Source: STRAFASIA

Contending Nuclear Deterrence Narratives in the Post-

Balakot Scenario
Dr Zafar Iqbal Cheema: is the President of Strategic Vision Institute (SVI),

Islamabad.

After the first use of two nuclear weapons on Japan by the U.S., Bernard

Brodie drew the seminal lesson that Nuclear weapons have transformed the

purpose of military establishments from winning the wars to averting them

and nuclear deterrence acts as a tool to achieve this purpose. Thus,

deterrence is psycho-strategic dissuasion employing the threat of inflicting

unacceptable punishment on the adversary(ies) if it undertakes military

action injurious to one‟s vital national interests. It directly affects the

strategic calculus in such a way that it would render any conventional

military victory into something worthless. This perception is pervasive

albeit in rational decision-making models, prevents war and limits conflicts

to the sub-conventional. However, the efficacy of nuclear deterrence

depends on the recognition of each other‟s possession of „credible‟ nuclear

weapons capabilities and corresponding mutual perceptions of nuclear

doctrines. It also helps to determine how stable the nuclear deterrence is,

since competing doctrinal approaches towards nuclear deterrence are

destabilizing for strategic stability.

Credible capability, deterrence equilibrium, credible signaling and

reputation for resolve are the keynotes of stable and sustainable nuclear

deterrence. Besides, the defending states must be able to resist the political

and military demands of the opposing side, which is preparing to impose

conflict on a country trying to defend its nation, deny coercion or defy

escalation dominance.

India and Pakistan have competing rather than corresponding doctrinal

narratives. Corresponding deterrence narratives suggest the agreeable

conceptual underpinnings in the light of lessons learnt from major powers‟

experience from the Cold War era. That efficacious nuclear deterrence

nullifies that conventional victory is achievable and that a mutually agreed

perception among nuclear weapon states drives them to a corresponding

deterrence narrative. Nawaz Sharif – Vajpayee summit in Lahore in early

1999 visualized the sort of ideational correspondence of India – Pakistan

nuclear doctrines but the process was undermined by the Kargil conflict.

India has so far successfully defied the conflict resolution model in South

Asia vis-à-vis both Pakistan and China. Thus, deterrence remains the only

workable option in South Asia to prevent major wars that have been borne

out in the past due to lack of dispute-resolution and may bear out in the

future. Pakistan has repeatedly proposed a strategic restraint regime in

South Asia to check the arms race and mitigate the South Asian security

dilemma but has not received fruitful outcome due to the Indian

opposition.

India‟s acquisition of nuclear deterrent is pre-figured, while Pakistan‟s is

existential. Underpinnings of technological advancement have direct

impact over evolving dynamics of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, which

is mostly led by India. Peace and stability between Pakistan and India are

currently under the influence of the Indian quest to acquire sophisticated

air defence systems and both parties‟ continuous acquisition of advanced

missile technologies. In response, Pakistan tries to maintain deterrence

equilibrium with India under the principle of minimum credible deterrence

which aims at full spectrum range given the centrality of threat from India.

Under this principle, Pakistan seeks to buttress strategic equilibrium vis-à-

vis India and to deter the Indian threats ranging from strategic to

conventional.

In February 2019 India attempted to impose a „new normal‟ through what it

called „Surgical Strike 2.0‟, after the Pulwama episode, but it didn‟t work as

she might have anticipated. On 26 February 2019, a squadron of Mirage

2000 (equipped with Spice 2000 missiles) entered Pakistan in an attack

mode with stand-off weapons, 50 km range), but abandoned their payload

around a seminary nearby Balakot in Pakistan. Next day i.e., February 27,

2019, the PAF responded „credibly‟ in operation „Swift Retort‟, by attacking

military targets across the Line of Control (LoC) inside the Indian occupied

Jammu and Kashmir, and in the ensuing air battles, shot down two Indian

aircraft but India acknowledged only one. India also shot down its own

helicopter through a friendly fire, under the friction of conflict.

In a well-publicized interview, Kanwal Sibal (former Foreign Secretary)

stated that through Balakot airstrike, India not only called Pakistan‟s

nuclear bluff but helped to overcome its concern that conventional strike

against Pakistan could escalate. Indian stance is being often reiterated.

Indian claims of failure of Pakistan‟s deterrent capability represent a

perceptually flawed narrative to project after Pakistan‟s action on 27

February (2019). This Indian narrative was generated to fulfill domestic

electoral objectives while neglecting its conceptual inadequacies and

repercussions on a broader regional level. The region has come close to the

point where nuclear deterrence might get undermined by force projection

in the evolving strategic posture of India. Pulwama Balakot episode

authenticates the role of Indian domestic politics in altering its strategic

narrative and deterrence perceptions. Pakistan Air Force operation „Swift

Resort‟ drove home the point to India strongly that Pakistan would disallow
any military misadventure, not just to let the purported „new norm‟ become

a norm. Indian claim of introducing a new normal was not allowed to

prevail.

In a policy statement on February 6, 2020, Gen. (R) Khalid Kidwai, Advisor

to NCA (National Command Authority) stated that „Pakistan must shoulder

the responsibility of maintaining the vital strategic balance in the

conventional and nuclear equation with India as the particular determinant

of the state of strategic stability in South Asia”, and that he would „like to

caution that it would be a serious professional folly on their part [India] to

consider that a single airstrike, that too conducted most unprofessionally,

would render Pakistan‟s robust nuclear deterrence a bluff”. Nuclear

weapons are used to deter or avert full-blown wars, in words of Vipin

Narang: “nuclear weapons are not meant to deter air-strikes”.

In the post-Pulwama-Balakot scenario, unfortunately, „competing nuclear

narratives‟ are getting the endorsement. India claims a „new normal‟

wherein it reasserts a right to undertake military action against any

Pulwama style militant activity in Indian held Kashmir or elsewhere in

India on a presumptive Pakistani involvement without waiting for or

holding an inquiry. India‟s proclaimed „proactive‟ behaviour is in fact

aggressive. Pakistan reasserts its policy of full-spectrum deterrence under

the auspices of minimum credible deterrence with the proviso that if India

attacks Pakistan militarily or if in any way that undermines deterrence

equilibrium, Pakistan would develop and augment a better equivalence to

restore the calculus. Pakistan‟s behaviour is reactive and defensive. A

region like South Asia, with two nuclear weapon states with enduring

animosity and huge conventional asymmetry, is in dire need of effective

and sustainable nuclear deterrence with corresponding doctrinal narratives

as its foundation.