Theoretical Approaches To Normativity in Communication Research

Communication Theory ISSN 1050-3293
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Theoretical Approaches to Normativity

in Communication Research
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Liane Tessa Rothenberger1 , Claudia Auer1 , & Cornelius B. Pratt2
1 Institute of Media and Communication Science, Technische Universität Ilmenau, Germany
2 Strategic Communication, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Normativity is inarguably a major concept in the social sciences. Even so, social science
research seldom acknowledges its importance, its influence on research inquiries, and its
impact on the trajectories of communication science and on the scientists themselves. It
is against that background that this article calls for a better understanding of the role
of normativity in communication studies. In doing so, it analyzes Bourdieu’s theoretical
framework of field, habitus, and capital and how the intersection of all three concepts
helps explain and justify the importance of norms in communication research. Finally,
this article identifies differences between the norms of the orthodox and the heretics,
based on various schools of thought and on paradigms from both U.S. and German
communication–research histories.
Keywords: Pierre Bourdieu, Communication Research, Normativity, Norms.
doi:10.1111/comt.12103
The purpose of this article is to develop a case for acknowledging the pivotal role of
norms as a point of departure in rigorous communication–science research; for inte-
grating norms into communication discourses; and, most important, for ensuring that
the communication research process is both transparent and palpable. The theoretical
framework of Pierre Bourdieu lends itself for this purpose because, in his work (e.g.,
Bourdieu, 2004) he meticulously analyzes conditions of the scientific field. Field soci-
ology proposes a suitable alternative to structural and to actor-oriented approaches
(cf. Hess, 2011, p. 334). There is a constantly changing dynamic between the individu-
als or elements in interaction that play on the field and the field itself. “The field is the
analytical space defined by the interdependence of the entities that compose a struc-
ture of positions among which there are power relations” (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015,
p. 5). Reflection of normative influences is required to better understand the mech-
anisms and functionality of the scientific field. “For Bourdieu, to better understand
the conditions of the production of knowledge is a condition for producing better
knowledge” (Burawoy, 2012, p. 19). Bourdieu describes how science is influenced by
Corresponding author: Liane Tessa Rothenberger; e-mail: liane.rothenberger@tu-ilmenau.de
176 Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association

L. T. Rothenberger et al. Normativity in Communication Research
religious, political, economic, industrial, and bureaucratic powers as well as by the

media. Of course, if one thinks of genetics or military research, dependence on such
factors perhaps plays a more important role; nonetheless, communication studies are
no less affected by such a dependence.
Brosius (2003) views the social and political interest in media questions as a reason

for a “strong normative pressure” (p. 4111 ) that is imposed on the field. If, for example,
violence had been committed by a person who frequently played violence-themed
computer games or watched horror movies, then, results of cause–effect studies
on media exposure and behavioral outcomes would be required by political or
judicial agencies as evidence of the negative impact of such media consumption.
Furthermore, research on media reporting often follows a highly normative research
approach, opting, say, for freedom of the press or criticizing concentration of media
enterprises. These examples illustrate that communication scholars consistently
engage in norm-driven practices and demonstrate values designed specifically to
meet social goals and to respond to the public good; “the actual doings of academic
researchers … show that normative judgments are common enough” (Hansson,
2014, p. 113). In a less obvious way, all major theories—and, therefore, the scientists
who refer to them—“are subject to reservations regarding ideology and schools”
(Wiedemann & Meyen, 2013, p. 10). Such reservations manifest themselves as
skepticism toward dominant or marginal paradigms.
A more than an eclectic treatment of the topic requires a conceptual analysis as
presented here by introducing and applying Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, capital,
field, and distinction. The analysis is largely based on German and American histories
of communication scholarship, which may not be applicable to the situation in other
countries such as, for example, China (Waisbord & Mellado, 2014; Wang, 2014).
It focuses on how communicators are influenced by their respective fields, habi-
tus, and capital, relating to Bourdieu’s field theory. It suggests reasons for emphasizing
more transparency in normativity in communication studies, and avers that an appli-
cation of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework can help obtain more insight into norma-
tivity in communication science. It then addresses what happens when norms in our
field are challenged and who the orthodox communication scientists and the heretics
in our field are. We conclude by suggesting what the field can do to uncover the role
of normativity in communication scholarship.
Normativity: A blind spot in communication research

Scientists and thus also communication researchers hold socially shared mental or
verbalized imaginations of a desired and principally achievable future that can be
realized through respective actions. Selecting a certain theory, choosing the empirical
method, interpreting, and even analyzing data are explicitly or implicitly influenced
by those guiding principles or norms. If, for example, researchers analyze the fram-
ing of men and women or homosexuality and heterosexuality in media coverage, they
(explicitly or implicitly) assume that, according to the principle of equality, journalists
Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association 177

Normativity in Communication Research L. T. Rothenberger et al.
ought to report it in a nondiscriminatory, disinterested way. This “oughtness” mani-

fests and exemplifies normativity. “Normative means that explanations are based on
choices among cultural values and ultimately on some premises about the nature and
purposes of human existence” (Christians, Glasser, McQuail, Nordenstreng, & White,
2009, p. 19). Scientific theories often implicitly or explicitly indicate norms and relate

to prescriptions in the political, media, and social science systems. Yet, only seldom do
communication scientists reflect on the normative underpinnings of their work, and,
if they do, the depth varies to a large extent. Blumler and Cushion (2014, p. 263) state:
In journal articles there appears a wide divergence in the level of
empirical-normative reflection, i.e., the extent to which authors make normative
sense of their data. Although it is true that some authors provide more extended
discussions of the normative implications of their results, others tend to
conclude with mainly descriptive and cursory summations of their data sets.
Part of an explanation for that may be that very often researchers of “objective”
research are not aware of the different levels of normative influence. Instead, they are
afraid of damaging their allegedly “value-neutral” empiricism by too much norma-
tivity (cf. Althaus, 2012, p. 98). For this reason, they attempt to present their research
as objectively as possible. But social science texts do not represent an objective real-
ity (cf. Robbins, 2007, p. 778): “They express the orientations of selves whose iden-
tities and intellectual perspectives are shaped by the phenomena that they seek to
objectify.”2 Usually, the authors’ first attempt at a brief normative forecast can be
found at the end of an article. “Normative assertions about media performance often
appear as throwaway lines in an empirical study’s concluding discussion or as prepara-
tory throat-clearing before an empirical study is introduced” (Althaus, 2012, p. 97).
However, to make a normative assessment, one needs to cover a much wider range
of human behaviors. This means adhering to theories and paradigms and present-
ing perspectives from different schools of thought may result in revising, rejecting, or
approving certain phenomena or actions of social reality.
There are three kinds of norms that can inhere in communication scholarship: (a)
those of public value, (b) those of method, and (c) those of proper conduct.3 Regarding
norms of public value, many researchers acknowledge (implicitly) their devotion to
serve democracy. That is because the overwhelming majority of the authors publish-
ing in communication-science journals stems from Western democracies. Of course,
there are several normative theories of democracy (cf. Fishkin, 2009, p. 65) and the
adherence to normative values of democracy like political equality, deliberation, and
participation (Fishkin, 2009, p. 33) varies and can range from cognitively couched
ones, for instance in the engagement of an informed citizenry, with affective ones like
the “felt” affiliation, to a certain school of thought. However, there appears to be an
implicit consent on normative background across the inner field of communication
scholarship. And, if scholars acknowledge studies from other countries (e.g., China,
Nigeria, Russia, and Saudi Arabia), it is often with a wagging finger to identify the
wrongness, from the scholar’s viewpoint, in these countries’ professional or academic

practices (e.g., no liberal, no unfettered media in China; no envelope journalism in

Nigeria; no karam in Saudi Arabia). Thus, it is important that, at the outset of our
research, we reflect on our own normative foundation and research practices.
Normativity in regard to methods appears not obvious initially but might become
clear in the context of deliberation studies: They investigate deliberative democratic

norms and suppose that people have alternate opinions—whether asked individually
in a telephone survey or in a focus or discussion group. “In this effort to fuse norma-
tive and empirical research agendas, the trick is to identify a treatment condition that
embodies the appropriate normative relevance” (Fishkin, 2009, p. 27). Besides norms
related to proper scientific work, scientists face normative demands when commu-
nicating the relevance or value of their work to the public. In this regard, an area of
utmost concern in Western democracies is transparency in communication research
in regard to the production of knowledge. A rationale for that is indicated in pub-
lic deliberation and participation that must ideally “create a space for discussion in
which participants will feel that they are free from coercion, and can express views
that may not be popular or ask questions about assertions made by others” (Guttman,
2010, p. 174). It is the task of researchers, then, to find methods and settings in which
systematic discussion is encouraged.
For the third kind of norms, those of proper conduct (e.g., when presenting papers
at conferences), the pressures to conform are the normative corset: being determined
to avoid exceeding the time limit for one’s presentation or to show one’s respect toward
other scholars.
Need for more transparency on normative influences

A content analysis of 245 articles published from 1990 to 1992 in nine journals
affiliated with major scholarly and media organizations in the United States indi-
cated that mass communication researchers conformed relatively strongly to the
norms of three research traditions—social science, interpretive studies, and critical
analysis—and that there was some convergence among all three (Fink & Gantz,
1996). While researchers adhered strictly to their research traditions, they modified
their expectations to align with real-world research, and journal editors and reviewers
allowed cross-traditional inquiries. Social science research norms expect researchers
to state research questions and test hypotheses, to apply theories to their inquiries,
and to use probability-sampling techniques, whenever possible.
One could argue now that it would be superfluous to repeat continuously that
a certain research project is, for example, based on the principles of democracy,
in particular when it is received in a community that implicitly agrees with these
principles. Normative assessments of or conclusions drawn from empirical findings
are often similar to an enthymeme—an abbreviated syllogism. Althaus (2012), refer-
ring to Aristotle’s rhetoric, argues that people from one “field” will understand the
enthymeme used in that field. They can fill the premise demanded by the shortened
assumption because they come from the same normative school of thought. This

results in the fact that “although empirical studies often make normative claims,
empirical scholars may fail to recognize those claims as normative because the value
judgments are lurking in the background as unstated premises” (Althaus, 2012,
p. 109). Thus, normative backgrounds advance without the community realizing it.
However, other audiences may be excluded from following the analysis or argument.

Therefore, researchers should become more aware of their normative schools of
thought and make them transparent at the beginning of a research, which is, of
course, a metatheoretical, normative claim in itself.
“Normative assessment aims merely to identify the core assumptions underly-
ing statement of value that scholars use to assess the relevance or importance of
their empirical findings” (Althaus, 2012, p. 99). So, why do we follow certain norms?
Whence do they stem? Why are only some of them selected by certain groups? In other
words, we should question our own premises, our “field,” “habitus,” and “capital,”
because it is in these sociological categories by Bourdieu that we suggest analyzing
normativity in communication research. Even though “Bourdieu’s ideas are being
increasingly frequently applied to questions relating to media and communication”
(Park, 2014, p. 2), in regard to normativity, only the works of Huber (2010); Meyen
(2012, 2013); Wiedemann and Meyen (2013), as well as that of Wiedemann (2014)
provide the initial constellation of impulses that spark our interest in the subject.
Now, communication researchers are increasingly being tethered to the notion that
such an analytical framework can serve as a useful tool in analyzing scientific actions.
Bourdieu and normativity

Bourdieu raises a basic question: Why do people act in a certain way? In our words:
What are the social mechanisms that make communication research what it is? In
answering that question, Bourdieu describes the relationship between the individ-
ual actions of agents (i.e., scientists) and social structures. Each agent unites certain
dispositions; the individual life praxis is integrated into the given (institutionalized)
structure. The major thinking tools Bourdieu introduces for his explanation of the
embedment of an agent in society are habitus, social field, and capital.
Norms are seldom mentioned explicitly in Bourdieu’s works. Yet, what Bourdieu
(1995, p. 10) describes as “la conscience et la connaissance des possibilités et des
impossibilités inscrites dans l’espace des possibles,” we call normativity. It acts as a sys-
tem of constraints that restrains scientific revolution or subversive tendencies and as
a matrix for all suggestions of scientific solutions at a certain point in time. Bourdieu
(1995, p. 10) also speaks of moral prescriptions or proscriptions. Norms constrain
decisions within specific requirements of the field and regulate the scholars’ behavior.
Hence, they also function as justifications for the scholars’ actions and decisions (cf.
Lamont, 2009, p. 248).
One of Bourdieu’s rare statements on norms is that on the acquisition of those
capital components demanded by the field (e.g., cultural assets or doctoral degrees).
Actors following these demands “gain in legitimacy, … which entails feelings such as

being in the right, being within the framework of the norm just as you are” (Bourdieu,
1982, p. 359). To Bourdieu, norms are internalized as part of the habitus, stem from
the professional field, and are also placed in the field from the outside, for example,
by political regulations. “In Bourdieu’s theory, normativity is detectable as a funda-
mental category which determines the stratification mechanisms of social interaction”

(Recke, 2011, p. 167). The interaction on the level of the agents as well as on social
levels is characterized by norms. Recke places normativity in the trilogy of “norm,
rule, and practice as an interactional pattern” (Recke, 2011, p. 170) and regards it as
“converging principles” (Recke, 2011, p. 172). Therefore, it must be stated that not all
norms are reflected in rules or laws.
Objections that norms have no place in Bourdieu’s theories can be countered by
the fact that he always saw the agent as a socialized individual (macro–micro link)
and that norms (of all three kinds identified previously) are an immediate part of this
socialization. Normativity is expressed in norms of practice, and “explains the way
in which the selection of a specific norm from the vast variety of available norms in
a society or community is carried out in a specific situation by a particular individu-
al” (Recke, 2011, p. 167). In practice, norms are discursively negotiated. This is how
paradigms (see below) and schools of thought like the Chicago School or the Mainz
School are established through the practice of science, a paradigm being “the equiva-
lent of a language or a culture: it determines the questions that can be asked and those
that are excluded; the thinkable and the unthinkable” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 15).
Wiedemann (2014) argues that Bourdieu’s theory can be used “to portray the roots
of schools of thought” (p. 96) in Germany or in the United States. These schools of
thought are inherent in the habitus of the individual researcher. This, for example,
applies to the Catholic German communication scientist Emil Dovifat during the Nazi
regime and to the bourgeois Jürgen Habermas, Theodor W. Adorno’s research assis-
tant. Both were influenced by their mentors, by religion, and by the environment of
their upbringing.
Norms, normativity, and Bourdieu’s capital concept

The concept of capital serves to “determine the position of the agent in the social
space and the social classification struggles” (Wiedemann, 2014, p. 89). It encom-
passes not only economic capital, that is, resources or possessions that are convertible
to money, but also cultural (gained by education or by the acquisition of knowledge),
social (relationship networks acquired from social networks, e.g., appreciation), and
symbolic (prestige and overall reputation) capital (cf. Wiedemann, 2014, p. 89). In
sum, capital comprises the resources an agent acquired during the course of her or his
life that are necessary for action. Even more, a person’s capital can explain why two
individuals performing in the same field achieve different outcomes. It is responsible
for the distinction of their performance “in terms of a set of cultural and arbitrary
norms” (Claussen & Osborne, 2013, p. 62) and one has to possess the “right kind”
(p. 62) of it to arrive at the core positions in one’s field. Therefore, people strive for
capital to strengthen their position in the social field. They place so much effort in

accomplishing goals that their peers recognize and appreciate a scholar’s capital. In
these circumstances, the so-called “Matthew effect” might occur: Resources and pres-
tige have the tendency to go to those who already have them and there is a “bias in
favor of research that confirms commonly accepted theory, gender and ideological
bias” (Lamont, 2009, p. 246). Institutions and schools of thought actively distribute,

shape, and legitimize these normative barriers and traditions. This shows that theo-
ries, methods and skills are bound to normative traditions within the field.
According to Bourdieu (2004), “Scientific accounts aim to respect the ideal norms
of scientific protocol rather than describe what really happened” (p. 20). That is why
readers of scientific texts identify a predefined language as well as a similar structure
of journal articles: A scientific article has to adhere to normative rules that govern its
production. Furthermore, issues of “personal honesty, technical competence, institu-
tional affiliation, style of presentation and nationality” (p. 20) lead to the situation
“that if a discovery is made in a reputed laboratory at a prestigious university it has
more chance of being validated than if it emerges in another, less well-regarded one”
(p. 21).
Hess (2011) analyzed U.S. doctoral programs in history and social studies of sci-
ence and technology and found that there is indeed a normative influence reflected
in institutional prestige, topical interest, and an individual’s position and discipline.
The social capital of a department influences its prestige. It is also important to note
that dominant networks in science have the capacity of reproduction (cf. Hess, 2011,
p. 346). They produce students who later continue their work and pass on their norms
(the pipeline function). And this capacity is closely related to the volume of capital at
certain universities or departments.
The scientific capital is also closely linked to visibility, for example, having a recog-
nized name or being the first author on a manuscript. Burawoy (2012) describes the
U.S. academic world as “dominated by ideologies of consensus formation and peer
review” (p. 11). Similarly, in Germany, there was an obvious change from edited jour-
nals to the dictum of a rigorous double-blind peer-review process (Hanitzsch, 2016;
Langenbucher, 2016). And “peer review turns out to have an effect of reproducing
the structures of the discipline, since this system supports the field’s dominant agents
as well as the topics and methods, which are regarded as legitimate at the discipline’s
power pole.” (Meyen & Wiedemann, 2016, pp. 8–9) Capital is, therefore, a decisive
factor in regard to social power whether an agent can act in a certain way or not.
An agent receives positive reactions as an extension of her or his symbolic cap-
ital, if she or he behaves in a norm-conforming way. “Symbolic capital is the cap-
ital of recognition accumulated in the course of the whole history of prior struggles
(thus very strongly correlated to seniority)” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 396). Symbolic capital
can pertain to agents as well as collectives (cf. Bourdieu, 1999, p. 397). Even eco-
nomic capital may depend on the prevailing norms within a certain academic dis-
cipline. For instance, it often appears easier for communication scientists to receive
research grants for quantitative studies, because in the style of the natural sciences
this is regarded as the most desirable method (cf. Peiser, Hastall, & Donsbach, 2003,

p. 326). Accordingly, Altmeppen, Weigel, and Gebhard (2011) found that quantita-
tive research methods and procedures dominate current communication research.
“Quantitative methods and psychological approaches promised scientific authority”
(Meyen, 2012, p. 2378). The dominance of quantitative studies also showed that a
norm coined in the natural sciences was transplanted to the social sciences because

it was deemed as enabling more research outcomes. This also applies to communi-
cation science, as Brosius (2003) explicates: “Colleagues follow the research funds,
the allocation of which is oriented towards the latest and not towards systematic cri-
teria” (p. 414). Consequently, a connection with external funding may be assumed.
Therefore, Meyen (2012, p. 2393) calls grant money “economic and symbolic cap-
ital.” This setting explains the influence of normative requirements from research
grant-disbursing institutions (e.g., the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [German
Research Foundation] or the U.S. National Science Foundation or the National Insti-
tutes of Health), all of which encourage multidisciplinary approaches to scientific
investigations, such as the intersections of economics and politics, of politics and pub-
lic health, or of neurobiology and psychology. This is supported by findings from
Lamont (2009) who analyzed how decisions in funding panels (e.g., evaluation of
grant and fellowship proposals) are made—situations in which norms play a decisive
role (cf. p. 18). Lamont (2009) describes the evaluation processes in five U.S. funding
agencies’ work. From interviews with funding panelists, Lamont (2009) concludes as
follows: “The panelists’ sense of the legitimacy of the process is as tied to unwritten
customary rules that they themselves produced (and reproduce), as it is to broader
norms of universalism and professionalism” (p. 247). Enlarging Bourdieu’s perspec-
tive, who primarily focused on the cognitive aspects shaping such judgments, Lamont
stresses how personal taste, “gut feelings,” and emotions—“in particular pleasure,
saving face, and maintaining one’s self concept” (p. 20)—influence decisions during
the evaluation process. Claussen and Osborne (2013) also aver that “schemata, sen-
sibilities, dispositions, and tastes of the sociohistorical cultural contexts” (p. 63) that
individuals inhabit enable them to acquire their normative framework as indicated in
capital and habitus.
For members of the German Communication Association, Altmeppen et al.
(2011) found that at nearly 20%, the European Union and other European-subsidy
institutions are the most important providers of external funding. These institutions
expect a commitment to democratic, pro-European norms. Donors such as Volk-
swagen, Bosch, the Fulbright Fellowships, or Thyssen have their own norms as well.
Private firms can also be donors and, in this context, Bourdieu (2004) turns toward
the “logic of competition” that leads researchers to “combine and conjugate with
more or less constrained or willing submission to the interests of firms to let whole
areas of research drift little by little in the direction of heteronomy” (p. viii).
This procedure also has a negative impact on the development of the theoretical
frameworks of the discipline (academic field), “[b]ecause of this taken-for-granted
status”—and what Coddington (2012) asserts here when referring to Kuhn’s (1996)
paradigm concept is also applicable to norms—“paradigms [and the norms they

inherit, the authors] can function (often in tandem with professionalization) to limit
their communities’ range of inquiry, closing off issues and alternative approaches
that are not compatible with their form” (p. 379). Bourdieu (2004), who refers to
Kuhn in his book, Science of Science and reflexivity, draws on the discontinuities in
science and on “the internal conflict between orthodoxy and heresy, the defenders

of the paradigm and the innovators” (p. 15). Contrary to Kuhn, whom he critiques
for analyzing “the scientific world from a quasi-Durkheimian perspective, as a
community dominated by a central norm” (p. 15), Bourdieu searches for models
that explain change engendered not from within the field or from people who never-
theless have internalized the prevailing norms in an attempt to revolutionize them;
rather, Bourdieu also searches for causes of change from outside, raising questions
on the normative principles of those who could have evaluated or reviewed the work
(p. 16).4 Marxist–Leninist ideas in journalism research, for example, ended in Ger-
many along with the collapse of the German Democratic Republic. In sociology, to
draw upon another social scientific discipline, we are reminded of the heated debates
between critical sociology (public and policy-oriented, reformers, and activists) and
the radical professional establishment—“proponents of a scientific sociology and
an autonomous academic discourse” (McLaughlin, Kowalchuk, & Turcotte, 2005,
p. 135) concerned that sociology might be moving too close to Marxism.
Norms, normativity, and Bourdieu’s habitus concept

In Bourdieu’s (1993) words, habitus “refers to acquired properties, capital” (p. 21). It
comprises perception, thinking, and action schemes. They determine how the agent
perceives her or his environment, the theories used, and norms embraced. Thus, it is a
type of Weltanschauung that comprises internalized norms that guide one’s behavior;
“the habitus is an acquired set of dispositions that shapes, and is shaped by an individ-
ual’s actions and experiences” (Funk, 2009, p. 11). In unforeseen situations, actors rely
on their habitus, channeling perceptions and making them individually digestible. It
is the “product of the social position” (Wiedemann, 2014, p. 88), thereby indicating
where the agent is positioned in society. It is some type of “feel for the game” for play-
ing the game on the field–and part of the (implicit or explicit) rules or norms of the
game. Thus, there is a mutual influence between habitus and norms.
This can be further explained by the fact that Bourdieu conceives the habitus as
being somewhat two sides of the same coin (cf. Wiedemann, 2014). He writes that
habitus constructs and structures society (construction, modus operandi, i.e., how and
why agents act), but at the same time is determined by it because social structures are
internalized by the agent (determination, opus operatum, i.e., dispositions and social-
ization). Bourdieu (1982) describes the opus operatum as congealed experience. Here,
certain behavioral schemata congeal to conceptions of norms. Accordingly, norms
have an effect on the habitus and become part of it; in other words, actors adapt to the
prevailing norms (opus operatum), but they also introduce their own norms into the
appropriate field, depending on their current capital (modus operandi).

The habitus, a set of incorporated dispositions, is acquired during the individ-

ual’s course of socialization when “the agent internalizes, according to his milieu and
trajectory, the objective rules that govern the social world (and in particular the func-
tioning of a field)” (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 17). The more the habitus corresponds
to the rules of the field, the better the agent will feel in his position in the field and will

distinguish himself from others that merely follow the demands of the field without
“having” them in their habitus (cf. Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 17). The agent will move
on easily and gain more recognition, so that, consequently, “the process of change in
the service of the preservation of the structures of positions is sociologically more
probably than change oriented towards transforming them” (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015,
p. 16). However, change is possible when an agent sets new norms, suggests another
perception of certain issues and, thereby, entrains field fellows in whom the wish for
subversion has already latently existed (cf. Hilgers & Mangez, 2015).
The habitus can be modified, allowing for variations: The habitus is understood
as a system of durable dispositions that is generated by the social structures of the
environment (Bourdieu, 1976). Within dispositions, an individual can freely make
decisions to act. Dispositions are already learned at an early age. The agent grows up in
certain social structures and assimilates the demeanor offered by them. There is a cer-
tain amount of closure in social structure that facilitates the implementation of social
norms. Thus, the actions of an agent are governed, constrained, and shaped by these
norms (Coleman, 1988). Gender, upbringing, prevailing spirit of the times, teachers,
type of school, and many other similar forces have an impact on the formation of the
habitus and create the perception and evaluation categories of the agent.
Sentiments are an element closely intertwined with habitus. They can influ-
ence decisions such as identifying a study’s theoretical or conceptual framework as
Gouldner (1970) explains by using Marxism as an example. In his pivotal book The
coming crisis of western sociology (1970), he advocates that neutral and objective
science, moral discourse, and political or social engagement cannot be separated—or
compartmentalized. Even for Bourdieu himself, his “scholarly career went hand
in hand with public engagement” (Burawoy, 2012, p. 16), as in his attitude against
the violence of colonialism. Shared sentiments shape the pedagogic and research
relevance of a theory.
Whether or not it ‘should be,’ social theory is always rooted in the theorist’s
experiences. Whether or not it should be, the sensed validity of a theory depends
therefore upon the sharing of experience and of the sentiments to which such
experience gives rise, among those who offer and those who listen to the theory.
(Gouldner, 1970, p. 8)
Sometimes, such a positive feeling toward a theory or scholarly school is even
rooted in personalities like the followers of Habermas, Weber, and Adorno. This also
results in a sometimes positive, sometimes critical dependence of junior scholars on
senior professors. Domain assumptions are usually taught by the senior, more ortho-
dox scholars. Differences in experiences with orthodoxies or with heretics can lead

to a change in habitus and to a subjective attachment to certain topics—one reason

not all categories of scientists follow the same parable. Affect or sentiments some-
times stand in contrast to existential and normative values or domain assumptions
(cf. Gouldner, 1970, p. 38). Revisiting the seemingly threadbare example of Marxism,
some researchers view it as an outlier theory in our field, even as they appear attracted

to it. Sometimes, actors do not make their deviant feelings public in their peer group
because they are concerned about being marginalized. Attitudes and evolution of
Marxist theory in the former Soviet Union’s academic world, for example, was at total
variance with the development in the United States, as was the rise and commitment
to functional theory (cf. Gouldner, 1970). Furthermore, Marxism is more relevant in
South Africa because of the historical conditions and upbringings of disparate gener-
ations (Burawoy & von Holdt, 2012).
While the social background and upbringing have an influence on the future tra-
jectory (trajectoire), a great number of these trajectories are open (Bourdieu, 1982).
It is no doubt possible to distinguish families of trajectories, with, in particular,

the opposition between on the one hand, the ‘central’ players, the orthodox, the
continuers of normal science, and, on the other hand, the marginal, the heretics,
the innovators, who are often situated on the boundaries of their disciplines
(which they sometimes cross) or who create new disciplines on the boundaries
of several fields. (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 43)
In communication research, for example, critical studies far removed from con-
ventions of strict naturalistic sciences (Lemert, 1974) have come from within the
boundaries of the field and its fractured subdisciplines such as feminist studies or
gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and queer research. It is these subdisciplines that
have long been making a case for normativity or for (at least) an understanding of
the necessity of normativity in all scientific work. The Ethnicity and Race in Com-
munication Division of the International Communication Association, for example,
states: “The division also works to advocate for the improved status, representation
and opportunities for underrepresented scholars in communication” (International
Communication Association, n.d.). It is obvious that the collective trajectory of a
group is not always consistent with that of an individual; group changes may occur,
for example.
Norms, normativity, and Bourdieu’s field concept

Norms are general in that they do not address individuals, but all community mem-
bers who share a specific feature (cf. Stemmer, 2008); in our case, that means commu-
nication scientists. That is where Bourdieu’s term field (champ) comes into play.
The field is a specific social microcosm (cf. Bourdieu, 2004) and has relations to
other fields such as economics or politics. For the field of communication studies, for
example, it is the relation to academic peers that counts, not that to the lay public to
whom the outcomes of academic research should be directed. Each field has a specific

structure and thus conflicts of interest can arise. Each field rests subject to explicit
rules but also to “des régulations automatiques, comme celles qui résultent du contrôle
croisé entre les concurrents” (Bourdieu, 1995, pp. 3–4; original emphasis).
A field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions
anchored in certain forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of

historical relations ‘deposited’ within individual bodies in the form of mental
and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action. (Wacquant,
1992, p. 16)
As noted earlier, social interactions play an important role in the assignment and
negotiation of norms. They occur in what Bourdieu refers to as field. Horizontally, it
comprises the different spheres of social life such as private and professional life, and
vertically, different hierarchies in the “field of power” at the top, which is powerful
enough to influence other fields and to initiate restructuring. A constant rebalancing
of one’s position (on the basis of the capital) in comparison with others takes place in
the field, wherein the objective is to obtain and maintain power.
A field can only exist when the “players” in it have similar interests. In an effort to
delineate one field from other fields, field inhabitants justify their own norms. Bour-
dieu defines the belief of the players that they will profit from the field-specific rules of
the game, as “illusio.” This illusio “describes the implicit belief in the meaningfulness
of the game: the consent to the unwritten doxa of the field, the commitment to an enjeu
(to what is at stake on the field), and the readiness to take part in the field-internal
conflicts; in short, in the conscious identification with the field” (Wiedemann, 2014,
p. 90). Success in the field depends on the scholar’s competence and knowledge, and
also how she or he incorporates the “nomos” and the “illusio”—the belief in the game.
Bourdieu generally conceptualizes
the scientific field as [a] relatively autonomous network of objective disparity
relationships which is subject to its own rules and meets requirements from the
outside applying the field’s internal logic. Also here, there is an autonomous
(intellectual) and heteronomous (secular) pole and the positions in the field are
determined by the distributions of the scientific capital, a special form of the
symbolic capital, as well as the university capital (institutional power resources).
(Wiedemann, 2014, p. 95)
Huber (2010) considers communication science a subfield of science. When com-
paring scientific fields at universities, communication science or research does not
always appear at the top of the field of power; often medical science, legal studies,
natural, and technical sciences are on top of the range, whose impact is borne out in
journal rankings based on “impact factors.”
Each actor in the field attempts to set herself or himself apart from the rest and
seeks to improve her or his position in the social space. In comparing the inner
field of communication research internationally, the United States is pre-eminent
because of its professional and academic associations, its scholarly journals, and its

global language. The United States is generally perceived in academic circles as a

role model for scholarly research and publication activities. It sets the normative
standards for journal publications. “The academic discipline of communication
is (still) a U.S.-centered enterprise … heavily influenced by the North American
research traditions” (Meyen, 2012, p. 2380).

An examination of scientific journals’ landscape and their expectations on specific
language and on scientific methods suggest that for communication research (e.g.,
that in, say, Public Relations Inquiry or in Media, Culture and Society) to be viewed as
significant in knowledge production requires well-articulated modes of scholarship.
On the required scientific language, “The ‘empiricist repertoire’ is characteristic of
formal experimental research papers which are written in accordance with the empiri-
cist representation of scientific action: the style must be impersonal and minimize
reference to social actors and their beliefs so as to produce all the appearances of
objectivity” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 22). Hilgers and Mangez (2015, p. 7) observe: “The
more autonomous a field, the more it produces an autonomous and specific language,
representations and practices, and the more the perception of realities is subject to the
logic specific to the field.”
Other academic journals (e.g., the International Journal of Press/Politics or the
European Journal of Communication) appear to be editorially more open to a range
of approaches. This shows that communication research is in no way a homogeneous
field, but “a field located at the cross-roads of the social sciences and the humanities”
(Waisbord, 2015, p. 585). It is subject to the editorial shift of the flagship Journal of
Communication, whose new editor railed against the tendency of “individual inter-
est and institutional dynamics [to] drive specialization” (Waisbord, 2015, p. 586) and
advocated an “ecumenical publication” (Waisbord, 2015, p. 585) that counters frag-
mentation in the field.
According to Bourdieu, the agents and their (communication) scientific actions
cannot be separated from the (communication) scientific field (cf. Huber, 2010,
p. 48). In placing communication scientists in Bourdieu’s field, Huber (2010) assumes
“that the self-concept of the professors can only be understood based on the back-
ground of their social trajectories and their (perceived) position in the scientific
field” (p. 51). Normativity must be viewed as an immanent part of this self-concept.
Also, “the questions, theories, and methods that are regarded as legitimate” (Meyen,
2012, p. 2379) are closely linked to normative assumptions apparent in the field.
Communication scientists have always observed, normatively, that media plurality is
“good,” censorship “bad.”
New scholars and their entrance into (the field of) communication
scholarship
Norms of the field become apparent not only in research but also in teaching and,
above all, in recruiting. Which new scholars will be supported to assume new
academic or research positions? Who are the reception researchers who publish in

high-impact journals? Each power node, as it were, attempts to enforce its normative
assets upon the other actors in the field: “in practice the scientific field, no less than
any other field, is a combat zone in which actors struggle to enforce their view of
the world—their theories, methodologies and philosophies” (Burawoy, 2012, p. 19).
Less dominant researchers tend to adhere to the norms set by other researchers who

play a decisive role in recruiting other researchers. The inner orthodox circle will
make recruitment decisions consistent with the expectations of the inner field. To
experience consensus and agreement between speakers and among members in a
social group can engender professional satisfaction (Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger,
2009) and thus result in a higher motivation toward commitment. Of course, one does
not deny that mutually fruitful dialogue between orthodox and heretics is possible.
However, complete deliberation is often not possible because most times a junior
scholar’s involvement is controlled by the circle in the inner field. Depending on the
individual’s relations with other actors, social pressure for conformable behavior in
the field is paramount; a distortion of where the group moves can occur depending
from where it starts and where the normative origins of the group lie. Adaptations
are possible when incentives are offered or promised. Change can also be triggered
from external sources, for example, economic pressure. To explicitly state any form
of research funding is required by the normative policy of many journals.
In academic conferences, there usually is a certain type of habitus, which manifests
itself in, say, the type of clothing, the style of speech. An affective norm is apparent
when, for example, conference participants “don’t feel” like dressing like the others,
but still “feel” pressed to dress like other conference participants. In this regard, norms
also help people to be distinct of other fields, for example, by “customs and rules of
dress” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 396) as every community shares a common discourse and
common practices. Norms can differ according to the point of career trajectory and
according to the intended field of reception (cf. Robbins, 2007, p. 89). Offspring of
academics might feel more at ease with the norms of the academic world than do those
with working-class backgrounds because of their habitus and accumulated capital and
their display of more elegance in the field (cf. Lamont, 2009, p. 192). They might also
be better in strategic networking on the field.
This generates the following questions: What are the culturally valued skills
(valued by the inner field community) and what are the sanctioned skills and
behaviors/manners? How does the individual scholar “feel” toward the orthodox?
How does she or he stand in relation to those in power and influence? How strong
is the wish to become part of a seemingly homogeneous public body that repre-
sents a certain normative branch of scholars and of scholarship? Has one already
inherited the norms by speaking of “WE, the reception researchers”? How would
one feel if one were not accepted in the community? This also depends on how
sensible the scholar is to such questions and is a constant conative, affective, and
cognitive process.
Successful researchers are expected to be more effective when they adhere to given
norms that conform to the rules of the game. Meyen (2012) identifies “a certain type

of public conduct” (p. 2378) as one element of success in communication research. If

junior scholars integrate into their work that type of conduct, of adherence to norms
in their habitus and on the field, they improve their chances of being in control—that
is, of attaining power or at least sharing the field with the powerful and the influential.
As an external normative influence, also in recruitment processes, research manage-

ment certainly has become important within communication studies. As previously
indicated, the influence of state development institutions and of grants-disbursing
agencies on the mechanisms of science is so obvious that it must be disconcerting
that the field of politics at its peak of power forces its way onto the field of (not
only scientific communication) research. Regarding the raising of external funding,
science is subject to a strong economic pressure. A norm-influenced example of that
is “the rise of health communication” and “promotion of research on children and
media” (Meyen, 2012, pp. 2393–2394); these topics are en vogue and financed by
powerful grant donors.
Bourdieu (1975, p. 4) writes about objects or issues of research that are deval-
ued by society and from which researchers shy away, be it empirical research objects,
theories or methods. He even sees the import of research mechanisms current in
“top” research domains as a reason for scientific revolutions. Researchers in the field’s
corridors of power intensify this effect as they often censor methods or objects that
are deemed “unworthy” (“indignes,” Bourdieu, 1975, p. 4) or not of interest. This
“reference to a hierarchy of values is objectively inscribed in practices” (Bourdieu,
1975, p. 6; in the translation of Bourdieu, 2008, p. 96) that can be dubbed normative
practices.
The result is an opposition among legitimate, prestigious objects, and “unworthy”
ones that are more and more surrounded by scientific silence. The
opposition between orthodox objects (or domains, etc.) and those objects
claiming attention that might be labeled avant-garde or heretical, depending on
whether we situate ourselves on the side of the defenders of established hierarchy
or that of those seeking to impose a new definition of legitimate objects,
expresses the polarization established in any field between institutions or agents
who occupy opposed positions in the structure of distribution of the specific
capital. (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 5; in the translation of Bourdieu, 2008, pp. 94–95)
The empirical perspective of the social sciences is considered the most important
of the discipline—in German-speaking, as well as in English-speaking, communities
(cf. Peiser et al., 2003, p. 320). Reception studies range highest in the assessment of
the scientific importance of the individual professional groups (cf. Peiser et al., 2003,
p. 323). Apart from these different normative standards of humanities and social sci-
ences, researchers must follow the norms of the university vis-à-vis research expecta-
tions, that is, the institutional norms such as requirements for tenured appointments,
promotions, and tenure. As Curtin (2012) observes, “ … what gets published, funded
and recognized is, in large part, dependent on whether the researcher’s paradigmatic

perspective is congruent with that of editorial boards, granting agencies, or promo-

tion and tenure committees” (p. 39). Accordingly, it is also the sanctions that ensure
that a norm is enforced (cf. Stemmer, 2008). Here, we again note the functioning of
the scientific field:
Systems of selection (such as elite schools) favour great scientific careers – in

two ways: first by designating those whom they select as remarkable for others
and also for themselves, thus summoning them to make themselves remarked
through remarkable actions, especially in the eyes of those who have remarked
them (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 12).
Sanctions can manifest in a so-called “censure sociale (déguisée en contrôle
scientifique) soit, de manière tout à fait directe, à travers des interdits, parfois
explicites, en matière de publication et de citation, soit, plus souterrainement, à
travers des procédures de recrutement” (Bourdieu, 1995, p. 6), resulting in privilege
and lobbying.
Bourdieu conceptualizes fields as relatively autonomous, characterized by specific
functions and (normative) rules (cf. Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 5). Along with the
autonomization goes the emergence of elites who are “responsible for the legitimate
interpretation of practices and representations in specific areas of activity. These elites
rationalize an implicit system of schemes of action, systematizing it in the form of
explicit norms” (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 6). The elite is the persons who are the
most recognized because they hold the right (or seen as most legitimate) capital. If the
(normative) rules of the field change, also the distribution of recognition will change.
“The struggle in a field is thus a struggle to impose a definition of legitimate recogni-
tion, in which victory leads to more or less monopolistic control of the definition of
the forms of legitimacy prevailing in the field. The history of the field is the history of
the internal and external struggles that animate it, the history of the distribution of
the specific capital and the variation of this capital” (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 6).
To become a member of a certain field, the entrant has to pay “a minimum entry
tariff” (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 7). In our case, this means that the entrant has
to pay tribute to the works of the orthodox, has to deal with the body of knowledge
hitherto available that constitutes the discipline of communication scholarship.
Even though scholars recognize that within a field it is difficult for newcomers to
subvert the established order of the orthodox and that reproduction and preserva-
tion of structures prevail (cf. Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 11), they also see that there
is a constant change and movement that is deployed by the so-called avant-garde of
the field. The avant-garde is persons situated at the heterodox pole, seeking to distin-
guish themselves from “established senior figures” (Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, p. 11).
The more they gain recognition, the more they will gain influence on other parts or
agents of the field, setting their own norms. “The questions that Bourdieu raised for
the study of intellectual fields are about power, that is, why some researchers, and
with them their sense of priorities for future research and tastes for what is considered
interesting research, are able to achieve the dominant positions” (Hess, 2011, p. 334).

We further ask, which disposition has one for action even if one is not in congruence
with the prevailing norms?
Norms are sustained, norms are challenged

The field is a place of conflict and competition, where “participants vie to establish
monopoly over the species of capital effective in it” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 17); for
example, scientific authority in the scientific field. Normative standards can be valid
for a long time across all fields. In general, the agents of a field try to prevent an
abrupt (norm) change “of the academic producers and consumers of educational
products” (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 228) because it could challenge their competence. If
the validity claim of a norm is debated, this appears “as [a] challenge to an entire
way of life with the risk of the collective identity loss” (Forst & Günther, 2011,
p. 18). Also, the struggle for financial resources enhances the conformity to norms.
Internally, “the agents at the dominant pole of any given social field define the rules
[the norms, the authors] that ultimately determine success or failure” (Meyen, 2012,
p. 2384).
The fact that the social space and the specific field are at times subject to weaker or
stronger dynamics applies to the majority of norms. In this process, it is decisive which
agents define how strong the field is, which groups are created, and what bearing the
connection between personal habitus and scientific activities has. Bourdieu coined
the expression “the orthodox” for the rulers in the field. The dominant opinion cor-
responds to group orthodoxy (communis doctorum opinio, cf. Bourdieu, 1988). The
orthodox meet the expectations of the field and, as a rule, have a high-power position
(cf. Bourdieu, 1988). The orthodox are confronted with the heretics and their oppos-
ing norm perceptions or a different approach in connection with existing norms.
Bourdieu calls all those (scientists) heretics, who spread “a type of anti-institutional
atmosphere” from a marginal position (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 20). To some extent, these
scientists must face with the contempt and rejection of the internal agents on the
field.
If a researcher tends toward the heterodox or the orthodox pole in the field also
depends on his former positions and trajectory (Bourdieu, 1975, p. 5). Regarding his
own field, Bourdieu (1999) refers to “the age-old battle of philosophy against sociol-
ogy” in which the philosophers “feel threatened in their anthropological monopoly”
(p. 395). The alteration of norms sometimes is intensified during times of “revolution”
(to speak with Kuhn) when the generally accepted and largely undisputed modi are
confronted and “the background framework which alone can define ‘correctness’ is
itself in question” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 80).
Bourdieu (1988) writes about “relations of opposition, the content of which may
vary, depending on the field” (p. 120). Also, the different disciplinary backgrounds
of researchers and their search for interfaces with different branches of science may
lead them to move away from the core of the field toward other fields or to challenge
core premises. In the early phases of the development of communication science and

research, researchers tended to come from disparate scholarly disciplines such as soci-
ology, political science, ethnography, and social psychology.
There is a tacit adhesion to the unquestioned presuppositions on which the author-
ity of the orthodox is built (cf. Bourdieu, 1995, p. 6). It is something like a working
consensus of the academic orthodox that defines what is legitimate and what is not (cf.

Bourdieu, 1995, p. 5). Bourdieu (1995, p. 6) sees this normative working consensus of
the orthodox distributed “sur les institutions d’enseignement, sur les lieux de publica-
tion officiels, sur les associations professionnelles et même sur l’accès aux ressources
nécessaires à la recherche empirique.” For extreme positions within the orthodox and
heterodox, Bourdieu (1995, p. 8) employs the terms “ultras” and “outsiders.” The new
entrants into the field want to break with the routines of the academic establishment
(Bourdieu, 1995, p. 8). Bourdieu (1995, pp. 8–9) speaks of a fight between different
oppositions regarding theory and methodology.
There is a difference between how norms try to prescribe how one ought to
behave and how one behaves. Affective norms and feelings play a pivotal role in
this regard as Coleman (2013) notes in the example of voting. Following Coleman
(2013), we assume that everyone holds ideals, sticks to certain rituals and routines,
and sometimes follows narratives of deviation and pathology that “often serve to
illuminate norms” (Coleman, 2013, p. 68). Only if we know about the deviants and
about the heretics are we reminded of what we think to be normal. In Coleman’s
(2013, p. 68) words:
these dysfunctions [e.g., the scholar who does not stick to the 12-minute
PowerPoint presentation, in violation of the performative norm], by pointing to
what is missing, cast light on the meanings and maintenance of what is deemed
to be normal. Too often rendered invisible by their apparent naturalness, norms
are made conspicuous through their partial or non-realisation.
Yet, those who opt to serve in the dominant pole of the field do not at all present
a concordant canon, either. Nonetheless, a powerful environment makes a researcher
even more powerful within the field, as illustrated by an actor in sociology: “As
a Berkeley sociologist, Burawoy has access to cultural capital, powerful networks,
resources and highly motivated and well-trained graduate students that help his
efforts in promoting a vision for public sociologies” (McLaughlin et al., 2005, p. 140).
Researchers in other countries have other resources and other priorities precisely
because they operate in other higher-education systems. These material conditions
influence the production of knowledge to a great extent.
Depending on which side of the field a scholar works and thinks, she or he con-
fronts distractors. Burawoy (2014) gives the example of public sociology and its advo-
cates, stating that advocating public sociology can arouse professional hostility and
“can jeopardize an academic career” (p. 279). Why, he asks, are there still advocates of
this branch? Because, he answers, they see sociology as a vocation and moral commit-
ment and have in mind “not simply the pursuit of an instrumental career” (p. 279). It
is scholars like these who dare challenge the status quo in the field.

Challenging the field—Voices from the heretics

Besides the fact that normative schools of thought may differ in subdisciplines,
geographical domains, and cultures, they also undergo a national development
within a discipline over time. Changing institutional power structures and the
decreasing number of scientists possessing capital have resulted in the diminished

importance of critical theory and of historical materialism and in the scientists’
marginalized role in communication research. The critical perspective of normativity
questions dominant orthodoxies—the practices and the values that influence one’s
worldviews. Because of its focus on inequality, social injustice, the abuse of power
relationships, and unjust practices at both the individual and institutional levels, this
theoretical perspective draws our attention to using a variety of research methods,
say, inductive (or the interpretive paradigm) and deductive (or the postpositivist
paradigm), to study phenomena. Each such method calls into question the norma-
tivity of the investigative process and its findings. Granted, strategies are available
to enhance reliability of results—and to learn through public opinion research what
groups are interested in knowing and how they intend to learn. The deliberative
polling model, which, for example, has been presented as an antidote to the chal-
lenges of the population representation must still “be modified in order to enable
people from marginalized groups to participate in a way that equalizes their chances
of to have an impact in the group” (Guttman, 2010, p. 191). The point here is that
normativity is an enduring perennial challenge nonetheless.
Fewer investigators were being recruited from these schools of thought, because
beginning scholars mainly seek to establish contact with impactful academic centers
of the field (e.g., systems and actor theories), not so much with those in the periph-
eral areas. Such scholars know that a nonconformist approach to scholarship will
be sanctioned—if not proscribed. It is a strategic political and career-determining
choice to decide to which field, paradigm or boundary one belongs. The higher
the probability and willingness to sanction, the higher the probability that the
norm-addressee conforms to the norm (cf. Lamnek, 2002, p. 387). Sanctions alone,
however, do not guarantee that the targeted conditions are actually realized. A second
element of a norm is the willingness of the norm-addressee to avoid the sanction
or negative consequence that results from not doing something (cf. Stemmer, 2008,
p. 157).
There is a principal opposition among the dominant, the defenders, and the dom-
inated, the challengers of the field (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 35). The challengers pose a
constant threat to the dominants and they have to play the game as well as possible
to maintain their dominant position. Dissidents from the normative or people with
a strongly deviating habitus or capital are denied access by the powerful (à la Bour-
dieu: the orthodox) in the field. How open or closed the field is indicates how the
chances to be heard are distributed in society. How do communication researchers
react if they are confronted with challenges to and deviators (à la Bourdieu: heretics)
from the norm, and with divergent professional concepts? How do they preserve their

collective authority? In times of threat, when a paradigm is challenged, one increases

the contrast to those one wants to have on the other side of the boundary (e.g., the
arts and the humanities).
How a norm change occurs in German communication research is illustrated by
Löblich (2010) and by Hohlfeld and Neuberger (1998). They identify a reorientation

process of German communication science, from the humanities to the social
sciences, which started in the mid-1960s. Löblich (2010) states that German com-
munication science hardly applied empirical methods, for example, researcher
observations or experimental designs, between 1956 and 1980, primarily because,
during that time, communication science was deeply rooted in the humanities. She
further noted a “change of trend towards empirical social science” (Löblich, 2010,
p. 103) in 1968 and 1969.
Consequently, media history, as a course, saw a significant decline in student inter-
est, whereas courses in media policy and media practice were revised and strength-
ened in response to popular interest among student enrollees. The changes, however,
did not occur in the form of a “revolution,” but slowly as an “evolution” (cf. Löblich,
2010, p. 103) or change in the field by the ascent of the heretics and by pushing aside
the orthodox. It is highly possible that also the institutional threat to the discipline
added to these changes (cf. Löblich, 2010, p. 310).
Of course, the issue of time has to be prominently considered, also in regard to
changes within the field. Challengers to the orthodoxy (the heterodox positions) fre-
quently aver that their own positions will be vindicated in the long run. Thus, they are
wont to be patient.
Critics might think our analysis presents the Bourdieu’an approach in too positive
a light and that Bourdieu’s approach leaves too little room for individual freedom
and initiative because the agent is determined strongly by the habitus (Funk, 2009).
Furthermore, one might think that Bourdieu underestimates the creative power, the
independence and the change potential of the individual. These can be countered by
asserting that escaping from the norm corset obtained and rehearsed through capital,
habitus, and field is only rarely successful. Limited freedom of action can indeed be
assumed with reference to norms, because norms leave deep, indelible footprints, even
as the everyday know-how for making them cannot be expressed through procedural
rules.
Conclusion: Reflexivity of normativity in communication scholarship

Specific notions prevail in a certain society and every researcher has prepossessions
and predispositions that are hard to suppress. We encourage researchers to reflect on
their own practice and normative background, going into a position of “observational
detachment” (Robbins, 2007, p. 87). Whatever direction the researcher takes—be
it positivist empiricism or critical theory—every researcher should acknowledge
the following: “I know that I am caught up and understand the world that I take as
my object” (Bourdieu, 2004, p. 115). In general, they should ask themselves what

resources do we have in communication science to bring about positions whereby the

strategies that agents employ will find them bringing transparency to norm expecta-
tions? Scholars should acknowledge, if necessary, how their educational capital and
their social origins influence their (academic) way of thinking and professional trajec-
tory. In his work, Science of Science and Reflexivity (2004), Bourdieu turns the mirror

toward sociology and toward himself as a sociologist and scrutinizes, among other
things, his own trajectory and social capital. Bourdieu himself was not at all reluctant
to raise his voice and comment on all sorts of political issues (cf. Bourdieu, 2008).
He also was very much concerned with the transfer of knowledge from the “scientific
ivory tower” into public debate. Poupeau and Discepolo have assembled Bourdieu’s
texts that impressively show his political activism or “interventions” (Bourdieu, 2008).
As an example for personal and institutional enmeshments, Bourdieu narrated the
backstory of an article whose authors adopted Mertonian expressions, thanked Mer-
ton for his suggestions in a footnote and acknowledged that their work was financed
by an institution controlled by Merton: “So many signs that this is a school united
by a socially instituted cognitive style, backed by an institution” (Bourdieu, 2004,
p. 10).
Norms can also be forced into formal structures, which in the most extreme cases
become law. Then, deviations from the norm can also be punished, sanctioned, or pro-
scribed. A group or institution of higher authority monitors the observation of and its
conformity with norms and recommends, for example, that the German Council of
Science (Wissenschaftsrat) or, at the university level, the professoriate should ensure
compliance with scientific norms like objectivity, validity, rationality, and replicabil-
ity. The faculty, as research supervisor, accomplishes such compliance by insisting on,
say, their students’ developing robust data sets for their research papers and theses or
ensuring attaining well-known standards in students’ final examinations and defenses.
Sometimes this supervisory authority is first created when a norm is violated (non-
conformity with normative patterns), as in cases of plagiarism.
In sum, we aim to engender a discussion on the transparency of norms in com-
munication science. In this article, we suggested the application of Bourdieu’s field,
habitus, and capital concept, as well as his framework of heresy versus orthodoxy,
to shed light on valid and outdated norms in communication science and research.
Depending on the time, form and structure of science, culture, economy, and poli-
tics, other theories and methods are encouraged and appear en vogue in our scientific
field. We were able to identify different internal and external influences on the field
such as politics and research grants, which initiated normative changes and added to
the fact that the field structures change. Against this background, we state that it is
important to reflect on one’s own social and academic trajectory and habitus and the
relativity of our research (cf. Lemert, 1974). Communication scientists should pose
and answer questions such as the following: What are my normative starting points?
How tight is my own normative corset and from whence does it stem in the con-
texts of habitus, capital, and field? Am I subject to certain economic or political or
personal constraints? Which connections, oppositions, schools, and movements am I

associated with? What are the trajectories of my coauthors (for further questions, see
also Hilgers & Mangez, 2015, pp. 19–22)?
We call this a demand for more reflexivity of normative influences. This demand
is not new in sociology (à la Bourdieu, Gouldner, and Burawoy) but has hitherto
not been explicated in communication scholarship. Gouldner (1970, pp. 25–26), for

example, advocates
a new and heightened self-awareness among sociologists [ … ], this means we
must acquire the ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs [ … ], for example,
that when we are asked why it is that some sociologists believe sociology must be
a ‘value-free discipline,’ we do not simply reply with the logical arguments on its
behalf.
In his epilogue to The coming crisis of western sociology (1970), Gouldner illustrates
the meticulous self-awareness and the reflection he demands of every researcher: to
explain the significance of the research, as well as its methods and theories by relating
them to one’s personal and academic experiences—that is, one’s trajectory, capital,
habitus and relation to the field. What Gouldner (1970) demands is a “Reflexive Soci-
ology” (p. 488) that should be integrated as a “work ethic” (p. 504) into the daily
professional work of a scholar.
Burawoy (2014) takes a “saving sociology” approach that is criticized by McLaugh-
lin et al. (2005). They argue “that the ‘reflexive’ and ‘critical’ categories of sociology,
as Burawoy has conceptualized them, are too ambiguous and value-laden to allow
for empirical investigation” (p. 133). They do not deny, however, that the institu-
tional context of the universities in which the researchers operate have to be taken
into account, as well as the discipline and nation or culture whence the researcher
comes. The conditions of how and where research is conducted are important, par-
ticularly for strictly empiricist researchers. An approach to implementation will be
to “institutionalize reflexivity in mechanisms of training, dialogue, and critical eval-
uation” (Wacquant, 1992, p. 41). Normative and ethical discussions could also be
included in the education of researchers. Furthermore, stricter journal and publisher
guidelines could require the inclusion of a passage on the normative stance in the
conclusion or introduction of an article. An example of a statement on how to inte-
grate a normative perspective into a research article is provided by Coleman (2013):
“At the normative core of the analysis set out in the following pages is the assumption
that, like any other complex communicative act, the expression of preferences calls
for affective investment” (p. viii). Another example: “The philosophical orientation
of this book aligns with the normative vision set forth by Benjamin Barber in Strong
Democracy” (Stromer-Galley, 2014, p. 4). The benefits of such statements would be
to better understand and interpret the research process, its results, and its implica-
tions. Thinking of the power of social sciences and their methods, we conclude that
this is a veritable step toward ensuring the utmost transparency in communication
research.

Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Barbara Thomaß and Kaarle Nordenstreng for their comments
on an earlier version of this article. We are very grateful to the anonymous reviewers;
through their comments, much input was given to advance the manuscript.

Notes
1 All non-English language citations in this article were translated by the authors.
2 Bourdieu (1999) himself dealt extensively with the question of “objectivation” (p. 394)
and the social conditions of the production of scientific work.
3 We thank the anonymous reviewer for suggesting the delineation of norms.
4 Even though Bourdieu contradicts the universalism of Durkheim, he nevertheless derived
some ideas from him, for example, that on the “closer agents are to each other, the more
intense the competition; the further apart they feel, the more a relative indifference
reduces the tensions” (Lahire, 2015, pp. 70–71).
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Communication Theory ISSN 1050-3293

Theoretical Approaches to Normativity

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Keywords: Pierre Bourdieu, Communication Research, Normativity, Norms.

Corresponding author: Liane Tessa Rothenberger; e-mail: liane.rothenberger@tu-ilmenau.de

176 Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association

religious, political, economic, industrial, and bureaucratic powers as well as by the

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Normativity: A blind spot in communication research

Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association 177

ought to report it in a nondiscriminatory, disinterested way. This “oughtness” mani-

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practices (e.g., no liberal, no unfettered media in China; no envelope journalism in

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Need for more transparency on normative inﬂuences

Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association 179

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Bourdieu and normativity

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Norms, normativity, and Bourdieu’s capital concept

Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association 181

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Norms, normativity, and Bourdieu’s habitus concept

184 Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association

The habitus, a set of incorporated dispositions, is acquired during the individ-

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to a change in habitus and to a subjective attachment to certain topics—one reason

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It is no doubt possible to distinguish families of trajectories, with, in particular,

Norms, normativity, and Bourdieu’s field concept

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global language. The United States is generally perceived in academic circles as a

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188 Communication Theory 27 (2017) 176–201 © 2016 International Communication Association

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of public conduct” (p. 2378) as one element of success in communication research. If

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perspective is congruent with that of editorial boards, granting agencies, or promo-

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Norms are sustained, norms are challenged

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Challenging the ﬁeld—Voices from the heretics

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