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*From PPT *Shaded portions: From Pointers ni Sir
*From Audio
*From Codal
*Included in Syllabus but not in both audio and powerpoint
AGRARIAN REFORM
I. History and Legal Basis
PRE-SPANISH PERIOD
Before the Spaniards came the Filipinos lived in villages or barangays
ruled by chiefs or datus.
Everyone had access to the fruits of the soil.
DAR did not elaborate on this one. But what I can surmise is that
probably no one was concerned about ownership. Gamay rag tao at
that time. I think the keyword there is “access”. Walay limitation ba.
SPANISH PERIOD
When the Spaniards came the concept of encomienda (Royal Land
Grants) was introduced.
- “haciendas” (wealthy chinese families)
st
1 PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
First Philippine Republic was established in 1899, Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo
declared in the Malolos Constitution his intention to confiscate large
estate. - but his regime was short lived.
Aguinaldo’s plan was never implemented.
AMERICAN PERIOD
Philippine Bill of 1902 – Set the ceilings: 16 has for private individuals
and 1,024 has for corporations.
Land Registration Act of 1902 (Act No. 496) –registration of land titles
under the Torrens system. That means, ownership continued to be the
concern starting way back from the spanish period.
Public Land Act of 1903 – introduced the homestead system.
Tenancy Act of 1933 (Act No. 4054 and 4113) – regulated relationships
between landowners and tenants of rice (50-50 sharing) and sugar
cane lands. -limited
COMMONWEALTH PERIOD
President Manuel L. Quezon espoused the “Social Justice” program.
1935 Constitution- “The promotion of social justice to ensure the well-
being and economic security of all people should be the concern of the
State”
Commonwealth Act No. 178 (An Amendment to Rice Tenancy ActNo.
4045) -Certain controls in the landlord-tenant relationships
Commonwealth Act. No.461, 1937 – Specified reasons for the dismissal
of tenants and only with the approval of the Tenancy Division of the
Department of Justice. You will note again, the relationship bet.
Landlord and tenant has proliferated and the government was just
giving restrictions. Meaning, the landlord can’t just unilaterally eject the
tenants, there has to be justifiable reasons.
Rural Program Administration, created March 2,1939- purchase and
lease of haciendas and their sale and lease to the tenants.
JAPANESE OCCUPATION
peasants and workers organizations grew strength.
peasants took up arms
Anti- Japanese group, the HUKBALAHAP (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa
Hapon)
not much during this time
PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
➢ After Philippine Independence in 1964 , problems of land tenure
remained .
President Manuel Roxas (1946-1948):
Republic Act No. 34 -- 70-30 sharing arrangements and regulating
share-tenancy contracts. It used to be 50-50, now it is 70-30.
Republic Act No.55 – more effective safeguard against arbitrary
ejectment of tenants.
PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC
President Elpidio Quirino (1948-1953)
Executive Order No. 355 issued on October 23,1950 -- Replaced the National
Land Settlement Administration with Land Settlement Development
Corporation (LASEDECO)
President Ramon Magsaysay(1953-1957)
Republic Act No. 1160 of 1954 -- Abolished the LASEDECO and established
the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA)
Republic Act No. 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954)– (note)
-relationship between landowners and tenant farmers by organizing share-tenancy
and leasehold system.
-tenant has option to elect either share tenancy or leasehold
-it also created the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Cont. President Ramon Magsaysay(1953-1957)….
Republic Act No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of 1955) – Created the Land
Tenure Administration(LTA)
Take note of this under Magsaysay, 1199, just for our consumption although it has
been superseded.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
Before Magsaysay, the relationship was concentrated on share tenancy but during
this time there was another system that came out, and what’s that? LEASEHOLD.
If before share tenancy was about sharing 50/50, then 70/30, and now share
tenancy is kelangan ikaw land owner imung ipa eject you should follow the reasons
to eject.
No arbitrary ejectment ! those are the concerns during Magsaysay but here
comes another concern and that is LEASEHOLD and in fact under the law the
tenant has the option, why the option?
Because this was changed in the time of Macapagal under R.A. 3844. Under
Macapagal there is no more option, ! no more share tenancy, we will only adopt
leasehold
What’s the difference between share tenancy and leasehold? You will note in share
tenancy, the concerns are sharing and ejectment.
What are in share tenancy that is not in leasehold?
If a tenant dies under share tenancy the children of the deceased cannot succeed
but under leasehold the descendants automatically become tenants as well. Once a
tenant, father or mother dies, a land owner cannot say “since I cannot eject you
tenant I will just sell this land”. Under leasehold, the transferee or the
purchaser of the land is bound by the relationship. In short, the Land owner has no
escape. This was the option before during the time of Macapagal. With this law
R.A.3344, share tenancy was abolished and it was only leasehold. Macapagal was
even called the father of Agrarian Reform.
• President Carlos P. Garcia (1957-1961)
• Continued the program of President Ramon Magsaysay.
• President Diosdado Macapagal(1961-1965):
Republic Act No. 3844 of August 8,1963– Abolished shared tenancy,
institutionalized leasehold.
• President Ferdinand Marcos(1965-1986):
Republic Act No.6389, (Code of Agrarian Reform) and RA No. 6390 of 1971
– Created the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Agrarian Reform
Special Account Fund.
- Provides automatic conversion of share tenancy to leasehold.
Presidential Decree No. 2, September 26,1972 – Declared the country under
land reform program.
Presidential Decree No.27,October 21,1972– Restricted land reform scope to
tenanted rice and corn lands and set the retention limit at 7 hectares.
President Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992)
➢ Section 21 under Article II – “The State shall promote comprehensive
rural development and agrarian reform.”
▪ signed into law Republic Act No. 6657
▪ became effective on June 15,1988
E.O 405, during the time of Aquino, vested in the LBP to determine land valuation.
In the acquisition, the landowner can voluntarily give up the land and AGREE on
the land valuation to be determined by Land Bank. If the landowner does not agree
with the acquisition, the government will have to do the compulsory acquisition.
And then, after that, you will have the valuation of the land bank of the Phil. If the
land owner does not agree with the valuation, the land owner will usually go to the
Civil Court.
Who has jurisdiction? Regional trial court acting as Special Agrarian Court
President Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998):
➢ His administration committed to the vision “Fairer, faster and more
meaningful implementation of the Agrarian Reform Program.
Republic Act No.7881,1995 – Amended certain provisions of RA 6657
and exempted fishponds and prawns from the coverage of CARP.
Republic Act 8532,1998 (Agrarian Reform Fund Bill) – additionalPhp50
billion for CARP and extended its implementation for another 10 years.
- You have the additional fund and extending the implementation for
another 10 years. Why was there an extension?

- Because R.A.6657 was to be implemented for a period of 10 years.
- Why extended it? Well that would be an admission that the program
has not been fully implemented. After this in 1998 it was extended for
another 10 years so it went to 2008.
- What was the latest amendment under CARP? 

It was CARPER R.A.9700 passed on 2009
- So what happened when CARP expired on 2008 and before CARPER
was enacted into law? Do you know what the congress did? 

- Congress merely passed a Resolution, Both houses, they passed a
resolution extending the coverage of CARP.

Question: Is that Valid? ☺ “daw” (valid nalang…)
- If the Land of your client between 2008 and 2009 can you question the
acquisition, Saying that there was no law supporting to that acquisition?
(naa ni sa later part, basta gipa.retroact nila ang law to include the
period nga walay law kay nalangay ug approve.)
President Joseph E. Estrada(1998-2000)“ERAP PARA SA MAHIRAP”
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➢ launched the Magkabalikat Para sa Kaunlarang Agraryo or MAGKASAKA.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2000-present):
Kung manag-iya na sila sa yuta, nganung naa pa may leasehold?
- Because the constitution or the law provides merely a right, a farmer may
not opt to avail of that right. Ingon sila “a di mi motoo ana inyung
programa oie, Pabilin lang mi diri arlese unta padayun lang mig tenant”
but they will not be governed by share tenancy, wala na… abolished
naman to, but they will be governed by leasehold operations.
- Nganu man ang government is concerned for farmers who are lessee’s
even though they don’t want to own parcels of land? Because dili sila
ganahan nga naa napuy INEQUALITY.
How does the government protect the interest of the farmers? Leasehold contract.
And, if you are the farmer in leasehold, you should have that leasehold annotated
at the back of the title of the land.
Land Tenure Improvement/Provision of Support Services
Why is there a need for improvement? And Why is there a need for support?
- Remember, equalization of social and economic forces. That means the Law itself
recognizes that the mere giving of this parcels of Land to the farmers is not
enough. They need credit assistance (para sa tanom and all)

Agri-Agra Law – under the law there is a specific provision that rural banks must
have a portfolio for credit assistance to be extended by way of loan to farmers.

Sa ato pa RESERVE daan. (wa na gi.apil sa syllabus kay motaas na daw)
Infrastructure Project/ KALAHI ARZone
- Agrarian reform Zone, once there is an area composed of ARB’s,
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries, They are a community, butangan sila og
skwelahan, butangan sila multi-purpose hall, that part of assistance of
the state and they are called AR zone.
Agrarian Justice (2 PHASES)
1. Agrarian Legal Assistance – executive (DAR will provide lawyers to farmers)
2. Adjudication of Cases.
*If you are the lawyer of the Land Owner, inyung papahawa.on ang nagpuyo sa
yuta sa inyung client. Muadto kag DAR for assistance? You may not be granted.
Why? Who will decide, DAR dba? Who will assist? DAR And besides, if you are the
lawyer of the Landowner, you will not be tempted to get inside the system. Why?
The moment you get inside the system, the element needed so that DAR can
adjudicate the case is RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TENANTS. Now, would you
admit that there is Landowner and Tenant Relationship? Dili! Kansi kaayo ang
landowner ana. Ngano man? If you admit that, there are certain RESTRICTIONS!
And ofcourse, that is against the interest of your client land owner.
- Asa man cla mangadto? Sa civil courts na! Mao nang mufile sila ug
forcible entry, unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana.
CARPER
Importance of Land Reform and its Constitutionality*
Assoc. of Small Landowners vs. Hon. Secretary, 175 SCRA 343
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the
distribution of this precious resource among our people. But it is more than a
slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing the
increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as
their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social
justice to "insure the well-being and economic security of all the people,” especially
the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding
specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment
and disposition of private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and
profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and
implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil."
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments,
it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human
Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the
common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the
State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless,
to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the
State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In
determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, had already been enacted by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8,
1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially superseded
almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972,
along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners.
On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full
land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of
their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
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131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power
from the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of farmers. The result, after almost a
year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed
on June 10, 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them supplementary effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers
under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. As for the
power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229,
the same was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a
rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian
reform.
ARTICLE XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods
and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an
expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
under-privileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine,
by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed,
held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition
of property and its increments.
Section 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create
economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a
just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
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Section 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers' organizations
to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and
shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research,
and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other
natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural
estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
Section 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen
through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production, and
marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and
conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just
share from their labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
Section 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds
of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation,
and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as
payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
ARTICLE XVIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 22. At the earliest possible time, the Government shall expropriate idle or
abandoned agricultural lands as may be defined by law, for distribution to the
beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program.
MEANING OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION
Laws that seek to promote the common good, generally by protecting and assisting
the weaker members of society.
Let’s talk about Social Justice. Why? Because what will follow are the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article XIII, that talks about Social Justice.
Just take note of the underlined words “SOCIAL JUSTICE IS THE HUMANIZATION
OF THE LAWS”. Personification of the laws. Meaning, the thrust of the law is TO
PROTECT PERSONS. And you have Equalization of Social and Economic Forces.
Another important phrase: “Measures calculated to ensure economic stability”.
Meaning of social justice
Social Justice – is neither communism nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy, but the humanization of the laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the state so that justice in its National and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the component
elements of society, through the maintenance of proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, and
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all government on time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.
The constitutional provisions on agrarian reform
(5) Specific provision on agrarian and natural resources reform. Article XIII:
Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and
reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-
sharing.
Article XIII, Sec.4- This was already complied. The mandate that a law should be
passed that will undertake an agrarian reform program. How was it manifested?
You have RA 6657. The law was passed in 1988, during the time of Aquino. The
Constitution itself mandates that the program is founded on the right of FARMERS
and REGULAR FARM WORKERS, and OTHER FARM WORKER.
Rights if you are a Farmer, Regular Farm Worker? Your right is to own the lands you
till. You can either put it in (1)your name, or it can be the (2)name of the
cooperative on which you are a member. Okay?
Was this complied under CARL? Not necessarily. Why? Because under CARL, you
can own an agricultural land EVEN IF YOU ARE NOT A TILLER of the said land.
Nobody questioned this in the SC. Nobody said that “hey SC, why should my land
be awarded to somebody who is not a tiller of my land when the Constitution says
To own the lands they till”. How will the SC solve this question if this is raised in the
future? Anyway, that’s not the issue now.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
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How about OTHER FARM WORKERS? Do they have the right to own the lands they
till? NO because the constitution just said that “they have the right to receive a just
share of the fruits”. Was this complied under CARL? My opinion is it was not. Why?
There are different classes of farmers. We have Regular Farmworkers, Seasonal
Farmworkers, and the catch-all Other Farmworkers. You are an “Other Farmworker”
if you do not fall under the 2 preceding categories. Those classes of farmers:
(1)Farmworkers and (2)Other Farmworkers they qualify to own parcels of land
under the law. Is the law consistent with the Constitution? I don’t think so.
Take note of this, what is the meaning of “Landless”? Does it mean technically that
the person does not own any amount of land? That is usually our impression. But
under CARL, you are landless as long as you don’t own an agricultural land
exceeding 3 hectares. Is that the purpose of an agrarian reform program? I believe
the purpose is really for those who are truly landless because that is the very
essence of social legislation: Equalization of Forces. If you own a parcel of land,
why the need of having another parcel of land?
Another issue is this: RETENTION LIMITS. I’ll give you an overview so that at least
you will understand when we talk about agrarian reform. Agrarian Reform program
is basically taking away parcels of land by the state from those owners of the
agricultural lands. If you own 60 hectares, you won’t own anymore 60 hectares.
You will only be able to retain a certain number of hectares. Who determines the
number? CONGRESS. Under CARL, landowners can retain up to 5 hectares. So, if
you own 60 hectares, you will retain 5 hectares. That is agrarian reform; that is
equalization of forces. Why? Because you have landowners who own parcels of
land and you have tenants who till the land but don’t own any parcels of land. How
will they become equal? The government will take away parcels of land and give it
to the land owners.
But, that does not end there because that TAKING is what you call Expropriation of
Eminent Domain. That’s why in Sec. 4, there is a provision there subject to the
Payment of Just Compensation. This is not simple because if you own vast hectares
of land, you don’t have to give it away and receive a compensation nga ang
mu.valuate kay ang government kay normally gagmay. Pero, base rapud na sa
imong sayop. Ngano man? Under Sec. 17, one of the factors that will affect the
computation of just compensation is the Assessed Value. And ang landowner nga
gusto makasave, dili mudeclare sa sakto na assessed value. Ang ideclare sa tax
declaration, gamay ra kaayo kay aron gamay rag bayran nga real property tax.
Without knowing, ang iyang yuta kuhaon diay to sa gobyerno unya ang iyang yuta,
bayran ra base sa botbot niya na assessed value.
Sec 4 talks about retention limits. It qualifies retention limits. Reasonable retention
limits. That has not been questioned, so right now the limit is fixed at 5 hectares.
Children of landowners will also retain, subject to this 2 qualifications:
1. At least 15 yrs. Old
2. (a)Personally Cultivating the land or, (b)Directing managing the land
Kasagarang anak, dili jud nay mu.uma. So anhi ni nila pasiguon sa ikaduha.
“Directly managing the land”. Naa bana? Wala! Nagpahayahay rana. So what is the
implication here? It is prone to corruption and abuse. Ngano man? Pwede raman
“daw” sabotsaboton ang MARO. What is MARO? Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer.
He is the representative of DAR in the Municipal/City Level. It is the MARO who
investigates who are the children qualified for retention, and submit a report to the
PARO. So that is the framework of this agrarian reform program.
Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations
to participate in the planning organization, and management of the program, and
shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research,
and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
Sec. 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship,
whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other
natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
“The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own
agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by
law.
Take note of Sec. 6, still in the constitution. While the framework is: Acquisition
subject to payment of just compensation, the program must respect (1)prior rights,
(2)homestead rights, and (3)the rights of indigenous communinities. So if you are a
holder of homestead patent, your land is not covered by the agrarian reform
program. But, there is a BUT. Here, in sec. 6, there is no qualification. It just
mentioned “subject to prior rights, homestead rights”. But you know what
happened to the law? The law qualifies it. Qualifies it in a sense that if you are a
grantee of a homestead patent, gitagaan kag yuta sa DENR para naa kay ikabalay,
but wala ka nagpuyo or actually till sa yuta, the law says that you are not qualified
for the exemption. But, section 6 does not qualify.
Sec. 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,
especially of local communities; to the preferential use of the communal marine
and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also
protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to
offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion.
Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine
and fishing resources.
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Sec. 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of
the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation,
and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as
payment for their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.
RA 3844
BENEFICIARIES
Tenant Farmers
Agricultural wage-earners or farm workers
Settlers including migrant workers
Owner-cultivators of less than family-size farms
LANDS COVERED BY THE CODE
Tenanted Areas
Landed Estates
Old Settlements
Proposed Settlements
COMPOSITION OF THE CODE
An agricultural leasehold system to replace all existing share tenancy
systems in agriculture.
During the Time of Diosdado Macapagal and it was this law that ABOLISHED
SHARE TENANCY and UPHELD LEASE HOLD. Before this was RA 1199 where
the tenant is given the choice whether the tenant would love to go to share
tenancy or lease hold. If you have read 1199 the meaning or the concept of share
tenancy and lease hold are the same.
With respect to parties: Parties are the land owner and the tenant although in the
case of leasehold the tenant is technically called lessee.
There is a contribution of the land owner and that contribution is in the form of a
land. The contribution of the tenant or lessee is labor. And the tenant/lessee is
supposed to plant, cultivate, harvest and when there is production, divide the
share. The same concept ! share tenancy and leasehold.
But why is it that leasehold is preferred over share tenancy?
Why leasehold?
- Protects tenurial and economic status
- ECONOMIC STATUS It is the upliftment of the life of the tenant.
But what about tenurial? It has something to do with tenure. [Im
sure in your favorite subject LABOR LAW, you remembered security of
tenure] Security of tenure is provided by law not withstanding
any contract. So if you have a contract that says you are only there
for a period of 10 months for example but under the law you are
considered to be regularly employed because you are performing work
directly for the company then you are considered a regular not
withstanding any contract. The same concept is true with respect to
agrarian reform. That means if you are a tenant or a lessee the
LO cannot just dispossess, remove or eject you from the land
w/o apparent reason there has to be a ground, it should be
based on the ground. And the grounds are provided by law.
- Guarantees physical possession, enjoyment and management
- Assures continuity of relations
- In case of death of the tenant or the lessee, the relationship
CONTINUES. It continues with the immediate family. That’s
why there’s protection of the tenurial status.
- In case lessor sells or alienates the legal possession, transferee shall be
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of lessor. - -
- The transferee/the purchaser is subrogated but not
subrogated in the positive sense of the word. He has
to assume the rights and obligations of the lessor.
The transferee cannot say that I am innocent, I don’t know,
I am not aware that there was this relationship between
tenant and LO because if that is the case that that can be
an excuse then futile ang balaod.
Agricultural leasehold? (read Sec 4-38 for more info :p)
A juridical tie between lessor and lessee
- Abolished shared tenancy. Now leasehold tenancy.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
4
- Why is it that leasehold relationship was preferred?
a. Tenurial Security under Agrarian Land Reform – relationship can
exist even if there is death of the lessee or lessor, sale , transfer
or conveyance of agricultural land.
- The transferee of the agriland, the vendee is bound by the leasehold
relationship
- Should it be annotated? No. Not necessary. The law provides for that.
- Leasehold relationship will remain. To protect the lessee from possible
ejectment or disposition of property.
- Refers to 2 parties
- It is referred as agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee
- Lease – somebody must pay rental
- Can the lessor eject the tenant?
Yes, the lessor has the grounds provided by 3844 to eject the tenant.
Unless the ground for ejectment is not enumerated in 3844, the lessee
cannot be ejected.
Po vs Dampal
- talks about redemption, the right of the lessee to redeem a property that was
foreclosed by the bank. But the law even mentions about the right of pre-emption
“if ibaligya gani sa tag-iya ang yuta dunay katungod nga e.offer ngadto
sa lessee ang yuta.”
Sec. 12 on legal redemption ! Farm lots foreclosed by the bank due non-payment
of a loan. Po is the highest bidder in the auction. The previous owner, the
mortgagor and the tenant filed a Civil Case against the bank for annulment of
mortgage. Meanwhile the tenant filed a complaint for legal redemption with DAR.
Subject of this case is the case of legal redemption not the annulment of mortgage.
Because Dampal wants to redeem the land from the bank. But PO said you have no
right of redemption because it is already beyond the period as provided under sec.
12. Sec 12 provides 180 days from notice in writing.
DARAB said no more right to redeem because it has prescribed. But you have to
know under sec. 12, it provides for a reckoning point, and the reckoning point is a
NOTICE IN WRITING. Who shall give the notice? It is the vendee,
supposed to be the bank that shall serve notice on all the lessees
including Private Respondent Dampal because he is affected by the sale.
Not only the lessees but also including DAR.
-There was no notice served. So SC said, the lack of written notice does not start
the running of the prescriptive period.
- Contention of PO, the highest bidder ! Dampal, when you filed an action against
the bank for nullity of mortgage you were aware that there was non-payment of
the loan and the bank is to foreclose the property. It was foreclosed that is why you
are seeking the nullity of the mortgage. Therefore you are considered to have a
constructive knowledge. ! SC said, this contention fails because of the express
requirement under the law that it has to be in WRITING.
One of the important provisions of the law is w/ respect to grounds to dispossess.
Take note: “dispossess” here means removal/ejectment from the land. So
you will note among the grounds that has been listed, dili pwede
ma.rakrakan ang tenant ug pusil. The land owner still has to comply with this.
This law still applies. (on grounds for ejectment)
SIR: Under the current law, CARL, there is no provision on ejectment! So which one
will you consult? This law (RA 3844). There is no provision under CARL regarding
the rights and obligations, you have to consult this law. That’s why this one is still
very applicable with respect to leasehold.
Grounds to dispossess a lessee: TOP-FNS
a. Failure to comply with terms and conditions of agreement
b. Planting of crops or the use of land for other purpose than that
agreed upon
c. Failure to adopt proven farm practices to conserve land
d. Fault or negligence resulting in substantial damage
e. Non-payment of rental when due
- One of the Important ground is this non-payment of the rental
when due. Going back to the relationship, LO provides the land, lessee
labor and when there is production they are supposed to divide the
produce. The produce there to be given by the lessee to the lessor/LO
is the rental. The rental is FIXED by law. The rental shall not exceed
25% of the average normal harvest. D pwede patas.an. Nganu
Page 4

man? Maalkansi ang lessee. Kung magsabot sila ug 50-50,unsaon
pagka.uplift sa economic status sa lessee?! Pwede paubsan? Pwede.
f. Employed a sublessee
- Normally the grounds are last two grounds, under 3844, there is an
express provision that the lessee will allow a sublessee.
- If they are agricultural workers under RA 3844, they are under Bill Of
Rights, they are entitled to minimum wage law, among others.
- Agricultural lessee vs Civil lessee
To distinguish lessee under Civil Code and under Agrarian Law
1. Grounds to eject - AL – 3844 while CL – Civil Code
2. Where will you file the ejectment case – agri lessee – DAR while
civil lessee – in regular courts
- Lessee has substantial rights, you don’t have to allege , you have to
support.
- Allegation only is not sufficient
Extinguishment of relation vs dispossession
a. Extinguishment – no court approval, voluntary act (abandonment
of land without knowledge of lessor or voluntary surrender by
lessee) or an act of God
b. Dispossession – with court order, premise of lessee
Sta. Anna vs Carpo, the issue is non-payment of the rentals. You will note there
are different rulings of the DAR.
ABBREVIATIONS USED: PARAD is the provincial adjudicator. Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator – PARAD. The DARAB is the central office in Manila. So any
decision of the PARAD goes to DARAB and from the DARAB being a quasi-judicial
agency under the rules of Court, goes to CA.
Now SC discusses first about BURDEN OF PROOF. NOTE: According to the SC under
sec. 37 the burden of proof to show the existence of a cause of
rejectment is upon petitioner land owner. That means we are talking about
all the grounds to dispossess. It is the LO who has the burden to prove the ground.
SC qualified that non-payment must be willful and deliberate. That means di
lang failure, it could be failure but if there was negligence on the part of the lessee
to pay that may not be taken against the lessee, because it has to be WILLFUL and
DELIBERATE non-payment.
So according to the court the lessee executed an affidavit that the LO refused to
receive the respective lease rentals and for another year the lessee wrote two
notices to the LO informing him of the availability of the lease rentals pero wa
kuha.a sa LO. That means there was no willful and deliberate non-payment
of the rentals due.
Sec. 37 talks about dispossess. There is a difference between extinguishment
of the relation as against dispossession.
- DISPOSSESSION there has to be a court order. Dili ni order referring to
civil court on the aspect of Civil law relationship, it is in the context of
the Department of agrarian reform.
- There is an ejectment under civil law, there is also an ejectment under
agrarian reform. The jurisdiction for one is different from the other.
- I’m sure you’ve heard cases about LO filing cases on ejectment against
occupants. Normally from squatters, in a parcel of land. And it’s normal
for lawyers to file the case under the civil law concept. Not agrarian
law. WHY? Its hard ang agrarian and its difficult to the part of
the LO. Why? If you file ejectment under agrarian law you are
bound by whatever rights of the occupants may have on the
parcel of land. Bound ka especially under RA 3844 that means you
cannot eject unless your ground falls under any of those grounds and
unsa may kasagaran mahitabo sa yuta? Diba naa sa yuta mo.kalit
nalang ug turok ang mga tawo bisag wa gitanum? Wa mo kabantay
ana? Murag mushroom diba? Tan.aw nimu nag.tulda lng, pagkahuman
ni balay na, nya nipa hut, nya nag.scene na jud. so you don’t file it
normally at the agrarian court. Why? Unsa man imu e.ground? and
besides if you file it there, you recognize that there is
relationship of LO and Lessee. Remember TENURIAL STATUS. Bisag
mamatay na na cya di ghapon na nimu mapahawa kay naa may
nag.sunod. So what LO would do is to file it under the civil
concept mao na nga nay rule 70. Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. Of course it may not fall under forcible entry, WHY? One year
mana from the time of entry, normally wa man ka diha. So imu buhaton
ngadto ka sa unlawful detainer and the allegation normally was that
there was TOLERANCE. You tolerate ang ila occupation with the
understanding nga hoy ug pahawaon gani moh, hawa na. That
is the civil law concept.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
5
- Jurisdiction is different, civil law concept you file to civil court, agrarian
ejectment you file ari sa agrarian Court /PARAD. So when we mention
here about court order we are referring to the order coming from the
agrarian court and the offense is premised on the grounds under the
law.
- Whereas if it is an extinguishment, normally it is a voluntary act.
Kung e. abandon, mopahawa sila sa yuta. Hinaot wala pamusila kay
aron mahadlok that is an extinguishment or there is an act of God,
basig gbaha.an cguro nya wala mo.hubas ang baha.
Can relation be terminated by death?
⦿ No, continue between lessor and members of lessee’s immediate farm
household to be chosen by lessor within 1 month from death:
⦿ If lessor cannot choose, the law provides this order of assumption: 1.
surviving spouse; 2. eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; 3. next
eldest descendants in the order of their age.
Liabilities of lessor if he ejects tenant without authorization?
-Fine or imprisonment
-Damages suffered
-Attorney’s fees
-Remuneration for last income
That means that there must be a complaint filed before the PARAD to
be able to lawfully eject a tenant. So, it is also provided for under the law.
Lease rental
Shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average normal
harvest during the 3 agricultural years immediately preceding the date
of leasehold after deducting amount used for the seeds and costs of
harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing.
- NOTE: EQUIVALENT: because it is not necessary that the payment of
the lease rental is the produce. It can be the produce, the money or
can be both depending upon the agreement of the parties.
- BUT, the lease rental cannot exceed 25%.
WHAT IS THE MEANING HERE OF AGRICULTURAL YEAR?
- The planting up to the harvest cycle, that constitutes agricultural year.
It is not referring to the calendar year. So probably in one year, there is
a cycle of 2 agricultural years depending on the crop/crops planted.
Bill of Rights for Agricultural Labor
SECTION 39.Rights for Agricultural Labor. — To enable the farm workers to
enjoy the same rights and opportunities in life as industrial workers, they shall
enjoy the following:
- (1)Right to self-organization;
- (2)Right to engage in concerted activities;
- (3)Right to minimum wage;
- (4)Right to work for not more than eight hours;
- (5)Right to claim for damages for death or injuries sustained
while at work;
- (6)Right to compensation for personal injuries, death or
illness; and
- (7)Right against suspension or lay-off.
SECTION 40.Right to Self-Organization. — The farm workers shall have the right
to self-organization and to form, join or assist farm workers' organizations of
their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing: Provided, That this right shall be
exercised in a manner as will not unduly interfere with the normal farm
operations. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for
membership in farm workers' organizations under their supervision but may form
separate organizations of their own.
SECTION 41.Right to Engage in Concerted Activities. — The farm workers shall
also have the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection.
For the purpose of this and the preceding Section, it shall be the duty of the
farm employer or manager to allow the farm workers, labor leaders, organizers,
advisers and helpers complete freedom to enter and leave the farm, plantation
or compound at the portion of the same where said farm workers live or stay
permanently or temporarily.
SECTION 42.Right to Minimum Wage. — Notwithstanding any provision of law or
contract to the contrary, farm workers in farm enterprises shall be entitled to at
least P3.50 a day for eight hours' work: Provided, That this wage may, however,
be increased by the Minimum Wage Board as provided for in Republic Act
Numbered Six hundred and two.
Page 5
 6
SECTION 43.Right to Eight Hours' Work. — Notwithstanding the provision of
Purpose Abolish leasehold in Main purpose is to provide
existing laws to the contrary, farm workers shall not be required to work for
tenanted lands. It land for the landless through
more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during
made the tiller of acquiring and distribution of
which the farm worker is not working and can leave his working place and can
the land the lands and providing support
rest completely shall not be counted.
amortizing owner of facilities and system for the
Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or the land he tills. benefit of the farmers.
impending emergencies caused by serious accidents, fire, flood, typhoon,
epidemic, or other disaster or calamity, or in case of urgent work to be Land Private lands which Covers all public and private
performed on farm machines, equipment or installations in order to avoid a Covered are devoted to rice agricultural lands including
serious loss which the farm employer or manager would otherwise suffer, or and corn ONLY. other lands of public domain
some other just cause of a similar nature, but in all such cases the farm workers s ui t a ble fo r a gr ic ul t ure
shall be entitled to receive compensation for the overtime work performed at the regardless of tenurial
same rate as their regular wages, plus at least twenty-five per arrangement and commodity
centum additional, based on their daily wages. produced.
No farm employer or manager shall compel a farm worker to work during Effect in With the passage of Main governing law of
Sundays and legal holidays: Provided, however, That should the farm worker Implementi RA 6657, it is only a Agrarian Land Reform here
agree to work on said days, he shall be paid an additional sum of at least ng Land suppletory law. This in the Philippines.
twenty-five per centum of his regular compensation; Provided, further, That the Reform means, it will be
farm employer or manager shall not be held liable for any claim for overtime Program applicable only to
work which he had not previously authorized, except if the work rendered was those matters not
to avoid damages to crops, produce, work animals or implements, buildings or covered by RA 6657.
the like.
Any agreement or contract between the farm employer or manager and the farm Number of Makes a distinction: • Note: not beneficiaries:
worker contrary to the provisions of this Section shall be null and void. hectares - If irrigated: 3 this is referring to the
that a - If not irrigated: tenants (because naa sad
SECTION 44.Right of Action for Damages. — Notwithstanding the provisions of tenant or 5
existing laws to the contrary, Act Numbered Eighteen hundred and seventy-four, baya beneficiaries na
farmer can
as amended, entitled "An Act to extend and regulate the responsibility of children under CARL)
own
employers for personal injuries and death suffered by their employees while at o The beneficiaries,
work", shall apply to farm workers insofar as it may be applicable. meaning the ARBs
SECTION 45.Right to Compensation for Personal Injuries, Death, or (agrarian reform
Illness. — Notwithstanding the provisions of existing laws to the contrary, Act beneficiaries) can be
Numbered Thirty-four hundred and twenty-eight, as amended, entitled "An Act awarded not exceeding 3
prescribing the compensation to be received by employees for personal injuries, hectares
death or illness contracted in the performance of their duties", shall apply to
farm workers insofar as it may be applicable. Ownership 7 hectares if • the retention is 5 hectares
of the land personally cultivated regardless of whether the
SECTION 46.Right Against Suspension or Lay-Off. — The landowner, farm
that can be by the landowner landowner is tilling the
employer or farm manager shall not suspend, lay-off or dismiss any farm worker
OR will cultivate
without just cause from the time a farm workers' organization or group of farm retained land or not.
workers has presented to the landowner a petition or complaint regarding any o Children of the
matter likely to cause a strike or lockout and a copy thereof furnished with the landowner – not
Department of Labor, or while an agricultural dispute is pending before the Court exceeding 3 hectares
of Agrarian Relations. If it is proved during the said period that a worker has
each, subject to 2
been suspended or dismissed without just cause, the Court may direct the
reinstatement and the payment of his wage during the time of his suspension or conditions:
dismissal, or of any sum he should have received had he not been suspended or 1. 15 years old and above
dismissed, without prejudice to any criminal liability of the landowner, farm 2. Personally cultivating or
employer or farm manager as prescribed by Section twenty-four of directly managing
Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and three, as amended. cdasia
SECTION 47.Other Applicable Provisions. — All other existing laws applicable to
non-agricultural workers in private enterprises which are not inconsistent with
this Code shall likewise apply to farm workers, farm labor organizations and
PD 27 – rice & corn land
agrarian disputes as defined in this Code, as well as to relations between farm
RA 6657 – all other agricultural land (including lands of public domain).
management and farm labor and the functions of the Department of Labor and
other agencies.
SECTION 48.Exceptions to Preceding Section. — The preceding Sections of this Sigre vs. CA, G.R. No. 109568, August 8, 2002
Chapter, except Sections forty, forty-one, forty-two and forty-three shall not
apply to farm enterprises comprising not more than twelve hectares The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law operates
distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural
SUPPLETORY EFFECT (nothing sa slides or sa records, but apil sa syllabus, idk asa
land including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as
sa law dapit… enlighten meeee) ! wala pud ang Reyes vs. Reyes GR 140164 (read provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; while,
case nalang) P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for
- IMO: This law has suppletory effect on CARL based on the grounds to the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states:
dispossess/eject since wala man dawn na sa CARL (believe at your own "Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect to
risk!!) rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x" It cannot be gainsaid, therefore,
that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever
provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to
TENANTS EMANCIPATION DECREE

the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained
(Pres. Decree no.27.) ! Marcos decree even with the passage of R.A. 6657.
BENEFICIARIES
Sigre v. CA : PD 27 is suppletory and operates separately from RA 6657.
Beneficiaries of the Decree are the bona fide tenant farmers of private
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share- Can lands acquired under PD 27 be transferred by DAR to another
crop or lease tenancy (not farm labor), whether classified as landed estate or qualified beneficiary?
not
Estolas vs. Mabalot, G.R. No. 133706, May 7, 2002

The tenant farmer- whether in land classified as landed estate (i.e., with an area
Facts:
of 24 hectares or above) or not, shall be deemed owner (subject to certain
requirements and conditions) of a portion constituting a family size of five (5)
hectares, if not irrigated and three (3)hectares, if irrigated. Lands transferred to
tenant-farmers under the Decree will revert to the government and not to the
landowners in case where the tenant abandons his tillage or refuses to take
advantage of his rights under the laws.
Note that the Decree does not apply to lands owned by the government or
government-owned corporation.
DIFFERENCE:
Difference between PD 27 (Tenants Emancipation Decree) and RA 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law)
PD 27 RA 6657
A Certificate of Land Transfer (hereinafter referred to as
CLT) was issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot
(hereinafter referred to as subject land). Needing money for medical
treatment, respondent passed on the subject land to the petitioner.
According to respondent, there was only a verbal mortgage; while
according to petitioner, a sale had taken place.
Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner before
the Barangay Lupon in Pangasinan for the purpose of redeeming the
subject land. When no amicable settlement was reached, the case was
referred to the DAR regional office
. DAR’s District Office found that respondent merely gave the subject
land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan he had
incurred from the latter; and recommending that the CLT remain in the
name of respondent and that the money loan be returned to petitioner.
Petitioner insisted that the subject land had been sold to
him by respondent and requested the DAR to cancel the CLT in
respondent’s name. Another investigation was conducted on the matter
which led to the issuance of an Order issued by DAR Regional Director.
In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering
the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting abandonment
thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject

Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS Page 6


land. Respondent’s request for reinvestigation was denied in a
Resolution.
Thus, respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central
Office which an order was issued reversing the assailed Order of DAR
Regional Director and ordering the petitioner to return the subject land
to respondent. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issues:
A. Whether or not there is a valid abandonment made by Respondent Mabalot.
B. Whether the act of Respondent Mabalot in conveying to petitioner the right to
possess and cultivate the disputed parcel of land constitutes a valid abandonment
thereby rendering the property available for transfer to other bonafide farmers.
C. Whether the issuance of an emancipation patent and thereafter a transfer
certificate of title in the name of petitioner has validated and legitimized possession
and ownership over the disputed property."
Held:
Main Issue:
 EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the
Abandonment
The subject property was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27. A CLT was
issued in his favor. PD 27 specifically provides that when private agricultural land --
whether classified as landed estate or not – is primarily devoted to rice and corn
under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy, the tenant farmers thereof shall be
deemed owners of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if
not irrigated, and three (3) hectares if irrigated.
Petitioner avers that respondent neither protested when the former had the subject
land surveyed and planted with 40 mango trees, nor attempted to return the
money he had borrowed from petitioner in 1976. Because the lot has been
abandoned by respondent, the beneficiary, and because PD 27 does not prohibit
the transfer of properties acquired under it, petitioner theorizes that the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) may award the land to another qualified
farmer-grantee.
7
The Cagayan Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) however valued the
land at P80,000 following the factors set under RA 6557 (CARL) and of which such
value, as just compensation to the respondent, was approve by the lower court
(RTC) setting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Issue:
Whether or not PD 27 or RA 6557 is the applicable law in determining the value of
the land which was taken under PD 27 or before RA 6557 was enacted.
Held:
The Court laid down in Paris v. Alfeche the applicability of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No.
228 in relation to R.A. No. 6657 in the matter of the payment of just compensation.
There the Court explained that while under P.D. No. 27 tenant farmers are already
deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the
land before the title is transferred to them and that pending the payment of just
compensation, actual title to the tenanted land remains with the landowner.
In Paris, the application of the process of agrarian reform was still incomplete thus,
the Court held therein that with the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before its
completion, the process should now be completed under R.A. No. 6657,
with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 applying only suppletorily.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to
determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just
compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the
equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
The land therefore should be valued under RA 6657 following the guidelines set in
DAR AO no. 5, series of 1998 and not under PD 27.
Land Bank v. Heirs of Cruz:
-The determination of just compensation should be based on RA 6657
for lands covered under PD 27. PD 27 applies only suppletorily.
Although this was not discussed in any of the case: ngano nindot man ang under
6657 and not under PD 27? Just by analysis. There are more factors under 6657.
So the factors are more reasonable and just insofar as the owner and the
government is concerned.

Non-transferability of Land Awarded Under PD 27

We do not agree. PD 27 specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to
its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the government shall not be
transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the One of the factors considered under just compensation is the tax declaration.
government by other legal means. The law is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. ▪ What can you find under the tax declaration?
Upon the promulgation of PD 27, their emancipation gave them the rights to
possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves. These rights were • Assessed value. Upon whose declaration? The OWNER’s
granted by the government to them as the tillers and to no other. Thus, to insure declaration. If gamay ra imo ideclare then gamay ra sad
their continuous possession and enjoyment of the property, they could not, under imo just compensation.
the law, effect any transfer except back to the government or, by hereditary
succession, to their successors.11
Other factor is the zonal value.
Furthermore, this Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be interpreted
liberally in favor of the grantees in order to give full force and effect to the clear
*LBP vs. Sps. Rokaya GR 180804: not in records/ppt but according to the syllabus:
intent of such laws: "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers"; and to
SAME PRINCIPLE with LBP vs. HEIRS OF CRUZ
make them "more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source
of genuine strength in our democratic society."12
Abandonment:
Neither are we convinced that an award under PD 27 may be transferred to
another in case the grantee abandons it. The law is explicit. GUAN vs. QUIRINO
No Abandonment
- The awardee here abandoned the land for 11 years.
For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and
absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property and
(b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There - The SC said that under this admin order that if the awardee/beneficiary
must be an actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or fails to cultivate, till or develop or to use the land for any economic
claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by purpose continuously for a period of 2 calendar years that is
another. In the present case, no such "willful failure" has been demonstrated. Quite abandonment. NOTE: the law use CALENDER years, not agricultural. So
the contrary, respondent has continued to claim dominion over the land. calendar year is favorable to the tenant.
No Valid Reallocation
Furthermore, even if respondent did indeed abandon his right to possess and
cultivate the subject land, any transfer of the property may only be made in favor
of the government. In Corpuz v. Grospe,19 the Court held that there was a valid
transfer of the land after the farmer-grantee had signed his concurrence to the
Samahang Nayon Resolution surrendering his possession of the landholding. This
voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon constituted a surrender or transfer to PRESENT LAW (CARPER) RA 6657
the government itself.
CHAPTER 1
In the present case, there was no valid transfer in favor of the government. It was
Is industrialization a component of Agrarian Reform?Yes.
petitioner himself who requested the DAR to cancel respondent’s CLT and to issue
▪ Sec.2 (RA 6657)
another one in his favor.21 Unlike in the above-cited case, respondent’s land was
➢ “…sound rural development and industrialization”
not turned over to the government or to any entity authorized by the government
➢ “…to promote industrialization”
to reallocate the farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become
➢ Industrial inputs necessary to agriculture (fertilizers,
beneficiaries of PD 27. Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-
insecticides, hybrid seeds, irrigation systems, tractors)
beneficiary’s landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The
proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed
Can private corporation acquire ownership of alienable lands of public
abandonment, and that the subsequent beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as
domain?
provided by law.
Chavez v. PEA: No, only through lease not exceeding 25 yrs. Renewable not more
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED than 25yrs. And not to exceed 1,000 hectares

(CONST., Art. XII, Sec.3)

Estolas v. Mabalot : Land may only be transferred either by succession or to
government. DEFINITIONS: Agriculture, enterprise, agricultural activity.
DAR cannot transfer directly to a qualified beneficiary.
One section that uses the word agriculture is Section 4. COVERAGE. The law says:
Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G.R. No. 175175,
September 29, 2008
Facts: This law covers all public/private agricultural lands including other lands of
Case is regarding the valuation to the land of the respondents of which the area the public domain suitable for agriculture.
was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer
program under PD 27. SEC 3(B) defines agriculture or agricultural activity.
The LBP, petitioners herein, valued the land in accordance with the guidelines set
forth under PD 27 and EO No. 228 and pegged the value of the land amounting to
P106,935.76 per hectare. Respondents rejected petitioner’s valuation and insist on Sec. 3 (b) “Agriculture” or “Agricultural Activity”
claiming that the said land is worth between P150,00 to P200,000 per hectare. - Means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising
of livestock, poultry or fish including the harvesting of such farm products, and

Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS Page 7


other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such
farming operations done by person whether natural or juridical.
Question: Ngano man puwa mana ang raising of livestock, poultry or fish?
o Originally, that was placed by law. But in the case of Luz Farms versus
Secretary of DAR (1990), the SC struck down that phrase for being
unconstitutional.
Luz Farms v. Sec. – Sec.3 (b) unconstitutional
(“raising of livestock, poultry and swine” per SC)
- “use of land is incidental and not the principal factor”
✓ RA 7881 (effective May 1995)
- amended Sec.3(b) and removed “the raising of livestock, poultry or fish”
• raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming.
• Industrial, not agricultural activity.
• Great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of
industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities,
drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for
feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and
digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells,
elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances
SIR: Mao na akong kasagaran binuang ani “wala kay baboy na itanom, baktin na
mahimong baboy” hehehe.
- DAR Admin. Order No. 01, S. 2004 (RULES & REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS USED
FOR CATTLE RAISING FROM THE COVERAGE OF CARP)
- “Livestock and poultry do not sprout from the land.”
5 years pa after nakarealize ang congress, so it was eventually removed from
sec3(B).
Governs the exclusion of agri lands used for cattle raising from coverage of CARP. If
you have an application for exclusion, you file it with DAR to be excluded from
CARP, you should prove that the land is actually, exclusively and directly (ADE) used
for cattle raising. So it was the policy that if the land is ADE for cattle raising as of
June 15, 1988 then it shall be excluded but of course you have to wait for the
ruling of DAR with respect to application for exclusion.
Any change in use shall be subject to policies on land conversion ! If you want to
change classification of your land from agricultural to residential or commercial or
industrial it is governed by another policy not this admin order.
• Objective: To prevent circumvention of CARP and to protect the rights
of ARBs due to unauthorized change/conversion or fraudulent
declaration of areas used for cattle purposes.
• Why? (Just a possibility daw) It may have happened that DAR may not
be able to inspect all lands that are covered under CARP in fact if I’m
not mistaken, up to now, only 63% has been achieved insofar as
implementation of the Law is concerned.
• Coverage: All applications for exclusion from CARP of private
agricultural lands actually, exclusively and directly used for cattle raising
as of 15 June 1988.
DAR actually has a ratio for that ! admin order no. 9 in the succeeding case: one
animal is entitled to 1 hectare of land, 1 cattle. And then 1.7 something hectares
that’s good for 21 heads insofar as infrastructure is concerned.
Those that will exceed or portions which will not be covered by this will have to be
covered under CARP, the purpose should be for the growth of cattle industry but if
the filing of the exclusion is in response to notice of CARP coverage, DAR shall deny
due course if the application is filed 60 days after date of receipt of notice. That
means you have to be fast do not wait for DAR to be able to send you a notice of
CARP coverage. Before DAR should serve that, you have to already apply for a
petition for exclusion. Only exclusion petitions fully supported shall be accepted.
• Types of animal: cattle (of bovine family), bull, calf, cow.
• Policies:
(1) Those ADE used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be
excluded (exclusion to be granted only upon proof and continuously
utilized up to time of application);
(2) Any change in use shall be subject to policies on land conversion
(3) Only the grazing/pasture area and for infrastructure necessary for
cattle raising shall be excluded; all other areas shall be covered.
(4) Encourage growth of cattle industry
(5) If filing of exclusion is in response to notice of CARP coverage, DAR
shall deny due course if application is filed 60 days after date of receipt
of notice.
(6) Only exclusion applications fully supported by documents shall be
accepted
DAR v. Sutton: (leading case due to nullification of AO no. 9)
Masbate land -cattle-breeding capital of Phil
(VOS - due to Luz Farms - withdraw VOS)
- Constitutionality of AO No. 9, S. 1993 (prescribing a maximum retention
limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising);
- SC nullified AO; RA 7881 changed definition of “agricultural
activity“ by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted
to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. Congress
clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
8
the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Now what is the implication of Luz farms case and the amendment made by
congress per RA 7881?
- Supreme court and congress are saying that lands devoted to live stock
are not to be covered under CARP.
What did DAR do after the Luz Farms case?
- DAR issued AO #9 series 1993. Remember the Luz farms case was in
1990 and AO #9 is in 1993, that is why in this case, originally the land
owner filed a VOS; voluntary offer to sell meaning he is surrendering to
the government the land for purposes of CARP but here comes Luz
Farms. (I’m not sure how many months after the filing of the VOS did
the supreme court come out with the ruling in Luz Farms case)
- In Luz Farms supreme court said, lands devoted to live stock are not
covered so they are saying “well we have parcels of land devoted to
livestock so we have to withdraw our VOS” and questioned AO #9
saying under the constitution, Luz Farm, and congress, DAR cannot
regulate the raising of livestock because in this particular AO, DAR
stated that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the
raising of livestock poultry or swine shall be excluded.
*There is a constitutional basis for saying that live stock raising is not included
under CARP because it was found in the deliberations of the CON-COM particularly
commissioner Tadeo, the one representing the tenant, (and he was asked in Filipino
of course) whether the farm workers include those person who are working in
livestock, poultry and swine. And his answer was that they are NOT included.
- So taking a cue from that deliberation the supreme court, in the case of
Luz Farms deleted that phrase raising of live stock etc. from the
definition of agricultural activity.
SC: DAR you have no power to regulate. What you did, using the AO was trying to
regulate live stock farming but you have no power because that is not within your
jurisdiction, it is not part of CARP coverage. This has been exempted by the
constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform.
Because DAR lost in the Sutton case when supreme court nullified AO #9, DAR
issued an admin order #7. This time DAR learned its lesson, we will not regulate
livestock because that is outside of our authority but what we will do is we will
classify lands those devoted to livestock and those not devoted to livestock to their
guidelines.
Admin. Order No. 07, S. 2008
Policy guidelines:
▪ Lands ADE used for livestock purposes as of 15 June 1988 and
continuously used shall be excluded; conversely, those not ADE are
subject to CARP if one or more of the following conditions apply: (1)
there is agricultural activity in the area (i.e., cultivation of soil, planting
of crops, growing of trees including harvesting); (2) land is suitable for
agriculture and occupied and tilled by farmers.
• In line with principle of regularity in the performance of official
functions, all processes by DAR per AO No. 9 are valid.
- But this one surprises me, despite the fact that AO #9 was
nullified, DAR said in line with the principle of regularity of
the performance of official functions all processes of DAR
for AO number 9 are valid. Anyway nobody questioned it!
• Sec. 3 (c) “Agricultural land” land devoted to agricultural activity & not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
Republic vs Salvador Lopez Agri-business
Facts
Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of
160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business
Corporation.
On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga
issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned
landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition
pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law).
On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office
(PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT
No. T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case
of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as
the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing
and habitat of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of
goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL).
On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite
investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as
enumerated.
On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled
and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP
T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez,
Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the respondent-Secretary requesting for
the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that
they needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995,
petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for
the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 stating that it has
been operating grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2)
lots form an integral part of its grazing land.
The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated
March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on
the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and
exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself
admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for
exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL
Page 8

Held:
In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut
trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage.
In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the inspection found
that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and
rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the denial of the application for
exemption. 30 Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for
agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP.
These findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional
Director who denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the
DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals.
In the 07 February 1994 Letter-Affidavit addressed to the DAR Secretary, SNLABC
requested the exemption of the Limot lands on the ground that the corporation
needed the additional area for its livestock business. As pointed out by the DAR
Regional Director, this Letter-Affidavit is a clear indication that the Limot lands were
not directly, actually and exclusively used for livestock raising. SNLABC casually
dismisses the clear import of their Letter-Affidavit as a "poor choice of words."
Unfortunately, the semantics of the declarations of SNLABC in its application for
exemption are corroborated by the other attendant factual circumstances and
indicate its treatment of the subject properties as non-livestock.
Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC,
found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were
not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABC's
use of the area as a "seasonal extension of the applicant's 'grazing lands' during
the summer." Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually,
directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's livestock business, especially since these
were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are
more suitable — and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used — for
agricultural purposes.
• Tax declaration classified as agricultural land (one way to prove)- it is
not conclusive.
There are 2 basic functions of DAR in relation to CARP,
1. Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI): who are involved in
implementation? From the bottom you have the MARO going up you
have the PARO(provincial), RARO (regional), Secretary of Agrarian
Reform and from that office of the president, CA then SC, that’s the 1st
basic function in so far as implementation.
2. Decision making(quasi-judicial): the MARO has no function but in quasi
– judicial from the bottom you have PARAB(provincial adjudicator),
RARAB(regional), DARAB based in manila the central office from DARAB
to CA to SC.
But you have to note in the implementation aspect it is possible nga from the
MARO etc., there is a delineation along the way but only on two aspects meaning
(especially on the coverage on the land) it is possible that the trial court will
intervene somewhere, what aspects?
1. Just compensation
2. criminal offenses
It is only on two aspects that the civil court has jurisdiction. I’m referring to RTC.
CASE: There are 2 lands here. You have the Lopez land and the 2nd one is the
Limoc Lands. You have here the finding of MARO of several heads of cattle, some
covered by several certificates. There were structures used for livestock business,
the existence of the cattle prior to the enactment of CARL positively affirmed, farm
workers and overseers interviewed by the MARO.
SC: Lopez lands you are devoted to livestock raising therefore not included under
CARL.
DAR argued: SC the tax declaration characterized the lopez land as agricultural.
SIR: In a tax dec, you will find there the classification of the land, and
pinakapermero ana nga table agricultural sa ubos either residential commercial or
industrial ug agri imu classification barato imu bayaran nga real property tax but
the moment nga mahimo nag siyag commercial(?) or industrial, it goes higher.
So DAR is saying: therefore the fact that it is agri, this detracted from the claim
that they were used for livestock purposes
but SC said: there is no law or jurisprudence that holds that land classification in a
tax dec is conclusive in filing. That means you may not rely solely on the tax dec.,
you can base it on another evidence, and what is that evidence? Here in the Lopez
case you have the findings of the MARO, which findings stated the lands were used
for livestock raising.
SIR: But I’m not saying you cannot use tax dec as a basis but you cannot rely on it
solely. You can also rely on other evidence specially on MARO’s findings which
according to our jurisprudence is entitled to respect by the SC.
What about Limot Lands, what is the finding? The report says the entire limot lands
were devoted to coconut and rubber so the question was: where the limot lands
ADE devoted? NO! why? Because the entire limot lands were planted with coconuts
and rubber. So verily the limot lands were ADE used for agricultural plantations
which makes them subjects to CARL. The corporation SNL-ABC argued that there is
a misapprehension of facts and requested an exemption on the ground that the
corporation needed the additional area for the livestock business. So what is the
logic there? “Needed the additional area” that will happen in the future which is
proof that the land is not yet being actually used for livestock business.
Milestone Farms, Inc. vs. Office of the President
Facts:
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
9
Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960. 4 Among its pertinent secondary
purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to
acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to
sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce
when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell
poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies,
stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and by-products of said
business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food
necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be
authorized by law. 5
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect,
which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However,
on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform 6 that agricultural lands devoted to livestock,
poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).
Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-
hectare property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T-410434) M-15750,
(T-486101) M-7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T-274129) M-15751, (T-486103) M-7309,
(T-486104) M-7310, (T-332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311, (T-486106) M-7312,
M-8791, (T-486107) M-7313, (T-486108) M-7314, M-8796, (T-486109) M-7315,
(T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and located in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, from the
coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz
Farms.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth
rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for
livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10,
1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9. 7
Acting on the said application, the DAR's Land Use Conversion and Exemption
Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner's
property and arrived at the following findings:
[T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is 258.8422 hectares;
the area which served as infrastructure is 42.0000 hectares; ten (10) hectares are
planted to corn and the remaining five (5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that
the livestock population are 371 heads of cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of
swine and 788 heads of cocks; that the area being applied for exclusion is far
below the required or ideal area which is 563 hectares for the total livestock
population; that the approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes with
an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below the allowable 10%
variance; and, though not directly used for livestock purposes, the ten (10)
hectares planted to sweet corn and the five (5) hectares devoted to fishpond could
be considered supportive to livestock production.
On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary Garilao)
issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422
hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646
hectares of the property to be covered by CARP. 14
Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from
CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of
June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that the Certificates of
Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of
cattle were registered in the name of petitioner's president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to
June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered
from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates rather
than to the headcount because "the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle
owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988.
Issue:
Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL
Held:
With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioner's arguments fail to
persuade. Its invocation of Sutton is unavailing. In Sutton, we held:
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the
coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their
ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show
a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine
and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine
and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of
"agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is
different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A
great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and
blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution
equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other
technological appurtenances. TaDSHC
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has
exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
Petitioner's admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock
is fatal to its cause. 64 While petitioner advances a defense that it leased this ranch
because the occupants of the subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we
find it surprising that not even a single police and/or barangay report was filed by
petitioner to amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover, we
accord respect to the CA's keen observation that the assailed MARO reports and the
Investigating Team's Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the
43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject
property.
• Adjacent property is not covered.
Page 9

SIR: Upon the report of the MARO there was no livestock farming but in the
adjacent property there were 43 heads of cattle, in the area adjacent. The area is
not owned by the land owner of the subject property because the land owner
leased the area from another person.
The contention of the land owner: he did not use the subject property for this 43
head of cattle because according to him there were occupants of the said property
who harmed the 43 head of cattle. That’s why he allegedly transferred the cattle to
the area adjacent and leased the adjacent area from another person. That means
in the subject property, there is no livestock found. The subject property was not
devoted to livestock raising.
SC: The fact that you are leasing another ranch for raising of your own livestock,
that is fatal to your cause. Even if you have alleged that the occupants of the
subject property harmed its cattle, you did not submit a police or a barangay report
to amplify your argument and the supreme court accorded respect to the inspection
of MARO that the 43 cows while owned by petitioner were actually pastured
outside of the subject property. So what is the implication if there was no devotion
to the subject property to live stock raising? The property is not excluded from
CARP coverage.
Agricultural Land (Section 3 c)
• Sec. 3 (c) “Agricultural land” land devoted to agricultural activity & not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
2 elements:
- Devoted to agricultural activity
- Not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
Who classifies the land as mineral forest? DENR
The other one, residential, commercial, industrial? Local government units to be
approved by HLURB. So in our context we have a zoning ordinance, the zoning
ordinance is a classification.
The zoning ordinance delineates which part of the city is under residential
classification, which part is under commercial, which part is industrial. And the LGU
will submit the zoning ordinance to HLURB for approval.
Take note: there is a cut-off date (June 15, 1988) in passing a zoning ordinance
(changing the classification from agricultural). Sec 4 of CARP covers all private and
public lands so you need to present proof that there was classification
Natalia Realty v. DAR – 1979 (Leading case)
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb
the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod
Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas
proclaimed as townsite reservation. NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision. Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo
Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA
immediately registered its objection to the Notice of Coverage
SC:
“ They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of the reservation”. Lands
previously converted by government agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural
uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were outside the coverage of that law.
Ruling not confined solely to agricultural lands located within townsite reservations,
but applied also to real estate converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of the CARL.
NOTE:
DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and the case of Natalia Realty, Inc
opine that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by R.A. No.
6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the DAR to approve such conversion
may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands
that are already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15,
1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not
operate to divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands covered by PD 27, which
have been vested prior to June 15, 1988.
In order to implement the intent and purpose of the provisions of the
aforecited laws, the DAR has issued guidelines through AO No. 4, Series of 2003.
(Please refer to the attached files together with this reviewer… The important
provisions there are only the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION, APPROVING
AUTHORITIES, EFFECT ON PRE-EXISTING CARP COVERAGE and PROTESTS).
There was already a presidential proclamation reserving lands (for squatters) in
antipolo, san mateo and montalban as townsite areas, the areas proclaimed as
townsite reservation. (Relate this case with Alangilan case below)
DAR AO No. 4 (Rules on exemption) - “all lands already classified as commercial,
industrial or residential before June 15,1988 no longer need conversion clearance”
• Requirements: Sworn application, copy of title, certification from
HLURB (zoning or classification, citing zoning ordinance), among others.
Public notice. Disturbance compensation.
Conversion clearance is a requirement before you can change the classification
of your land from agricultural to residential, commercial, or industrial. (And
probably this is also where corruption…).
Public notice, sa land mismo mag notify ka na there is an application for
exemption and disturbance compensation.
Disturbance compensation is money to be paid to occupants of the property,
normally, Tenants of the property.
Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999
Facts:
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner
Roxas & Co., Inc and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the
government under RA No. 6657.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner with TCTs and Tax
Declarations of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway,
all located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
Issue:
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
10
Whether or not the petitioner’s landholdings are subject to coverage under the
CARL, in view of the undisputed fact that petitioner’s landholdings have been
converted to non-agricultural uses by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which
declared the Municipality of Nasugbu as a tourist zone, and the zoning ordinance of
the said Municipality re-classifying certain portions of the petitioner’s landholdings
as non-agricultural or at the very least entitle the petitioner to apply for conversion
as conceded by respondent DAR.
Held:
Respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner’s
landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over
petitioner’s application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-
agricultural. The agency charged for conversion is the DAR.
The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three
haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process therein.
In and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to the
respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of
petitioner’s application for conversion.
• Notice of coverage was wrongfully sent
• SC: . DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of
petitioners' landholdings does not ipso facto give the Supreme Court the
power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for conversion of its
haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to determine
whether Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural
which exempts from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not
with the Supreme Court. Case was remanded to DAR for proper
acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for
conversion
Roxas and Company: sir is disappointed in this case… why?
- in Natalia diba the SC decided whether Natalia Landholdings is excluded
or included. Alangilan the SC decided. Alarde the SC decided. But in this
case the SC did not. According to the SC that power belongs to DAR not
with the SC. So iyang gi uli to DAR to determine whether the
application for conversion should be granted.
- Dissenting opinion by Ynares Santiago: there are already pieces of
evidence submitted in this case. (1) certification from DENR. Na ang
yuta dili na feasible, economically sound for farm and agricultural
development (2) you have a resolution of the sangguniang bayan
panlalawigan letter of MPDC man ciguro ni siya, advising that the
municipality had no objection to the conversion of the lands to non
agricultural purposes. So it was raised by Justice Santiago, why refer it
back when it can be decided on the basis of these pieces of evidence.
One of the issues here is about notice of coverage. It was wrongfully sent. Roxas
and Company is a corporation and just like remedial law, civil procedure, a
corporation may authorize persons to receive notices i.e. President, general
manager, corporate secretary, in-house counsel. In this case ang gi tagaan
administrator of the land, so it was wrongfully sent. SC also remanded it to DAR for
proper acquisition proceedings.
NHA vs. Allarde, G.R. No. 106593, November 16, 1999
Facts:
Lots 836 and 839, registered in the of the Republic of the Philippines, and covered
by the TCT No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively, were acquired by the Republic
on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust Company. They form part of the Tala Estate
in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on April 26, 1971, was reserved by
Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing programs of the National
housing Authority.
According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed lots
since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on six-hectare
portion of said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a 13 hectare
portion of the same lots.
In 1989, Mateo filed with the DAR the petition for the award to them of subject
disputed lots under CARP.
On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses Mateo, relying on their claim that the
subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought before
the respondent RTC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction, to enjoin the NHA from bulldozing further and making constructions on
the lots under controversy.
RTC Judge Allarde issued the injunction against NHA.
Held:
As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (included the disputed lots) was resrved,
inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the
NHA, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural
activity
• SC: As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed
lots) was reserved under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the
housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same has been
categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity
contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore,
outside the coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the
respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural
land" and restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its
housing project thereon, are evidently bereft of any sustainable basis
Presidential proclamation reserving the disputed lands for housing programs by the
state. Although nakalahi lang puro presidential proclamation. Ang usa, local
government unit.
Advincula-Velasquez vs. CA,et al., G.R. No. 111387, June 8,2004
The petitioners were the agricultural lessees of a Riceland located in Parañaque
Metro Manila.
In 1978, Sps. Nery and the Lorenzo sold the property to the Delta Motor’s
Corporation (DMC). Petitioner Velasquez, in his capacity as leaseholder agricultural
tenant, filed an action for the redemption of the said property before the Court of
Agrarian Relation. The CAR dismiss the petition for lack on the part of the
petitioner to redeem the property in its acquisition price in the amount of 2,319,210
pesos but directing the defendant to maintain the petitioner as agricultural lessee
to the land in question.
Page 10

Petitioner Velasquez and the defendants appealed the decision of the CAR to the
Intermediate Appellate Court who affirmed the decision of the CAR. Petitioner
Velasquez filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court who issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the CAR’s decision pending the out come of the petition.
In 1981, the land in question was reclassified as residential zone under the
ordinance issued by the city of Manila. Later, the land in question was mortgage by
the DMC to the PNB as a security for its obligation who later foreclose it because of
the failure of the DMC to pay its account. The PNB in 1986 executed a deed of sale
of the said land in favor of the Remman Enterprise Inc. who decided to develop it
in to a residential subdivision.
Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issue a decision on the petition for review filed by
the petitioner Velasquez affirming the decision of the IAC stating that the case had
become moot and academic with regards the claim of the petitioner against the
DMC considering that the property had been foreclose by the PNB declaring
however that the petitioner may redeem the property from the PNB and its
transferee. The record was remanded to the PARAD or the Provincial Agrarian
Adjudication for the petitioner to exercise there right of redemption but since the
case had become moot and academic, the PARAD denied the action of the
petitioner to recover the property against the DMC since the land in question is now
a residential land. The right of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee was
terminated and the property was now in the possession of the Remman Enterprise,
Inc. The petitioner filed a motion before the DARAB or the Department of Agrarian
Adjudication Board who reverses the decision of the PARAD stating that the land in
question is an agricultural land and uphold the right of the petitioner as an
agricultural lessee to recover the said land .The Remman Enterprise filed an appeal
before the CA who reverses the decision of the DARAB because the land in
question was already reclassified as residential land as early as 1981 converting it
from agricultural land in to non-agricultural land. The petitioner filed a motion to
the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the land was an agricultural land or a residential land.
Held:
According to the Supreme Court, agricultural land was defined under RA. 6657 as
those land devoted to agricultural activities and not classified as forest, minerals,
residential and industrial land.
The records show that as early as 1981, the landholding was reclassified as a low
density zone under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, Series of 1981
before Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1998. It has been considered as
early as that time for residential purposes thus not within the ambit of CAR.
• SC: Since the property was already reclassified as residential by the
Metro Manila Commission and the HSRC before the effectivity of Rep.
Act No. 6657, there was no need for the private respondent to secure
any post facto approval thereof from the DAR
Jose Junio, et., al vs Garilao
Facts:
"In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994, filed with the [Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)] by complainants (some of whom are herein
petitioners), identified as 'Potential CARP Beneficiaries' per Certification of OIC
[Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)] dated November 21, 1991 . . ., it is
prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the registered owners
of a certain parcel of agricultural land consisting of 71 hectares, more or less,
known as Lot No. 835-B of Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy. Pahanocoy, Bacolod City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79622. Petitioners claim that . . . Sta.
Lucia Realty Corporation and the Estate of Guillermo Villasor, represented by Irving
Villasor, are bulldozing and leveling the subject property for the purpose of
converting it into a residential subdivision; that as prospective CARP beneficiaries of
the land in question, 'being former laborers, actual occupants and permanent
residents of Barangay Pahanocoy,' their rights will be prejudiced by the illegal
conversion of the land into a residential subdivision . . . .
"On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC Executive Director forwarded the complaint to
[Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)], DAR, Region VI, Bacolod City for
appropriate action . . . . Before any hearing could be conducted thereon, the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform issued an Order dated September
13, 1994 in 'RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE PURSUANT
TO DOJ OPINION NO. 44, SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et al., Rep. by
Atty. Angel Lobaton, Jr., Petitioners,' portions of which read as follows:
'After a careful study of the facts of the case and the evidences presented by the
parties, this Office finds the petition for exemption to be well founded. Under DOJ
Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, it provides that lands which has already been
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial and industrial areas, prior to
June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from CARP coverage. To this, it is an [i]nescapable
conclusion that the subject property is exempted from CARP coverage considering
the fact that the same was classified as residential as evidenced by the Resolution
No. 5153-A, Series of 1976 of the City Council of Bacolod and as approved by the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now HLURB) in its Resolution dated
September 24, 1980 as per Certification dated June 22, 1994 issued by the said
Commission. The Certification of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) dated
June 9, 1994 stated that the subject land is not irrigable or is outside the service
area of the irrigation system in the locality. In effect the said application had
conformed to the requirements of the law on exemption. In accord thereto, the
stand of Mr. Espanola that the portion, which he planted to trees and developed
into mini-forest should be covered by CARP[,] is beyond recognition as the program
does not apply to those which are already classified as residential lands prior to the
effectivity of CARL on June 15, 1988. Instead, it is confined only to agricultural
lands, which under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c), it defines agricultural lands as lands
devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential or industrial land. With the above stated definition, it is beyond
reason that the placing of the said portion under CARP coverage (1.5 hectare) is
devoid of legal and factual basis.'"
Issue:
Whether the respondent DAR secretary had the inherent authority or power to
exclude or exempt at will from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) the subject agricultural land which was already automatically
covered by the CARL (RA 6657) upon its effectivity on June 15, 1988 without
affording due process to herein petitioners and without the necessity of Congress
having first to amend Section 4 of the said law authorizing such exemption or
exclusion from CARP coverage.
Held:
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
11
Section 3(c) of the CARL defines agricultural land as that which is "devoted to
agricultural activity . . . and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land."
The meaning of agricultural lands covered by the CARL was explained further by
the DAR in its Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, 12 entitled "Revised
Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural Land to Non-
Agricultural Uses," issued pursuant to Section 49 of CARL, which we quote:
". . . . Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as defined in
R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) and its predecessor agencies, and not classified in
town plans and zoning ordinances as approved by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June
1988 for residential, commercial or industrial use."
Prior to this Order, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 dated March 16, 1990,
which was addressed to then DAR Secretary Florencio Abad, recognized the fact
that before the date of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988, the reclassification or
conversion of lands was not exclusively done by the DAR. 13 Rather, it was a
"coordinated effort" of all concerned agencies; namely, the Department of Local
Governments and Community Development, the Human Settlements Commission
and the DAR.
It is thus settled that with respect to areas classified and identified as zonal areas
not for agricultural uses, like those approved by the HSRC before the effectivity of
RA 6657 on June 15, 1988, the DAR's clearance is no longer necessary for
conversion.
DAR vs. Berenguer
Facts:
The respondents were the registered owners of several residential and industrial
lands with a total area of 58.0649 hectares located in Barangay Bibincahan,
Sorsogon.
In April 1998, the respondents received from the DAR notices of coverage of their
said landholdings by the Government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
or CARL). They protested the notices of coverage, filing on October 5, 1998, in the
office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Regional Director Dalugdug) in
Legaspi City, their application for exclusion of their landholdings from CARP
coverage, and praying for the lifting of the notices of coverage.
In October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the
respondents' application for exclusion, cancelled their titles and issued certificates
of land ownership awards (CLOAs), covering their landholdings, to the members of
the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (Baribag), not
to the respondents' workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was not
impleaded in the respondents' application for exclusion.
In support of their claim that their landholdings were already classified as
residential and industrial, the respondents submitted the following documents,
namely: 8
a.The certification dated May 18, 1999 issued by HLURB, stating, among others,
that the Town Plan/Zoning Ordinance of Sorsogon, Sorsogon (classifying Barangay
Bibincalan, * where the respondents' properties were located, as a residential and
commercial area), was approved by HLURB (then Human Settlements Commission/
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission);
b.An excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of the Municipality of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showing that Barangay Bibincalan * was part of the Central
Business District; hence, the respondents' landholdings in Bibincalan * were
classified as residential and industrial;
c.Resolution No. 5 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, series of 1981,
expanding the area of the poblacion to include Barangay Bibincalan, * among
others;
d.The certification dated August 27, 1997 issued by the Office of the Zoning
Administrator, Office of the Mayor, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, signed by Deputized Zoning
Administrator Raul Jalmanzar, declaring that the respondents' landholdings were
situated in Barangay Bibincalan * within the Poblacion area of the Municipality of
Sorsogon; and
e.Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, stating that a parcel of land
was considered non-agricultural, and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the CARP,
if it had been classified as residential, commercial, or industrial in the City or
Municipality Land Use Plan or Zoning Ordinance approved by HLURB before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is covered under RA 6657
Held:
In ruling that the respondents' landholdings were not devoted to cattle raising, the
DAR relied on DAR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9, series of 1993, which
required that properties should be considered excluded from the coverage of the
CARL only if it was established that as of June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of
the law, there existed the minimum ratio of one head of cattle to one hectare of
land, and one head of cattle to 1.7815 hectares of infrastructure.
According to the DAR, only 15 heads of cattle were found within the 58 hectares
sought to be excluded based on the semestral survey conducted in Sorsogon by the
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics in the period from 1988 to 1992, which was in
contravention of DAO No. 9, series of 1993.
The CA found, however, that heads of cattle were really being raised in the
landholdings of the respondents. This finding was not disputed by the DAR. In view
of the finding of the CA, we cannot now hold differently, for we are bound by the
finding of fact of the CA. Verily, the insufficiency of the number of heads of cattle
found during the semestral survey did not automatically mean that the landholdings
were not devoted to the raising of livestock. We concur with the CA that there
could be several reasons to explain why the number of cattle was below the ratio
prescribed under DAO No. 9 at the time of the survey, including pestilence, cattle
rustling, or sale of the cattle.
Page 11

Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the poblacion area of the
municipality included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents' landholdings
were situated.
There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents' landholdings have been
part of the poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with Hilario and Natalia,
holding that the respondents' landholdings were non-agricultural, and,
consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL, was fully warranted. In fact, the
excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed
that Barangay Bibincahan was within the Central Business District of the
municipality.
Actually involving same fact and ruling in so far as classification is concerned but
this one gives us a principle that DAR has to establish that the land holdings were
agricultural. It is incumbent upon DAR to establish.
Alangilan v. Office of President
• SC: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as
agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as
residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the
term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land
from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR
Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended
land use. It does not denote that the property has already been
reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is
not a land classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the
effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still
agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the
landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already
been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then
there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994
Ordinance.
Petitioner Alangilan filed an application for exclusion from CARP. DAR denied it
saying the term reserved denotes it is not yet classified. So what is the proof of
petitioner for asking exclusion and exemption?
- 1982: you have an ordinance from the sangguniang bayan of batangas
that the subject landholding is reserved for residential under zoning
which was approved by HSRC, the predecessor of HLURB.
- 1994: provincial ordinance of the city zoning map and comprehensive
zoning reclassifying the landholding as residential land.
Remember even prior to 1988, in this case, 1982 pa, naanay zoning approved by
HLURB. But what is contested by DAR is the use of the word “reserved”.
SC said the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural reserved by DAR
contrary to petitioner’s assertion that the term reserved for residential does not
change the nature of the land from agri to non agri. The term reserve simply
reflects the intended the land used. It does not denote the property has already
been reclassified.
SIR: I don’t agree with the court.
1. The reasoning there that the term “reserve” does not change the
nature of the land from agri to none agri, SC was talking about nature
of the land, agricultural to non agricultural. But the question is: isn’t it a
fact that there are (2) elements for agri land: devoted to agri activity
and not classified as mineral, forest, etc. This issue answers the first
element not the second element.
2. Second the law uses the word “classified”. If we are to abide by the
ruling of the court, is the court saying that before a zoning ordinance is
passed there is already actual use of the land by the people residing in
the city or conducting business? Not necessarily, because a city or an
LGU can have a projection. It can project. (It can say na oi kini na yuta
bare pa. wala pa gigamit we want to use this land as industrial para mo
daghan ang mga factory we will project.) So we will pass an ordinance
classifying this as industrial even in the absence of actual use. It can be
classified already. But the SC was referring to the nature of the land
from agri to non agri. For me you can still make a classification even if
the intended land used is not yet to be.
Did that case (Alangilan) overturn the other (Natalia)? No. There was no issue.
What Alangilan should have done is to raise that issue in Natalia and other cases
(because it is not only in Natalia) that the word reserved was used.
Heirs of Deleste vs Leviste
Facts:
The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the
owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of
34.7 hectares (subject property). Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a
son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. Virgilio had been raised
by the couple since he was two years old. Gregorio also had two daughters,
Esperanza and Caridad, by still another woman. 3
When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the subject property.
4 On February 16, 1954, Hilaria and Virgilio sold the subject property to Dr. Jose
Deleste (Deleste) for PhP16,000. 5 The deed of sale was notarized on February 17,
1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also, the tax declaration in the name of
Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.
The arrears in the payment of taxes from 1952 had been updated by Deleste and
from then on, he paid the taxes on the property. 6
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
12
On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died. 7 Gregorio's brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed
as special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently,
Edilberto Noel (Noel) was appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate.
On April 30, 1963, Noel, as the administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased spouses, filed before the Court of First Instance, Branch II, Lanao del
Norte an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 698. 9 Said case went up to this Court in Noel v. CA,
where We rendered a Decision 10 on January 11, 1995, affirming the ruling of the
CA that the subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses Gregorio
and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject
property to Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate
of Gregorio were held to be the co-owners of the subject property, each with a
one-half (1/2) interest in it. 11
Notably, while Civil Case No. 698 was still pending before the CFI, particularly on
October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates
that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under the Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject property
was placed under the said program. 12 However, only the heirs of Gregorio were
identified by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners.
Concomitantly, the notices and processes relative to the coverage were sent to
these heirs. 13
In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the "Zoning
Regulation of Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property as commercial/
residential. 14
Eventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in
favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual cultivators of the subject
property. 15 The CLTs were registered on July 15, 1986.
In 1991, the subject property was surveyed. 17 The survey of a portion of the land
consisting of 20.2611 hectares, designated as Lot No. 1407, was approved on
January 8, 1999. 18 The claim folder for Lot No. 1407 was submitted to the LBP
which issued a Memorandum of Valuation and a Certificate of Cash Deposit on May
21, 2001 and September 12, 2001, respectively. Thereafter, Emancipation Patents
(EPs) and Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) were issued on August 1, 2001 and
October 1, 2001, respectively, in favor of private respondents over their respective
portions of Lot No. 1407.
On February 28, 2002, the heirs of Deleste, petitioners herein, filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to
nullify private respondents' EPs. 21 This was docketed as Reg. Case No. X-471-
LN-2002.
On July 21, 2003, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a
Decision 22 declaring that the EPs were null and void in view of the pending issues
of ownership, the subsequent reclassification of the subject property into a
residential/commercial land, and the violation of petitioners' constitutional right to
due process of law.
Subsequently, the DARAB, in DARAB Case No. 12486, reversed the ruling of the
PARAD in its Decision 25 dated March 15, 2004. It held, among others, that the EPs
were valid as it was the heirs of Deleste who should have informed the DAR of the
pendency of Civil Case No. 698 at the time the subject property was placed under
the coverage of the OLT Program considering that DAR was not a party to the said
case. Further, it stated that the record is bereft of any evidence that the city
ordinance has been approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB), as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1990, and
held that whether the subject property is indeed exempt from the OLT Program is
an administrative determination, the jurisdiction of which lies exclusively with the
DAR Secretary or the latter's authorized representative. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied by the DARAB in its Resolution 26 dated July 8,
2004.
Issue:
Whether the land is covered under agrarian reform
Held:
We agree with petitioners that the subject property, particularly Lot No. 1407, is
outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of the enactment by
the City of Iligan of its local zoning ordinance, City Ordinance No. 1313.
It is undeniable that the local government has the power to reclassify agricultural
into non-agricultural lands. In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. CA, 45
this Court held that pursuant to Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. (RA) 2264, amending
the Local Government Code, municipal and/or city councils are empowered to
"adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations in consultation with the
National Planning Commission." It was also emphasized therein that "[t]he power
of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-
agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of
the [DAR]."
Likewise, it is not controverted that City Ordinance No. 1313, which was enacted by
the City of Iligan in 1975, reclassified the subject property into a commercial/
residential area.
Page 12

However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to
divest tenant[-]farmers of their rights over lands covered by Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 27, which have been vested prior to 15 June 1988.
1975: You have a zoning ordinance approved by the HLURB so the land is outside
of CARP.
Rom vs Roxas & co.
Facts:
On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land
located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236
hectares and constituting portions of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title .
Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only
agricultural land 5 which is defined under Section 3 (c) thereof as "land devoted to
agricultural activity . . . and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial
or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL on
June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part
of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal
Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by
the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983.
Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already
classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use,
which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need
conversion clearance from the DAR.
In its Order 11 of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Application for Exemption Clearance from
CARP coverage filed by Roxas & Company, Inc., involving twenty-seven (27) parcels
of land, specifically described in pages 1 and 2 of this Order,[12] being portions of
TCT No. T-44664, with an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares located [in]
Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas is hereby GRANTED, subject to the following
conditions:
1.The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their
peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a final
determination has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation due and
entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas.
2.No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the
appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants who
are determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof of payment of
disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days
from such payment; and
3.The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer beneficiaries shall be subject of
a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas.
ISSUE:
Whether the land is covered under CARL.
Held:
Having established through said documents that the 27 parcels of land are within
the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, the DAR
declared as well that respondent substantially complied with the requirements of
DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98. The DAR thus
granted the application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor.
The Court recognized the power of a local government unit to classify and convert
land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL and
thus upheld the validity of said zoning ordinance.
You have the zoning ordinance (1982) and you have an approval HLURB on 1983.
LBP vs Estate of Araneta

Facts:
On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a
wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the
segregated area for townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be."
Then came the amendatory issuance, Proclamation 1637 dated April 18, 1977,
thereby increasing the size of the reservation, designated as "Lungsod Silangan
Townsite" (LS Townsite), by 20.312 hectares and revising its technical description
so as to include, within its coverage, other lands in the municipalities of San Mateo
and Montalban, Rizal to absorb "the population overspill in Greater Manila Area,"
but again "subject to private rights, if any there be,"
Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired
ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court litigation. A little over
a week later, he had OCT No. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
13
On July 22, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 131
instituting the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thereafter, then
DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina, in a memorandum of March 10, 1988, ordered
the Regional Director of DAR Region IV to proceed with the OLT coverage and final
survey of the Doronilla property. 12 Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) 13 of 1988, was then enacted,
and took effect on June 15, 1988
On December 12, 1989, DAR issued a "Notice of Acquisition" addressed to
Doronilla, covering 7.53 hectares of the land now covered by TCT No. 216746 and
offering compensation at a valuation stated in the notice. 15 Alarmed by the turn of
events whereby DAR was having its property, or a portion of it, surveyed, incidental
to effecting compulsory land acquisition, the Araneta Estate addressed a letter 16
to DAR dated June 27, 1990, formally protesting the series of land surveys being
conducted by the Bureau of Lands on what is now its property. It claimed that the
CARL does not cover the said property, being part of the LS Townsite reservation,
apart from being mountainous, with a slope of more than 70 degrees and
containing commercial quantities of marble deposit. The Araneta Estate followed its
protest letter with two (2) more letters dated June 20, 1990 and May 28, 1991, in
which it reiterated its request for conversion, citing, for the purpose, Department of
Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 181, Series of 1990.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in gave retroactive effect or application to Proclamation
Nos. 1283 & 1637 resulting in the negation of "full land ownership to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries covered by P.D. No. 27
Held:
Several basic premises should be made clear at the outset. Immediately prior to the
promulgation of PD 27 in October 1972, the 1,645-hectare Doronilla property, or a
large portion of it, was indisputably agricultural, some parts devoted to rice and/or
corn production tilled by Doronilla's tenants. Doronilla, in fact, provided concerned
government agencies with a list of seventy-nine (79) 30 names he considered bona
fide "planters" of his land. These planters, who may reasonably be considered
tenant-farmers, had purposely, so it seems, organized themselves into Samahang
Nayon(s) so that the DAR could start processing their applications under the PD 27
OLT program. CLTs were eventually generated covering 73 hectares, with about 75
CLTs actually distributed to the tenant-beneficiaries. However, upon the issuance of
Proclamation 1637, "all activities related to the OLT were stopped."
To restate a basic postulate, the provisions of RA 6657 apply only to agricultural
lands under which category the Doronilla property, during the period material, no
longer falls, having been effectively classified as residential by force of Proclamation
1637. It ceased, following Natalia Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval
of its inclusion in the LS Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying
presidential issuance. In this regard, the Court cites with approval the following
excerpts from the appealed CA decision:
The above [Natalia Realty, Inc.] ruling was reiterated in National Housing Authority
vs. Allarde where the Supreme Court held that lands reserved for, converted to,
non-agricultural uses by government agencies other than the [DAR], prior to the
effectivity of [RA] 6657 . . . are not considered and treated as agricultural lands
and therefore, outside the ambit of said law. The High Court declared that since the
Tala Estate as early as April 26, 1971 was reserved, inter alia, under Presidential
Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the [NHA], the same has been
categorized as not being devoted to agricultural activity contemplated by Section
3(c) of R.A. No. 6657, and therefore outside the coverage of CARL.
GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC.vs RUBEN ALCAIDE
Facts:
Petitioner Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of 14 parcels of
land.
n April 14, 1998, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of
Coverage over the subject landholding informing petitioner that the subject
properties were being considered for distribution under the government's agrarian
reform program. 4 Thereafter, on November 15, 1998, the corresponding Notice of
Valuation and Acquisition 5 was issued informing petitioner that a 37.7353-hectare
portion of its property is subject to immediate acquisition and distribution to
qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries and that the government is offering
P7,071,988.80 as compensation for the said property.
Petitioner then filed a Petition 6 before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
wherein it argued that the properties were bought from their previous owners in
good faith; that the same remains uncultivated, unoccupied, and untenanted up to
the present; and, that the subject landholdings were classified as industrial, thus,
exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner prayed, among other things, that the Notice of Coverage and Notice of
Acquisition be lifted and that the properties be declared exempt from the coverage
of CARP.
Respondents 8 on their part countered, among other things, that the classification
of the land as industrial did not exempt it from the coverage of the CARP
considering that it was made only in 1997; the HLURB 9 certification that the
Municipality of Biñan, Laguna does not have any approved plan/zoning ordinance to
date; that they are not among those farmer-beneficiaries who executed the waivers
or voluntary surrender; and, that the subject landholdings were planted with palay.
Page 13

On June 8, 2001, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza, issued an Order 11 in
favor of the respondent declaring that the subject properties are agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is exempted.
Held:
As aptly found by the Office of the President, the importance of conducting an
ocular inspection cannot be understated, since it is one of the steps designed to
comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The Office of the
President stressed this in its Decision, to wit:
In other words, before the MARO sends a Notice of Coverage to the landowner
concerned, he must first conduct a preliminary ocular inspection to determine
whether or not the property may be covered under CARP. The foregoing
undertaking is reiterated in the latest DAR AO No. 01, s. of 2003, entitled "2003
Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural
Lands Under RA 6657." Section 1 [1.1] thereof provides that:
"1.1Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) — After
determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP, and upon
accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the
NOC (CARP Form No. 5-1)." (NOC stands for Notice of Coverage)
Found on the records of this case is a ready-made form Preliminary Ocular
Inspection Report (undated) signed by the concerned MARO. Interestingly,
however, the check box allotted for the all-important items "Land Condition/
Suitability to Agriculture" and "Land Use" was not filled up. There is no separate
report on the record detailing the result of the ocular inspection conducted. These
circumstances cast serious doubts on whether the MARO actually conducted an on-
site ocular inspection of the subject land. Without an ocular inspection, there is no
factual basis for the MARO to declare that the subject land is devoted to or suitable
for agricultural purposes, more so, issue Notice of Coverage and Notice of
Acquisition.
The importance of conducting an ocular inspection cannot be understated. In the
event that a piece of land sought to be placed from CARP coverage is later found
unsuitable for agricultural purposes, the landowner concerned is entitled to, and
the DAR is duty bound to issue, a certificate of exemption pursuant to DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. of 1997, entitled "Issuance of Certificate of
Exemption for Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and Compulsory
Acquisition (CA) Found Unsuitable for Agricultural Purposes."
More importantly, the need to conduct ocular inspection to determine initially
whether or not the property may be covered under the CARP is one of the steps
designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The CARP
was not intended to take away property without due process of law (Development
Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245. [1996]). The exercise
of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the
taking of private property. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106
[1999], the Supreme Court nullified the CARP acquisition proceedings because of
the DAR's failure to comply with administrative due process of sending Notice of
Coverage and Notice of Acquisition of the landowner concerned.
Considering the claim of appellant that the subject land is not agricultural because
it is unoccupied and uncultivated, and no agricultural activity is being undertaken
thereon, there is a need for the DAR to ascertain whether or not the same may be
placed under CARP coverage. 47** AcICHD
Thus, the question of whether or not petitioner's properties could be covered by
the CARP has not yet been resolved. Until such determination, it follows that
petitioner's landholdings cannot be the proper subject of acquisition and eventual
distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, these involve factual
controversies, which are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court. Verily, the review of
factual matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual
issues.
Puyat and sons vs. Alcaide is about ocular inspection. It’s about the first element,
whether it is devoted to agricultural purposes.
You have a preliminary ocular inspection report form signed by the MARO but the
checkbox for this one “land condition suitability to agriculture, land use” was not
filled. So according to the SC it is not clear whether there was an ocular inspection,
so it was remanded to DAR for the conduct of ocular inspection. Why important?
Because you cannot find if the land is suitable or unsuitable for agricultural
purposes in the absence of an ocular inspection.
AGRARIAN DISPUTE [Section 3(d)]
❑ any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements (leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship) over lands devoted to agriculture
❑ any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under CARL
and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership.
❑ “tenancy relationship”
Different sections where the words “agrarian dispute” is used: Sec 47, 53, 54
BARC – Barangay agrarian reform committee
If you are familiar with katarungang pambarangay, before you can file a case
generally you need to secure certificate to file action. Generally under DAR you
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
14
need to secure a certification from BARC before you can file a case before DAR. Of
course there are exceptions
ESSENTIAL REQUISITIES: PSC-PPS
1) Parties (landowner & tenants)
2) Subject matter is agricultural land
3) Consent of parties
4) Purpose is agricultural production
5) Personal cultivation by tenant
6) Sharing of harvest between parties
❖ All requisites must concur, absence of one does not make one a tenant.
SIR: When you read the cases involving agrarian dispute take note that “parties”
are related to “consent” because I think they are inseparable. Another issue is this
“subject matter is agri land”.
Isidro v. CA
- Private resp is owner of land. Sister of private respondent allowed
Isidro to occupy swampy portion subject to condition to vacate upon
demand. Failure to vacate, unlawful detainer was filed against Isidro.
RTC dismissed bec land is agricultural and so agrarian.
SC:
⦿ Jurisdiction over subject matter determined from allegations of
complaint. Court does not lose jurisdiction by defense of tenancy
relationship and only after hearing that, if tenancy is shown, the court
should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Case involving agri land does not
automatically make such case agrarian. Six requisites were not present.
There was no contract to cultivate & petitioner failed to substantiate
claim that he was paying rent for use of land.
In this case, it was an action for unlawful detainer, but the court dismissed it
because the land is agricultural and concluded that it is agrarian. This is an error on
the reasoning of the court, because the dismissal was based only on one element
and not on the 6 requisites.
So the SC mentioned that when it comes to jurisdiction over the subject matter, it is
determined from the allegations of the complaint and the court does not lose
jurisdiction by a defence of tenancy relationship. That a case involving agri land,
does not automatically make the case agrarian reform.
In actual practice, most landowners whose agri land is occupied by persons whom
they want to be ejected from the land, the normal remedy is to file for an action for
recovery of possession, you have a summary action normally an unlawful detainer
case. Or another action which is accion publiciana. You have this principle that
jurisdiction is to be determined from allegations of the complaint. This is a new
innovation, section 19 was introduced by RA 9700.
Taking a cue from Isidro and other cases, what will determine jurisdiction would be
the allegations of the complaint. If there is an answer filed and there is an
allegation of tenancy relationship, that allegation will not take away the jurisdiction
of the court. But read section 50-A, which states that if there is any allegation from
any of the parties, that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a
farmer, farm worker, or tenant, the case shall automatically be referred by the
judge or the prosecutor to DAR which shall determine and certify within 15 days
from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists.
Where can you find an allegation? In an answer, not in the complaint. So if there is
an action for unlawful detainer filed by a landowner against a tenant, the tenant
will make a defense in his answer that there is a tenancy relationship. What will the
judge do? Pursuant to section 50, the judge will automatically refer to DAR.
If DAR will certify that the action is agrarian in nature, what will the judge do?
Section 50 does not provide what the judge will do, but if you were the judge, you
would have to rely on the certification by DAR because DAR is supposed to have
exclusive jurisdiction.
But we have here a scenario that if the judge will rely on the determination of DAR,
that judge is now saying i have no jurisdiction based on an allegation from an
answer and based on the confirmation by DAR. 1st issue, what happens now to the
principle that jurisdiction is determined on the allegations of a complaint. second,
you have a case where a court loses jurisdiction, based on mere allegation, there is
no hearing, because if you are the lawyer for the tenant, you allege in your answer
that as one of your defenses that there is tenancy relationship, under rule 16 of
rules of procedure you will have to ask for a hearing of your affirmative defenses.
In the hearing you present evidence about tenancy relationship. That is the process
prior to this, but under section 50, allegation and certification from DAR, the court
may now lose jurisdiction. The court will have to dismiss the case and the
aggrieved party will have to appeal. If the court will not dismiss, and the tenant is
aggrieved, the tenant will file a petition for certiorari, or grave abuse of discretion
using section 50. 2nd point, section 50 –A, does not only apply to court, it also
applies to the prosecutor’s office.
SUPLICO v. CA
❖ Suplico is a lessee of rice land. Private respondent was allowed by
Suplico to till the land while Suplico will provide the farm implements
and thereafter Suplico was to receive cavans from the palay by way of
rental. Years later, Suplico threatened to eject priv. resp. from the
property, so private respondent filed an action for damages against
Suplico in CAR. Resp. Owner intervened in case and alleged the
absence of contractual relationship. Trial court declared private
respondent as agricultural lessee and confirmed by CA.
SC:
- SC found no reasons to disturb findings
1. Private respondent was in actual possession of land with family in a
farmhouse just like what a farm tenant normally would.
Page 14

2. Private resp. and wife were personally plowing, planting, weeding
and harvesting.
3. Management was left entirely to private respondent
4. Private respondent shared the harvest with Suplico.
Let me just tell you in advance that agrarian disputes are a question of evidence. In
the case of suplico, suplico is a lessee and the private respondent was allowed by
suplico to till the land; suplico receiving the sharing. When suplico threatened the
respondent to eject, the respondent filed an action for damages. Based on the
facts, there is no consent from the owner, that is why the owner intervened in the
case and alleged absence of relationship. The trial court declared the respondent
as agri lessee confirmed by the CA. Check on the ruling of the court. Actual
possession, cultivation, harvest, but the SC did not discuss the other requirements
specially on the consent requirement. Probably petitioner in this case did not raise
as issue the other requirements and the SC relied on the findings of the lower
court.
MONSANTO v. ZERNA: tenancy relationship may be established verbally or
writing
❖ Sps. Zerna were charged with qualified theft for the taking of coconuts
owned by petitioner. They were acquitted but required Zerna to return
P1,100 to Monsanto on the ground that Monsanto did not consent to
harvest of coconut. Who is entitled to P1,100 proceeds of copra sale.
This falls under DARAB
▪ There is Agrarian dispute:
1. Subject of dispute was taking of coconuts
2. Private respondents were overseers at the time of taking by virtue of
Agreement .
❖ tenancy relationship may be established verbally or writing, expressly
or impliedly
- here there was agreement which contradicts petitioner’s contention
that private respondents are mere overseers. Being overseers does not
foreclose their being tenants. Petitioner allowed respondent to plant
coconut, etc. Harvests: receipts of remittance by respondent. Petitioner
is claiming the amount of P1,100 as balance from proceeds of copra
sale. Private respondents contend that this P1,100 is their
compensation pursuant to tenurial arrangements. Since this amount is
intertwined with the resolution of agra dispute, CA correctly ruled that
DARAB has jurisdiction. RTC has only jurisdiction over criminal and it
acted beyond when it ruled that agri tenancy between parties. This
belongs to DARAB.
To harass the tenants, gikiha ang tenants sa landowners ug qualified theft.
Qualified theft kay allegedly they were taking coconuts.
In the fiscal’s office, the respondent is supposed to file a counter affidavit when a
subpoena is issued. In the counter affidavit, the tenancy relationship must be
alleged by the lawyer of the tenant so that under section 50-A the fiscal’s office will
refer it to DAR. DAR will issue a certification and will inform the fiscal and the fiscal
may be constrained to dismiss the case.
The question is, isn’t it that in the fiscal’s office, the function is to find probable
cause? And when there is an allegation in the counter affidavit made by the
respondent which may be evidentiary in nature, the fiscal normally will say that if
there is evidence, it is to be proven in court. But this time, because of a mere
allegation, the fiscal will say that he has no jurisdiction and the parties should go to
DAR. If the case is dismissed, the remedy there is you go to a higher fiscal – DOJ,
Office of the President, etc.
If you apply the context of Isidro vs. CA case about allegations in a complaint
which will establish jurisdiction of a court, walay remedy ang landowner. The
landowner cannot say that the case should not be referred because the tenant
must first establish that he is a tenant. It may create a clash between law and
court procedure. Remember, court procedure are promulgated by the supreme
court. We have a provision of the law where there is an automatic referral, all those
silent on what the court will do, if there is certification from DAR.
BEJASA v. CA
FACTS:
Candelaria owned two parcels of land, which she leased to Malabanan. Malabanan
hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and clear it, with all the expenses shouldered
by Malabanan. Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any
consideration for its use, be it in the form of rent or a shared harvest
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the Bejasas
SC:
Court found that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties. There was
no proof that Malabanan and the Bejasas shared the harvests. Candelaria never
gave her consent to the Bejasas’ stay on the land . There was no proof that the
Dinglasans gave authority to the Bejasas to be the tenant of the land in question.
Not all the elements of tenancy were met in this case. There was no proof of
sharing in harvest. While Bejasa testified, SC said only Bejasa’s word was presented
to prove this. Besides testimony was suspicious because of inconsistency Bejasa
testified that he agreed to deliver 1/5 of harvest as owner’s share, yet at one time,
he also mentioned that 25% was for Malabanan and 50% for owner. Moreover,
landowners never gave consent, citing Chico vs. CA , 284 534 – “self serving
statement are inadequate, proof must be adhered”. Even assuming that landowner
agreed to lease it for P20,000per year, such agreement did not prove tenancy .
Consideration should be harvest sharing.
Candelaria is the owner, malabanan is the lessee. It was malabanan who hired
Bejasa. Very obvious, no consent from the owner. There was no proof that
malabanan and Bejasa shared the harvest. Candelaria never gave consent to
Bejasa. There was no consent, and so there was no tenancy relationship. The point
is, if there are occupants in the property claiming to be tenants, the land is
agricultural, they are cultivating, they allege sharing of the harvest, but the owner
proves there was no consent, then the occupants cannot claim tenancy
relationship. The tenants can be ejected. How do you prove sharing? There has to
be a receipt, or any other similar evidence. Is it possible? No because the receipt
can be used against the owner. Normally, in the absence of receipt, the evidence of
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
15
the tenant can be an affidavit because the proceedings before is submission of
position paper. You attach affidavits. Can you submit your own affidavit if you are a
tenant? Yes, but the court will normally say that it is self-serving. You have to prove
through independent evidence – affidavits of neighbours or other tenants.
VALENCIA v. CA
FACTS:
- Valencia is the owner of land, she leased the property for five (5)years
to Fr. Andres Flores under a civil law lease concept; lease with
prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land without
Valencia’s written consent. During the period of his lease, private
respondents were instituted to cultivate without consent of Valencia.
After lease, Valencia demanded vacate but refused; Private
respondents were later awarded with CLTs after they filed application
with DAR; CLTs were upheld by Exec Sec and CA.
Valencia is the owner, Flores is the lessee, it was flores who allowed the private
respondents. No tenancy, again no consent. Tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. The lessee did not have the authority to sublease because there was a
prohibition to sublease.
ALMUETE v. ANDRES (Issue on Ownership)
Facts:
Almuete was in exclusive possession of subject land. Unknown to
Almuete, Andres was awarded homestead patent due to investigation
report that Almuete was unknown and waived his rights; Andres also
represented that Almuete sold the property to Masiglat for radiophone
set and that Masiglat sold to him for a carabao and P600. Almuete filed
an action for recovery of possession and reconveyance before trial
court. Issue is who between 2 awardees of lot has better right to
property.
SC:
This is controversy relating to ownership of farmland so, beyond the ambit of
agrarian dispute. No juridical tie of landowner and tenant was alleged
between petitioners and respondent. RTC was competent to try the case.
The issue is whether there is an agrarian dispute. No. The issue was about
ownership so it is beyond the ambit of agrarian dispute. There was no juridical tie.
PASONG BAYABAS v. CA : “no evidence”
Development of land: converted from agricultural to residential as
approved by DAR. Petitioners, claimed they are actual tillers of land,
they filed a complaint for damages alleging surreptitious conversion;
priv resp denied cultivation & waiver of rights was executed by some.
SC : no tenancy
❑ no allegation in complaint that petitioners members are tenants; waiver
of rights constitutes abandonment. No substantial evidence that private
respondent is landlord. Possession/entry is w/o knowledge of owner.
Cultivation / possession not proven. As to the remaining twenty and
more other complainants, it is unfortunate that they have not shown
that their cultivation, possession and enjoyment of the lands they claim
to till have been by authority of a valid contract of agricultural tenancy.
On the contrary, as admitted in their complaint a number of them have
simply occupied the premises in suit without any specific area of tillage
being primarily mere farm helpers of their relatives
There was no difficulty on the part of the supreme court here, why? In the
complaint there was no allegation of tenancy. So how can the court acquire
jurisdiction over the complaint? There was no substantial evidence, private
respondent was landlord, there was no possession or entry without knowledge of
the owner that was alleged in the complaint. Again, just to reiterate, tenancy
relationship is a question of evidence, same here in Escariz vs Revilleza.
ESCARIZ v. REVILLEZA : “tenancy is not presumed”
Involving fruit on land owned by private respondent. Petitioner is
claiming tenancy. DARAB considered petitioner a tenant; CA reversed
SC: Tenancy is not presumed. There was no evidence to prove consent of parties
and sharing of harvest. SC agreed with CA that there is no evidence on record to
prove the existence of the following elements: (a) the consent of the parties and
(b) the sharing of harvests.
HEIRS OF JUGALBOT V. CA
FACTS:
Jugalbot was issued EP; EP was challenged by Heirs of priv resp before
DARAB and seek cancellation of title and recovery possession; on appeal, DARAB
upheld but CA reversed.
SC: Absence of tenancy relationship. The taking of property violated due
process (CA was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process
because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to
the proper party); no ocular inspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and
report to verify the truth of the allegations of Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant
of the property. By analogy, Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals applies to the
case at bar since there was likewise a violation of due process. No concrete
evidence of cultivation; No proof was presented except for their self-serving
statements. Independent evidence, aside from self-serving statements, is needed.
Plus CA findings- Jugalbot was soldier of US Army and migrated to US and
returned only in 1998, wife and daughter were residents of California. Land
involved is residential and not agricultural because of zoning ordinance. Coverage
Section 4: All alienable and disposable public lands. All private lands devoted to or
suitable to agriculture Schedule of implementation – Sec. 5 “The distribution xxx
shall be implemented immediately and completed within ten years from effectivity
hereof.” Sec. 63: “The initial amount needed to implement this Act for the period of
ten years upon approval hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund
created under Sections 20 and 21 of Executive Order No. 299. xxx.”. RA 8542:
amended Sec. 63 as follows: “The amount needed to implement this Act until 2008
shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund.” RA 9700, Sec. 21:
“The amount needed to further implement the CARP as provided in
this Act, until June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under Republic Act No.
8532 and other pertinent laws, shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund and
other funding sources in the amount of at least One hundred fifty billion pesos
(P150,000,000,000.00)”
Page 15
 16
This one will disturb landowners. If you are a landowner and you don’t want the
court to pass upon your relationship assuming you recognize that person occupying
Normally it is the tenant who will file a case because when the landowner sends a as a tenant, landowners may want to pay money to their tenants and let them
demand letter to the occupant to vacate, the occupant or the tenant would work, or possible, what happened is this, the tenant was given a portion of the
normally file an action before DAR. land. There was an agreement here, the tenant was given a portion of the land.
Nasayop ang abogado, y man? It was not clear which portion of the land was given
This one is different, Jugalbot was granted a title – emancipation patent. He was that is why there was a conflict of claims in the interpretation. The landowner is
granted a title because of his claim that he is a tenant. The title was challenged by saying that the tenant’s house is erected on the owner’s lot while the tenant is
the heirs of the landowner, so the heirs filed and sought the cancellation of the title saying it is on the land that was given to him. The court said there is agrarian
of jugalbot and wanting recovery of possession. The issue: is jugalbot really a dispute. As long as the subject matter is the legality of the termination, if the
tenant and therefore entitled to the emancipation patent? There was no proof of dispute originates from such relationship that is tenancy relationship. Example, you
cultivation and per findings of CA, jugalbot was a soldier of the US army, he have a waiver executed by a tenant saying that out of financial grant of the
migrated to the US and returned only in 1998. Kanus-a gi-issue ang title? It was in landowner or from person A, he no longer has a right over the land and he has
1997, so he was not here in pinas. His wife and daughter were residents of waived it etc. If the tenant will question it and say that he was not fully apprised of
California plus the land was residential. Meaning there was no tenancy relationship his right with respect to that and probably was not able to read. It has something
between jugalbot and the landowner, so the title was cancelled. to do with that relationship, then the landowner will have a problem. If the dispute
originates from such relationship, it is a tenancy relationship.
NICORP case (found it in the later part… go go)
VICENTE ADRIANO vs. ALICE TANCO
SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO, vs. ANITA R. FLORES
Facts:
Facts:
On December 18, 1975, respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land
Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land located in Barangay Sumandig in
consisting of 28.4692 hectares located in Norzagaray, Bulacan. The land was
Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus
devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents.
Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally between the
two until 1975 when the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. Per Order
Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a letter 6 dated January 16, 1995
2 from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region III, San
informing him that subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive
Fernando, Pampanga, rent was provisionally fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to vacate the property as soon as
Jesus Fajardo religiously complied with. From the time petitioner cultivated the
possible.
land, he was allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on
the stony part of the land, which is the subject of controversy.
Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland
which might impair his security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir, herein
regional office of DARAB in Region III a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful
respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores and
Possession with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement, denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG
Injunction. He averred that in 1970, Arsenio Tanco (Arsenio), the husband of Alice,
PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG
instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since then, he
PANIG." 3 This was followed by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA
has been performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning,
LUPA," executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot
smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally
No. 2351 an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there
between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve and establish his
was a conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores
home at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the
and Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform
plantation. Presently, he is in actual possession of and continues to cultivate the
Office, Baliuag, Bulacan. 4 In the Report and Recommendation dated May 3, 2000,
land.
the Legal Officer advised the parties to ventilate their claims and counterclaims
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos,
In their Answer, respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property.
Bulacan.
They stressed that Vicente never worked and has no employer-employee
relationship with Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick. Insofar as Alice is concerned,
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein respondent
respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker.
Anita Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In the complaint, she
Issue:
alleged that, as the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she inherited a
WHETHER or not VICENTE IS A BONA FIDE tenant.
parcel of land consisting of stony land, not devoted to agriculture, and land suitable
and devoted to agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan;
Held:
that, sometime in the 1960s, during the lifetime of Leopoldo delos Reyes, Jesus
Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a
Fajardo requested the former to allow him to work and cultivate that portion of
tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation
land devoted to agriculture; that Jesus Fajardo was then allowed to erect a house
of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant
on the stony part of the land, and that the use and occupation of the stony part of
acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. 23
the land was by mere tolerance only; and that the land, which was divided equally
between the two parties, excluded the stony portion. In February 1999, respondent
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that
approached petitioners and verbally informed them of her intention to repossess
one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. 24 For tenancy
the stony portion, but petitioners refused to heed the request.
relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural
Issue:
land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural
Whether or not MTC or the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case.
production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing
of the harvests between the parties. 25 All the requisites must concur in order to
Held:
establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
requisites is fatal.
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm the findings of
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking
the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
The essential element of consent is sorely missing because there is no proof that
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers,
the landowners recognized Vicente, or that they hired him, as their legitimate
tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in
tenant. And, although Vicente claims that he is a tenant of respondents' agricultural
the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or
lot in Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that he has continuously cultivated and openly
lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over
occupied it, no evidence was presented to establish the presence of consent other
lands devoted to agriculture.
than his self-serving statements. These cannot suffice because independent and
concrete evidence is needed to prove consent of the landowner.
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial
arrangements. The contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the
Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of harvests is lacking. Independent
tenancy relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case from
evidence, such as receipts, must be presented to show that there was sharing of
the ambit of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute
the harvest between the landowner and the tenant. 28 Self-serving statements are
because the controversy involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising
not sufficient.
from the landlord-tenant relationship.
Here, there was no evidence presented to show sharing of harvest in the context of
"Indeed, section 21 of the Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving
a tenancy relationship between Vicente and the respondents. The only evidence
the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the
submitted to establish the purported sharing of harvests were the allegations of
settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and
Vicente which, as discussed above, were self-serving and have no evidentiary
tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
value. Moreover, petitioner's allegations of continued possession and cultivation do
Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the
not support his cause. It is settled that mere occupation or cultivation of an
relationship of landlord and tenant — at the time of the dispute. The same may
agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an
have arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such
agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws. 30 It is essential that, together
relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and
with the other requisites of tenancy relationship, the agricultural tenant must prove
the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully
that he transmitted the landowner's share of the harvest.
terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from the relationship of landlord
and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by the Court of Agrarian
Neither can we agree with the DARAB's theory of implied tenancy because the
Relations . . ."
landowner never acquiesced to Vicente's cultivating the land. Besides, for implied
tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential requisites of tenancy must be
In the case at bar, petitioners' claim that the tenancy relationship has been
present.
terminated by the Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject matter of the
dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship, or if the dispute
Again a question of evidence. The court reiterating that independent evidence
originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by the DAR, through the
include RECEIPTS that must be presented.
DARAB. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the action
beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.
Labor law: in illegal dismissal cases, it is the employer who has the burden.

Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS Page 16


Agrarian: it is the person claiming to be the tenant who has the burden to prove his
allegation of tenancy. He who alleges has the burden to prove. Not only that,
Respondent-landowner has no obligation to prove exception or defects.
ESTATE OF PASTOR M. SAMSON vs. MERCEDES R. SUSANO
Facts:
Pastor M. Samson (Pastor) owned a 1.0138-hectare parcel of land known as Lot
1108 of the Tala Estate Subdivision located in Bagumbong, Caloocan City.
Pastor was approached by his friend Macario Susano (Macario) who asked for
permission to occupy a portion of Lot 1108 to build a house for his family. Since
Pastor was godfather to one of Macario's children, Pastor acceded to Macario's
request. Macario and his family occupied 620 square meters of Lot 1108 and
devoted the rest of the land to palay cultivation. Herein respondents, Macario's wife
Mercedes R. Susano and their son Norberto R. Susano, insist that while no
agricultural leasehold contract was executed by Pastor and Macario, Macario
religiously paid 15 cavans of palay per agricultural year to Pastor, which rent was
reduced by Pastor in 1986 to 8 cavans of palay per agricultural year.
Pastor subdivided Lot 1108 into three portions of which he sold portions of it
without Macario's knowledge.
Pastor sold 2,552 square meters of Lot 1108-A to spouses Felix Pacheco and
Juanita Clamor, allegedly also without Macario's knowledge and consent.
According to respondents, no written notice was sent by Pastor to Macario prior to
the sale to Chan of Lot 1108-C comprising an area of 6,696 square meters. They
aver that Macario came to know of the transaction only after Chan visited the
property sometime in October 1990 accompanied by an employee from the city
government.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a tenancy relation between Pastor Samson and Macario
Susano and in binding herein petitioner.
Held:
We find in favor of petitioners. Applying our pronouncement in Levardo v. Yatco, 51
we rule that the subject land cannot be subject to the OLT program of P.D. No. 27
for two reasons: first, the subject land is less than seven hectares; and second,
respondents failed to show that Pastor owned other agricultural lands in excess of
seven hectares or urban land from which he derived adequate income, as required
by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. 52
Moreover, the DAR Memorandum on the "Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small
Landowners" dated July 10, 1975 is explicit:
5.Tenanted rice and/or corn lands seven (7) hectares or less shall not be covered
by Operation Land Transfer. The relation of the land owner and tenant-farmers in
these areas shall be leasehold . . . 53
However, while the disputed landholding which had an original aggregate area of
only 1.0138 hectares is not covered by the OLT program, the same may still be
covered by P.D. No. 27, albeit under its Operation Land Leasehold (OLL) program.
The OLL program placed landowners and tenants of agricultural land devoted to
rice and corn into a leasehold relationship as of October 21, 1972. 54 But the fact
that Macario, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, was a de jure tenant must be
established.
In the case at bar, while the RARAD, DARAB and the CA are unanimous in their
conclusion that an implied tenancy relationship existed between Pastor Samson and
Macario Susano, no specific evidence was cited to support such conclusion other
than their observation that Pastor failed to protest Macario's possession and
cultivation over the subject land for more than 30 years. Contrary to what is
required by law, however, no independent and concrete evidence were adduced by
respondents to prove that there was indeed consent and sharing of harvests
between Pastor and Macario.
It has been repeatedly held that occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land
will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence
is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, or consent of the
landowner. Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot
be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on
record adequate to prove the element of sharing. To prove sharing of harvests, a
receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving
statements are inadequate. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the
elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be done away with by
conjectures. Leasehold relationship is not brought about by the mere congruence
of facts but, being a legal relationship, the mutual will of the parties to that
relationship should be primordial. For implied tenancy to arise it is necessary that
all the essential requisites of tenancy must be present.
The affidavits executed by three of respondents' neighbors are insufficient to
establish a finding of tenancy relationship between Pastor and Macario.
Principle: affidavits of the tenant or persons claiming to be a tenant are self-
serving.
This case deals with affidavits executed by the neighbors of the occupants. SC
considered the affidavits as insufficient because of lack of details.
Lesson: you can use affidavits of neighbors for as long as it has the specific details
which are:
- how the agreement was implemented
- how much was given
- Private respondents averred that, being the actual occupants and qualified
when and where the payments were made
- whether they have a witness when the landowner is receiving the
share.
JUAN GALOPE vs. CRESENCIA BUGARIN
Facts:
Respondent owns a parcel of land. Petitioner farms the land.
In Barangay Case No. 99-6, respondent complained that she lent the land to
petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from
petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
17
own. Petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had
been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to
P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest. The case was not settled. 5
Represented by Celso Rabang, respondent filed a petition for recovery of
possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as DARAB Case No. 9378. Rabang
claimed that respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave
nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the
land. Rabang also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who
allegedly possesses the land.
Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant
entitled to security of tenure. The Adjudicator said substantial evidence prove the
tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent. The Adjudicator noted the
certification of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) that petitioner is the
registered farmer of the land; that Barangay Tanods said that petitioner is the
tenant of the land; that Jose Allingag affirmed petitioner's possession and
cultivation of the land; that Allingag also stated that petitioner hired him only as
farm helper; and that respondent's own witness, Cesar Andres, said that petitioner
is a farmer of the land.
The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and stressed that
the elements of consent and sharing are not present. The DARAB noted petitioner's
failure to prove his payment of rentals by appropriate receipts, and said that the
affidavits of Allingag, Rolando Alejo and Angelito dela Cruz are self-serving and are
not concrete proof to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of rentals. The DARAB
added that respondent's intention to lend her land to petitioner cannot be taken as
implied tenancy for such lending was without consideration.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a tenancy relationship
Held:
The matter of rental receipts is not an issue given respondent's admission that she
receives rentals from petitioner. To recall, respondent's complaint in Barangay Case
No. 99-6 was that the rental or the amount she receives from petitioner is not
much. 14 This fact is evident on the record 15 of said case which is signed by
respondent and was even attached as Annex "D" of her DARAB petition.
Consequently, we are thus unable to agree with DARAB's ruling that the affidavits
16 of witnesses that petitioner pays 15 cavans of palay or the equivalent thereof in
pesos as rent are not concrete proof to rebut the allegation of nonpayment of
rentals. Indeed, respondent's admission confirms their statement that rentals are in
fact being paid. Such admission belies the claim of respondent's representative,
Celso Rabang, that petitioner paid nothing for the use of the land.
Respondent's act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving
rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement.
An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a
written contract alone. Section 5 18 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise
known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural
leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement.
Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present.
Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of their
relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. 19 They mutually agreed to the
cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their
relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the harvest,
petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondent's
motion 20 to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming,
further confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioner's personal
cultivation of the land 21 is conceded by respondent who likewise never denied the
fact that they share in the harvest.
One of a kind case!!! (LO was very honest)
Landowner filed a complaint at the barangay because she would want the occupant
to vacate the property. Reason: gigamyan sa renta ! the rent was insignificant,
she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own so that she can gain more
profits.
SC used her own admission that she received rentals from the petitioner. This is a
confirmation that indeed rentals were paid and that this is an agrarian dispute.
SUTTON VS. LIM
FACTS: On December 7, 1993, private respondents applied for the issuance of a
CLOA over a parcel of land before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Secretary. Upon the recommendation of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO), the application was granted and they were issued CLOA. Subsequently, on
January 31, 1994, the Register of Deeds of Masbate issued the corresponding OCT.
On November 23, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of the said
CLOA and title before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD), assailing the validity of the said issuances on the ground that the subject
parcel of land is a private land devoted to cattle raising which she inherited from
her deceased father, Samuel Sutton, who, in turn, previously bought the subject
parcel of land from Romanito P. Lim and his wife. Petitioner also claimed to have
been denied due process for not receiving any notice of private respondents'
application proceedings for CLOA. The petition was amended to include the MARO,
PARO and the Register of Deeds of Masbate as additional respondents.
beneficiaries of the subject lot which formed part of the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain, the DAR Secretary correctly issued the CLOA in their
favor. While admitting having sold a lot in favor of Samuel Sutton from whom
petitioner purportedly inherited the subject parcel of land, they asserted that the
lot sold was different from Lot No. 1493. Moreover, they interposed the defense of
prescription since the petition for cancellation was filed after the subject title
became indefeasible.
On the other hand, the MARO and PARO, in their Answer with Motion to
Dismiss, invoked the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
Page 17

functions in issuing the CLOA. They also clarified that the subject parcel of land has
been classified as Government Owned Land (GOL) or Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran (KKK) areas pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 2282, hence,
subject to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program's immediate coverage
(CARP coverage). Moreover, petitioner was not able to prove that she is the
registered owner of the subject parcel of land and that it is exempt from the CARP
coverage.
The CA Ruling: CA denied the petition on jurisdictional grounds and dismissed the
case without prejudice to its re-filing. It held that the DARAB does not have
jurisdiction over the instant controversy due to the absence of a landlord-tenant
relationship or any agrarian relations between the parties. It also ruled that since
the issuance of the subject CLOA was made in the exercise of the DAR Secretary's
administrative powers and function to implement agrarian reform laws, the
jurisdiction over the petition for its cancellation lies with the Office of the DAR
Secretary.
Issue: WON there is tenancy relationship?
HELD: The petition is without merit. While the DARAB may entertain petitions for
cancellation of CLOAs, as in this case, its jurisdiction is, however, confined only to
agrarian disputes. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction, the controversy must
relate to an agrarian dispute between the landowners and tenants in whose favor
CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the
administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and
regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are
within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not the DARAB.
Thus, it is not sufficient that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA
already registered with the Land Registration Authority. What is of primordial
consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties.
As defined in Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657, an agrarian dispute relates to "any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under the said Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
Verily, an agrarian dispute must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement
over lands devoted to agriculture. 18 Tenurial arrangements pertain to agreements
which set out the rights between a landowner and a tenant, lessee, farm worker or
other agrarian reform beneficiary involving agricultural land. Traditionally, tenurial
arrangements are in the form of tenancy 19 or leasehold
arrangements. 20 However, other forms such as a joint production agreement to
effect the implementation of CARP have been recognized as a valid tenurial
arrangement. 21
To be sure, the tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations referred to may be
established with the concurrence of the following: 1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) the
purpose of the agricultural relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6)
the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
In this case, a punctilious examination reveals that petitioner's allegations are
solely hinged on the erroneous grant by the DAR Secretary of CLOA No. 00122354
to private respondents on the grounds that she is the lawful owner and possessor
of the subject lot and that it is exempt from the CARP coverage. In this regard,
petitioner has not alleged any tenurial arrangement between the parties, negating
the existence of any agrarian dispute and consequently, the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. Indisputably, the controversy between the parties is not agrarian in nature
and merely involves the administrative implementation of the agrarian reform
program which is cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Section 1, Rule II of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure clearly provides that "matters involving strictly the
administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, and other agrarian reform laws
and pertinent rules, shall be the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR
Secretary."
Furthermore, it bears to emphasize that under the new law, R.A. No.
9700, 24 which took effect on July 1, 2009, all cases involving the cancellation of
CLOAs and other titles issued under any agrarian reform program are now within
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. (Section 9)
Consequently, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the herein
controversy, rendering its decision null and void. Jurisdiction lies with the Office of
the DAR Secretary to resolve the issues of classification of landholdings for
coverage (whether the subject property is a private or government owned land),
and identification of qualified beneficiaries.
LADANO VS. NERI
FACTS: Complaint by petitioner Luciano Ladano (Ladano) before the DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator against respondents Felino Neri (Neri), Edwin Soto, Adan
Espanola and Ernesto Blanco. Ladano alleged that on May 7, 2003, the
respondents forcibly entered the two-hectare land, located in Manalite
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
18
I,Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City, which he and his family have been peaceably
occupying and cultivating since 1970. The said respondents informed him that
the property belongs to Neri and that he should vacate the same immediately.
Not too long afterwards, the respondents fenced the property and destroyed
some of the trees and kawayan planted thereon. Ladano prayed that he be
declared the rightful "occupant/tiller" of the property, with the right to security
of tenure thereon. In the alternative that the judgment is in the respondents'
favor, he prayed that the respondents compensate him for the improvements
that he introduced in the property.
Respondents countered that Ladano's Complaint should be dismissed for lack of
merit. 11 He is not entitled to the reliefs he sought because he does not have,
as he did not even allege having, a leasehold arrangement with Neri, the
supposed owner of the land he is occupying. 12
Instead of arguing that he has a right to remain on the property as its bona
fide tenant, Ladano maintained that he has been its possessor in good faith for
more than 30 years. He believed then that the property was part of the "public
land and [was] open to anybody." 13 As a possessor and builder in good faith,
he cannot be removed from the subject property without being compensated for
the improvements that he had introduced. 14 He prayed for an award of
P100,000.00 as disturbance compensation. 15
On June 23, 2004, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed Ladano's
Complaint. 16 She determined that the two-hectare property, while agricultural,
is not covered by RA No. 6657, as amended, 17 which only covers agricultural
properties beyond five hectares. Presidential Decree No. 27, as
amended, 19 does not apply either because the property was not planted with
rice and corn. Neither is it covered by other agrarian tenancy laws because
Ladano had not presented any evidence of his tenancy relationship with the
landowner.
The DARAB determined that the only issue to be resolved is whether Ladano is a
tenant on the subject landholding. 25 If he is a tenant, he is entitled to security
of tenure and cannot be removed from the property. The DARAB held that
Ladano's 30-year occupation and cultivation of the land could not have possibly
escaped the landowner's notice. Since the landowner must have known about,
and acquiesced to, Ladano's actions, an implied tenancy is deemed to exist
between them. 27 The landowner, who denied the existence of a tenancy
relationship, has the burden of proving that the occupant of the land is a mere
intruder thereon. 28 In the instant case, respondents failed to discharge such
burden.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They assailed the DARAB's
finding of a tenancy relationship as having no factual basis. Ladano himself
never claimed sharing his harvests with, or paying rentals to, the landowner.
Without such an arrangement, no tenancy relationship can exist between
them 32 and Ladano cannot claim rights under the agrarian laws.
Contrary to the DARAB's ruling, the CA held that the burden lies on the person
who is asserting the existence of a tenancy relationship to prove that all the
elements necessary for its existence are present (6 requisites).
The CA concluded that there is no evidence supporting the DARAB's conclusion
that a tenancy relationship exists between Ladano and Neri. 38 In fact, Ladano
himself admitted that he entered and tilled the subject property without the
knowledge and consent of the landowner. Such admission negates the requisites
of consent and of an agreement to share harvests. 39
In seeking a reconsideration 41 of the CA Decision Ladano alleged, for the first
time, that he indeed shared a portion of his harvest with the landowner's
caretaker.
Issues Whether petitioner is an agricultural tenant on the subject property.
Our Ruling: Petitioner is not a tenant on the land and is not entitled to security
of tenure nor to disturbance compensation. His Complaint was properly
dismissed for lack of merit.
The Department of Agrarian Reform and its adjudication boards have no
jurisdiction over Ladano's Complaint. "For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over
the case, there must exist a tenancy [relationship] between the parties." 70 But
a careful reading of Ladano's Complaint shows that Ladano did not claim to be a
leasehold tenant on the land.
Petitioner never alleged that he had any agreement with the landowner of the
subject property. Indeed Ladano's Complaint did not assert any right that arises
from agrarian laws. He asserted his rights based on his prior physical possession
of the two-hectare property and on his cultivation of the same in good faith. The
issues that he wanted resolved are who between himself and the respondents
have a better right to possess the property, and whether he has a right to be
compensated for the improvements he introduced on the property. Clearly, the
nature of the case he filed is one for forcible entry 72 and for
indemnification, 73neither of which is cognizable by the DARAB, but by the
regular courts. While neither of the parties challenged the jurisdiction of the
DARAB, the Court can consider the issue of jurisdiction motu proprio.
Still a question about evidence.
In Isidro, the pronouncement of the SC that even if the land was agri, that does
not automatically become an agrarian dispute.
Page 18

In the same manner, even if the person is occupying and cultivating, that does
not ipso facto make that person a tenant. 6 requisites must be satisfied. Even if
there is harvest or cultivation, but there is no consent, there is no agrarian
dispute.
Chapter II (Coverage)
Recap on difference between PD 27 and CARL:
PD 27: rice and corn
CARL: everything is covered subject to certain exceptions (prawn farming,
fishpond, livestock, etc., under sec. 10) but generally all land, public and private
lands.
Common denominator: devoted to or suitable to agriculture
- Why is there such an element?
- These lands are supposed to be acquired by the government to be
given to farmer beneficiaries. Purpose: they will improve, (to cultivate
the land and for the land to be developed)
Actual cases: LO will allege that lands are suitable for ECOTOURISM so that it will
not be suitable for agriculture.
- Proof needed to show ecotourism suitability: certification from
department of agriculture.
(there was an issue on Roxas’ application for exemption) but SC said that this issue
has to be determined by DAR, not us.
Dissenting opinion of Ynares Santiago in Roxas and Company: There was a
certification from DA certifying that the land is not suitable for agriculture. So why
should we refer this to DAR when there is already a certificate?
HOMESTEAD GRANTEES (Sec.6) “Very important”
FIRST ASPECT of section 6 is about homestead. (Underlined provision)
SECTION 6.Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure,
and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
(PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least
fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have
been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas
originally retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original
homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as
long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or
contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the
area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the
option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or
another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant
chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and
shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses
to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder
to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option
within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice
of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on
the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease,
management, contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the
original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void: Provided,
however, That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when
registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after
the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any
transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
Purpose of Homestead: Given to the citizens of the Philippines for cultivation and
for residence
Maximum number of hectares that can be given to citizens is 12 hectares
Homestead is also a title ! which you will learn in Land Titles and Deeds
*More or less similar with Free Patent but they differ in the requisites
*Title given by DENR and normally there is a prohibition of conveyance within a
period of 5 years
SIR: Mao na ang uban mu.ingon nga “we might as well suffer the 5 yr prohibition
under free patent or homestead than go through with the judicial process of titling
which may take several years”
Qualifications under Sec. 6 (Take note):
1. original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs
2. who still own the homestead
3. as long as they continue to cultivate (most important)
HOMESTEAD PATENT A mode of acquiring alienable and disposable lands of public
domain for agricultural purposes conditioned upon actual cultivation and residence.
➢ filed at CENRO where land being applied is located.
➢ who are qualified - citizens of Philippines over 18 years
old & not an owner of more than 12 hectares of land (Art
XII, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution)
• designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-
destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance of the
homestead (CA 141, Section 116) within five years after the grant of
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
19
the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits
alienation of the homestead, but in line with the primordial purpose to
favor with the homesteader and his family the statute provides that
such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the
right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs.
CARL recognizes rights of homesteaders(Sec.6,)
• expressly recognized in Sec. 6, Art XIII, Constitution
SECOND ASPECT
Retention right of the landowner: xxx but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares.
- What is the meaning of that? A landowner, for ex., who has 20
hectares, at the effectivity of the law will now be able to retain only 5
hectares. 15 hectares will be acquired by the government subject to
payment of just compensation.
- Why retention? That is a right of the landowner to hold on to 5
hectares without any condition or qualification.
■ Meaning: WON the landowner is personally cultivating, that is
not required by law. That is an absolute right of the landowner
■ Although later on, we will later on discover that there is an
admin order issued by DAR setting limitations – landowner has
to apply with DAR to be able to exercise retention, there is a
period within which to exercise and if there is a failure to
exercise within the period given then there is a possible waiver
of that right.
■ But the landowner, if aggrieved by the MARO (for ex. because it
is the MARO who normally handles the application at the lower
level) can go the Sec. of DAR on appeal.
THIRD ASPECT
Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to
the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and
(2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm
Take note that the word used by law with respect to the children or child of the
landowner is NOT retention but AWARD.
- Meaning: for a child to be awarded by the government with 3 hectares,
he HAS to COMPLY with these qualifications
- Who normally examines the qualifications? MARO
■ SIR: and with due respect with MAROs, it is also possible that it
is in the appreciation of these qualifications that corruption can
come in, with or without consideration
FOURTH ASPECT: Retained area of the landowner (second par. of Sec. 6)
- Who has the right to choose? LANDOWNER
- What if in the chosen area, there are tenants? What would happen to
the tenants? Law gives them (tenant) two options:
1. You can be a qualified beneficiaries of other portions of the
land of the landowner or on agricultural lands owned by other
persons
2. You can remain on the retained area. If he chooses to remain
on the retained area:
◆ The tenant loses his right to become a qualified
beneficiary
◆ There is now a leasehold relation between the
landowner-lessor and the tenant on the retained area.
Tenant will not acquire any parcel of land but he
continues to be a tenant on the retained area and to be
governed by Chapter 3 of the law.
2 CASES UNDER HOMESTEAD:
Alita vs. CA, 170 SCRA 706
Facts:
Two parcels of land in Tungawan, Zamboanga del Norte were acquired
by private respondents’ predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under
the provisions C.A. No. 141.
Private respondents/owners Enrique Reyes, et al. herein are desirous
of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners/tenants Gabino Alita refuse to
vacate, relying n the provisions of PD 27 and PD 316 and appurtenant regulations
issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.
Held:
We agree with the petitioners in saying that PD 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them
ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure
promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However,
such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of
the Public Land Act or CA No. 141. Thus,
“The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection
of the poor. The law gives a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a
modest house for himself and family and plant what is necessary for subsistence
and for the satisfaction of life’s other needs.xxx”
Both the Philippine constitution and the CARL respect the superiority
of the homesteaders right over the right of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian
Reform Statute.
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the
homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian
Reform statute. In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which provides:
“The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.”
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso
supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like
those of the property in question, reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. “xxxx... Provided further, That original homestead
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at
Page 19

the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.”
ALITA v. CA: (1989)
➢ private respondents predecessors-in-interest have acquired
2 parcels of land in Zamboanga del Sur thru homestead
patent
➢ petitioners/ tenants refuse to vacate relying on PD27
SC:
➢ PD decreed the emancipation of tenants from bondage of soil and
transferring to them ownership of land they till.
➢ However, PD27 cannot be involved to defeat the very purpose of CA
141 (Public Land Act)
➢ Phil. Constitution respects the superiority of homesteader’s rights and
CARL also.
Sec. 6:
Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
Paris vs. Alfeche, 364 SCRA 110
Facts:
Petitioner Florencia Paris is the owner of 10.6146 hectare of land in
Paitan,Bukidnon. The said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents
Dionisio Alfeche, et al. who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their names
pursuant to Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under PD 27 notwitstanding the fact
that neither the tenants nor the Land Bank [has] paid a single centavo for the said
land.
Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of 7
hectares under PD 27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her children under
CARL., the tenants are not supposed to acquire the subject land and the
Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for being
contrary to law. Petitioner further alleged that she owns the subject property as
original homestead grantee who still owned the same when RA 6657 was
approved, thus she is entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants.
As regards to the land, petitioner has applied for retention of 7
hectares contending that the lands subject of the instant petition are covered by
Homestead Patents, and as decided by the Supreme Court in Patricio vs. Bayug and
Alita vs. CA, the homesteaders and their heirs have the right to cultivate their
homesteads personally, which is a superior right over that of tenant-farmers.
Held:
Petitioner’s contention is without legal basis. PD 27, under which the
EP sought to be canceled here were issued to respondents, applies to all tenanted
private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not. The law
makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear
that the lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt from it operation.
Petitioner’s claimed entitlement to retain 7 hectares is also untenable.
PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states:
“In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than 7 hectares if such
landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it.”
Clearly, the right to retain an area of 7 hectares is not absolute. It is
premised on the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be
retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law.
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As
admitted by petitioner herself, the subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is
clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part thereof.
Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her landholdings.
Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform, Republic Act
(RA) No. 6657, to which the application of PD 27 is suppletory, petitioner's lands
are subject to land reform. The said Act lays down the rights of homestead
grantees under Sec. 6 thereof.
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and
retain the original homesteads, only for "as long as they continue to cultivate"
them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically
exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued
cultivation by the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall
exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
Neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating the subject
homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that respondents were the ones who had
been cultivating their respective portions of the disputed properties.
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with
Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires no qualifying condition for the landowner to
be entitled to retain such area.
Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3)
hectares each, since they are not actually tilling the parcels or directly managing
the farm.
PARIS v. ALFECHE (2001)
• Paris is owner of 10 hectares in Bukidnon and another property of 13
hectares. She admitted that land is fully tenanted by private
respondents Alfeche,et al.
• Paris claimed that she is entitled to retention and that as original
homestead grantee, she is entitled to retain the lands to the exclusion
of tenants.
SC :
❑ Petitioner’s contention is w/o legal basis. PD applies to all tenanted
private agriculture lands primarily devoted to rice and corn. Nowhere
does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempted
from its operation. Under RA 6657, rights of homestead grantee are
provided but with condition: only for “as long as they continue to
cultivate them”. That parcels of land are covered by homestead will not
automatically exempt them from operation of land reform. It is the fact
of continued cultivation by original grantees or direct compulsory heirs
that shall exempt their lands. Petitioner can retain however 5 hectares
which require no qualifying condition (Sec.6)
DIFFERENCE between Alita and Paris:
- Alita: had the desire to personally cultivate ! granted
- Paris: no desire to cultivate ! denied
RETENTION RIGHTS
NCC: conjugal – total is 5; capital/paraphernal – not more than 5 each but not
exceed 10
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
20
FC (Aug.3,1988) per DAR Adm. Order No. 2, s. 2003:
capital/paraphernal - not to exceed 5 provided with judicial separation
absolute (presumed) – not to exceed 5
*Even if you have two spouses, the two is considered to be one! Therefore, they
shall only have 5 hectares depending of course on the relation.
SIR: This is what is actually happening but do not do this. (with respect to
retention limit
*illegal: A has 5 hectares of agri land, and wants to buy the 5 hectares of B. If A
will buy the land and will change the document of B with A’s name, A’s land holding
will exceed 5 hectares (that is not allowed under the law because the buyer is
supposed to execute an affidavit of the transferee saying that the acquisition will
not exceed the landholding provided by law). Limitation applies throughout the
Philippines.
What would A do? A will pay B with the consideration but A will not
cause the transfer of B’s name on the land. Ipabilin ang name sa yuta in the name
of B to avoid perjury. But there will be complications…
*legal:
- Before buying the land, change the classification in tax declaration from
agricultural to residential or commercial or industrial.
- Disadvantage: Real property taxes
- Be careful: Republic vs. CA (under Sec. 10 on exemptions): There is no law or
jurisprudence that says that the classification under tax declaration is the absolute
standard.
- tax dec vs. MARO's findings (land is agri) ,SC upheld MARO’s findings
LANDOWNER’s RETENTION RIGHTS
Is this right defeated by the issuance of CLTs/EPs or CLOAs?
How CLOA is issued to farmer beneficiaries:
- Under Sec. 16 on acquisition by the government, there are different
schemes under the reform:
■ Land transfer schemes: 2 aspects – voluntary and compulsory
◆ Voluntary – the landowner will volunteer to convey the
land to the government, agree on the price and then
execute the deed of conveyance
◆ Compulsory – if the landowner refuses the notice of
acquisition and notice of coverage. Gov. will have to
expropriate. This time is a different expropriation. WHY?
● Even without the title (2 copies: owner’s title and
the RD’s title), if the government has already
deposited the amount with LBP, registry of deeds
can already cancel the title of the owner and issue
a new title in favor of the government. The
government can now issue different titles to farmer
beneficiaries. It is now called CLOA “Certificate of
Land Ownership Award”.
Even if the farmer beneficiary is given the CLOA, he still has to pay the government
30 annual amortizations with interest. (that is how long the farmer pays the
government for the just compensation)
DAEZ v. CA
Issuance of EPs/CLOA’s to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar
landowner from retaining the area. In fact, EP or CLOA may be cancelled if land
covered in later found to be part of landowner’s retained area. In this case, CLTs of
private respondent were leased w/o according Daez her right of choice. So DAR
was ordered to fully accord Daez her rights under Sec.6 of RA 6657.
• Retention by landowner: 5 hectares
• Retention by each child of landowner: 3 hectares provided:
1. at least 15 years of age; and
2. actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm
DAR Adm. Order # 2, S.2003
• Who may apply for retention
• Period to exercise right of retention
• Where to file
• Instance where owner is considered to have waived his right of
retention
• Operating produces : MARO – PARO – REG. DIRECTOR- Sec. (Appeal)
RA 9700, Sec 3 amended Sec 4.
“That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below
shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries”. (RA
9700, Sec. 3)
Kini kataw.anan kay (hmm…), Sec 5 is about schedule of implementation. The law
says, the distribution shall be implemented within 10 yrs from effectivity. So when
CARL took effect, June 15, 1988, it was effected for 10 years. Why is it that we are
still implementing CARL till now? Because the law was amended.
How was the law amended? Sec. 5 was not the one amended but SEC 63 which is
about funding. So legislators should have amended Sec 5!!! RA 8542 amended Sec
63 extending implementation for another 10 years. How was it worded?
“the amount needed xxx until 2008 (Dec 31)”
Worse, when CARL expired on 2008, it was amended extending it further to June
30, 2009. How? Joint Resolution which was easier.
RA 9700 approved Aug 7 2009 but given retroactive effect. Why? Na.late pag
approve sa Congress.
6657: 10 years upto 1998
8542: upto 2008 interpreted up to Dec. 31
Joint Resolution: From Dec. 31, 2008 to June 30, 2009
9700: approved Aug but they reckoned July 1, 2009 ang effectivity up to June 15,
2014 (5 yr period)
Next time, you amend correctly!!! May have question on legality!!!
What is the good point of these amendments? Congress was consistent of its error!
“SEC. 6-A. Exception to Retention Limits. - Provincial, city and municipal
government, units acquiring private agricultural lands by expropriation or other
Page 20

modes of acquisition to be used for actual, direct and exclusive public purposes,
such as roads and bridges, public markets, school sites, resettlement sites, local
government facilities, public parks and barangay plazas or squares, consistent with
the approved local comprehensive land use plan, shall not be subject to the five
(5)-hectare retention limit under this Section xxx.” (RA 9700, Sec. 4)
SIR: That means if you have an agricultural land, the landowner will choose an
area which the LGU will use for public purposes, the landowner cannot use his right
of retention to prevent the LGU from exercising its right to expropriate.
- REASON: Public purposes such as road, bridges, public market, school
sites, resettlement sites, local government facilities, public parks and
barangay plazas or squares
- So what the landowner can do is choose another area. That is if it is
consistent with the comprehensive land use of the LGU.
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions from coverage of CARL
(a) Lands ADE used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves
(exempt);
- You will note, jurisdiction here lies with DENR
- Example: agricultural lands all the way to balamban (watershed area),
exempted from CARP because it is for a different purpose
(b) private lands ADE used for prawn farms and fishponds (exempt)
- You have RA 7881, that exempts it from the coverage during the time
of Ramos
(c) lands ADE used and found to be necessary for national defense,
school sites and campuses including experimental farm
stations, seeds and seedlings research, church sites and
convents, mosque sites, communal burial grounds and
cemeteries, penal colonies and farms and all lands with 18%
slope and over (exempt)
- Very interesting (daw), Why? (a) and (b), you have the qualifying
words ADE, which is used under letter (b) and which is also used under
letter (c) BUT, there is an additional phrase: found to be necessary.
And this was tested in the case of Central Mindanao. WHY? (go to
Central Mindanao Case)
- experimental farm stations, seeds and seedlings research ! why
exempted? For agricultural production
- church sites and convents, mosque sites ! freedom of religion
■ SIR: reminded me of Estrada vs. Escritor
■ There is an allowable accommodation for religion under
CERTAIN circumstances ! this is part of the accommodation
- Last part is: lands with 18 degrees slope and over ! bakilid au
(exempted) WHY? Because of possible soil erosion
DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 06-06
SECTION 3. Qualifications of Children-Awardees. — The child of a landowner
whose landholding is subject of acquisition and distribution under the CARP may be
awarded and given preference in the distribution of said lands if he/she meets all of
the following criteria: DaCTcA
3.1 Filipino citizen;
3.2 At least fifteen (15) years of age; and
3.3 Actual tillers or one directly managing the farm as of June 15, 1988 up to
the time of the conduct of field investigation of the landholding under CARP. Direct
management shall refer to the cultivation of the land through personal
supervision under the system of labor administration. It shall be interpreted along
the lines of farm management (this one is more difficult…) as an actual major
activity being performed by the landowner's child from which he/she derives his/
her primary source of income.
SECTION 4. Rights and Obligations. — The children-awardees shall have the
following rights and obligations:
4.1 All children-awardees shall exercise diligence in the use, cultivation and
maintenance of the land including the improvements thereon. Unauthorized sale of
the land, or negligence or misuse of the land and support extended to children-
awardees, and other violations under existing guidelines shall be grounds for the
forfeiture of their right as such;
4.2 Lands awarded to qualified children of landowners may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession or to the
government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten
(10) years; Provided, however, that the children or the spouse of the transferor
shall have a right to repurchase the land from the government or the LBP within a
period of two (2) years from the date of transfer; and
4.3 The children-awardees may avail of any support services being provided by
the government in agrarian reform areas.
Exemptions from coverage (Section 10)
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions from coverage of CARL
(a) Lands ADE used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish
sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves (exempt);
(b) private lands ADE used for prawn farms and fishponds (exempt)
(c) lands ADE used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites
and campuses including experimental farm stations, seeds and seedlings research,
church sites and convents, mosque sites, communal burial grounds and cemeteries,
penal colonies and farms and all lands with 18% slope and over (exempt)
CENTRAL MINDANAO v. DARAB
• The subject lands are exempted because they are actually, directly &
exclusively used and found necessary for school site and campus,
including experimental farm stations for educational purposes and for
establishing seed and seeding research
• The construction of DARAB in Section 10 restricting the land area of
CMU to its present needs overlooked the significant factor it growth of a
university in years to come. By the nature of CMU, which is a school
established to promote agriculture & industry, the need for vast tract of
agriculture land for future programs of expansion is obvious.
• While portion of CMU land was leased by Phil. Packing Corp.(now Del
Monte), the agreement was prior to CARL & was directly connected to
the purpose & objectives of CMU as educational institution
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
21
• As to determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary
for use of CMU, school is in best position to resolve & answer the
question. DARAB & CA have no right to substitute unless it is manifest
that CMU has no real need for land.
- one part used for school and campus site
- another part not used, part is leased to Del Monte Phil. Packing Co.
- Central Mindanao is an agricultural school
- SC: did not use the phrase “found to be necessary”, but impliedly it
was referring to it. Because even if that portion of land was not used, if
it was found to be necessary for future expansion, it is to be exempted
from coverage.
- QUESTION: who will determine/decide when and what lands are found
to be necessary? SC: it is the school and the only exception is if it is
manifest that CMU has no real need for the land. (but who will admit
that??)
Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs. Secretary of DAR, 274 SCRA 30
Facts:
Petitioners are engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds
and prawn farms. They question Sections 3[b], 11, 13, 6[d], 17 and 32 of RA 6657
as unconstitutional because they extend the agrarian reform to aquaculture lands
even as Sec. 4, Art. 13 of the Constitution limits agrarian reform only to agricultural
lands.
Held:
The Court ruled that provisions of RA 7881 expressly states that fishpond and
prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. Thus, petition to question
the constitutionality of some portion of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is
moot and academic with the passage of RA 7881.
Atlas Fertilizer v. Sec.
• Atlas engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn
farms; challenged RA 6657 which coverage lands devoted to the
aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.
SC:
R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are
excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question
concerning the constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and
academic with the passage of R.A. No. 7881
Sanchez v. Marin
Issue:
Whether the subject fishpond is exempted/excluded from the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government by virtue of the
amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7881 to R.A. No. 6657
SC:
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7881 amended Section 10 of Republic
Act No. 6657 by expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually, directly and
exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds from the coverage of the CARL.
Republic vs. CA, 342 SCRA 189
Facts:
Parcels of land in Jala-Jala, Rizal was covered and has a tax
declaration classifying the said land as agricultural. The DAR then issued a Notice of
Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory acquisition pursuant to
Section 7, Chapter II of RA 6657.
Private respondent corporation filed with the DAR office an application for
exemption of the land from agrarian reform but the same was denied.
The CA reversed the DAR orders declaring those portions of the land of the
petitioner which are mountainous and residential to be exempt from the CARP.
DAR then appealed to SC contending and claiming that the subject properties have
already been classified as agricultural based on the tax declaration and therefore is
covered by CARL.
Held:
RA 6657 (CARL) covers all private and agricultural land. Agricultural lands are “land
devoted for agricultural activity and not classified as minerals, forest, residential
commercial or industrial”
No law or jurisprudence holds that the land classification embodied in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry. The
DAR administrative order no.6 lists the other documents, aside from tax
declaration, that must be submitted when applying for exception from CARP. The
classification made by the Land Regulatory Board outweighed the classification
stated in the tax declaration.
REPUBLIC v. CA
Tax declaration classified subject land as agricultural. DAR issued notice of
coverage & owner applied for exemption. Application was denied and on appeal the
Court of Appeals created a commission to conduct ocular inspection and survey the
land. Later, based on the report submitted by the commission, the Court of Appeals
reversed the Order of the DAR and exempted the lands from CARL. Republic
contends that tax declaration classified it as agriculture & which cannot be altered
by mere ocular inspection.
SC: There is no law/jurisprudence that land classification in tax declaration is
conclusive; tax declaration is clearly not sole basis of classification of land. SC gave
credence to commission’s report. Based on their report, it was found that the land
use map submitted by private respondent was an appropriate document consistent
with the existing land use. It was confirmed that the lands are not wholly
agricultural as they consist of mountainous area with an average of 28% slope. The
CARL has further provided that all lands with 18% slope and over except those
already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty Dev’t Corp. vs. CA, 367 SCRA 175
Facts:
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation was the
registered owner of two parcels of land at Cabuyao, Laguna. According to the
petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide clean potable water to
the Canlubang community, and thet 90% light industries are now located in the
area. Thus, praying for the exemption of the said parcels of land for the compulsory
acquisition under CARP.
Held:
Page 21

The disputed land is classified as PARK and subsequent studies and
survey showed that the parcel of land in question forms a vital part of a watershed.
Article 10 of RA 6657 expressly states that “Lands actually, directly and exclusively
used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding
grounds, watersheds and mangroves shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the
DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of
18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL. R. A. No.
6657, Section 10, provides:
"Section 10. Exemptions and Exclusions. – “xxx..and all lands with eighteen percent
(18%) slope and over, except those already developed shall be exempt from
coverage of this Act."
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof showing that the disputed
parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage of CARP
because of its very high slopes.
NICORP MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. LEONIDA
DE LEON
Facts:
On August 26, 2004, respondent filed a complaint before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Region IV-Province of Cavite,
praying that petitioners Salvador R. Lim and/or NICORP Management and
Development Corporation (NICORP) be ordered to respect her tenancy rights over
a parcel of land located in Barangay Mambog III, Bacoor, Cavite, registered under
TCT No. T-72669 in the name of Leoncia De Leon and Susana De Leon Loppacher
(De Leon sisters), who were likewise impleaded as parties-defendants in the suit.
Respondent alleged that she was the actual tiller and cultivator of the land since
time immemorial with full knowledge and consent of the owners, who were her
sisters-in-law; that sometime in 2004, petitioners circulated rumors that they have
purchased the property from the De Leon sisters; that petitioners ignored
respondent's requests to show proof of their alleged ownership; that on August 12,
2004, petitioners entered the land and uprooted and destroyed the rice planted on
the land and graded portions of the land with the use of heavy equipment; that the
incident was reported to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) which issued
a Cease and Desist Order 5 but to no avail.
Respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to respect her tenancy rights
over the land; restore the land to its original condition and not to convert the same
to non-agricultural use; that any act of disposition of the land to any other person
be declared null and void because as a tenant, she allegedly had a right of pre-
emption or redemption over the land.
Petitioner Lim denied that respondent was a tenant of the subject property under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). He alleged that respondent is
a septuagenarian who is no longer physically capable of tilling the land; that the
MARO issued a certification 7 that the land had no registered tenant; that
respondent could not be regarded as a landless tiller under the CARP because she
owns and resides in the property adjacent to the subject land which she acquired
through inheritance; that an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy 8 was executed by the De
Leon sisters when they sold the property to him. DTIaCS
Moreover, Lim claimed that respondent and her family surreptitiously entered the
subject land and planted a few crops to pass themselves off as cultivators thereof;
that respondent tried to negotiate with petitioner Lim for the sale of the land to her,
as the latter was interested in entering into a joint venture with another residential
developer, which shows that respondent has sufficient resources and cannot be a
beneficiary under the CARP; that the land is no longer classified as agricultural and
could not thus be covered by the CARP. Per certification issued by the Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Bacoor, Cavite, the land is
classified as residential pursuant to a Comprehensive Land Use Plan approved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
Issue:
Whether or not the land is exempted.
Held:
In the instant case, there is no substantial evidence to support the appellate court's
conclusion that respondent is a bona fide tenant on the subject property.
Respondent failed to prove the third and sixth elements cited above. It was not
shown that the De Leon sisters consented to a tenancy relationship with
respondent who was their sister-in-law; or that the De Leon sisters received any
share in the harvests of the land from respondent or that the latter delivered a
proportionate share of the harvest to the landowners pursuant to a tenancy
relationship.
The affidavits did not mention at all that the De Leon sisters received a portion of
the harvests or that respondent delivered the same to her sisters-in-law. The
affidavits failed to disclose the circumstances or details of the alleged harvest
sharing; it merely stated that the affiants have known respondent to be the
cultivator of the land since time immemorial. It cannot therefore be deemed as
evidence of harvest sharing.
That respondent was allowed to cultivate the property without opposition, does not
mean that the De Leon sisters impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold
relation with respondent. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not
ipso facto make one a de jure tenant.
Finally, the sale of the subject land to petitioners did not violate Sections 65 33 and
73 34 (c) of R.A. No. 6657. There was no illegal conversion of the land because
Sec. 65 applies only to lands which were covered by the CARP, i.e., those lands
beyond the five-hectare retention limit allowed to landowners under the law, which
were distributed to farmers-beneficiaries. In the instant case, it was not shown that
the subject land was covered by the CARP. Neither was it shown that the sale was
made to circumvent the application of R.A. 6657 or aimed at dispossessing tenants
of the land that they till
The evidence that was mentioned by the SC was a letter. In this letter, it was found
that there was no tenancy relationship, because of the use of the word kasama.
The word kasama would be taken in varying context, not necessarily in relation to
agricultural leasehold agreement. It was not also clear the word kasama referred to
the tenant.
(Sec. 11) : COMMERCIAL FARMS
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
22
Commercial farms – private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms,
orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations.
They are subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution after 10 years from
effectivity.
SIR: I think Del Monte falls under this classification. I’m not sure.
LUZ FARMS
❖ Sec. II which includes “private agricultural land devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry & swine raising” in definition of “commercial farms” is
invalid.
Adm. Order #01 (2004): rules & regulations governing exclusion of agricultural land
used for cattle raising from CARP. Citing Luz Farms case private agricultural land or
portions thereof actually, exclusively &directly used for cattle raising as of 15 June
1988 shall be excluded. Exclusion shall be granted only upon proof of AED prior to
15 June 1988 & continuously utilized for such purpose up to application. Any act to
change or convert ; w/ intent to avoid CARP,shall be invalid. Only the grazing area
& portions of property required for infrastructure necessary for cattle raising shall
be considered for exclusion
Why is there special treatment to commercial farms? Because of possible effect to
company and distribution of lands to farmer beneficiaries, basin ug mawagtang and
kanindot sa yuta na dili unta i-subdivide or i-distribute. Agricultural production can
be better if they are not distributed or are intact as a whole.
For commercial farms, there is a suspension of 10 years sa pag-implement. And
there are alternative methods available to commercial farms other than distribution
of lands.
DAR A.O #9, S of 1998 – allows commercial farms certain options, subject to
approval of DAR & workers: (aside from voluntary & compulsory coverage)
CLOAs are issued - joint venture
in name of cooperative - growership agreement
of workers - lease – back
- direct payment
Please note: in any of these methods, ang yuta ma.adto gihapon sa farmer
beneficiaries, dili lang i-distribute. Intact ang yuta, but the former landowner can
participate in this method.
- For instance, joint venture: kinsa ang mag.joint venture? Ang farmer
beneficiary and former landowner
■ Beneficiaries will contribute the use of the land, the investor
furnishing the capital and technology.
■ Note: there has to be approval from DAR
- Lease-back: an owner of the land will now rent his own land from the
farmer beneficiary
■ Lease may not exceed 10 years. There is a least rental
■ Needs approval of DAR
- Growership arrangements: magsabot sila daan na ug mag.harvest na
gani, ako ang mu.palit sa inyohang products
■ To be approved by DAR
- Direct payment scheme: if they can agree na ang property will have to
be transferred to the farmer beneficiary and the farmer beneficiaries
will be paying the landowner for the land.
■ To be approved by DAR
■ According to DAR, it requires that CLOA be issued collectively or
under co-ownership under the direct payment scheme
*NOTE: Former landowner shall be given priority with respect to these methods.
Contracts are reviewed by DAR Support Services to be submitted to the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) and to be endorsed to PARC.
PARC is the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council headed by the President of the
Philippines.
Please note: these are not the only methods under CARP. Another is the:
- Stock distribution option: referring to hacienda Luisita
- For how many years, the SDO was perfectly managed, it was a good
method until when the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council headed by
GMA revoked the SDO on the ground that among others, it failed to
alleviate the conditions of the farmer beneficiaries. And which
revocation was upheld by the SC.
- Right now, the lands are being distributed to farmer beneficiaries
consistent with the ruling of the Court.
DAR vs. Sutton, et al., G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005
DAR issued A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a
landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public and private agricultural lands
under the coverage of agrarian reform.
Issue:
The constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993.
Held:
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted
by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its
power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules
and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the
provisions of the Constitution. The rule-making power of an administrative agency
may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the
Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations In the case at bar, we find that the
impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to
regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude,
inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or
“agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from
crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
DAR v. SUTTON :
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Land devoted to cow & calf breeding. Lands under VOS before CARP.
After CARP & Luz Farms case, Sutton filed withdrawal of VOS. DAR issued A.O #9
(1993) which provide that only portions of land used for raising of livestock, poultry
& swine shall be excluded. DAR partially exempted portion but ordered acquisition
the rest.
SC: AO is invalid as it contravene Constitution since livestock , swine/poultry raising
do not fall under “agriculture” & “agricultural activity”
DAR Adm. Order No. 7-2008
Policy Guidelines:
1. Private agricultural lands or portions therof actually, directly or exclusively used
for livestock purposes other than agricultural like cattle raising as of june 15, 1988
and continuously and exclusively utilized or devoted for such purpose up until the
time of inventory shall be excluded from CARP coverage.
2. Conversely, landholdings or any portions thereof not actually, directly and
exclusively used for livestock raising are subject to CARP coverage if one or more of
the following conditions apply:
2.1 if there is agricultural activity in the area, i.e cultivation of the soil, planting of
crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of such products, and other
farm activities and practices, whether done by a natural or juridical person and
regardless of the final use or destination of such agricultural products
2.2 the land is suitable for agriculture and it is presently occupied and tilled by
farmer/s.
5. in case of any of the conditions under items 2.1 and 2.2 are evident, the PARO
shall immediately proceed with the issuance of NOTICE of COVERAGE on the
subject landholding or portions thereof
8. any act of the landowner to change or convert his agricultural land for livestock
raising shall not affect the coverage of his landholdings under CARP. Any
diversification or change in the agricultural use of the landholdings, or shift from
crop production to livestock raising shall be subject to the existing guidelines on
land use conversion.
Adm. Order #7 (2008)

(Guidelines per Sutton Case (livestock raising)
• Lands ADE used for livestock like cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 &
continuously devoted shall be excluded.
• Those not ADE are subject to CARP provided that the agricultural
activity in land is suitable for agriculture presently tilled by farmers
Chapter III (IMPROVEMENT OF TENURIAL & LABOR RELATION)
WHAT ARE THE WAYS IN DISTRIBUTING LANDS TO QUALIFIED FARMERS?
1. Compulsory acquisition (Sec.16)
2. Voluntary offer to sell/voluntary land transfer (Sec.20)
3. Non-land transfer schemes –stock distribution option(SDO);
production & profit sharing (PPS)- Sec. 13/32; leasehold
operation(Sec.12)
In the case of Hacienda Luisita, CJ Corona was the only one who gave a dissenting
opinion because remember, in the decision of Hacienda Luisita, while the SC
revoked the Stock Distribution Program, the SC used the Operative Fact Doctrine.
Even if the program is null and void, using that doctrine, we have the consult the
farmers whether they would want to remain as stockholders or they would want
the land distributed.
- CJ Corona dissented saying Sec 31 is void because with respect to
agrarian reform, it is only distribution, there are no other ways.
Leasehold Operation: (We can understand because) Under sec. 6, if the area
chosen by the landowner is tenanted, and the tenant chooses to remain on the
land. That is a choice personal to the tenant
SDO: different scheme. That’s why some authors are saying, the land reform of the
Philippines is very different:
1. Other asian countries only have 3 hectare retention limit, in the Phil,
why 5?
2. Why do have an SDO as an option?
■ There is no evidence to prove that this is an accommodation in
favor of Hacienda Luisita during the time of Aquino. At the same
time, there is no proof that the revocation by the PARC of the
program of Hacienda Luisita headed by GMA was also as a
defense? (dili maklaro seri) against Aquino
Take note: VOS, there is a cut-off date under RA 9700. (Right now you cannot avail
of this)
- Without any notice from DAR, the landowner proposes to the
government.
VLT is not anymore an option under the present law (RA 9700)
- VLT is an option by the landowner that after receiving the notice of
acquisition from DAR, the landowner offers.
Under RA 9700, what will remain is COMPULSORY ACQUISITION.
Note: That is consistent with the thrust of the government, that by 2014,
everything should have been offered compulsorily, without waiting whether the
landowner will offer or not.
Under Sec 12, DAR is mandated to determine and fix the lease rentals. And this is
shown in Admin Order No. 02-06.
DAR Adm. Order No. 2-06
RA 6389 automatically converted share tenancy throughout the country into
agricultural leasehold relationship
1. abolition of share tenancy now covers all agricultural landholdings without
exceptions
2. the conversion of share tenancy into leasehold is mandated by law.
3. All share-crop tenants were automatically converted into agricultural lessees as
of june 15, 1988 whether or not a leasehold agreement has been executed
4. Leaseholders security of tenure shall be respected and guaranteed.
IV. GOVERNING POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
23
Pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657, and in order to fully implement the
provisions of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, on agricultural leasehold, the following
policies and principles are hereby issued:
1. Agricultural leasehold shall be based on a tenancy relationship.
The following are essential elements of agricultural tenancy:
1.1. The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
1.2. The object of the relationship is an agricultural land;
1.3. There is consent freely given either orally or in writing,
express or implied;
1.4. The purpose of the relationship is agricultural production;
1.5. There is personal cultivation;
1.6. There is consideration given to the lessor either in a form
of share of the harvest or payment of fixed amount in money or
produce to or both.
2. Agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term of period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale,
alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the land. In case the
agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor as
provided for under Sec. 10, R.A. 3844, as amended.
xxx
4. The consideration for the lease shall not be more than the
equivalent of 25% of the average normal harvest (ANH) during the three
(3) agricultural years immediately preceding the date the lease was
established. If the land has been cultivated for less than 3 years, the initial
consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest of the
preceding year/s when the land was actually cultivated.
If we talk about leasehold, and there is a determination by DAR on the lease
rentals, the perfect scenario is: there has to be a document showing the agreement
on leasehold between the landowner and the lessee-tenant.
If you have a document, the tenant can have it annotated, registered with the
registry of deeds and the law itself provides this should be free from payment of all
fees and services.
- point of registration: protect the right of the lessee-tenant, so that any
prospective buyer may be cautioned by simply looking at the title itself
that there is a leasehold relationship involving that parcel of land.
But even without the document, under AO 02-06, leasehold relation shall not be
extinguished by expiration of term, by sale, in case of alienation, purchaser-
transferee shall be subrogated to rights obligations of tenancy.
RA 6657 mandates Dar to determine the fix rentals within retained areas and areas
not yet acquired for agrarian reform
- Farmer has a right to elect whether to become a farmer beneficiary or a
leaseholder in the retention are of the landholder.
Sec.12 of 6657 mandates DAR to determine & fix the lease rentals within the
retained areas and areas not yet acquired.
Sec. 6 of 6657 recognizes the right of farmer to elect whether farmer-beneficiary
OR leaseholds in retained area.
Sec.67 of 6657 directs RD to register patents, title & documents required for
implementation of CARP
❑ Pursuant to DAR’s mandate to protect the rights & improve tenurial &
economic status of farmers in tenanted lands, DAR issued AO
02-06(REVISED RULES & PROCEDURES GOVERNING
LEASEHOLD IMPLEMENTATION IN TENANTED AGRICULTURAL
LANDS):
-Leasehold is based on tenancy relationship (repeat 6 requisites)
-Leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by expiration at term nor
by sale. In case of alienation, purchaser/transferee shall be subjugated
to rights/obligation of lessor.
- specific provision on the consideration to be given to the lessor which
can either be in a form of share of harvest or payment of money
-DARAB has jurisdiction to cancel leasehold contract. Why DARAB?
- DARAB exercises quasi-judicial powers. With respect to
quasi-judicial powers, Leasehold contract involves rights,
obligations and others terms of the contract
-The consideration of lease shall not be more than 25% of average
normal harvest during 3 agri years
-AO 02-06 states, among others, the rights & obligations of lessor/
lessee.
CHAPTER IV – REGISTRATION
❑ Sec. 14 & 15 require the registration of landowners & beneficiaries w/
DAR. Purpose is to establish databank & identify actual famer-
beneficiaries.
Insofar as beneficiaries are concerned, registration will determine if you have a
standing to intervene in a case. Enunciated in the case of Fortich vs. Corona:
Fortich, et al. vs. Corona, et al., G.R. 131457, August 19, 1999
This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao,
Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development
Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine
Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational
corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Grower's
Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April,
1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory
acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. 4
NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and
was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial
Page 23

Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director,
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines
(Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any
activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders." 5
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers'
protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners
claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution
"after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda
Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the
President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by
reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared
final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision
dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win"
Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the
President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7
thereof provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the
President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special
laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall
be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally
meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall
apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring
the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed
a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-
open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of
the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became
the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order
No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one
(1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March
29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section
7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that
the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the
Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of
the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
Fortich vs. Corona : intervenors claimed that they are farmworkers & so
intervened in case.
SC: There is no ruling yet from DAR whether intervenors are beneficiaries, so they
have no standing yet to intervene in the case.
❑ DAR safeguards the list of ARB & provide IDs as proof of being bonafide
beneficiaries
❑ DARAB has jurisdiction to disqualify an ARB.
Concha vs. Rubio: Not a dispute between LO and tenant. Fight among tenants
- question: who among them should be considered qualified to become
beneficiaries over a portion of land?
- who determines who is qualified? DAR specifically MARO
- although SC said in this case that it is the Sec. of DAR through the authorized
offices
- What was the finding of MARO?
- when he was talking about respondents, he was talking about the
parties who were not considered qualified. Why were they not qualified? According
to the MARO they:
-refused to sign the form
-already given disturbance compensation
-Respondents: we returned the money to the landowners
-But MARO found that they used the money in building
their houses in the lot given to them
-executed the document “sinumpaang salaysay” that they already
abandoned the landholding in question
-As a matter of principle, the finding of the MARO is to be accorded respect unless
there is a showing of abuse of authority.
CHAPTER V – LAND ACQUISITION
▪ Landlessness is acknowledged as the core problem in the rural areas
and the root cause of peasant unrest.
▪ In order to hasten the implementation of the program, the Department
of Agrarian Reform has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode
of land acquisition. To the same end, the law provides for the steps in
acquiring private lands through administrative instead of judicial
proceedings. This procedure is allowed provided the requirements of
due process as to notice and hearing are complied with.
▪ Compulsory acquisition may be defined as the mandatory
acquisition of agricultural lands including facilities and improvements
necessary for agricultural production, as may be appropriate, for
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
24
distribution to qualified beneficiaries upon payment of just
compensation.
▪ The Notice of Coverage (NOC) commences the compulsory acquisition
of private agricultural lands coverable under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Along the various phases of the CARP
proceedings, the process stalls because of Land Owner (LO) resistance,
most of whom invoke the ground of lack of notice or non-observance of
due process in attacking the proceedings.
Just to show us the amendment by RA 9700, the words added under section 16.
“AND DISTRIBUTION”
SECTION 6.The title of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 16.Procedure for Acquisition and Distribution of Private Lands."
Why was this added? Because Sec. 16 doesn’t only talk about acquisition, it also
involves distribution of lands.
LAND ACQUISITION
SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.- For purposes of acquisition of
private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the
DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal
delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the
municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in
accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent
provisions hereof.
But it was not clear in the law about how identification is determined ! this was
filled up by DAR through an Admin Order.
- talks about “notice to acquire”: In the case of CONFED vs. DAR, SC talks about
two notices
1. Notice of coverage: More or less Preliminary: WHY?
- because while it notifies that the property shall be placed under
CARP, the landowner is entitled to retention.
- notifies the landowner about the public hearing about the results of
field investigation, land evaluation and other pertinent matters
- the landowner will be informed that the field investigation of his
landholding shall be conducted. After that comes the notice of
acquisition.
2. Notice of acquisition:
- the area subject of compulsory acquisition has to be stated. WHY? It
is based already on the field investigation
- plus the amount of just compensation offered by DAR
How is the notice to be done? Personal delivery, registered mail and posting
Note in the case of CONFED: Notice shall contain the offer of DAR
- OFFER: offer of the government to the landowner as to how much the
government will pay the landowner corresponding to the land to be acquired.
- Discuss this in relation to par. (e): It is the deposit that is the key to the
immediate possession and issuance of a title
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal
delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall
inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner
the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers
a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title
and other muniments of title.
If landowner accepts ! no problem
If landowner rejects or fails to reply ! summary admin proceedings
Take NOTE: the purpose of this is compensation. With respect to just
compensation, RTC has jurisdiction.
Reiterate: there are only 2 instances where RTC has jurisdiction insofar as CARP is
concerned:
1. just compensation
2. criminal offenses
then why is it that the law in par. (d) talks about determination of just
compensation? It was determined by the SC in CONFED, that this determination is
only PRELIMINARY. Meaning that the landowner (as also shown in par. (f)) can still
resort to court IF he disagrees with the decision referred in par. (d).
- So they bring the matter to court of proper jurisdiction for the
FINAL determination of just compensation.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation of the land by requiring
the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to summit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted
for decision.
Notice in par. (e), par (d) would give you 30 days to respond. You have to inform
DAR whether you accept or reject it.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
How do we know the amount to be deposited? Should it be based on par. (d) after
summary admin proceedings or par. (a) that is contained in the notice to acquire?
! CONFED CASE
Page 24

In real scenario: transfer of title may happen before immediate possession. Why? It
is possible that there is resistance here on the part of the landowner.
ex. Even if the title is already in the name of the Republic of the Philippines but
DAR cannot take possession because gibutangan ug guard ang agri land,
landowner still actually possesses the land while he is fighting for the acquisition in
court.
Take note here: in normal dealings (voluntary dealings), if you have a sale of land,
the seller will execute the Deed of Sale and give the original copy (owner’s
duplicate copy) to the buyer, so that the buyer can go to RD, and be issued a new
title in favor of the purchaser. But here it is different.
1. Under par. (e), Registry of Deeds can cancel the title of the LO on the
basis of the deposit, certification from land bank which will be
annotated to the title and RD will issue a new title in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines.
2. The title is cancelled even without the surrender of the owner’s copy
3. RD’s copy of the LO’s title is cancelled even if the owner’s copy is
subsisting
■ Probable in case LO rejects offer or does not reply, he is still in
possession of the title
■ Advise: do not simply rely on the owner’s copy, you get a
certified true copy from the RD.
4. RD can cancel and issue under CARL even if there is no payment of
taxes and transfer fees (provided in Sec 66 and 67 below)
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
Sec. 16 outlines the procedure for acquisition of private land
❑ Take note of Sec.16(d) & (e):
(1) practice of having no deed of transfer or conveyance
(2) titles are cancelled w/o owner’s copy surrendered (in Torren's
System, if there is refusal in involuntary dealings remedy is file petition
in court
(3) RD titles are cancelled while owner’s copy is subsisting
Sec. 66 (Exemptions from taxes &fees of land transfer)
Sec. 67 (Free Registration of patents, titles & documents required for
implementation of CARP)
Sec. (e) : Once DAR request and LBP makes deposit of initial valuation, DAR can
request RD to cancel title & transfer it to Republic of Phil. So even if landowners
protests valuation, distribution of land will proceed. CLOAs are issued upon land
acquisition: so cancellation of title of landowner can simultaneously go w/ issuance
of CLOA.
In Association of small land owners, SC did not say “automatically”. SC
said that title and ownership remain w/ LO until full payment of past conversation.
CONFED vs. DAR
Facts:
Petitioners CONFED, NFSP, UNIFED and PANAYFED claim that their members own
or administer private agricultural lands devoted to sugarcane. They and their
predecessors-in-interest have been planting sugarcane on their lands allegedly
since time immemorial. While their petition is denominated as one for prohibition
and mandamus, the petitioners likewise seek to nullify paragraphs (d), (e) and (f)
of Section 16 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In other words, their arguments, which will
be discussed shortly, are anchored on the proposition that these provisions are
unconstitutional.
They allege the following grounds in support of their petition:
It is the principal contention of the petitioners that, in the exercise by the State of
the power of eminent domain, which in the case of RA 6657 is the acquisition of
private lands for distribution to farmer-beneficiaries, expropriation proceedings, as
prescribed in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, must be strictly complied with. The
petitioners rely on the case of Visayas Refining Company v. Camus and Paredes 7
decided by the Court in 1919. In the said case, the Government of the Philippine
Islands, through the Governor-General, instructed the Attorney-General to initiate
condemnation proceedings for the purpose of expropriating a tract of land
containing an area of 1,100,463 square meters to be used for military and aviation
purposes. In compliance therewith, the Attorney-General filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance (CFI) and among the defendants impleaded was Visayan
Refining Co. which owned a portion of the property intended to be expropriated.
The CFI provisionally fixed the total value of the subject property at P600,000 and
upon payment thereof as deposit, the CFI authorized that the Government be
placed in possession thereof.
Paragraph (e) is assailed by the petitioners as it authorizes the DAR, by allegedly
merely causing the deposit with the Land Bank of the compensation, to
immediately take possession of the property and to direct the Register of Deeds to
cancel the certificate of title of the landowner without notice to and consent of the
latter. The petitioners contend that, in contrast, under the Civil Code, if the creditor
or obligee refuses to accept the tender of payment, it is the duty of the debtor or
obligor to make consignation of the thing or amount due. Under the Civil Code,
there is no effective payment without valid tender of payment and consignation in
court. 15 The petitioners theorize that, in the same manner, the DAR cannot be
allowed to take possession of the property of a landowner, by mere deposit of the
compensation that it has summarily fixed under paragraph (e), without having to
go to court.
Paragraph (f) is characterized by the petitioners as meaningless and useless to the
landowner. It allegedly compels him to file a case, and in the process incur costs
therefor, for the final determination of just compensation when, in the meantime,
he has already been deprived of possession of his property and his certificate of
title cancelled.
The Respondents' Counter-Arguments
The Land Bank urges the Court to dismiss the petition since the constitutionality of
RA 6657 had already been categorically upheld by the Court in Association of Small
Landowners. Further, some of the grounds relied upon by the petitioners allege
matters that require factual determination. For example, the allegation that the
DAR is subjecting the sugar lands to the coverage of RA 6657 without first
ascertaining whether there are regular farmworkers therein and whether they are
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
25
interested to own, directly or collectively, the land they till, allegedly requires
factual determination. Considering that the Court is not a trier of facts, the Land
Bank argues that these matters are better threshed out in a trial court.
HELD:
DAR's compulsory acquisition procedure is based on Section 16 of RA 6657. It does
not, in any way, preclude judicial determination of just compensation
Contrary to the petitioners' submission that the compulsory acquisition procedure
adopted by the DAR is without legal basis, it is actually based on Section 16 of RA
6657. Under the said law, there are two modes of acquisition of private agricultural
lands: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for compulsory acquisition is that
prescribed under Section 16 of RA 6657. TCDcSE
In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court painstakingly outlined the
procedure for compulsory acquisition, including the administrative orders issued by
the DAR in relation thereto, in this manner:
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and
the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall
send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered
mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall
of the place where the property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the
Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform
the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he
executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders
the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer,
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the
landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts
summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land.
The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit
evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days
from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its
decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter,
the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the
issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any
party may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final
determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to
hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is
the identification of the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries. However, the
law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the
DAR issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, which set
the operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as
follows:
"II.OPERATING PROCEDURE
A.The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the assistance of the pertinent
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall: EDATSI
1.Update the master list of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area
of responsibility. The master list shall include such information as required under
the attached CARP Master List Form which shall include the name of the landowner,
landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
2.Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or
landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which the
landowners have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land
acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a)CARP CA Form 1 — MARO Investigation Report
b)CARP CA Form 2 — Summary Investigation Report of Findings and Evaluation
c)CARP CA Form 3 — Applicant's Information Sheet
d)CARP CA Form 4 — Beneficiaries Undertaking
e)CARP CA Form 5 — Transmittal Report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned
forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same are true and
correct. IEHTaA
3.Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/meeting to
the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to
the said conference/meeting shall also be sent to the prospective farmer-
beneficiaries, the BARC representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
representative and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of
the property. He shall discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the
views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The
landowner shall also be asked to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the
meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an
integral part of the CACF.
4.Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO).
B.The PARO shall:
1.Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2.Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in
accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. The valuation worksheet and the
related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO and all the
personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms. TCASIH
3.In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular
inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection and verification
shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds 500,000 per estate.
Page 25

4.Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the
duly accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to the Central Office.
The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of
his report.
C.DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD), shall: ECTHIA
1.Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate
and determine the final land valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A
summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and duly certified by the
BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final
valuation.
2.Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative,
a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the Notice
to the landowner personally or through registered mail within three days from its
approval. The Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory
acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3.Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and
submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition. However, in case of
rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a
summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance
with the procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1989.
Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on just compensation, the BLAD
shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the required Order of
Acquisition.
4.Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit
of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the
Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take
possession of the land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries." AEDCHc
CONFED vs. DAR
❑ Compulsory Acquisition
❑ Notice of Acquisition
❑ First step: identification of the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries.
❑ Law is silent
❑ Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989
❑ Valid implementation , two notices
❑ DAR A.O. No.12, Series of 1989, amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No.9,
Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O No.1, Series of 1993
Expropriation in Consti Law: two limitations:
1. Public use 2. Payment of just compensation
SC: In this case, there is no more need to prove public use because this has been
settled in the Constitution when it called for Agrarian Reform. So there is only one
limitation remaining: just compensation.
JUST COMPENSATION
1. What are the factors which the court must rely upon to be able to
determine just compensation? (Sec. 17)
2. When shall we reckon the payment of the determination of just
compensation? Time of ACTUAL taking
■ But it is different in this case, while the SC has mentioned about
date of taking, but it has been interpreted at the time of the
issuance of the title which may different.
■ Actual scenario: actual taking may precede issuance or vice
versa
3. Is the landowner entitled to claim interest?
Last issue is the application of Rule 67:
- sec. 58 and rule 67 talks about appointment of commissioners. When the case is
filed in the RTC: in the law itself, it says MAY appoint, under rule 67, court SHALL
appoint Commissioners for the determination of just compensation.
- who normally opposes commissioners? BIR, city assessor, provincial assessor
(they are more or less knowledgeable on the aspect of just compensation)
LBP vs Trinidad
Facts:
Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land situated
in Sampao, Kapalong, Davao del Norte with an approximate area of 37.1010
hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-49200, 14.999 hectares of
which was covered by RA No. 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)
scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Private respondent offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) the price
of P2,000,000.00 per hectare for said portion of the land covered by CARP.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued and offered as just
compensation for said 14.999 hectares the amount of P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57
per hectare. The offer was rejected by private respondent.
In accordance with Section 16 of RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP deposited for the
account of private respondent P1,145,806.06 in cash and in bonds as provisional
compensation for the acquisition of the property.
Thereafter, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through the Regional Adjudicator
(RARAD) for Region XI conducted summary administrative proceedings under
DARAB Case No. LV-XI-0330-DN-2002 to fix the just compensation.
On June 26, 2002, the DARAB rendered a decision fixing the compensation of the
property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare.
Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision but the same
was denied on September 4, 2002.
Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial determination
of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Tagum City, docketed as DAR Case No. 78-2002, which is the subject of
this petition.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
26
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against DAR before
the same Special Agrarian Court docketed as DAR Case No. 79-2002, to which
petitioner LBP filed its answer and moved for the dismissal of the petition for being
filed out of time.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Delivery of the Initial Valuation praying that
petitioner LBP be ordered to deposit the DARAB determined amount of
P10,294,721.00 in accordance with the Supreme Court ruling in "Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, Pedro L. Yap, Et Al., G.R. No. 118712, October 6,
1995". EAIcCS
Petitioner LBP filed a Manifestation praying that the amount of the deposit should
only be the initial valuation of the DAR/LBP in the amount of P1,145,806.06 and
not P10,294,721.00 as determined by the DARAB.
On December 12, 2002, public respondent rendered the assailed resolution
ordering petitioner LBP to deposit for release to the private respondent the DARAB
determined just compensation of P10,294,721.00.
On December 13, 2002, petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
order to deposit.
On December 17, 2002, private respondent filed a motion to cite Romeo Fernando
Y. Cabanal and Atty. Isagani Cembrano, manager of petitioner LBP's Agrarian
Operations Office in Region XI and its handling lawyer, respectively, for contempt
for failure to comply with the order to deposit.
After the filing of private respondent's comment to the motion for reconsideration
and petitioner LBP's explanation and memorandum to the motion for
reconsideration, public respondent rendered the assailed resolution dated February
17, 2003, denying petitioner LBP's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner LBP filed a motion to admit a second motion for reconsideration which
still remains unacted upon by public respondent.
ISSUE:
The lone issue in this controversy is the correct amount of provisional
compensation which the LBP is required to deposit in the name of the landowner if
the latter rejects the DAR/LBP's offer. Petitioner maintains it should be its initial
valuation of the land subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) while respondent
claims it pertains to the sum awarded by the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB in a summary
administrative proceeding pending final determination by the courts.
HELD:
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657 reads:
(d)In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring
the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the
just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the
notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted
for decision.
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
We find the foregoing as a strained interpretation of a simple and clear enough
provision on the procedure governing acquisition of lands under CARP, whether
under the compulsory acquisition or VOS scheme. Indeed, it would make no sense
to mention anything about the provisional deposit in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) —
the landowner is sent a notice of valuation to which he should reply within a
specified time, and in sub-paragraph (c) — when the landowner accepts the offer
of the DAR/LBP as compensation for his land. Sub-paragraph (d) provides for the
consequence of the landowner's rejection of the initial valuation of his land, that is,
the conduct of a summary administrative proceeding for a preliminary
determination by the DARAB through the PARAD or RARAD, during which the LBP,
landowner and other interested parties are required to submit evidence to aid the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD in the valuation of the subject land. Sub-paragraph (e), on
the other hand, states the precondition for the State's taking of possession of the
landowner's property and the cancellation of the landowner's title, thus paving the
way for the eventual redistribution of the land to qualified beneficiaries: payment of
the compensation (if the landowner already accepts the offer of the DAR/LBP) or
deposit of the provisional compensation (if the landowner rejects or fails to respond
to the offer of the DAR/LBP). Indeed, the CARP Law conditions the transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Question was on the correct amount of provisional compensation which LBP was
required to deposit.
-is it the amount stated in par. (a) which is supposed to be contained in the notice
of acquisition?
- or is it the amount based on par. (d) after the conduct of summary proceedings?
- there is a difference there in actual practice
LBP: says that it is our offer under par. (a) which is P1M only.
Respondent: it is the amount after the summary admin proceeding to be
undertaken by PARAD, RARAD and DARAB which is P10M.
SC: subpar. (e) should be related to subpar (a), (b), and (c) considering that the
taking of possession by the state is the next step after DAR, and LBP supplied with
the notice requirements.
In effect the SC is saying: it is the offer of the LBP that will determine that that is
the correct amount to be deposited not the amount after the determination of just
compensation in a summary administrative proceeding
- reasoning: if the DAR will wait for the summary admin proceedings this
will hamper land redistribution process
Note that: par (a) precedes over par. (d) on the determination of the correct
amount to be deposited.
Page 26

Reiterated in the case of Pagayatan.
LBP vs Pagayatan
Facts:
On October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286-hectare Suntay Estate, consisting of
irrigated/unirrigated rice and corn lands covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-31(1326) located in the Barangays of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Sta. Lucia, and San
Nicolas in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, was subjected to the operation of
Presidential Decree No. 27, under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with the
farmer-beneficiaries declared as owners of the property. However, a 300-hectare
portion of the land was subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) instead of the OLT. Thus, Certificates of Landownership Award were issued
to the farmer-beneficiaries in possession of the land. 5 Such application of the
CARP to the 300-hectare land was later the subject of a case before the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), which ruled that the
subject land should have been the subject of OLT instead of CARP. The landowner
admitted before the PARAD that said case was pending with this Court and
docketed as G.R. No. 108920, entitled Federico Suntay v. Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the owner of the land remained unpaid for the property. Thus, Josefina
S. Lubrica, in her capacity as assignee of the owner of the property, Federico
Suntay, filed a Petition for Summary Determination of Just Compensation with the
PARAD, docketed as Case No. DCN-0405-0022-2002. Thereafter, the PARAD issued
its Decision dated March 21, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads: ECSHID
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.Fixing the preliminary just compensation for 431.1407 hectare property at
P166,150.00 per hectare or a total of P71,634,027.30.
2.Directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to immediately pay the aforestated
amount to the Petitioner.
3.Directing the DAR to immediately comply with all applicable requirements so that
the subject property may be formally distributed and turned over to the farmer
beneficiaries thereof, in accordance with the Decision of the DARAB Central in
DARAB Case No. 2846.
The LBP then filed a Petition dated March 4, 2004 with the RTC docketed as
Agrarian Case No. 1390, appealing the PARAD Decision. In the Petition, the LBP
argued that because G.R. No. 108920 was pending with this Court in relation to the
300-hectare land subject of the instant case, the Petition for Summary
Determination of Just Compensation filed before the PARAD was premature. The
LBP argued further that the PARAD could only make an award of up to PhP5 million
only. The PARAD, therefore, could not award an amount of PhP71,634,027.30. The
LBP also contended that it could not satisfy the demand for payment of Lubrica,
considering that the documents necessary for it to undertake a preliminary
valuation of the property were still with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
ISSUE:
What is the proper amount to be deposited under Section 16 of Republic Act No.
6657? Is it the PARAD/DARAB determined valuation or the preliminary valuation as
determined by the DAR/LBP?
HELD:
The LBP posits that under Sec. 16 (e) of RA 6657, and as espoused in Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 18 it is the purchase price offered by the DAR in
its notice of acquisition of the land that must be deposited in an accessible bank in
the name of the landowner before taking possession of the land, not the valuation
of the PARAD.
The Court agrees with the LBP.
Conspicuously, there is no mention of the PARAD in the foregoing Sec. 16 (e) when
it speaks of "the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act." Moreover, it is
only after the DAR has made its final determination of the initial valuation of the
land that the landowner may resort to the judicial determination of the just
compensation for the land. Clearly, therefore, it is the initial valuation made by the
DAR and LBP that is contained in the letter-offer to the landowner under Sec. 16
(a), said valuation of which must be deposited and released to the landowner prior
to taking possession of the property.
It is clear from Sec. 16 of RA 6657 that it is the initial valuation made by the DAR
and the LBP that must be released to the landowner in order for DAR to take
possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not
authorize the release of the PARAD's determination of just compensation for the
land which has not yet become final and executory.
Compensation in cash or in LBP bonds (Section 16)
Payment of cash and bonds !otherwise the government will go bankrupt if all in
cash.
Bonds ! to give the government time to appropriate in the future when the bonds
will mature
VOS (Voluntary offer to sell): under the law, if you make VOS, landowner is entitled
to 5% payment in cash, additional than that provided by law.
Land Bank v. CA
• Private respondent challenged the admin order issued by DAR
permitting the opening of trust account by LBP, in lieu of depositing in
cash or in LBP bonds.
SC:
• Sec. 16 (e) is explicit that deposit be in “cash” or in “LBP bonds”;
• Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be
made in any other form like a trust account;
• There was no basis for issuance of order.
WHY? Because the trust account is under the control of the trustee. The
beneficiary-landowner cannot properly use or control the funds when the funds is
supposed to be given due for land owner. ! not sanctioned by law
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
27
SIR: ila baya ng yuta, gikuha ra sa gobyerno, di pa jud nimo bayaran ang just
compensation niya?
The same with the case of Honeycomb.
Land Bank v. CA
Facts
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR
and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by
the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and
payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657,
private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned
the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to
expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the
just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust
accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was
issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits
the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land
before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA
6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank
merely "earmarked," "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their
names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of
the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid
exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. 11 Moreover,
the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the
Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
ISSUE:
Whether the opening of trust accounts for payment of just compensation is valid.
HELD:
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
"SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — . . .
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be
made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among
the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least,
qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a
"trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA
6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."
LBP vs Honeycomb
Facts:
Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered owner of
two parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate.
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the
responsibility of determining the land valuation and compensation for parcels of
land acquired pursuant to the CARL, 6 and using the guidelines set forth in DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of 1989, as amended by DAR AO No. 3,
series of 1991, fixed the value of these parcels of land.
When Honeycomb Farms rejected this valuation for being too low, the Voluntary
Offer to Sell was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board, Region V, Legaspi City, for
a summary determination of the market value of the properties.
HELD:
As a final point, we have not failed to notice that the LBP in this case made use of
trust accounts to pay Honeycomb Farms. In Land Bank of the Phil. v. CA, 29 this
Court struck down as void DAR Administrative Circular No. 9, Series of 1990,
providing for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds
contemplated in Section 16 (e) of RA 6657. We said: CSDcTH
It is very explicit . . . [from Section 16(e)] that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express,
or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly
deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section
16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit."
xxx xxx xxx
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact
rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis
in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds." In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and
54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of
the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Compulsory acquisition and notice requirements (Section 16)
DLR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-05
PROCEDURES
Page 27

1. Commencement
1.1. Commencement by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) — After
determination by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of the agricultural
landholdings coverable under CARP in his area of jurisdiction, he shall submit the
list of these agricultural landholdings to the PARO who shall prepare and send,
through the MARO, the NOC (CARP-LA Form No. 7) to the concerned LO.
1.2. Commencement by a party — Any person may commence the proceedings
herein by filing a petition for coverage before the Department of Land Reform
(DLR) Central Office (DLRCO), DLR Regional Office (DLRRO), DLR Provincial Office
(DLRPO) or DLR Municipal Office (DLRMO) of the region/province or municipality
where the subject landholding is located. The DLR office which received the
petition for coverage shall transmit or forward the same to the PARO of the
province where the subject landholding is located. The DLRPO, through the MARO,
shall validate the petition and shall issue the NOC, if warranted. In the event that
the result of the validation/evaluation by the DLRMO/DLRPO is such that an NOC is
not warranted, the DLRPO shall forward its findings or that of the DLRMO to the
DLRRO for evaluation and issuance of an Order, treating the petition as an Agrarian
Law Implementation (ALI) case.
2. Posting of the NOC
The MARO shall post copies of the NOC for at least seven (7) days in the
bulletin boards or any conspicuous places in the municipality/city and the barangay
where the property is located and thereafter issue the corresponding Certification
of Posting Compliance (CARP-LA Form No. 5).
3. By Whom the NOC is served
3.1. Upon receipt of a copy of the NOC and upon instruction by the PARO
(CARP-LA Form No. 8), the MARO where the subject landholding is located or any
DLR personnel officially authorized by the PARO shall cause the service of the NOC
to the LO in accordance with these rules.
3.2. If the LO's residence is outside the Philippines or unknown, the MARO of
the place where the subject landholding is located shall submit a report of such fact
or failure to notify the LO through the regular mode of service to the PARO, and
shall request the latter to cause the publication of the NOC in a newspaper of
general circulation.
4. Service of the NOC
4.1. General rule — The NOC shall be addressed to and received by the LO.
4.2. Service upon co-owners — In case of co-ownership, the NOC shall be
served upon each and every co-owner, unless one is specifically authorized to
receive for the other co-owners. AHEDaI
4.3. Service upon minors or incompetents — When the LO is a minor, insane or
otherwise incompetent, service shall be made upon him personally and to his legal
guardian if he has one, or if none, upon his guardian ad litem whose appointment
shall be applied for by the DLR. In the case of a minor, service may also be made
on his father and/or mother.
4.4. Service upon entity without juridical personality — When the LOs who are
persons associated in an entity without juridical personality are sued under the
name by which they are generally or commonly known, service may be effected
upon all the LOs by serving upon any one of them, or upon the person in charge of
the Office or place of business maintained in such name. Such service shall not
bind individually any person whose connection with the entity has, upon due
notice, been severed before the proceeding was brought.
4.5. Service upon domestic private juridical entity — When the LO is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines
with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, in-house counsel or
administrator.
4.6. Service upon LO whose identity or whereabouts is unknown — In any
proceeding where the LO is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the DLR may order.
4.7. Extraterritorial service — When the LO does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, or when the LO ordinarily resides within the Philippines but is
temporarily out of the country, service may be made by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and for such time as the DLR may order.
5. Modes of Service:
5.1. Personal Service — This is made by handing a copy of the NOC to the LO in
person, or if the LO refuses to receive and sign the NOC for whatever reason, by
tendering the same to him/her.
5.2. Substituted Service — If personal service of the NOC cannot be served
directly to the LO within a reasonable time, service may be made by leaving copies
of the NOC at the LO's:
5.2.1. residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein;
or
5.2.2. office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge
thereof.
5.3. Service by Registered Mail — if personal or substituted service is not
practicable, service by registered mail will be made to the last known address of
the LO. The registered mail envelope shall be marked "DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE
ONLY" and "RETURN TO SENDER" if addressee has: MOVED OUT, UNKNOWN
ADDRESS, REFUSED TO ACCEPT OR INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS.
5.4. Service by publication — If any of the preceding three (3) modes of service
fails, the NOC will be published once in a newspaper of general circulation. A
"RETURN TO SENDER" stamped on the mailing envelope will serve as proof that
the NOC was not received by the LO. The publication need not state the entire
contents of the NOC but only the following essential particulars:
5.4.1. Complete name/s of the LO/all LOs and last known address, if available;
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
28
5.4.2. Address or location of the subject landholding (barangay, municipality/city,
province);
5.4.3. The number of the Original or Transfer Certificate of Title (OCT or TCT) or
latest Tax Declaration (TD) covering the subject landholding;
5.4.4. A declaration that the Republic of the Philippines shall cover the subject
landholding under CARP;
5.4.5. A reasonable period of thirty (30) days from publication date within which
the LO must file a response to the NOC, with a warning that failure to do so within
the period shall mean waiver of the right/privilege to: apply for exemption/
exclusion or choose the retention area; nominate child/ren as preferred
beneficiaries or submit evidence for determining just compensation.
6. Proof of Service
6.1 Personal or substituted service — The proof of service of the NOC shall
consist of:
6.1.1. Written admission of the LO served, or;
6.1.2. Official Return of the MARO or affidavit of the DLR personnel serving,
stating the following: the date, place and manner of service, the papers, if any,
which have been served with the process and name of the person who received the
same.
6.2 Proof of service by registered mail — If service is made by registered mail,
proof may be made by the affidavit of the DLR personnel effecting the mail and the
registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed
immediately upon its receipt by the sender or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter
marked "RETURN TO SENDER" stamped by then post office concerned or together
with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the postmaster to the
addressee.
6.3 Proof of service by publication — If the service has been made by
publication, service may be proved by the following: 1) the unclaimed or returned/
unopened envelope referred to in paragraph 5.4 hereof; and 2) an affidavit of
publication by the publisher or authorized official together with a copy of the
newspaper where the NOC appeared.
7. Voluntary appearance — The LO's voluntary appearance in the proceedings
shall be equivalent to service of NOC.
8. Notice of Field Investigation
Upon proof of service of the issuance of NOC, the MARO sends to the LO
an invitation letter for the conduct of field investigation (CARP-LA Form No. 10).
Assoc. of Small Landowners:
Upheld validity of Sec. 16 RA 6657 (manner of acquisition of private
agricultural lands and ascertainment of just compensation). Section 16(e) of the
CARP Law provides that: “Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment, or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries”
Sec. 16, RA 6657
The title of the section states: “Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands.”
Section 6, RA 9700
The title was amended: "SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition and
Distribution of Private Lands."
• Confed v. DAR
➢ Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory
acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners
and the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the
identification process must be made.
➢ Identification process in Sec. 16 is silent so DAR filled gap
(AO #12, s. 989)
Situation: Violation on the procedure of compulsory acquisition proceedings
Roxas case : CLOA was not properly issued, DAR should be given chance to
validate (correct) proceedings.
-the violation does not give the court the power to nullify CLOA already issued
Fortich case: CLOA was illegal & should be cancelled for being in violation of law.
SIR’s opinion: ROXAS should be controlling because the issue and the ruling are in
point. Fortich, in my opinion, is an obiter dictum because there was already a
judgment that became final and executor and this was challenged before the SC.
They have already reached a win-win resolution and because of that, there was
just one or two sentences that talked about cancelling the illegal CLOA. But this
conclusion was pursuant to that final judgment.
Notice of Coverage:
▪ Notifies landowner that his property shall be placed under CARP and
that he is entitled to exercise his retention right;
▪ Notifies him that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and
representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to
discuss the results of the field investigation, the land valuation and
other pertinent matters.
▪ Also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding
shall be conducted where he and the other representatives may be
present.
Notice of Acquisition:
▪ The Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory
acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
• Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the Bureau of
Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall prepare and submit to
the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition. However, in case of
rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall
conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just
compensation.
• Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on just
compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for
approval the required Order of Acquisition.
Page 28

• Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or
upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or
non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent
Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property
is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the
land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries.
• RA 6657: Revolutionary kind of expropriation
▪ affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever
kind as long in excess of max retention limits;
▪ intended for the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small
segment of the population but of the entire Filipino nation, from all
levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted
owner;
▪ does not cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond
in time to the foreseeable future;
▪ Constitution has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just
distribution" among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
prison of their dreams and deliverance
• Despite the revolutionary or non-traditional character of RA 6657,
however, the chief limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) public use; and (2) payment of just compensation,
are embodied therein as well as in the Constitution.
• With respect to "public use,“ in Association of Small Landowners
declared that the requirement of public use had already been settled by
the Constitution itself as it "calls for agrarian reform”, which is the
reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners,
subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits.
• On “just compensation”, judicial determination is expressly prescribed in
Section 57 of RA 6657 as it vests on the Special Agrarian Courts original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners. It bears stressing that the determination
of just compensation during the compulsory acquisition proceedings of
Section 16 of RA 6657 is preliminary only, court can review.
Section 16 (f) clearly provides:
“(f)Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to
the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation”
Application of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court?
▪ Rules of Court, including Rule 67 thereof, is not completely disregarded
in the implementation of RA 6657 since the Special Agrarian Courts, in
resolving petitions for the determination of just compensation, are
enjoined to apply the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
▪ Section 58 of RA 6657, like Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, provides for
the appointment of commissioners by the Special Agrarian Courts.
▪ Sec. 58: “may”; “motu proprio or instance of party”
▪ Rule 67: “shall”
Santos v. LBP :
Facts:
RTC required payment of compensation for petitioner's land taken
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, to be made in cash and
bonds. According to petitioner, said order illegally amended the judgment rendered
which directs payment of compensation to be made "in the manner provided in RA
6657”.
SC:
Trial court decision directing payment of just compensation “in the
manner provided by RA 6657” is not illegally amended but is merely clarified by an
order issued during execution proc that such amount shall be paid in cash and
bonds.
It is a matter of terminology because payment in cash and in bond are the SAME in
the manner provided by law.
Heirs of Deleste vs LBP
HELD:
On the violation of petitioners' right to due process of law
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject
property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to
due process of law was violated.
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a
property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-
compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of
administrative due process of law.
It was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the
subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in
favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a
constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned
by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument
involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and
binds third person who may subsequently deal with the same property.
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify other
persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been
entered into." 64 There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the
transfer of ownership over the subject property.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the
Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio
was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are nonetheless "good indicia of possession in the concept of an
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or, at least, constructive possession."
Petitioners' right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed
to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the
agrarian reform program.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
29
Failure to notify owners violating section 16.
-Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, childless. But the husband had a son name Virgilio
by another woman but was raised by the couple. Gregorio also had two daughters,
Esperanza and Caridad by still another woman. Gregorio died. Hilaria and Virgilio
sold the land to Jose Deleste. Sale was notarized, registered, declaration was
cancelled and tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.
-DAR notified the heirs of Gregorio meaning that Deleste was not notified.
SC: it was incumbent upon DAR to notify Deleste, he was the landowner, sale was
registered and tax declaration was already in the name of Deleste.
- petitioner’s right to due process was indeed violated, DAR failed to notify them.
- There can be no valid transfer of title should the CLT’s are void, cancellation of
TCTs and OCTs are clearly warranted.
There was also another case where SC sanctioned the cancellation of the title for
violating Sec. 16.
1
CHAPTER VI –COMPENSATION
Just Compensation:
➢ “full & fair equivalent of property taken from owner by
expropriation” (Assoc. of Small Landowners). The word "just" is used to
intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea
that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full, ample.”
Sec. 7, RA 9700:
"SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. — In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the value of the standing
crop, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, the assessment made by
government assessors, and seventy percent (70%) of the zonal valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), translated into a basic formula by
the DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper court. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation."
Assoc. of small landowners vs Hon. Secretary
JUST COMPENSATION; DEFINED. — Just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
LBP v. Dumlao
Facts:
➢ Respondents are owners of agri lands covered under PD 27;
Determination of just compensation remained pending with DAR, so
they filed complaint with RTC for determination.
SC:
• if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA No.
6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although
property was acquired under PD No. 27;
• the determination made by the trial court, which relied solely on the
formula prescribed by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228, is grossly erroneous.
The amount of P6,912.50 per hectare, which is based on the DAR
valuation of the properties "at the time of their taking in the 1970s",
does not come close to a full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from respondents;
• CA's act of setting just compensation in the amount of P109,000.00
would have been a valid exercise of this judicial function, had it
followed the mandatory formula prescribed by RA No. 6657. However,
the appellate court merely chose the lower of two (2) values specified
by the commissioner as basis for determining just compensation,
namely: (a) P109,000.00 per hectare as the market value of first class
unirrigated rice land in the Municipality of Villaverde; and (b) P60.00
per square meter as the zonal value of the land in other barangays in
Villaverde. This is likewise erroneous because it does not adhere to the
formula provided by RA No. 6657.
• It cannot be overemphasized that the just compensation to be given to
the owner cannot be assumed and must be determined with certainty.
• Section 17 was converted into a formula by the DAR through AO No. 6,
Series of 1992, as amended by AO No. 11, Series of 1994:
Basic formula (Voluntary Offer to Sell) or [Compulsory Acquisition]
regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present,
relevant and applicable.
Note:
1. PD 27: uses average crop harvest as a consideration;
RA 6657: factors for consideration in determining just compensation.
2. RA 6657 for lands covered by PD 27 and just compensation has not been
determined at the time of passage of RA 6657 applies because PD 27 and EO 228
have only suppletory effect.
Take into account the nature of land (i.e., irrigated), market value, assessed
value at the time of the taking, location (i.e., along highway) and the volume
and value of its produce, like:
• (a) prevailing market value of in the area and adjacent areas;
• (b) presence and availability of an irrigation system to
augment and increase agricultural production;
• (c) available comparable sales in the area;
• (d) average harvests per hectare.
➢ The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just
compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the
emancipation patents.
• Why? EP constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee. It is from the
issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the
Page 29

vested right of ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of
just compensation to the landowner.
➢ However, their issuance dates are not shown. As such, the trial court
should determine the date of issuance of these emancipation patents in
order to ascertain the date of taking and proceed to compute the just
compensation due to respondents.
• Petitioner’s argument that respondents should not be paid yet pending
determination by DAR is specious.
• To wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable neglect and
delay in processing is to violate the elementary rule that payment of
just compensation must be within a reasonable period from the taking
of property;
• Citing Cosculluela v. CA, just compensation means not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for
the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade
or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his
loss
PRINCIPLE: If an agri land is acquired under PD 27 but just compensation has not
been paid until RA 6657 took effect, just compensation will be computed on the
basis of the present law, NOT under PD 27.
REASON: It is inequitable that just compensation should be determined under PD
27 because just compensation is defined as the full and ample value of the land to
be given to the LO.
Under PD 27: only ONE factor in determining just compensation: average crop
harvest
Under the Present law: FACTORS (Section 17)
1. cost of acquisition
- Under Tax Law: basis either selling price or zonal evaluation whichever is
higher
2. current value of like properties
- case of Dumlao: factors were reduced into a formula by DAR. Formula upheld
by SC as valid
- value described in comparable sales
3. actual use & income & nature;
4. sworn valuation by owner;
5. tax declaration;
- assessed value, market value, and classification of land
6. assessment made by Government assessors.
Additional factors under Sec. 17 because of the amendment:
1. Value of the standing crop
2. Additional 70% of the zonal valuation of the BIR
Other additional factors under the Nable Case:
1. Farming experience
2. Thumb method
EFFECT if just compensation is not based on the factors: NOT VALID
- Even if the findings are based on the factors but not based on any
evidence in relation to the factors: evaluation is without basis
You have decision from PARAD, do you need to go to RARAD or DARAB before you
can file a case with RTC? NO
- Sec. 57: Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to
all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by
this Act.
- SAC refers to RTC
- Determination of DAR is only preliminary
- Sec 16 (f): the final determination of just compensation is vested on
the Special Agrarian Courts
Sps. Lee, vs. Land Bank of the Philippines,
Facts:
Petitioner were notified that their land holdings is covered by Gov't
Action Scheme pursuant to CARP. They received a notice of Land valuation from
DAR which offers P315, 307 for 3.195 hec. DAR Adjudication Board affirmed the
compensation and valuation and declared that LBP fully complied with the criteria
set forth by CARP. Petitioners sought reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner
filed a petition for determination of Just Compensation before RTC. RTC acting as
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), citing appraisal report decided P7,978,750.00 as just
compensation and ordered LBP to pay.
Petition for review by LBP to CA and found that the SAC made a
wholesale adoption of the valuation of the appraisal company and did not consider
the other factors set forth in R.A. No. 6657 even though the appraisal company
admitted that it did not consider as applicable the CARP valuation of the property.
Hence, this petition.
Held:
The Court took note:
“These factors have already been incorporated in a basic formula by the DAR
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. AO No. 5
precisely filled in the details of Section 17, R. A. No. 6657 by providing a basic
formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. This
formula has to be considered by the SAC in tandem with all the factors referred to
in Section 17 of the law. The administrative order provides:
A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or
CA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
30
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant, and
applicable.
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula
shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest
value of land within the same estate under consideration or within the same
barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from
receipt of claimfolder.
---
Where:
CNI=
(AGPxSP) - CO
.12
AGP= Average Gross Production corresponding to the latest available 12 months
gross production immediately preceding the date of FI (field investigation)
SP= Selling Price (the average of the latest available 12 months selling prices prior
to the date of receipt of the CF (claim folder) by LBP for processing, such prices to
be secured from the Department of Agriculture (DA) and other appropriate
regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. If
possible, SP data shall be gathered for the barangay or municipality where the
property is located. In the absence thereof, SP may be secured within the province
or region.
CO = Cost of Operations
Whenever the cost of operations could not be obtained or verified, an assumed net
income rate (NIR) of 20% shall be used. Landholdings planted to coconut which
are productive at the time of FI shall continue to use the assumed NIR of 70 %.
DAR and LBP shall continue to conduct joint industry studies to establish the
applicable NIR for each crop covered under CARP.
0.12 = Capitalization rate”
The Court finds that the factors required by the law and enforced by
the DAR Administrative Order were not observed by the SAC when it adopted
wholeheartedly the valuation arrived at in the appraisal report. The Court
repremands the case to the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court for the
determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act
No. 6657.
Sps. Lee v. LBP
➢ If valuation is based not on the factors, it is not valid .
(Note that in this case, there was admission that valuation was not
based on factors under CARL: a representative of the company admitted that it did
not consider the CARP valuation to be applicable).
➢ Case remanded.
Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz,
Facts:
Landholding of the respondents was placed under the coverage of the
land transfer program of P.D. 27. Petitioner pegged the value of the acquired
landholding at P106,935.76 based on the guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. 228. Respondents petitioned for valuation and determination of just
compensation before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator which fixed it to
P80,000.00 per hectare. Motion for Reconsideration was denied so the Petitioner
petition for the determination of just compensation before the RTC acting as SAC
held that the value of P80,000.00 per hectare fixed by the PARAD should be
accorded weight and probative value and that the SAC is guided by the various
factors enumerated in Section 17of R.A. No. 6657 in determining just
compensation. It disregarded respondents' claim that the valuation should be based
on the current market value of the landholding since no evidence was adduced in
support of the claim and also did not accept petitioner's valuation as it was based
on P.D. No. 27, in which just compensation was determined at the time of the
taking of the property. CA rendered the assailed decision partly granting petitioner's
appeal but affirmed the SAC decision fixing just compensation at P80,000.00 per
hec. Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition, arguing that the
formula set forth in P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 should be applied in fixing just
compensation since respondents' landholding was acquired under P.D. No. 27 in
cognizance to a settled rule that just compensation is the value of the property at
the time of the taking, on 21 October 1972.
Held:
The Court citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, “It would
certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline
provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the
just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should
be determined in accordancewithRA6657,and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent
of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real,
substantial, full and ample.”
The Court remanded the determination of just compensation to RTC
acting as SAC.
LBP v. Heirs of Cruz
• If valuation is not based on any evidence, it is w/o basis, so
determination be remanded.
• In this case, decision of PARAD and SAC points to no evidence, so case
was remanded.
Page 30

Is prior recourse to DARAB necessary before case for determination of JC may be
filed?
➢ No:
(a) because DAR may continue to alienate the lots during the
pendency of protest;
(b) Sec. 57 of RA 6657 states that SAC has orig and exclusive
jurisdiction.
• Content and Manner (Section 18)
• Sec. 18 speaks of cash or shares of stock, tax credits or LBP bonds.
• Is this not violation of usual way of payment in cash?
No, because “revolutionary kind”.
• Parties involved (Section 18)
LBP vs. Jocson and sons
Facts:
The property was placed under the coverage of the government's Operation Land
Transfer 2 (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 3 and awarded to
the tenant-beneficiaries by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which valued
the compensation therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80 following the
formula prescribed in P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228. 4
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 after computing the 6% annual
interest increment 5 due on the property per DAR Administrative Order No. 13,
series of 1994, which amount respondent withdrew in 1997, without prejudice to
the outcome of the case it had filed hereunder to fix just compensation.
Finding the DAR's offer of compensation for the property to be grossly inadequate,
respondent filed a complaint 6 on July 18, 1997 before the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Br. 46, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), against the Land
Bank (petitioner), 7 the DAR, and the tenant-beneficiaries, for "Determination and
Fixing of Just Compensation for the Acquisition of Land and Payment of Rentals".
In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the property was
acquired by the government under its OLT program and their valuation thereof
constituted just compensation, having been made pursuant to the guidelines set by
E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27.
In arriving at the just compensation, the SAC adopted a higher valuation
(P93,657.00/hectare) which the DAR had applied to a similar landholding belonging
to one Pablo Estacion adjacent to respondent's.
Issue:
Whether the SAC erred in the valuation the land
HELD:
In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, 27 the Court declared in
no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant law for determining just
compensation after noting several decided cases where the Court found it more
equitable to determine just compensation based on the value of the property at the
time of payment. This was a clear departure from the Court's earlier stance in
Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it declared that the reckoning period
for the determination of just compensation is the time when the land was taken
applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases involving
lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 where payment of just
compensation had not been completed. When in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was
passed before the full payment of just compensation, as in the case at bar, the
provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation control.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine
the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.
LBP vs Livioco
Facts:
Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of 30.6329 hectares of
sugarland 6 located in Dapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Sometime between 1987
and 1988, 7 Livioco offered his sugarland to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) for acquisition under the CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of
P9,189,870.00. The voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form 8 he submitted to the DAR
indicated that his property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to an
international paper mill.
The DAR referred Livioco's offer to the LBP for valuation. Following Section 17 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and DAR Administrative Order No. 17, series of 1989,
11 as amended by Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1991, 12 the LBP set the
price at P3.21 per square meter or a total of P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco
was then promptly informed of the valuation 14 and that the cash portion of the
claim proceeds have been "kept in trust pending [his] submission of the [ownership
documentary] requirements." 15 It appears however that Livioco did not act upon
the notice given to him by both government agencies. On September 20, 1991, LBP
issued a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has earmarked
the amount of P827,943.48 as compensation for Livioco's 26 hectares.
It was only two years later 17 that Livioco requested for a reevaluation of the
compensation on the ground that its value had already appreciated from the time it
was first offered for sale. 18 The request was denied by Regional Director Antonio
Nuesa on the ground that there was already a perfected sale.
Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes was an
outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco finally filed a petition for judicial
determination of just compensation against DAR, LBP, and the CLOA holders.
In this Petition before us, LBP assails the CA's assent to the valuation of Livioco's
property as a residential land. It maintains that it is not the State's policy to
purchase residential land. Since the property was acquired under the CARP, it had
to be valued as an agricultural land.
Issue
Was the compensation for respondent's property determined in accordance with
law?
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
31
HELD:
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated
property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. 68 There
are three important concepts in this definition — the character of the property, its
price, and the time of actual taking.
The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the property has
changed from agricultural to residential, because there is no allegation or proof that
the property was approved for conversion to other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that
is mandated by law to evaluate and to approve land use conversions 73 so as to
prevent fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform coverage. Even reclassification 74
and plans for expropriation 75 by local government units (LGUs) will not ipso facto
convert an agricultural property to residential, industrial or commercial. Thus, in the
absence of any DAR approval for the conversion of respondent's property or an
actual expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of said
property changed from agricultural to residential. Respondent's property remains
agricultural and should be valued as such. Hence, the CA and the trial court had no
legal basis for considering the subject property's value as residential.
Respondent's evidence of the value of his land as residential property (which the
lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at most, refer to the potential use of
the property. While the potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes
considered in cases where there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of
the expropriated property, it should never control the determination of just
compensation (which appears to be what the lower courts have erroneously done).
The potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for determining
just compensation for this will be contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair
market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its
price at the time of taking, not its potential uses. If at all, the potential use of the
property or its "adaptability for conversion in the future is a factor, not the ultimate
in determining just compensation." 77
The proper approach should have been to value respondent's property as an
agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the improvements in the
Municipality of Mabalacat. Valuing the property as a residential land (as the lower
courts have done) is not the correct approach, for reasons explained above. It
would also be contrary to the social policy of agrarian reform, which is to free the
tillers of the land from the bondage of the soil without delivering them to the new
oppression of exorbitant land valuations. Note that in lands acquired under RA
6657, it is the farmer-beneficiaries who will ultimately pay the valuations paid to the
former land owners (LBP merely advances the payment). 78 If the farmer-
beneficiaries are made to pay for lands valued as residential lands (the valuation for
which is substantially higher than the valuation for agricultural lands), it is not
unlikely that such farmers, unable to keep up with payment amortizations, will be
forced to give up their landholdings in favor of the State or be driven to sell the
property to other parties. This may just bring the State right back to the starting
line where the landless remain landless and the rich acquire more landholdings
from desperate farmers.
LO tried to prove that lot was residential not agricultural for higher just
compensation. There were several evidences presented by owner; certification from
the municipal planning office, zoning, HLURB, etc.
SC: No clearance from DAR. No allegation or proof that there was a conversion
clearance from agri to residential. That means that the land has to be valued as
agricultural land, NOT residential.
DISCUSSION: Do you need conversion clearance? SIR: IMO, no more.
- You need conversion clearance for purposes of real property tax in LGU
- Or assurance from DAR that your land is not covered under DAR
because the use is not anymore for agricultural activity
- Under sec. 17, no factor of conversion but actual use of the land
LBP vs Honeycomb
HELD: We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the applicable
DAR administrative regulations in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, 24 Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, 25 and Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Barrido. 26 In Barrido, we were explicit in stating that:
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function
vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his
discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by
law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard
the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The
courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian law, the formula provided by
the DAR for the determination of just compensation.
Valuation and Payment (Section 18)
FORMS OF PAYMENT
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR
and LBP or as may be finally determined by the court as just compensation for the
land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes at the option of the
landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is
concerned - Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares - Thirty
percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below - Thirty-five percent (35%) cash,
the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP
preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified investments in accordance with
guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
Page 31

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%)
of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year from the date of issuance
until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner choose to forego
the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP
bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the
landowner, his successors-in-interest or his assigns, up to the amount of their face
value for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets
under the Assets Privatization Program and other assets foreclosed by government
financial institution in the same province or region where the lands for which the
bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations
or shares or stock owned by the government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused
persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the
proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic enterprise, preferably in a
small and medium-scale industry, in the same province or region as the land for
which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to the government: Provided, That the use
of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a certain percentage of the
outstanding balance of the financial instrument: Provided, further, That the PARC
shall determine the percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government universities, colleges, trade schools and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in
government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take appropriate
measures to protect the economy.
LO can withdraw…
LBP vs Darab
- the valuation made by PARAB was rejected by the landowners, After
re-computation upon order of PARAD, a revaluated amount was made but Los still
found it low. Los appealed to DARAB,. Pending resolution of their appeal Los
interposed a Motion to Withdraw Amended Valuation seeking the release to tem of
the amount representing the difference between the initial value.
SC- the need to allow the landowners to withdraw immediately the amount
deposited in their behalf, pending final determination of what is just compensation
for their land
- it is a an oppressive exercise of eminent domain if you do not allow
withdraw
- it is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation
under Section 16 (e) and final compensation under Section 18 for the purposes of
exercising the landowners’ right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in
other situations in the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession
of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
SC invalidated LBP’s practice of opening trust accounts in favor of the landowner.
In case the amount has already been deposited, even if the landowner questions
the accuracy or the validity of the amount deposited and will thereafter file with the
RTC for determination of just compensation, the LO can withdraw the amount
deposited. ! Part of his right to just compensation
It should be deposited in the name of the landowner, not trust accounts (trust
accounts not expressly stated in Sec. 18)
Heirs of Lorenzo vs. LBP
- Petitioner are owners of land; first valuation was rejected but upon re-
computation and order of RRAD, the revaluation was accepted by owners LBP filed
MR but denied, LBP filed an opposition for determination of JC with the RTC
- Petitioner submit that LBP has no legal personality
- SEC 18, clearly states there should be a consensus among
- LBP is an indispensable party in expropriation proceedings under RA
6657 and thus has the legal personality to question the determination.
There are cases where LBP is the plaintiff of an RTC Case.
FACTS: LBP did not agree with the computation of RARAD. Landbank filed the case
in RTC. Challenged by the petitioners that LBP has no legal personality to institute
the agrarian case.
Is it possible that LBP and DAR cannot agree with the evaluation? YES
- WHY? Implementation of the program is with DAR in the EXECUTIVE
aspect. There is another aspect of DAR which is quasi-judicial.
- Probably, LBP coordinates with DAR in the implementation aspect but
LBP cannot dictate the quasi-judicial aspect
SC: these are the parties involving just compensation under Sec. 18.: Landowner,
DAR, and LBP. LBP is not merely a nominal party but is indispensable, independent
of DAR.
DAR vs Heirs of Domingo
Facts:
The late Angel T. Domingo (Domingo) is the registered owner of a 70.3420-hectare
rice land situated at Macapabellag, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. NT-97157.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
32
On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 2 (P.D. No. 27) was issued,
pursuant to which actual tenant farmers of private agricultural lands devoted to rice
and corn were deemed as full owners of the land they till. The land transfer
program under P.D. No. 27 was subsequently implemented by Executive Order No.
228.
On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija a complaint for determination and payment of just compensation
against the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and DAR.
Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the just compensation for
the subject land should be computed using the parameters set forth under Republic
Act No. 6657 4 (R.A. No. 6657).
The LBP and DAR disputed Domingo's valuation and claimed that the determination
of just compensation should be governed by the provisions of P.D. No. 27 in
relation to E.O. No. 228.
ISSUE:
Whether the method set forth under R.A. No. 6657 in the computation of just
compensation may be applied to private agricultural lands taken by the government
under the auspices of P.D. No. 27 in relation to E.O. No. 228.
HELD:
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with
PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in
Paris v. Alfeche.
xxx xxx xxx
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the
guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine
the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation
should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.
Same Principle with Dumlao Case: Based on RA 6657 not PD 27: Basis: Equity
Content and manner of compensation
Sec. 18 speaks of cash or shares of stock, tax credits, or LBP bonds
Is this not violation of usual way of payment in cash?
- No, because “revolutionary kind” and also practicality (Gov. will go
bankrupt if we rely on the ordinary expropriation which is all in cash)
- Cash usually only 25-30%
- LBP bonds usually spreads/matures in 10 years. (gives the Gov time)
Assoc. of small landowners vs Hon. Sec.
We do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent domain.
This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation. The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands
whenever found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the
maximum retention limits allowed their owners. Such a program will involve not
mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are
also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds,
other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the
amount of just compensation.
Therefore, payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money.
Parties Involved (Section 18)
Land Bank v. CA:
The parties are DAR, landowner and LBP. The law does not mention
the participation of farmer-beneficiary.
So consent of farmer-beneficiary is not required in establishing proper
compensation.
• Voluntary offer (Section 19)
• Section 19 provides for additional 5% cash payment if LO voluntarily
offers land for sale.
• Voluntary land transfer (Secs. 20 and 21)
How is VLT made?
Sec. 20 – LO may enter into voluntary arrangement for direct transfer to qualified
beneficiaries but subject to guidelines (i.e., all notices for VLT be submitted to DAR
within 1st year of implementation of CARP, terms and conditions shall not be less
favorable to transferee).
Sec. 21 – direct payment may be made in cash or kind by ARB under terms
mutually agreed and which shall be binding upon registration and approval by DAR.
• Sec. 44 (2) – provides that PARCOM shall recommend to PARC the
adoption of direct payment scheme. So, AO #2, s. 1995 was issued:
▪ Beneficiaries are determined by DAR;
▪ Area to be transferred to ARB should not be less than the area which
the govt would otherwise acquire;
▪ CLOA’s should bear proper annotations.
END OF MIDTERM (But take note of SEC. 27 on page 37… apil sa exam)
Room 405
- Except no. 3 LBP vs. Nable
- Not including payment of interest (3 cases)
- Nable not included
Page 32

- Sec. 27 (Carper) transferability, how many years is the prohibited period? 4
exceptions?
- agricultural activity, agrarian dispute, agricultural land (read all the cases)
! concentrate here
- ra 3844: focus on in case of death of lessee, who will assume cultivation; grounds
to dispossess lessee; 2 cases (Po and Sta. Ana cases)
- sec. 10 (c) exceptions and exemptions; esp. Central Mindanao Case
- association of small landowners: revolutionary kind of expro: justification of the
SC
- sec. 16: procedure on compulsory acquisition (heirs of Trinidad: correct payment
of deposit)
- Livioco: Landowner tried to prove that land is residential. There were several
evidences, etc… SC: no clearance from DAR. Land is valued as Agricultural land.
- sec. 6 homestead (note the important qualifications) (cases: Alita and Paris vs.
Alfeche)
- Dumlao case: just compensation PD ! RA 6657: computed on the basis of the
present law
- landbank of the phil: whether it has legal personality to file a case before RTC
involving just compensation?
- Ways of distribution of lands to qualified beneficiaries (Chapter 3): voluntary offer
(sec.20), compulsory (Sec. 16), non-land transfer schemes (SDO, Leasehold
operation- sec.12)
- type: 60 (mcq) -40
Additional from Francis
- Confed vs. DAR (2 chief limitations)
- 6 requisites of agrarian dispute (know different principles of the case)
- definition of agricultural land (Alangilan case)
- Sec. 16: (heirs of deleste): correct amount to be deposited by landbank
- preliminary determination of just compensation by DAR vs. RTC as special
agrarian court
- sec. 16: notice of acquisition (who is to be notified): heirs of Trinidad case
Payment in interest in just compensation
Apo Fruits corp. vs CA
Facts:
On October 12, 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the lands subject of
this case pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
or CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) referred their voluntary-offer-
to-sell (VOS) applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank fixed the just
compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and
P164,478,178.14, for HPI. The valuation was rejected, however, prompting Land
Bank, upon the advice of DAR, to open deposit accounts in the names of the
petitioners, and to credit in said accounts the sums of P26,409,549.86 (AFC) and
P45,481,706.76 (HPI). Both petitioners withdrew the amounts in cash from the
accounts, but afterwards, on February 14, 1997, they filed separate complaints for
determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).
When DARAB did not act on their complaints for determination of just
compensation after more than three years, the petitioners filed complaints for
determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagum
City, Branch 2, acting as a special agrarian court (SAC), docketed as Agrarian Cases
No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000. Summonses were served on May 23, 2000 to Land
Bank and DAR, which respectively filed their answers on July 26, 2000 and August
18, 2000. The RTC conducted a pre-trial, and appointed persons it considered
competent, qualified and disinterested as commissioners to determine the proper
valuation of the properties.
The RTC rendered its decision:
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners' fees
herein taxed as part of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and computed at Two and One-Half (2 1/2)
percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs' land and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the
interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until full payment;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interest was validly imposed.
HELD:
It is true that Land Bank sought to appeal the RTC's decision to the CA, by filing a
notice of appeal; and that Land Bank filed in March 2003 its petition for certiorari in
the CA only because the RTC did not give due course to its appeal. Any intervening
delay thereby entailed could not be attributed to Land Bank, however, considering
that assailing an erroneous order before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law
to every losing party, who cannot thus be considered to act in bad faith or in an
unreasonable manner as to make such party guilty of unjustified delay. As stated in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation: 18 HAcaCS
The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
does not mean that it deliberately delayed the payment of just compensation to
KPCI. . . . It may disagree with DAR and the landowner as to the amount of just
compensation to be paid to the latter and may also disagree with them and bring
the matter to court for judicial determination. This makes LBP an indispensable
party in cases involving just compensation for lands taken under the Agrarian
Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in such cases that are unfavorable
to it. Having only exercised its right to appeal in this case, LBP cannot be penalized
by making it pay for interest.
It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest on the just compensation is imposed
only in case of delay in the payment thereof which must be sufficiently established.
Given the foregoing, we find that the imposition of interest on the award of just
compensation is not justified and should therefore be deleted.
It must be emphasized that "pertinent amounts were deposited in favor of AFC and
HPI within fourteen months after the filing by the latter of the Complaint for
determination of just compensation before the RTC". It is likewise true that AFC
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
33
and HPI already collected P149.6 and P262 million, respectively, representing just
compensation for the subject properties. Clearly, there is no unreasonable delay in
the payment of just compensation which should warrant the award of 12% interest
per annum in AFC and HPI's favor.
APO: GR: When it comes to just compensation, there is no interest to be imposed.
EX: in case of delay on the basis of Art. 2209
- How do you appreciate delay? Depending on the FACTS
Apo: Rate of interest is 12%. ! in relation to damages (2209) as in forbearance of
money
- Already amended from 12%- 6% per annum (July 2013)
- But per jurisprudence, 12% per annum
Soriano: rate of interest is 6%
- Based on admin order issued by DAR: that the rates of interest to be
imposed on lands acquired under PD 27 is 6%
- Not the issue in the case but is the reckoning point (from where 6%
should be imposed)
- LBP: reckoned from the date of taking (advantageous to government)
- SC: NO! should be reckoned from the payment of just compensation.
LBP vs Soriano
Facts:
Domingo and Mamerto Soriano (respondents) are the registered owners of several
parcels of rice land situated in Oas, Albay. Out of the 18.9163 hectares of land 3
owned by the respondents, 18.2820 hectares were placed under the Operations
Land Transfer and the CARP pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 4 and Republic
Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 5
The LBP 6 pegged the value of 18.0491 hectares of land at P482,363.95 7
(P133,751.65 as land value plus P348,612.30 incremental interest), while the
remaining 0.2329 hectare was computed at P8,238.94. 8 Not satisfied with the
valuation, respondents, on 23 November 2000, instituted a Complaint 9 for judicial
determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, 10
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Respondents alleged that they are
entitled to an amount of not less than P4,500,000.00 as just compensation. 11
On 21 February 2005, the SAC rendered a judgment, ordering LBP to pay the
respondents P894,584.94. The dispositive portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the just compensation of the 18.0491 hectares of irrigated riceland
is P133,751.79, plus increment of 6% per annum computed annually beginning
October 21, 1972, until the value is fully paid, and of the 0.2329 hectare of rain fed
riceland is P8,238.94 plus 12% interest per annum, beginning August 17, 1998,
until the value is fully paid or a total of P894,584.94 as of this date. Land Bank is
ordered to pay the landowners Domingo Soriano and Mamerto Soriano said
amount/land value in accordance with law.
Both parties disagreed with the trial court's valuation, prompting them to file their
respective appeals with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however,
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It also upheld the award of compounded
interest, thus:
In the case at bar, the subject lands were taken under PD 27 and were covered by
Operation Land Transfer, making the aforecited Administrative Order applicable.
HELD:
In the instant case, while the subject lands were acquired under Presidential
Decree No. 27, the complaint for just compensation was only lodged before the
court on 23 November 2000 or long after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 in
1988. Therefore, Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the principal basis
of the computation for just compensation. As a matter of fact, the factors
enumerated therein had already been translated into a basic formula by the DAR
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of Republic Act No. 6657.
The award of interest until full payment of just compensation is to ensure prompt
payment. Moreover, respondents claim that the date LBP approves the payment of
the land transfer claim and deposits the proceeds in the name of the landowner is
not tantamount to actual payment because on said date, the release of the amount
is conditioned on certain requirements.
Note: RA 6657 – 12%
PD 27 – 6%
LBP vs Rivera
Facts:
The respondents are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land embraced by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-082, and later transferred in their names under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-95690 that was placed under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 in 1972. Only
18.8704 hectares of the total area of 20.5254 hectares were subject of the
coverage.
After the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) directed payment, LBP approved
the payment of P265,494.20, exclusive of the advance payments made in the form
of lease rental amounting to P75,415.88 but inclusive of 6% increment of
P191,876.99 pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.
On 1 December 1994, the respondents instituted Civil Case No. 94-03 for
determination and payment of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court.
LBP filed its answer, stating that rice and corn lands placed under the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 27 7 were governed and valued in accordance with the
provisions of Executive Order No. 228 8 as implemented by DAR Administrative
Order No. 2, Series of 1987 and other statutes and administrative issuances; that
the administrative valuation of lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and
Executive Order No. 228 rested solely in DAR and LBP was the only financing arm;
that the funds that LBP would use to pay compensation were public funds to be
disbursed only in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that the
supporting documents were not yet received by LBP; and that the constitutionality
of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 was already settled.
Page 33

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 19 we affirmed the award of 12% interest on just
compensation due to the landowner. The court decreed:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited
with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation
must include interest on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and
the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in
a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before
the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest on the
zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted
condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This
allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the
time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum
should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value
of the currency over time.
Voluntary Offer for Sale (Section 19)
SEC. 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sale. - Landowners other than banks
and other financial institutions who voluntarily offer their lands for sale shall be
entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash payment.
NOTE: Under CARPER, there is no more voluntary offer. Only compulsory
acquisition
Voluntary Transfer (Section 20 and 21)
SEC. 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. - Landowners of agricultural lands subject to
acquisition under this Act may enter into a voluntary arrangement for direct
transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries subject to the following guidelines:
(a) All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the DAR within the
first year of the implementation of the CARP. Negotiations between the landowners
and qualified beneficiaries covering any voluntary land transfer which remain
unresolved after one (1) year shall not be recognized and such land shall instead
be acquired by the government and transferred pursuant to this Act.
(b) The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less favorable to the
transferee than those of the government's standing offer to purchase from the
landowner and to resell to the beneficiaries, if such offers have been made and are
fully known to both parties.
(c) The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for non-compliance by either
party and shall be duly recorded and its implementation monitored by the DAR.
SEC. 21. Payment of Compensation by Beneficiaries Under Voluntary Land Transfer.-
Direct payment in cash or in kind may be made by the farmer-beneficiary to the
landowner under terms to be mutually agreed upon by both parties, which shall be
binding upon them, upon registration with and approval by the DAR. Said approval
shall be considered given, unless notice of disapproval is received by the farmer-
beneficiary within 30 days from the date of registration. In the event they cannot
agree on the price of the land, the procedure for compulsory acquisition as
provided in Section 16 shall apply. The LBP shall extend financing to the
beneficiaries for purposes of acquiring the land.
Chapter VII
Distribution of lands to landless residents (will not be included in the Midterms)
- Defined under Sec. 2: Landless resident does not necessarily mean
that a person does not own a land. One can be considered landless for
purposes of CARP if that person does not own more than 3 hectares of
land.
QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES
(1) The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to
landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless
residents of the same municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land;
Previous law: there is no provision that (a) and (b) should be prioritized
Amendment: they are prioritized of that same landholding up to a maximum of 3
hectares each.
(2) The children of landowners who are qualified shall be given preference in the
distribution of the land of their parents.
(3) Actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed
therefrom.
(4) Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No.27 who have culpably sold, disposed
of, or abandoned their lands are disqualified to become beneficiaries under the
Program.
(5) A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, aptitude, and
ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible.
Presupposing that the beneficiary has registered with the department.
(6) If, due to the landowner’s retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees,
or workers on the land, there is not enough land to accommodate any or some of
them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for distribution
under the Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
34
(8) No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3) hectares of agricultural
land. (Sec. 23)
Beneficiaries to be awarded with the land of Polo Coconut were questioned by Polo
Coconut.
Polo: these beneficiaries are not tenants of our land thus not qualified.
SC: it is DAR who is mandated to select CARP beneficiaries.
Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the
landowners. Thus, the DAR cannot be deemed to have committed grave abuse of
discretion simply because its chosen beneficiaries were not tenants of PCPCI (DAR
vs. Polo Coconut Plantation Co., In., et al., G.R. 168787, September 3,
2008).
Award Ceiling Limit (Section 23)
SEC. 23. Distribution Limit. - No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3)
hectares of agricultural land.
AWARD TO BENEFICIARIES
❑ Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award, which shall contain the restrictions and conditions
provided for in the Act, and shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds
concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title. (Sec. 24)
Same principle of indefeasibility and imprescriptibility after one year from
registration ! due to the amendment (RA 9700)
If there is certification of deposit, it is the ministerial duty of the RD.
Issuance of CARP Beneficiary Certificate
❑ When certificate issued. – Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the
rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall commence from the
time the DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be
completed within 180 days from the time the DAR takes actual
possession of the land. Ownership of the lands by the beneficiary shall
be evidenced by an Emancipation Patent (EP) or a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA), which shall contain the restrictions, and
conditions provided by law and which shall be recorded in the Register
of Deeds concerned and annotated on the Certificate of Title.
If there is no CLOA yet (for any reason), beneficiary will be issued CARP Beneficiary
Certificate.
Beneficiaries are required to pay LBP in 30 annual amortizations with 6% interest
per annum.
In several instances, however, the EP or CLOA cannot be immediately issued
pending the fulfillment of certain legal and administrative requirements. Examples
of these are:
(a) The Supreme Court ruling in the case of “Association of Small Landowners in
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform” (G.R. No. 76742, 14,July
1989.) that title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only
upon full payment of compensation to their respective landowners;
(b) The conduct of subdivision surveys to define the specific parcel of land being
awarded through the EP or CLOA.
Cont. of Issuance of CARP Beneficiary Certificate (1)…
❑ Thus, pending the fulfillment of the said requirements, the identified
beneficiaries may already be in possession of the land but still have no
EP or CLOA therefor. For this reason, the DAR shall first issue a CARP
Beneficiary Certificate (CBC) to provide the would-be beneficiaries, an
intermediate document to evidence that they have been identified and
have qualified as agrarian reform beneficiaries under the CARP.
Moreover, aside from attesting to the inchoate right of the identified
beneficiary to be awarded the land or portion thereof, the CBC issued
shall entitle the recipient to receive support services under the CARP.
PAYMENT BY BENEFICIARIES
(1)Lands awarded pursuant to the Act shall be paid for by the beneficiaries to the
LBP in thirty (30) annual amortization at 6% interest per annum subject to the
following rules:
(a) The payments for the first three (3) years after the award may be at
reduced amounts as established by the PARC.
(b) The first five (5) annual payments may not be more than 5% of the value
of the annual gross production as established by the DAR.
(c) Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year exceed 10% of
the annual gross production and the failure to produce accordingly is not due to the
beneficiary’s fault, the LBP may reduce the interest rate or reduce the principal
obligation to make the repayment affordable.
(2) The LBP shall have a lien (i.e., prior right) by way of mortgage on the land
awarded to the beneficiary; and this mortgage may be foreclosed by the LBP for
non-payment of an aggregate of three(3) annual amortization. The LBP shall advice
the DAR of such proceedings and the latter shall subsequently award the forfeited
landholding to other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land has been
foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming a beneficiary
under the Act. (Sec. 26.)
TRANSFERABILITY OF AWARDED LANDS (Sec. 27)
(1) Lands acquired by beneficiaries under the Act may not be sold, transferred
or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the
LBP or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years. However, the
children of the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land
from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of the
availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay Agrarian Reform
Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is situated. The Provincial
Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) shall, in turn, be given the
due notice thereof by the BARC.
Land titles: one year repurchase from registration; here, it is two years
Page 34

(2) If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land
may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of the
beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer or
conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself.
Lebrudo vs Loyola
Facts:
Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a parcel of land located in Barangay
Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, awarded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
under Republic Act No. 6657 4 (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988. This lot is covered by Certificate of Land Ownership 5 (CLOA) No.
20210 issued in favor of Loyola on 27 December 1990 and duly registered on 14
March 1991 under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.
On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased and
represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo, filed with the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, an
action 6 for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA in the name of Loyola and the
issuance of another for the one-half portion of the lot in Lebrudo's favor.
In a Decision 7 dated 18 December 1995, the PARAD dismissed the case without
prejudice on the ground that the case was filed prematurely. On 11 March 1996,
Lebrudo re-filed the same action. 8
Lebrudo alleged that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989 to redeem
the lot, which was mortgaged by Loyola's mother, Cristina Hugo, to Trinidad
Barreto. After Lebrudo redeemed the lot for P250.00 and a cavan of palay, Loyola
again sought Lebrudo's help in obtaining title to the lot in her name by shouldering
all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from her mother, Cristina
Hugo. In exchange, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the
lot. Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola. Loyola then
allegedly executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay 9 dated 28 December 1989, waiving
and transferring her rights over the one-half portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo.
To reiterate her commitment, Loyola allegedly executed two more Sinumpaang
Salaysay 10 dated 1 December 1992 and 3 December 1992, committing herself to
remove her house constructed on the corresponding one-half portion to be allotted
to Lebrudo.
Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However, Loyola
refused. Lebrudo sought the assistance of the Sangguniang Barangay of Milagrosa,
Carmona, Cavite; the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Carmona, Cavite; and the
Department of Agrarian Reform to mediate. However, despite steps taken to
amicably settle the issue, as evidenced by certifications from the PNP and the
barangay, there was no amicable settlement. Thus, Lebrudo filed an action against
Loyola.
In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who approached her
and offered to redeem the lot and the release of the CLOA. Loyola denied
promising one-half portion of the lot as payment for the transfer, titling and
registration of the lot. Loyola explained that the lot was her only property and it
was already being occupied by her children and their families.
ISSUE:
The main issue is whether Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot
covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and transfer of rights embodied in
the two Sinumpaang Salaysay.
HELD:
A Certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing ownership of
the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and contains the
restrictions and conditions provided for in RA 6657 and other applicable laws.
Section 27 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700, 20 which provides for the
transferability of awarded lands, states:
SEC. 27.Transferability of Awarded Lands. — Lands acquired by beneficiaries
under this ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary
succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries
for a period of ten (10) years.
It is clear from the provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold, transferred or
conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerate four exceptions: (1)
through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; 3) to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the
prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is
void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian
reform laws.
In the present case, Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the lot
awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for shouldering all the expenses for
the transfer of the title of the lot from Loyola's mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola's
name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to
him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim.
Lebrudo's assertion must fail. The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or
conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years from
the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo does not
fall under any of the exceptions. In Maylem v. Ellano, 21 we held that the waiver of
rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for
being violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and transfer of rights to
the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola is void for
falling under the 10-year prohibitory period specified in RA 6657.
NON-LAND TRANSFER SCHEMES
(1) Leasehold Operations (LO)- lands within the land owners’ retained
areas or lands not yet due for distribution are placed under leasehold to
ensure farmers’ security over the land they till and pre-empt their
displacement while waiting for the eventual distribution of the land;
(2) Production Profit Sharing (PPS)- This scheme is an interim measure
while the lands owned or operated by agricultural entities await
coverage under the CARP. There entities are companies mostly involved
in the commercial production of rubber, banana, and pineapple;
(3) Stock Distribution Option (SDO). - Under this arrangement, the farmers
are entitled to dividends and other financial benefits and are also
assured of at least a representatives at the Board of Directors,
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
35
management or executive committee to protect the rights and interest
of shareholders; and
(4) Commercial Farm Deferment (SFD). – This scheme provides corporate
landowners of newly-established commercial plantations enough time to
recover their investment before such agricultural lands are covered by
CARP. The deferment period was up to 1998. Pending final land
transfer, however, these corporations shall implement a production and
profit-sharing scheme in their farms.
The monitoring of non-land transfer activities by the field offices of the DAR has
not been given much priority, as there has been greater pressure for them to
deliver their land acquisition and distribution (LAD) targets.
LEBRUDO: There was a violation of the prohibited period (sold within the
prohibitory period). There was a waiver, signed by the owner. Subject is the validity
of the waiver
SC: Waiver is void. It violated the law.
Chapter VIII (Corporate Farms)
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners. - Corporate landowners may voluntarily
transfer ownership over their agricultural landholdings to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to Section 20 hereof or to qualified beneficiaries, under such
terms and conditions consistent with this Act, as they may agree upon, subject to
confirmation by the DAR.
Upon certification by the DAR, corporations owning agricultural lands may give their
qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase such proportion of the capital stock of
the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to agricultural activities,
bears in relation to the company's total assets, under such terms and conditions as
may be agreed upon by them. In no case shall the compensation received by the
workers at the time the shares of stocks are distributed be reduced. The same
principle shall be applied to associations, with respect to their equity or
participation.
Corporations or associations which voluntarily divest a proportion of their capital
stock, equity or participation in favor of their workers or other qualified
beneficiaries under this section shall be deemed to have complied with the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That the following condition are complied with:
(a) In order to safeguard the right of beneficiaries who own shares of stocks to
dividends and other financial benefits, the books of the corporation or association
shall be subject to periodic audit by certified public accountants chosen by the
beneficiaries;
(b) Irrespective of the value of their equity in the corporation or association, the
beneficiaries shall be assured of at least one (1) representative in the board of
directors, or in a management or executive committee, if one exists, of the
corporation or association;
(c) Any shares acquired by such workers and beneficiaries shall have the same
rights and features as all other shares; and
(d) Any transfer of shares of stocks by the original beneficiaries shall be void ab
initio UNLESS said transaction is in favor of a qualified and registered beneficiary
within the same corporation.
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer
envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such stock distribution
approved by the PARC within the same period, the agricultural land of the
corporate owners or corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of this
Act.
HLI vs PRAC
BASIC Facts:
THE HACIENDA COMPRISED 6,443 HAS. IN 1957 TABACALERA SOLD THE LAND TO
TADECO OWNED BY THE COJUANCOS. GSIS FINANCED THE PURCHASE ON
CONDITION THAT THE LAND WILL ULTIMATELY BE SUBDIVIDED AND SOLD TO
THE TENANTS.
IN 1980 GOVT FILED AT RTC MANILA CASE AGAINST TADECO FOR IT TO
SURRENDER THE HACIENDA TO MAR (NOW DAR) SO THE LAND WILL BE
DISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS. MANILA RTC RULED AGAINST TADECO. TADECO
APPEALED TO CA. IN 1988 CA DISMISSED THE APPEAL SUBJECT TO REVIVAL IF
TADECO FAILS TO GET APPROVAL OF FARMERS OF STOCK DISTRIBUTION
OPTION (SDO) AND IF OPTED BY FARMERS TADECO FAILS TO IMPLEMENT SDO.
IN 1988 TADECO CREATED HACIENDA LUISITA INC (HLI) AND TADECO BOUGHT
SHARES OF HLI IN EXCHANGE OF THE HACIENDA LAND. THE TOTAL SHARES
WERE 400,000,000 WITH PAR VALUE OF P400,000,000.00. 150,000,000 SHARES
WERE FOR FARMERS AND 250,000,000 SHARES FOR OTHER STOCKHOLDERS.
FARMERS AND HLI ENTERED INTO STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION AGREEMENT
(SDOA) WHICH PROVIDES THAT FARMERS AGREE BECAUSE SUCH SDO WILL
IMPROVE THEIR LIVES AND THEY WILL GET GREATER BENEFITS. DAR APPROVED
SDOA.
IN 1995 HLI APPLIED TO CONVERT 500 HAS TO INDUSTRIAL USE. CONVERSION
WS APPROVED. THEN IT TRANSFERRED THE 500 HAS TO CENTENNARY
HOLDINGS INC WHICH TRANSFERRED IT TO LUISTA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP OR
LIPCO. LIPCO CONVEYED SOME LANDS TO RCBC AS PAYMENT FOR LOANS. IN
ADDITION TO THE 500 HAS SOLD TO LIPCO, 80.51 HAS WAS EXPROPRIATED FOR
USE OF SCTEX.
IN 2003 FARMER GROUPS FILED CASE AT DAR FOR EITHER RENEGOTIATION OF
SDOA OR ITS REVOCATION ON GROUND THAT THEIR LIVES DID NOT IMPROVE
AND THEY DID NOT GET FAIR SHARES IN THE SALE OF LANDS TO LIPCO AND
FOR SCTEX USE. DAR CREATED TASK FORCE WHICH RECOMMENDED TO PARC
(PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUCIL) THAT THE PREVIOUS ORDER
APPROVING THE SDO BE REVOKED.
IN 2005 PARC REVOKED THE SDO AND ORDERED THE COMPULSORY
ACQUISITION OF THE HACIENDA FOR DISTRIBUTION TO FARMERS. HLI WENT TO
THE SC AND ASKED FOR TRO TO STOP IMPLEMENTATION OF PARK ORDER. IN
2006 SC ISSUED TRO. HENCE THE CASE.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE:
Page 35

HLI ARGUES THAT PARC IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO REVOKE THE STOCK
DISTRIBUTION PLAN (SDP). THE LAW GIVES PARC THE POWER TO APPROVDE
SDP. BUT THE LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT IT CAN DISAPPROVE THE SDP. IS
HLI’S ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. IF PARC WAS GIVEN POWER TO APPROVE SDP, IT HAS THE POWER TO
REVOKE IT BY THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION. OTHERWISE PARC
WOULD BE A TOOTHLESS AGENCY.
On the postulate that the subject jurisdiction is conferred by law, HLI maintains
that PARC is without authority to revoke an SDP, for neither RA 6657 nor EO 229
expressly vests PARC with such authority. While, as HLI argued, EO 229 empowers
PARC to approve the plan for stock distribution in appropriate cases, the
empowerment only includes the power to disapprove, but not to recall its previous
approval of the SDP after it has been implemented by the parties.[13][93] To HLI,
it is the court which has jurisdiction and authority to order the revocation or
rescission of the PARC-approved SDP.
HELD
We disagree.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve
the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC.
However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to revoke
the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other
executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the
power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is
deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic
postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed.[14][94]
We have explained that “every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all
such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred
from its terms.”[15][95] Further, “every statutory grant of power, right or privilege
is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.[16][96]
Gordon v. Veridiano II is instructive:
The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly
granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the
authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place. Thus, if the
FDA grants a license upon its finding that the applicant drug store has complied
with the requirements of the general laws and the implementing administrative
rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA may revoke the said
license. By the same token, having granted the permit upon his ascertainment that
the conditions thereof as applied x x x have been complied with, it is only for the
violation of such conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit.[17][97]
(Emphasis supplied.)
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the
conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the
agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or
recall the approval of the plan.
As public respondents aptly observe, to deny PARC such revocatory power would
reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the very same agency tasked to
ensure compliance by the corporate landowner with the approved SDP would be
without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.[18][98] With the
view We take of the case, only PARC can effect such revocation. The DAR
Secretary, by his own authority as such, cannot plausibly do so, as the acceptance
and/or approval of the SDP sought to be taken back or undone is the act of PARC
whose official composition includes, no less, the President as chair, the DAR
Secretary as vice-chair, and at least eleven (11) other department heads.[19][99]
Hacienda Luisita CASE: (binalik na discussion from Chapter 3)
Hacienda Luisita Inc (HLI) was not the original corporation owning the Hacienda
Luisita Estate. But under SDO, one of the requirements is that there has to be a
corporation ! they will have to make a new corporation consisting of the old
corporation plus the farmer tenants as stockholders.
There was a program approved by PARC headed by the President of the
Philippines. For a period of time it was valid especially from Aquino, Ramos and
Estrada. Time of Arroyo, there was a complaint that the standard of living has not
improved and there were violations of the program. Investigated and allegations
found to be true, the program/agreement was cancelled by PARC headed by
Arroyo. No improvement of lives and a violation on the giving of homelots (yuta
para sa balay). HLI did not present any proof that they complied.
SC: annulment or revocation of the program is valid
Confronted with the issue: Previously it was legal but now it was revoked. What
shall we do now? Used Operative fact doctrine: let tenants choose.
- Plebescite: to remain as stockholders of HLI or distribute lands
- Chose for distribution of lands
- Right now, DAR is implementing distribution of lands to 6000 farmer
beneficiaries
Dissenting of CORONA: Provision on SDO is Unconstitutional. When we speak of
agrarian reform, it is always distribution of lands.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
WHAT IS THIS DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION?
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN A STATUTE IS AS MUCH A PART OF IT AS THAT WHICH IS
EXPRESSED.[20][94] EVERY STATUTE IS UNDERSTOOD, BY IMPLICATION, TO
CONTAIN ALL SUCH PROVISIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE ITS
OBJECT AND PURPOSE, OR TO MAKE EFFECTIVE RIGHTS, POWERS, PRIVILEGES
OR JURISDICTION WHICH IT GRANTS, INCLUDING ALL SUCH COLLATERAL AND
SUBSIDIARY CONSEQUENCES AS MAY BE FAIRLY AND LOGICALLY INFERRED
FROM ITS TERMS.”[21][95]FURTHER, “EVERY STATUTORY GRANT OF POWER,
RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE IS DEEMED TO INCLUDE ALL INCIDENTAL POWER, RIGHT
OR PRIVILEGE
Agrarian Reform Outline Reviewer - Atty. Capanas - AMaWS
36
ISSUE
RESPONDENT FARM ARGUES THAT SEC 31 OF RA 6657 WHICH ALLOWS STOCK
DISTRIBUTION INSTEAD OF LAND DISTRIBUTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT
CONTRAVENES SECTION 4, ART. X111 OF THE CONSTITUTION. IS THIS
ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR QUESTIONING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A
LAW ARE NOT ALL COMPLIED WITH. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE: (1) THERE IS
AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY; (2) THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
IS RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY BY A PROPER PARTY OR
ONE WITH LOCUS STANDI; AND (3) THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
MUST BE THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.[32][108]
THE FARMERS QUESTIONED THE CONSITUTIONALITY OF R.A. 6657 ONLY AFTER
14 YEARS SINCE THE SDP WAS DRAWN AND IMPLEMENTED. IT IS TOO LATE.
ALSO, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUE REGARDING THE SDP WAS NOT THE LIST
MOTA. IT WAS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDP.
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock distribution, an
arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the fundamental right of farmers and
farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.[33][106]
To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 permits
stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer; in fine, there is stock
certificate ownership of the farmers or farmworkers instead of them owning the
land, as envisaged in the Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an
anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian
reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.[34][107]
Reacting, HLI insists that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of land
ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries. It draws attention in this
regard to Sec. 3(a) of RA 6657 on the concept and scope of the term “agrarian
reform.” The constitutionality of a law, HLI added, cannot, as here, be attacked
collaterally.
The instant challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 and necessarily
its counterpart provision in EO 229 must fail as explained below.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review over, and
pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or legislative departments,
it does so only when the following essential requirements are first met, to wit:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible
opportunity by a proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.[35]
[108]
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM, composed of
a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its failure to challenge the
constitutionality of Sec. 3l of RA 6657, since as early as November 21, l989 when
PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time
thereafter and why its members received benefits from the SDP without so much of
a protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP
via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said plan and
approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to stress, by FARM or any
of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA. Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did
NOT question the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the
purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the
public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor General, did not question the
constitutionality of the provision. On the other hand, FARM, whose 27 members
formerly belonged to AMBALA, raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3,
2007 when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM
some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the day. The FARM
members slept on their rights and even accepted benefits from the SDP with nary a
complaint on the alleged unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits
were derived. The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional
issue that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the
occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from the application of
an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of constitutionality
will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised and presented in
an appropriate case at the first opportunity.[36][109] FARM is, therefore, remiss in
belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second
requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity is clearly wanting.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be the
very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not
present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the
case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing
the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act.[37][110] If some other
grounds exist by which judgment can be made without touching the
constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored.[38][111] Garcia v. Executive
Secretary explains why:
Lis Mota — the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake
judicial review — means that the Court will not pass upon a question of
unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on
some other ground, such as the application of the statute or the general law. The
petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and
not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.[39][112] (Italics in the
original.)
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by
AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory
Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to
support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or
not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP
for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented,
offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these key
issues may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is
not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of
the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.
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