The Case: B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent

B. M. No.
1036 June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal
profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law
is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of
Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation
of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May
2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal
Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with
the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for
vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from
signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required
respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC.
Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law."
Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing.
He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the
pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11
May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of
Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate
for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be
allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his
appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May
2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the
MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer;
and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative
case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections.
The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC
likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May
2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the
practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he
appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his
resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel
for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to
the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that
he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan
himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him"
before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same
date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-
PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14
May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the
MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law
without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur.
p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of
service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes
possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person
seeking admission had practiced law without a license.5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate passed the bar
examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for
practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the
1âwphi1
Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered
by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a
private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor
and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your
acceptance."10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does
not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent
to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation,
respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear
as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled " People vs. Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a
certification with regard to respondent's authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case. 2 On
September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment. 3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885
without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled
him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de
parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with
his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the
interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were
covered by leave applications approved by the presiding judge. 1âwphi1.nêt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for authorization to appear as
counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court
without the required authorization from the Court. 5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the
"Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who belong to a "powerless
family" from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms.
Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their
close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No.
84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal
case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the
latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their
illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject
of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt
it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services
of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and
that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close
relative by giving a free legal assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as branch
clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in
Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown
by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative matter to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and
recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before the
METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel
before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono counsel
likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did
not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family,
he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his
family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during
all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first
securing permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that
said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is
found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which
is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice" prohibited by the said
section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative. 8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his
cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to
obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part
in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. 9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998,
June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave
applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the
head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the
Department contemplated by law. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-8320. December 20, 1955.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIM BEN, Defendant-Appellant.
Vicente Jayme and Celso C. Veloso for Appellant.
Solicitor General Juan Liwag, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Antonio A.
Torres for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
CRIMINAL LAW; PENALTY; PROMISE OF LENIENCY DOES NOT MAKE PENALTY VOID IF
RECOMMENDATION IGNORED. — A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not
render the sentence of the court void if the latter ignores the recommendation and meters out to the
defendant a penalty which is provided by law
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating
paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibited cinematographic films of
indecent or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view in
the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without the aid
of counsel.
The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called for
trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the
aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have the information
read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in the affirmative. The court
interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a
plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as
provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he
insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a
fine of P200 be imposed upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6 months
and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his right were fully protected and
safeguarded. The Court implied with its duty when it informed the appellant that it was his right to have
the aid of counsel. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains to ascertain whether he
was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered. Notwithstanding this precaution and
warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the information.
Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine
would be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant
seems to bear out his claim; But such recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the
appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty
such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out
to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.
The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the Appellant

G.R. No. L-5346 January 3, 1911
W. W. ROBINSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCELINO VILLAFUERTE Y RAÑOLA, defendant-appellant.
R. Diokno for appellant.
Haussermann, Cohn and Fisher for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y
Rañola, alleging as a first cause of action: That the plaintiff was engaged, in the city of Manila and at the time specified
further on, in the importation and sale of flour and other products from abroad, with an office in the city of Manila, a
business which he still continued, through the agency of Castle Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the
defendant, a resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an instrument duly executed on October 19, 1906, by his attorney in fact
and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized for the purpose, and
ratified on the same date before the notary public of Manila, D. R. Williams, acknowledged and confessed that he owed
the plaintiff the net sum of P3,852.50; that by the said instrument duly executed the defendant bound and pledged
himself to pay to the plaintiff the said sum of P3,852.50 in four monthly installments from that date, at the rate of P1,000
for each of the first three installments and P852.50 for the last one, and likewise the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per
cent per annum, to be adjusted and paid at the time of paying each of the installments fixed; that in the said instrument
the defendant moreover bound himself to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs and expenses, in case the latter
should recur to judicial process for the collection of the aforementioned debt; and that, as security for the payment of
the said debt, of the interest thereon and of the amount for costs and expenses, the defendant voluntarily executed, by
means of the said instrument and in favor of the plaintiff, a special mortgage upon the properties of his absolute
ownership and control, which are:
A., p. 72, back. A rural estate, No. 433, consisting of land planted in coconut trees, in the barrio of Dumacaa of the
municipality of Lucena, and containing an area of 2 hectares, 57 ares, and 73 centares.
B., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 434, consisting of coconut land in the barrio of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena, 2 hectare, 4
ares, and 78 centares in area.
C., p. 73. A rural estate, No 435, consisting of unirrigated land containing 1,200 coconut trees, in the same barrio of
Lucena, and with and are of 7 hectares, 81 ares, and 4 centares.
D., p. 74. A rural estate, No 436, consisting of coconut land containing 700 coconut trees, in the barrio of Silangan
Mayao, Lucena, and with and area of 1 hectare and 84 centares.
E., p. 74. back. A rural estate, No 438, consisting of land planted with 300 coconut trees, in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena,
and measuring 52 ares and 66 centares in area.
F., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 439, consisting of coconut land containing 500 coconut trees, in the same barrio and
pueblo, with an area of 98 ares and 66 centares.
G., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 440, consisting of coconut land containing 800 coconut trees, in the same barrio and
pueblo, with an area of 36 ares and 5 centares.
H., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 441, consisting of coconut land containing 300 coconut trees, in the same barrio and
pueblo, measuring 50 ares and 73 centares.
I., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 914, consisting of improved land, planted with 1,000 coconut trees situated in the barrio of
Dumacaa, Lucena, of 7 hectares, 12 ares, and 60 centares in area.
J., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 915, consisting of improved land, planted with 100 coconut trees and situated in the barrio
Cotta, Lucena, of 93 ares and 22 centares in area.
K., p. 79. A rural estate, No. 916, consisting of improved land, planted with 200 coconut trees and situated in the same
barrio and pueblo, of 13 ares and 4 centares in area.
The respective bounderies of each one of the estates above enumerated were set fourth in the said instrument of
mortgage, which was duly inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas. This deed does not appear to have been
canceled, and constitutes an encumbrance on the properties described in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated in the
instrument referred to, that the liability of the property mortgaged was distributed in the following manner:
The estate described under letter A responded for P800 of the
debt and for the sum of P75 as costs .......................................................... P 875.00
Estate letter B, liability P200, costs P40 ............................................................... 240.00
Estate letter C, liability P160, costs P40 ............................................................... 200.00
Estate letter D, liability P130, costs P40 ............................................................... 170.00
Estate letter E, liability P92.50, costs P30 ............................................................. 122.50
Estate letter F, liability P150, costs P40 ................................................................ 190.00
Estate letter G, liability P280, costs P40 ............................................................... 320.00
Estate letter H, liability P250, costs P40 ............................................................... 290.00
Estate letter I, liability P1,400, costs P75 .............................................................. 1,475.00
Estate letter J, liability P260, costs P40 ................................................................. 300.00
Estate letter K, liability P130, costs
P40 ............................................................... 170.00 Total ......................................................................................
.................... 4,352.50
It was stated further, as an express condition, that default of payment of any of the installments specified in the fourth
preceding paragraph would cause the entire obligation to mature and would entitle the plaintiff (it says "defendant") to
require the payment of the same in its totality and forthwith to institute foreclosure proceedings against any and all of
the mortgage properties.
The complaint further alleged, as a first cause of action, that, notwithstanding the repeated demands made upon the
defendant, the latter had not paid his debt nor the interest thereon, excepting the sum of P550, paid on different dates
on account of the debt and interest due, wherefore the defendant owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,302.50, the
remainder of his debt and besides P385.57 as interest due from December 6, 1906, to the date of the filling of the
complaint; that the plaintiff was then the legal owner of the mortgage, and that he had not been paid the whole nor any
part of the sum expressed in the preceding paragraph.
As a second cause of action against the defendant, the complaint alleged, among other things: That the defendant, by
means of an instrument duly executed on December 21, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente
Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized — an instrument ratified on the same date before the
notary Daniel R. Williams — and in consideration of the credit which the plaintiff agreed to allow the said defendant up
to the sum of P3,560, executed a special voluntary mortgage of the properties of his absolute ownership and control
which are described as follows:
No. 1, p. 72. Estate No. 432, first inscription, volume 28, general register; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees,
26 hectares, 56 ares, and 87 centares in area, situated in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena. A part of this land is planted
with coconut and nipa palm trees and the rest is arable.
No. 2, p. 72, back. Estate No. 433, first inscription of the same volume; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees, 2
hectares, 57 ares, and 73 centares in area, situated in the same barrio and pueblo.
hectares, 4 ares, and 78 centares in area, situated in the barrio of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena.
No. 6, p. 74. Estate No. 436, first inscription of the same volume; coconut land containing 7,000 coconut trees, 1
hectare, 88 ares, and 54 centares in area, situated in the barrio of Silangan Mayao, Lucena.
No. 7 p. 74, back. Estate No. 438, first inscription of the volume aforesaid; coconut land, 52 ares and 66 centares in
area, containing 300 coconut trees and situated in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena.
No. 8, p. 75. Estate No. 439, first inscription of the same volume; coconut land, 98 ares and 66 centares in area,
containing 500 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 9, p. 75, back. Estate No. 440, first inscription of the volume mentioned; coconut land, 36 ares and 5 centares are,
containing 500 coconut trees and also located in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 10, p. 75, back. Estate No. 441, first inscription of the said volume; coconut land, 50 ares and 73 centares in are,
containing 300 coconut trees and located in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 11, p. 73. Estate No. 914, consisting of improved land planted with 1,000 coconut trees, located in the barrio of
Dumacaa, Lucena, with an area of 7 hectares, 12 ares, and 60 centares.
No. 12, p. 76. Estate No. 915, volume 106 general register; an improved piece of land, 93 ares and 22 centares in area,
containing 800 coconut trees and situated in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena.
No. 13, p. 79. Estate No. 916, volume 106 general register; an improved piece of land, 13 ares and 4 centares in area,
containing 200 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and pueblo.
No. 14, p. 127. Estate No. 932, volume 106 general register; an improved piece of coconut land, 2 hectares, 79 ares,
and 49 centares in area, containing 2,000 coconut trees and located in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena.
The respective boundaries of each of the estates above enumerate were set forth in the said instrument of mortgage,
which was duly inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas, and does not appear to have been cancelled, and
constitutes an encumbrance on the properties described, in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated, in the instrument referred
to, that the liability of the property mortgaged was distributed in the following manner:
The estate described under No. 1 responded for P800 of the P890.00
debt and for the sum of P90 as
costs ...............................................
Estate No. 2, liability P420, costs 460.00

P40 ..........................................….
P40 ..........................................….

P40 ..........................................….

P30 ..........................................….

P30 ..........................................….

P40 ..........................................….

P40 ..........................................….

P40 ..........................................….
Estate No. 10, liability P110, cost 150.00

P40 ..........................................….

P25 ..........................................….

P25 ..........................................….

P30 ..........................................….

P90 ........................................….
Total .......................................... 4,160.00

…...........................................……
That the aforementioned mortgage was executed as security for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum or sums which
the defendant might owe him by reason of the said credit, which was granted under the following terms and conditions:
1. That the said credit should not exceed the sum of P3,560 and was granted for the period of six months from the 20th
of November, 1906, and defendant was to make use of it in taking flour from the plaintiff's warehouse, at current prices,
by means of written duebills or orders signed by the defendant or by his attorney in fact.
2. That the said written duebills or orders should be paid within thirty days from their date, and it was stipulated that the
amount or value of each one of them should bear an annual interest of 8 per cent from the date of their maturity, if not
paid before.
3. That total amount of what the defendant might be owing, by reason of the said credit, should be settled and entirely
paid, together with the interest thereon, by the 20th of May, 1907, on which date all the orders or duebills issued by the
defendant against the said credit should be considered as matured, even though the extension above mentioned
should not have expired.
4. That it should be optional be optical on the part of the plaintiff to honor the duebills or orders which the defendant
Marcelino Villafuerte might issue against the said credit, in the event that the latter should fail to pay the amount of his
previous duebills or orders at the time they should respectively fall due, or should fail to comply with and observe any of
the conditions and stipulations contained in the said instrument of October 19, 1906, ratified before notary Williams; that
the defendant should be bound to pay to the plaintiff P600, in case of litigation, and also to pay all the expenses that
might be occasioned by the execution of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, those of its inscription in the
registry, cancellation, and release, as well as the expenses incurred by the plaintiff on account of the instrument of
October 19, 1906, referred to in the first cause of action, together with those of its inscription in the registry; provided,
moreover, that the aforementioned instrument of December 21, 1906, should be retroactive in its effect from the 20th of
November of the same year, and that the flour which the said defendant, through his attorney in fact, Vicente Marcelo
Concepcion, had withdrawn from the plaintiff's warehouses since the 20th of November, 1906, should be include in the
credit opened; that the estates described under the Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, bore a first mortgage in
favor of the plaintiff executed as security for the obligation, the fulfillment of which is demanded in the first cause of
action; that, by clause 14 of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, it was stipulated that in case W. W. Robinson,
the plaintiff, should have to institute foreclosure proceedings against the property above described, either by reason of
the mortgage hereby placed on the same, or of the obligation affecting the said property, in his favor, by virtue of the
said instrument of October 19 of the present year, Robinson should be entitled to take charge of the management of all
or any of the said realities until they should be sold, and to collect their revenues, rentals, fruits, and products for the
purpose of applying the same to the payment of the judgment; that, by clause 15 of the said instrument of December
21, 1906, it was also stipulated that it was expressly covenanted that, in case Robinson should have to proceed judicial
against the property therein mentioned in order to collect any amount to the payment of which they were subject, all the
orders or duebills issued on account of the credit granted in the said instrument should be considered as matured and
payable, and Robinson should be entitled forthwith to demand the payment of any balance found to be due him by
Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, with the privilege of levying upon all or any of the realities comprised with the mortgage
mentioned in the said instrument; that the amount credited for the expenses referred to in No. 7 of the fifth paragraph of
this cause of action reached P174.95; that the defendant, availing himself of the credit granted in the aforementioned
instrument of December 21, 1906, took and withdrew from the plaintiff's warehouses, on different dates between the
20th of November and the 19th of December, 1906, inclusive, various quantities of flour, the total value of which
amounted to P5,588.15; that the defendant had not paid any part of this amount, except the sum of P375.00, and was
owing a balance of P5,213.15; that at the time of the complaint the said defendant owed the plaintiff the sums of
P174.95 and P5,213.15, in addition to P503.79 as interest due up to the date of the complaint; that the plaintiff was
then the legal owner of the mortgage above referred to, and that none of the sums mentioned nor any part thereof had
been paid to him: wherefore the plaintiff asked that judgement be rendered in his favor against the defendant, for the
following amounts: (1) For the sum of P3,302.50, the principal demanded in the first course of action, and interest
thereon at 8 per cent per annum from date until its payment; (2) for the sum of P385.57, as interest due on the principal
mentioned in the preceding paragraph and remaining unpaid, and, in addition, the interest on this sum at the rate of 6
per cent per annum from the date of the complaint until paid; (3) for the sum of P5,213.15, the amount of the debt
claimed in the second cause of action, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from date
until it's payment; (4) for the sum of P503.79, the interest due on the principal mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from date until payment; (5) for the sum of P174.95, claimed in paragraph
9 of the second cause of action, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the complaint until
payment; and, (6) for the sum of 1,000 for costs and attorney's fees.
The plaintiff further prayed that an order be issued directing the delivery to the plaintiff of the properties described in the
complaint, in order that he might administer them during the course of this suit and until they should ultimately be sold,
and authorizing him to collect and receive the revenues, rentals, fruits, and other products of the said estates and to
retain them in his possession in order to satisfy the judgment that would be rendered in this case, and that in case the
said judgment be not satisfied thereby, the sale of the said properties be ordered and the proceeds thereof be applied
to the purpose.
The defendant, in his answer, made a general and specific denial of each and all of the allegations of the plaintiff for
each and all of the actions instituted by him in each and all of the paragraphs of the complaint, and as a special
defense, and in his crosscomplaint, alleged: That the defendant did not execute, consent to, nor authorize the
execution of a power of attorney of any kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, empowering the latter
to mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, to the plaintiff or to any person whatever, any of the properties mentioned
in the complaint, nor to accept from and open with the plaintiff any credit nor establish with him any business in flour;
nor execute any power of attorney nor grant any authority whatever in favor of the said Concepcion so that the latter
might represent him and accept in his name credit, or moneys whatsoever from any person; nor dispose of, mortgage,
or encumber any of the properties described in the complaint; that the defendant received no sum whatever from the
plaintiff nor was he in the latter's debt for the amount claimed in the complaint, nor for any other sum of money; that he
did not give his consent to all of to any one of the mortgages alleged in the complaint, and that all the said mortgages
on the properties therein mentioned were founded on a supposed power of attorney said to have been executed by the
defendant in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which power of attorney was fictitious, false, fraudulent, null and
void, that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did the latter intervene therein and that the said power of attorney
had no true reason for existence; wherefore the defendant asked that judgment be rendered absolving him from the
complaint with the costs against the plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the mortgages alleged in the complaint and
the inscription of each of them in the office of the register of property of Tayabas, and by ordering the cancellation of all
the inscriptions of the said mortgages and encumbrances of the aforementioned properties.
The plaintiff, in answering to the counter complaint, set up a general and specific denial of each and all of the
allegations of the defendant with respect to each and all of the actions brought by him in each and all of the paragraphs
of the counter complaint, and prayed that judgment be pronounced in his favor, and against the defendant, in
conformity with the petitions made in his complaint.
The case came up for hearing on November 30, 1908, and after the presentation of oral evidence by both parties, the
documentary evidence being attached to the record, the court, on December 15 of the same year, rendered judgment
whereby it directed that the plaintiff should recover from the defendant the sum specified in the first instrument of
mortgage, P3,302.50, as principal, the additional sum of P385.57 as interest up to April 30, 1908, besides the interest
on the said principal, at the rate of 8 percent per annum from the date just above mentioned until its complete payment,
also the P500 stipulated in the said instrument as payable by the defendant as costs and expenses in case of litigation;
and the sum mentioned in the second instrument of mortgage, P5,213.15 as principal, besides P503.79, as interest up
to the 30th day of April, 1908, in addition to the interest on the said principal at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, form
the date just of P174.95, as expenses for the execution of the instrument, for its inscription, cancellation, and
acquaintance, as provided for in clause 17 of the said instrument, and the additional sum of P600, which it was
stipulated in the second instrument the defendant should pay for costs and expenses in case of litigation. The judgment
further ordered that the defendant should pay the several amounts above mentioned, with the interest and costs, on or
before the first day of the sitting of the court in April, 1909, and that, in case such order should not be compiled with, the
mortgages should be foreclosed and a final writ should be issued directing that all the properties before described the
sold, the proceeds of the sale to pay the principal, interest, and costs. The defendant, when notified of this judgement,
took exception thereto, announced that he would file a bill of exceptions, and moved for a new trial on the ground that
the evidence was insufficient to warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was
denied and exception was taken by the appellant, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, which was certified to,
approved, and forwarded to the clerk of this court. By an order of March 1, 1909, it was provided that the execution of
the aforesaid judgment should not be suspended pending the appeal, unless the defendant, for the reasons stated in
the said order, should give a bond for P10,000.
The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is the collection of various sums owed by the defendant,
Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on the real properties set out in the two
notarial documents evidencing the debt, exhibited under letter A and B, and inscribed in the property registry of the
Province of Tayabas.
The mortgage action brought by the creditor, based upon the two aforementioned notarial documents is proper,
inasmuch as it is sought to collect certain sums specified in the said instruments on account of their not having been
paid within the periods therein stipulated, and consequently the real properties offered as security for the solvency of
the debts contracted by the debtor are duly liable for the satisfaction of the same; and although the credit of P3,852.50,
the value of the flour furnished to Camilio C. Gomez, in account with the defendant, and referred to in the instrument
lettered A, was to have been paid in four installments from October 19, 1906, at the rate of P1,000 in each one of the
three first months and P852.50 in the fourth and last month, yet since the debtor, notwithstanding the demands made
upon him, did not comply with his obligation nor pay his debt in conformity with the tenor of the said instrument, letter A,
for he only paid the creditor the sum of P550 delivered partially on different dates, the default of payment of any of the
installments agreed upon produces the effect that all of these must be deemed to have matured and entitles the
creditor to demand the payment of his entire credit and to proceed against the mortgaged properties for the purpose of
collecting his credit, which amounts to P3,302.50, after the deduction of the said P550 from the principal, with the
interest due from the 6th of December, 1906, amounting to P385.57.
With respect to the credit mentioned in the instrument, Exhibit B, and granted by the plaintiff to the defendant Villafuerte
under agreement that the latter should make use of the said credit by taking flour from the creditor's warehouse by
means of written duebills or orders signed by the debtor, or his attorney in fact, under condition that the value or amount
of the said duebills should be paid within thirty days from their date and that these acknowledgments of debts should
bear interest of 8 per cent per annum from the date of their maturity, it was also a condition that the aforesaid
instrument should be deemed to be retroactive in its effect, from November 20, 1906, that the quantities of flour which
were taken from the plaintiff's warehouse since the said November 20, 1906, should be considered as included, and
that the total amount of whatever the defendant might owe, by reason of the credit mentioned together with the interest
thereon, should be settled and entirely paid on May 20, 1907, on which date all the orders or duebills issued against the
said credit should be deemed to have matured, even though the thirty days' delay stipulated should not have expired.
In view of the fact that the defendant succeeded in withdrawing flour to the value of P5,078.15, without his having paid
the amount due therefor, except P375, it can not be denied that there still remains a balance to be paid of P4,703.15
(pp. 5 and 88 of the record).
In the account, Exhibit E, there appears a statement of the sacks of flour which were taken on account of the said credit
by means of the nine duebills, Exhibit F, attached to the aforementioned account, in which it also appears that the value
of the said sacks of flour was P4,703.15, after the deduction of P375.
The complaint which gave rise to the present suit is in accordance with the provisions of section 255 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and the mortgages constituted in the two instruments aforementioned fulfill the conditions and
requirements prescribed in articles 1857, 1874, and 1875 of the Civil Code; wherefore judgment should be rendered
favorable to the mortgage creditor, in accordance with section 256, and following, of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The defendant debtor denied the existence of the obligations contained in the said instruments; he asserted that the
latter, and the powers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion were false, and likewise denied that
he owed the plaintiff any of the amounts claimed in the complaint, or that he had authorized the said Concepcion to
mortgage the realties described in the said complaint, and in asking for his release, he prayed that the aforementioned
mortgages and the inscriptions of the same in the property registry be declared null and void.
If it is true, as it appears to be, that the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola executed, on July 11 and October 29,
1906, in this city, the powers of attorney, Exhibits C and D, in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, before the notaries
Eugenio de Lara and Daniel R. Williams, respectively, it not having been proved at trial that the said powers of attorney
were false or null and void, the mortgages upon the real properties, executed by the attorney in fact, duly authorized for
the purpose, in the instruments designated under letter A and B, the first of them ratified in the notarial record, letter G,
by the debtor before the same notary, Williams, must be accepted as valid and in force, inasmuch as the said mortgage
deeds appear to have been ratified in due form by contracting or interested parties before the said notary in Manila, it
not having been proven at trial that they contained any flaw or defect which might operate to annul them.
The evidence adduced by the defendant in his attempt to prove that, on the two dates before mentioned, when the said
two powers of attorney appear to have been executed, he was in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in this city of Manila, has
not resulted in defeating the validity, authenticity, and force of the said powers of attorney, for the truth of their contents
as well as their ratification by the person executing them was certified to by notaries before whom they were exhibited
respectively in the presence of two witnesses; the oral testimony presented by the defendant was insufficient to prove
that the notaries Lara and Williams untruthfully certified that Marcelino Villafuerte, whom they attested under oath that
they knew, personally appeared before them and ratified in its totality the contents of the aforementioned document,
declaring that he had executed it freely and voluntarily and exhibited for the purpose his cedula, No. 453963, issued in
Lucena, Tayabas, on January 15, 1906.
In order to establish the conclusion, as the logical result of the evidence, that the said two notaries, falsely, and entirely
irrespective of the truth, issued the certificates which appear under their respective signatures and seals at the foot of
the powers of attorney, letters C and D, it is not sufficient to prove, by means of the testimony of witnesses, (mostly
relatives) and by unauthenticated documents, that on the dates of the execution of the powers of attorney the persons
executing them was not here in Manila, where the instruments were certified to, but in Lucena, Tayabas; clear, strong,
and irrefutable proof must be adduced to prove that the said notaries could not have averred that the said person was
actually in their presence, that they heard him ratify the contents of the respective documents, and could have certified
to the number of his cedula, the only one exhibited to both notaries, without having ostensibly perverted the truth. The
defendant himself, who averred that he was in Lucena on July 11, 1906, the date of the first power of attorney, said that
he was not sure whether on October 29 of the same year, the date of the second, he was in the said pueblo or in this
city of Manila.
Public instruments authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law, are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gives rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. They
shall also be evidence against the contracting parties and their legal representatives with regard to the declarations the
former may have therein. (Arts. 1216 and 1218, Civil Code.)
The force of proof of depositions of witnesses shall be weighed by the courts in accordance with the provisions
of the law of civil procedure, taking care to avoid that, by the simple coincidence of some depositions, unless
their truthfulness be evident, the affairs may be finally decided in which instruments, private documents, or any
basis of written evidence are usually made use of. (Art. 1248, Civil Code.)
The defendant debtor having been requested by letter, in the beginning of the year 1907, to pay his debt, were it true
that he had not contracted the obligations contained in the instruments lettered A and B, nor executed in favor of
Vicente Marcelo the powers of attorney lettered C and D, would have at that time made the proper investigations and
taken the necessary steps for the annulment or invalidation of the said instruments. The defendant did not even attempt
to do anything of the kind, and we do not find any just reason nor any legal ground whatever to warrant a discussion of
the conclusion arrived at by the evidence presented in this suit.
Were it true that on the dates of the 11th of July and the 29th of October, 1906, the defendant Villafuerte was in Lucena,
Tayabas, and not in Manila, it is not understood how two notaries who attested that they personally knew him could
have certified that, on the respective dates aforementioned, the said defendant appeared in person before them, ratified
the instrument of power of attorney which he had executed, and, to identify his personality, exhibited to the said
notaries his certificate of registration, the only one and the same one which he presented at each of his appearances
on the said dates. Without proof, nor rational, acceptable explanation, it is impossible to believe that the personal
certificate of registration, which identifies a citizen, was for some four months in the possession of another person
residing in a distant place. It was not proved in a satisfactory manner at the trial how or why the said cedula, or
registration certificate, came to remain for so long a time in the possession of the Chinaman Sy Chuy Chim or of
Vicente Marcelo, as averred by the defendant or his counsel, and under this supposition, so strange, anomalous, and
out of the ordinary rule that every citizen should necessarily keep his certificate of identification in his possession, no
explanation whatever was given by the defendant's counsel as to the purpose for which the defendant parted with his
cedula and sent it to either the said Chinaman or Marcelo. The Chinaman was not examined in this litigation and the
attorney in fact, Marcelo, denied that he had received the said cedula sent by his constituent. So that for the reasons
hereinbefore stated, it is evident that the defendant Villafuerte personally exhibited the said cedula to the two
aforementioned notaries, on his ratification of the respective instrument of power of attorney before each one of them,
and it is not permissible to conclude that the instruments of power of attorney executed by the defendant, as well as the
certifications subscribed by the notaries Lara and Williams, are false, because of the absolute absence of proof as a
foundation for such a charge; for a notarial document, guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with the law, must
be sustained in full force and affect so long as he who impugns it shall not have presented strong, complete, and
conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or detect provided against by law.
Although the documents exhibited by the defendant's counsel could not, for lack of proof of their authenticity, destroy or
impair the value and force of the notarial documents or instruments on which the plaintiff's claim is based, it is, however,
to be noted that Pedro Cantero, whose signature appears attached to the papers found on pages 159, 162, and 170, of
the record, was not examined either, even for the purpose of identifying his signature, he being a Spaniard and an
attorney it is not possible to believe that he wrote the aforementioned documents in the form and style in which they
appear to have been drawn up; wherefore, on account of these circumstances, it is reasonable to presume that the
documents of pages 159 and 170, and the note of page 162, of the record, were not authentic.
It is also to be observed, in the document or letter found on page 136 of the record, and which also was
unauthenticated, that the aforementioned dates of the 11th of July, 1906, appear therein with a correction, made in the
proper place, of the figures 11 and 6 of the first date, a repetition and details which induce the presumption that the said
letter was written on a different date.
By the foregoing it has been duly shown that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh errors attributed to the judgment are
devoid of reason and legal foundation. With respect to the third error alleged we hold that the admission of the
documents designated by the letters L and M was proper for the purpose for which they were presented, because that
of letter L is an original and one of the triplicates drawn up for a single purpose, as stated therein, and that of letter M is
also an original ratified before a notary, in the certificate of which, dated July 13, 1906, there certainly appears an
annotation of the dame number 453963 of the cedula of the defendant Villafuerte which he exhibited to the notaries
who authenticated the powers of attorney Exhibits C and D.
With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle being permitted to address questions to
some of the witnesses during the hearing of the case, notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who
represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that the intervention of the said law clerk and employee of Messrs.
Haussermann, Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, was improperly admitted; it was not authorized by
any law, for the reason that the said Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted under oath
to practice his profession before the courts of these Islands, and therefore, on objection being made to his present at
the hearing of the case, the judge should have sustained such objection and should have excluded Lacalle and not
permitted him to address questions to the plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that Attorney Agustin Alvares,
designated in substitution of the said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff's representative in the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, was present.
Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of some of the proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno
Lacalle are not subject to annulment, as no positive detriment was caused to the defendant, although such intervention
is in no manner permitted by the law of procedure.
However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's witnesses and the presentation of
documents of various kinds exhibited at the trial be stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person who
was neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason, based upon any positive
prohibition of the law, to authorize the striking out to the answers given by the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even
though the said answers may have been evoked by questions addressed by a person not authorized by law, and there
is much less reason for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the same witnesses by the defendant's attorney, and
the answers thereto.
Although the presentation of the documents which support the claims of the plaintiff party be deemed to be improper,
on account of their having been made by a person who had not the qualifications of a practicing attorney it is
nevertheless true that their presentation was authorized by the attorney Alvarez and the documents exhibited continued
to be united to the record and were not stricken out therefrom on motion by the other side, but, on the contrary, the
attorney for the defendant or his counsel discussed the authenticity and validity of the said documents, made
allegations against the same and concluded by asking that these documents, and also the inscription of those
designated under letters A and B, be declared null and void.
From the preceding statements it is concluded that the intervention of Jose Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in no
manner prejudiced the rights and interests of the defendant and that, if judgment was rendered against him and in favor
of the plaintiff, it was in consequence of the merits of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and of the inefficacy and
worthlessness of the testimony given by the defendant.
If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented substantial, strong and convincing evidence of the falsity of the two
powers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence would have
been totally invalidated and annulled, and this suit would have had a different ending.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm the judgment appealed from, as we hereby do, with the
costs against the appellant, and in consequence thereof we acquit the plaintiff from the cross complaint relative to the
declaration of nullity of the mortgages and inscriptions, as requested by the defendant. The first day of the term of court
immediately following the date on which the fulfillment of this judgment is ordered shall be set for the payment of the
amounts due and the foreclosure of the said mortgages. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-16731 March 30, 1960
FFLIPE ECO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., respondents-appellees.
A. Vicente and B. Zapata for appellant.
Ramon Marfori and Vicente Bonot for appellees.
Asst. Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Dominador Quiros for appellees Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and Director of Forestry.
BARRERA, J.:
In a petition for certiorari filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 33674) on September 11, 1957,
Felipe Eco sought annulment of the proceeding, orders, and decisions rendered by the respondents Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources and Director of Forestry, claiming that the latter committed an abuse of discretion in
suspending his certificate of Private Wood-land Registration No. 1329, covering a tract of land with an area of 700
hectares, 290 hectares of which were forestal, and the former, in dismissing petitioner's appeal.
After the respondents had duty filed their answer justifying the controverted act, the case was heard.
On April 30, 1958, the court rendered judgment finding, inter alia that on January 17, 1956, petitioner Eco obtained
from the Bureau of Forestry a certificate of private wood-land registration under Section 1829 of the Revised
Administrative Code, on the strength of a possessory information title covering 700 hectares but which was made to
appear later on a sketch to contain 290 hectares of forest land, 99 hectares of are logged area and 811 hectares
cultivated area; TigMan Lumber Co., another timber licensee, protested against this registration and filed a petition for
reconsideration which was apparently granted because the Director of Forestry suspended the operation of Eco's
certificate; that likewise, it was found that portions of the area released from the forest zone were under occupancy by
some 80 oppositors; that after a series of protests and counter-protests, objections and counter-objections between the
parties, the Director of Forestry recommended cancellation of Eco's certificate of private woodland and the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources approved the recommendation; that upon the appeal of Eco, the Secretary reopened
the case and ordered a formal investigation of the whole controversy to give the parties "ample opportunity to formally
present their respective sides of the controversy and (be) given their 'day in court'"; that petitioner Eco refused to
submit to this, reinvestigation, insisting that it was not necessary; that in the face of this attitude of Eco, the Secretary of
Agriculture & Natural Resources issued a decision, the pertinent part of which reads:
In the light of the above findings and circumstances, this Office is of opinion, and so holds that the dismissal of
the appeal of Felipe Eco is perfectly in order. This is because of his adamant stand (not) to submit to the formal
investigation duly ordered by this Office. A clear indication of this attitude is shown by his failure to appear at the
investigation on May 2, 1957, when he was duly notified thereof thru his counsel.
WHEREFORE, and as the forested portion of the land in controversy is actually occupied by the TigMan
Lumber Co., Ltd., the appellee herein, and the remaining area which was released from the forest zone is under
actual occupation and cultivation by public land applicants who had duly filed their respective public land
applications therefore, the instant appeal of Felipe Eco should be, as hereby it is, DISMISSED. Conformably
herewith, the TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd., is hereby authorized to resume its operation inside the land in question.
HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land in dispute once and for all, the appellant herein is hereby given
a period of ninety(90) days from the date hereof within which to institute voluntaryregistration proceedings
covering the land; otherwise, this Office will take the necessary steps to bring the land under the operation of
Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act 141) in conjunction, with Act No. 496. For this purpose,
steps shall be taken by this Office to gather evidence for the Government with a view to supporting its
opposition to the voluntary registration proceedings that the appellant herein may institute, or to sustain the
move of the Government in the event that it will be compelled to institute compulsory registration proceedings
pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.
So Ordered.
On the basis of the foregoing findings, the trial court, Judge Magno S. Gatmaitan presiding, dismissed the petition
for certiorari, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court believes and so holds that there was nothing inherently wrong in the actuations of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and of the Director of the Bureau of Foresty; the Court concurs with their
opinion that in order to terminate the litigation between all the parties here, the most proper procedure was for
petitioners to institute voluntary registration proceedings; nor can petitioners claim that equity is with him in the
meantime since as already stated above, much can be said about the excess in his area. The result will be
dismissal. . . .
Copy of this decision was actually received by counsel for the petitioner on May 5, 1958.
On June 3, 1958 or 28 days thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied
on June 14, 1958, for lack of merit. On June 21, 1958, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond. Respondents
registered opposition thereto for the reason that the filing of said notice of appeal and appeal bond was made out of
time. Sustaining this allegation, the court, by order of July 5, 1950, disapproved petitioner's appeal bond and notice of
appeal.
On September 6 of the same year, petitioner filed a motion for relief under Rule 38, praying for the setting aside of the
decision on the ground of excusable negligence. The alleged negligence consisted of the erroneous computation by
counsel's clerk of the period within which an appeal may be made, said clerk being of the impression that the
prescriptive period to appeal in certiorari cases is also 30 days like in ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days as
provided in Section 17 of Rule 41. The motion for relief was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals but this court certified the case to us, the question involved herein being one of law.
In support of his view, petitioner-appellant cites our ruling in the cases of Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446,1 and
Herrera vs. Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc., G. R. No. L-2587, promulgated on September 19, 1950. 2 The aforecited
ruling has no application to the one at bar. The delay in the filing of the pleadings in those cases was brought about by
the inability to file the same due to the illness either of the clerk or of the attorney. It is quite different in the instant case.
Evidently, what was delegated by petitioner's counsel to his clerk was the computation itself of the period within which
the appropriate pleading may be filed. This act is hardly prudent or wise.As the lower court aptly said: "the duty to
compute theperiod to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the attorney which he can not and should not delegate unto
an employee because it concerns a question of study of the law and its application, and this Court considers this to be
a delicate matter that should not be delegated." The negligence here cannot, therefore, be considered excusable.
Even considering it on the merits, appellant's cause must also fail. The petition for relief was predicated principally on
the ground that the court a quo erred in not holding that the ruling of the respondent Director of Forestry, affirmed by
the respondent Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, suspending his Private Woodland Registration certificate
was made in abuse of discretion, because said officials allegedly deprived him of his day in court. It is noteworthy to
mention, however, that it is precisely for this reason that the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources ordered a
formal investigation of the matter to enable the parties to present their respective evidence. Yet, appellant Eco refused
to submit to such investigation. Naturally, the ruling of the respondent Director was affirmed. How can it be claimed then
that the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources gravely abused his discretion in dismissing Eco's appeal?
Furthermore, in his questioned order of June 11, 1957, the respondent Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources
provides:
HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land in dispute once and for all, the appellant (Eco) herein is hereby
given a period of ninety (90) days from the date hereof within which to institute voluntary registration
proceedings covering the said land; otherwise, this Office will take the necessary steps to bring the land under
operation of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act 141) in conjunction with Act No. 496. For this
purpose, steps shall be taken by this Office to gather evidence for the Government with a view to supporting its
opposition to the voluntary registration proceedings that the appellant herein may institute, or to sustain the
move of the Government in the event that it will be compelled to institute compulsory registration proceedings
pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.
SO ORDERED.
Apparently, instead of taking this course and thus proving his alleged right over the property, appellant elected to
institute certiorari proceedings against the abovementioned officials in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Underthe
circumstances, it is evident that appellant's action has no foundation at all.
Wherefore, finding no error in the appealed order denying petitioner's motion for relief, the same is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the petitioner-appellant. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 128573 January 13, 2003
NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO AND ANNABELLE LUMO, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing with registered land may generally rely on the
correctness of a certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it to determine the legal status of
the property.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the February 7, 1997 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 55149, which in turn affirmed the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs-spouses are adjudged the absolute owners and possessors of the properties in
question (Lot 18583, under TCT No. T-50134, and all improvements thereon) and quieting title thereto as
against any and all adverse claims of the defendant. Further, the sheriff's certificate of sale, Exhibit 4; 4-A;
Sheriff's deed of final conveyance, Exhibit 5, 5-A; Tax Declarations No. 71211, Exhibit 7, and any and all
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding in favor of the defendant, as against the plaintiffs, and
their predecessor-in-interest, which may be extant in the office of the Register of Deeds of Province of Misamis
Oriental, and of Cagayan de Oro City, and in the City Assessor's Office of Cagayan de Oro City, are declared as
invalid and ineffective as against the plaintiffs' title.
"The counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."3
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered to sell to private respondent-spouses Alfredo and Annabelle
Lumo, a house and lot measuring 340 square meters located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City.
Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents made inquiries at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City where the property is located and the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of the vendor's title.
They found out that the property was mortgaged for P8,000 to a certain Mrs. Galupo and that the owner's copy of the
Certificate of Title to said property was in her possession.
Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to redeem the property from Galupo at their expense, giving the
amount of P10,000 to Comayas for that purpose.
On May 30, 1988, a release of the adverse claim of Galupo was annotated on TCT No. T-41499 which covered the
subject property.
In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before the release of Galupo's adverse claim, private respondents and
Guillermo Comayas, executed a deed of absolute sale. The subject property was allegedly sold for P125,000 but the
deed of sale reflected the amount of only P30,000 which was the amount private respondents were ready to pay at the
time of the execution of said deed, the balance payable by installment.
On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute sale was registered and inscribed on TCT No. T-41499 and, on even date, TCT
No. T-50134 was issued in favor of private respondents.
After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested the issuance of a new tax declaration certificate in their
names. However, they were surprised to learn from the City Assessor's Office that the property was also declared for
tax purposes in the name of petitioner Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. Records in the City Assessor's Office
revealed that, for the lot covered by TCT No. T-50134, Alfredo Lumo's T/D # 83324 bore the note: "This lot is also
declared in the name of Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. under T/D # 71210".
Apparently, on February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas obtained a P15,000 loan from petitioner Bank using the subject
property as security. At the time said contract of mortgage was entered into, the subject property was then an
unregistered parcel of residential land, tax-declared in the name of a certain Sergio A. Balibay while the residential one-
storey house was tax-declared in the name of Comayas.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing Comayas to borrow money and use the subject lot as security.
But the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the Special Power of Attorney were recorded in the registration book of the
Province of Misamis Oriental, not in the registration book of Cagayan de Oro City. It appears that, when the registration
was made, there was only one Register of Deeds for the entire province of Misamis Oriental, including Cagayan de Oro
City. It was only in 1985 when the Office of the Register of Deeds for Cagayan de Oro City was established separately
from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental.
For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate mortgage was foreclosed and the subject property sold at a public auction
to the mortgagee Naawan Community Rural Bank as the highest bidder in the amount of P16,031.35. Thereafter, the
sheriff's certificate of sale was issued and registered under Act 3344 in the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Misamis Oriental.
On April 17, 1984, the subject property was registered in original proceedings under the Land Registration Act. Title
was entered in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City as Original Certificate of Title No.
0-820, pursuant to Decree No. N-189413.
On July 23, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41499 in the name of Guillermo P. Comayas was entered in the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for redemption of the foreclosed subject property lapsed and the MTCC
Deputy Sheriff of Cagayan de Oro City issued and delivered to petitioner bank the sheriff's deed of final conveyance.
This time, the deed was registered under Act 3344 and recorded in the registration book of the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City.
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax declaration for the subject house and lot.
Thereafter, petitioner Bank instituted an action for ejectment against Comayas before the MTCC which decided in its
favor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MTCC in a decision dated April 13, 1988.
On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution of its judgment.
The MTCC, being the court of origin, promptly issued said writ.
However, when the writ was served, the property was no longer occupied by Comayas but herein private respondents,
the spouses Lumo who had, as earlier mentioned, bought it from Comayas on May 17, 1988.
Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their home, private respondents filed an action for quieting of title which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 89-138. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring private
respondents as purchasers for value and in good faith, and consequently declaring them as the absolute owners and
possessors of the subject house and lot. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the trial
court's decision.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SHERIFF'S DEED OF FINAL CONVEYANCE WAS DULY EXECUTED AND
REGISTERED IN THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY ON DECEMBER 2, 1986;
II. WHETHER OR NOT REGISTRATION OF SHERIFF'S DEED OF FINAL CONVEYANCE IN THE PROPER
REGISTRY OF DEEDS COULD BE EFFECTIVE AS AGAINST SPOUSES LUMO.
Both parties cite Article 1544 of the Civil Code which governs the double sale of immovable property.
Article 1544 provides:
". . . . Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of Property."
Petitioner bank contends that the earlier registration of the sheriff's deed of final conveyance in the day book under Act
3344 should prevail over the later registration of private respondents' deed of absolute sale under Act 496, 4 as
amended by the Property Registration Decree, PD 1529.
This contention has no leg to stand on. It has been held that, where a person claims to have superior proprietary rights
over another on the ground that he derived his title from a sheriff's sale registered in the Registry of Property, Article
1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil Code will apply only if said execution sale of real estate is registered under Act
496.5
Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled when it was already acquired by petitioner bank by virtue of a final
deed of conveyance. On the other hand, when private respondents purchased the same property, it was covered by the
Torrens System.
Petitioner also relies on the case of Bautista vs. Fule6 where the Court ruled that the registration of an instrument
involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may
subsequently deal with the same property.
However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at the time of the execution and delivery of the sheriff's deed of
final conveyance on September 5, 1986, the disputed property was already covered by the Land Registration Act and
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-820 pursuant to Decree No. N189413 was likewise already entered in the registration
book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan De Oro City as of April 17, 1984.
Thus, from April 17, 1984, the subject property was already under the operation of the Torrens System. Under the said
system, registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land.
Moreover, the issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of relieving the land of all claims except those noted
thereon. Accordingly, private respondents, in dealing with the subject registered land, were not required by law to go
beyond the register to determine the legal condition of the property. They were only charged with notice of such
burdens on the property as were noted on the register or the certificate of title. To have required them to do more would
have been to defeat the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make the Torrens Title indefeasible and valid
against the whole world.
Private respondents posit that, even assuming that the sheriff's deed of final conveyance in favor of petitioner bank was
duly recorded in the day book of the Register of Deeds under Act 3344, ownership of the subject real property would
still be theirs as purchasers in good faith because they registered the sale first under the Property Registration Decree.
The rights created by the above-stated statute of course do not and cannot accrue under an inscription in bad faith.
Mere registration of title in case of double sale is not enough; good faith must concur with the registration. 7
Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration of the sheriff's deed of final conveyance on December 2, 1986
amounted to constructive notice to private respondents. Thus, when private respondents bought the subject property on
May 17, 1988, they were deemed to have purchased the said property with the knowledge that it was already
registered in the name of petitioner bank.
Thus, the only issue left to be resolved is whether or not private respondents could be considered as buyers in good
faith.
The "priority in time" principle being invoked by petitioner bank is misplaced because its registration referred to land not
within the Torrens System but under Act 3344. On the other hand, when private respondents bought the subject
property, the same was already registered under the Torrens System. It is a well-known rule in this jurisdiction that
persons dealing with registered land have the legal right to rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to
dispense with the need to inquire further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. 8
Did private respondents exercise the required diligence in ascertaining the legal condition of the title to the subject
property so as to be considered as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith?
We answer in the affirmative.
Before private respondents bought the subject property from Guillermo Comayas, inquiries were made with the
Registry of Deeds and the Bureau of Lands regarding the status of the vendor's title. No liens or encumbrances were
found to have been annotated on the certificate of title. Neither were private respondents aware of any adverse claim or
lien on the property other than the adverse claim of a certain Geneva Galupo to whom Guillermo Comayas had
mortgaged the subject property. But, as already mentioned, the claim of Galupo was eventually settled and the adverse
claim previously annotated on the title cancelled. Thus, having made the necessary inquiries, private respondents did
not have to go beyond the certificate of title. Otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of
Title would be rendered futile and nugatory.
Considering therefore that private respondents exercised the diligence required by law in ascertaining the legal status
of the Torrens title of Guillermo Comayas over the subject property and found no flaws therein, they should be
considered as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith.
Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the appellate court upholding private respondents Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo
as the true and rightful owners of the disputed property is affirmed.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

The Case: B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent

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The Case: B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant, EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent

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B. M. No.

1036 June 10, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIM BEN, Defendant-Appellant.

Vicente Jayme and Celso C. Veloso for Appellant.

The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the Appellant

Estate No. 2, liability P420, costs 460.00

Estate No. 4, liability P120, costs 160.00

Estate No. 5, liability P100, costs 130.50

Estate No. 6, liability P100, costs 130.00

Estate No. 7, liability P120, costs 160.00

Estate No. 8, liability P110, costs 150.00

Estate No. 9, liability P110, costs 150.00

Estate No. 10, liability P110, cost 150.00

Estate No. 11, liability P80, costs 105.00

Estate No. 12, liability P80, costs 150.00

Estate No. 13, liability P90, costs 120.00

Estate No. 14, liability P900, costs 999.00

Total .......................................... 4,160.00

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