From Pak-Bangla to Bangladesh, what went wrong?

The main reasons for the crumbling of Pakistan and the development of Bangladesh on
December 16, 1971, were the military barbarities submitted by the Pakistan Armed force against
unarmed Bengalis; the convergence of a huge number of outcasts from East Bengal into India
since March 1971; lastly the immediate Indian military intercession in East Bengal, upheld by
the discretionary help of the Soviet Association.
The triggering event that eventually led to the separation of east Bengal into a separate state
occurred in March 1971.When Ikram Sehgal returned to Dhaka on the 27th of March 1971, he
was in a stun, because he heard steadfast and submitted Pakistanis say, "it's all over". Noticeably,
the Bengali side including one of his cousins who used to be the Civic chairman of Dhaka and a
hardcore member of the Muslim League, let him know straight "It's finished. Punjabis better
leave!"
“There was so much confusion going on you cannot imagine. But I felt quite clear, for me
coming back to East Pakistan, that this was not a mistake.”- Ikram Sehgal

Operation Searchlight was an arranged military executing carried out by the Pakistan Armed
force to stifle the Bengali patriot development in East Pakistan during the freedom war of 1971.
The first arrangement was to assume responsibility for the significant urban areas on March 26,
and afterward wipe out all resistance, political or military inside one month. This occurrence
happened on the grounds that there was a finished breakdown of expert in East Pakistan, disarray
managed as a huge in lawfulness circumstance created. Ammunition and nourishment were
being sent through boats to West Pakistani soldiers at different spots.

There is no doubt that given the predetermined number of Pakistani soldiers to control what was
going on there, it was unavoidable. The grave misstep was to remove Mujib from that spot. They
ought to have kept Mujib there and consulted with him around then. Mujib under those
conditions, by then, needed to pick endurance over whatever else. Negotiators neglected to
safeguard and present Pakistan's case before the world – as a casualty of a preplanned universal
intrigue. The military neglected to ensure the philosophy and regional wildernesses against inner
and outer foes. This event eventually led to The Bangladesh Liberation War in which Mukti
Bahini fought to remove Pakistani occupation forces from Bangladesh.

The ascent of Bengali sub-patriotism inside Pakistan, in any case, had its root in various
elements including political, monetary, social, sociological, that had been working since Pakistan
was made in 1947. Of the considerable number of territories which comprised Pakistan, it was
Bengal which gave the strongest help to Mohammed Ali Jinnah in his battle for the foundation of
a different Muslim state in the sub-mainland. Yet, within a brief period, the Bengalis started to
have doubts.
In spite of the fact that they were the greater part bunch in Pakistan, they experienced a profound
established dread of control by the minority gathering of West Pakistan. In a vote-based system,
the greater part ought not have any dread of control, nor should they need to request shields, for
example, territorial independence, reservation of spots in the common help and the military and
ensures that the monetary improvement of their area would not be disregarded, nor their way of
life compromised. Be that as it may, for two decades the lion's share Bengali gathering felt
obliged to look for these assurances; and when they were not in truth, Bengali sub-patriotism
started to assemble force until eventually it turned into a national development for the production
of a different state.
First, the political factor: Pakistan started its political vocation under a parliamentary framework
demonstrated on Westminster and under a government constitution. Be that as it may, neither the
parliamentary framework nor the alliance was veritable. The established structures and trappings
of majority rules system just gave a shroud to run by the rare sorts of people who had the option
to amass control in their very own hands. For eleven years (1947-58) of purported parliamentary
vote based system, there was not a solitary general political race, and the common decisions
were portrayed as 'a sham, joke and a misrepresentation upon the electorate '.' Efficient
ideological groups didn't exist.
With the decrease of the Muslim Class, there was no national party; the remaining gatherings
were more barely based than those in the new Asian majority rule governments, not to talk about
Western nations. The disappointment of parliamentary majority rule government prompted the
improvement of an almighty and flighty official, helped and upheld by a ground-breaking
bureaucracy. Pakistan was commanded by administrators and troopers.
The rise of this all powerful decision world class greatly affected the rebel development in East
Bengal. The decision world class was made out of senior civil servants none of whom was East
Bengali. Up to 1958 they were bolstered in a roundabout way by the military; after 1958, armed
force backing was immediate and open. There was a bureau and a parliament, but the political
request in Pakistan could be called 'a government under an equitable constitution'. It was a
'modernizing government' in which Bengalis had no offer. Aside from during the short interim of
thirteen months of H. S. Suhrawardy's bureau in 1956-57, the Bengalis had barely any job in
national issues. Each imperative choice, regardless of whether it identified with political or
protection or financial or discretionary issues, was in the last investigation made by the decision
tip top, made out of West Pakistani common and military officials.
In commonplace issues, the circumstance was no better for the Bengalis. Indeed, even in their
own territory, all the key posts in the organization were held by West Pakistanis who had direct
access to the focal decision faction. The nation had, in principle, a bureaucratic constitution, yet
by and by the commonplace government was altogether subordinate to the center, particularly in
money related and regulatory issues. The Bengalis found another decision gathering set over
them instead of the previous English authorities.
The common and military authorities from West Pakistan positioned in East Bengal never tried
to build up any genuine bonds with the neighborhood populace who viewed them as outsiders.
There were not many social contacts; the West Pakistani authorities believed themselves to be
socially better than the Bengali Muslims, who were viewed as changes over from lower-standing
Hindus. The outcome was harshness and a broadening hole.
When with the foundation of Pakistan, the Bengali Muslims found that the special situation of
the British and the privileged Hindus had gone toward the West Pakistanis, they began focusing
on their social and etymological affinities with the Bengalis of West Bengal. The Pakistan
specialists viewed this as a genuine danger to the presence of Pakistan and attempted to force a
social consistency dependent on Islam.
The Bengalis responded forcefully. They felt-similarly as the Muslims of unified India had felt-
that their treasured culture and lifestyle were compromised. The principal tussle was over the
language question. In 1948 the Bengalis responded fiercely to Jinnah's recommendation that
Urdu ought to be the main national language. On February 21, 1952, three understudies of Dacca
University were slaughtered in a mob over this issue. From that point forward, February 21 has
been seen as a day of grieving for the valued language of the Bengalis.
The Pakistan government neglected to welcome the way that countries are comprised of
individuals whose profound emotions about such inquiries as their language can't be securely
disregarded. A government association can be reinforced by giving social opportunity and self-
sufficiency. In any case, Pakistan's endeavor to force consistency where decent variety was
attractive had unfortunate outcomes. Each endeavor made by the Pakistan government to
energize and cultivate a social consistency dependent on Islamic culture in East Pakistan created
a sharp response; the Bengalis started to look increasingly more to West Bengal for social liking
and bonds.
It was most deplorable and sad that the political elements in Pakistan in 1969-71 were not
completely valued. When the political race was finished, it was vain as well as most imprudent to
test Sheikh Mujib. The result was a giant loss of human lives and one of the best human disasters
of modem history. India, presumably, had an influence in the crumbling of Pakistan, yet the
genuine duty lies in the historical backdrop of the most recent too many years of Pakistan, when
a dominant part of the nation's populace was dealt with like a pilgrim people. The civil and
military decision exclusively liable for the catastrophe.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
 Choudhury, G. (1972). Bangladesh: Why It Happened. International Affairs (Royal
Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 48(2), 242-249. doi:10.2307/2613440
 Jalal, Ayesha (2014) Toward the Watershed of 1971. In The Struggle for Pakistan. A
Muslim Homeland and Global Politics. Cambridge Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 142 -176
 Faruki, K. (1972). THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR, 1971, AND THE UNITED
NATIONS. Pakistan Horizon, 25(1), 10-20. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393109