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Book NuclearDisarmament PDF
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
A WAY FORWARD
1
IDSA Task Force Report
Cover Illustration :
The illustration on the cover is a rendering of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ which was first depicted
in 1947 by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists to indicate the imminence of global disaster due
to a nuclear exchange. The closer the symbolic clock face is to midnight, the closer the
world is estimated to be to global disaster. The Clock initially showed seven minutes to
midnight, was placed at 17 minutes to midnight in 1991 at the end of the Cold War, and is
currently placed at 6 minutes to midnight. Apart from a nuclear exchange, issues like
climate change and negative implications of nanotechnology have also been factored in
while depicting the current time.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying,
recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses (IDSA).
Disclaimer : The views expressed in this report are of the Task Force and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Institute and the Government of India.
ISBN: 81-86019-69-3
2
CONTENTS
PAGE
Foreword ................................................................................................................ 5
Introduction .......................................................................................................... 7
3
IDSA Task Force Report
4
FOREWORD
As long as nuclear weapons remain with some states, others will seek to
develop them. Their continued existence poses the risk that someday they will
be used. The growing demand for nuclear energy will result in increased
availability of knowledge and materials to produce nuclear weapons. Highly
motivated transnational terrorist organizations have already shown their resolve
to procure Weapons of Mass Destruction and the possibility of their someday
procuring nuclear materials and using them as weapons can no longer be
dismissed.
These real and growing dangers call for a range of coordinated actions.
But at the same time the momentum for nuclear disarmament needs to be revived.
Even though arch realists of the cold war era have begun to see the logic of
abolishing nuclear weapons, their initial enthusiasm seems to be dissipating. A
global consensus on disarmament remains a distant dream.
5
IDSA Task Force Report
6
INTRODUCTION
T
h e international community has The USA and the Soviet Union (later the
not, till recently, sought to achieve Russian Federation) have concluded a
the objective of a nuclear weapon number of bilateral nuclear arms reduction
free world in a concerted fashion. There agreements, like the two Strategic Arms
have of course been innumerable calls for Limitation Treaties, the Intermediate Range
the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Strategic Arms
United Nations General Assembly Reduction Treaty, etc. which have brought
(UNGA), for instance, from its very first down their nuclear weapon holdings. As a
session in 1946, has periodically called for result of these agreements the global
the elimination of nuclear weapons, and nuclear warhead stockpile, over 95 per cent
since 1996 has annually recommended of which is held by the USA and Russia,
negotiations for the conclusion of a Nuclear has come down to the present-day level of
Weapons Convention (NWC) aimed at around 23,000. While this represents a
achieving this objective. Similarly, as early significant drop from the 1985 peak of about
as 1954, the Board of Governors of the 70,000 warheads, 3 present holdings of
International Commission of the Red Cross nuclear warheads are sufficient to destroy
(ICRC) pleaded for the prohibition of the the world several times over. This exercise,
use of nuclear weapons and the ICRC at its which many see as “an elimination of
21st International Conference held in redundancies”,4 was driven by the logic of
Istanbul in 1969 passed a resolution calling relations between these two states and not
upon the United Nations (UN) for a special by any desire for the elimination of nuclear
agreement on the prohibition of weapons weapons. Accordingly, these agreements
of mass destruction. Similar sentiments neither led to, nor even envisaged, the
against nuclear weapons were also voiced subsequent involvement of the other
by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) nuclear weapon states in discussions to
in 1996, by the Nuclear Non Proliferation further the cause of nuclear disarmament
Treaty (NPT) Review Conferences in 1995 aimed at the elimination of nuclear
and 2000, by leaders like Rajiv Gandhi in weapons.
1988, and by groups of middling powers in
19841 and 1998.2 Progress has, however, Far from working for a nuclear weapon free
been limited as the five nuclear weapon world the nuclear weapon states have
states, recognized as such by the NPT, have, constantly been upgrading their nuclear
historically, shown little interest in a arsenals and have integrated them into their
nuclear weapon free world. war-fighting doctrines and mechanisms.
1
6 nation continent initiative involving Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania.
2
New Agenda Coalition involving Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden.
3
See Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi (Co-Chairs), Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Policy Makers,
at <http://www.icnnd.org/reference/reports/ent/pdf/ICNND_Report EliminatingNuclearThreats.pdf>, p. 13.
4
Foreword by Hans Blix to Morten Bremer Maerli and Sverre Lodgaard (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation and International
Security (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. xiv–xviii.
7
IDSA Task Force Report
All of them, with the exception of China, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and
have spurned the no-first-use doctrine and UN Security Council Resolution 1540,
clearly envisage the use of nuclear weapons among others designed to prevent
even in conventional conflict situations. The horizontal proliferation. While the IAEA
USA has gone so far as to project their use functioned as the policing agency
in pre-emptive and preventive modes. The administering a safeguards system to
nuclear weapon states are, therefore, guilty ensure that the non-nuclear weapon states
of having legitimized nuclear weapons and party to the NPT did not divert source and
enhanced their importance as a currency of special fissionable materials for weapon
power. This, in turn, has encouraged purposes the multilateral regimes and
proliferation. Many a state that would
initiatives detailed the materials,
never have contemplated going nuclear,
equipment and technologies normally to be
had the nuclear weapon states moved
denied to such states except under stringent
towards nuclear disarmament, has done so,
conditionalities, as well as measures to be
with a few actually crossing the forbidden
taken in order to prevent such materials,
threshold.
equipment and technologies from falling
The focus of the nuclear weapon states all into unauthorized hands. Over time, IAEA
these years has been not on addressing policing has been steadily tightened
vertical proliferation but on curbing through mechanisms like full-scope
horizontal proliferation while at the same safeguards, the Additional Protocol, etc.,
time maintaining their monopoly on and the guidelines laid down by the
nuclear weapons. Their instrument of multilateral bodies have become more
choice for this purpose was the NPT, which
restrictive both in respect of what can be
was essentially based on a bargain,
provided to non-nuclear weapon states and
whereby the nuclear weapon states on the
of the conditionalities on which such
one hand committed themselves to “pursue
supplies may be made. These measures
negotiations in good faith” for nuclear
have been supplemented by several
disarmament and the non-nuclear weapon
initiatives – unilateral, regional and
states on the other hand undertook to
international – designed primarily to
forswear nuclear weapons for all time. In
addition, the non-nuclear weapon states prevent nuclear weapons, materials,
were guaranteed an inalienable right to civil equipment and technologies from coming
nuclear technology. in possession of unauthorised parties.
8
For instance, while non-nuclear weapon Nevertheless, the world remains perilously
states were required to upfront renounce close to the use of nuclear weapons, as
the acquisition of nuclear weapons the reflected in the fact that the Bulletin of the
obligation on the nuclear weapon states was Atomic Scientists in January 2010 moved the
more nebulous, entailing only “good faith” hands of its Doomsday Clock backward by
negotiations towards “effective measures a minute to six minutes to midnight, after
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race having advanced it by two minutes to five
at an early date and to nuclear minutes to midnight in 2007.5 In a sense the
disarmament”. Moreover, while the treaty
situation is more precarious today than for
had specific provisions to curb horizontal
much of the cold war period, partly on
proliferation, by way of the requirement of
account of the increased likelihood of non-
IAEA safeguards on non-nuclear weapon
state actors getting access to nuclear
states and restraints on supply of source,
materials or weapons, and partly on
special fissionable materials and equipment
account of the increase in the number of
to them, there were no similar stringent
obligations on nuclear weapon states in nuclear armed states, some of which do not
achieving the stated goal of nuclear have the benefit of the experience of years
disarmament by way of a timeframe or of safeguards put in effect by the nuclear
even rough benchmarks. weapon states to prevent nuclear accidents,
misjudgements and unauthorized launches.
In these circumstances, it is no surprise that
Moreover, whilst during the cold war a
while the NPT regime has not been able to
nuclear exchange was essentially a binary
reverse vertical proliferation it has had
function and thus much more controllable,
some success in curbing horizontal
today with the number of nuclear armed
proliferation. This is borne out by the fact
states having increased the possibility of
that, with Israel having gone nuclear before
the NPT came into force, only three use of nuclear weapons has increased
additional states, namely, Pakistan, India exponentially. Finally, the legitimization of
and North Korea have acquired nuclear nuclear weapons resulting from the policies
weapons, over and above the five NPT- adopted by the nuclear weapon states can
recognized nuclear weapon states. Four result in another thirty to forty states going
states have given up nuclear weapons, nuclear at relatively short notice as they
namely Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and have the capacity to do so. It is in this
South Africa, and several like Libya have context that in 2005 Robert McNamara
abandoned their quest for nuclear weapons. argued:
5
See “ ‘Doomsday Clock’ moves one minute away from midnight”, 14 January 2010, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
at <http://thebulletin.org/content/media-center/announcements/2010/01/14/doomsday-clock-moves-one-minute-
away-midnight>. The closer the clock is to midnight, the closer the world is estimated to be to global disaster. Originally,
only a global nuclear war was under consideration but now climate change and “new developments in the life
sciences and nanotechnology that could inflict irrevocable harm” are also factored in by some scientists. The gravity
of the situation is borne out by the fact that the Doomsday Clock has steadily moved down from 17 minutes to
midnight in 1991 to 6 minutes to midnight today. Indeed, even for many years during the cold war, the hands of the
clock were further from midnight than they are today.
9
IDSA Task Force Report
If the United States continues its current need to work for a nuclear weapon free
stance, over time, substantial proliferation of world. In spelling out the “trajectory” of US
nuclear weapons will almost surely follow. policy towards this end he argued inter alia
Some, or all, of such nations as Egypt, Japan, for reduction in the salience of nuclear
Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Taiwan will very
weapons, cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the
likely initiate nuclear weapon programs,
increasing both the risk of use of the weapons
nuclear weapon states, strengthening the
and the diversion of weapons and fissile NPT regime, operationalizing the
materials into the hands of rogue states or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),
terrorists. 6 and finalizing the Fissile Material Cut-Off
Treaty (FMCT). President Obama’s Prague
Indeed, it could be argued that the NPT speech was preceded by the Obama-
regime has reached the limits of its success Medvedev joint statement in London on 1
and, henceforth, will produce diminishing April 2009 wherein the two leaders, while
returns unless accompanied by sincere and committing their respective states to work
concerted moves aimed at the elimination towards the goal of achieving a nuclear
of nuclear weapons. This is because weapon free world, also agreed to work
progress on non-proliferation can together to fulfil their obligations under
ultimately be ensured only by progress on Article VI of the NPT and “demonstrate
nuclear disarmament. One without the leadership in reducing the number of
other is simply not sustainable. nuclear weapons in the world”. It must be
noted, however, that no timeframe has been
Conscious of the ever-increasing risk of the
set for achieving the objective of a nuclear
actual use of nuclear weapons and of
weapon free world which, in fact, is only
progressive horizontal proliferation, the
seen as a “long-term goal”. Nevertheless,
nuclear weapon states are hoping to push
the position taken by the USA and Russia
for further tightening of the NPT regime,
constitutes a quantum change from the past
entailing even more onerous restrictions on
as they have recognized, albeit belatedly,
non-nuclear weapon states, at the
that movement on nuclear disarmament is
upcoming NPT Review Conference in 2010.
a sine qua non for sustained progress on
Aware that these demands will be rejected
horizontal proliferation and that they must
out of hand unless they are accompanied
be much more serious in respect of their
by some concrete moves which are seen as
obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
an indicator of sincerity, on their part to
address vertical proliferation the nuclear Accordingly, we may witness a series of
weapon states, and in particular the USA, moves on the part of the nuclear weapon
are now beginning to suggest the states aimed at curbing both horizontal and
importance of moving towards a nuclear vertical proliferation. It remains to be seen
weapon free world. Thus, in his speech on whether these moves represent a sincere
5 April 2009 in Prague, President Barack effort at eliminating nuclear weapons and
Obama made a ringing endorsement of the are meaningfully sustained beyond the
6
Securing our Survival: the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention , at <http://www.icanw.org/files/SoS/
SoS_section4.pdf>, p. 17.
10
2010 NPT Review Conference. It is months. The positions taken on nuclear
imperative, therefore, that India is ready disarmament in the past by the nuclear and
with an appropriate response, not only in non-nuclear weapon states are outlined
terms of an overarching approach to the
first. The current NPT regime, the threats
process of nuclear disarmament but also in
and challenges posed by the continued
terms of the fine details of the highly
complex technical issues involved in existence of nuclear weapons, the evolution
negotiating an agreement, or convention, of thinking about a nuclear weapon free
on the elimination of nuclear weapons. world, and a possible approach to the
elimination of nuclear weapons are then
An effort has been made in this manuscript
to suggest an Indian approach to the analysed. In the process, some of the
unfolding non-proliferation agenda of the complexities involved in arriving at this
nuclear weapon states in the coming desired end state are also discussed.
11
IDSA Task Force Report
12
Chapter 1
T
h is chapter discusses, in two far actually gone nuclear. Even North Korea
separate sections, the several did so after walking out of the NPT.
approaches of nuclear weapon
As succinctly put by Steve E. Miller,
states and non-nuclear weapon states to
nuclear disarmament. At no time during the life of the NPT, from
1968 onwards, have nuclear weapons been
A. NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES regarded as anything other than central and
integral to the defence postures of the nuclear-
The key to nuclear disarmament, obviously,
weapon states … At no time during the life of
rests with the nuclear weapon states. Their
the NPT has nuclear disarmament been
reluctance to renounce nuclear weapons
compatible with the military doctrines of the
accounts for the glacial pace of nuclear
nuclear-armed states.
disarmament. This is particularly
reprehensible because while the non- Accordingly, despite lip-service by the
nuclear weapon states signatories to the nuclear weapon states to the notion of
NPT have lived up to their commitment nuclear disarmament it has at no time been
under the treaty to forgo nuclear weapons, “an operational policy objective of any of
the nuclear weapon states have failed to these states.”7
fulfil their part of the bargain requiring
USA and Russia. The end of the cold war
them to take effective measures towards
should have eliminated the rationale for
nuclear disarmament. On the contrary, they
nuclear weapons particularly for the two
have been steadily modernizing their
superpowers. The USA would have
nuclear arsenals and their nuclear doctrines
benefited the most from the abolition of
indicate that they are unlikely to give up
nuclear weapons as by the early 1990s it
their nuclear weapons any time soon.
enjoyed an overwhelming margin of
It is true that a few non-nuclear weapon qualitative superiority in conventional
states such as Egypt, South Korea, Iran and weapons over any other military power.
Libya undertook some prohibited nuclear- This holds true even today.
related activities in technical violation of the
Instead of moving in this direction, the USA
IAEA safeguards applicable to them.
and Russia did not take any concerted
Condemnable as these activities were, they
action to promote the emergence of a
can in no way be cited as a reason for the
nuclear weapon free world and reduce the
nuclear weapon states to have flouted the
salience of nuclear weapons. They currently
nuclear disarmament obligations applicable
hold over 95 per cent of the world’s
to them under the NPT. This is all the more
stockpile of 23,335 nuclear warheads and
so as, barring North Korea, no non-nuclear
account for 7540 of the 8190 operational
weapon state signatory to the NPT has so
7.
Steven E. Miller, “Proliferation, Disarmament, and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty”, in Maerli and
Lodgaard (eds.), Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, pp. 50–69.
13
IDSA Task Force Report
warheads (see Annexure I: Status of World this reason that in the process of
Nuclear Forces 2009). Congressional ratification of the NPT the
US Administration made a declaration of
It may be mentioned moreover that US
interpretation to the effect that the treaty
deployments of nuclear warheads in
would cease to be valid in time of war. Jozef
Europe peaked at 7300 in 1971. They have
Goldblat asserts in this context:
since been gradually drawn down. It is
estimated that currently there are around From the start of hostilities, transfer to any
150–240 US non-strategic nuclear warheads recipient of nuclear weapons, which in
at six nuclear weapon facilities in five states peacetime remain under the control of US
belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty forces, as well as their acquisition by NNWS
Organization (NATO): Belgium (10–20), [non-nuclear weapon states] by other means,
Germany (10–20), Italy (70–90), would cease to be prohibited. This
Netherlands (10–20), and Turkey (50–90).8 interpretation, called “war reservation”,
contradicts the essential provisions of the
The USA was also deploying nuclear
NPT.9
weapons in South Korea (until 1991),
Greece (2001) and the UK until a couple of In any case, such deployments greatly
years ago. Such overseas deployments are enhance the risk of use of nuclear weapons.
arguably in violation of Article I of the NPT,
While the nuclear arsenals of the USA and
which requires the nuclear weapon states
Russia are down substantially from the
not to
peak levels in the 1980s, both states
transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear continue to modernize their weapon
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices systems. Like the USA and Russia the other
or control over such weapons or explosive nuclear weapon states, namely France, UK,
devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any and China, as well as those who have
way to assist, encourage, or induce any non- crashed into the nuclear club, namely Israel,
nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or India, Pakistan and North Korea have
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other constantly been upgrading their nuclear
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons.
weapons or explosive devices.
An original signatory of the NPT along with
The contention that there is no such the UK and the Soviet Union, the USA has
violation as Article I merely refers to been concerned mainly with preventing
“transfer” and not deployment is untenable horizontal proliferation. It has shown no
because many of the warheads deployed indication of fulfilling its part of the bargain
overseas are earmarked for delivery by under Article VI of the treaty requiring it
host-country aircraft and aircrew which to undertake “effective measures” towards
would require transfer of control at some nuclear disarmament. Admittedly, the USA
point in time prior to actual use. It is for concluded a number of important
8
<http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_nato.html>.
9
Jozef Goldblat, “Ban on Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in Light of International Law,” in Maerli and Logaard (eds.),
Nuclear Proliferation and International Security, pp. 9–29.
14
Approach to Nuclear Disarmament
agreements with the Soviet Union/Russia of 1996 for Joint Theatre Nuclear
such as the Intermediate Range Nuclear Operations postulated the use of nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty, thus eliminating an weapons against non-state actors in
entire class of weapon systems in the possession of weapons of mass destruction
possession of the two states, the Strategic as well as against conventional forces. The
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) Interim US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002
Agreement, the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) went further, advocating the possible use
Treaty, the SALT II Agreement, the of nuclear weapons (a) against hardened
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) targets which can withstand a conventional
I, START II, and the Treaty on Strategic attack, (b) in retaliation against a weapon
Offensive Reductions (SORT) which placed of mass destruction attack, and (c) in the
limits on missile launchers and warheads. event of surprising military developments.
However, these agreements have still left The NPR advocated the retention of the
the USA with an inventory of nearly 10,000 nuclear hedge over and above the already
warheads, enough to destroy the world existing hedge of 2500 nuclear warheads.
several times over. It is clear that these It envisaged a new triad comprising nuclear
agreements were not conceived as an forces, non-nuclear defence systems and a
exercise to work towards a nuclear weapon responsive infrastructure (the hedge). It
free world, progressively drawing down also advocated the building of new types
the weapon holdings of the two nuclear of nuclear weapons, notably bunker busters
giants and involving the other nuclear and low-yield weapons. Clearly, the NPR
weapon states into a proportionate viewed nuclear weapons as being more
attenuation of their nuclear capabilities. usable than ever before. The US annulment
Moreover, even this process of bilateral of the ABM Treaty and efforts at
arms reductions was stymied due to the US refurbishing US ballistic missile defence
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002, were pointers in this direction and marked
which provoked Russia into reneging on a paradigm shift in US thinking. Under the
START II. The USA’s dismissive approach Bush Administration pre-emption came to
to nuclear disarmament was mirrored in its be considered as synonymous with
failure to ratify the CTBT – even though it counter-proliferation. Even the Obama
Administration, though currently not
had co-sponsored the UN resolution urging
envisaging “construction of new ballistic
commencement of negotiations thereon –
missiles, submarines or heavy bombers”, is
and in its change of tack midstream through
“developing a new generation air-launched
negotiations on the FMCT by proposing
cruise missile”. There is also domestic
that there was no need for international
pressure for development of a “Reliable
verification.
Replacement Warhead”. In addition, “The
US strategies since the mid-1990s have been service life of existing equipment has been
to advocate new rationales for the retention extended till 2030 and higher yield
of nuclear weapons and developing new warheads from dismantled missiles
types of nuclear weapons. The US doctrine installed on them.”10 President Obama’s
10
See Evans and Kawaguchi (Co-Chairs), Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 20.
15
IDSA Task Force Report
calls for a nuclear weapon free world, France. France, though a late entrant to the
discussed in greater detail in Chapter V, NPT in 1992, has signed and ratified the
constitute a welcome change from past US CTBT, has signed several Nuclear Weapon
policy, but it remains to be seen how Free Zone Treaties, and is supportive of the
effectively he is able to achieve forward FMCT. While abandoning its land-based
movement in this regard. missile systems and reducing its air-
launched nuclear warheads by a third, it has
Russia, an original signatory of the NPT,
continued apace with the modernization of
signed and ratified the CTBT in 1996, and
its nuclear arsenal which is estimated to
has maintained a moratorium on testing
have about 300 nuclear warheads. France
since 1990. It originally espoused the no-
is set to replace its nuclear submarine-
first-use doctrine in 1982, but apprehensive
launched M-45 missiles with the more
of NATO expansion and grappling with the
modern and 9000 km range M-51 three-
degradation of its conventional weapon
stage missiles in 2010. 13 These
systems, abandoned it in 1993. Thus,
developments have been made possible as
Russia’s Security Concept of 1997
laboratory-based expansions of French
envisaged the use of all its forces, including
nuclear weapon design, development and
nuclear weapons, in case of armed
production capacities have been underway
aggression that posed an existential threat.
for years.
The Security Concept of 2000 went further
and permitted the use of nuclear weapons The centrality of nuclear weapons to France
as deterrence to even smaller-scale wars is highlighted by the following excerpt from
that did not necessarily pose an existential its White Paper on Defence and National
threat to Russia. The important role of Security, published in June 2008:
nuclear weapons in Russia’s security
Nuclear deterrence remains an essential
posture is reflected in the threat of nuclear
concept of national security. It is the ultimate
attack held out to Poland by the Russian
guarantee of the security and independence
Deputy Chief of Staff, General Anatoly
of France. The sole purpose of the nuclear
Nogovitsin, for its willingness to host a US
deterrent is to prevent any State-originating
ballistic missile defence system. 11
aggression against the vital interests of the
Continuing to modernize its nuclear forces,
nation wherever it may come from and in
Russia has developed the RS-24, an
whatever shape or form. Given the diversity
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
of situations to which France might be
with multiple independently retargetable
confronted in an age of globalisation, the
vehicles (MIRV), which is an improved
credibility of the deterrent is based on the
version of the TOPOL-M; it was scheduled
ability to provide the President with an
for deployment in December 2009.12.
autonomous and sufficiently wide and
11
Cited in Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Nuclear Notebook: Russian Nuclear Forces 2009,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, May/June 2009, p. 55.
12
Norris and Kristensen, p. 56.
13
The M-51 (with more than double the range of M-45) was test-fired for the fourth time in January 2010. See Pierre
Tran, “French Sub-Launched M51 Missile Test-Fired”, 27 January 2010, at <http://www.defensenews.com/
story.php?i=4473080>.
16
Approach to Nuclear Disarmament
diversified range of assets and options. This free world. For instance, in February 2008,
requires the modernisation of two components: Defence Secretary Des Browne called for a
the sea-based ballistic missile submarine force sustainable and credible plan for multilateral
and the airborne missiles carried by nuclear- nuclear disarmament indicating that “The
capable combat aircraft. Even though there UK has a vision of a world free of nuclear
may not be any direct threat of aggression weapons … we intend to make further
today against France, it is imperative to retain progress towards this vision in the coming
the capability to preserve the freedom of action years.”16 Prime Minister Gordon Brown at
of our nation if our vital interests are threatened the UN General Assembly in September 2009
with blackmail. France will have the means to proposed a “global grand bargain” between
develop its capability as long as nuclear nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear
weapons are necessary for its security. weapon states whereby the nuclear weapon
states would reduce their nuclear weapons
Indeed, in January 2006 President Jacques in return for non-nuclear weapon states not
Chirac warned that France was prepared to acquiring them. As part of the effort, he
launch a nuclear strike against any country informed that his government was
that sponsored a terrorist attack against reviewing a possible reduction in the UK
French interests. In this context, he indicated nuclear submarine fleet from 4 to 3. Brown
that the French nuclear arsenal had been insisted, however, that maintaining the UK’s
reconfigured to make a tactical strike in nuclear missiles was “non-negotiable”.17 The
retaliation against terrorism.14 UK House of Commons in March 2007 had
also voted in favour of the government’s
UK. The UK’s rationale for possession of plan to renew its nuclear weapon
nuclear weapons rests on the premise of collaboration agreement with the United
deterrence in conformity by and large with States for another ten years. New facilities
that of USA, Russia and France. It looks to for nuclear warhead design and testing were
its nuclear weapon capability not only as a also approved.18
means to deter nuclear threats but also
“other threats, such as from biological or It may be underlined that the USA, Russia,
chemical weapons, and has declined to give France and the UK have not only distanced
promises of no first use.” 15 However, themselves from the no-first-use doctrine,
amongst the recognized nuclear weapon but also refrained from providing
states the UK has, perhaps, taken the lead in meaningful and unconditional negative
embracing the objective of a nuclear weapon security assurances to non-nuclear weapon
14
Cited in Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, p. 16.
15
George Perkovich and James M. Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons”, Adelphi Paper 396 (London: IISS,,
2008), p. 21.
16
See Des Browne, “Laying the Foundation for Multi-Lateral Disarmament”, Conference on Disarmament, 5
February 2008, at <http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0802/doc04.htm>.
17
“Brown move to cut UK nuclear subs”, BBC, 23 September 2009, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/
8270092.stm>.
18
See “Opposition to Trident continues to grow”, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 85, Summer 2007, at <http://
www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd85/85news02.htm>.
17
IDSA Task Force Report
states. As regards the assurances of non-use not so far ratified it. Similarly, China for
of nuclear weapons provided by them in years prevented the negotiation of the
national statements in 1995, which are FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament
virtually identical, these extend only to non- (CD) ostensibly on the ground that equal
nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. attention needed to be paid to discussions
Secondly, non-use of nuclear weapons on a ban on the weaponization of outer
against such states is not applicable if they space. It is probable that this was a ploy to
are involved in an attack in alliance or gain time to build up adequate stocks of
association with a nuclear weapon state fissile material for weaponization. China
against the nuclear weapon state concerned has, moreover, been relentlessly
and its allies or states towards which it has modernizing its nuclear weapon systems
a security commitment. and has sufficient fissile material to support
a much larger nuclear arsenal than the
China. Alone among the nuclear weapon
around 240 warheads attributed to it.
states China has not only embraced an
Analysing President Jiang Zemin’s address
unqualified no-first-use concept but has
in July 2000 to China’s Central Military
also provided negative security assurances
Commission on the “Five Musts” on
which are clearly unconditional.
nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Threat
Accordingly, in its national statement on
Initiative suggests that
security assurances on 5 April 1995 China
stated, inter alia: Jiang’s statement as well as recent research has
suggested that Chinese strategists have begun
China undertakes not to be the first to use
to shift their doctrine from minimum to
nuclear weapons at any time or under any
limited deterrence in which China would
circumstances. China undertakes not to use
possess a more sophisticated nuclear force
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
structure capable of controlling nuclear
non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-
escalation during a conflict and bringing
weapon-free zones at any time or under any
about intra-war deterrence. This new doctrine
circumstances. This commitment naturally
may also provide for nuclear war fighting in
applies to non-nuclear-weapon States parties
specific circumstances.20
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons or non-nuclear-weapon Israel. Israel is the sixth nation in the world,
States that have entered into any comparable and the first in the Middle East, to have
internationally binding commitments not to developed and acquired a nuclear weapon
manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive capability. It went nuclear in 1967 and since
devices.19 1970 its nuclear weapon capability has been
This apparently benign approach must, commonly acknowledged. Israel has
however, be taken together with the fact advanced nuclear weapon capabilities both
that while it has signed the CTBT China has in terms of the quantity and quality of its
19
See “China’s National Statement on Security Assurances”, 5 April 1995, at <http://www.nti.org/db/
china/engdocs/npt0495a.htm>.
20
See “China’s Nuclear Doctrine,” at <http://www.nti.org/db/China/doctrine.htm>.
18
Approach to Nuclear Disarmament
21
See Evans and Kawaguchi (Co-Chairs), Eliminating Nuclear Threats, p. 23.
22
Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons,” p. 24.
23
“Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Programme”, at <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakArsenal.html>.
24
R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, “A nuclear power’s act of proliferation”, Washington Post, 13 November 2009, at
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/12/AR2009111211060.html>; see also
“China’s Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan”, at <http://www.nti.org/db/china/npakpos.htm>.
25
Evans and Kawaguchi (Co-Chairs), Eliminating Nuclear Threats.
19
IDSA Task Force Report
Pakistan has not publicly enunciated its non-use of nuclear weapons against non-
official nuclear doctrine. It has been nuclear weapon states, a clear indication
projected, however, that the guiding that India would build and maintain a
principle of its nuclear doctrine is minimum credible minimum deterrent, would
credible deterrence. It is, apparent continue to observe a moratorium on
nevertheless that Pakistan’s nuclear nuclear testing and maintain strict control
weapon progamme is India-specific. on export of nuclear-related technologies.
Indeed, Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, the India also reiterates its continued
then head of Pakistan’s Strategic Force commitment to a nuclear weapon free
Command is on record asserting that world through global, verifiable and non-
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are aimed discriminatory nuclear disarmament
solely at India. He is further reported to measures. “The doctrine is reflective of
have indicated that these weapons would India’s resolve not to engage in an arms
be used if: race, and not emulate the nuclear war
1. India attacks Pakistan and conquers a fighting doctrines expounded by some
large part of its territory (space other nuclear weapon states, but rather to
threshold) envisage the role of nuclear weapons purely
2. India destroys a large part either of its as a deterrent.”27 It is true that India’s no-
land or air forces (military threshold) first-use stance is not open-ended as it
3. India proceeds to the economic leaves open the possibility of retaliation in
strangling of Pakistan (engaging in a the event of an attack on it or its forces by
naval blockade or stoppage of the nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.
Indus waters) Nevertheless, there can be no mistaking the
4. India pushes Pakistan into political purely defensive role accorded by India to
destabilization or creates large-scale nuclear weapons.
internal subversion (domestic North Korea . North Korea is the latest
destabilization).26 entrant into the nuclear armed club. It
India. India conducted a peaceful nuclear withdrew from the NPT in January 2003
explosion in 1974. In 1998 it went nuclear and tested in October 2006 and May 2009.
(Pokhran II) in the light of the fact that the North Korea is presumed to have six to
region was awash with nuclear weapons eight nuclear weapons along with a missile
and all its calls for a nuclear weapon free delivery system. North Korea’s
world remained unheeded. India has been weaponization has demonstrated the
involved in the negotiations leading up to fragility of the NPT regime and the fact that
the NPT and the CTBT but has not signed if any state is determined to go nuclear it
these treaties. India’s nuclear doctrine can do so. It has further shown up the
embraces the concepts of no-first-use and inability of the international community to
26
“Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan”, A concise report of a visit by Landau
Network Centre, Centro Volta to Pakistan, January 2002.
27
Keynote address by Satish Chandra at the Delhi Policy Group Seminar on “Nuclear Weapons and Security”, 30–31
August 2004, New Delhi.
20
Approach to Nuclear Disarmament
28
“NATO: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, at <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm>.
29
<http://www.nti.org/db/disarmament/country_nato.html>.
21
IDSA Task Force Report
rhetoric”. The policy brief underlines that deterrence”.30 In these circumstances, much
Australia’s alliance with the US is a “vital like all other countries which are
part of its defence policy” and includes beneficiaries of extended deterrence, Japan
“extended deterrence” and suggests that cannot but view a nuclear weapon free
President Obama’s initiative for a nuclear world with mixed feelings.
weapon free world “raises important
Threshold and Virtual Nuclear Weapon
questions for Australia and other allies States. The threshold and virtual nuclear
under the US nuclear umbrella.” It is one weapon states include states like Japan,
thing for US allies to support the gingerly South Korea and Germany, which benefit
moves so far taken towards nuclear from extended deterrence. They also
disarmament; it is quite another thing for include states like Brazil, Argentina, South
them to sincerely strive for a nuclear Africa, Egypt and Iran, which are regional
weapon free world. These states advocate powers with considerable technical
a process of nuclear disarmament capabilities in the nuclear power
stretching over several decades rather than production field and the nuclear fuel cycle.
one envisaging the elimination of nuclear Many of the latter can, if they so choose,
weapons in a much shorter and finite cross the nuclear threshold relatively easily.
timeframe. Indeed, some of them had, at one time or
Japan committed itself in 1967 to not another, ambitions of going nuclear; only a
possessing, not producing and not few years ago, Egypt and South Korea were
permitting introduction of nuclear weapons found to have undertaken certain
into its territory. Christopher W. Hughes prohibited activities in violation of their
suggests, however, that “The nuclear IAEA safeguard obligations. South Africa
option is gaining greater credence in Japan” had become a nuclear armed state and has
due to Japan’s anxieties over North Korea, voluntarily dismantled its weapon system.
China’s modernization of its nuclear forces, Libya was proceeding down the path of
doubts over the credibility of US extended weaponization but was compelled to
deterrence and USA’s general non- abandon all such activities. Iran is suspected
proliferation stance. While the increasing of harbouring such ambitions. The urge of
nuclearization of its neighbourhood at one these countries towards nuclearization has
in the past been triggered by the
level gives a further fillip to Japan’s
legitimization of nuclear weapons and the
traditional calls for a nuclear weapon free
perceived benefits conferred by their
world, at another level it impels Japan to
possession. Their preference would be for
cling even more closely to the US nuclear
a world free of nuclear weapons.
umbrella. Japan is already concerned about
the ongoing US-China rapprochement and These countries may not, however,
these concerns would be magnified if they necessarily subscribe to every piecemeal
led to the reduction of US “dependence on disarmament proposal. Brazil, for instance,
nuclear weapons to provide extended has not agreed to sign an Additional
30
Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarisation (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, April 2009);
cited in Reshmi Kazi, “Japan’s Nuclear Future”, Strategic Analysis, 33(6) (November 2009): 809–13.
22
Approach to Nuclear Disarmament
Protocol with the IAEA which would weapons of mass destruction). Egypt has
expand inspections to sites not directly therefore refused to adhere to the IAEA
related to nuclear materials. Its new Additional Protocol and the Chemical
Defense Strategy Plan states that Brazil will Weapons Convention, and to ratify the CTBT,
not sign any additions to the NPT until the the African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the
nuclear weapon states have made progress Pelindaba Treaty), and the Biological and
towards nuclear disarmament. Brazil is a Toxin Weapons Convention.32
member of the NSG and with its neighbour
In contrast to Brazil and Egypt, South
Argentina has firmly opposed a new text
Africa, while being a staunch advocate of
of the guidelines which would make
the early elimination of nuclear weapons
adherence to the Additional Protocol a
as the only guarantee that they will never
requirement for supply.31
be used, has been in favour of virtually all
Egypt ratified the NPT in 1981 and is fully the disarmament, arms control, and
supportive of it, but has had a twofold confidence-building measures on the table
approach to non-proliferation: including the CTBT, a verifiable FMCT, the
strengthening of the NPT regime and the
While consistently leading efforts to establish
IAEA, stronger negative security measures,
a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
etc.
(and since 1990 a WMD-Free Zone), Egypt has
also protested about key components of the Other NPT signatories. The remaining states
nonproliferation regime for their lack of parties to the NPT constituting the vast
universality (i.e. because Israel remains majority are all unequivocally in favour of
outside the NPT and other treaties restricting a nuclear weapon free world.
31
<www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/brazil/index.html>.
32
<www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/egypt/index.html>.
23
IDSA Task
Chapter 2 Force Report
T
he current nuclear non-proliferation them in perpetuity. Furthermore, it obliged
regime is anchored firmly in the the later under Article III to accept IAEA
NPT (Annexure II) buttressed by the safeguards in order to verify the fulfilment
IAEA safeguards system and multilateral of the obligations assumed by them under
export control and technology denial the treaty, to prevent “diversion of nuclear
arrangements, reinforced further by several energy from peaceful uses to nuclear
arms control agreements and a variety of weapons or other nuclear explosive
bilateral, multilateral and international devices”. For this purpose the article further
initiatives. In addition, there are bilateral stipulated that the safeguards would be
agreements between the USA and Russia “followed with respect to source or special
addressing vertical proliferation. Matin fissionable material whether it is being
Zuberi in August 2004 described the produced, processed or used in any
nuclear non-proliferation regime with its principal nuclear facility or is outside any
focus on the NPT as such facility”. In addition, the article
prohibited the states parties to the treaty
an interlocking network of international
from providing the non-nuclear weapon
treaties, domestic legislations, bilateral
states not only source or special fissionable
regional and multilateral verification systems
material but also “equipment or material
called nuclear safeguards, positive and
especially designed or prepared for the
negative security assurances to non-nuclear
processing, use or production of special
weapons states, economic sanctions,
fissionable material”, unless the source or
technology controls, nuclear weapon free
special fissionable material was
zones and informal groupings of states for
safeguarded.
specific purposes …33
Non-nuclear weapon states agreed to
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
accept the unequal status conferred upon
The NPT is a treaty under which the rights them by the treaty as Article IV guaranteed
and obligations of the nuclear and non- them “unfettered access to civil nuclear
nuclear weapon states are unequal. Nuclear technology”34 and Article VI contained a
weapon states, enjoying a privileged nuclear disarmament commitment albeit
position, were defined as those that had over the long term. Implicit in this was that
tested before January 1967. Membership of the second-class status of the non-nuclear
the nuclear weapon club was thus frozen weapon states was temporary and that the
for all time to five states. The treaty nuclear weapon states would eventually
permitted the nuclear weapon states to abandon their nuclear weapons. Thus the
retain nuclear weapons but required the issues of horizontal proliferation and
non-nuclear weapon states to renounce nuclear disarmament are intertwined and
33
Matin Zuberi, “PSI: Pros and Cons”, Centre for Security Analysis, Chennai, August 2004, pp. 10-17
34
Miller, “Proliferation, Disarmament, and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” p. 50.
24
Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
35
Ibid., p. 51.
36
Ibid., p. 52.
37
Ibid., p. 54.
38
Ibid.
25
IDSA Task Force Report
As a result of the pressure exerted by the Article VI. These steps ranged from the
non-nuclear weapon states and as a price broad and expansive to the narrow and
for obtaining the indefinite extension of the precise. Most fundamentally it called for
NPT, the nuclear weapon states made the “An unequivocal undertaking by the
following concessions on nuclear nuclear weapon states to accomplish the
disarmament at the 1995 NPT Review total elimination of their nuclear arsenals
Conference, which find mention in the leading to nuclear disarmament to which
consensus document on “Principles and all States parties are committed under
Objectives for Nuclear Proliferation and Article VI”. It also called for the immediate
Disarmament”: establishment in the CD of a body
mandated to work on nuclear
Recognition in the preamble of the goal
disarmament, and established the principle
of elimination of nuclear weapons;
of irreversibility in nuclear disarmament
Reaffirmation of the commitment of
and arms control efforts. Additionally, it
the nuclear weapon states to pursue
called for a continued testing moratorium,
nuclear disarmament; and
early entry into force of the CTBT,
Adoption of an action plan for immediate negotiations for the conclusion
“effective implementation” of Article of the FMCT, full implementation of START
VI, which inter alia included II, early completion of START III,
completion of the CTBT by 1996, preservation and strengthening of the ABM
immediate commencement and early Treaty, etc. It also had an omnibus
completion of talks for finalization of provision calling for further unilateral
the FMCT and “determined pursuit” reductions in nuclear arsenals, further
of reductions in nuclear weapons. reductions in non-strategic nuclear
The ICJ in its Advisory Opinion in July weapons, diminished role of nuclear
1996, elaborating on the meaning and weapons in security policies and “the
content of Article VI, unanimously took the engagement as soon as appropriate of all
view that “There exists an obligation to the nuclear weapons states in the process
pursue in good faith and bring to a leading to the total elimination of their
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear nuclear weapons”.
disarmament in all its aspects under strict Regrettably, despite these developments
and effective international control.” This the nuclear weapon states did not reshape
removes all ambiguities in the meaning of their positions and strive to fulfil their
Article VI by specifically pointing out that nuclear disarmament obligations under the
it requires the achievement of nuclear NPT. Most of them did not accept the ICJ’s
disarmament which must be interpretation and argued that its Advisory
comprehensive and should not merely be Opinion did not have legal force and was
limited to some steps towards it. not legally binding. Accordingly, they
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference the turned down a UNGA resolution in 1997
Final Document identified thirteen practical endorsing the ICJ Advisory Opinion and
steps (Annexure III)) for the fulfilment of calling for talks on a convention prohibiting
26
Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration set up in 1957. Its three main functions as
went on to infringe virtually all the thirteen per its statute are to “verify that
steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review safeguarded nuclear material and activities
Conference and, in fact, did the opposite of are not used for military purposes”, help
what was required. While other nuclear “countries to upgrade nuclear safety and
weapon states are also at fault, the fact is security, and to prepare for and respond to
that the USA “serves as the lightning rod emergencies” and help “countries mobilize
on these issues”.39 peaceful applications of nuclear science and
technology.”40 It is no surprise that the
As a result, the vast majority of states not
IAEA’s safeguards system and verification
only believe that the nuclear weapon states
role today vastly overshadows its other two
are not in compliance with Article VI, but functions, with the NPT having made it
that they also do not intend to comply with mandatory for all non-nuclear weapon
it. The longstanding discord on non- states signatories to the treaty to conclude
compliance of the nuclear weapon states IAEA safeguards agreements.
with their nuclear disarmament obligations
cannot but adversely affect the nuclear non- The IAEA safeguard system currently
proliferation regime. The cavalier attitude comprises three types of safeguard
of the nuclear weapon states to nuclear arrangements: for states not party to the
disarmament is not a good advertisement NPT, for the nuclear weapon states and for
for the NPT and is detrimental to non- non-nuclear weapon states signatory to the
proliferation. NPT.
The first type of safeguard arrangements
Though the NPT was extended for all time
are currently applicable only to India,
at the 1995 Review Conference, it permits,
Pakistan and Israel, which are not NPT
under Article X, withdrawal with three
signatories. They are applicable under
months notice in “the supreme interests”
of the country. Though only the Democratic agreements that cover only the nuclear
Peoples Republic of Korea has so far material, facilities, equipment and/or
exercised this right, the possibility of other materials specified in the agreement. These
countries doing so cannot be ruled out, item-specific safeguards agreements are often
particularly if the recalcitrance of the the result of conditions agreed upon with a
nuclear weapon states on Article VI State supplying the item(s) in question to
continues much longer. another State and are based on the provisions
in document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. These
The International Atomic Energy
agreements have provided for the application
Agency (IAEA) of safeguards to nuclear material, non-nuclear
The NPT is policed by the IAEA, which has material (e.g. heavy water, zirconium tubes),
become the world’s nuclear inspectorate. facilities, a heavy water production plant and
The IAEA predates the NPT, having been nuclear-related equipment. Under such
39
Ibid., p.60.
40
<www.iaea.org/OurWork/index.html>.
27
IDSA Task Force Report
agreements, the Agency is required to ensure The third type of safeguards arrangements
that the nuclear material and other specified entered into by the IAEA are the
items are not used for nuclear weapons or comprehensive safeguards as stipulated
other nuclear explosive devices or in such a under Article III of the NPT for the non-
way as to further any military purpose.41 nuclear weapon states. These constitute the
The second type of safeguard arrangements bulk of the safeguards agreements entered
are those applied to nuclear weapon states. into by the IAEA and cover all nuclear
They are termed voluntary safeguards material in the state. These agreements
because the latter are not bound by the NPT follow the structure and content set out in
to accept them. Agency document INFCIRC/153 (Corr.).2.
Such agreements require the state to accept
However, all five have concluded safeguards Agency safeguards on all source or special
agreements under which they have fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear
voluntarily offered nuclear material and/or activities within it or carried out under its
facilities from which the Agency may select control anywhere. The Agency, on its part,
to apply safeguards. These so-called has the right and obligation to ensure that
voluntary offer safeguards agreements safeguards are so applied on all such
(VOAs) generally follow the format of material, for the exclusive purpose of
agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), verifying that such material is not diverted
but vary in the scope of materials and facilities to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
covered, e.g. excluding those with national explosive devices.
security significance. VOAs also foresee the
possibility of withdrawing such material and
Consequent upon the failure to detect Iraq’s
facilities from safeguards. The Agency
nuclear weapon programme despite it
implements safeguards in such States: (i) to
being a signatory to a comprehensive
test innovative safeguards methods, or to give
safeguards agreement, it was decided to
the Agency experience that it might not
further strengthen the IAEA safeguards
otherwise gain in safeguarding advanced
system. Accordingly, in February 1992 the
nuclear fuel cycle facilities; and (ii) to fulfil
IAEA Board of Governors affirmed that the
expectations of non-nuclear-weapon States
scope of comprehensive safeguards
that some facilities in nuclear-weapon States
agreements was not limited to nuclear
are subject to safeguards. The Agency also
material actually declared by a state, but
applies safeguards in nuclear-weapon States
included any material that is required to be
as a result of legal obligations arising from
declared. Expressed differently, the Board
other safeguards agreements and for
confirmed that the Agency has the right and
efficiency reasons (e.g. to verify transfers of
obligation, under such agreements, not only
nuclear material when it is more cost effective
to verify that state declarations of nuclear
to verify such transfers in the exporting,
material subject to safeguards are “correct”
nuclear-weapon State than in the receiving,
(i.e. they accurately describe the type(s) and
non-nuclear-weapon State).42
quantity (ies) of the state’s declared nuclear
41
<www.iaea.org/Our Work/SV/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf>.
42
Ibid.
28
Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
material holdings), but that they are also well as its manufacture and export of
“complete” (i.e. that they include sensitive nuclear-related technologies. In
everything that should have been declared). order to do so the Agency is authorized to
Soundly based safeguards conclusions use satellite imageries, wide area
regarding “completeness” in states with environmental sampling, access to all parts
comprehensive safeguards agreements in of the nuclear fuel cycle, short-notice access
force depend on the extent to which the to all buildings at the inspection site, access
Agency is equipped to detect undeclared even to nuclear fuel cycle activities not
nuclear material and activities in such involving nuclear material, etc.
states. The IAEA has approved Additional
Although the Agency has the authority, under Protocol agreements with 124 countries, 92
comprehensive safeguards agreements, to of which, including all the nuclear weapon
verify the absence of undeclared nuclear states, have ratified them. The Additional
material and activities, the tools available to Protocols with the nuclear weapon states
it to do so, under such agreements, are limited. are, however, specially tailored to
This realisation set the stage for safeguards specifications dictated by the latter.
strengthening efforts culminating in the Moreover, to be effective the Additional
approval, by the Board of Governors, of a Protocols need to be backed by
model protocol additional to safeguards comprehensive safeguards, which the
agreements which provides the Agency with nuclear weapon states have not concluded.
such tools: the Protocol Additional to Bilateral and Multilateral
Agreement(s) between State(s) and the IAEA Arrangements
for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/
540 (Corr.)), referred to as the Model
While the aforesaid comprehensive
safeguards agreements have in the main
Additional Protocol. It is only for States with
been concluded by non-nuclear weapon
both a comprehensive safeguards agreement
states pursuant to their obligations under
and an additional protocol in force that the
the NPT, they are also required under some
Agency has the verification tools it needs to
other bilateral or multilateral arrangements.
provide credible assurance of the absence of
These include: the Treaty for the Prohibition
undeclared nuclear material and activities.43
of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and
If the IAEA’s policing authority under the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty); the South
comprehensive safeguards is considerable, Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
entailing inter alia environmental sampling (Rarotonga Treaty); the Argentine-Brazilian
and unannounced or surprise inspections, Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy;
that coupled with the rights accorded to it the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear
by the Additional Protocol makes it far Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty); the
more extensive and intrusive. The latter, African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
inter alia, enables the Agency to review a (Pelindaba Treaty); and the Central Asian
state’s entire nuclear fuel cycle activities as Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty.
43
Ibid.
29
IDSA Task Force Report
30
Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
44
Mohammed El-Baradei, “Towards a Safer World”, The Economist, 16 October 2003.
45
Tariq Rauf, “Export Controls and Multilateral Nuclear Arrangements,” in Maerli and Lodgaard (eds.), Nuclear
Proliferation and International Security, pp. 267–90.
31
IDSA Task Force Report
46
Question relating to measures to safeguard non-nuclear weapon states parties to the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons,” 19 June 1968, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/
NR0/248/36/IMG/NR024836.pdf?OpenElement
32
Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
nuclear states parties to the NPT, except in General Assembly resolutions to start
the case of invasion or other attack on them, negotiations for concluding them were
their territory, their forces and their allies, adopted as far back as December 1993. It is
carried out or sustained by such a non- unfortunate that the USA, which
nuclear weapon state in association or cosponsored the resolutions for finalizing
alliance with a nuclear weapon state. China the CTBT and FMCT, subsequently became
alone undertook to maintain a non-use inimical to their conclusion.
posture vis-à-vis the non-nuclear weapon The current non-proliferation regime is also
states parties to the NPT, or non-nuclear dotted with a host of initiatives aimed at
weapon states that have undertaken one or another threat related to nuclear
comparable internationally binding weapons and their spread. For instance, one
commitments not to manufacture or set of initiatives comprising the US-
acquire nuclear explosive devices. sponsored Container Security Initiative
Clearly, the negative and positive security (CSI), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
assurances provided to the non-nuclear UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
weapon states have been anaemic and have 1540 (Annexure VI), and the Global
not adequately addressed their Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is
apprehensions about the use of nuclear directed at interdicting trafficking of
weapons against them. nuclear-related supplies and addressing the
dangers of nuclear terrorism.
Some of the arms control measures
implemented to date include the following: Launched in 2002, the CSI entails the pre-
the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, screening of container traffic bound for the
prohibiting testing in the atmosphere, outer US, at foreign ports, as an additional means
space, and under water; the 1971 Sea Bed of preventing entry into the USA of
Treaty, prohibiting the implanting of containers that pose a terrorist risk, and
nuclear weapons or any other weapon of promote smoother flow of traffic at US
mass destruction in the ocean floor or ports. Pre-screening is undertaken on the
subsoil thereof; the 1974 US-Soviet basis of advanced technologies for purposes
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), limiting of non-intrusive examination of suspect
the yield of underground nuclear weapon containers and data bases developed in
tests to 150 KT; and the 1976 US-Soviet regard to the reliability of suppliers.
Currently, over fifty foreign ports are
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET)
participants in the CSI.
governing underground nuclear explosions
for peaceful purposes. While these have The PSI, announced by President Bush in
some value, the more meaningful arms May 2003, is a multilateral coordination
control measures like the CTBT, designed mechanism designed to prevent the flow
to put a stop to all testing, and the FMCT, of weapons of mass destruction and related
aimed at prohibiting the production of all materials to, and from, states and non-state
fissile material for weapons purposes, actors of proliferation concern by
continue to elude the international interdiction which can involve the boarding
community despite the fact that UN of ships or denying transit facilities to
33
IDSA Task Force Report
aircraft. Participation in it has increased for establishing safe storage sites for
from 11 countries initially to over 95 nuclear weapons, for dismantling nuclear
countries currently. weapons, missiles, etc. in accordance with
START I requirements. Furthermore, a
UNSCR 1540 outlaws non-state actors as
dismantlement programme was initiated
holders of weapons of mass destruction and
under which 500 tons of highly enriched
provides an international legal basis for
uranium extracted from Russian weapons
interdiction of the latter.
is being down-blended in Russia and then
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear transported to the USA for use as fuel in
Terrorism is an international agreement nuclear power plants.
which came into being in October 2006. It
Yet another set of initiatives is directed at
was a move spearheaded by the US and
discouraging countries from acquiring
Russia with the following objectives:
mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle because
Bring together experience and once they do so they can go nuclear
expertise from the non-proliferation, relatively quickly. This is the rationale for
counter-proliferation,and the restraint exercised by export control
counterterrorism disciplines groups like the NSG in effectuating nuclear
Integrate collective capabilities and fuel cycle-related transfers and the call on
resources to strengthen the overall all states in the recently passed UN Security
global architecture to combat nuclear Council Resolution 1887 “for stricter
terrorism national controls for the export of sensitive
Provide the opportunity for nations to goods and technologies of the nuclear fuel
share information and expertise in a cycle”. It is in this backdrop that the USA
legally non-binding environment. in 2006 advanced the Global Nuclear
Energy Partnership (GNEP) aimed at
Another set of initiatives, under the restricting nuclear fuel manufacture to a
Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme, relatively small number of producer
is to secure and dismantle weapons of mass countries which would lease it to consumer
destruction and their associated states and take back the spent fuel and
infrastructure in the states that formed part reprocess it. It is too early to assess whether
of the former Soviet Union, so that the this initiative will take off.
problem posed by the possibility of leakage
of know-how and of nuclear materials The most striking failure of the current
consequent upon the disintegration of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the
Soviet Union is minimized. Under this absence of any agreement or understanding
programme, many of the 60,000 scientists amongst all the nuclear weapon states
and engineers employed in the Soviet aimed at progressively reducing their
nuclear weapons programmes have been holdings in fulfilment of their obligations
absorbed in internationally funded civilian under Article VI of the NPT.
programmes at centres established in There have been, since the 1970s, several
Moscow, Armenia, Georgia, etc. Russia was bilateral agreements between the US and
also given assistance under the programme the Soviet Union/Russian Federation
34
Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
which, apart from SALT I, have resulted in 6000 accountable warheads for each
a substantial draw down of their nuclear country. The treaty expired by 5
weapons from earlier peak levels. The most December 2009 and the US and Russia
notable of these agreements have been were committed to a new agreement
listed as follows: by that date.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks START II, of 1993, imposed further
(SALT I) of 1969–1972 led to an interim reductions on the number of strategic
agreement freezing the number of delivery vehicles and warheads
ICBM launchers for the two countries deployed on them. But the treaty did
and setting ceilings on the numbers of not enter into force because on US
submarine-launched ballistic missile withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
(SLBM) launchers and ballistic missile Russia indicated that it would not
submarines. Significantly, these abide by it.
ceilings permitted an increase of SLBM
The Strategic Offensive Reductions
launchers from existing levels.
Treaty (SORT) of 2002, in force till 31
The SALT I talks also led to the Anti December 2012, envisages reduction in
Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 operationally deployed strategic
permitting deployment of only two warheads by each side to between 1700
limited area defence systems with up and 2200 within ten years. It lacks a
to 100 interceptor launchers each. In verification mechanism and does not
1974 a protocol was signed limiting prescribe the destruction of delivery
such deployment to only one site. In mechanisms or specify what is to be
June 2002 the US withdrew from this done with the warheads.
treaty.
As stated earlier, the foregoing cuts in the
In 1979 the SALT II treaty limited the nuclear arsenals of USA and Russia may
total number of delivery vehicles seem impressive, but with their current
(launchers and bombers) to 2400 for holdings, amounting to several thousand
each side to be further reduced by end- warheads, they still have the ability of
1981 to 2250. In 1986 the US indicated destroying the world many times over.
that it would no longer be bound by Moreover, the history of the aforesaid arms
these limits on the grounds that the agreements does not inspire much
USSR was violating it. confidence. It has been noted that the USA
walked out of the ABM Treaty with no
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear
compunction and Russia walked out of
Forces (INF) Treaty of 1988 required
START II in retaliation. Furthermore, the
both countries to eliminate all ground-
absence of a verification system in SORT
based ballistic and cruise missiles with
lends an air of casualness to the entire
a range of 500 to 5500 km.
bilateral disarmament process between the
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty two nuclear giants. This tardy approach to
I (START I) of 1991 set a ceiling of 1600 nuclear disarmament explains Mohamed
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and El-Baradei’s assertion in the second part of
35
IDSA Task Force Report
his interview published on 7 October 2009 those who are in a position to proliferate or
in The Hindu that the nuclear environment reproduce themselves and only secondarily
that dawned with President Obama’s to those who may subsequently be in such a
advent to power “is coming after two position.48
wasted decades when the nuclear weapon
The failure of the nuclear weapon states to
states made no significant effort to move
give up nuclear weapons accounts in large
towards nuclear disarmament in fulfilment
measure for the unravelling of the nuclear
of their [commitment] under the NPT.”47
non-proliferation regime. This is evident in
The fatal flaw in the current nuclear non- the nuclear break-out by three states and
proliferation regime has been the failure of the reluctance of the non-nuclear weapon
the nuclear weapon states to fulfil their part states to assume any further obligations
of the commitment to move towards sought to be imposed on them in the cause
nuclear disarmament, even as the non- of non-proliferation. Had the nuclear
nuclear weapon states, by and large, stood weapon states eliminated their nuclear
by their obligations of renouncing such arsenals the nuclear break-outs that have
weapons and putting up with safeguards been witnessed would not have occurred,
and all manner of technology control and all states would have readily taken on all
denial regimes. This misplaced emphasis on the obligations required to keep the world
horizontal proliferation and lack of focus free of nuclear weapons and there would
on the pressing need for disarmament have been no possibility of terrorists
accounts for most of the nuclear-related acquiring nuclear weapons.
concerns that afflict the international
community today. As early as August 1965, Some of the other shortcomings in the
V.C. Trivedi, India’s representative to the current nuclear non-proliferation regime
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, can be summarised as follows:
had, in the NPT negotiations, highlighted The nuclear weapon states
the need for emphasis on vertical disregarded their obligations under
proliferation, in the following terms: Article VI of the NPT to move
When we are talking, therefore, of non- effectively towards nuclear
proliferation, the fundamental problem we disarmament. Moreover, some of them
have to consider is that of proliferation that have themselves been proliferators in
has already taken place…. A non-proliferation violation of Article I. It is common
agreement is, therefore, basically an knowledge that China, a signatory to
agreement to be entered into by the nuclear the NPT, aided and abetted Pakistan’s
powers not to proliferate their weapons … A emergence as a nuclear weapon state
prohibition to proliferate applies firstly to and continues to do so.49
47
Siddharth Varadarajan, “The reality is that India will remain outside the NPT”, The Hindu, 7 October
2009, at <http://www.hindu.com/2009/10/07/stories/2009100751800900.htm>.
48
Cited in S.K. Sharma and Gopal Singh (eds.), Documents on India’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy, Vol. II
(New Delhi: Anamika, 1999), p. 590.
49
See Thomas C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation
(Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009); Also Smith and Warrick, “A nuclear power’s act of proliferation”
36
Current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
50
Zuberi, “PSI: Pros and Cons”
37
IDSA Task Force Report
looking forward to working with India to It would be ill advised for India to be
come up with a twenty-first-century associated with the exercise to strengthen
version of the NPT. In an interview to the NPT because
Fareed Zakaria on CNN on 22 November
it is out of tune with world realities and has
2009, when queried whether the US should
help bring India into the system as a nuclear failed its own charter, and any attempt to
weapon state, Prime Minister Manmohan resuscitate it will only further erode the
Singh reiterated that India “is a nuclear objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-
weapons state … a responsible nuclear proliferation. It is time to think of a new non-
power. We have an impeccable record of proliferation and disarmament architecture
not having contributed to unauthorized and it is critical that India takes a lead in
proliferation of these weapons of mass this venture.52
destruction” and added that “I hope it will
happen.”51
51
Cited in “The Haves and the Haves”, Blog of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington,
3 December 2009, at <http://csis.org/blog/haves-and-haves>; see also “Dr. Manmohan Singh on CNN’s Fareed
Zakaria GPS”, 23 November 2009, at <http://www.indiainfoline.com/Research/LeaderSpeak/Dr.-Manmohan-
Singh-on-CNNs-Fareed-Zakaria-GPS/6112722>; David P. Fidler and Sumit Ganguly, “Singh’s Shrewd Move”,
Newsweek, 4 December 2009, at <http://www.newsweek.com/id/225533>.
52
Amitabh Mattoo, “A Treaty to Nowhere”, The Telegraph (Kolkata), 2 December 2009, at <http://
www.telegraphindia.com/1091202/jsp/opinion/story_11803227.jsp>.
38
Chapter 3
I
t is commonly acknowledged that one the enormous tensions between the two
of the most serious threats facing the superpowers, the new elements at play
world today emanates from nuclear today make the world a much more
proliferation. This stems from the fact that dangerous place.
nuclear weapons are far deadlier, in terms
First, each additional country acquiring
of the devastation that they can cause, than
nuclear weapons multiplies manifold the
other weapons of mass destruction, notably
risk of use of nuclear weapons. This arises
biological and chemical weapons, and they
not merely from a nuclear armed state’s
are constantly proliferating.
intentional or accidental use of nuclear
Though nuclear weapons are down to a weapons, but also from the leakage of its
third of their peak levels of the 1970s, and nuclear weapon-related know-how and
though the two main repositories of these materials to both state and non-state actors
weapons no longer pose an existential either by design or due to a security failure.
threat to each other, the possibility of their China, for instance, has as a matter of policy
use is perhaps greater than ever before. As consistently provided Pakistan with
argued by Sidney Drell and James Goodby technological and material support in its
in an essay entitled “Issues for Debate”, nuclear weapon development programme.
written for a conference on nuclear Similarly, Pakistan has been providing
disarmament held on 24–25 October 2007 nuclear weapon-related materials and
at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, know-how to a number of countries and
new threats have appeared that cause us to
some of its nuclear scientists were in touch
believe that a nuclear blast in one of the
with al Qaeda.
world’s great cities is more likely than during Secondly, even though there were
the Cold War. With the spread of technology originally five nuclear armed states, and
on a global scale, the world now faces the with the addition of Israel in the late 1960s
prospect that its most terrible weapons will six, decision-making on the actual use of
fall into dangerous hands, whether in rogue these weapons during the cold war was,
states or in terrorist organizations, resulting essentially, a binary function involving only
in a world less predictable, more accident- the US and Soviet leaderships. This led to a
prone, and more susceptible to worst-case greater measure of control on the use of
thinking. The danger is magnified by regional nuclear weapons, particularly as, over time,
conflicts and by an extensive nuclear black these two states had put in place a system
market that flourished undetected for years.53 of safeguards to prevent nuclear accidents,
While during the cold war the threat of a misjudgements and accidental launches.
nuclear holocaust was omnipresent due to The increased number of nuclear armed
53
See George P. Schultz, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, “Rekjavik Revisited: Step toward a world free of
nuclear weapons”, at < http://www.nuclearsecurityproject.org/atf/cf/%7B1FCE2821-C31C-4560-BEC1-
BB4BB58B54D9%7D/DRELL_GOODBY_REYKJAVIK2_REV0D.PDF>.
39
IDSA Task Force Report
states coupled with the fact that binary serious consideration in about thirty
polarity induced by the cold war no longer countries which do not currently have it.
operates, has increased the risk of use of In addition to the 436 nuclear power
nuclear weapons both because decision- reactors currently operating over 40 are
making on this issue is now in the hands of currently under construction, 130 are
several players, and not just basically two, planned for 2030 and over 200 are further
and because the new nuclear armed states back in the pipeline.55
have not had the “luxury of time to develop Fourthly, some newly nuclear armed states
rules, tacit and otherwise, to tilt the scale may become more adventurist under the
against the use of nuclear weapons”.54 One assumption that retaliation would be
reason why deterrence worked between the muted in view of their nuclear capability.
USA and the Soviet Union was that, as Pakistan, for instance, has engaged itself in
argued by Schultz et al., they had no terrorist activities directed against India
territorial claims against each other and with much greater abandon after having
were “insulated by thousands of miles from weaponized from the 1990s onwards. It has
the daily frictions that arise when also attempted to use nuclear blackmail
adversaries live side by side.” The against India on more than one occasion.
circumstances have changed in respect of
the new nuclear armed states, which makes Fifthly, leaderships of nuclear-armed rogue
the world a much more dangerous place. states are unlikely to be as responsible as
those of normal states and more prone to
Thirdly, the spread of technology coupled the rash use of nuclear weapons.
with the renaissance of the nuclear power Furthermore, they are more likely to be
industry, fuelled by the pressing proliferators and not averse to the diversion
requirement of clean energy in the context of nuclear know-how and materials to both
of the need to address the menace of global state and non-state actors.
warming, greatly increases the possibility
Finally, with each passing day there is an
of horizontal proliferation in the absence of
increasing possibility of terrorist groups
the elimination of nuclear weapons and the
acquiring some kind of nuclear weapons,
absence of an international regime that
weapon-usable fissile materials or
makes their acquisition an impossibility.
radioactive materials for making a dirty
Some idea about the extent to which the
bomb. Al Qaeda has for long been on the
world is beginning to turn to nuclear energy
lookout in this regard. It has been hunting
may be gauged from the fact that the World
for fissile material or suitcase bombs from
Nuclear Association estimates that the
Russia as well as technological know-how
global nuclear generating capacity is set to
from Pakistani scientists.
increase to at least 1130 GWe by 2060 from
the current level of 373 GWe. It also While it is unlikely that terrorist groups
indicates that nuclear power is under could in the near future build a nuclear
54
Ibid., pp. 3–19.
55
See “The risks associated with peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” in Evans and Kawaguchi (Co-Chairs), Eliminating
Nuclear Threats, pp. 48–56.
40
Threats and Challenges in a Nuclearized World
device from scratch they could, however, legitimized nuclear weapons and failed to
much more easily steal nuclear weapons or prevent proliferation. Indeed, as long as
fissile material from storage or during there are nuclear weapons there will be
transportation. In this context, it may be proliferation not merely to states but also
noted that, as per the Illicit Trafficking to non-state actors. As the 1996 Canberra
Database (ITDB) maintained by the IAEA Commission on Complete Elimination of
there were, between January 1993 and Nuclear Weapons starkly put it:
December 2008, 421 incidents involving
theft or loss of nuclear and other radioactive So long as any such weapons remain, it defies
materials, and 336 incidents involving credibility that they will not be used, by
unauthorized possession of such materials accident, miscalculation or design. And any
and criminal activities relating to them. such use would be catastrophic. It is sheer luck
that the world has escaped such a catastrophe
It is more or less axiomatic that as long as
till now.56
there are nuclear weapons, nuclear power
reactors, radioactive materials, etc., such Since the science of making nuclear
endeavours on the part of terrorist outfits weapons cannot be unlearnt the only
will continue and it is only a matter of time effective way of preventing such weapons
before they succeed. Once such outfits from ever being used is to make their use
secure nuclear weapons, their use is an international crime and to eliminate
inevitable, as terrorists cannot be deterred them on the pattern of biological and
and have a low responsibility threshold. chemical weapons. For this purpose all
Elimination of nuclear weapons would nuclear armed states would have to give
greatly diminish, though not completely
up their nuclear weapons under
close, the possibility of terrorist groups
international supervision and a
acquiring nuclear materials.
multilaterally negotiated agreement would
The task of preventing the use of nuclear have to be arrived at for their elimination
weapons in a nuclearized world is within a time-bound framework. Such an
enormously difficult. Like the proverbial agreement would have to be internationally
apple in the Garden of Eden, the very and effectively verifiable. It would also
existence of the nuclear weapon makes its need to have inbuilt safeguards, to ensure
use inevitable. that no state or non-state actors would ever
The NPT regime has not helped in acquire nuclear weapons, and should they
advancing the cause of a nuclear weapon do so they would face the severest possible
free world. On the contrary, it has international sanctions.
56
http://www.ccnr.org/canberra.html, accessed on 15 January 2010.
41
IDSA Task
Chapter 4 Force Report
T
he evolution of thinking about the “generally be contrary to the rules of
need for nuclear disarmament is as international law”.
old as nuclear weapons themselves.
In accordance with the abovementioned
While “Global Zero” has usually been
principles, the following four instruments
marginalized in the international strategic
have been concluded banning the use of
and political discourse, it has remained a
certain classes of weapons:
cherished goal in the agenda for global
peace and security. 1. The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting
the use of asphyxiating, poisonous and
It has often been argued that nuclear
other gases and all bacteriological
disarmament is not achievable because
modes of warfare;
nuclear technology cannot be unlearnt or
un-invented and the genie once out of the 2. The 1972 Biological Weapons
bottle cannot be put back into it. Convention banning the development,
International law, however, provides production and stockpiling of
instances where states have agreed on bacteriological toxins for hostile
certain principles of war-fighting, including purposes and providing for their
the eschewing of certain classes of weapons destruction;
of mass destruction. 3. The 1993 Chemical Weapons
The Law of Hague (1899), addressing the Convention banning the development,
conduct of war, established the principle of production and stockpiling of chemical
the need to maintain the delicate balance weapons and providing for their
between military necessity and destruction;
humanitarian consideration in war, which
4. The 1997 Anti Personnel Mines
included drawing a distinction between
Convention banning the development,
non-combatants and the military, with a
production, stockpiling and retention
view to confining the use of weapons and
or transfer of anti-personnel mines and
tactics to only military objectives. The
providing for their destruction.
inability of nuclear weapons, like all
weapons of mass destruction, to restrict Regrettably, nuclear weapons still remain
themselves to only military objectives and exempt from any such ban, or even
their proclivity to impose enormous opprobrium, regarding their use or threat
suffering on the civilian population violates of use. On the contrary, as stated earlier,
the most basic principle of international they have been allowed to become a
law. It is this factor which influenced the currency of power and most of the nuclear
International Court of Justice (ICJ) to rule armed states have no compunction in
in its 1996 Advisory Opinion that the threat postulating their use in conventional
or use of nuclear weapons would conflict situations in a first use mode.
42
Evolution of Thinking About Nuclear Disarmament
This is all the more reprehensible as the is both a nuclear arms control and a nuclear
legitimization of nuclear weapons flies in disarmament treaty, but since the nuclear
the face of international law and opinion. disarmament obligations undertaken by the
In this context, it is germane to note that nuclear weapon states were disregarded, it
the very first resolution adopted by the UN has essentially functioned only as an arms
General Assembly (UNGA) in January 1946 control agreement aimed mainly at curbing
called for the “elimination from national horizontal proliferation.
armaments of atomic weapons and of all
In the bilateral US-Soviet Union construct
other major weapons adaptable to mass
this period saw arms control agreements
destruction”57 (Annexure VII). This was
like the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT,
followed up by a UNGA resolution in 1961
1974), the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
stating that the use of nuclear weapons
Treaty (PNET, 1976), the SALT I Interim
went against the “spirit, letter and aims” of
Agreement (1972) and the Anti-Ballistic
the United Nations and as such were in
Missile (ABM) Treaty. The only nuclear
violation of the UN Charter (Annexure
disarmament treaty concluded between the
VIII). The resolution further proclaimed
two in this period was the Strategic Arms
that the use of nuclear weapons was a
Limitation Talks II (SALT II) agreement of
“crime against mankind and civilization”.58
1979. These agreements were undertaken
This widespread aversion to nuclear to stabilize the nuclear arms race between
weapons has persisted over the decades them and to address the growing prospect
accompanied by repeated calls for their of war between them. Arms control had the
elimination. Unfortunately, all these calls larger goal of stabilization rather than to
have been unheeded and no effort has been simply get to lower numbers of weapons,
made to evolve a multilaterally much less address the wider issue of the
negotiated, universal and internationally elimination of nuclear weapons.
verifiable agreement designed to achieve
It was from the 1980s onwards that one
the elimination of nuclear weapons within
witnessed major bilateral US-Soviet/
a time-bound framework. The focus in
Russian agreements on nuclear
the 1960s and 1970s essentially lay on
disarmament which brought about
arms control.
substantial reductions in their weapon
The major multilateral arms control holdings. It may be recalled that the
agreements of the time were the Partial Test beginning of the 1980s, after the 1978 UN
Ban Treaty (PTBT, 1963), the Outer Space Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I),
Treaty (1967), the Treaty of Tlatelolco witnessed an upsurge in popular sentiment
(1967), the NPT (1967), and the Seabed towards nuclear disarmament. This may be
Treaty (1971). The NPT, strictly speaking, traced to the apprehensions aroused by the
57
“Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the problems raised by Atomic Energy”, UNGA Resolution 1(I), 24
January 1946, at <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/
NR003252.pdf?OpenElement>.
58
“Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons,” UN General Assembly Reso-
lution 1653, 24 November 1961, at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/06/IMG/
NR016706.pdf?OpenElement>..
43
IDSA Task Force Report
US-Soviet nuclear confrontation of the time required the nuclear weapon states to
and to NATO’s decision in 1979 to deploy eliminate nuclear weapons, there was little
cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. further progress on bilateral nuclear
The Reagan Administration’s commitment disarmament apart from the SORT Treaty
to a nuclear build-up triggered much public of 2002. On the contrary, nuclear weapons
anxiety and an outburst of popular protest. acquired greater salience in Russian and US
The Nuclear Weapon Freeze Campaign nuclear doctrines, the USA walked out of
drew public support in the US and won the the ABM Treaty and Russia out of START
backing of the Democratic Party. Similar II, and the commitments made towards the
anti-nuclear sentiment was evident in much elimination of nuclear weapons at the 2000
of West Europe. In nearly every West NPT Review Conference received a major
European country, anti-nuclear groups setback at the next NPT Review Conference
were revived and grew into mass due to inflexible approach of the US. These
movements. negative developments were accompanied
President Reagan did not remain by the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests,
unaffected by this outburst of popular North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT
sentiment and, turning a new leaf, sought and its nuclear tests, fears that Iran may go
to advance nuclear disarmament in the US- nuclear, exposure of the A.Q. Khan
Soviet context. President Gorbachev, too, proliferation network and apprehensions
for different reasons, had similar ideas. It that sooner or later non-state actors like al
is in this context that Reagan and Qaeda might obtain nuclear devices.
Gorbachev at their first summit in Geneva It is in the backdrop of the foregoing, which
in 1985, breaking out of the prevailing presages the breakdown of the non-
mindset of their respective establishments, proliferation regime and the increased
declared that “a nuclear war cannot be won possibility of the use of nuclear weapons,
and must never be fought”. Though success that the world is witnessing a groundswell
in agreeing upon the elimination of all of opinion in favour of the elimination of
ballistic missiles by 1996, as proposed by nuclear weapons. The first salvo in this
the US, eluded the two leaders at the regard was fired by four former prominent
subsequent Reykjavik Summit in 1986, the US officials comprising George Schulz,
meeting laid the groundwork for the
William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam
subsequent INF Treaty of 1988 and for the
Nunn in a set of two articles in the Wall
START I treaty of 1991.
Street Journal of 4 January 2007 and 15
Unfortunately, despite the end of the cold January 2008. 59 Their call for a nuclear
war, the renunciation of nuclear weapons weapon free world is based on the
by Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and South argument that the end of the cold war has
Africa, the indefinite extension of the NPT, rendered the doctrine of US-Russian
and the ICJ’s ruling that the NPT clearly deterrence “obsolete”, that with a
59
“A world free of nuclear weapons”, 4 January 2007, A15, at <http://www.fcnl.org/issues/
item.php?item_id=2252&issue_id=54>; “Toward a nuclear free world”, 15 January 2008, at <online.wsj.com/public/
article_print/SB120036422673589947.html>.
44
Evolution of Thinking About Nuclear Disarmament
multiplicity of nuclear armed states, campaign. The latter has proposed a plan
reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence for the phased, verified elimination of
is “becoming increasingly hazardous and nuclear weapons, starting with deep
decreasingly effective”, and that terrorist reductions in the US and Russian arsenals,
outfits, “outside the bounds of a deterrent to be followed by multilateral negotiations
strategy” are also increasingly more likely among all nuclear powers for an agreement
to get nuclear weaponry. They readily to eliminate all nuclear weapons by 2030.
acknowledge that the non-nuclear weapon In a public opinion poll commissioned by
states have “grown increasingly skeptical Global Zero in 2008, substantial popular
of the sincerity of the nuclear powers” in support was found for the elimination of
fulfilling their disarmament commitment, nuclear weapons through an agreement in
that the non-proliferation efforts currently a time-bound framework. In twenty of the
underway are inadequate, and that it is twenty-one countries surveyed large
essential to have a vision of a nuclear majorities ranging from 62 to 93 per cent
weapon free world along with a series of favoured such an agreement. The exception
steps towards that goal to pull the world
was Pakistan, where 46 per cent favoured
back from the “nuclear precipice”.
the plan while 41 per cent opposed it. All
Despite some contrarian voices like that of nations known to have nuclear weapons
James Schlesinger, former US Secretary of were included in the poll, except North
Defence, who continue to attach great value Korea where public polling is not available.
to nuclear deterrence and are sceptical
In a refreshing change from the past,
about a verifiable elimination of nuclear
President Obama, after assuming office in
weapons, the call for a nuclear weapon free
January 2009, also called for a world free of
world has found resonance amongst many
nuclear weapons. In this context, he
leaders, particularly in the West, most
undertook to take deep cuts in US nuclear
notably in the US and UK. Several think-
tanks the world over have been energized weapon holdings, reduce the salience of
to provide an intellectual underpinning to nuclear weapons in US doctrines, ratify the
the cause of a nuclear weapon free world. CTBT, and urge all concerned to commence
In addition, in support of this cause the negotiations on the FMCT in January 2010.
Australian and the Japanese governments He has succeeded in getting President
in September 2008 launched an Medvedev on board for agreeing to
International Commission on Nuclear Non conclude a follow-on agreement to START
Proliferation and Disarmament and the I in April 2010. Both sides have pledged to
Nuclear Threat Initiative. Stanford reduce their deployed strategic nuclear
University’s Hoover Institution launched warheads to 1,550 and strategic delivery
the National Security Initiative. In systems to 800 (both deployed and
December 2008, one hundred leaders from non-deployed, with a limit of 700 for
around the world launched a Global Zero deployed systems).60
60
“US-Russian Nuclear Arms Control at a Glance”, Arms Control Today, March 2010, at http://
www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/US Russia Nuclear Agreements March 2010
45
IDSA Task Force Report
While President Obama’s assertions and reductions or the depth of the reductions
actions are certainly a welcome advance to be effected. The proposed drawdown in
over the positions taken by his predecessors the nuclear arsenals of the two countries is
who, barring Reagan, were not even to be spread over as long as seven years,
prepared to contemplate a world without and the reductions are envisaged only in
nuclear weapons, it is significant that respect of operationally deployed strategic
Obama has neither put any timeline for the offensive nuclear weapons, and not in
elimination of nuclear weapons nor respect of nuclear weapons held back in
presented any concrete programme of reserve or tactical nuclear weapons. It may
action as to how one would arrive at that be recalled that SORT, concluded in 2002,
goal, apart from suggesting that after the had envisaged that by 2012 operationally
US and Russia take deep cuts in their deployed warheads would be reduced by
arsenals, other nuclear weapon states each country to between 1700 to 2200 – a
should also join in the process of nuclear figure only marginally higher than the
disarmament. He has also admitted that the ceiling of 1550 warheads agreed to by
goal of a nuclear weapon free world may Obama and Medvedev. There is, of course,
not be achieved in his lifetime. a much sharper draw down in the numbers
Furthermore, he was categorical that the US of delivery vehicles as compared to the
nuclear arsenal will continue to be used for START I level of 1600, but with the
providing extended deterrence to US allies availability of MIRV technology this is not
for as long as nuclear weapons exist and particularly meaningful. The only real
that the NPT regime will be strengthened. advance of the new agreement between the
Indeed, UN Security Council Resolution USA and Russia is that it will have an
1887 (Annexure IX), personally sponsored effective verification mechanism.
by President Obama, calling for the
Neither President Obama, nor the four
universalization of the NPT, was essentially
high-ranking former officials, nor most of
focused on curbing horizontal proliferation
the think-tanks involved even in the
by a further tightening of restraints on the
prevailing more positive international
non-nuclear weapon states, with nuclear
environment for nuclear disarmament are
disarmament receiving scant attention. Of
seriously looking towards the elimination
the twenty-nine operative paragraphs of
of nuclear weapons within a time-bound
the resolution only two deal with nuclear
framework through a universal,
disarmament and that, too, in a generic
multilaterally negotiated, non-
fashion, with no direct appeal to the nuclear
discriminatory and internationally and
weapon states to show greater sincerity and
effectively verifiable convention. The
urgency in fulfilling their obligations in this
absence of such an approach, barring on the
regard, as required under Article VI of the
part of the Global Zero campaign, raises
treaty.
suspicions that the entire objective of this
Similarly, the follow-on agreement to exercise, in the lead-up to the 2010 NPT
START I can hardly be termed as path- Review Conference, is to once again
breaking or spectacular, whether in regard pressure the non-nuclear weapon states to
to the time to be taken to effect the take on even more onerous obligations,
46
Evolution of Thinking About Nuclear Disarmament
through a further tightening of the NPT The US Strategic Posture Commission in its
regime, in return for some rather limited report in 2009 had made a similar
nuclear disarmament measures undertaken recommendation.
by the US and Russia and promises of a As Mohamed El-Baradei has argued, it is
nuclear weapon free world in the very unlikely that the non-nuclear weapon states
distant future. will
These suspicions are further heightened by move forward very much to tighten the
the fact that the four senior former US nonproliferation regime except in sync with
administration officials in an article in The the NWS [nuclear weapon states] making
Wall Street Journal of 19 January 2010 good on their commitments. Only if the
revealed that their conversion to the cause weapon states demonstrate that they are
of a nuclear weapon free world was less moving irreversibly towards disarmament
than total. They not only recognized the through concrete [steps] can they have the
“necessity to maintain the safety, security moral authority to call on the rest of the world
and reliability” of the US nuclear weapons to tighten the nonproliferation regime. The
as long as other countries had them but shortcomings in the system will not be
called for additional funding of three [remedied] unless the NWS understand the
national laboratories involved in the inextricable link between disarmament and
modernization of the US nuclear arsenal.61 nonproliferation.62
61
See “How to protect our nuclear deterrent”, Wall Street Journal, 19 January 2010, at <http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704152804574628344282735008.html>.
62
Mohamed El-Baradei’s interview to The Hindu, 3 October 2009 and 7 October 2009.
47
IDSA Task
Chapter 5 Force Report
T
he route to a nuclear weapon free and Patricia Lewis written in January 2009,
world is strewn with pitfalls, and the report of the International Commission
the achievement of the desired end on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
state would require sincerity of purpose on Disarmament, co-chaired by Gareth Evans
the part of the nuclear armed states, as well and Yoriko Kawaguchi, published in
as statesmanship, perseverance and November 2009 under the title “Eliminating
negotiating skill on the part of the Nuclear Threats – A Practical Agenda for
international community as a whole. While Global Policymakers”, and the Global Zero
the prime responsibility for the elimination Action Plan published in June 2009.
of nuclear weapons rests upon the nuclear
The main thesis of the Perkovich-Lewis
armed states, as it is they who have to give
essay is that in order to reach the Vantage
them up, the non-nuclear weapon states
Point – “a position of deep reductions in
also have a role as they have to be prepared
nuclear weapons” – from which abolition
to take on even more onerous obligations,
can be “envisaged, mapped and
if need be, so as to provide credible
navigated”, conditions for the same must
assurances that they will never acquire
first be created. However, it neither puts
nuclear weapons.
any precision on these conditions nor
There are essentially two approaches to outlines the “exact shape and detailed
nuclear disarmament – one, timid and content” of what should constitute the
incremental; the other, bold and direct. The Vantage Point. These are expected to
first envisages the adoption of several emerge from a series of “studies and
measures considered essential for working experiments” to be completed by 2015
towards a nuclear weapon free world some leading to the evolution of an “international
time in the distant future. The second action plan” to move to the Vantage Point.
approach seeks to achieve nuclear
The essay argues, however, that progress
disarmament not by a series of incremental
on getting to the Vantage Point is
moves but in a time-bound framework,
predicated on US-Russian-Chinese strategic
through a multilaterally negotiated,
cooperation and a host of other politico-
universal, non-discriminatory and
security issues such as extended deterrence,
internationally and effectively verifiable
US-China relations, the “low numbers
convention or treaty.
challenge”, imbalances in conventional
The Incremental Approach weapon capabilities, China-India-Pakistan
Many of the recent converts to the relations, etc. It also suggests that the main
desirability of a nuclear weapon free world elements of the Vantage Point should, inter
are proponents of the incremental approach alia, be deep reductions in US-Russian
to nuclear disarmament. Instances of this nuclear arsenals, participation of all nuclear
approach are provided in an essay entitled armed states in reductions and controls,
“The Vantage Point” by George Perkovich doctrinal/deployment norms and rules
48
Route to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
reducing salience of nuclear weapons, the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Phase III
CTBT operationalization, ban on fissile (2019–2023) would involve the negotiation
material production for weapon purposes, of a global zero accord signed by all
proliferation-resistant fuel cycle regime, nuclear-capable countries for the
tightening of the NPT regime, etc. Having elimination of nuclear weapons in a phased,
discussed the Vantage Point, albeit verified and proportionate manner by 2030.
somewhat ephemerally, the essay leaves Phase IV (2024–2030) would entail the
the readers tantalizingly poised as it does actual implementation of the draw down
not map out the progression therefrom to of these nuclear arsenals to zero.
the elimination of nuclear weapons
The incrementalists project their gingerly
The recommendations of the International
approach as being dictated by realism, but
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
they expose themselves to the charge that
and Disarmament (ICNND), while not as
they are not serious about actually getting
nebulous as those contained in the
to a nuclear weapon free world. The fact
Perkovich-Lewis essay, suffer from the
remains that the longer the world waits for
same malaise of not setting any definite
the elimination of nuclear weapons the
timeframe for the elimination of nuclear
greater the risk of the use of these weapons.
weapons. The ICNND postulates that the
elimination of nuclear weapons could take In these circumstances, common sense
place only some time beyond 2025 when, dictates that the goal should be expeditious
inter alia, the right political, military, achievement of a nuclear weapon free
verification and fuel cycle management world. If the international community
conditions have been established. could eliminate chemical weapons through
a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
The Global Zero Action Plan is much more
why can it not eliminate nuclear weapons
forthcoming, suggesting that the
through a Nuclear Weapons Convention
elimination of nuclear weapons be
(NWC)?
undertaken in four phases by 2030. In Phase
I (2010–2013), it envisages a bilateral The Bold and Direct Approach
agreement between USA and Russia
The second approach, as mentioned earlier,
whereunder the two would reduce their
seeks to achieve nuclear disarmament not
warhead holdings to one thousand each. In
by a series of incremental moves but in a
Phase II (2014–2018), a multilateral accord
time-frame, through a multilaterally
is envisaged amongst the nuclear weapon
countries whereunder USA and Russia negotiated, universal, non-discriminatory
would reduce their nuclear warhead and internationally and effectively
holdings to 500 each by 2021 and the others verifiable convention or treaty. To those
would freeze the number of their warheads who argue that it is unrealistic to pursue
until 2018 followed by proportionate global zero in the near future, one can do
reductions. This would be accompanied by no better than refer to Barry Blechman’s
the establishment of a comprehensive firm assertion, in his article in the New York
verification and enforcement system Times of 18 February 2010 that this is “not
coupled with strengthened safeguards on true”. He argues that
49
IDSA Task Force Report
The technical expertise necessary for air-tight themselves, formidable, given the
verification has already been developed complexities of the issues involved, the
through past agreements and international politico-security factors which militate
supervision of the countries that have against the nuclear armed states working
relinquished nuclear programmes. towards this end are far more serious.
International precedents already exist for Technical issues always have technical
virtually every procedure necessary to solutions and can, ultimately, be resolved
eliminate nuclear weapons safely, verifiably, through sagacity and accommodation, but
and without risk to any nation’s security. political-security factors, which condition
the political will of the key players, notably
The vast majority of the non-nuclear
the nuclear armed states, can be dealt with
weapon states are supporters of this more
only through a radical change of mindset.
direct approach. Since the longer the time
provided for any endeavour the lower the The Political-security Factors. The reluctance
probability of success, a rapid approach of the nuclear armed states to renounce
towards the elimination of nuclear weapons nuclear weapons stems from a variety of
would be more appropriate, rather than a factors. First, these weapons are a currency
timid one placing a premium on a plethora of power. It is not for nothing that the
of confidence-building measures, arms recognized nuclear weapon states are the
control arrangements, and mechanisms to only permanent members of the UN
establish trust and promote cooperation Security Council and have a preferential
amongst the major players. Each of these status under the NPT regime as compared
measures, arrangements and mechanisms, to the non-nuclear weapon states. It is
while useful in themselves, are immensely debatable if countries like the UK and
complex and carry the risk of failure. As France would remain permanent members
Blechman has pointed out, “piecemeal of the UN Security Council in a nuclear
control efforts will never work; we have to weapon free world. Secondly, such
think more boldly if we are to achieve weapons are regarded as the ultimate shield
global nuclear disarmament.”63 both against aggression or external
destabilization. It could be argued that the
Accordingly, the summit of a nuclear nuclearization of Russia and China
weapon free world should be taken, not by immunized them from US meddling.
the cumbersome process of establishing a Similarly, the kid glove treatment of North
base camp or vantage point, from which it Korea and of Pakistan by the US is
may not even be clearly visible, but by aerial explained by their having acquired nuclear
assault! weapons. Thirdly, nuclear weapons have
The challenges in negotiating an agreement become an integral part of the war-fighting
on the elimination of nuclear weapons fall capabilities of the nuclear armed states.
into two clusters, notably technical and Indeed, the US even envisages their
politico-security. While the former are, in employment in a pre-emptive and
63
Barry Blechman, “Stop at START”, New York Times, 18 February 2010, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/
19/opinion/19blechman.html>. Blechman is a fellow at the Stimson Centre and Co-Editor of Elements of a Nuclear
Disarmament Treaty.
50
Route to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
preventive mode. Fourthly, one or another argue that we need to start working on that
of these countries sees nuclear weapons as alternative security system in parallel now.
an equalizer against the stronger country. That obviously requires a different Security
This is true of both Russia and China vis-à- Council, a different security paradigm, a very
vis USA, of Pakistan vis-à-vis India, and robust verification system, a very transparent
possibly of India vis-à-vis China. Some of international community in so far as making
these countries could thus well insist on a sure that they are in compliance.
balanced reduction in conventional
Such a perfect security system, though
weapons before agreeing to renounce their
eminently desirable and one that would
nuclear weapons. Finally, the existence of
certainly promote the elimination of
political hot spots such as Taiwan,
nuclear weapons, will come neither easily
Palestine, the Russian periphery, North
nor in the foreseeable future. The question,
Korea, etc. involving the interests of one or
therefore, that needs to be addressed is
another of the nuclear armed states makes
whether the elimination of nuclear
their renunciation of nuclear weapons
weapons is really so dependent on having
problematic. Accordingly, they may well
in place the proposed security framework.
insist on the stabilization of the situation in
The answer is in the negative because, given
these hot spots before agreeing to renounce
the political will the elimination of nuclear
their nuclear weapons.
weapons is technically achievable with “a
In addition, non-nuclear weapon states, very robust verification system” designed
enjoying the benefits of extended to ensure the liquidation of all national
deterrence, may also have reservations nuclear weapon arsenals and calibrated to
about the elimination of nuclear weapons prevent any country from ever again going
as this would lead to the attenuation of the nuclear. The call for constructing a new
security umbrella enjoyed by them. security framework is something of a red
herring because most states want the
Indeed, some have argued that the
elimination of nuclear weapons with or
establishment of a new security framework
without a new security framework. Those
is a prerequisite for the elimination of
amongst the nuclear armed states who have
nuclear weapons in order to take care of the
security concerns about suddenly having
legitimate security concerns of states in a
to do without nuclear weapons are, in fact,
post-nuclear weapon world. Mohamed El-
much better equipped to look after
Baradei put this thought elegantly in his
themselves than most other countries.
interview to The Hindu published on 7
States enjoying extended deterrence can
October 2009:
still enjoy the same through conventional
…. once we decide to go to zero, we have to weapons. Finally, if chemical weapons can
have in place a new security system that be extinguished without insistence on a
assures every country that its security is not new security framework surely the same
diminished, that it is protected and that it has can be done in respect of nuclear weapons.
built in a very strong mechanism for detecting
and deterring any country that might think While at first blush the political-security
of violating that. That’s why I continue to factors cited above may appear weighty,
51
IDSA Task Force Report
most of them lose their importance if the possession of all states and set in place
weighed against the consequences of a verification system both to ensure the
continuing with business as usual. Rapid destruction of all existing nuclear weapon
progress on nuclear disarmament is critical stockpiles and to make certain that no state
to prevent proliferation. As long as nuclear ever again goes nuclear. As pointed out by
weapons are not delegitimized and as long Barry Blechman, “A comprehensive
as some states are allowed to retain their agreement for phased verified reductions
nuclear arsenals there will always be some to nuclear zero is not only feasible but far
states wanting to weaponize. The less risky than the ineffective path we have
realization of their ambition in this regard been on for so long.”64
is progressively becoming easier through
Technical Issues. The technical complexities
a variety of factors such as the spread of
in concluding a Nuclear Weapons
science and technology and the increasing
Convention or Treaty for the elimination of
popularity of nuclear power reactors.
nuclear weapons are, of course,
Equally worrisome is the possibility of non-
considerable. But given the will, these can
state actors, against whom deterrence will
be overcome through negotiations. Some of
not work, acquiring nuclear weapons or
these technical issues are examined below.
materials for use in a dirty bomb. The
consequences of such proliferation will A. What should be the scope of such a
greatly increase the security risk to the Convention? Should it be aimed at
existing nuclear weapon states. Thus the merely eliminating nuclear weapons
balance of advantage clearly lies with the or should it extend to erasing the
nuclear weapon states abandoning nuclear capabilities to produce them? Should
weapons which, far from advancing their it extend also to delivery vehicles?
security interests, actually impinge Should ballistic missile defences
adversely upon them. Resolving the need to be prohibited?
international hot spots or achieving Ironically, the NPT has no definition
balanced arms reductions may never be of nuclear weapons or nuclear
realized. On the other hand, each day lost explosive devices whose proliferation
in eliminating nuclear weapons means it was designed to halt! The 1967
living an additional day under the fear of a Treaty of Tlatelelco, which preceded
nuclear holocaust or incident. the NPT, has an acceptable definition
The complete elimination of nuclear which reads as follows: “A nuclear
weapons can most effectively be achieved weapon is any device which is capable
through a multilaterally negotiated Nuclear of releasing energy in an uncontrolled
Weapon Convention or Treaty which manner and which has a group of
would, inter alia, prohibit the development, characteristics that are appropriate for
testing, production, stockpiling, transfer or use for warlike purposes.” The
use of nuclear weapons. It would also cater adoption of such a definition would
for the destruction of nuclear weapons in limit the scope of the proposed
64
Ibid.
52
Route to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
53
IDSA Task Force Report
54
Route to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
65
See Securing our Survival: the Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, at <http://www.icanw.org/files/SoS/
SoS_section4.pdf>, p. 168.
66
Perkovich and Acton, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons”.
55
IDSA Task Force Report
would minimize the politics in the thoroughly debated amongst the parties
application of sanctions and introduce concerned before commencing negotiations
an element of automaticity and in order to find appropriate solutions. It is
transparency in imposing sanctions, felt however that these can best be resolved
which would make for a far more in the CD in the process of negotiating the
effective and fair enforcement regime. CCENW. Only through such negotiations
will solutions to knotty issues emerge on
I. Should there or should there not be
the basis as much of technical feasibilities
an internationally controlled nuclear
as of political give and take.
deterrent or arsenal and in what
manner should it function? No one can underestimate the complexity
of these negotiations, which will have to
While the elimination of national
grapple not merely with the extremely
nuclear weapon arsenals must be
undertaken, it is important that a few difficult technical issues involved but also
nuclear weapons remain available with the establishment of a new non-
under international control to deter proliferation regime, necessary in a nuclear
use or threat of use of a nuclear weapon free world. The latter will have to
weapon which a state may somehow be put in place as the current NPT regime,
have clandestinely acquired. Perhaps, based upon nuclear haves and have-nots,
ten to twenty nuclear bombs each may would be an anachronism in a world
be kept for this purpose in the USA devoid of nuclear weapons. It would have
and Russia under international to be much more equitable and designed
control. Such an international stockpile to keep the world free of nuclear weapons,
of nuclear weapons would also come barring those under international control,
in handy for any emergent use, such and in which the same rules would apply
as addressing an imminent meteor uniformly to all states whether in terms of
strike to the planet. fuel processing conditionalities,
inspections, or sanctions. Indeed, the focus
J. Should there be a withdrawal clause? of many of the protagonists of the
A withdrawal clause weakens any graduated approach to nuclear
international regime. Accordingly, for disarmament on the NPT regime is
as critical an agreement as an NWC, misplaced, because in the new world order
there should be no such clause. This it would simply have no place and,
alone would ensure that the therefore, if one gets into the negotiation
elimination of nuclear weapons is on the elimination of nuclear weapons
irreversible. many of the problems facing the NPT
regime would be finessed.
These are but a few of the technical issues
which present themselves while It is to be expected that the proposed
contemplating the conclusion of a negotiations in the CD will be difficult,
Convention on the Complete Elimination stormy and protracted, but they should be
of Nuclear Weapons (CCENW). Some able to secure the elimination of nuclear
argue that these issues should first be weapons within a time-bound framework.
56
Route to the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
57
IDSA Task
Chapter 6 Force Report
T
h e groundswell of opinion in nuclear weapons with a specified
favour of a nuclear weapon free timeframe”. In these circumstances, it is not
world blends well with India’s surprising that George Perkovich and
position on the issue, both traditional and James M. Acton have suggested, in the
current. India has always been a staunch backdrop of this history that India is “the
advocate of the elimination of nuclear most willing of all nuclear-armed states to
weapons. Over two decades ago, Prime participate in the global elimination of
Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed an Action nuclear arsenals.”67
Plan (Annexure XI) to the Third Special There is sound logic in India’s commitment
Session on Disarmament for a nuclear to a nuclear weapon free world. India’s
weapon free world to be achieved by 2010. security would be much better served in an
India’s position on this issue remains the environment where there are only
same. Thus, India’s Nuclear Doctrine, as conventional weapons. It would not only
enunciated in January 2003 (Annexure XII), obviate the possibility of a global nuclear
pledges India’s “continued commitment to holocaust, a regional nuclear exchange, or
the goal of a nuclear weapon free world a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons or
through global, verifiable and non- materials, but would also deprive Pakistan
discriminatory nuclear disarmament.” This of a nuclear shield behind which to engage
approach has since been reiterated on in terrorist actions against India. Some have
several occasions. argued that nuclear weapons provide India
Most recently, India’s approach has been an equalizer against China. This argument
comprehensively articulated in the may have been valid if India had hostile
statement made in the UNGA First intentions vis-à-vis China, much as Pakistan
Committee by its Permanent has vis-à-vis India. Since this is not the case,
Representative to the CD on 10 October India will not need nuclear weapons if all
2008 (Annexure XIII). In the aforesaid nuclear armed countries, including China,
statement India, inter alia, called upon the do not have them. For India, its
nuclear weapon states to negotiate a no- conventional forces are sufficient to keep
China’s possible hostile intentions in check.
first-use agreement, an agreement for non-
India’s need for nuclear weapons has arisen
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
only because China and Pakistan had them.
weapon states, to reduce the salience of
India’s use for nuclear weapons, as
nuclear weapons in their security doctrines,
reiterated in its nuclear doctrine, is purely
and to adopt nuclear risk reduction
for deterrence and not for first use.
measures. Most important of all, India
urged the negotiation of a nuclear weapons Therefore, it makes sense for India, even as
convention “leading to the global, non- a nuclear armed state, to lead the current
discriminatory and verifiable elimination of movement for the elimination of nuclear
67
Ibid.
58
Realising the Vision : Policy Choices for India
weapons. India’s traditional advocacy of and ratifying the CTBT. India’s hesitancy
nuclear disarmament, its security interests, on this issue was signalled by former
and the international acclaim that is there Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran in an
to be garnered, demand that India plays a address at the Brookings Institution in
proactive role in promoting the cause of March 2009, where he reportedly stated that
nuclear disarmament and takes a India would not sign the CTBT unless the
leadership role in this regard. world moved “categorically towards
Since the surest route to the elimination of nuclear disarmament in a credible
nuclear weapons is through an NWC, as timeframe”.
detailed in the previous chapter, India It may be pointed out that the CTBT has
should continue to press for the immediate been signed by 180 countries, of whom 148
commencement of negotiations on it in the have ratified it, including three nuclear
CD, which it has for long been urging. In weapon states, notably France, Russia and
so doing, India should emphasize that such the UK. In order to come into force the
a direct approach is far superior to the treaty requires that the 44 states having
incremental approach being commonly nuclear technological capabilities,
touted by most other advocates of a nuclear prevailing at the time of the finalization of
weapon free world. Not only will any the treaty, must sign and ratify it. Of these,
forward movement achieved under an North Korea, India and Pakistan are yet to
incremental approach be susceptible to sign the treaty. China, Egypt, Indonesia,
reversal but, above all, the slow progress Iran, Israel and the USA, having signed it,
implicit in such an approach will expose the have yet to ratify it. The US, though the
international community for many more major player, has so far been unable to get
decades to the nuclear menace. Senate approval for ratification. But
India should suggest that simultaneously President Obama, putting his full weight
with the negotiation of the NWC aimed at behind ratification, may succeed. In the
the elimination of nuclear weapons within event, India’s opposition to the CTBT
a time-bound framework and setting in could become a stumbling-block to
place a robust verification and control operationalizing it, as most of the other
system to supplant the NPT regime, a hold-outs are likely to fall in line with
number of other steps be taken, as detailed the US.
in the previous chapter. These steps are
It may be recalled that India’s reservations
essential to minimize the danger of use of
on the CTBT began to be expressed from
nuclear weapons pending their elimination,
the autumn of 1995 and peaked in the
which will take at least another five to ten
period leading up to Pokhran II in May
years in a best-case scenario, following
1998. The sharp change in the Indian
the commencement of the proposed
position was attributed at the time to the
NWC negotiations.
loosening link between the process of
India does not appear to have a problem nuclear disarmament and the CTBT. Shyam
with any of the measures detailed in the Saran’s assertion, cited above, merely
previous chapter barring, perhaps, signing echoes this thought process. The basic flaw
59
IDSA Task Force Report
in this line of argument is that India had logical for India to stand in the way of the
not, ab initio, firmly predicated its support finalization of CTBT. Indeed, since it cannot
to the CTBT on any definitive progress on itself test, it should welcome a Treaty which
nuclear disarmament. Thus the UNGA forecloses the testing option for other
resolution of December 1993 calling for countries as well. Moreover, by continuing
negotiations on the CTBT in the CD, which to oppose the CTBT or being seen as
was co-sponsored by India, makes no such lukewarm in its support, India would
definitive linkage. Moreover, right up till needlessly sully its disarmament
the autumn of 1995 India remained an credentials. It has sometimes been argued
active and constructive participant in the that India must keep open its testing option.
negotiations on the CTBT in the CD. It is To ensure that its deterrence remains
possible therefore, that the real reason that credible, India may need more tests. In
led to the change in its position was that response, two points may be made. First,
India wished to retain its testing option. because of Indo-US civilian nuclear deal,
This is corroborated by Prime Minister Atal testing may not be a desirable proposition.
Bihari Vajpayee’s assertion at the 1998 Second, while a few questions have been
UNGA session that “The treaty, as it raised about India’s hydrogen bomb
emerged, was not accepted by India on capability, the government ha refuted this
grounds of national security.”68 view. In any case, it must be emphasised
In any case, post-Pokhran II there has been that India’s atomic bomb capability has at
a sharp diminution in India’s visceral no stage been questioned. In other words,
opposition to the CTBT. Indeed, Prime India’s deterrent capabilities are in place
Minister Vajpayee stated categorically at and testing is no longer critical for the
the 1998 UNGA session that India was country for this purpose. India will, of
prepared to bring the discussions that it was course, be constrained by not being able to
having with key interlocutors on, inter alia bring about improvements in its design, etc.
the CTBT, “to a successful conclusion, so of its warheads as it cannot test. This
that the entry into force of the CTBT is not approach however would not be consistent
delayed beyond September 1999”. He with a policy of nuclear disarmament.
added: “We expect that other countries, as As regards the FMCT, India should have
indicated in Article XIV of the CTBT, will
no objection to working along with other
adhere to this Treaty without conditions”.69
like-minded countries on the issue. India
Moreover, since Pokhran II India has not
first proposed the FMCT in 1954 and
shown signs of wanting to test. This is borne
cosponsored the resolution in its support
out by its repeated commitments to a
in December 1993. India is also committed
moratorium on testing and its signing the
by the nuclear deal to work in support of
nuclear deal rules out testing.
it. India must, of course, ensure that the
In these circumstances, it would not seem FMCT should be strictly as per the mandate
68
Address of Prime Minister Vajpayee at UN General Assembly, 24 September 1998, at <http:www.indianembassy.org/
special/cabinet/Primeminister/pmspeech%28UN%29.htm>.
69
Ibid.
60
Realising the Vision : Policy Choices for India
70
Stephen G. Rademaker, “Rising to the Challenge of Effective Multi-Lateralism”, at <http:www.fissilematerials.org/
ipfm/site_down/rad06.pdf>.
61
IDSA Task Force Report
62
ANNEXURES
63
IDSA Task Force Report
64
Annexure I
65
IDSA TaskIIForce Report
Annexure
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to
referred to as the Parties to the Treaty, participate in the fullest possible exchange of
scientific information for, and to contribute
Considering the devastation that would be
alone or in co-operation with other States to,
visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and
the further development of the applications of
the consequent need to make every effort to
atomic energy for peaceful purposes,
avert the danger of such a war and to take
measures to safeguard the security of peoples, Declaring their intention to achieve at the
earliest possible date the cessation of the
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear
nuclear arms race and to undertake effective
weapons would seriously enhance the danger
measures in the direction of nuclear
of nuclear war,
disarmament,
In conformity with resolutions of the United
Urging the co-operation of all States in the
Nations General Assembly calling for the
attainment of this objective,
conclusion of an agreement on the prevention
of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, Recalling the determination expressed by the
Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear
Undertaking to co-operate in facilitating the
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space
application of International Atomic Energy
and under water in its Preamble to seek to
Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear
achieve the discontinuance of all test
activities,
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and
Expressing their support for research, to continue negotiations to this end,
development and other efforts to further the
Desiring to further the easing of international
application, within the framework of the
tension and the strengthening of trust between
International Atomic Energy Agency
States in order to facilitate the cessation of the
safeguards system, of the principle of
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the
safeguarding effectively the flow of source and
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and
special fissionable materials by use of
the elimination from national arsenals of
instruments and other techniques at certain
nuclear weapons and the means of their
strategic points,
delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and
Affirming the principle that the benefits of complete disarmament under strict and
peaceful applications of nuclear technology, effective international control,
including any technological by-products which
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter
may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from
of the United Nations, States must refrain in
the development of nuclear explosive devices,
their international relations from the threat or
should be available for peaceful purposes to
use of force against the territorial integrity or
all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-
political independence of any State, or in any
weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, of the United Nations, and that the
66
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68
Annexure II
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5. The Depositary Governments shall 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into
promptly inform all signatory and force of the Treaty, a conference shall be
acceding States of the date of each convened to decide whether the Treaty
signature, the date of deposit of each shall continue in force indefinitely, or
instrument of ratification or of accession, shall be extended for an additional fixed
the date of the entry into force of this period or periods. This decision shall be
Treaty, and the date of receipt of any taken by a majority of the Parties to the
requests for convening a conference or Treaty.1
other notices.
Article XI
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French,
Depositary Governments pursuant to
Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally
Article 102 of the Charter of the United
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of
Nations.
the Depositary Governments. Duly certified
Article X copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by
the Depositary Governments to the
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national
Governments of the signatory and acceding
sovereignty have the right to withdraw
States.
from the Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events, related to the IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned,
subject matter of this Treaty, have duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.
jeopardized the supreme interests of its
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of London,
country. It shall give notice of such
Moscow and Washington, the first day of July,
withdrawal to all other Parties to the
one thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight.
Treaty and to the United Nations Security
Council three months in advance. Such Source
Source:: <http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/
notice shall include a statement of the npttext.html>
70
Annexure III
71
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72
Annexure IV
73
IDSA TaskVForce Report
Annexure
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3514th of nuclear weapons would endanger
meeting, on 11 April 1995 international peace and security,
74
Annexure V
75
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Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th Affirming that prevention of proliferation of
meeting on 28 April 2004 nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
should not hamper international cooperation in
The Security Council,
materials, equipment and technology for
Affirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical peaceful purposes while goals of peaceful
and biological weapons, as well as their means utilization should not be used as a cover for
of delivery,* constitutes a threat to international proliferation,
peace and security,
Gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and
Reaffirming, in this context, the Statement of its the risk that non-State actors* such as those
President adopted at the Council’s meeting at identified in the United Nations list established
the level of Heads of State and Government on and maintained by the Committee established
31 January 1992 (S/23500), including the need under Security Council resolution 1267 and
for all Member States to fulfil their obligations those to whom resolution 1373 applies, may
in relation to arms control and disarmament and acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear,
to prevent proliferation in all its aspects of all chemical and biological weapons and their
weapons of mass destruction, means of delivery,
Recalling also that the Statement underlined the Gravely concerned by the threat of illicit
need for all Member States to resolve peacefully trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological
in accordance with the Charter any problems in weapons and their means of delivery, and
that context threatening or disrupting the related materials,* which adds a new dimension
maintenance of regional and global stability, to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and
Affirming its resolve to take appropriate and also poses a threat to international peace and
effective actions against any threat to security,
international peace and security caused by the Recognizing the need to enhance coordination
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological of efforts on national, subregional, regional and
weapons and their means of delivery, in international levels in order to strengthen a
conformity with its primary responsibilities, as global response to this serious challenge and
provided for in the United Nations Charter, threat to international security,
Affirming its support for the multilateral treaties Recognizing that most States have undertaken
whose aim is to eliminate or prevent the binding legal obligations under treaties to which
proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological they are parties, or have made other
weapons and the importance for all States commitments aimed at preventing the
parties to these treaties to implement them fully proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological
in order to promote international stability, weapons, and have taken effective measures to
elcoming efforts in this context by multilateral account for, secure and physically protect
arrangements which contribute to non- sensitive materials, such as those required by
proliferation, the Convention on the Physical Protection of
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Annexure VI
Nuclear Materials and those recommended by 3. Decides also that all States shall take and
the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and enforce effective measures to establish
Security of Radioactive Sources, domestic controls to prevent the
Recognizing further the urgent need for all proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or
States to take additional effective measures to biological weapons and their means of
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical delivery, including by establishing
or biological weapons and their means of appropriate controls over related
delivery, materials and to this end shall:
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Annexure VI
10. Further to counter that threat, calls upon 11. Expresses its intention to monitor closely
all States, in accordance with their the implementation of this resolution and,
national legal authorities and legislation at the appropriate level, to take further
and consistent with international law, to decisions which may be required to this
take cooperative action to prevent illicit end;
trafficking in nuclear, chemical or
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
biological weapons, their means of
delivery, and related materials; Source: <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/73519.htm>.
Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons, that are specially designed for such use.
Non-State actor: individual or entity, not acting under the lawful authority of any State in conducting activities which
come within the scope of this resolution.
Related materials: materials, equipment and technology covered by relevant multilateral treaties and arrangements, or
included on national control lists, which could be used for the design, development, production or use of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery.
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Resolved by the General Assembly of the United work to the Security Council.
Nations to establish a Commission, with the
3. Composition of the Commission
composition and competence the setout
hereunder, to deal with the problems raised The Commission shall be composed of
by the discovery of atomic energy and related one representative from each of those
matters: states represented on the Security
Council, and Canada when that State is
1. Establishment of the Commission:
not a member of the Security Council.
A Commission is hereby established by
Each representative on the Commission
the General Assembly with the terms of
may have such assistance as he may
reference set out under Section 5 below.
desire.
2. Relations of the Commission with the
4. Rules of Procedure
Organs of the United Nations
The Commission shall have whatever
(a) The Commission shall submit its reports
staff it may deem necessary, and shall
and recommendations to the Security
make recommendations for its rules of
Council, and such reports and
procedure to the Security Council, which
recommendations shall be made public
shall approve them as a procedural
unless the Security Council, in the interest
matter.
of peace and security, otherwise directs.
In the appropriate cases the Security 5. Terms of Reference of the Commission
Council should transmit these reports to The Commission shall proceed with the
the General Assembly and the Members utmost dispatch and enquire into all
of the United Nations, as well as to the phases of the problem, and make such
Economic and Social Council and other recommendations from time to time with
organs within the framework of the respect to them as it finds possible. In
Untied Nations. particular, the Commission shall make
(b) In view of the Security Council’s primary specific proposals:
responsibility under the Charter of the (a) for extending between all nations the
United Nations for the maintenance of exchange of basic scientific information
international peace and security, the for peaceful ends;
Security Council shall issue directions to
(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent
the Commission in matters affecting
necessary to ensure its use only for
security. On these matters the
peaceful purposes;
Commission shall be accountable for its
80
Annexure VII
(c) for the elimination from national before the next stage is undertaken.
armaments of atomic weapons and of all
other major weapons adaptable to mass The Commission shall not infringe upon
destruction; the responsibilities of nay organ of the
Untied Nations, but should present
(d) for effective safeguards by way of
recommendations for the consideration of
inspection and other means to protect
those organs in the performance of their
complying States against the hazards of
tasks under the terms of the United
violations and evasions.
Nations Charter.
The work of the Commission shall
proceed by separate stages, the successful Source: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
completion of each of which will develop RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/
NR003252.pdf? OpenElement
the necessary confidence of the world
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Recalling that the use of weapons of mass weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter
destruction, causing unnecessary human and aims of the United Nations and, as
suffering, was in the past prohibited, as being such, a direct violation of the Charter of
contrary to the laws of humanity and to the the United Nations;
principles of international law, by international
(b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
declarations and binding agreements, such as
weapons would exceed even the scope of
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868, the
war and cause indiscriminate suffering
Declaration of the Brussels Conference of 1874,
and destruction to mankind and
the Convention of The Hague Peace
civilisation and, as such, is contrary to the
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Geneva
rules of international law and to the laws
Protocol of 1925, to which the majority of
nations are still parties, of humanity;
Considering that the use of nuclear and thermo- (c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
nuclear weapons would bring about weapons is a war directed not against an
indiscriminate suffering and destruction to enemy or enemies alone but also against
mankind and civilisation to an even greater mankind in general, since the peoples of
extent than the use of those weapons declared the world not involved in such a war will
by the aforementioned international be subjected to al the evils generated by
declarations and agreements to be contrary to the use of such weapons;
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Annexure VIII
(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo- convening a special conference for
nuclear weapons is to be considered as signing a convention on the prohibition
violating the Charter of the United of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear
Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of weapons for war purposes and to report
humanity and as committing a crime on the results of such consultation to the
against mankind and civilization; General Assembly at its seventeenth
session.
2. Requests the Secretary-General to consult
the Governments of Member States to Source : http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/167/06/IMG/
ascertain their views on the possibility of NR016706.pdf?OpenElement
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84
Annexure IX
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IDSA Task Force Report
nuclear arms reduction and disarmament, Council has acted upon, demands that the
and on a Treaty on general and complete parties concerned comply fully with their
disarmament under strict and effective obligations under the relevant Security
international control, and calls on all other Council resolutions, and reaffirms its call
States to join in this endeavour; upon them to find an early negotiated
solution to these issues;
6. Calls upon all States Parties to the NPT to
cooperate so that the 2010 NPT Review 11. Encourages efforts to ensure development
Conference can successfully strengthen of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by
the Treaty and set realistic and achievable countries seeking to maintain or develop
goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars: non- their capacities in this field in a
proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear framework that reduces proliferation risk
energy, and disarmament; and adheres to the highest international
standards for safeguards, security, and
7. Calls upon all States to refrain from
safety;
conducting a nuclear test explosion and
to sign and ratify the Comprehensive 12. Underlines that the NPT recognizes in
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), thereby Article IV the inalienable right of the
bringing the treaty into force at an early Parties to the Treaty to develop research,
date; production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination
8. Calls upon the Conference on
and in conformity with Articles I and II,
Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty
and recalls in this context Article III of the
banning the production of fissile material
NPT and Article II of the IAEA Statute;
for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices as soon as possible, 13. Calls upon States to adopt stricter national
welcomes the Conference on controls for the export of sensitive goods
Disarmament’s adoption by consensus of and technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle;
its Program of Work in 2009, and requests
14. Encourages the work of the IAEA on
all Member States to cooperate in guiding
multilateral approaches to the nuclear
the Conference to an early
fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear
commencement of substantive work;
fuel supply and related measures, as
9. Recalls the statements by each of the five effective means of addressing the
nuclear-weapon States, noted by expanding need for nuclear fuel and
resolution 984 (1995), in which they give nuclear fuel services and minimizing the
security assurances against the use of risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA
nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon Board of Governors to agree upon
State Parties to the NPT, and affirms that measures to this end as soon as possible;
such security assurances strengthen the
15. Affirms that effective IAEA safeguards
nuclear non-proliferation regime;
are essential 10 prevent nuclear
10. Expresses particular concern at the proliferation and to facilitate cooperation
current major challenges to the non- in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear
proliferation regime that that the Security energy, and. in that regard:
86
Annexure IX
87
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88
Annexure X
89
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90
Annexure XI
3.1.2.2 Declaration by the United States and 3.1.3.1 Conclusion of a treaty banning
the Soviet Union that the fissile chemical weapons
material released under the INF
3.1.3.2 Conclusion of a treaty banning
Treaty would be utilized for peaceful
radiological weapons
purposes only and accordingly be
subjected to supervision by the 3.1.4 Conventional Force:
International Atomic Energy Agency 3.1.4.1 Substantial reduction of NATO and
3.1.2.3 Declaration by all nuclear weapon Warsaw Pact conventional forces,
States of their stockpiles of nuclear especially offensive forces, and
weapons and weapon-grade weapon systems in Europe from the
fissionable material Atlantic to the Urals
91
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92
Annexure XI
93
IDSA Task Force Report
4.5 A world order crafted out of outmoded respected. The right of each nation to
concepts of the balance of power, of choose its own socio-economic system
dominance by power blocs, of spheres of must be assured.
influence, and of special rights and
4.7 Concomitant changes will be called for in
privileges for a select group of nations is
the international economics order. The
an unacceptable anachronism. It is out of
interdependence o all the economies of
tune with the democratic temper of our
the world makes for a symbiotic
age.
relationship between development in the
4.6 The new structure of international South and stability and growth in the
relations has to be based on scrupulous North. In a just and equitable order, access
adherence to the principles of peaceful to technology and resources, on fair and
coexistence and the Charter of the United reasonable terms will be assured. The gap
Nations. It is necessary to evolve stronger between the rich and the poor nations will
and more binding mechanisms for the be bridged.
settlement of disputes, regional and
international. The diversity among Source: Appendix 6, in Manpreet Sethi, Nuclear
Strategy: India’s March towards Credible Deterrence
nations must be recognized and (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2009), pp. 383-388.
94
Annexure XII
95
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96
Annexure XIII
97
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98
Annexure XIV
Mindful of the solemn obligations of States Recognizing with satisfaction that the Antarctic
parties, undertaken in article VI of the Treaty Treaty 74 and the treaties of Tlatelolco, 75
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Rarotonga, 76 Bangkok, 77 Pelindaba 78 and
71
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.
72
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of NuclearWeapons, Final
Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I) and Corr.2), annex, decision 2.
73
2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I
(NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled “Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular
paragraphs”, para. 15:6.
74
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 402, No. 5778.
75
Ibid., vol. 634, No. 9068.
76
See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 10: 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.7), appendix VII.
77
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1981, No. 33873.
78
A/50/426, annex.
99
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Semipalatinsk,79 as well as Mongolia’s nuclear- the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to
weapon-free status, are gradually freeing the the Treaty,80
entire southern hemisphere and adjacent areas
Desiring to achieve the objective of a legally
covered by those treaties from nuclear
binding prohibition of the development,
weapons,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling,
Stressing the importance of strengthening all threat or use of nuclear weapons and their
existing nuclear-related disarmament and arms destruction under effective international
control and reduction measures, control,
Recognizing the need for a multilaterally Recalling the advisory opinion of the
negotiated and legally binding instrument to International Court of Justice on the Legality of
assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued on
threat or use of nuclear weapons, 8 July 1996,81
Reaffirming the central role of the Conference Taking note of the relevant portions of the report
on Disarmament as the sole multilateral of the Secretary-General relating to the
disarmament negotiating forum, and implementation of resolution 60/76,82
regretting the lack of progress in disarmament
1. Underlines once again the unanimous
negotiations, particularly nuclear
conclusion of the International Court of
disarmament, in the Conference during its 2006
Justice that there exists an obligation to
session,
pursue in good faith and bring to a
Emphasizing the need for the Conference on conclusion negotiations leading to
Disarmament to commence negotiations on a nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
phased programme for the complete under strict and effective international
elimination of nuclear weapons with a control;
specified framework of time,
2. Calls once again upon all States
Expressing its regret over the failure of the 2005 immediately to fulfil that obligation by
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty commencing multilateral negotiations
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear
to reach agreement on any substantive issues, weapons convention prohibiting the
development, production, testing,
Expressing its deep concern at the lack of progress
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat
in the implementation of the thirteen steps to
or use of nuclear weapons and providing
implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-
for their elimination;
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons agreed to at
79
Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.
80
See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol.
I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I, section entitled “Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular
paragraphs”, para. 15.
81
A/51/218, annex; see also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996,
p. 226.
82
A/61/127 and Add.1.
100
Annexure XIV
3. Requests all States to inform the Secretary- 4. Decides to include in the provisional
General of the efforts and measures they agenda of its sixty-second session the item
have taken on the implementation of the entitled “Follow-up to the advisory
present resolution and nuclear opinion of the International Court of
disarmament, and requests the Secretary- Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use
General to apprise the General Assembly of Nuclear Weapons”.
of that information at its sixty-second
Source: http://disarmament2.un.org/vote.nsf/
session; 511260f3bf6ae9c005256705006e0a5b/
29f78f3e7148aec785257205006b1a0d/$FILE/
A%20RES%2061%2083.pdf
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N.S. Sisodia is the Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. He has earlier served as Secretary to
Government of India in the Ministries of Finance and Defence. He was also
Vice-Chancellor of the University of Udaipur.
Arvind Gupta, a member of the Indian Foreign Service, holds the Lal Bahadur
Shastri Chair at IDSA. He is also the Managing Editor of Strategic Analysis
and Cluster Coordinator of the Internal Security and South Asia Clusters.
G. Balachandran
Balachandran, a Visiting Fellow at the IDSA and the National Maritime
Foundation, is a well-known scholar on nuclear issues and defence economics.
Rajiv Nayan is a Research Officer at the IDSA working on nuclear issues for
more than a decade.
Saba Joshi is a Research Intern at the IDSA with research interests in nuclear
issues.
102