16 Pecho Vs People G.R. No. 111399

2/9/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 262
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pecho vs. People
*
G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.
ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and the SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed; Criminal Law; The

right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men,
has its origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of Great
Britain demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of
Orange in 1688.—On the assumption that the prosecution’s
evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction for the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the
petitioner’s claim that he could not be convicted of the said crime
without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. Such right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has
its origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of Great Britain
demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of Orange
on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the Constitution of the
United States and was extended
________________
* EN BANC.
519
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 519
Pecho vs. People
to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. It

was later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000170274e1392777c5fb0003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.

Same; Same; Same; Objectives of the Right to be Informed.—
The right to be informed has the following objectives: First. To
furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had
(United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
the crime charged.
Same; Same; Same; What determines the real nature and
cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law.—What determines the real nature and cause
of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or
preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. It
follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which,
although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter.
Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Conspiracy must be shown to exist
as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself.—There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose
and de-
520
Pecho vs. People
sign, concerted action, and community of interest. It is, however,

settled that the same degree of proof required for establishing the
crime is likewise required to support a finding of conspiracy. In
other words, conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself in order to
uphold the fundamental principle that no one shall be found
guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Except when he is the mastermind in a
conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have
performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed.—It is also
essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for
the acts of the others that there be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design.
Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary
that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a
direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime
planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Same; Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; A judgment
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only
if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.—Under
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence
would be sufficient to convict if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As
jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
521
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 521
Pecho vs. People
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estafa Through Falsification of

Public and Commercial Documents; Constitutional Law;
Presumption of Evidence; Where there is reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused, he must be acquitted even though his
innocence may be doubted since the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.—Otherwise stated, there is no
sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the
petitioner and Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither
is there evidence of petitioner’s active participation in the
commission of the crime. The concordant combination and
cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the
prosecution’s evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section
4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable doubt as to
his guilt. And since his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof
beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then be acquitted
even though his innocence may be doubted.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Anunciatico M. Navarro for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified the

appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 14844 by holding the petitioner guilty of the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as maximum and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00).
In short, we held that although the petitioner could not
be convicted of the crime charged, viz., violation of Section
3(e) of
522
Pecho vs. People
R.A. No. 3019, as amended—because the said section

penalizes only consummated offenses and the offense
charged in this case was not consummated—he could,
nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the
crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably
filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that after
having been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, a special law, he could not be convicted anymore
of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, an offense punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, a general law; otherwise, the
constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be
violated. In other words, his acquittal of the crime charged
precludes conviction for the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial
documents, because both offenses arose from the same
overt act as alleged in the information in Criminal Case
No. 14844.
In its Comment on the motion for reconsideration signed
only by Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz
and Solicitor Josette Sonia Holgado-Marcilla, the Office of
the Solicitor General disagrees with the petitioner and
asserts that the rule on double jeopardy cannot be
successfully invoked in this case considering that no new
information for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed against the petitioner; only one
information was filed against him and his co-accused. For
double jeopardy to exist, there must be such new
information and the accused must be able to show that (1)
he has been previously brought to trial, (2) in a court of
competent jurisdiction, (3) upon a valid complaint or
information sufficient in form and substance, (4) for the
same offense or an attempt to or frustration thereof as that
charged in the new information, and that (5) the case has
been dismissed or terminated without his consent or after
he had pleaded
1
to the information but before judgment was
rendered.
_______________
1 Citing Paulin vs. Gimenez, 217 SCRA 386 [1993]; People vs.
523
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 523

Pecho vs. People
Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General joins the

petitioner in the latter’s plea for his acquittal, but for
another ground, namely, insufficiency of evidence.
In the resolution of 22 August 1995, we directed the
Solicitor General to inform the Court whether he agrees
with the recommendation of Assistant Solicitor General De
la Cruz and Solicitor Holgado-Marcilla. In his
Manifestation of 14 September 1995, the Solicitor General
not only expressed full agreement with the said
recommendation, but even added the following
observations:
10. After reading the Court’s Decision, the Solicitor

General has noted that petitioner’s conviction is
based on circumstantial evidence.
11. The law and a host of the Court’s ruling declare
that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if the following conditions concur:
(1) There is more that one circumstance;

(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt
(Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
12. In this case, it should be stressed that the inference

that petitioner falsified documents appears to be
based on another inference, i.e., that he was in
possession of the same because he accompanied his
co-accused Catre in the transactions. However,
other than accompanying Catre, there is no
evidence on record that petitioner had custody of
the falsified documents.
13. As to the conspiracy angle, there is likewise no
showing that petitioner interceded for Catre. In
fact, it was Catre who talked to Calica. (p. 19-20,
TSN, August 26, 1991). Neither was it shown that
petitioner had a hand in the processing of the
import entry declaration for the release of the
shipment from the Bureau of Customs. It was not
also proven that he was instrumental in the
approval of the import entry declaration.
_______________
Vergara, 221 SCRA 560 [1993].
524

Pecho vs. People
14. The elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts

constituting the crime itself, must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Manuel, 234 SCRA
532). To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance
of the conspiracy. (People vs. Roxas, 241 SCRA
369). In this regard, it is respectfully submitted
that there is no overt act conclusively attributable
to petitioner which would pin him down as a co-
conspirator.
15. Thus, it is the inexorable duty of the Solicitor
General to recommend petitioner’s acquittal, as he
so recommends, inasmuch as the People was not
able to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the
constitutional presumption of petitioner’s
innocence.
We then required the parties to submit their respective

memoranda on the following issues:
(a) the insufficiency of the evidence for the complex

crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents, and
(b) the validity of the conviction therefor under an
information for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, vis-à-vis the constitutional
right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and the

Office of the Solicitor General are one in asserting that the
petitioner could not be convicted based entirely on
circumstantial evidence because of the failure of the
prosecution to satisfy the requisites set forth in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, namely, (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner further cited

portions of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the
testimony of Customs Broker Constantino Calica which
prove that it was Catre alone who made the introduction to
Calica that they were agents of Eversun Commercial
Trading, and that it was Catre who did all the talking and
directly transacted with Calica regarding the terms and
conditions of the particular engagement and who actually
deliv-
525
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 525

Pecho vs. People
ered the documents to him. There is no evidence that the

petitioner had a hand in the processing of the import entry
declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau
of Customs or was instrumental in the approval of the
import entry declaration. Thus:
Q Now, did Mr. Odon Pecho actually engage your services?

A They are two, sir, Mr. Joe Catre and Mr. Odon Pecho.
Q Who actually transacted with you with regards to your
services, is it Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
A Mr. Joe Catre, sir.
Q So it was Joe Catre?
A Yes, sir.
Q And not Odon Pecho, is that right?
A Well, he is the companion of Mr. Catre and they
introduced themselves to me that they are the
authorized representative of the importer.
Q That is right. Who introduced to you?
A Mr. Catre was the one who talks [sic] to me, sir.
Q But in your testimony, the person who delivered to you
the documents, the bill of lading, the commercial
invoices, the packing list, the importer’s sworn
statement, etc. which was made the basis of the, of your
preparation for the processing of the import entry, who
delivered toyou these documents that you mentioned?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And who talked to you about the terms and conditions
of this engagement or contracts?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And not Mr. Odon Pecho?

A Yes, sir.
Q Who actually delivered to you the documents, Mr. Catre
or Mr. Pecho?
A It was Mr. Catre, sir, he was the one handling the case.
AJ ESCAREAL
Q [To] Whom did you talk first?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor, he was the one handling the
case, the documents, Your Honor.
Q Do you know how they introduced themselves to you?
A That is the only thing that I remember Your Honor that
they came to my office and told me that they are the im-
526

Pecho vs. People
porter’s representatives and that they are engaging my

services.
Q Who said that?
A Mr. Catre Your Honor.
Q How about Mr. Pecho?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Did he say anything?
A At that time your Honor, it was Mr. Catre who was
doing that talking.
Q Did Mr. Catre give his name to you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did he introduce himself?
A That he is Mr. Joe Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about his companion, did his companion introduce
himself to you or he was introduced by Mr. Catre to
you?
A He did not introduce himself to me Your Honor.
Q So during that meeting you do not know that the name
of the companion of Mr. Catre is Odon Pecho.
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And how did your son attend to it?
A Two days after Your Honor, Mr. Catre called our office
to assist and help them in the preparation of the cargo
at the arrastre operator because that is usually being
done by the broker when the shipment goes for
examination. (t.s.n., Hearing of August 26, 1991).

As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General

rejects the theory of the petitioner and submits that the
information in this case contains the essential ingredients
of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents; therefore, assuming there is sufficient
evidence, the petitioner could be convicted of the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public
and commercial documents without violating Section 14(2),
Article III of the Constitution on the right of the accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
We shall first take up the second issue since it involves a

constitutional right of the accused.
527
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 527

Pecho vs. People
On the assumption that the prosecution’s evidence had

satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction for the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents, there is absolutely no
merit in the petitioner’s claim that he could not be
convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
2
against
him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Such right,
an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in
the Bill of Rights which the people of Great Britain
demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of
Orange on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the
Constitution of the United States and was extended to the3
Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902.
It was later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately,
enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987. It
has the following objectives:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge

against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the
court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had
(United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not
conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every4 fact and circumstance necessary to constitute
the crime charged.
Conformably therewith, 5
the Rules of Court has prescribed
the appropriate rules.
What determines the real nature and cause of
accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the
________________
2 Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

3 U.S. vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 223 [1904].
4 Supra note 3, at 226.
5 Sections 6-12, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
528

Pecho vs. People
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble

of the information or complaint nor the specification of the
provision of law alleged
6
to have been violated, they being
conclusions
7
of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal
mistake.
It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a
crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and

proof.—When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the
evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved include in that which is charged, or of the offense

charged included in that which is proved.
The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in

determining when an offense includes or is included in
another. We have shown in the challenged decision why the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents is included in the offense
charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this
case “can also be considered as charging two offenses: the
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex
crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents,” and since8the petitioner failed
to object before trial to such duplicity, he could be validly
convicted
9
of both or either of the offenses charged and
proved.
II
We shall now turn to the first issue: whether the evidence

adduced by the prosecution had established beyond reason-
_______________
6 Matilde vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456 [1975].

7 U.S. vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 [1910].
8 Section 3(e), Rule 117, Rules of Court.
9 Section 3, Rule 120, Id.
529
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 529

Pecho vs. People
able doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the complex crime
of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents. In light of the consistent and
persistent negative stance of the Office of the Solicitor
General, personally confirmed and reinforced by the
Solicitor General in his separate Manifestation, we
reevaluated the evidence.
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we based the
conviction of the petitioner on conspiracy.
The question that logically crops up then is not whether
the combination of the circumstantial evidence proved in
this case against the petitioner had established beyond
reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents, as asseverated by him and the

public respondent. Rather, the question is whether the
prosecution has discharged its duty to establish conspiracy
between the petitioner
10
and Catre.
The information charges the petitioner
11
and his co-
accused Joe Catre as principals who “conspir[ed],
confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed], and mutually
help[ed] one another,” with Catre “representing himself to
be a representative of Everson Commercial Trading of
Cotabato City, a corporation, firm or partnership which
turned out to be nonexistent, fake or fictitious.” The
evidence for the prosecution, as admitted by the
respondent, only showed that it was Catre who possessed
the falsified documents, contracted the services of Calica,
and delivered the documents to the latter for processing. In
the absence of satisfactory explanation, Catre, being the
one in possession
12
of the forged documents, is presumed to
be the forger. Catre, however, could not provide the
explanation because only the petitioner was tried. The
information states that his address is “unknown,” and the
record does not show that a warrant for his arrest was
issued. The
_______________
10 Original Records (OR), 1.

11 Article 17, Revised Penal Code.
12 Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, 125 Phil. 1110 [1967]; 19 SCRA 688
[1967].
530

Pecho vs. People
only warrant
13
of arrest that was issued was that for the
petitioner. Assuming that such evidence and the others
adduced by the prosecution are to be admitted to prove the
commission of the crime, a prima facie case enough to
prove the guilt of Catre with moral certainty was duly
established against Catre as a principal. Accordingly, if
conspiracy were proven, the petitioner would be equally
guilty of the offense proved. For, in a conspiracy, every act
of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a common
design or purpose of such a conspiracy
14
is, in contemplation
of law, the act of each of them.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
15
15
decide to commit it. Direct proof of previous agreement to
commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and 16
design,
concerted action, and community of interest. It is,
however, settled that the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is likewise required to support a
finding of conspiracy. In other words, conspiracy must be
shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the
commission of the offense itself in order to uphold the
fundamental principle that no one shall be found guilty
17
of a
crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.
It is also essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy
as to be liable for the acts of the others that there be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance
_______________
13 OR, 5.
14 RAMON C. AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, vol. 1 [1987],
488; People vs. Pama, 216 SCRA 385 [1992]; People vs. Rostata, 218 SCRA
657 [1993]; People vs. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 [1993].
15 Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
16 People vs. Martinado, 214 SCRA 712 [1992]; People vs. Pama, supra
note 14; People vs. Cordova, 224 SCRA 319 [1993]; People vs. Canillo, 236
SCRA 22 [1994].
17 Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9 [1989]; People vs. Garcia, 215
SCRA 349 [1992].
531
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 531

Pecho vs. People
18
of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind
in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should
have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution19
in the execution of the crime planned to be
committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself,
or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators
by being present at the commission of the crime or by 20
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.
Since conspiracy must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, then the next inquiry would be whether
the prosecution was able to adduce such proof against the
petitioner. It is in this respect that we agree with the

People and the petitioner that the prosecution had only
circumstantial evidence against the petitioner.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially
formulated, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,
i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
21
with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.
In the instant case, all that the prosecution was able to
prove insofar as the petitioner is concerned is that he and
co-accused Catre are from Surigao del Norte; that he
accompa-
_______________
18 People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235 [1988].

19 AQUINO, op. cit., 497.
20 People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 [1995].
21 People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs. Alvero, 224 SCRA
16 [1993]; People vs. Genobia, 234 SCRA 699 [1994].
532

Pecho vs. People
nied Catre in contracting the services of customs broker

Constantino Calica; and that he also was with Catre when
the latter went with Dennis Calica, son of Constantino
Calica, to the Manila International Container Port. In all
these instances, however, it was Catre who transacted the
business and did all the talking. As a matter of fact, the
petitioner was not even introduced to Calica. As
recapitulated by the Office of the Solicitor General in its
Memorandum:
[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded for Catre.

Prosecution witness Calica testified that it was Catre and not
petitioner, who introduced themselves as agents of Eversun

Commercial Trading. He also testified that it was Catre who did
all the talking and directly transacted with him (Calica) regarding
the terms and conditions of the particular engagement and it was
also Catre, and not petitioner, who actually delivered the
documents to him (tsn, August 26, 1991). There is no evidence
that petitioner had a hand in the processing of the import entry
declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of
Customs. There is also evidence that petitioner was instrumental
in the approval of the import entry declaration. In short, there is
no showing that petitioner
22
performed an overt act in furtherance
of alleged conspiracy.
The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove

that the petitioner (1) personally represented himself as an
agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the
falsity of any of the public and commercial documents in
question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of all or some
of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial
evidence to prove conspiracy between the petitioner and
Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither
is there evidence of petitioner’s active participation in the
commission of the crime. The concordant combination and
cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by
the prosecution’s evidence fails to satisfy the requirements
of Section 4, Rule 133
________________
22 Rollo, 204-205.
533
VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 533

Pecho vs. People
of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable doubt as to his

guilt. And since his constitutional
23
right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty can24
be overthrown only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then25
be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision of 14 November
1994 is SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered
REVERSING the challenged decision of 28 June 1993 and
resolution of 12 August 1993 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 14844 and ACQUITTING petitioner

ODON PECHO of the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial documents,
without, however, prejudice to any appropriate
administrative action which his office may take against
him as may be warranted by the circumstances in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Padilla, Regalado,

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Francisco,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., On leave.
Motion for reconsideration granted. Judgment set aside,

petitioner acquitted.
——o0o——
________________
23 Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

24 Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
25 U.S. vs. Gutierrez, 4 Phil. 493 [1905]; People vs. Sadie, 149 SCRA
240 [1987]; Perez vs. Sandiganbayan, supra note 17.
534
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16 Pecho Vs People G.R. No. 111399

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2/9/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 262

518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

Constitutional Law; Right to be Informed; Criminal Law; The

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 519

Pecho vs. People

to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. It

the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987.

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pecho vs. People

sign, concerted action, and community of interest. It is, however,

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 521

Pecho vs. People

Same; Same; Same; Same; Estafa Through Falsification of

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified the

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pecho vs. People

R.A. No. 3019, as amended—because the said section

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 523

Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General joins the

10. After reading the Court’s Decision, the Solicitor

(1) There is more that one circumstance;

12. In this case, it should be stressed that the inference

Vergara, 221 SCRA 560 [1993].

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

14. The elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts

We then required the parties to submit their respective

(a) the insufficiency of the evidence for the complex

In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and the

beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner further cited

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 525

ered the documents to him. There is no evidence that the

Q Now, did Mr. Odon Pecho actually engage your services?

Q And not Mr. Odon Pecho?

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

porter’s representatives and that they are engaging my

As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General

We shall first take up the second issue since it involves a

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 527

On the assumption that the prosecution’s evidence had

First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge

2 Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution.

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

information or complaint and not the caption or preamble

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and

offense proved include in that which is charged, or of the offense

The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in

We shall now turn to the first issue: whether the evidence

6 Matilde vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456 [1975].

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 529

commercial documents, as asseverated by him and the

10 Original Records (OR), 1.

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 262, SEPTEMBER 27, 1996 531

petitioner. It is in this respect that we agree with the

18 People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235 [1988].

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nied Catre in contracting the services of customs broker

[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded for Catre.

petitioner, who introduced themselves as agents of Eversun