt from judicial review when so warranted. "Any agreement
stipulating that 'the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and unappealable' and
'that no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any part
of the arbitrator's award may be availed of' cannot be held to preclude in proper
cases the power of judicial review which is inherent in courts."
Case law holds that the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator's or a
Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators' decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules[41] on questions of fact, of law, mixed questions of fact
and law,[42] or a mistake of judgment.[43] However, in several cases, the Court allowed the
filing of a petition for certiorari from the VA's judgment to the CA under Rule 65 of the
same Rules, where the VA was averred to have acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
LISONDRA v MEGACRAFT INTL CORPORATION

Since "technical rules of procedure are not to be strictly interpreted and apmanner
that would defeat substantial justice or be unduly detrimental to the work force," the
Court may opt to relax these rules "in order to give full meaning to the constitutional
mandate of affording full protection to labor."

What is at stake in this case is petitioner's livelihood itself. The Court cannot allow the
same to be taken away from her without even a chance at a full and judicious review
of the case by the Court of Appeals. Thus, there is a need to apply such leniency in
this case in order to serve the ends of justice.
WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION v CA

General rule: A defective certification or no verification is not a ground for dismissal.

-The Court will require the party to submit verification to comply with the requisites.

-The case will be dismissed if the verification submitted is also defective.

"Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct." Here, there was no substantial compliance with the
verification requirement as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private
respondents actually swore to the truth of the allegations in the petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of competent evidence of any
of their identities.
LRTA v ALVAREZ

G.R: GOCC not covered by NLRC in employment cases

The same factual setting, (save for the identity of private respondents) and issues
raised in this case also obtained in Light Rail Transit Authority v.
Mendoza51 (Mendoza). In that case, this Court ruled that LRTA is solidarily liable for
the remaining fifty percent (50%) of the respondents' separation pay. The doctrine
of stare decisis, therefore, warrants the dismissal of this petition. The rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue where the same questions
relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Thus, the Court's ruling in
Mendoza regarding LRTA's solidary liability for respondents' monetary claims arising
from the very same AMO-LRTS which private respondents sought to enforce in the
proceedings a quo applies to the present case. Consequently, LRTA's appeal must
be dismissed.
HOEGH FLEET SERVICES PHILS INC v TURALLO

there are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary
and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to
the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his
agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed
indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a
litigation. The instances where these may be awarded are those enumerated in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof which pertains to actions for
recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have
agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as
part thereof. The extraordinary concept of attorney's fees is the one contemplated in
Article 111 of the Labor Code. This is awarded by the court to the successful party to
be paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages sustained by the former in
prosecuting, through counsel, his cause in court.
TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY v PAJARON

The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to
comply with this requirement renders the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and
executory. This indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure
the workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given
to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is further meant to
discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of their
obligations to the employees."

However, the Court, in special and justified circumstances, has relaxed the
requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal on
technical considerations to give way to equity and justice. Thus, under Section 6 of
Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, the reduction of the appeal
bond is allowed, subject to the following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond
shall be based on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount (10%) in
relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant. Compliance with these two
conditions will stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal.
TOLENTINO-PRIETO v ELVAS

Article 229 of the Labor Code mandates that appeals from the judgment of the LA
which involve a monetary award may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

These statutory and regulatory provisions explicitly provide that an appeal from the
LA to the NLRC must be perfected within 10 calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards or orders of the LA. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the
appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee;
(2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company; and (3)
filing of a memorandum of appeal.

Both the NLRC and the CA found good faith on the part of respondents, stating that
the filing of the alleged fake bond was without their knowledge and that they did not
purposely post a spurious bond. We adhere to a strict application of Article 229 of the
Labor Code when appellants do not post an appeal bond at all; but here an appeal
bond was actually filed. Strict application of the rules is therefore uncalled for.
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP v VECO

Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be
filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution"
sought to be assailed. The provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied,
indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to
the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing a
pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. 

The Union admittedly/received on August 18, 2011 the NLRC's July 29, 2011
Resolution, which denied their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's June 30,
2011 Decision. Therefore, the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari
ended on October 1 7, 2011. But the certiorari petition was filed one day after, or on
October 18, 2011. Thus, petitioners' failure to file said petition within the required 60-
day period rendered the NLRC's Decision and Resolution impervious to any attack
through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, and no court can exercise jurisdiction to
review the same. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the ends of justice
would be better subserved by allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one day late.
When the law fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one (61)
days

QUANTUM FOODS INC v ESLOYO

It bears stressing that the reduction of the bond provided thereunder is not a matter of
right on the part of the movant and its grant still lies within the sound discretion of the
NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds and the reasonableness of the bond
tendered under the circumstances. The requirement on the existence of a
"meritorious ground" delves on the worth of the parties' arguments, taking into
account their respective rights and the circumstances that attend the case.

Case law has held that for purposes of justifying the reduction of the appeal
bond, the merit referred to may pertain to (a) an appellant's lack of financial
capability to pay the full amount of the bond, or (b) the merits of the main
appeal such as when there is a valid claim that there was no illegal dismissal to
justify the award, the absence of an employer-employee relationship, prescription of
claims, and other similarly valid issues that are raised in the appeal.
It should be emphasized that the NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion
to reduce bond, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
UST v SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST

"Preliminarily, the Court stresses the distinct approach in reviewing a CA's ruling in a
labor case. In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the correctness of the CA' s
Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65.
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law. In ruling for legal
correctness, the Court views the CA Decision in the same context that the petition
for certiorari  was presented to the CA. Hence, the Court has to examine the CA's
Decision from the prism of whether the CA correctly determined the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision."

"In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when its
findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, which refers to
that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence and the
applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the
CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition."

SESSION DELIGHTS ICE CREAM AND FAST FOODS v CA

Had the case involved a pure money claim for a specific sum (e.g. salary for a
specific period) or a specific benefit (e.g. 13th month pay for a specific year) made by
a former employee, the labor arbiter’s computation would admittedly have continuing
currency because the sum is specific and any variation may only be on the interests
that may run from the finality of the decision ordering the payment of the specific
sum.

In contrast with a ruling on a specific pure money claim, is a claim that relates to
status (as in this case, where the claim is the legality of the termination of the
employment relationship). In this type of cases, the decision or ruling is essentially
declaratory of the status and of the rights, obligations and monetary consequences
that flow from the declared status (in this case, the payment of separation pay and
backwages and attorney’s fees when illegal dismissal is found). When this type of
decision is executed, what is primarily implemented is the declaratory finding on the
status and the rights and obligations of the parties therein; the arising monetary
consequences from the declaration only follow as component of the parties’ rights
and obligations.

Under the terms of the decision under execution, no essential change is made by a
re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of
the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. A re-computation (or an original
computation, if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law –
specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this
provision – that is read into the decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case,
the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of
the Labor Code. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon
execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final
decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation
of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of
the principle of immutability of final judgments.
MSMG-UWP v RAMOS

While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees expelled by the union
for disloyalty under the union security clause of the collective bargaining agreement
upon the recommendation by the union, this dismissal should not be done hastily and
summarily thereby eroding the employees' right to due process, self-organization and
security of tenure. The enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law
provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness, and always with due
process. Even on the assumption that the federation had valid grounds to expel the
union officers, due process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate
hearing by respondent company.
While it is true that the issue of expulsion of the local union officers is originally
between the local union and the federation, hence, intra-union in character, the issue
was later on converted into a termination dispute when the company dismissed the
petitioners from work without the benefit of a separate notice and hearing.

Although the issue of whether or not the federation had reasonable grounds to expel
the petitioner union officers is properly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, being an intra-union conflict, this Court deems it
justifiable that such issue be nonetheless ruled upon, as the Labor Arbiter did, for to
remand the same to the Bureau of Labor Relations would be to intolerably delay the
case.

A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or declare its
autonomy. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve
the interests of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its
autonomy from the federation to which it belongs when circumstances warrant, in
accordance with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. Thus, a local
union which has affiliated itself with a federation is free to sever such affiliation
anytime and such disaffiliation cannot be considered disloyalty. In the absence of
specific provisions in the federation's constitution prohibiting disaffiliation or the
declaration of autonomy of a local union, a local may dissociate with its parent union.

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP v SECRETARY OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT

But while Article 257 directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an
unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election
must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242 enumerates the exclusive
rights of a legitimate labor organization among which is the right to be certified as the
exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires
legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR.

A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon

submission of the following to the BLR: 1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its
issuance by the labor federation or national union, and 2) The constitution and by-
laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local
or chapter, and attested to by its president.

Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not
become a legitimate labor organization. In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary
of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under oath is fatal to its
acquisition of a legitimate status.

The mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of
an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to
serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed
by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the
petition for certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent,
the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which must be a
legitimate labor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate status
of the mother union.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v MANDAUE PACKING PRODUCTS PLANTS

Clearly under the present rules, the first step to be undertaken in the creation of a
chartered local is the issuance of a charter certificate by the duly registered
federation or national union. Said federation or national union is then obligated to
report to the Regional Office the creation of such chartered local, attaching thereto
the charter certificate it had earlier issued.

Old Rule: the local/chapter acquires legal personality from the date of the filing of the
complete documentary requirements, and not from the issuance of a certification to
such effect by the Regional Office or Bureau.

A labor organization is deemed to have acquired legal personality only on the date of
issuance of its certificate of registration, which takes place only after the Bureau of
Labor Relations or its Regional Offices has undertaken an evaluation process lasting
up until thirty (30) days, within which period it approves or denies the application. ,
the duty of the Bureau of Labor Relations to recognize the local/chapter upon the
submission of the documentary requirements is not ministerial, insofar as the Bureau
is obliged to adjudge the authenticity of the documents required to be submitted.

However, in ascertaining whether or not to recognize and register the local/chapter,

the Bureau or Regional Office should not look beyond the authenticity and due
execution of the documentary requirements for the creation of the local/chapter as
enumerated under Section 1, Rule VI, Book V of Department Order No. 9. Since the
proper submission of these documentary requirements is all that is necessary to
recognize a local/chapter, it is beyond the province of the Bureau or Regional Offices
to resort to other grounds as basis for denying legal recognition of the local/chapter.
SAMMA-LIKHA v SAMMA CORPORATION

The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-

claims, cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their
respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner
or applicant. A certification proceeding, even though initiated by a "petition," is not a
litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character. Such
proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring relief,
but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board's functions are not judicial
in nature, but are merely of an investigative character. The object of the proceedings is not
the decision of any alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted deprivation of rights but is
merely the determination of proper bargaining units and the ascertainment of the will and
choice of the employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining representative.
Legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned
only in an independent petition for cancellation of certificate of registration. Unless
petitioner’s union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue to
have all the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to petition for
certification election.

NUBE v PEMA

It is well settled that [l]abor unions may disaffiliate from their mother federations to
form a local or independent union only during the 60-day freedom period immediately
preceding the expiration of the CBA. However, such disaffiliation must be effected by
a majority of the members in the bargaining unit. Applying the foregoing
jurisprudence to the case at bar, it is difficult to believe that a justified disaffiliation
took place. While the record apparently shows that attempts at disaffiliation occurred
sometime in June of 2003 x x x the latest result of a certification election dated 17
October 2003 mooted such disaffiliation. Further, even if for the sake of argument an
attempt at disaffiliation occurred, the record is bereft of substantial evidence to
support a finding of effective disaffiliation. There might have been a mass withdrawal
of the union members from the NUBE-PNB Chapter. The record shows, however,
that only 289 out of 3,742 members shifted their allegiance from the mother union.
Hence, they constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have
successfully severed the local union’s affiliation with NUBE. Thus, since only a
minority of the members wanted disaffiliation as shown by the certification election, it
can be inferred that the majority of the members wanted the union to remain an
affiliate of the NUBE. There being no justified disaffiliation that took place, the
bargaining agent’s right under the provision of the CBA on Check-Off is unaffected
and still remained with the old NUBE-PNB Chapter.

The Bank cannot be faulted for not releasing union dues to NUBE at the time when
representation status issue was still being threshed out by proper governmental
authority. Prudence dictates the discontinuance of remittance of union dues to NUBE
under such circumstances was a legitimate exercise of management discretion
apparently in order to protect the Bank’s business interest. The suspension of the
check-off provision of the CBA, at the instance of the latter made in good faith, under
the present circumstances cannot give rise to a right of action. For having been
exercised without malice much less evil motive and for not causing actual loss to the
National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE), the same act of management [cannot]
be penalized.
ASSOCIATED WORKERS UNION-PTGWO v NLRC

While it is true that AWUM as a local union, being an entity separate and distinct from
AWU, is free to serve the interest of all its members and enjoys the freedom to disaffiliate,
such right to disaffiliate may be exercised, and is thus considered a protected labor
activity, only when warranted by circumstances. Generally, a labor union may disaffiliate
from the mother union to form a local or independent union only during the 60-day
freedom period  immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA.6 Even before the onset
of the freedom period (and despite the closed-shop provision in the CBA between the
mother union and management) disaffiliation may still be carried out, but such disaffiliation
must be effected by a majority of the members in the bargaining unit. This happens when
there is a substantial shift in allegiance on the part of the majority of the members of the
union. In such a case, however, the CBA continues to bind the members of the new or
disaffiliated and independent union up to the CBA's expiration date.
The record does not show that individual respondents had disaffiliated during the freedom
period. The record does, however, show that only eleven (11) members of AWU
(individual respondents) had decided to disaffiliate from AWU and form AWUM.
Respondent Metro had about 4,000 employees, and around 2,000 of these were members
of AWU. It is evident that individual respondents had failed to muster the necessary
majority in order to justify their disaffiliation.

GABRIEL v SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from
employees, deducts union dues or agency fees from the latter's wages and remits them
directly to the union. It assures continuous funding; for the labor organization. As this
Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off is primarily for the benefit of the union
and only indirectly for the individual employees.

Art. 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for union's
incidental expenses, attorney's fees and representation expenses. These are: 1)
authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at the general
membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretary's record of the minutes of the
meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by the
employees concerned. Clearly, attorney's fees may not be deducted or checked off from
any amount due to an employee without his written consent.

In the case at bar, there were no individual written check off authorizations by the
employees concerned and so the assessment cannot be legally deducted by their
employer. A written individual authorization duly signed by the employee concerned is a
condition sine qua non for such deduction. No deduction can be made from the salaries of
the concerned employees other than those mandated by law.

PEU v ESQUIVEL
The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully negotiated the CBA with
the employer is given the right to collect a reasonable fee called "agency fee" from non-
union members who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case they accept the
benefits under the CBA. The legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither
contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that
non-union employees may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment
conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. Labor Code mandates the submission of
three (3) documentary requisites in order to justify a valid levy of increased union dues.
These are: (a) an authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the members at
the general membership meeting duly called for the purpose; (b) the secretary's record of
the minutes of the meeting, which shall include the list of all members present, the votes
cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessment
or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for check-off duly signed by the
employees concerned. Jurisprudence states that the express consent of the employee to
any deduction in his compensation is required to be obtained in accordance with the steps
outlined by the law, which must be followed to the letter; however, PEU-NUWHRAIN
failed to comply. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that there is no legal basis to impose union
dues and agency fees more than that allowed in the expired CBA, i.e., at one percent
(1%) of the employee's monthly basic salary.
ASIA INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT v ASIAN INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT
FACULTY ASSOCIATION

In Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, this Court declared that "[i]n case
of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an
employer like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the union's
certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended."
On the basis of the ruling in the above-cited case, it can be said that petitioner was
correct in filing a petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration.
Petitioner's sole ground for seeking cancellation of respondent's certificate of
registration - that its members are managerial employees and for this reason, its
registration is thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article 245 of the
Labor Code which declares that managerial employees are ineligible to join any labor
organization --- is, in a sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of
misrepresentation for registering under the claim that its members are not managerial
employees.

REFORMIST UNION OF R.B. LINER, INC v NLRC

The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding upon the
private respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the
process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the
authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties,” and
as mode of arbitration where the parties are "compelled to accept the resolution of
their dispute through arbitration by the a third party." Clearly then, the legality of the
strike could no longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much less by the NLRC, as
this had already been resolved. It was the sole issue submitted for compulsory
arbitration by the private respondents.

The Labor Code provides that the decision in compulsory arbitration proceedings
"shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the
parties."

While we do not abandon the rule that "unfair labor practice acts are beyond and
outside the sphere of compromises.” the agreement herein was voluntarily entered
into and represents a reasonable settlement, thus it binds the parties.

USTFU v BITONIO, JR.

The election of union officers should be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the union's constitution and bylaws, as well as the Philippine Constitution and the Labor
Code. Specifically, while all legitimate faculty members of the University of Santo Tomas
(UST) belonging to a collective bargaining unit may take part in a duly convened
certification election, only bona fide members of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU) may
participate and vote in a legally called election for union officers. Mob hysteria, however
well-intentioned, is not a substitute for the rule of law.

Self-organization is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Philippine Constitution and the

Labor Code. Employees have the right to form, join or assist labor organizations for the
purpose of collective bargaining or for their mutual aid and protection. Whether employed
for a definite period or not, any employee shall be considered as such, beginning on his
first day of service, for purposes of membership in a labor union. Corollary to this right is
the prerogative not to join, affiliate with or assist a labor union. Therefore, to become a
union member, an employee must, as a rule, not only signify the intent to become one, but
also take some positive steps to realize that intent. The procedure for union membership
is usually embodied in the union's constitution and bylaws. An employee who becomes a
union member acquires the rights and the concomitant obligations that go with this new
status and becomes bound by the union's rules and regulations.

A union election is held pursuant to the union's constitution and bylaws, and the right to
vote in it is enjoyed only by union members. A union election should be distinguished from
a certification election, which is the process of determining, through secret ballot, the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, for
purposes of collective bargaining. Specifically, the purpose of a certification election is to
ascertain whether or not a majority of the employees wish to be represented by a labor
organization and, in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization.

In a certification election, all employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit can

vote. Therefore, a union member who likewise belongs to the appropriate bargaining unit
is entitled to vote in said election. However, the reverse is not always true; an employee
belonging to the appropriate bargaining unit but who is not a member of the union cannot
vote in the union election, unless otherwise authorized by the constitution and bylaws of
the union. Verily, union affairs and elections cannot be decided in a non-union activity.

TOYOTA MOTORS PHILIPPINE CORPORATION LABOR UNION v TOYOTA

If a labor organization’s application for registration is vitiated by falsification and

serious irregularities, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a
legitimate labor organization. And if a certificate of registration has been issued, the
propriety of its registration could be assailed directly through cancellation of
registration proceedings in accordance with Arts. 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, or
indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification
election. We believe the procedural requirements to impugn the registration by
petitioner were more than adequately complied with as shown in the 1997 case
of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation
Labor Union.

UPSU v LAGUESMA

A distinction exists between those who have the authority to devise, implement and
control strategic and operational policies (top and middle managers) and those
whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-and-file
employees of an organization (first-level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes
them from the rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of the employer
in supervising such rank-and-file employees.

reference was made to the distinction between managers per se (top managers and
middle managers) and supervisors (first-line managers). That distinction is evident in
the work of the route managers which sets them apart from supervisors in general.
Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating employees in line with set
tasks assigned to them, route managers are responsible for the success of the
company's main line of business through management of their respective sales
teams. Such management necessarily involves the planning, direction, operation and
evaluation of their individual teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not
entail.

Confidential employees. By the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a
confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who
exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations. As such, the rationale
behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or joint a labor union
equally applies to them.
because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict
of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership.

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION NATU v

INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining

agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in
connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding
individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the
employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees'
bargaining representative. the act of a company president in writing letters to the
strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union
membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his
employees' right to collective bargaining. It is likewise an act of interference for the
employer to send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time
specified therein, otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs.
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or
his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking,
constitutes unfair labor practice. All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor
practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an
activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.

H. ARONSON & CO., INC. v ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION

The true cause of the termination of the services of the complainants is their
membership with the Associated Labor Union and their union activities. This finding is
supported by the antecedent facts related above, that is, since its establishment in
1920 the only instance when the management of the H. Aronson & Company began
to find interference in the conduct of its business affairs was in 1958 when the
Associated Labor Union, to which the complainants are affiliated, declared two strikes
wherein the union decisively got what it wanted from the reluctant management.
Attempts were made by the management to break the majority then held by the
Union but it was not successful.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the Court of Industrial Relations had jurisdiction
over the case and the petitioners herein; that it correctly found petitioners guilty of
unfair labor practice.

VICTORIAS MILLING CO INC v VICTORIAS-MANAPLA WORKERS

ORGANIZATION-PAFLU
the dismissal of the employees by the respondent Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
was in pursuance of a clause of a agreement between said company and the Free
Farmers Union, which agreement became automatically renewed upon its expiration
on December 31, 1959, and before a new bargaining agreement could be arrived at,
the action of the respondent company in enforcing the terms of the closed-shop
agreement is a valid exercise for its rights and obligations under the contract. The
dismissal by virtue of thereof cannot constitute an unfair labor practice, as it was in
pursuance of an agreement that has been found to be regular and of a closed-shop
agreement which under our laws is valid and binding.

SWOFLU v UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION

Unfair labor practice not only involves acts that violate the right to self-organization
but also covers several acts enumerated in Article 259 of the Labor Code. Under this
provision, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice when it fails in its duty to
bargain in good faith. National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals
failed to consider the totality of respondent's acts, which showed that it violated its
duty to bargain collectively. This constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 259(g)
of the Labor Code. Respondent repeatedly refused to meet and bargain with
SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union, the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank-
and-file employees., claiming the effectivity of 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Respondent’s reliance on the 2002 CBA as basis for not negotiating with petitioners
is unjustified. Respondent's duty to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor
Union as the incumbent bargaining agent is clear.
The winning union had the option to either continue the existing collective bargaining
agreement or negotiate a new one. petitioners were justified in demanding a
renegotiation. Respondent was remiss in its duty when it repeatedly refused
negotiations with petitioners.
ZAMBRANO v PH CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers' right to organize. There
should be no dispute that all the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice in
essence relate to the workers' right to self-organization. Thus, an employer may only
be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in
whatever manner the right of his employees to self-organize. 

The general principle is that one who makes an allegation has the burden of proving
it. Although there are exceptions to this general rule, in the case of unfair labor
practice, the alleging party has the burden of proving it. The petitioners miserably
failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did not identify the acts of Phil
Carpet which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point
out the specific provisions which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the
Court pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground that
they were dismissed from employment simply because they were union officers and
members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice, however,
cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided
in favor of labor.
In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are
concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was an attempt at
union-busting. Hence, the charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of unfair labor practice
must fail for lack of merit.
AQUINO v NLRC
Separation pay is a statutory right, while retirement benefits may be granted by agreement
of the employees and their employer or as a voluntary act on the part of the employer.
After careful examination of the record, CBA and the Retirement Plan, it was found out
that no specific prohibition against the payment of both benefits to the employee. The
Court used the principle that any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved
in its favor. The Court feels that if the company really intended to make the separation pay
and the retirement benefits mutually exclusive, it should have sought inclusion of the
corresponding provision of the corresponding provision in the Retirement Plan and the
CBA as to remove all possible ambiguity regarding this matter. Petitioners are demanding
their rights. These rights are embodied in the CBA which was the result of negotiations
between the company and the employees. Bargaining is a process where the parties
discuss their demands and counter-demands and, after haggling, agree on what is
essentially a compromise reflecting the concessions mutually given by the parties to arrive
at a common understanding. The resultant contract provides for demandable rights not
withdrawable doles. When the employer signs a CBA, it recognizes the rights of the
workers and does not merely concede certain privileges to them out of goodness of its
heart. Petitioners are entitled to retirement benefits under the provisions of the CBA and
the Retirement Plan being binding instruments, not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO v CONFESOR

Magnolia and SMFI became distinct entities with separate juridical personalities. Thus,
they can not belong to a single bargaining unit. Moreover, in determining an appropriate
bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The
employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have
substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by
the type of work they performed. Considering the spin-offs, the companies would
consequently have their respective and distinctive concerns in terms of the nature of work,
wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment. Interests of employees in the
different companies perforce differ. SMC is engaged in the business of the beer
manufacturing. Magnolia is involved in the manufacturing and processing of diary
products while SMFI is involved in the production of feeds and the processing of chicken.
The nature of their products and scales of business may require different skills which must
necessarily be commensurated by different compensation packages. The different
companies may have different volumes of work and different working conditions. For such
reason, the employees of the different companies see the need to group themselves
together and organize themselves into distinctive and different groups. It would then be
best to have separate bargaining units for the different companies where the employees
can bargain separately according to their needs and according to their own working
conditions.

ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC v TORRES

Only the collective bargaining agent, the local union SLMCEA in this case, possesses
legal standing to negotiate with petitioner. A duly registered local union affiliated with
a national union or federation does not lose its legal personality or independence.
Appending "AFW" to the local union's name does not mean that the federation
absorbed the latter. No such merger can be construed. Rather, what is conveyed is
the idea of affiliation, with the local union and the larger national federation retaining
their separate personalities.

In the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity

of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Art. 263 (g) of Labor
Code, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity thereof.
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN v SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT

in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer who is requested to

bargain collectively may file a petition for certification election any time except upon a
clear showing that one of these two instances exists: (a) the petition is filed within one
year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result or (b) when a
bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become
the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout. While there is no question that the
petition for certification election was filed by the herein petitioner after almost four
years from the time of the certification election and, therefore, there is no question as
to the timeliness of the petition, the problem appears to lie in the fact that the
Secretary of Labor had found that a bargaining deadlock exists.
A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a
state of inaction or of neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions
(as in government or a voting body): standstill." 21 There is a deadlock when there is
a "complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed
forces; as, the deadlock of a jury or legislature. A thorough study of the records
reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" specially on the
part of the University. Its indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably
resulted in the failure of the parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that
unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the DWUEU-ALU, there was no
"counteraction" of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining
should be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of
the employer to respond in some manner to such acts. the Court is not inclined to
rule that there has been a deadlock or an impasse in the collective bargaining
process. As the Court earlier observed, there has not been a "reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining" on the part of the University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening
all possible avenues for the conclusion of an agreement, the record is replete with
evidence on the University’s reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to bargain with
the duly certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is that the
University evidently had no intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court
recognizes that technically, the University has the right to file the petition for
certification election as there was no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its
prayer that the herein assailed Orders be annulled would put an unjustified premium
on bad faith bargaining.

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED

INDUSTRIES v SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT

In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit, whether probationary or permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly
stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes
of collective bargaining." Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the employment
relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union binds all employees
in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent,
have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code
makes no distinction as to their employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting
the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the
bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the
"bargaining unit."

A certification election is the process of determining the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining, refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages, hours of work and
all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. 7

It is well-settled that under the so-called "double majority rule," for there to be a valid
certification election, majority of the bargaining unit must have voted AND the winning
union must have garnered majority of the valid votes cast.

A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2)
highest number of votes in a certification or consent election with three (3) or more
choices, where such a certified or consent election results in none of the three (3) or
more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total
number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number
of votes cast.