Technical Community - North America

N-G-HE 250

Issue Jul 2014

Relief Device Design Basis and Verification Requirements

This Technical Rule is recommended for use at all BASF North American sites to define the required
BC032.020 design basis/calculations for all Pressure Relieving Devices and design verification
requirements for High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Devices

Commitment category Recommended

Application region North America
© 2014 BASF

Type Guideline
Discipline Safety, Health and Environmental Protection - Safety
Aligned with North America
Source language English
Published in Intranet
Application by Employees of BASF
Supersedes N-G-HE 250 EN:2008-09
Replaced by
Latest review / next scheduled review Jul 2014 / Jul 2019
Author / contact person Becton, Jeremy - NC/M
Further contact persons Cane, Vincenzo - NCE/T

INTERN Page 1 of 7
BASF Technical Rules N-G-HE 250.doc / 15.07.2014
Contents
Page

1 Purpose 3
2 Definitions 3
2.1 Device 3
2.2 High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Device 3
2.3 Qualified Person 3
2.4 Reactive Systems 3
3 Scope 3
4 Procedure 4
4.1 Documentation of Design Basis and Design Calculations 4
4.2 Design Accuracy for High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving
Devices 5
4.3 Five-year Design Verification for High Failure Consequence Pressure
Relieving Devices 5
4.4 Addressing Deficiencies 5
5 Responsibilities 6
6 References 6
6.1 Documents from Other Sources 6
7 Attachments 6
7.1 Forms 6
 N-G-HE 250 Jul 2014
Page 3

1 Purpose
To define the required BC032.020 design basis and/or calculations for all Pressure Relieving Devices, and design
verification requirements for High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Devices.

2 Definitions

2.1 Device
For the purpose of this guideline, a device is a relief valve, rupture disc, rupture pin, conservation vent, or weighted
manway cover.

2.2 High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Device

A Pressure Relieving device for which a failure to adequately relieve would likely result in one the following:
• A major fire or explosion
• A pressure wave or flying debris that endangers personnel
• Release of a cloud of highly toxic material
• Significant off site consequences
• Major environmental damage
These Pressure Relieving Devices are typically those that protect the following:
• Highly exothermic reaction systems
• Equipment handling large volumes of flammable gases or liquids above their boiling point
• Equipment handling highly toxic, volatile materials.

2.3 Qualified Person

A designated person who (through training and experience) has gained adequate skills for evaluating the adequacy of
the design of pressure relief systems and their components. The North American Pressure Relief Committee maintains
a list of qualified people which can be accessed through the Pressure Relief Systems Frequently Asked Questions
Database.

2.4 Reactive Systems

A system with exothermic reaction potential for which the energy or products generated could result in an overpressure
of that system.

3 Scope
This guideline is recommended for use at all BASF North American sites.
4 Procedure

4.1 Documentation of Design Basis and Design Calculations

The following should be included for all devices (N-G-HE 250 Form 01 “Relief Device Verification Sheet” may be used
as a checklist to ensure all items are included; N-G-HE 250 Form 01 is also included in PSV-Calc):
• List of devices with High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Devices identified
• List of failure scenarios considered. If PSV-Calc is used, this is covered by the “Summary” and “Additional
Scenarios” and/or “Scenario Evaluation Form” sheets. For any scenarios where other methods (e.g. safety
instrumented system) are used to provide overpressure protection instead of a relief device, provide supporting
design documentation.
• Worst Case Failure Scenario. If PSV-Calc is used, this is covered by observation of the “required orifice size” on
the “Summary” and “Additional Scenarios” sheets.
• List of process fluids possible in the vent system (if applicable, for multi-purpose plant)
• Rationale for the identification of the worst case process fluid (if applicable, for multi-purpose plant)
• Fluid Phase (liquid, vapor, or 2 phase)
• Standards and codes used in the calculation. Provide a statement that the calculation is based on API 520,
API 521, API 2000, and/or NFPA 30, and the version (year) of the standard used. For PSV-Calc, see the
“Instructions, Standards & Codes” sheet for the versions used.
• Location of the discharge point. Discharge point should be described in some meaningful way.
• Evaluation of the safety of the discharge point. Relief device discharge design should be evaluated with respect to
the hazard characteristics of the material being vented. For example, potentially flammable releases should be
evaluated with respect to nearby ignition sources, and toxic material releases should be evaluated with respect to
the location of people both on and off site. Dispersion modeling can be a part of this evaluation.
• Runaway reaction scenario summary (if applicable): For reactive systems, a document explaining the runaway
scenarios considered, Thermal Stability Tests to identify potential runaway reactions (if applicable), description of
the function of the SIS (if applicable), and a calculation of the SIS-limited scenario that the relief device needs to
vent (if applicable).
• Inlet/outlet pressure drop for relief valves; include alternate engineering analysis of valve stability when required.
(See N-G-HE 200, Section 4.4 for additional information)
• Overall system capacity for rupture disc systems
• Reaction force calculations and piping stress analysis when applicable
• Conservation vent and/or manway cover capacity; include impact of pressure drop when outlet/inlet piping lengths
are significant
• Prior verification sheets, for High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Device only
• List of major equipment protected, including design temperatures, pressures, and codes of construction (e.g.
ASME Section VIII, API 620, API 650).
• Calculation of flows
• Calculation of orifice size
• Device Specification Sheet including the following information: tag number; service; type of fluid (vapor, liquid, two
phase); equipment on which the device is attached; process variables used in calculations; device set pressure,
orifice area and flow coefficients; rupture disk burst pressure and temperature, operating ratio, manufacturing
range and flow resistance factor (KR); standards and codes used for calculations; set pressure. PSV-Calc can be
used in place of a specification sheet to document this information.
 N-G-HE 250 Jul 2014
Page 5

4.2 Design Accuracy for High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Devices
A Qualified Person must validate the design scenarios and calculations at least once (preferably during the initial
design or subsequently as part of the re-validation effort).

4.3 Five-year Design Verification for High Failure Consequence Pressure Relieving Devices
Verify that the content of the existing design basis documentation is up to date. N-G-HE 250 Form 02 “Tracking
Spreadsheet” is an example of a tracking tool that can be used to schedule verification work.
Discuss the history of the device with operations and maintenance. Inquire about any changes that may affect the
design basis of the device. Inquire about maintenance problems. Document the discussions with operations and
maintenance regarding changes and any past issues. If the history of change is uncertain, perform one or more of the
following checks:
• Review MOCs for changes that may affect the device
• Review incident reports that may be related to the device
• Field check the device. Check that the data on the device matches the documentation. Check that associated
piping matches the P&ID and calculations.
Verify that all changes affecting the operating conditions of the device have been properly addressed and documented.
Document the findings and execution of the Review Process including signature and date. N-G-HE 250 Form 01 “Relief
Device Verification Sheet” may be used for this documentation and, if used, it should be kept in the relief device
documentation file.

4.4 Addressing Deficiencies

In the case of documentation deficiencies, the reviewer shall inform Operations and Technical Engineering Services,
and take necessary steps to correct the deficiency. N-G-HE 250 Form 02 “Tracking Spreadsheet” is an appropriate
place to note documentation deficiencies.
Some examples of documentation deficiencies include:
• No sizing calculations
• No pressure drop calculations
• No supporting documentation (e.g. Cv size, heat transfer rate, equipment design conditions, etc.)
• Unknown or wrong standards used for calculations
• Overpressure scenarios not shown
• Overpressure scenarios not calculated
• Fire case not considered
• Overpressure scenarios not in the risk analysis
• Overpressure scenario in the risk analysis but not in the calculations
• Relief calculations not reviewed as part of the risk analysis
In the case of technical deficiencies, the Operations Manager and TES Manager must be made aware of potential
problems by a documented communication. N-G-HE 250 Form 02 “Tracking Spreadsheet” is an appropriate place to
note and track technical deficiencies.
After a technical deficiency is communicated, perform a risk analysis to determine how quickly remediation should be
completed. A team normally consisting of operations, process safety, and the process engineer should perform the risk
analysis. In all cases, the risk analysis must be carried out using the BASF Risk Matrix.
If the risk of operation with the technical deficiency is found to be acceptable, the timeline for resolving the issue can
follow a normal schedule (e.g. remediate during the next scheduled opportunity, outage, or turnaround). If the risk of
continued operation is unacceptable, an interim operating plan needs to be developed. This plan would include any
temporary or permanent measures that must be taken to manage the risk while the relief device is being engineered
and resolved. The temporary measures would enable the plant to continue to operate until the issue is permanently
resolved (e.g. during the next scheduled opportunity, outage, or turnaround).
If a safe interim operating plan cannot be developed, the timeline for the remediation must be essentially immediate
and a decision needs to be made whether the plant can be allowed to continue operation. This would involve
discussions and approvals on the actions to take between the head of the Process Safety CoE and the directors of
Operations and Engineering or their designees.
The Pressure Relief Systems Frequently Asked Questions Database contains an example of a procedure that can be
used to ensure technical deficiencies are properly addressed and documented.
Some examples of technical deficiencies are:
• Inadequate relief capacity
• Inadequate set pressure
• Excessive inlet pressure drop
• Excessive back pressure
• Inadequate piping supports (e.g. reactive forces too high)
• Inadequate type of device for service
• Inadequate installation

5 Responsibilities
The North American Process CoE has the responsibility of revising and interpreting this procedure.

6 References

6.1 Documents from Other Sources

BC032.020 Pressure Relieving and Venting Devices
G-P-SF 710 Protecting Vessels and Piping from Overpressure and Overtemperature
G-R-PRS 040 Documentation for Process Safety
API STD 520 Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-relieving Devices in Refineries Part I
API STD 521 Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems
API STD 620 Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-pressure Storage Tanks
API STD 650 Welded Tanks for Oil Storage
API STD 2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks
ASME Section VIII Division 1 Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels
N-G-PM 112 Piping Specialty Item / Relief Device List
N-G-HE 200 Safety, Health and Environmental Protection - Safety; Pressure Safety Relief
NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
Pressure Relief FAQ Frequently Asked Questions Database
PSV-Calc BASF Pressure Relief Calculation Software

7 Attachments

7.1 Forms
N-G-HE 250 Form 01 Relief Device Verification Sheet
N-G-HE 250 Form 02 Tracking Spreadsheet
 N-G-HE 250 Jul 2014
Page 7

Approval

Author / contact person Becton, Jeremy - NC/M

Publisher North America Technical Rules Coordinator

Responsible for Content and updating N-CoE Process

Wilkins, Jay

Approved by N-CoE Process Sponsor

Kimmitt, Jack 14.07.2014