THE PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF

RELIABILITY CENTRED MAINTENANCE

Phil Clarke
Director
The Asset Partnership

Summary: This paper outlines the basics principles of Reliability-centred Maintenance (RCM) and
describes two case study applications of RCM in the power distribution industry.

Key Words: Reliability, Maintenance, Asset Function

1. INTRODUCTION

Reliability Centred Maintenance (RCM) had its origins in the aircraft industry in the late 1960s and early
1970s when it was realised that aircraft maintenance philosophies of scheduled overhauls were based on
flawed paradigms.

Extensive research into aircraft component failure characteristics in the 1950s, 60s and 70s had shown
that the intuitive belief that failure could be attributed to “wear out” type failures was wrong, and that in
fact the majority of components displayed failure characteristics that indicated that failure was most likely
to occur when the component was new or just after maintenance. This “discovery”, combined with
reality that complex wide bodied aircraft such as the Boeing 747 could not be economically maintained
through scheduled overhauls, forced a new approach to determining aircraft scheduled maintenance
requirements.

The result of several years of evolutionary thinking in how tackle this complex issue was Stan Nowlan
and Howard Heap’s landmark 1978 report “Reliability-centred Maintenance”1, which set out the
definitive approach to determining aircraft maintenance requirements.

Industries outside aviation were slow to realise that the basic philosophies embodied within Nowlan and
Heap’s RCM report could equally be applied to assets other than aircraft. (An aircraft is, after all, only a
highly specialised and refined machine.) Consequently, RCM did not come into use in other industries
until the mid 1980s, and has only become popular in the 1990s, some 20 years after its basic philosophies
were embraced in the aviation industry.

The adoption of RCM by other industries has not been with its hiccups and setbacks. Not all industries
have the culture of thoroughness, rigour, analytical skills, and project management know-how of the
aviation industry. As a result, industries seeking minimum effort, inexpensive, “quick fix” solutions have
been disappointed in their attempts to apply RCM. Where it has been applied properly, RCM has
achieved outstanding benefits and results. Consequently, RCM has received “mixed reviews” in its
application in general industry.

This paper gives two examples of the practical application of RCM principles. It has given rigour and
logic to decisions that have in the past been left to “gut feel” and “engineering judgement”.
2. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RELIABILITY CENTRED MAINTENANCE

2.1. What is RCM?

The basic principles of RCM as embodied by Nowlan & Heap have become blurred in more recent times
by “imposter” techniques claiming to be RCM of some form. Typical examples are “streamlined RCM”
techniques that claim to give the benefits of RCM in less time. In reality, these approaches do not comply
with SAE JA1011 “EVALUATION CRITERIAFOR RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE (RCM)
PROCESSES” which was developed specifically to clarify what is and what is not RCM. So in reality,
they are not RCM at all.

It is worth briefly recapping on what “true” RCM is and how it is applied.

The RCM process entails asking seven questions about the asset or system under review:
• what are the functions and associated performance standards of the asset in its present operating
context?
• in what ways can it fail to fulfil its functions?
• what causes each functional failure?
• what happens when each failure occurs?
• in what ways does each failure matter?
• what can be done to predict or prevent each failure?
• what should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found?

2.2. The RCM II Information Worksheet: gathering the basic information

The first four of the seven questions are answered on the RCM II Information Worksheet (or FMEA):
• Functions: what functions and performance standards do the users of the asset want in its present
operating context?
• Functional Failures: in what ways can the asset fail to do what the users want?
• Failure Modes: what can cause each Functional Failure?
• Failure Effects: what are the physical effects of each failure?

2.3. Failure Consequences

The fifth of the seven questions asks how does each failure matter, since it is a basic tenet of RCM II that
what we are trying to avoid is the Consequences of each failure, much rather than the failure itself. For
any task to be worth doing, it must be able to deal successfully with the consequences of failure. In
RCM II, the Failure Consequences are:
• Hidden Failures: Hidden failures are functional failures which will not be evident in normal
circumstances, and usually concern protective devices which are not fail safe.
• Safety or Environmental: Failures could hurt or kill someone, or lead to the breach of an
environmental standard.
• Operational: Where the functional failure will have some adverse effect on operational capability.

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• Non Operational: Where the only cost is the cost of repair.

2.4. Pro-active Tasks and Default Actions

The sixth and seventh questions ask what can be done to predict or prevent failure, or if not, what can
then be done. RCM II provides strict criteria for assessing if a task is “technically feasible” in addressing
the failure mode. The pro-active and default tasks (in order of preference) are:
• On Condition Tasks, where items are checked (or inspected) and left in service if they are performing
satisfactorily.
For on condition tasks to be technically feasible, the failure characteristics need to satisfy the
following requirements:

The frequency of an on condition task is governed by the “P-F interval”, which is the period from
when impending failure can be detected to when the failure would occur if nothing were done to
prevent it. An on condition task must be carried out at intervals which are less than the P-F interval if
it is to have a reasonable probability of detecting a failure in the processes of occurring. RCM
debunks the long held belief by some maintenance professionals that the frequency of condition
monitoring is based on the criticality of failure. It is how long something takes to fail that will
ultimately determine how often condition monitor should be carried out.
• Scheduled Restoration and Discard Tasks, where items are either overhauled or replaced at a
specified frequency regardless of their condition.
For scheduled restoration and discard tasks to be technically feasible, the failure modes must have the
following characteristics:

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 The frequency of schedule restoration and discard task is governed by the “useful life” of the item, the
age at which the conditional probability of failure increases rapidly. (This is that age after which most
failures are likely to occur.)
• Failure Finding Tasks, where Hidden Functions are checked to determine if they are still working.
The frequency of a failure finding task is determined by the reliability of the hidden function
expressed as the mean time between failure (MTBF) and the availability of the required from it
(which is in turned determined by the risk of multiple failure.) This relationship is shown below:

Desired 99.99% 99.9% 99.8% 99.5% 99% 98% 95% 93%

Availability
Failure Finding 0.02% 0.2% 0.4% 1.0% 2.0% 4.0% 10% 15%
Interval as % of
MTBF

• No Scheduled Maintenance, where no action is taken to prevent failure. “No scheduled

maintenance” is often referred to as “run to failure”, and is the outcome in an RCM analysis if no task
can be found which is either technically feasible (meaning the task is technically not preventable) or
worth doing.
• Redesign, where items or processes are redesigned. Redesign of the asset or some processes
associated with its operation or maintenance will the outcome if no task can be found which is both
technically feasible and worth doing, and the consequences of allowing the failure to occur (either
from a risk or economic perspective) are unacceptable or undesirable.

Only those tasks which are both technically feasible and worth doing are selected. This ensures that tasks
that will have no or little effect in reducing failure rates or are of no benefit will be eliminated from
scheduled maintenance routines.

As Nowlan and Heap pointed out in their 1978 report, the application of RCM logic will reveal that for
some failure types there is no form of effective preventive or predictive maintenance. This conclusion is
based purely on the technical characteristics of the failures themselves, and not their consequences.
These types of failures will give little or no warning they are about to happen, and can occur at any time
(ie, they are not age related).

The most effective way of managing them is to manage the failure consequences much rather than the
failure itself, such as by providing protective devices or system redundancy.

It is the author’s experience however, that in many industries where the basics of RCM are either not
known or poorly understood, maintenance policies are implemented for failures that are effectively not
preventable or predictable. We call these policies “psychological maintenance”, as they makes people
feel better, but achieves little else. At best, this approach can lead to a waste of maintenance resources on
fruitless tasks, and at worst it will lull a false sense of security for failures that could be positively lethal
should they occur.

3. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF RCM

This paper examines two applications of RCM in the power distribution industry. Power distribution
systems have obviously been around for a long time, and have been subject to ongoing maintenance of
one form or another. The application of RCM allowed maintenance issues to be critically examined in
away that had not been attempted or appreciated previously.

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The examples given are relatively simple ones (power pole cross arm inspections and streetlight
replacement policy), but the vast numbers of assets involved make determining the optimum policy a
critical issue.

3.1. RCM Case Study One: Power Pole Cross Arm Inspections

Power poles and their attachments of all types in the electricity transmission and distribution industries
have long been subject to regular inspections to assess their condition, and identify those in need of
replacement or repair. The intervals at which these inspections are carried out have largely been
established as a result of organisational culture, experience and “engineering judgement”, and have varied
considerably from state to state and organisation to organisation. Inspection intervals that have been
determined typically range from three to six years.

The types of materials employed (eg, wood, steel, concrete, etc) and local environment conditions have
also played a major part in the maintenance policies that have been developed.

The initial inspection of pole top equipment is generally undertaken by ground based inspectors, who
make a visual inspection using binoculars or other aids from several positions around the base of the pole.
Any defects noted are then reported for later corrective action, with the priority being based on the
inspector’s judgement of defect criticality. Aerial inspection by helicopter or fixed wing aircraft is
generally not an option due to cost and environmental considerations.

These inspections would come under the umbrella of being an “on condition” task within an RCM
analysis framework. Generally, the RCM test for “technical feasibility” of these inspections has not been
rigorously applied, and a number of distribution companies have used RCM logic to refine their
inspection techniques and pole and attachment inspection intervals.

In one particular study, power pole cross arm inspection frequencies came under close scrutiny. The
company concerned used predominantly wood cross arms in addition to galvanised steel cross arms, the
latter generally on concrete poles. The steel cross arms were general perceived to be “maintenance free”,
and focus was on the wood cross arms.

The primary function of a cross arm is to support multiple insulators that in turn support the conductors.
Maintaining the required clearances from phase to phase and phase to earth are the required performance
standards. Failure of the cross arm can mean a conductor coming into the contact with the ground or
ground to conductor clearances being substantially reduced as the conduct swings free of the pole. In
urban areas, this represents a considerable risk to individuals in the immediate vicinity, and in rural areas,
an additional risk of bush fire start. (A number of the fires during the Ash Wednesday fires in Victoria
originated from power distribution assets.) In RCM terminology, the failure consequences were judged to
be “safety”.

Some of the possible failure modes identified for wood cross arms were biodegradation, wood root, and
termite attack. All these failure modes were subjected to scrutiny under the RCM analysis.

It was soon realised that termite attack could not be dealt with by a feasible inspection at the frequency
then being undertaken. In the first case, termites will eat out a cross arm form “the inside out” (they do
not like daylight), so there may be no external visual indication that the internal mass of the cross has
been removed by termite attack. The only way to check is examine the cross arm “close up”, and test its
density with a spike. This is obviously not possible with a ground based inspection. Secondly, termites
can attack a cross arm and “make a meal of it” in a matter of months, which is considerably less time than
the period between existing inspections. In RCM terminology, the P-F interval was not long enough to be
of use for an on condition task to be “technically feasible”. Consequently, it was realised that the existing
inspections could do little to reduce cross arm failure rate due to termite attack, and the best option was
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other preventive measures such as chemical treatment in high termite risk areas to make them less
appetising.

Examination of records and anecdotal evidence from field staff indicated that termite attack was in any
case not the “dominant” failure mode, and that the overwhelming number of cross arm failures and
removals were due to a combination of biodegradation or wood rot. Consequently, the RCM criteria for
an on condition task was applied to these failure modes. It immediately became apparent that the existing
inspections faced serious limitations when placed under the RCM scrutiny.

The reasons for this were:

• What constituted a “potential failure condition” was a subjective assessment of the cross arm
condition by the inspector. In short, there was no readily quantifiable cross arm condition that could
be judged as being a clearly identifiable potential failure condition.

• Wood rot and biodegradation start on the top of the cross arm where it is most exposed to the weather.
However, the ground based inspector, who can be up to 5m below the pole top, can only readily
observe the base, sides and ends of the cross arm. Consequently, rot or biodegradation may be well
advanced before it can be readily observed from the ground, and by that time the cross arm could be
in a “failed” state (ie, not able to sustain the maximum loads that it could be subjected to.)

These two factors combined mean that purely ground based inspections have a low relative inspection
effectiveness, ie, there is potential for a significant number of failures to “slip through” the inspection
processes.

An additional consideration was:

• Even if a potential failure condition was clearly detectable, the P-F interval can vary significantly.
Factors such as local weather conditions, environment, species of wood, etc, can all influence the
length of the P-F interval.

These difficulties with the task are illustrated in the Figure I below.

Subjective Potential
Failure Condition
P-F Interval “Failed”
Detection could Non detection
= unjustified = functional
replacement Detection = justified
replacement failure (fault)
Low inspection effectiveness

Original strength
Possible
variation in
rate of
Min acceptable strength (variable according to application)
deterioration

No residual strength - failure under any conditions

Figure I. P-F interval for Cross Arms

These factors were appreciated by the inspectors themselves, which often led to conservative assessments
of cross arm condition being made. In practice, this often meant resulted in cross arms were reported for
replacement, when on close up examination from a cherry picker were deemed to be in an acceptable

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condition. This in turn frustrated maintenance personnel and a engendered a lack of confidence in the
integrity of the inspection process. Four possible outcomes are set out in the table 1 below.

Table 1. Cross Arm Inspection Outcomes

Observed Actual
Outcome Outcome result
Condition Condition

1 ✔ ✔ No impact. Items left in service.

2 ✘ ✔ Items unnecessarily replaced or re-inspected. Increases

maintenance costs for no benefit. Undesirable outcome.

3 ✘ ✘ Items replaced before failure. In service failure and

operational consequences avoided. Desirable outcome.

4 ✔ ✘ Items fail in service with operational or safety

consequences. Highly undesirable outcome.

✔ = Okay condition
✘ = Potentially failed condition

It became apparent during the RCM analysis that the limitations on the inspection process being
employed meant that a reduction in the number of in service cross failures (outcome 4) to an acceptable
level could not be achieved without an unacceptable increase in unnecessary replacements or
reinspections (outcome 2).

Consequently, using the existing inspection process as a basis, the RCM analysis determined that an
on condition task that would give a tolerable risk of failure at an acceptable cost was not technically
feasible. Following the RCM decision logic this led to either a scheduled restoration or discard task being
considered. Scheduled restoration was immediately dropped from consideration, as it is not possible to
restore a wood cross arm to its original condition. That led to very brief consideration of scheduled
discard task, ie a scheduled replacement of cross arms at fixed intervals.

As shown above, for schedule restoration to be technically feasible, there must be an age (or time in
service) where there is a rapid increase in the conditional probability of failure. Failure of cross arms is
undoubtedly age related (ie, probability of failure increases with age), but it is not with the rapid increase
in failure rate that a scheduled discard task requires to be economically viable. Detailed data is not
available, but estimates are that the life of cross arms can be anywhere from 20 to 70 years depending on
a variety of factors. The scheduled task interval required to achieve a tolerable level of failure would be
unacceptably expensive and was quickly dropped from consideration.

A combination of on condition and scheduled discard tasks was also discarded for similar reason to those
outlined above.

For failure modes which have safety and environmental consequences, RCM requires redesign of the
asset or the process used to manage the asset, and both options were employed in this particular case. For
high voltage (HV) circuits, where the consequences of cross arm failure are most severe, it was judged
that no maintenance task could be developed for wood cross arms that would reduce risk of failure to a
tolerable level. Consequently, all new and replacement cross arms for HV circuits will use only
galvanised steel cross arms. This, in RCM terms constitutes a redesign of the asset and the process used to
maintain it.
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For LV circuits, it was judged that a revised (redesigned) inspection procedure could be developed for
wood cross arms that could reduce in service failure rate and unnecessary replacements. The first step
was to recognise the limitations of the ground based inspection, but nonetheless try and increase its
inspection effectiveness. A number of initiatives were implemented to improve inspection effectiveness,
including a more detailed and systematic procedure with increased guidance for the inspector to follow,
and the use of more powerful visual aids. The objective of the ground based inspection was changed.
The ground based inspector is no longer required judge definitively if a cross arm is in need of
replacement, but has the option of judging if a more detailed “up close” inspection from a cherry picker is
required. The role of the more effective second close up inspection is to make the final judgement on the
need for replacement. The combination of the two inspections will give the best achievable result in
terms of maintenance effectiveness and costs.

3.2. RCM Case Study Two: Street Light Maintenance Policy

Australian power distribution companies are normally responsible for the maintenance of public lighting
assets in their areas of responsibility. Local councils will then be charged for the cost of this
maintenance.

Two broad maintenance policies have generally been followed with respect to street lighting. These are:

• “Bulk” change out of all street lights at fixed intervals, supported by “spot” change outs of lights that
may fail in the interim. The perceived economies of scale and efficiencies that can be gained from a
“proactive” planned bulk change out make it more attractive, at least on the surface, than more
reactive spot change on failure. The cost per lamp of replacement for bulk change is generally less
half that of a spot change.

• “Spot” change out only when lamps fail in service.

In either case, spot change out requirements can be determined by relying on public reports of failed
street lights, or conducting regular patrols to identify failed lights for repair.

RCM was applied by an Australian power distributor to determine which of these two policies was most
advantageous.

The first step in applying RCM to street light assets was to decide what it was that was to be maintained,
and to what standard. The temptation is to look merely at each street light in isolation. However,
individual street lamps should be judged as being part of a streetlight “system”.

“AS/NZS 1158.1.3:1997 Road lighting - Vehicular traffic (Category V) lighting - Guide to design,
installation, operation and maintenance” sets outs the maintenance objectives and requirements for street
light systems. The main objectives are:
• Average streetlight availability should be at least 95%.
• Average light (lumen) output should not be less than 70% of original design output.

Not unreasonably, it is also an objective of power distribution companies that overall maintenance costs
be reduced.

The RCM study looked at the relative viability of the two maintenance policies. The RCM process
followed the usual steps of completing a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) followed by the
application of the RCM Decision Diagram logic.

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Street light failures were generally judged as being safety consequences. Street lighting failing to achieve
the required standards could be a contributing factor in motor vehicle accidents, or public security in
public areas such as car parks, and pedestrian areas. The levels of risk that could be tolerated could vary
according to operating context (eg, high accident rate major intersection verses a quiet low traffic density
suburban street.)

As noted above, the analysis was carried out on the basis of the function of a street light system much
rather than individual streetlights. For example, RCM tells us that the failure of an individual streetlight
is essentially not preventable there being no warning of failure and failure could occur at any time.
However, a single streetlight failing will not necessarily cause the failure of the system as whole, and
AS1158 indicates that system failure will occur only if an overall availability of 95% is not achieved. A
potential failure of the system as whole will be if the availability is between 100% and 95%.

The first step in deciding on the optimum maintenance policy was to determine the reliability and lumen
depreciation characteristics of the street lamps involved. A typical mortality / lumen depreciation curve is
shown in Figure II below.
100
Mortality/Lumen Depreciation (%)

80

R elia bility/ M o rta lity

60
L u m en de pre cia tio n

40

20

0
20 0 0 4 00 0 6 0 00 8 00 0 10 0 00 12 00 0 14 0 00 1 60 00 18 0 00 2 00 0 0

H o u rs
Figure II. Street Lamp Mortality and Lumen Depreciation

These curves tell us that a proportion of the lamp population will begin failing almost from new. For
example, the curve indicates that after about 10,000 hours (about 2½ years @ 4,000 hours per year) the
survival rate will be about 95%. This means that on average, it could be expected that 5% of lamps
would have failed before reaching 10,000 hours. The curves also tell us, that for the lamps that do
survive to 10,000 hours, their lumen output will have dropped to approximately 80% of their original
design output.

The first task to be considered was if an on condition task was technically feasible to ensure at least 95%
availability. This is a relatively easy calculation to make. An estimate was made of the average failure
rates of all the components that could cause an individual streetlight to fail. These included the lamp, PE
cell, ballast, starter, contactor, wiring/circuit/connections, vegetation, time controlled switch, and
Zellweger relay. These were added to give an estimate of the failure of the streetlight assembly as a
whole.

The relationship that Reliability (R) = e-λt, where t is the time in service and λ is the failure per period,
could be used to determine the patrol interval. The equation is simply rearranged to t = -(ln R)/λ. An
availability of 95% or less from streetlights is judged as being a functional failure, so an availability of
97% was taken as being the potential failure condition (ie, reliability to the patrol interval should not be
less than 97%). Based on the estimated failure rates, this gave a patrol interval of between two and three
months. Data since gathered indicates that an availability better that 97% is being achieved with a patrol

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interval of two months, and with approximately 70% of light failures being detected by the patrol. The
remaining failure reports are coming from the public.

Thus, an understanding of RCM and reliability characteristics established what the patrol interval should
be. A similar understanding helped the choice between bulk change and spot change out policies.

The first consideration was to look at the cost impact, as this was the issue most readily on the
maintenance manager’s mind. In simple terms, the cost of doing spot change outs must be balanced
against the economies of scale doing bulk change outs. As can be seen from the curves in Figure II
above, the longer lamps are left in service the greater the number that fail and require spot change out.
For bulk change out, is it is assumed that all lamps are changed (even ones that have replaced early
failures). The longer the interval between bulk change out, the lower the unit cost per time in service.
However, this also means that there is more opportunity for the lamps to fail in service. It therefore
becomes a matter of determining what the two sets of costs are for a proposed bulk change out intervals,
and establishing if there is an optimum point where their sum reaches a minimum.

Figure III below illustrates for a particular type of lamp where this is the case. As can be seen, the cost of
spot changes increases with greater bulk change out intervals as the greater number of lamps fail (ie, more
unscheduled maintenance activity), and the cost of bulk change out reduces so that there is an “optimum”
at around 10,000 hours.

$ 3 5 .0 0

$ 3 0 .0 0 S p o t c o s t p e r la m p /1 0 0 0 h rs

$ 2 5 .0 0 B u lk c o s t p e r la m p /1 0 0 0 h rs
T o ta l c o s t p e r 1 0 0 0 h o u rs
$ 2 0 .0 0

$ 1 5 .0 0

$ 1 0 .0 0

$ 5 .0 0

$ 0 .0 0
2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 18000 20000
Bulk Change Out Interval (Hours)

Figure III. Street lamp bulk change costs

However, as can be seen on this set of curves, the total cost (top line) only just reaches a minimum point,
and only increases at a very slow rate afterwards. Therefore, there is an insignificant cost difference
between 10,000 and 14,000 hour bulk change out intervals. The particular lamp in question had a very
rapid increase in mortality after 8,000 hours, yet despite that, there was only marginal financial benefit in
favour of bulk change out. More typically, the cost curves looked like the one given below in Figure IV.

Page 10
 $ 8 .0 0

$ 7 .0 0
S p o t c o s t p e r la m p / 1 0 0 0 h r s
$ 6 .0 0
B u lk c o s t p e r la m p / 1 0 0 0 h r s
$ 5 .0 0
T o ta l c o s t p e r 1 0 0 0 h o u rs
$ 4 .0 0
$ 3 .0 0

$ 2 .0 0
$ 1 .0 0
$ 0 .0 0
00

00

00

00

0
00

00

00

00

00

00
20

40

60

80

10

12

14

16

18

20
Bulk Change Out Interval (Hours)

Figure IV. Street lamp bulk change costs

In the case of the lamp in Figure IV, there is no optimum point for bulk change out. Spot change out is
the cheaper option within the range of available reliability data.

However, let us not, at our peril, forget that RCM tells us that assets exist to perform a function. As
maintainers, our role is to maintain asset functions, much rather than the assets themselves. Streetlight
systems exist to provide lighting for a variety of reasons, mainly safety and security.

AS1158.1.1.3 requires that average lumen output does not fall below 70% of the original design value.
The lumen depreciation curve given above clearly shows that lumen output from individual lamps will
deteriorate as they age. The RCM study also examined what effect this would have on overall streetlight
performance. The first thing to consider was that only those lamps that survived could suffer lumen
depreciation. New lamps will replace lamps that fail early in life, and this will increase the average
output of the “system”. Consequently, the lower the lamp mortality, the higher the average lumen
depreciation. This supports RCM logic, which indicates that for a scheduled discard to be technically
feasible, most items must survive to that age at which it is intended to carry out the task. A typical
average lumen depreciation curve is shown below in Figure V.

100
90
% of design Lumens

80
70
60
50 Effective Average Lumens
40
30
20
10
0
2000 4000 6000 8000 100001200014000160001800020000

Bulk Change Out Interval (Hours)

Figure V. Street lamp Lumen Depreciation

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This particular lamp is the same one whose cost curve is given in Figure IV above. Even though there is
no optimum bulk change out interval based on cost, there is one based on lumen performance. As can be
seen, the average lumen depreciation curves indicate that performance will fall below 70% or original
output after approximately 10,000 hours. If the intended function is that lumen output must be at least
70% of original output, then at the system has ”failed” at this point.

Ironically, the RCM study indicated that lamps for which bulk change out was justified on economic
grounds, bulk change was not needed to address lumen deprecation. This is perhaps due to the fact that in
such cases, not enough lamps survive to an age where lumen depreciation becomes significant.

4. CONCLUSION

Previously, maintenance determination has been very much an ad hoc affair based more on “gut feel”
than logic. The results have often been less than optimal in terms of sustaining asset performance and
wasteful in terms of the use of maintenance resources.

The examples given above are relative simple examples of how the application of Reliability-centred
Maintenance principles and their understanding can bring structure and logic to maintenance policy
determination.

Similar revelations in failure management policy-making have been made in a wide variety of industrial
applications through adherence to the strict principles embodied in Nowlan and Heap's original RCM
concept and now enshrined within the new SAE RCM standard, JA 1011: "Evaluation criteria for
Reliability-centered Maintenance Processes "5.

5. REFERENCES

1. Nowlan FS and Heap H, Reliability-centred Maintenance, National Technical Information

Service, US Department of Commerce, 1978

2. Mowbray JM, Reliability-centred Maintenance II, 2nd edition, Butterworth and

Heinemann, 1997

3. Smith DJ, Reliability, Maintainability and Risk, 5th edition, , Butterworth and Heinemann,
1997

4. AS/NZS 1158.1.3:1997 Road lighting - Vehicular traffic (Category V) lighting - Guide to

design, installation, operation and maintenance, Standards Australia, 1997

5. SAE Standard JA 1011: "Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-centered Maintenance (RCM)

processes"

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