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Maloto v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988
Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)
Facts:  Bautista Angelo, J. (Ponente)
1. Petitioners and respondents are the
neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died
in 1963. The four heirs believed that the
deceased  did not leave a will, hesnce they
filed an intestate proceeding. However, the
parties executed an extrajudicial settlement
of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.
2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate
of the deceased's counsel allegedly
discovered her last will which was
purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet.
Hence the annulment of the proceedings
and a probate petition was filed by the
devisees and legatees. The said will was
allegedly burned by the househelp under the
instruction of the deceased
3. The lower court denied the probate on
the ground that the animus revocandi in the
burning of the will was sufficiently proven.
Issue: Whether or not there was valid
revocation of the will
RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a
valid revocation to occur,the  'corpus' and
'animus' must concur, one without the other
will not produce a valid revocation. The
physical act of destruction of a will must
come with an intention to revoke (animus
revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of
evidence to comply with the said
requirement. The paper burned was not
established to be the will and the burning
though  done under her express direction
was not done in her presence.
Under Art. 830, the physical act of
destruction, in this case the burning of the
will, does not constitute an effective
revocation, unless it is coupled with animus
revocandi on the part of the testator. Since
animus is a state of mind, it has to be
accompanied by an overt physical act of
burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling
done by the testator himself or by another
under his express direction and  presence.
Molo vs. Molo
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation
Facts:
1. Marcos Molo executed 2 wills, one
in August 1918 and another in June 1939. The
latter will contained a revocation clause
which expressly revoked the will in 1918. He
died without any forced heirs but he was
survived by his wife, herein petitioner Juana.
The oppositors to the probate were his
nephews and nieces.
2. Only a carbon copy of the second will was
found. The widow filed a petition for the
probate of the 1939 will. It was admitted to
probate but subsequently set aside on
ground that the petitioner failed to prove its
due execution. 
3. As a result, the petitioner filed another
petition for the probate of the 1918 will this
time. Again the oppositors alleged that said
will had already been revoked under the
1939 will. They contended that despite the
disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocation
clause is valid and thus effectively nullified
the 1918 will.
Issue: Whether or not the 1918 will can still
be valid despite the revocation in the
subsequent disallowed 1939 will
RULING: Yes.The court applied the doctrine
laid down in Samson v. Naval that a
subsequent will,containing a clause revoking
a previous will, having been disallowed for
the reason that it was not executed in
accordance with law cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as the said revocatory clause is
void.
There was no valid revocation in this case.
No evidence was shown that the testator

deliberately destroyed the original 1918 will
because of his knowledge of the revocatory
clause contained in the will executed in 1939.
The earlier will can still be probated under
the principle of dependent relative
revocation.The doctrine applies when a
testator cancels or destroys a will or
executes an instrument intended to revoke a
will with the intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as substitute for
the old, and the new disposition fails of
effect for some reason.
Rodelas v. Aranza  heir as against the nephew, who is
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
Relova, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. The appellant filed a petition for the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by
the appellees on the ground that the
deceased did not leave any will, holographic
or otherwise.
2. The lower court dismissed the petition for
probate and held that since the original will
was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in
the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can
be proved by means of a photocopy
RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or
destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because the authenticity of the handwriting
of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court with the standard writings of
the testator.
As in the case of Gam v Yap, “the execution
and contents of a lost holgraphic will may
not be proved by bare testimony pf
witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will. Will itself must be presented, otherwise
it shall produce no effect. But it may be
proved by a photograhic or photostatic
copy.. or by other similar meanw, whereby
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the authenticity of the handwriting of the
deceased may be exhibited and tested
before the probate court.”
Azaola v. Singson
GR L-14003 Aug 5, 1960
FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon
City on September 9, 1957. Petitioner
submitted for probate her holographic will,
in which Maria Azaola was made the sole
the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco
Azaola, was presented to testify on the
handwriting of the testatrix. He testified
that he had seen it one month, more or less,
before the death of the testatrix, as it was
given to him and his wife; and that it was in
the testatrix’s handwriting. He presented
the mortgage, the special power of the
attorney, and the general power of
attorney, and the deeds of sale including
an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two
residence certificates showing the testatrix’s
signature were also exhibited for
comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground
that (1) the execution of the will was
procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of the petitioner
and his wife, and (2) that the testatrix did
not seriously intend the instrument to be her
last will, and that the same was actually
written either on the 5th or 6th day of
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956
as appears on the will.
The probate was denied on the ground that
under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the
proponent must present three witnesses
who could declare that the will and the
signature are in the writing of the testatrix,
the probate being contested; and because
the lone witness presented “did not prove
sufficiently that the body of the will was
written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”

Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he
was not boundto produce more than one
witness because the will’s authenticity was
not questioned; and second, that Article 811
does not mandatorily require the production
of three witnesses to identify the
handwriting and signature of
a holographic will, even if its authenticity
should be denied by the adverse party.
ISSUE:
W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory or permissive.
HELD:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not
mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will
was not contested, petitioner was not
required to produce more than one witness;
but even if the genuineness of
the holographic will were contested, Article
811 can not be interpreted to require the
compulsory presentation of three witnesses
to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied.
Since no witness may have been present at
the execution of a holographic will, none
being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil
Code), it becomes obvious that the
existence of witness possessing the
requisite qualifications is a matter beyond
the control of the proponent. For it is not
merely a question of finding and producing
any three witnesses; they must be witnesses
“who know the handwriting and signature
of the testator” and who can declare
(truthfully, of course, even if the law does
not so express) “that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the
testator”. There may be no available witness
of the testator’s hand; or even if so
familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling
to give a positive opinion. Compliance with
the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may
thus become an impossibility.
This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of
Article 811 allows the court to resort to
expert evidence. The law foresees the
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possibility that no qualified witness may be
found (or what amounts to the same thing,
that no competent witness may be willing to
testify to the authenticity of the will), and
provides for resort to expert evidence to
supply the deficiency.
What the law deems essential is that the
court should be convinced of the will’s
authenticity. Where the prescribed number
of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the will is
genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to
call for expert evidence. On the other hand,
if no competent witness is available, or none
of those produced is convincing, the Court
may still, and in fact it should, resort to
handwriting experts. The duty of the Court,
in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of
inquiry, for the state is as much interested as
the proponent that the true intention of the
testator be carried into effect.
Cuenco vs CA
G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
o The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts
FACTS:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in
Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and
children of the first marriage, residing in
Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the
first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the
senator died intestate in Manila but a
resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu,
Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife,
filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate

of the last will and testament, where she
was named executrix. Rosa also filed an
opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu
but this court held in abeyance resolution
over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall
have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to
dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue,
considering that CFI Cebu already acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The
opposition and motion to dismiss were
denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of
Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to
CFI Quezon.
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not CA erred in issuing
the writ of prohibition against the QC court
o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted
without jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and
assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI
Cebu's order expressly consenting in
deference to the precedence of probate
over intestate proceedings
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that CA erred in
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against
the Quezon City court from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and
setting aside all its orders and actions,
particularly its admission to probate of the
last will and testament of the deceased and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof without bond pursuant to the
deceased testator's wish.
On Venue and Jurisdiction
Under Rule 73 Sec. 1, the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.
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The residence of the decent or the location
of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue.
If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.
The court with whom the petition is first
filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise
jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts, but this does not mean
‘exclusive jurisdiction’ per se. Such court,
upon learning that a petition for probate of
will has been presented in another court in
compliance with residence requirement,
may decline to take cognizance of the
petition and hold it in abyrancr, and defer to
the second court which has the probate
proceedings the alleged last will.
Here, this is what happened; Cebu CFI first
assumed jurisdiction, but held in abeyance
the intestacy proceedings due to pending
probate proceedings in QC CFI. Doctrine of
precedence of probate proceedings over
intestatce proceedings apply. QC’s order
already long final since respondents did not
appeal.
Codoy v. Calugay
312 SCRA 333
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay,
Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas,
devisees and legatees of the holographic will
of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de
Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the
said will. They attested to the genuineness
and due execution of the will on 30 August
1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel
Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that
the will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible. They raised doubts as regards
the repeated appearing on the will after
every disposition, calling the same out of the

ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased, it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6
witnesses and various documentary
evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of
the probate court who produced and
identified the records of the case bearing
the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar
who was made to produce and identify the
voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same
was already destroyed and no longer
available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that
she had acquired familiarity with the
deceased’s signature and handwriting as she
used to accompany her in collecting rentals
from her various tenants of commercial
buildingsand the deceased always issued
receipts. The niece also testified that
the deceased left a holographic will entirely
written, dated and signed by said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for
the deceasedin the intestate proceedings of
her late husband, who said that the
signature on the will was similar to that of
the deceased but that he can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who
testified that she was familiar with the
signature of the deceased which appeared in
the latter’s application for pasture permit.
The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay,
claimed that she had lived with
the deceased since birth where she had
become familiar with her signature and that
the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence
was granted by the lower court. It was
reversed on appeal with
the Court of Appeals which granted the
probate.
ISSUE:
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1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing
that at least three witnesses explicitly
declare the signature in a contested will as
the genuine signature of the testator, is
mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently
establish the authenticity and due execution
of the deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a
mandatory order, an imperative obligation
and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that
the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by
the law, is to give effect to the wishes of
the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals
who for their benefit will employ means to
defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present
petition is to determine the true intent of
the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to
declare explicitly that the signature
appearing in the holographic will was that of
the deceased.
The election registrar was not able to
produce the voter’s affidavit
for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared
receipts and letters of the deceased and did
not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal
belongings of the deceased but was in the
possession of the said niece, who kept the

fact about the will from the children of
the deceased, putting in issue her motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she
saw the decreased write a note or sign a
document.
The former lawyer of
the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the
holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-
witness requirement was not complied
with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will
convinces that the strokes are different
when compared with other documents
written by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the
oppositors to adduce evidence in support of
their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against
bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their
truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws
on this subject should be interpreted in such
a way as to attain these primordial ends.
But, on the other hand, also one must not
lose sight of the fact that it is not the object
of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise
the right to make a will. (Ajero v CA)
However, we cannot eliminate the
possibility of a false document being
adjudged as the will of the testator, which is
why if the holographic will is contested, the
law requires three witnesses to declare that
the will was in the handwriting of
the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the
probate of a holographic will, it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the
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testator. If the will is contested, at least
three of such witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory
order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and
that the presumption is that the word
“shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
Roberts v. Leonidas
GR L-55509 April 27, 1984
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died
in 1977. He was survived by his second wife
(Maxine), their two children (Pete and
Linda), and by his two children by a first
marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended by
divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco,
California on January 23, 1959. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate
described as conjugal property of himself
and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were
presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on
March 1978. Maxine admitted that she
received notice of the intestate petition filed
in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah
Court admitted the two wills and codicil to
probate on April 1978 and was issued upon
consideration of the stipulation between
the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.
Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with
knowledge of the intestate proceeding in
Manila, entered into
a compromise agreement in Utah regarding
the estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate
proceeding was instituted by Ethel. On
March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding
on the ground of pendency of the Utah

probate proceedings. She submitted to the
court a copy of Grimm’s will. However,
pursuant to the compromiseagreement,
Maxine withdrew the opposition and the
motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will
found in the record.The estate was
partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for
the probate of the two wills (already
probated in Utah), that the partition
approved by the intestate court be set aside
and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointedexecutrix and
Ethel be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and return the
same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they
were defrauded due to the machinations of
Ethel, that the compromiseagreement was
illegal and the intestate proceeding was void
because Grimm died testate so partition was
contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition
which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack
of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion
to dismiss.
HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did
not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying
Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case
because Grimmdied with two wills and “no
will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed”
(Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of
Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory. It
is anomalous that the estate of a person
who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
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intestate case should be consolidated with
the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should
continue hearing the two cases.
Nepomuceno v. CA Digests
Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals
Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will
wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as
the sole and only executor. It was also
provided therein that he was married to
Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of
the will but the legal wife and her children
opposed alleging that the will was procured
through improper and undue influence and
that there was an admission of concubinage
with the petitioner.
3. The lower court denied the probate on
the ground of the testator's admission of
cohabitation, hence making the will invalid
on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed
and held that the will is valid except the
devise in favor of the petitioner which is null
and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on
the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the
general rule is that the court's area of
inquiry is limited to the an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will.
This general rule is however not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation
constrains it to do and may pass upon
certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship
between the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance
with law but the court didn't find it to serve
a practical purpose to remand the nullified

provision in a separate action for that
purpose only since in the probate of a will,
the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739
which voids a donation made between
persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at
the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it
is also prohibited.
Nuguid v. Nuguid
GR L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS:
Rosario died single, without descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving were her
legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6
brothers and sisters. One of the siblings filed
a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario 11 years before her death and prayed
that she be admitted to the probate and be
appointed administrator. The parents
opposed saying that they are the
compulsory heirs of the decedent in
the direct ascending line and that the will
should be void on the ground of
absolute preterition.
ISSUE:
Is the will void on the ground of preterition?
RULING:
YES. The decedent left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she
left forced heirs in the direct ascending line
her parents. And, the will completely omits
both of them; thus receiving nothing by the
testament, depriving them of their
legitime; neither were they expressly
disinherited. This is a clear case of
preterition. Note that A. 854 of the NCC
merely nullifies the “institution of heir”.
Considering that the will presented solely
provides for the institution of the petitioner
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as universal heir and nothing more, the
result is the same. The will is null and void.
“Preterition” is he omission in the testator’s
will of forced heirs or snyone of them, either
they are not mentioned or though
mentioned, neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited. Governed by Art.
854
“Disinheritance” is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heir of
his share in the legitime for a cause
authorized by law. Governed by Art. 918
Kalaw v. Relova
G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984
Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent,
claiming to be the sole heir of sister
Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the
latter's holographic will in 1968. The will
contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name,
designated as the sole heir was crossed out
and instead "Rosario" was written above it.
Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was
crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's
ma,e was written above it. This alteration
was initialed by the testator.
2. Rosa contended that the will as first
written should be given effect so that she
would be the sole heir. The lower court
denied the probate due to the
unauthenticated alterations and additions.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid
Whether or not the original unaltered text
(where Rosa is sole heir) ,after the
subsequent alterations were voided by
court order, shall be probated
RULING: Basic rule is “when a number of
erasures, corrections, and interlineations
made by the testator in a holographic will
has not been noted under testator’s

signature… the will is not invalidated as
whole but only as tomthe particular words
erased, corrected, or altered”
But here, the will is voided or revoked since
nothing remains in the will which could
remain valid as there was only one
disposition in it; which is he assignment of
sole heir of all of Natividad’s estate”. Such
was altered by the substitution of the
original heir with another.
To rule that the first will should be given
effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of
mind. However, this change of mind cannot
be given effect either as she failed to
authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814,
or by affixing her full signature.
Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245
FACTS:
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon
Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the
estate of the deceased and also delivered
the holographic will of the deceased.
Simeon stated that he found a notebook
belonging to deceased, which contained a
“letter-will” entirely written and signed in
deceased’s handwriting. The will
is dated“FEB./61 ” and states: “This is my will
which I want to be respected although it is
not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives
corroborated the fact that the same is
a holographic will of deceased, identifying
her handwriting and signature. Respondent
opposed probate on the ground that it such
does not comply with Article 810 of the CC
because the date contained in
a holographic will must signify the year,
month, and day.
ISSUE:
W/N the date “FEB./61 ” appearing on
the holographicWill of the deceased Bibiana
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Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the
Article 810 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Valid date.
This will not be the first time that this Court
departs from a strict and literal application
of the statutory requirements regarding the
due execution of Wills. The underlying
and fundamental objectives permeating the
provisions of the law wills consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their
execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and
restrictions to prevent the commission
of fraud and the exercise of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the
testator. If a Will has been executed in
substantial compliance with
the formalities of the law, and the possibility
of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof
is obviated, said Will should be admitted to
probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will,
attempts to comply with all the requisites,
although compliance is not literal, it is
sufficient if the objective or purpose sought
to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by
the testator. In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil.
476, we ruled that: The object of the
solemnities surrounding the execution of
wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. …
In particular, a complete date is required to
provide against such contingencies as that
of two competing Wills executed on the
same day, or of a testator becoming insane
on the day on which a Will was executed
(Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no
such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of
this case and found no evidence of bad faith

and fraud in its execution nor was there any
substitution of Wins and Testaments. There
is no question that the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was
entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testatrix herself and in a language known to
her. There is also no question as to its
genuineness and due execution. All the
children of the testatrix agree on the
genuineness of the holographic Will of their
mother and that she had the
testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of said Will. The objection
interposed by the oppositor-respondent
Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is
fatally defectivebecause the date “FEB./61 ”
appearing on the holographicWill is not
sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code. This objection is too technical to
be entertained.
As a general rule, the “date” in
a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However,
when as in the case at bar, there is no
appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity
of the Will is established and the only issue is
whether or not the date “FEB./61” appearing
on the holographic Will is a valid compliance
with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of
the holographic Will should be allowed
under the principle of substantial
compliance.
 Maloles II vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133359, January 31, 2000
FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos,
Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a
petition for probate of his will 1 in the
Regional Trial Court. He alleged that he
had no compulsory heirs; that he had named
in his will as sole legatee and devisee
the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that
he disposed by his will his properties with
an approximate value of not less than
10
P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will
were in the custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los Reyes
Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a
motion for intervention claiming that, as
the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator’s
sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was
the sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of
kin of Dr. De Santos. He
likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the
testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the
reconsideration of the order allowing the
will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner, being
a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de
Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose
the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by the respondent
RULING:
No. The petitioner in this case avers that, as
the nearest next of kin and creditor of the
testator, his interest in the matter is material
and direct. Even if petitioner is the nearest
next of kin of Dr. De Santos, he cannot be
considered an “heir” of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary
succession that one who has no compulsory
or forced heirs may dispose of his entire
estate by will.
Thus, Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
“One who has no compulsory heirs
may dispose by will of all his estate or any
part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.”
“One who has compulsory heirs
may dispose of his estate provided he does
not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.”
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Compulsory heirs are limited to the of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The
testator’s — children of spouses filed their opposition.

1. Legitimate children and The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the
descendants, with respect to their legitimate wife of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void,
parents and ascendants; though extrinsically void; the oppositors are
2. In default of the foregoing, the only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes
legitimate parents and ascendants, with filed a Motion for Consideration arguing that
respect to their legitimate children and she is entitled to some compensation since
descendants; she took care of Alejandro prior to his death
3. The widow or widower; although they were not legally married to
4. Acknowledged natural children, and each other. This was denied by the trial
natural children by legal fiction; court. The CA dismissed her appeal for her
5.  Other illegitimate children referred failure to wile the same within the extended
to in Article 287 of the Civil Code. period. CA order became final.

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not ISSUE:

a compulsory heir who may have
been preterited in the testator’s will. Nor
does he have any right to intervene in the
settlement proceedings based on his
allegation that he is a creditor of
the deceased. Since the testator instituted
or named an executor in his will, it is
incumbent upon the Court to respect
the desires of the testator. Only if
the appointed executor is
incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to
give bond may the court appoint other
persons to administer the estate. None of
these circumstances is present in this case.
Dr.Santos’ probate of his own will is valid in
accordancd to Art. 838, which allows filing
of petition ofmprobate of he will filed by the
testator himself.
Dorotheo v. CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Thereafter, her
husband Alejandro also died. n 1977, Lourdes
Dorotheo, petitioner who claimed to have
taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed
a special proceeding for the probate
May a last will and testament admitted to
probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final
and executor still be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order
can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will
of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof are
void. Alejandro gave all the property to the
concubine. Such is invalid because one
cannot dispose what he does not own. In
this case, the whole property is
the conjugalproperty of Alejandro and
Aniceta. Such has become final
and executor. The only instance where a
party interested in probate proceeding may
have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence
with circumstances do not concur herein.
Under Art. 960, testacy is preferred over
intestacy. But before there can be testacy
distribution, the will must pass the tests and
safeguards provided by law. No intestate
distribution can be done until and unless the

will failed to pass both its extrinsic and
intrinsic validity.
If will is extrinsically void, rules of intestacy
applies regardless if intrisicslly valid. If
extrinsically valid, next to determine is
intrinsic (whether provisions of will are valid
according to laws of succession). Here the
will is ruled extrinsically valid but intrinsically
invalid as it deprived compulsory heirs of
their share and the property involved is
conjugal propert of Alejandro and Anita.
Intestacy applies.
Ajero v. CA
236 SCRA 488
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was
submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on
the grounds that: neither the testament’s
body nor the signature therein was in
decedent’s handwriting; it
contained alterations and corrections which
were not duly signed by decedent; and, the
will was procured by petitioners through
improper pressure and undue influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero
with respect to the disposition in the will of
a house and lot. He claimed that said
property could not be conveyed by
decedent in its entirety, as she was not its
sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the
decedent’s holographic will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide
only the question of the identity of the will,
its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it
finds no reason for the disallowance of the
will for its failure to comply with the
formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of
testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
12
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision
holding that the decedent did not comply
with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found
that certain dispositions in the will were
either unsigned or undated, or signed by
not dated. It also found that the
erasures, alterations and cancellationsmade
had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that
Articles 813 and 814 of the NCC were not
complies with.
HELD:
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its
requirement affects the validity of
the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of
the dispositions, the result is that
these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the
whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be
admitted to probate notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article
814.
Unless the
authenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator’s signature,
their presence does not invalidate the will
itself. The lack of authentication will only
result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that
he requirements of authentication of
changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Article 813 and 814) separate from that
which provides for the necessary conditions
for the validity of the holographic will
(Article 810).
This separation and distinction adds support
to the interpretation that only
the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC –

and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 –
are essential to the probate of a holographic
will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and
Article 839 of the Civil Code enumerate the
grounds for disallowance of wills.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds
can serve to disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the
only issues to be resolved are:
1.whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent’s last will and
testament;
2.whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law;
3.whether the decedent had the necessary
testamentary capacity at the time the will
was executed; and
4.whether the execution of the will and its
signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding
the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud; accordingly,
laws on this subject should be interpreted to
attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what
assures authenticity is the requirement that
they be totally authographic or handwritten
by the testator himself. Failure to strictly
observe other formalities will no result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionable handwritten by the testator.
JOSE RIVERA petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ADELAIDO J. RIVERA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 75005-06 February 15, 1990
FACTS:
13
On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy
resident of that town named Venancio
Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera,
claiming to be the only surviving legitimate
son of the deceased, filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration over
Venancio’s estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076,
this petition was opposed by Adelaido J.
Rivera. Who denied that Jose was the son of
the decedent. Adelaido averred that
Venancio was his father and did not
die interstate but in fact left
two holographic wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Rivera was the
legitimate son of the deceased Venancio
Rivera.
RULING:
In case of doubt, under Art. 220 of the NCC,
all presumptions favor the solidarity of the
family. Thus every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of marriage
the legitimacy of children. Even in
the absence of any certificate of marriage or
other documentary proof of the existence of
marriage, the law presumes a man and
woman cohabiting with each other as being
married, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.
Based on this unrefuted legal presumption,
Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased
Venancio Rivera whose estate is in question,
in addition to the intriguing circumstances
surrounding Jose’s claim that he was a
legitimate son.
Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no
personality to contest the wills and his
opposition thereto did not have
the legal effect of requiring the three
witnesses as stated in Art. 811. The
testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera,
Jr. who authenticated the wills as having
been written and signed by their father, was
sufficient.
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