Corrected copy for Chapter 18, Brill Companion to the Reception of Plato in Antiquity, bibliography included

Chapter 18

The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides

Dennis Clark

Across the history of Platonism in Antiquity the interpretative fortunes of the

Parmenides underwent significant changes as the dialogue came to be valued
more and more as a vehicle for the definition of Platonic doctrine, utilized by
Platonists who sought to find in it more than a logical exercise. For the Middle
Platonists, it was the Timaeus that held pride of place as the source for most
of what was considered Plato’s conception of nature, creation, and even theol-
ogy, although it is possible that some philosophers did not completely ignore
the Parmenides, such as Moderatus, and it is hardly likely that it did not figure
to some extent already in the thought of Speusippus and Xenocrates. But for
the period preceding Plotinus’ direct reference to it in Ennead V.1, there is no
strong evidence of a concentrated effort in any surviving text which would in-
dicate that the dialogue was seen as primarily informing Platonism. Nor does it
appear to have been the subject of any commentary composed before the sec-
ond century AD, and it was that form of philosophizing which came to be in the
later period of Antiquity the main means of extracting from Plato’s own texts
his doctrine as it was to be rendered by his later followers in their own writings.
Thus in this light the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides (hereafter
Comm.) likely appears as the earliest extant attempt to practice Platonic phi-
losophy via the means of commenting on the content of the dialogue, which
was already hundreds of years old to its commentator. To modern readers and
scholars, however, the resultant value of the Comm., as for any other ancient
commentary on Plato, is of almost entirely historical value, most useful for in-
ferring the doctrine rather of its author. But it ought to be kept in mind that
the later Academic philosophers, such as the Neoplatonists, thought of them-
selves as true followers and inheritors of Plato, not innovators. The question
furthermore arises of how closely the author of the Comm. in his reading of the
Parmenides involves himself in interpretative issues which are germane to any
reading of the dialogue, as opposed to viewing it as a touchstone or expediency
to enable the importation or imposition of what truly are new concepts, regard-
less of how much he may have thought of himself as a faithful Platonist. The
Comm. also needs to be judged in the context of the development of the status
of the Parmenides itself in the history of Platonism in Antiquity, and as well in
the development of the commentary form, as the dialogue grew in importance
352 Cl ar k

in its reception in the later period. The issue also of the identity of its author,
his own philosophical allegiances, and the nature of the Platonism he evinces
loom large in any consideration of the place of this unusual work in the antique
Platonist tradition, although the salience of the authorship question should not
overshadow any philosophical content to be derived from the Comm. itself.
The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides has come down from An-
tiquity only in fragmentary condition, and was not known to modern schol-
arship until its discovery in the late 19th century in palimpsest form within
a manuscript of the library of Turin.1 Codex Taurinensis F VI 1, originally from
Bobbio, consisted of 94 folios containing an evangelarium, judged from its
script to be of the 5th to 6th century. Seven of the folios, however, had been
taken from an earlier Greek manuscript, apparently of the 5th century.2 The
resulting text produced by the first editor, Kroll, is comprised of six fragments
on 14 folio pages, which address the second half of the Parmenides, limited to
lemmata from the first and second hypotheses.3 The fragments begin and end
discontinuously, so that the first and last lines interrupt the sentences they re-
cord. Thus the combined extant text is lacunose between each fragment when
taken as a whole, but the line text within each fragment is mostly continuous,
with the exception of two corrupted sections of frag. I and frag. II. As to the
overall length of the complete commentary, even an estimate would be very
difficult to achieve. The extant fragments refer only to the second half of the
dialogue, and there is no backward reference in what remains to any earlier
section of the Parmenides which would offer some proof that the Comm. in fact
covered the first part of the dialogue, nor can it be known how far it addressed
the second half. At any rate, the Comm. may well have been of considerable
length, and if it may safely be assumed that the philosophical quality of the
entire work is as sophisticated as what is highly evident in the extant text, its

1 For a brief history of the text of the Comm., see Bechtle (1999), 17–18, and for more detailed
discussion, Kroll (1892), and Linguiti (1995), 67–73. Kroll built on the earlier descriptive
work from 1873 by B. Peyron and W. Studemund to publish the first critical edition, fortu-
nately before the loss of the manuscript in the fire at the library in Turin in 1904.
2 The relevant folios are 64, 67, and 90–94, for a total of 14 pages containing 35 lines each of
the Greek text in uncials, although the Latin script concluded on 92v, leaving 93 and 94 as
not palimpsest. See Bechtle (1999), 18, for the complete ordering of the folios. As to a rough
dating of the work itself, the reference to the CO in frag. IV and the dating of the original
Greek manuscript frame the period of authorship between the late 2nd century and the end
of the 5th century.
3 See Chase (2012b), 1359–61, and Bechtle (1999), 38–62 for the coverage of the dialogue.
That the Comm. is a lemmatic commentary appears certain from its general character and
the specific inclusion of Plato’s text from Prm.141a5ff in frag. III.
Th e An on ymou s Commen t ar y on t h e Par men id es 353

fragmentary state represents a considerable loss to the Platonic tradition as a

whole and certainly to the later interpretation of the Parmenides as a major
dialogue.
The Parmenides is known to have received several formal commentaries in
Antiquity, either by report or by the direct evidence of a surviving work. Ex-
tant in large part or whole are only Proclus’ massive exegesis and Damascius’
aporetic treatment of the first hypothesis in his Problems and Solutions Con-
cerning First Principles and the remaining hypotheses in his own commentary.
With the exception of the Comm., all the known others have Neoplatonist au-
thors, according to the authority of Proclus, including Porphyry and Iambli-
chus. Any attempt to appraise the position of the Comm. is challenged not
only by its anonymity and lack of certain dating, but also by the fact that no
other reported or surviving commentary predates Plotinus.4 Despite these
limita- tions, some observations can still be made, with some confidence.
Judged from the lower end of its broadest likely timeframe of composition,
the late 2nd century, the Comm. may well be the first addressed to the Par-
menides, as a formal work, of substantial length with serious intent to offer
what appears to be a cohesive interpretation.5 That the Comm. is also a “run-
ning commentary”, likely with a determined, if not completely discernible sko-
pos, shows itself even from the six extant fragments.6 Some value can be drawn
by comparing the Comm. with the Anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus,
also unfortunately fragmentary, which must predate the Comm., likely falling
within the period of the 1st century BC to 1st century AD; it represents the best
surviving example of an acknowledged Middle Platonist commentary.7 David
Sedley has shown that this work reflects the reality of the need after the closure
of the Academy for Platonists to restore the authority of Plato via exegesis of
the dialogues themselves as the main surviving witnesses of the Old Academy,
but that in order to achieve this goal, the Attic language of Plato in many cases

4 For excellent surveys of the philosophical commentary as a genre in Antiquity, see Baltussen
(2007), Chiaradonna (2012), Hoffmann (2006), Sedley (1997), and for the history of com-
mentary on Parm. specifically, Steel (2002), and Brisson (2010c).
5 Steel (2002), 12–13, does point out that Galen is known to have written an epitome of Parm.
amongst the others he produced of Plato’s dialogues, but otherwise affirms this ranking of
the Comm.
6 See Baltussen (2007), 261–2, of the historical development of the running commentary.
7 For the edition of the fragments and general discussion, see Bastianini and Sedley (1995),
and Sedley (1997), 122–9. Cf. the remarks of Dillon (1971), 126, on the character of Middle
Platonic commentaries in general, as introduction to his examination of another example, in
the fragments of Harpocration.
354 Cl ar k

needed explanation to contemporary speakers of Koine.8 Hence the Commen-

tary on the Theaetetus is likely typical of Middle Platonic commentaries in that
it is structured around included lemmata, offering generous but not exclusive-
ly philological exegesis, and in that helpful paraphrases not infrequently follow
the lemma itself. Its author is concerned also to set forth Plato’s doctrine with-
in the context of rival schools, seeking to reestablish on its own a comprehen-
sive Platonic philosophy via commentary. An excellent example comes early in
the extant fragments, col. V-VII on Tht. 143d1–5, where the notion of oikeiosis
(“appropriation”) as a basis of justice is explicated by, in part, cited rejection
of its specific definition in Stoicism and Epicureanism, in a somewhat polem-
ical fashion.9 In contrast, the Comm., at least in the extant fragments, is not
concerned at all with this kind of philological explanation, nor polemic, nor
comparison with other schools. Rather its method is to express a specific phil-
osophical reading without much recourse, at least in the extant fragments, to
other authors, though Plato always serves according to the writer of the Comm.
as the authoritative source for the implicit interpretation being laid out. This
approach is exhibited in frag. VI, which dwells on the function of the intellect.
Although the lemma itself is merely an introductory passage to the discussion
of the nature of the second one, before it is demonstrated how multiplicity
derives from the second one and being, the Comm. here essentially seizes on
one phrase, “that one itself”, Parm. 143a9, and from it the base apparatus of in-
tellect – intellect very much in the sense of a hypostasis – is extrapolated, as it
were. In this manner, the Comm. displays much more commonality with later
Neoplatonist running commentaries, appearing clearly in the vein of practic-
ing what really amounts to original philosophy via the means of an exegesis of
a received text of the master Plato, appearing, at least to a modern reader, more
exploratory than explanatory.
As is well known, with the shift from Scepticism starting with Antiochus, the
Platonists turned to Plato’s dialogues as a main source to create anew a positive
conception of his thought. Within that process, the dialogues were appraised
and categorized as to their subject and intent, but for the Middle Platonists it
was not the Parmenides, but rather the Timaeus, which served a central role.10
The Parmenides was first viewed as merely a logical exercise, either polemi-
cal or by some as expository, as Proclus relates in the invaluable survey of the
ancient tradition of the interpretation of the dialogue to be found in his own

8 Sedley (1997), 112–16, also citing the fundamental work of P. Hadot (1987), and Donini
(1994).
9 See Bonazzi (2008), 598–9.
10 See Runia (1986), 38–57, for an excellent summary of the status of Tim. in the period.
Th e An on ymou s Commen t ar y on t h e Par men id es 355

commentary on it.11 Next in chronological order he reports the first metaphys-

ical reading, which denies any ontological precedence to the one of the first
hypothesis with its negations, but is an advance on the earlier, purely logical in-
terpretations.12 Proclus furthermore presents two more schools of the exegetic
tradition, both also metaphysical: the first includes those who take the dialogue
to describe the complete structure of reality as it unfolds from the One, such
that each of the original hypotheses of the dialogue represents a level in the
hierarchy of being. The cornerstone of this edifice was laid at least as early as
Plotinus, who set the One at the pinnacle of his system and then associated it
with the one of Plato’s Parmenides in the first hypothesis, and then Intellect
with the second, and Soul with the third, although Plotinus is not named by
Proclus.13 The accepted list of commentators derived from him is as follows,
though perhaps not all of whom published formal commentaries: Amelius,
Porphyry, Iamblichus, Theodore of Asine, “the philosopher from Rhodes”,
Plutarch of Athens, and Syrianus.14 The number of total hypothe ses determined
to be in the dialogue furthermore varies across their interpreta- tions, as well as
the level of being each is assigned, according to Proclus’ report.15 The final
school of thought presented by him, as last and best, is that of his
master Syrianus, who according to Proclus declared the dialogue’s subject not
merely as being or the only being, but rather as One as the primordial cause
of all being – yet also One as God. Thus there ultimately came to be a theolog-
ical interpretation of the Parmenides, and not in any casual manner, one con-
cerned still with a thorough metaphysical exposition of being, but now also
within the context of the divine.16

11 For in-depth discussion of Proclus’ documentation of the history of commentary on

Parm., see Morrow and Dillon (1987), xxiv–xxxiv and 7–9. For the history of the recep-
tion and interpretation of the dialogue, see Steel (2002), 11–40, Bechtle (1999), 71–76,
Halfwassen (2006), 267–75, and Corrigan (2010), 23–36, the last of whom surveys not
only the ancient schools of thought but modern opinion as well.
12 This reading is most likely that of the Platonist Origen, singled out and criticized by
Proclus for taking this view. Cf. Steel (2002), 31–35, for this development, and Dillon
(1987), 8.
13 See Steel (2002), 15–23.
14 See Saffrey and Westerink (1968), l xxxviii, for this summary list, and for discussion of
the problematic Rhodian commentator.
15 For the history of the exegesis of the hypotheses up to Proclus, see Saffrey and Westerink
(1968), l xxv-l xxxix.
16 Proclus, in Parm. I 641–643. See Steel (2002), 38–41 for discussion. Iamblichus is the
first Neoplatonist known to have undertaken the theological interpretation in a formal
commentary on Parm. See Steel (1997a), 15–30.
356 Cl ar k

The question immediately arises of whether the author of the Comm.

is among these or not: would Proclus, if he were familiar with such a work,
totally ignore the formal commentary of a Platonist working at the high level
of interpretation which characterizes it? Obviously in its fragmentary state,
there is no way to determine how many of the hypotheses the author of
the Comm. covered, and how or, to be sure, even if he associated each with
some level of being. However much the author had addressed the first and
second hypotheses in detail, he makes it clear that he considers the one of
the first hypothesis to rank at the supreme level. The two fragments covering
the beginning section of the second hypothesis clearly concern themselves
primarily with intellect or mind and how it proceeds from the one of the first
hypothesis.17 What are the main philosophical elements that can be drawn
from the fragments of the Comm. to aid in placing it in the above tradition of
interpretation of the Parmenides?
At the outset it should be noted that throughout the fragments the first one
is referred to as god, as theos in such a way as to make clear that the author
identifies the one of the first hypothesis with god. God, or the one, has an ab-
solute singularity, but must not, as in the thought of Speusippus, be considered
reductive or a mere counterpart to or retreat from multiplicity.18 God is the
cause of all things, their multitude and their being, and can be addressed as
“one” as long as not in the sense of simplicity or smallness, rather by its hypos-
tasis which is superior. God, though cause of being, is himself superstantial or
hyperousios, and through him are both one and monad. Just as god is no min-
imum, nor does he “snatch himself away” from that for which he is the cause
of being, as the Chaldaean Oracles assert, regardless of their being divine utter-
ances – but will appear thus to humans to whom such things cannot be under-
stood. Nor does he abolish number in the exercise of his power, but remains

17 Given the anonymous nature of the Comm., throughout this analysis it is proper to refer
always to the one of the first or second hypothesis under discussion not as the One, the
Neoplatonic One, though indeed if the author is post-Plotinian then it would not be inap-
propriate, but in order not to prejudice the discussion as to authorship, that form at least
in English will be avoided.
18 Consistently when discussing this point the author in fact uses Speusippus’ own term,
plethos, not some other, such as ta polla, used most frequently by Plato himself in the
text under commentary. Unless he is using the term as merely a synonym without further
relevance, because he does repeat it more than once, is the author in the first fragment ac-
cording more than a passing reference to Speusippus, but rather engaging in some more
detailed polemic? For studies of Speusippus in the Comm., see Halfwassen (1993), Bech-
tle (2010), and Brisson (2010a).
Th e An on ymou s Commen t ar y on t h e Par men id es 357

one. He allows of no aspects or relations, and is unknowable to humans, and

as such the only means of definition of god or the one which is available to
humans is by negative theology. God or the one does not divide into knower
and known, since there is no difference possible within himself. Yet, by a sort
of transcendent type of knowledge, all knowledge is within him.
But god or the one encompasses a sort of idea of being, such that in it, in
a way, preexists being, while remaining pure and unmixed itself, beyond sub-
stance and being and act, and so causes being to be imparted the one of the
second hypothesis, the one that is. The second one participates vertically in
that idea of being which is provided by god or the first one, but the nature of
the participation with the first one which allows the reception or bestowal of
its oneness is horizontal. But his participation is not at all a simple juxtaposi-
tion, which effects the procession from the first one. The second one, simple as
it is, drawing on the first one, also differs from itself in act (energeia) and exis-
tence (hyparxis): it is not one and simple on the level and the triad of existence
(hyparxis), intellect (noesis), and life (zoe). Just so also mind or intellect cannot
see itself other than by some power of oneness, some power transcending the
act of thought and what is thought, in order to distinguish and hold one from
the other. The mind works within the triad as well. The act of thought and
what is thought have being and are actions, and by the first term of the triad,
existence, the action would be of remaining and not moving. By the second,
intellect, the action would be of self-regard, reversion, and by the third term,
life, the action would be of having proceeded from mere existence and become
indefinite (aoristos). So mind, in so far as it is one, by that higher power above
action that governs its actions, is not moving nor changing nor subject to any
relation; but at the same time it is yet all these things, in its actions, according
in fact to the triad starting from existence, then to intellect regarding itself, and
expanding to the level of life. So the second one within its orbit ranges from
what is beyond measure to that which is boundless in its measure, and mind
conforms within that orbit.
There can be no doubt that such a reading is a metaphysical one, obviously
far removed from any logical one typical of Middle Platonism, nor can it be in
anyway consonant with the view of Origen, who dismissed the first one is as
ontologically negatory.19 Though given that only the first two hypotheses are
represented in the fragments, it is clearly a concern of the author to examine
the hierarchy of being. The concept of procession furthermore is twice clear-
ly referred to in frag. V and in any way that would imply it is implicit to
the

19 For Origen’s interpretation, see Morrow and Dillon (1987), 389–91.

358 Cl ar k

author’s conception of this hypostatic structure.20 It is also of no little signif-

icance that the commentator identifies, consistently and clearly in no mere-
ly metaphorical fashion, the one of the first hypothesis with god as an entity
which is above being. To do such is to impose an external ontological frame-
work onto the Parmenides and link it in the most fundamental way to theology.
There is of course no discussion by Plato himself of the one as god in any of the
hypotheses, and so this reading of the dialogue must appear as a noteworthy
point in the evolution of Platonism. But it should be added, in consideration
of the known development of Platonic ontology across its full history, that this
representation of the one of the first hypothesis as well as the association of
the second one with Nous both allow or even promote the view that the au-
thor, while carefully referring to the one of the first hypothesis and the one of
the second, presents in his interpretation of the Parmenides a hypostasized
structure like that of Plotinus, and those Neoplatonists who followed him.
Did any earlier Platonist associate the one of the first hypothesis with god?
There is no direct evidence of such a view, either in a formal commentary on
the Parmenides or otherwise, but certainly given the loss of so many Middle
Platonic texts, this absence of evidence cannot be determinative evidence of
absence. Two figures however present themselves as possibilities, and have
received much attention as such, and in fact in direct connection with the
Comm. One is Moderatus, the subject of Dodds’well known study arguing that
he had already in his time established an ontological hierarchy of three Ones,
based on the first three hypotheses of the Parmenides, and indeed one much
like that of Plotinus.21 The other is Eudorus, who does himself place a One as

20 The commentator’s term is parodos, not the perhaps more likely to be expected proodos,
within this context of mixed, “horizontal” participation, put forth here as the mechanism of
procession, see Bechtle (1999), 169–74, especially on 171, where Bechtle points out that even
if not in Parm. itself here, Plato does elsewhere present such a mixing, non-hierarchical par-
ticipation, for example at Sph. 254d. For more on this “horizontal”participation and how this
passage unfolds, see also Hadot (1961), 422–3, and cf. Brisson (2010b), 277–80. The appear-
ance of the term parodos is of significance also for the dating of the Comm., although it has
not been hitherto noted in the scholarship: if it is pre-Plotinian, then this is very likely the first
extant explicit expression of the concept of procession. Or on the other hand, since it is a fun-
damental element and concern for Plotinus, perhaps it is rather more likely to offer proof that
the Comm. is either contemporary or post-Plotinian. Could the use of parodos in this instance
be an attempt to represent in a precise manner this type of “horizontal”participation?
21 Dodds (1928), including in his argument that Moderatus may have commented on Parm.,
if not necessarily formally. For more on possible pre-Plotinian interpretation of the hy-
potheses as more than merely logical, especially by Moderatus and other Neopythagore-
ans, see Tarrant (1993), 148–77.
Th e An on ymou s Commen t ar y on t h e Par men id es 359

the highest principle, directly above the Monad and Dyad. He furthermore in
fact also refers to the One as hyperano theos, interestingly enough using exactly
the same expression as appears in the Comm. in frag. II. 91v l.12.22 Both philos-
ophers, it should be noted, worked in the Neopythagorean milieu as well as the
Platonic, and so it may be they tended to privilege this sort of henology more
than other contemporaneous Middle Platonists did. The main question is, did
they look to the Parmenides in any way to support those views: in the case of
Eudorus there is no direct evidence at all, and in that of Moderatus there is
Porphyry’s report of the three Ones, and Dodds’ persuasive arguments which
attempt and have been often accepted to wed them to the dialogue. Yet to be
sure, nevertheless, despite the strength of the evidence which he presents and
which has been added since his time, incontrovertible proof cannot be found
in any ancient source that Moderatus was referring to the Parmenides. Alterna-
tively perhaps he was influenced rather by the three Kings found in the Second
Letter, which may have arisen earlier and been furthermore even established
separately from the Letter.23
Thus, all in all, as far as the existing fragments allow an appraisement, in
form and in method, in its philosophical type of interpretation as metaphysi-
cal and at least rudimentarily theological, when viewed in light of the known
tradition, the Comm. is better judged to have more in common with most Neo-
platonic commentaries than with what is known and remains of those of Mid-
dle Platonism.
Since, then, the discovery of the Comm. scholars, not surprisingly, have at-
tempted to determine not just the period of its composition but its author,
using a variety of approaches. Given, however, the nature of the extant text,
the chief means used to answer this extremely interesting question is the ex-
amination of any philosophical content extracted from it, including analysis of
terms which can be safely taken from it in order to be considered as technical
ones in a Platonic context and evaluated in comparison with known works of
other authors. But at the outset it may have to be conceded that the extremely
small range of fragments precludes any absolute success, and that the best that
can be hoped for is a probability of assignment, or perhaps exclusion of certain
philosophers from the authorship. Yet despite the fragments’ sparseness, the
luck of the remains is such fortunately that they do at least address the first

22 For Eudorus’ philosophy, see Dillon (1977/1996), 114–35.

23 See Saffrey and Westerink (1974), xx–l ix, for history of the exegesis of the Second Letter. AQ1
For a recent critique of Dodds’ argument concerning Moderatus, and strenuous reex-
amination of the “Neoplatonic” interpretation of Parm. as a whole, see Gerson (2016),
73–75.
 360 Cl ar k

and second hypotheses, and so most definitely engage matters of major rele-
vance to Platonic ontology.
Much of the scholarship on the Comm. in fact has concentrated in large
part, often in complex argument, on this one issue of authorship. Some years
after Kroll had proposed a 4th century Platonist between Iamblichus and Syr-
ianus, Plutarch of Athens was then suggested, but since Hadot’s major work
claiming Porphyry as the author, more and more scholars have tended to ac-
cept his thesis. But others have nevertheless countered that the commentary
must be earlier, that it is likely Neopythagorean, and with some also finding
additional evidence in Sethian Gnostic texts appearing to parallel passages in
the Comm. in order to support an earlier, non-Porphyrian author. Others con-
tinue to reserve judgment as to any attribution.24
Hadot’s contention is based on several principles: first, that the Comm. as-
sumes the philosophy of Plotinus, since both associate as fundamental the one
of the first hypothesis with a One as the supreme principle, and a form of Intel-
lect with the one of the second hypothesis, and by the fact that the treatment
in the Comm. of the triad hyparxis, intellect, and life appears as being more de-
veloped than in Plotinus’conception. Secondly, Hadot finds specific, highly sig-
nificant lexical concurrences of crucial terminology in the Comm. and in works
of Porphyry.25 In addition to these correspondences, Hadot investigates in great
depth doctrinal commonalities found in both the Comm. and in several works
of Marius Victorinus, and attributes their original source as Porphyry, especially
the concept of being and the “idea of being”in frag. V, and that of the intelligible
triad.26 Underlying his thesis is furthermore a basic interpretation of Porphyry’s

24 For the first editor’s reasoning, see Kroll (1892), 624. For a comprehensive and balanced
survey of the scholarship, centering on the work of Hadot attributing the Comm. to Por-
phyry, including criticisms and objections, see above all Chase (2012b), 1362–71. See
AQ2 also Hadot (1968), 103–7, denying the attribution by Beutler (1957), to Plutarch of Ath-
ens. Taormina (1989), rejects Plutarch as well, but would assign an author of the later
4th century, as does Linguiti (1995), 91. Cf. Zambon (2002), 35–41, and Girgenti (1996),
171–86, for other surveys, in support of Hadot. For a survey given in course of one major
expression of the view that the Comm. is not by Porphyry, see Corrigan (2000), 141–2.
Some have taken the view that Porphyry himself need not be the author, but rather some
unknown follower, and at least one scholar has proposed Amelius: Brisson (2010a), 61.
25 Even with the loss of so many of Porphyry’s works in which the relevant terminology
would likely be expected to appear for comparison with that of the Comm., Hadot com-
piles a very persuasive assemblage, drawn from Sent., Philosophos historia, Harm., In Cat.,
among others. See Hadot (1961), 429–38.
26 But see Drecoll (2010), for the argument that Victorinus need not have drawn these con-
cepts from Porphyry.
Th e An on ymou s Commen t ar y on t h e Par men id es 361

method: that he attempts to reconcile the teachings of Plotinus with those of

the Chaldaean Oracles, and resolve the conflict of the essentially Middle Pla-
tonic position of the Oracles, in its view that the supreme god holds in himself
Power and Intellect and engages in act and furthermore encompasses a sort of
preexistence of the realities, with Plotinus’ position that the supreme One is
purely absolute, that is does not act, and that Intellect proceeds from the One.27
As persuasive to many as the arguments of Hadot continue to be, they have
not gone unchallenged. Two main approaches have been taken in criticism of
his proof of the authorship. One centers on the thesis that there is in actuality
no philosophical doctrine contained in the Comm. which could not be ascribed
to a Middle Platonist – one, however, who will have espoused those concepts
in it in anticipation of Plotinus. Also, given the citation of the Chaldaean
Oracles, among other reasons, he will have been a Platonist of the time of and
of similar views to Numenius, and likely also a Neopythagorean.28 The other
contention centers on the relationship of certain Sethian Gnostic texts to
the Comm., particularly as regards the emergence of the second one and the
triad of hyparxis, intellect, and life. In this view the Gnostic works, including
Zostrianos and Allogenes, are seen as posterior to and centrally influenced by
the Comm.; in this argument also it is seen as the work of a Middle Platonist.29
The Gnostic texts in addition exhibit a reliance on apophatic theology as the
only means available to mortals to relate to the ineffable, very much like the
apophatic usages in frag. II.30 Victorinus, furthermore, at least in part (Adversus
Arium I.49), has been shown rather to share a common Greek source with
the Coptic Zostrianos, once again likely Middle Platonic in origin, preceding
Porphyry, although Hadot has pointed out that this discovery pertains only
to the second group of texts of Victorinus put forth by him as evidence for
Porphyry’s authorship.31

27 Hadot (1968), 482.

28 Chiefly Bechtle (1999), and (2000), and Corrigan (2000).
29 Corrigan (2000), and Turner (2001), 724–44, for two seminal studies, followed by many
others, include Rasimus, (2010) and (2013). Again, for an extensive bibliography, see
Chase (2012b), 1365–66. Bechtle (2000), 408–12, adds to his earlier work more empha-
sis on the Gnostic evidence. On the triad in relation to Porphyry and the Comm., see Ed-
wards (1990), Majercik (1992), Majercik (2001) and Majercik (2005).
30 For a detailed discussion of its use in Allogenes, and many relevant remarks on the use of
apophatic measures in general, see Burns (2010). Negative theology was certainly well
attested as a key practice in Middle Platonism itself; cf. Carabine (1995), 51–102.
31 Tardieu (1996), and Hadot (1996). It is fair to say that there has not been a successful AQ3
effort to counter completely Hadot’s argument based on the lexical similarities between
the Comm. and known works of Porphyry.
362 Cl ar k

Hence both counter-arguments share the fundamental view that the Comm.
is pre-Plotinian, Middle Platonic, and likely of Neopythagorean character to
some degree. While the possible connections to Gnostic texts are certainly of
great interest, it is the Middle Platonic authorship which is crucial, it appears,
to both arguments, and a dependence on the likelihood that already in that
earlier period the Parmenides had been commented on in a metaphysical fash-
ion and in such a fundamental way that at a minimum the ones of the first two
hypotheses had been interpreted as representing henological levels of being.
But it must be that only those philosophers who also set a One which is also
transcendant at the head of their ontological system can be seen as viable can-
didates.32 Eudorus, as stated above, did indeed posit a One as the “highest god”
above all reality.33 But certainly the normal view of the Platonic god in Middle
Platonism, conceived of as expressed by Alcinous or Maximus of Tyre, as the
supreme Intellect within whose compass resides the Forms as thoughts, will
not comport at all to the first one of the Comm.
A fact, however, not noted previously in the scholarship (cited above) is that
the first one in the Comm. is referred to consistently and directly, not in any
metaphorical way, as theos, god (three times in frag. I, five in frag. II, and three
in frag. IV), and should offer an aspect of consideration to some degree in deter-
mining the authorship. In Book VI of his own commentary on the Parmenides
Proclus, while presenting how his predecessors understood the subject matter
of the hypotheses, confirms that Porphyry is among those who associate the
first hypothesis with “the Primal god”.34 Elsewhere indeed Porphyry himself

32 Bechtle (1999), 77–111, for Numenius, Eudorus, and Moderatus, and Bechtle (2000),
405–8, for more on Moderatus, and especially the important consideration proposed by
Dodds that Moderatus commented on Parm., if not formally, at least as a part of forming
the conception of the three One’s, which may of course predate Moderatus himself.
33 As noted by Bechtle (1999), 106. He rightly points out the difficulty given the sparse tex-
tual evidence for not only Eudorus but also Speusippus and Xenocrates to allow the deter-
mination of the nature and status of interpretation of Parm. up to Eudorus’time. Bechtle,
nevertheless, without specific proof, attributes a similar view to Eudorus as Dodds does
to Moderatus. What, however, is to be made of the usage of monad only two lines later in
the same fragment, how it actually fits into the ontology expressed there, appears to be a
question not fully addressed by any modern editor, though Linguiti (1995), 142–3, does
suggest the term may be used analogically to the monad as inferior counterpart to the
One on lower levels of reality, as in later Neoplatonists.
34 In Parm. VI 1054. Morrow and Dillon (1987), 412 n.21 points out that it is the scholiast here
who identifies Porphyry. Later at 1069, Proclus himself will declare that the subject of the
first hypothesis is god. Although this feature of the Comm. apparently has not been overtly
to any extent observed in the scholarship, Hadot does cite the phrase ho epi pasi theos, as
Th e An on ymou s Commen t ar y on t h e Par men id es 363

refers repeatedly to the One as god: in Sent. 31 each of several references to

the One is made as theos without exception, as well as in Smith 223f, one of
the fragments of his History of Philosophy reported by Cyril of Alexandria, and
likely also in another of those, 221f.35 Thus Porphyry is the first philosopher
after Eudorus definitely known to have equated the One with god in more than
one text and not just metaphorically, and to have commented formally on the
Parmenides.36
If Porphyry is indeed the author of the Comm., as Hadot holds, since it deals
with the first two hypotheses, the work then ought also to be examined for any
evidence contributing to the resolution of the apparent contradiction between
Porphyry’s position regarding the One and the criticism of Damascius (PA 43, I
86.8–15 Ruelle), that he made the highest principle of all things rather the Fa-
ther of the intellectual triad. Such a study has been undertaken, one of whose
arguments from an insightful reading of frag. Vand VI is that the second one in
its relationship (schesis) to being implicitly forms a sort of triad in its unfold-
ing, as it gives rise to being, a triad of the One, being, and Difference. It may
be observed then that Dillon’s implicit triad thus would be embedded in the
“horizontal” participation in operation here.37 So, in a sense, the principle of
being appears to reside or at least come into operation, at the second level, but

one lexical item also used frequently by Porphyry elsewhere and thus one hallmark of
Porphyry’s authorship. Bechtle (1999), 248, and, more extensively, Cazelais (2005), to be
sure have shown that the term predates Porphyry handily and is hardly uncommon – but
the more important issue must be not the particular phrasing used, but the fact itself of
the identification of the first one with god, and that theos in any form is used so freely and
often for the first one For more ons Porphyry's theological conception of the One,
see now Johnson (2013), 57-63.
35 Cf. Porphyry (ed.) Brisson (2005), I 332–4, for the Greek text of Sent. 31. Porphyry in chap.
34 of de Abstinentia, following Apollonius of Tyana, proclaims the impropriety of phys-
ical sacrifice to god, again terming him ho epi pasi theos, for the reason that he is above
all being. Porphyry does not however in this passage make explicit mention of the One,
although his description there of the nature of god and the apophatic sacrificial mode
due him because of his nature is quite fitting.
36 What, however, of his master Plotinus? The situation in this regard is rather complex, and
well explored by Rist (1962), 169–180, in which he lists all the possible instances of ref-
erences, mostly indirect, to the One as god in Plotinus. It should probably be kept in mind
also that Plotinus, as is well known, struggles to denominate the One in any way, and none
of Rist’s examples is at all as simply nominative as what is found in the Comm., but they
certainly nonetheless are noteworthy in this context.
37 See especially Dillon (2007), and for Porphyry’s apparently more flexible view of the
One than that of Plotinus in the Sent., Dillon (2010), and Dillon (1992), where he first
addresses the conflict between Damascius and Proclus with Porphyry, building also on
comments of Hadot (1968), and adduced more evidence from other works of Porphyry.
 364 Cl ar k

with the One presenting itself in this schesis and creating its own triad. But for
Damascius, in his accusation against Porphyry (along with Proclus, in Parm.
1070), this notion compromises the inviolable transcendence of the One. Even
if Porphyry otherwise set it on high, it could not also be brought down or ap-
pear to be brought down, subtly or not, into the realm of being and intellect,
regardless of the fact that Plato himself explicitly argued that the one of the
second hypothesis does act in this way at that level, in the passage under ex-
amination here. So perhaps, in a way, the quarrel was in reality more with Plato
than with Porphyry, again if he is the author of the Comm., or at least with what
Plato postulates in the Parmenides.
Whoever the author is, there is no doubt that he provides still a close read-
ing of the dialogue, but chiefly in order to support a metaphysical and theolog-
ical system not found directly in Plato’s dialogues. Its theological nature will
perhaps not have been as complex as what is seen in the later interpretations
of Syrianus and Proclus, and most likely Iamblichus, and there is of course no
knowing what other, if any, theological elements appeared in the remainder
of the Comm., but it is certainly at a minimum a step along that road, one that
leads far from any theological thought of Plato himself.38 If the Comm. is the
first formal commentary on the Parmenides, then it is the first step on that
road, which will propose a reading of Plato that unifies henology and theology
up and down the chain of being, and integrates so many of the ancient Greek
gods within its system, and with the dialogue as the backbone of that struc-
ture. However esoteric in fact that interpretation may be to Plato’s original in-
tent, the author of the Comm. again would have seen himself to be working to
explicate Plato, not to impose upon him a foreign doctrine.
The difficulties provided by the state of the text of the Comm. may never
allow any scholar to surmount them to the degree that an absolute consensus
regarding who that author is may be reached, but even so, much excellent
research along that daunting path has already brought greater clarity
regarding all the texts under consideration in connection with the Comm.,
many of which hold their own
special challenges. Regardless of whether agreement is ever achieved, much
more has been and no doubt will be accomplished in the search to delineate

38 Steel (1997a), 15–30, offers an excellent analysis of the theological elements of what can
be drawn from the extent evidence, mostly in Proclus, of Iamblichus’ overall interpreta-
tion of the hypotheses. There is unfortunately nothing particularly relevant in this regard
AQ4 to be found in the actual fragments of his commentary. See Van Riel (2013), especially
61–121 for the metaphysical aspect of Plato’s own conception of the gods, at least as pre-
sented in the dialogues, where again it should be pointed out that Tim. figures so promi-
nently, not Parm.
Th e An on ymou s Commen t ar y on t h e Par men id es 365

better the developmental relationship between Middle Platonism, the system

of the Chaldaean Oracles, the Gnostic texts, early Christian Latin Platonism,
and Neoplatonism, for which the Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides
offers itself as a considerable, if perplexing, witness of what was a new branch
taken in the development of Platonism, and which perhaps even also largely
marked a crossroads in the reception of Plato.

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