RULES 119 -

120
New Trial & Judgment
Criminal Procedure

GROUP 3 – 2C

Gualberto, Marshan Deinn S. (2012-045363)

Mansibang, Ferdinand B. (2011-026747)
Mendoza, Rafael Jerome M. (2016-094901)
Rosete, Michael Angelo A. (2012-041651)
Serrano, Kristine H. (2016-095042)
 CONCEPCION CUENCO, et. al. v. RAUL RISOS, et. al.
G.R. NO. 152643. August 28, 2008. THIRD DIVISION. (NACHURA, J.)

Facts:

Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before
the RTC of Cebu City where they made it appear in a deed of real estate mortgage that
Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence,
the criminal case. Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal
Case on the ground of prejudicial question; that the Civil Case—action for declaration of nullity
of the mortgage, should first be resolved. RTC granted the motion. This prompted Concepcion to
institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the RTC
orders.

The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter's deposition explaining the
need to perpetuate Concepcion's testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age,
which limited her freedom of mobility. RTC directed that Concepcion's deposition be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City. After several motions for change of venue of the
deposition-taking, Concepcion's deposition was finally taken at her residence—Cebu city.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the
CA.

CA observed that despite the defect in the respondents' petition, by not impleading the
People of the Philippines, an indispensable party, it resolved the matter on its merit, declaring
that Section 15, Rule 119 and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court govern the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion's
deposition should have been taken before the judge or the court where the case is pending, which
is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
Issue:

Whether or not Concepcion's advanced age and health condition exempt her from the
application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the
application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ruling:

NO. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the
witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken,
had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of
conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been compelled to appear
before the court for examination during the trial proper.

Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. Thus, it is required that the conditional examination be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. There is nothing
in the rule which may be interpreted that such requirement applies only to cases where the
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the
present case. If the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when
he is under detention. This requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the
witness' deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility.

The court cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls
for a strict construction of the rules. Petition is denied. CA decision and resolution are affirmed.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANACLETO MAGDANG, JOSE
CADUNGON and AMPARO SUMUGAT. G.R. No. L-836. (Bengzon, J.)

Facts:
In December, 1942, the defendants-appellees were charged with malicious mischief in
the justice of the peace court of Culasi, Antique. The complaint alleged that they had plowed
land planted with mongo thereby damaging the owner in the sum of fifteen pesos. They asserted
the right to cultivate the land. Found guilty by the justice of the peace, they appealed to the court
of first instance.  There the trial was postponed several times. On March 10, 1944, the case
was called for hearing. The provincial fiscal was absent. Counsel for defendants moved for
dismissal.

Issue:

W/N notification to of the actual date of hearing to the provincial fiscal is a dispensable
requirement for a new trial.

Ruling:

The records of the case now before us demonstrate how incomplete and informal the

proceedings were - obviously due to the emergency caused by the war. We find therein that the

fiscal never asserted in writing that he had not been notified. On the other hand the judge says

that said officer "failed to appear in court this morning without any reason" which fairly implies
that the fiscal had been notified, notice being a fundamental requirement which must be

presumed to have been complied with. In situations similar to the one asserted here by the

prosecution, the fiscal or the party affected should first make representations in the court below

(in a motion for reconsideration or new trial) as to the alleged non-receipt of notice, so that the

trial judge may have an opportunity to make an official statement on the point or see to it that the

records are completed.  Considering that the question involves a petty offense possibly

mixed up with a civil litigation, we see no justification in letting it clutter court records for a long

time, especially in the absence of a clear case. The order of dismissal is affirmed.

 People of the Philippines v. Buenaventura Mariano y Tabaquin
G.R. No. L-19243, February 29, 1964, EN BANC (Concepcion, J.)

Facts:
Buenaventura Mariano was charged of having illegally engaged in the business of
carrying, conveying or transmitting letters or packages for monetary consideration, without
authority. Mariano pleaded not guilty, and when the case was set for hearing, it was postponed
for several times upon his motion. When the trial was set for June 7, 1961, Mariano moved for
the appointment of assessors, which, the lower court denied for the following reasons:

1.) That the appointment of assessors is discretionary for the court which, under the
circumstances, felt should be exercised adversely to the accused; and
2.) That the motion had merely a dilatory purpose.

Issues:
1) W/N the defendant is entitled to the appointment of assessors
2) W/N said motion of Mariano was a mere dilatory tactic

Ruling:

YES. (But not granted- read no. 2) The lower court erred in ruling that the appointment of
assessors under Sec. 154 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is merely directory and does not in any
way imply a duty on the part of the court to grant the petition. Sec. 154, as has been applied in
several precedents is mandatory. The appointment of assessors is a substantial right granted by
law. Once the motion to this effect has been filed, the court is duty-bound to act on the motion.

YES. Lower court affirmed in denying the motion.The insistence of the defense to have
assessors appointed is merely part of the dilatory tactics employed by the defense. The case was
filed on August 11, 1960. When the case was called for the arraignment of the defendant, the
defense sought and obtained a postponement on the gorund that it had sought the reinvestigation
of the case. Finally, the defendant was arraigned on September 26, 1960. On November 14,
1960, the date set for trial, the defendant moved for postponement on the ground that his original
counsel had withdrawn and that he needed time to secure the services of another counsel. This
was granted in an order dated November 18, 1960. The hearing was set for January 4, 1961. On
January 3, 1961, the defense filed a motion for permission to withdraw his original plea of not
guilty to enable him to file a motion to quash. The Court granted the defense permission to file
the said motion which was in fact filed on January 9, 1961. On the same date, the Court denied
the motion to quash and the case was set for hearing on March 6, 1961. On March 3, 1961, the
defense, alleging that they had to file several briefs and memoranda, moved for the
postponement of the hearing. The defense counsel, however, taking for granted perhaps, that the
Court would grant their motion to postpone, failed to appear on March 6, 1961, whereupon the
Court ordered them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. On March 16, 1961,
the Court excused counsel for this non-appearance. The trial was set for June 7, 1961. On June 3,
1961, the defense filed his original motion for the appointment of assessors.

Defendant did not even try to explain why it took him over eight (8) months since his
arraignment, on September 26, 1960, and almost seven (7) months since the case was first set for
trial, to ask for the appointment of assessors. The circumstance and the delay in moving for the
appointment of assessors after several postponements of the hearing upon defendant’s request,
clearly indicates that his purpose in filing the motion was purely dilatory. The request for the
appointment of assessors should be made at the earliest convenient time so as not to hinder or
delay the trial or to unnecessarily inconvenience the progress of the work of the court.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendant. It is so
ordered.
ROMEO JACA v. MANUEL BLANCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Iloilo
G.R. No. 2792. May 23, 1950. EN BANC (Ozatea, J.)

Facts:

Petitioner Jaca was accused before the CFI of Iloilo of triple homicide through reckless
imprudence. After arraignment the case was called for trial. The accused was present. But as
nobody appeared for the prosecution, the court then and there dismissed the case without
prejudice. Four (4) minutes later counsel for the private prosecution and the City Fiscal together
with the witnesses for the prosecution, and explained to the court that their tardiness was due to
the fact that the chauffer of the jeep in which they were riding was detained by a policeman for
driving on the wrong side of the street.

Satisfied with the explanation, the respondent judge granted the request. Counsel for the
accused moved for the reconsideration of the order of the court setting aside its order of
dismissal reinstating the case, on the ground that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction in doing
so. The motion having been denied, the accused filed the present petition for certiorari,
contending that by setting aside its order of dismissal and reinstating the case, the respondent
judge placed him in double jeopardy inasmuch as he had been arraigned and the dismissal of the
case was without his express consent

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Jaca was placed in double jeopardy with the reinstatement of
the case by respondent judge.
Ruling:
NO. The dismissal contemplated in Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as
relied by the petitioner contemplates a definite and unconditional dismissal which terminates
the case, and not a dismissal without prejudice (conditional or provisional dismissal) like in the
present case. If the accused should deem such conditional or provisional dismissal to be unjust
and prejudicial to him, he could and should object to such dismissal and insist that the case be
heard and decided on the merits. Upon such objection and insistence of the accused, if the
prosecution does not present its evidence and if its failure to do so is unjustified, the court should
dismiss the case for the failure to prosecute. Such dismissal would come under the purview of
Section 9, Rule 113.

In the case at hand, both the accused and his attorney were present when the respondent
judge dictated the order of dismissal without prejudice, but interposed no objection thereto. As
such, the Court finds that under the circumstances there is no violation of any constitutional right
of the accused by the respondent judge in reconsidering his previous order of dismissal after it
was dictated and in reinstating the case against the accused. For the accused had been neither
previously convicted nor acquitted, nor had the case against him been definitely dismissed since
the dismissal was without prejudice. The petition is DENIED, without costs against the
petitioner.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO
CATOLICO, DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE,
BRANCH III, RENATO HORTAL, ALIAS RENE, AND FELIPE CRUZ,
RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. L-31260. February 29, 1972. (TEEHANKEE, J.)

Facts:

A criminal information was filed charging respondents Renato Hortal and Felipe Cruz and
six other still unidentified persons with robbery in band committed at midnight at Carmona,
Cavite. Having failed to post bail, accused were placed under detention and case was set for trial.
However, trial could not be held on this date because of the absence of the offended parties and
their witnesses. Respondent court then ordered the deputy sheriff to proceed to the residence of
the complainants and personally serve them with the court's subpoena requiring their appearance
at the trial as reset for the next day, October 14, 1969 at 8:30 a.m. 

Provincial fiscal appeared at the scheduled day and hour, and noticing that the complainants
and prosecution witnesses were not yet in court, moved that the case be called at 10:00 a.m. of
the same day. At 10:00 a.m., the complainants and their witnesses were not in court and the
provincial fiscal was constrained to ask for a provisional dismissal which was consented by the
accused. Within minutes after respondent court dictated the order of provisional dismissal, the
complainants and other prosecution witnesses arrived in the courtroom. Provincial fiscal then
immediately moved for a reconsideration of the provisional dismissal order and having learned
that they had been delayed by engine trouble, manifested to respondent court said reason for their
delay.
 The provincial fiscal urged the court to act favorably on his motion to lift the provisional
dismissal order but respondent court ruled that "having been dictated in open court it
automatically inured in favor of the herein accused" and that the State's remedy "should be the
refiling of the same case." The provincial fiscal orally moved respondent court to reconsider its
verbal order of denial and that no substantial rights of the accused would be prejudiced by such
reconsideration but respondent court likewise verbally denied reconsideration and caused the
issuance by the clerk of court of the release order then and there, even before its verbal order of
provisional dismissal could be reduced to writing and duly signed. 

Issue:

W/N the court’s order is valid

Ruling:

NO. Respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of
jurisdiction and that its questioned orders should accordingly be annulled and set aside. 

A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution
for reconsideration of an order of dismissal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will
be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged
against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, when no substantial right of the
accused would be prejudiced thereby. 

A timely motion to reinstate the provisionally dismissed case was made within 2 or 3 minutes
after respondent judge had dictated in open court his order of dismissal and the offended parties
and their witnesses, who had been delayed by engine trouble and had to change vehicles, then
arrived. No substantial rights of the accused would be prejudiced by rescinding the verbal order
of provisional dismissal.  The verbal order had not yet been put in writing and duly signed by
respondent judge, and hence could be withdrawn or set aside so that it would produce no legal
force and effect.

Respondent court failed to take into account that accused-respondents were not permanent
residents of the resettlement area at Carmona where the robbery took place, and were without
means to put up bail and hence were under detention.  For it to order their immediate release
from custody even though its verbal orders of dismissal and denial of reinstatement of the case
were yet to be duly reduced to writing and signed, was an unauthorized and arbitrary procedure. 
Its peremptory denial of the timely motion to reinstate the case has put the State to needless great
expense and trouble, to say the least, to cause again the apprehension of respondents-accused —
if the police agencies succeed in finding them — when they could very well have been made to
face trial then and there on October 14, 1969, as scheduled. 

Technicalities, when instead of promoting the speedy administration of justice delay it, are
not looked with the speedy administration of justice delay it, are not looked with favor.  More so
in this case where it appears that the setting aside of the order of dismissal caused petitioner no
substantial prejudice admitting as he does that he could have been made to face the same charge
all over again in a separate action.

WHEREFORE , the writ of certiorari is granted and the three orders of respondent court all
dated October 14, 1969 are hereby annulled and declared without legal effect.  The writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made permanent and respondent court is
further ordered to proceed to the prompt trial of the reinstated criminal case (No. N-2296) and
thereafter render judgment thereon in accordance with law.  With costs against private
respondents.
 PEOPLE VS. MAMACOL Supreme Court En Banc, G.R. No. L-1748,
September 29, 1948, (Perfecto, J.)

Facts:

Defendant- appellant was sentenced by the lower court to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000 and to pay the costs, for the killing of Dagodob
in the early morning of October 16, 1946, in Ramitan, Malabang, Lanao.

The counsel of the appellant questioned the absence of the appellant during the last hearing at
Iligan on July 16, 1947 which according to the record, appellant was not present during the last
hearing as he was still in Dansalan, and this is a reversible error as, according to section 1 (a) of
Rule 111, the accused is entitled to be present at every stage of the proceeding and when the
crime charged is a capital one, such right cannot be waived. He beseech that the lower court
erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence after denying a motion for dismissal made
when the prosecution rested, without reserving the right to present said evidence in the event the
motion is denied and that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to convict appellant.

Issues:

1. WON the absence of the appellant during the last hearing when the crime charged is a
capital offense is a reversible error
 2. WON the lower court erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence after denying a
motion for dismissal made when the prosecution rested, without reserving the right to
present said evidence in the event the motion is denied.

3. That the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to convict appellant

Ruling:

The first question is not necessary, however, to decide in view of the result the court have
arrived at in deciding the last two questions. On the second question, where the motion to
dismiss is denied, there is no harm to the interest of the administration of justice to allow
defendant to present evidence, which might show his innocence, may lead to a miscarriage of
justice. We rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss made by an accused, with or without
reservation to present his evidence, will not impair his right to present it. The substantial rights of
an accused should not be impaired because of his counsel's anxiousness to have him promptly
acquitted. The need of applying the rule appears to be more emphatic in a case like this where
life or death or perpetual imprisonment of the accused are at stake. Upon the last question we
hold, after going over the evidence presented by the prosecution, that the testimonies of Apuntok
Mamangcas and Payocan Moro, the two witness for the prosecution, are enough to give the latter
a prima facie case. The appealed decision is set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the
lower court to allow the accused to present evidence and for further proceedings.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. MELECIO
TORRES ET AL., MELECIO TORRES, FIDEL GERVASIO, NICOLAS
CHAVEZ, ENGRACIO VARONA and MACARIO GARILLO, G.R. No. L-
43406. January 30, 1936. (Abad Santos, J.)

Facts:

The appellants, Melecio Torres, Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona, and
Macario Garillo, were charged in the Court of First Instance of Cavite with the crime of forcible
abduction with physical injuries. After due trial, they were found guilty: and Melecio Torres, as
the principal culprit, was sentenced to suffer not less than eight years of prision mayor and not
more than twelve years one day of reclusion temporal, while Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez,
Engracio Varona and Macario Garillo, were each sentenced to suffer less than and one day of
prision mayor. In assessing the penalty to be imposed, the court took into consideration the
aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed in the nighttime and by a band.
The facts which led to the filing of the information against the appellants are fully set forth in the
decision of the trial court, and it would be a work of supererogation.

Most of the errors assigned both in the brief for the appellant Nicolas Chavez and in that
for the other appellants, relate to the correctness of the findings of fact made by the trial court. It
is contended that "the court a quo erred in not finding as it is a fact that the accused Melecio
Torres had amorous relations with the alleged offended party, Dalisay Bonifacio, previous to the
8th of November 1934." It is also contended that "the court a quo erred in not finding it as a fact
that the accused Melecio Torres and the complainant Dalisay Bonifacio, on November 6, 1934
agreed to elope on the 8th of November, 1934, and consequently, that what happened was in
reality a fake abduction." No evidence was adduced in support of these contention except the
testimony of Melecio Torres himself the truth of which was challenged by Dalisay Bonifacio
denied having sustained amorous relations with Melecio Torres. She also denied having agreed
to elope with him. The circumstance which the girl was carried away by Melecio Torres and his
co-accused were such as to preclude the conclusion that it was done with her consent If there was
really an agreement between Melecio Torres and Dalisay Bonifacio to elope, it is inconceivable
why they did not select a more auspicious occasion to carry out their plan. It is likewise
inconceivable why Melecio Torres had to secure the assistance of four other men.

Issue:

W/N the lower court erred in not granting Nicolas Chavez a separate trial

Ruling:

The record shows that the application for a separate trial was made after two witnesses
for the prosecution had already testified. The application came too late; it should have been made
before the commencement of the trial. (U.S. vs. Morales, 8 Phil., 300.)

That there was conspiracy to abduct Dalisay Bonifacio and that Nicholas Chavez not only had
knowledge of, but took part in the conspiracy, the evidence leaves no room for a reasonable
doubt. We find no merit in the contention that Nicholas Chavez had no knowledge of the
unchaste designs of Melecio Torres.
 JAMES JOSEPH, MIGUEL ROMULO, ANTONIO SANTAMARIA,
RAMON IGNACIO MORAN, EUGENIO LOPEZ III, and JAIME
CLAPAROLS, JR. vs. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, HON. EMMANUEL G.
PEÑA, And the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. L-46329-30 April
10, 1979, EN BANC (FERNANDEZ, J.)

Facts:

The petitioners, James Joseph, Miguel Romulo, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio
Moran, Eugenio Lopez III, and Jaime Claparols Jr., were charged by Noemi L. Garcia with the
crime of multiple rape in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 20380 but upon transfer to the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, the same was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VIII-1750-Rizal.

The petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr. and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also charged with
another offense of multiple rape by the same complainant before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 20381 but upon transfer to the Circuit
Criminal Court, the same was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal. 
 Upon arraignment, the accused-petitioners entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. A
joint trial on the merits of both cases of all the accused was commenced and the prosecution
presented its evidence.

After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence in chief, the
petitioner Claparols, Jr. filed a motion to dismiss dated November 19, 1976; the petitioner Lopez
filed a motion to acquit dated November 19, 1976; the petitioners Romulo, Santamaria and
Joseph filed a motion to dismiss dated November 22, 1976; and the petitioner Moran filed a
motion to dismiss dated November 22, 1976.

The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, then heard the oral arguments of the
movants in amplification of their formal motions to dismiss/acquit and the oral arguments of the
prosecution in support of their opposition thereto. The respondent judge denied the motions in an
order dated February 7, 1977.

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the order denying the Motions to
Dismiss/Acquit was likewise denied by the respondent Judge in an order dated February 28,
1977 on the ground that "the issues raised and arguments adduced in the Motion for
Reconsideration together with the opposition thereto were the same grounds adduced in the
Motion to Dismiss and/or Acquit were virtually covered by the extensive arguments of both
parties ..."

Issue:

Whether or not the judge exercised grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

The submission that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to be
presumed innocent and the right against self-incrimination by the denial of their Motions to
Dismiss/Acquit by the respondent Judge has no merit. The respondent Judge made a thorough
perusal of the records of the cases and considered the exhaustive arguments of the parties which
lasted for almost eight (8) hours before resolving the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit. The motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit was denied because said
motion contained the same grounds adduced in petitioners' Motions to Dismiss/Acquit. There is
no showing that the respondent Judge denied the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit allegedly because of
his opinion that the Rules of Court in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal
cases prohibited it.

The petitioners are not precluded from presenting their evidence. In fact, the continuation
of the hearing of both cases was set on September 22, 24, 27 and 29, 1977 for the reception of
the evidence for the defense.

It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt. However, after the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional presumption of
innocence must yield to what has been so amply and persuasively demonstrated. 

The respondent Judge did not disregard any constitutional right of the petitioners. Said
respondent Judge is presumed to have considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution when
he denied the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners.

The Court cannot decide in this special civil action whether or not the evidence adduced
by the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners. It is now
petitioners' duty to neutralize the evidence of the State in order to maintain the presumption of
their innocence of the crime of which they are charged.

In the absence of a clear knowing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse
of discretion or acted in excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not annul an interlocutory order
denying a motion to dismiss a criminal case. Appeal is the proper remedy of the, petitioners in
order to have the findings of fact of the respondent judge reviewed by a superior court.

The petitioners' application for separate trial is meritorious. Section 8, Rule 119, Revised
Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 8. Trial of joint defendants. — When two or more defendants are jointly
charged with any offense they shall be tried jointly unless the court. n its
 discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate trials. In
ordering separate trials, the court y order that one or more defendants be each
separately tried, or may order that several defendants be jointly tried in another
trials, or may order that each defendant be separately tried.

The foregoing provision does not state when the application or separate trial may be
made. As a matter of law, the granting of a separate trial when two or more defendant are jointly
barged with an offense is discretionary with the trial court. 

Considering the established circumstances, the cause of the State would not be
jeopardized by the granting of separate trials to the accused. Inasmuch as the petitioners are said
with capital offenses, great care should be taken the evidence of one should not prejudice the
others. It appears they have different defenses which may be antagonist to each other. in the
interest of justice, this Court a separate trial may be granted even after f the prosecution as
finished presenting its evidence in chief. It is understood, however, that the evidence in chief of
the prosecution shall remain in the record as evidence against al the petitioners. It is not
necessary for the prosecution to adduce all over again its evidence in chief in each separate trial
of the accused. In the separate trial of the accused, only the accused presenting evidence has to
be present.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent judge denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit
of the petitioners are hereby affirmed and the petition to prohibit the continuation of the trial of
Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-17-00-Rizal and Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal and to
compel the respondent judge to acquit the petitioners is denied. The petition for habeas corpus is
also denied. However, the order dated June 10, 1977 denying petitioners' motion for lifting of
consolidation of trial and/or separate trial is set aside and the petition for separate trial for each
accused. is hereby granted. The evidence to be adduced by each accused-petitioner should not be
considered as evidence against the other accused-petitioners. Only the accused presenting
evidence is obliged to attend the trial. The prosecution does not have adduce all over again its
evidence in chief which shall be considered against all the petitioners, without prejudice to the
right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence in each separate trial.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS THE HON. JUDGE PEDRO C.
NAVARRO and JAIME CATUDAY, G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25, 1975.
(Fernandez, J.)

Facts:

On March 6, 1968, respondent Catuday was charged in the Municipal Court of Makati,
Rizal, with the crime of light threat allegedly committed against Henry Dioquino (Criminal Case
No. 12846). Almost a year later, or on February 3, 1969, and while the light threat case was still
pending, he was charged in the same court, with a different offense, frustrated theft, allegedly
committed against the Commonwealth Foods, Inc. In two separate decisions rendered on
September 10, 1969, the Municipal Court convicted him of the two charges. He appealed both
decisions to the Court of First Instance.

The theft case was first set for hearing on December 16, 1969. The threat case was
originally set for hearing on December 22, 1969. On December 16, 1969, the court ordered
continuation of the trial of the theft case for January 14 and 21, 1970 (Annex A, Motion for
Reconsideration). On December 22, 1969, the court rescheduled the hearing of the threat case for
January 26, 1970. On January 14, 1970, the court reset for January 21, 1970 the theft case
hearing of that day (Annex C, Motion for Reconsideration). When January 21, 1970 came, the
court rescheduled the theft case hearing for February 11 and 24, 1970 (Annex B, Motion for
Reconsideration). On January 26, 1970, the scheduled threat case hearing was rescheduled for
February 11, 1970. This was the first time the two cases were scheduled for hearing on the same
day, February 11, 1970.

For the theft case, it was for continuation of trial; for the threat case, it was for start of the
trial. On said February 11, 1970, the court in two separate orders, directed that the threat case be
rescheduled for February 24, 1970 (Annex D, Motion for Reconsideration), and that the trial of
the theft case be continued also on February 24, 1970. (Annex E, Motion for Reconsideration).
On February 24, 1970, counsel de oficio for both cases failed to appear. For the first time, the
court issued a single order in the two cases (Annex E, Motion for Reconsideration), directing
arrest of said counsel "and to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt"; and
ordering that "the trial set for today is hereby re-set for March 25, 1970, at 8:30 in the morning."

Petitioner claims that the threat case was never tried in the lower court so the charge
therein should not have been dismissed on the ground of lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that there was joint trial of the threat case and the theft
case, and since the prosecution failed to present evidence respecting the alleged threat, the case
was properly dismissed on the stated ground. Thus the question of denial of due process to the
State hinges on whether or not there was really a joint trial of both the threat and the theft cases.

Issue:

W/N the court which rendered the judgment acted beyond its authority

Ruling:

Yes. We have specific rules on joint trial in criminal cases. There is the rule that "when
two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried, jointly, unless
the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate trial." (Sec.
8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court). As long as the condition therein is fulfilled, that is, two or
more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, joint trial is automatic, without need of a
court order. The rule is inapplicable here because there is only one defendant in the two cases.

Then there is the rule that "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or which form
or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character may, in the discretion of the
court, be tried jointly." (Sec. 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court). In contrast, this second rule
clearly requires a court order for a joint trial, since the court has discretion whether or not to
order the same. "Jurisdiction" is the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing
[Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L. ed. 914 (23A Words and Phrases, p. 121)]. A
judgment is void for lack of due process, which is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction
(Trimica, Inc. v. Polaris Marketing Corp., et al., L-29887, October 28, 1974.

In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering his judgment of acquittal of
private respondent JAIME CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat which was
never tried in the respondent Judge's court nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse
of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Indeed, this is so grave and patent to
justify the issuance of a writ of CERTIORARI (Lagman v. Dela Cruz, 40 SCRA 101). And, in
fine, this Court has, in these words, defined "grave abuse of discretion" as: "Such capricious and
arbitrary exercise of judgment, as is equivalent, in the eyes of the law to lack of jurisdiction."
(Palma and Ignacio v. O. & S., Inc., 17 SCRA 98). For such want of jurisdiction, said
JUDGMENT is NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. It is one rendered by a court which had no
power so to do; it is as though there had been no judgment or process; it is coram non judice
(People v. Liscomg, 60 NY 559, 568, 569, Am. Rep. 211; 44 Words and Phrases 592). IN VIEW
OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court reconsiders and sets aside its resolution of April 17,
1974 dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari for lack of merit; and We hereby sustain
petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari and declare null and void the decision of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, dated July 20, 1973, insofar as it acquitted
the private respondent Jaime Catuday, as accused, in Crim. Case No. 20145 for light threat and
orders its reinstatement in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the corresponding trial. No
costs.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,vs. VIRGILIO
OPLADO and VISITACION FERNANDEZ GUYOT, defendants-appellees.
No. L-20146. September 30, 1964. EN BANC. (Bautista Angelo, J.)

Facts:

Virgilio Oplado and Visi tacion Fernandez Guyot were charged by the latter’s husband
with the crime of adultery. In view of the failure of the prosecution to arrest Visitacion
Fernandez Guyot, the trial of the case had to be repeatedly postponed, although the prosecution
had always been ready to proceed with the trial with respect to the co-accused Virgilio Oplado.
The Court a quo, upon motion of co-accused Virgilio Oplado ordered the provisional dismissal
of the case. This was objected by the prosecution. City Fiscal appealed.

Issue:
Whether the grant of provisional liberty was proper and whether one of the accused in a
prosecution for adultery may be separately tried in the absence of the other accused where both
the prosecution and the other accused are ready to go to trial.

Ruling:
 It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that while the husband cannot institute a
prosecution f or the crime of adultery without including therein both of the guilty parties if they
are both living, the statute does not require that both must necessarily be tried together.Hence, a
defendant in an adultery case may be tried alone or separately from his codefendant if the
prosecution and the party available are ready for it.

The trial Court granted the motion of the accused Oplado for the provisional dismissal of
the case on the ground that he is entitled to a speedy trial. This is not only an error but an abuse
of discretion, for the very right of accused Oplado to a speedy trial demanded that the case
against him be heard and prosecuted to a conclusion without waiting for the arrest of his co-
accused. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. This case is ordered
remanded to the lower Court for further proceedings. No costs.

CEFERINO M REGALA vs THE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST

INSTANCE OF BATAAN. GR No. L-781 November 29, 1946. (Pablo, L.)

Facts:

On June 6, the day appointed for the hearing, the Provincial Prosecutor, instead of
submitting his evidence, filed an amended complaint, including as witnesses the witnesses
named in the complaint, Wenceslao Cruz and conrado Mañalac. In this second complaint it was
alleged that between the appellant and his two co-defendants there was conspiracy, confederation
and mutual aid to commit the crime. Admitted by the court the complaint regarding the accused
Conrado Manalac and Wenceslao Cruz to be used as witnesses of the accusation, alleging the
five conditions required by Article 9, Rule 115. To this request the Judge agreed in his order of 6
June 1946. On June 14, the appellant filed the notice of appeal against said order, and it was
denied on the 19th of the same month. On June 26 the appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration that was denied on July 11.
 Alleging these facts, the Complainant presented his
original petition for certiorari, requesting that the Court annul the orders of June 6 and July 11,
1946 of the Bataan First Instance Court. The appellant alleges that if his aforementioned appeal
were not followed, it would cause irreparable damage to his substantial rights because he has no
other easy, simple and adequate remedy. In case of conviction, the accused can appeal and in the
court ad quem can discuss all the errors committed by the lower court. It is the ordinary remedy
granted by the current legislation.

The appellant alleges that the judge's order of July 11 denying the motion for
reconsideration is null and void because the judge acted without jurisdiction, since his
appointment has not been approved by the Appointments Committee, as published by a
newspaper of the same date. It does not appear in the record that the judge was aware of such
disapproval before issuing his order, which is impugned as illegal. A judge who discharges his
position before learning of the disapproval of his appointment is a de facto judge . All their
official actions, as de facto judge , are so valid for all legal purposes and for all kinds of matters,
such as those of a judge dejure. (Tayko vs. Capistrano, 53 Jur. Fil., 923.)

Issue:

W/N the Court of First Instance of Bataan has jurisdiction in rendering the judgment

Ruling:

Yes. In our opinion, the court does not abuse its discretion. The amendment to the
complaint was merely one of form. It does not affect or alter the nature of the crime, because, be
it Bruno or Cecilio ell that caused the mortal wound, the serial crime is the same. Nor does it
affect the extension of the applicants' responsibility, since, alleging in the complaint that both
defendants conspired and helped each other to commit the crime, they would be responsible to
the same extent, either one or the other the wound that caused the death of the deceased. It is,
therefore, an amendment purely in a way that does not substantially alter the complaint or affect
the rights of the accused (Arevalo and Arevalo v. Nepomuceno, 63 Jur. Fil., 665.)
 In addition, if the judge acted with an infraction or not of the Regulation, it was at most a
procedural error, and not an abuse of discretion, or excess or lack of jurisdiction. Such an error,
if it is in fact, can be corrected on appeal, after a final judgment has been issued in the first
instance, and not in an action of certiorari .

Only the remedy of certiorari proceeds when a court, in the execution of its judicial

functions, has acted without jurisdiction or with excess of it or with serious abuse of discretion
and that, in the ordinary procedure, the appellant does not have the simple and expeditious
remedy of appeal (Rule 67, Article 1). If for every error committed by a certiorari court , the
issues would be endless. Deny the application with the costs against the appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. JOSE HIDALGO y RESURRECCION and MAURA

GOTENGCO y SOLIMAN
G.R. No. L-6273. December 27, 1957 (ENDENCIA, J.)

DOCTRINE: The courts may believe one part of the testimony of a witness and disbelieve
another part. Courts are not required to accept or reject as a whole the testimony of a particular
witness.

FACTS:
In the evening of October 8, 1950, the second floor of appelants’ building was burned.
Immediately after the fire had been put out, the fire department inspected the second floor and
found two broken glass jars, ten unbroken glass jars containing gasoline, lines of toilet paper
dipped in the gasoline content of the jar and arranged in such a manner as to connect them to one
another, and eleven green tin covers.
 It was also discovered that the first floor and undivided one-half of the second floor of the
building were owned by the appellant spouses who insured the entire building with four
insurance companies under their different policies for a total sum of P75,000.
After the investigation, an information was filed against herein appellants, Florencio
Camilo, James Uy, and Aw Ming. But Florencio Camilo was excluded from the information to
be utilized as a government witness, and thus Florencio Camilo was allowed to testify in the
case.
The testimony of Camilo consists of an admission that he, James Uy and Aw Ming
caused the burning of the building upon the order and the assistance of the spouses-appellants.
The CFI acquitted Uy and Ming but convicted herein appellants.
Appellants argue that Camilo’s testimony was not given credence by the lower court with
respect to appellants' co-accused James Uy and Aw Ming who were acquitted and, therefore, it
should not also be given weight with regard to the herein appellants, for if Camilo's testimony as
regards the guilt of James Uy and Aw Ming was not credible, it should likewise be unworthy of
credence as regards the appellants' alleged complicity in the crime at bar. Also, appellants
question the exclusion of Camilo from the complaint in order for him to be a stat

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CFI erred in convicting the appellants in view of Uy and Ming’s
acquittal
2. Whether or not the CFI erred in not requiring the prosecution to present proof in support
of its motion for the discharge of Florencio Camilo before allowing him to be a witness
for the state.

RULING:
NO. It is a settled rule that the courts may believe one part of the testimony of a witness
and disbelieve another part. Courts are not required to accept or reject as a whole the testimony
of a particular witness.
In the case at bar, the lower court found that Camilo's testimony concerning the accused
James Uy and Aw Ming was not corroborated and, except said testimony, there was nothing in
the evidence presented by the prosecution which would connect them with the perpetration of the
crime charged against them, this being the main reason for their acquittal. In other words, James
Uy and Aw Ming were acquitted on the insufficiency of evidence and not on a finding that
Camilo's' testimony was not worthy of credence.
On the other hand, the lower court gave credence to the testimony of Florencio Camilo
with respect to the participation of the appellants in the burning of their building, because it is
corroborated by the fact that Maura Gotengeo issued the checks testified to by the witnessand by
the other fact, that the spouses had heavily insured the building in question for P175,000 prior to
the fire when the insurable value thereof was only about P78,000 or P79,000.

NO.Section 9, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, does not require presentation of proof
before a motion for exclusion of an accused to be witness for the state is granted. The law only
requires that hearing thereof be had and, in the case at bar, there has been auch hearing.

WHEREFORE, finding no errors in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed,
without costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMAS MARCELLANA

G.R. No. 137401-03. February 6, 2002 (PER CURIAM)

DOCTRINE: During a trial in open court, that the crime charged in the information should be
reduced to homicide, to which two of the defendants plead guilty and were duly sentenced, the
information, as modified, should also apply to the defendant, as appellant, and the penalty ought
not to be increased in this court.

FACTS:
Defendant Agaton Panganiban was charged with others, including Simplicio Marcellana,
in the Court of First Instance of Batangas with the crime of murder for the killing of Jose Par.
Eleuterio Poco was discharged by the trial court upon motion of the fiscal so that he could be
used as a witness for the Government.
At the conclusion of the evidence on behalf of the prosecution and of the defendants
Agaton Panganiban, Simplicio Marcellana and Candido Villanueva, the defendant Victorino
Catapang offered to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, if the fiscal would
amend his information so as to charge the crime of homicide instead of murder. The court
granted the motion.
The court convicted Marcellana, Catapang, and Panganiban as principals and Villanueva
as an accomplice of the crime of homicide. Panganiban appealed to the SC, contending, first, that
the trial court erred in granting the petition of the fiscal to discharge Poco, so that he could be
used as a witness for the Government, and that the evidence was not sufficient to convict him of
the crime of homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.

ISSUES:
Whether or not under the provisions of Act No. 2706, the trial court erred in discharging
Poco to use him as a witness for the prosecution.

RULING:
Act No. 2709 was largely enacted for the use and guidance of the trial court, and where
there is nothing in the record which tends to show that at the time the trial court discharged the
defendant Poco, so that he could be used as a witness for the prosecution, that the court knew or
had reason to believe that Poco had been previously convicted of an illegal marriage, and that
fact was first developed on his cross-examination, the defendant could not then take advantage of
the order.
The SC has no right to assume that the trial court had knowledge of the fact that Poco had
previously been convicted of another crime at the time the order was made. If that fact had been
called to the attention of the court before the order was made, the defendant would then have a
right to complain.
Where it appears from the record that during the trial the fiscal agreed in open court that
the crime charged in the information should be reduced to homicide, to which two of the
defendants plead guilty and were duly sentenced, the information, as modified, should also apply
to the defendant, as appellant, and the penalty ought not to be increased in this court.

ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), JOSE
V. PEREZ, AMADEA C. PEREZ, CIPRIANO LADINES and FLAVIA C. VALDENOR
G.R. No. L-55533 July 31, 1984 (TEEHANKEE, J.)

DOCTRINE: A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of
the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime
charged in the complaint

FACTS:
Miguel Roncesvalles, together Jose V. Perez, Amadea Consul Perez, Cipriano Ladines
and Flavia C. Valdenor wilfully, unlawfully and illegally made false statements and
misrepresentation of material facts in the application for agricultural loan signed by FLAVIA C.
VALDENOR and in the other supporting papers, calculated to produce semblance of compliance
with the legal requirements, making it appear that accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR is an
eligible borrower which misrepresentation or false statements of facts were considered as the
credit factors in the approval and the granting of the loan to accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR
in the amount of P30,000.00, by the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.
All the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After the prosecution had already
presented seven witnesses, the state prosecutors filed a motion with the court, asking that
accused Roncesvalles be discharged from the information in order that he may be used as a state
witness against his co-defendants, alleging that Roncesvalles had not at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude; that he did not appear to be the most guilty; that there
was absolute necessity for his testimony; that there was no other direct evidence available for the
proper prosecution of the offense committed and that his testimony could be substantially
corroborated in its material points. The motion was set for hearing and after the parties were
heard, the trial court, issued the questioned order denying the motion on the ground that, ". . .
Miguel Roncesvalles cannot be said to be the least guilty. He would be a principal by direct
participation, or a co-principal if he acted upon instruction of another as the prosecution alleges,"
and that, "the prosecution having presented all its witnesses, the Court, after going over their
testimony, cannot see how Roncesvalles' testimony, if ever he is discharged, would
be corroborated." 
Reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari with respondent appellate court praying for the annulment and setting aside of the trial
court's questioned orders. Respondent court sustained the trial court's ruling in its decision,
subject of the petition at bar and denied reconsideration thereof.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of
its jurisdiction in sustaining that there is no absolute necessity for Miguel Roncesvalles to be
considered as a state witness.

RULING:
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court prescribes the conditions in order that one or
several accused may be used as witnesses against their co-accused, to wit:
(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested;
(b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said defendant;
(c) the testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude."
While it is true that the court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed
by the rule exists, this grant of discretion is not a grant of arbitrary discretion, but rather a sound
judicial discretion to be exercised with due regard to the proper and correct administration of
justice. 
The trial court manifestly erred in denying the prosecution's motion to discharge accused
Roncesvalles or, the ground that he "cannot be said to be the least guilty." All that the law
requires, in order to discharge an accused and to use him as a state witness is that the defendant
whose exclusion is requested does not appear to be the most guilty, not necessarily that he is
the least guilty.  The trial court's order itself shows that Roncesvalles does not appear to be the
most guilty since it acknowledged that "he would be a principal by direct participation or a co-
principal if he acted upon instruction of another as the prosecution alleges."
The Rules say that it is necessary that the "said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty
from which the conclusion follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is no reason
why he may not be excluded as witness for the State. As a matter of fact, the candid admission of
an accused, of his participation in a crime, is a guaranty that if he will testify in court he will
testify truthfully.
The ground underlying the rule is not to let a crime that has been committed go
unpunished; so an accused who is not the most guilty is allowed to testify against the most guilty
in order to achieve the greater purpose of securing the conviction of the more or most guilty and
the greatest number among the accused permitted to be convicted for the offense they have
committed. 
The Respondent appellate court itself sustained the People's contention on this score,
simply stating that "respondent Court erred when it ruled that it could not grant the motion for
the discharge of Roncesvalles because it does not appear that he is the least guilty of the accused.
What Section 9, Rule 119 requires as one of the conditions for the discharge of one of the
accused to testify as a witness for the Government is that said 'defendant does not appear to be
the most guilty.' "
The Court overrules respondent court's finding that there is no absolute necessity for the
testimony of Roncesvalles. The testimony of Roncesvalles is absolutely necessary to prove
conspiracy among the accused who are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other
in defrauding the Lucena Rural. Roncesvalles was the Assistant Chief Inspector of the Lucena
Rural Bank and he was the one who signed the investigation report which contained false
information as to the credit standing of accused Flavia N. Valdenor. Nobody is in a better
position to testify and prove the existence of conspiracy than accused Roncesvalles, because he
is an officer of the bank.
It is noteworthy that these assertions appear to be based on solid ground for the
prosecutors presented their motion for discharge of Roncesvalles as a state witness only after
they had presented seven witnesses and could then show the absolute necessity for his testimony
in consonance with what was to be held by the Court in Flores vs Sandiganbayan that the trial
court should act on said discharge motion when the prosecution has presented all its other
evidence and it could then "fully determine whether the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule
119 of the New Rules of Court, are fully complied with."
A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at
the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in
regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime charged in the
complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the formality of a
trial. In coming to his conclusion as to the 'necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is re. requested'; as to the 'availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence'; as to which of the accused is the 'most guilty'; and the like, the judge
must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and information furnished by the state prosecutors.

WHEREFORE, respondent appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's questioned
orders denying the discharge of Miguel Roncesvalles as a state witness is hereby SET ASIDE.
As prayed for, the trial court is ORDERED to allow the discharge of said accused Miguel
Roncesvalles from the information before it in Criminal Case No. 0399 so that he may testify
therein as a state witness.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO

V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997 (REGALADO, J.)

DOCTRINE: To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was
later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring
client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble
profession of law.
FACTS:
Paredes, a Provincial Attorney, applied for a free patent. It was granted by later on
cancelled as it was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations, as the land had been
designated and reserved as a school site. A case for perjury was filed against him, and the
Tanodbayan issued a recommendation for criminal prosecution. In all these cases, Atty. Sansaet
was the counsel for Paredes. They filed a motion for reconsideration on the recommendation for
the Tanodbayan attaching falsified documents, making it appear that a criminal prosecution
would bring about double jeopardy. Later on, a case before the Sandiganbayan was filed against
Paredes, Atty, Sansaet, and another for violation of R.A. 3019. The issue in this case is whether
Atty. Sansaet can be discharged as a state witness. The Sandiganbayan refused saying that it was
against attorney client privilege, but the court held that Sandiganbayan erred as there was no
such privilege in conspiring to do unlawful acts.

ISSUES:
Did Sandiganbayan err in not allowing Atty. Sansaet to become a state witness against
his former client?

RULING:
YES. Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged
communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that
communications between attorney and client having to do with the client’s contemplated
criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of
falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well
settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it
must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from
revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of
the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the rules of
evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the
impugned resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner
be allowed and given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO MENDIOLA, FLORENTINO

ZAPANTA and GREGORIO REYES
G.R. Nos. L-1642-44 January 29, 1949 (PERFECTO, J.)

DOCTRINE: The clause "any time before they have entered upon their defense," used in the
section, is so clear as not to give rise to any misunderstanding. The words "any time before"
imply an indefinite period of time limited only by the time set by a court's jurisdiction and the
very nature of things, and that limit is set at the moment of the filing of the information.

FACTS:.
 The original information for murder committed on the person of Teofilo Ampil was filed
on April 27, 1946, against Taciano V. Rizal alone. On October 30, 1946, an amended
information was filed including new defendants, among them Alejandro Mendiola and on
November 6, 1946, assistant city fiscal Engracio Abasolo filed a motion to discharge defendant
Alejandro Mendiola in order that he may be utilized as witness for the prosecution, which motion
was granted.
On December 26, 1946, another independent information was filed for the same murder
against Gregorio Reyes.
On January 31, 1947, a new information was filed for the same murder against Taciano
V. Rizal, Vicente Llamas and the three appellants, including Alejandro Mendiola.
On February 7, 1947 counsel moved to quash the new information against Alejandro
Mendiola in the ground that he has previously been acquitted of the offense charged. The motion
was denied and erroneously.
They were tried and found by the trial court guilty as authors of such crime. It sentenced
then to death and to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Teofilo Ampil in the sum of P2,000
with subsidiary.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the prosecution was correct in opposing the discharge of the accused.
RULING:
The propositions announced by the prosecution are not supported either by law or by
reason.
Before the discharge is ordered, the prosecution must show and the trial court must
ascertain that the five conditions fixed by section 9 of Rule 115 are complied with. But one the
discharge is ordered, any future development showing that any or all of the five conditions have
not actually been fulfilled, may not affect the legal consequences of the discharge, as provided
by section 11 of Rule 115. Any writing or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the
discharge and of the court in granting the petition no question of jurisdiction being involved,
cannot deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal provided by section 11 of Rule 115 and of
the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
 The exception in the proviso of section 11 of Rule 115 against the defendant who "fails to
testify against his co-defendant" refers exclusively to a failure attributable to defendant's will or
fault. It is unfair to deprive defendant of an acquittal for a failure attributable to the prosecution,
and it would be an abhorrent legal policy to place defendant's fate at the mercy of anyone who
may handle the prosecution.
The three appellants were correctly found by the trial court guilty as authors of the crime
found by the trial court guilty as authors o the crime of murdered. It sentenced then to death and
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Teofilo Ampil in the sum of P2,000 with subsidiary.
With regard to appellants Gregorio Reyes and Florentino Zapanta, the principal penalty
must be changed toreclusion perpetua, insufficient votes having been cast to affirm the appealed
judgment, and there is even a minority opinion that they can be held as accomplices

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is modified and reversed in part, and appellant
Gregorio Reyes and Florencio Zapanta are sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to jointly and
severally indemnify the heirs of Teofilo Ampil in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the cost, and
appellants Alejandro Mendiola is acquitted and shall immediately be released upon promulgation
of this decision.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

LUCIANO TAN
G.R. No. L-62881 August 30, 1983 (MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.)

DOCTRINE: A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of
the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the commission of the crime
charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the
formality of a trial.
FACTS:
On 10 July 1981, upon motion of the prosecution, and after the parties were duly heard,
the Trial Court ordered the discharge from the Information of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a State
witness. The prosecution substantially satisfied the requirements by the rules as to the discharge
of Ngo Sin.
However in a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan, they pointed out that the
prosecuting Fiscal has failed to show the absolute necessity for the testimony of defendant Ngo
Sin. Such motion was then denied.
On Certiorari, Luciano Tan challenged the validity of the aforesaid Orders before respondent
Appellate Court. In a Decision promulgated on 25 June 1982, said Court held that "there
was no despotic exercise of discretion by His Honor in issuing the challenged orders" finding as
justified his rationalizations above-quoted.
Upon a Motion for Reconsideration filed by Luciano Tan, respondent Court reversed its
prior Decision and nullified the Trial Court Orders discharging Ngo Sin to be a State witness.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court a quo exercised its jurisdication with grave abuse of discretion

RULING:
The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion. It is believed that the record
justifies the discharge of Ngo Sin to be utilized as a State witness considering the absolute
necessity of his testimony for the successful prosecution of the criminal charge if it has to be
established that the accused Luciano Tan had planned and financed the theft.
All conditions for discharge prescribed by Sec. 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court have
been met. The Rules do not require absolute certainty in determining those conditions. Perforce,
the Judge has to rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the considerations presented by the
prosecuting officer.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Court's Resolution, dated 4 November 1982 reversing its own
prior Decision of 25 June 1982, as well as its Resolution of 17 December 1982 denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Orders of the then Court
of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City, Branch III, dated 10 July 1981 and 11 February
1982, in Criminal Case No. 719-SP, are hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court
corresponding to the former Court of First Instance is now directed to proceed with the trial on
the merits accordingly.

CECILIA C. BARRETTO and ROBERT SORIANO vs. HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57333-37 September 16, 1986 (YAP, J.)

DOCTRINE: A judgment of conviction based on the sole testimony of the accused-turned-state

witness, Esperanza Magadia thus, such testimony, coming from a polluted source, cannot be the
basis of a judgment of conviction, without being corroborated in its material points by other
evidence.

FACTS:
Cecilia Barretto, Esperanza Magadia and Robert Soriano were charged in five separate
informations before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Documents. Barreto is a Chief of Project Compassion Office in Province of Batangas, while
Magadia and Soriano are both casual employees in said office.
Alleged in the information charged against the accused, Magadia upon direction of
Barreto, make it appeared on a Time Book and Payroll of their respective office that one Leticia
Serrano, a separated casual employee of Project Compassion Office, rendered actual services and
worked for a certain period.
Magadia then falsified the signature of Leticia. Barreto and Soriano, despite the
knowledge of the falsified documents affixed their signature thereto as a witness to the
authenticity of the document. The timebook and paybook was presented in the office of the
treasurer and thereafter the purportedly wages of Leticia was delivered to Barreto who converted
the same to her personal use and benefit.
The cases were tried jointly. Prosecution filed a motion to discharged Magadia to be
utilized as a state witness. Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners of the crime charged in the 5
informations. A petition for reconsideration is filed before the SC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the uncorroborated testimony of Magadia as relied by the Sandiganbayan
is sufficient to convict the petitioners?

RULING: Section 9(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court requires, as one of the essential
conditions for the discharge of an accused in order to be utilized as state witness, that his
testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points. The testimony of Magadia
failed to meet this condition, and yet, the respondent court believed her and utilized her
testimony to convict the petitioners.
In People vs. Tabayoyong, 1 we held that the testimony of a self- confessed
accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by
itself and without corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter
committed or participated in the commission of the crime; thus, it is required that the testimony
be substantially corroborated by other evidence in all its material points.
 In the case at bar, the accused-turned-state witness Magadia admitted having falsified the
payroll, but tried to exculpate herself by shifting the responsibility to her co-accused. She
claimed that she merely acted upon the orders of Barretto who was her superior and whom she
could not refuse for fear that she would not renew her appointment. Magadia's testimony on this
point is not corroborated by any evidence. Not only that, there is evidence in the records of this
case showing that Barretto did not have the appointing power
What the court failed to note in its decision was that Magadia gave two statements to the
NBI. She gave an earlier statement on January 30, 1979, in which she admitted having falsified
the signatures of Leticia in the payrolls, but did not implicate Barretto. It is apparent that her later
statement was made in an effort to exculpate herself by pointing to her chief, Cecilia Barretto, as
the person responsible for the scheme of falsifying the payrolls. The trial court obviously failed
to consider this.

Judging from the acts done by Esperanza Magadia, she appears to be the most guilty. As
such, she has the strongest motive to point to petitioners as the guilty parties, in exchange for her
discharge and eventual acquittal. 

Without the testimony of Magadia, the petitioners would certainly have been acquitted as
there would have been no evidence to link them to the commission of the offense. The judgment
of conviction was based on the sole testimony of the accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza
Magadia. Such testimony, coming from a polluted source, cannot be the basis of a judgment of
conviction, without being corroborated in its material points by other evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court in Criminal Cases Nos. 1812 to 1816 is
REVERSED and set aside. Petitioners are hereby ACQUITTED, and declared without liability
of whatever nature arising from the incidents of this case.
 FLORITA SARDINIA-LINCO, ET AL. vs. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-55939 May 29, 1981 (EN BANC)

DOCTRINE: Where there exist mutual mistrust, suspicion and hostility between the
complainant and the judge, the latter should voluntarily inhibit himself if only to restore the
confidence of the complainant and prosecution in particular and the public in general in the
soundness of our judicial system and the integrity and probity of those who sit in the bench.

FACTS:
The Supreme Court in its resolution in upheld the order of the Executive Judge Gregorio
G. Pineda denying the motion of Augusto Syjuco, Jr. for inhibition from further hearing the anti-
graft case against former Land Registration Commissioner Gregorio Bilog, Jr. The contention for
the inhibition was based on the allegation that the subject land is suspended of being covered by
a void title belonging to respondent judge’s aunt but was subsequently declared by the Court as a
fake claim.
By virtue of the resolution, Judge Pineda continued the trial and hearing of the case.
However, according to the petitioners, Judge Pineda continued to show undue interest and
partiality in the trial of the case, obviously favoring the accused, which prompted the government
prosecutors, Linco and Guerrero, to file on August 25, 1980 before the respondent judge a
motion for his disqualification and/or inhibition of respondent judge which was denied and the
latter continued with the trial of the case. However, while the prosecution was still in the process
of presenting rebuttal evidence, respondent judge terminated the case and verbally ordered
petitioner Linco to submit memorandum on the case within ten days although the verbal order
was modified in respondent judge’s written ored requiring peitioners to submit their formal offer
of rebuttal evidence within ten days and to submit their memorandum within 30 days.
Petitioners allege that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by
arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously closing the case without allowing the State, represented
by the herein petitioners, to finish or complete its rebuttal evidence, a matter which, besides
being contrary to law is an obvious display of bias, hostility, and partiality. Petitioners pointed
out that respondent judge committed error of law and gravely abused his discretion in compelling
petitioner Guerrero to be placed on the witness stand and cross-examined in the hearing of their
motion for inhibition and finding them in contempt while denying their motion to hold counsel
for accused Bilog in contempt of court. They like reiterated their previous stand that respondent
judge committed error of law and grave abuse of discretion in refusing to inhibit himself from
trying the criminal case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the circumstances warrant the respondent Judge’s inhibition from trying
the case.

RULING:
 YES, the court adopted the opinion of Chief Justice Fernando. 'Chief Justice Fernando
voted to grant such motion consistently with the principle he has followed invariably in a number
of opinions penned by him that to avoid any suspicion as to the absence of that desirable frame
of mind expected of a judge, namely the cold neutrality of an impartial arbiter, and considering
the incidents that show the apparent lack of mutual goodwill between petitioner Syjuco and
respondent Judge, the latter's apparent willingness to leave the disposition of the matter to the
Court gives more than ample ground for his inhibition and the reraffling of the case.
Further, he said that under our broken line of doctrinal jurisprudence, elementary due
process which entitles every litigant to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge demand s the
inhibition of the judge. Where there exist mutual mistrust, suspicion and hostility between the
complainant and the judge, with the complainant charging in open hearing before this Court that
the judge offered him for sale  a land suspected of being covered by a void title and with the
judge likewise charging the complainant in open hearing with having hallucinations  and having
tried to bribe and corrupt him, and acknowledging complainant's fear that 'the accused will be
acquitted in my court,' the judge should withdraw from the case.
In view of the antecedents clearly demonstrating the antagonism between the
complainant and respondent judge or at the very least, on the basis of the evident lack of faith on
the part of the complainant and prosecution with respect to the ability of the respondent judge to
dispense justice without bias or partiality, the respondent judge should have voluntarily inhibited
himself if only to restore the confidence of the complainant and prosecution in particular and the
public in general in the soundness of our judicial system and the integrity and probity of those
who sit in the bench.

ACCORDINGLY, as first above stated, the Court has ordered and rendered judgment (1) that
the People of the Philippines be deemed impleaded as petitioner; (2) that respondent judge’s
Order of January 12, 1961 (Annex "FF" of the petition) declaring the case submitted for decision
upon the filing of memoranda be set aside and that the pending criminal case against private
respondents be reopened for further reception of the People’s rebuttal evidence, for which
purpose the People are given a period of thirty (30) days counted from the date first set for the
purpose; and (3) that respondent judge’s Order of January 7, 1981 (Annex "EE" of the petition)
sentencing petitioners Linco and Guerrero to a fine of P100.00 each for contempt of court be set
aside. For lack of necessary votes, as first above stated, the petition to set aside respondent
judge’s Orders of December 10, 1980 and January 6, 1981 (Annexes "W" and "DD" of the
petition) denying the motion for his inhibition and disqualification is denied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE CITY COURT OF SILAY, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976 (MUNOZ PALMA, J.)

DOCTRINE: Insufficiency of evidence by the prosecution tantamounts to a dismissal of a case

in the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would result to double jeopardy.

FACTS:
That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo
Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars
No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report
cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the weight of the
sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to be
heavier than its actual weight.
The three accused then were charged with the crime of “Falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the
respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented
were not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on the ground
that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly
enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged
earlier and that their case be dismissed.
The People asserts that the plea of double jeopardyis not tenable even if the case at bar
was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore
waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that
the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as
an acquittal which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and
unconstitutional for the accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff. 

ISSUES:
Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused on double
jeopardy.

RULING:
Yes, the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason
that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of
falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the
prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the
prosecution of another case.
 As it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That
there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a
competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously
acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused
in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and
concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court
with jurisdiction on the said case.
It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it
was proven that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It explained
further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first is that
the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and second, when
the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy
trial.
In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar
where there was dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the
approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the
accused which the law despises.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We are constrained to DISMISS this Petition of the People,
without pronouncement as to costs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO CONCEPCION,

G.R. No. L-1553 October 25, 1949 (PARAS, J.)

DOCTRINE: Retracting witnesses are not entitled to credit, since their affidavits are obviously
the result of an afterthought, and if they could have lied during their testimony in court for some
consideration or motive.

FACTS:
 This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the accused appellant,
Francisco Concepcion, guilty of treason on three counts.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that three individuals were apprehended by
Concepcion or at his instigation, due to their guerrilla connections.
Concepcion contended that:
a) the lower court committed an error in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of his
Filipino citizenship after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had moved
for dismissal;
b) the charges of which the appellant was convicted have not been approved in accordance
with the two-witness rule;
c) the he was an ex-USAFFE officer and joined the Japanese under duress.
Concepcion has filed a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence to show
that the appellant was merely a liaison officer between the Provincial Government of Cebu and
the Japanese Military Police; that three of the prosecution witnesses are retracting, and that the
appellant had saved some Filipinos arrested by the Japanese

ISSUES:
Whether or not the appealed judgment be affirmed.

RULING:
YES. As the matter of reopening a case for the reception of further evidence after either
the prosecution or the defense has rested is within the discretion of the trial court.
There may not be corroboration between the two prosecution witnesses, but said
witnesses are uniform in their testimony—that Basilio Severino was arrested on December 7,
1944. The latter important detail constitutes the overt act of treason charged.
There is nothing in the record which tends to indicate that the appellant apprehended or
aided in the arrest of his victims under actual and imminent threats of death or bodily harm in
case he should do otherwise. Upon the other hand, the evidence shows that he willingly
perpetrated the acts of treason of which he was convicted by the lower court.
 The first point is sought to be established by affidavits of two Japanese war prisoners.
These are not entitled to credit, as their affidavits were executed after, the defeat of Japan in the
last war, of which fact the Japanese affiants may be assumed to be aware.
The alleged civilian position of Concepcion did not prevent him from becoming a traitor
to his country. Also, neither are the three retracting witnesses entitled to credit, since their
affidavits are obviously the result of an afterthought, and if they could have lied during their
testimony in court for some consideration or motive, they can now by the same token commit
another falsity.
The alleged circumstance that the Concepcion helped some of his countrymen arrested by
the Japanese certainly does not exempt him from criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is affirmed.

GOODLAND COMPANY INC. vs ABRAHAM CO AND CHRISTINE CHAN

G.R. No. 196685 December 14, 2011 (CARPIO, J.)

DOCTRINE: An order granting an accused’s Demurrer to Evidence is a resolution of the case

on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would result to double jeopardy.

FACTS:
 On February 29, 2000, the defendants were charged for Falsification of Public
Documents under Art. 172 of the RPC, in connection with a Real Estate Mortgage, causing it to
appear that Mr. Gilbert Guy, Vice President of Goodland Company, Inc., participated in the
preparation and execution of said Real Estate Mortgage whereby Goodland Co. Inc., mortgaged
to Asia United Bank a real property in Makati.
After the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the respondents filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to file Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence claiming that
the prosecution failed to establish the second and third elements of the crime and cited the
prosecution’s failure to adduce evidence that Co and Chan caused it to appear in a document that
Gilbert Guy participated in the act and that the latter did not participate in the said act.
On October 16, 2008, the MeTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the
case for failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence to rebut the
presumption of innocence of the accused; RTC and CA affirm. **Judge Moreno
Now, the Petitioner seeks to reverse the acquittal on the ground of Grave Abuse of
Discretion by the MeTC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Demurrer to Evidence equates to acquittal hence, double jeopardy
attaches.

RULING:
An order granting an accused’s Demurrer to Evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal would result to double jeopardy.
The only grounds upon which an acquittal may be recalled or withdrawn is when the
prosecution is denied due process of law or when the trial court commits grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s Demurrer to Evidence, which
negates the attachment of jeopardy.
There was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the MeTC, RTC, and CA,
respectively.
 Grave abuse of discretion is an act of a court performed in a capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.
In the present case, Goodland failed to prove that 1) the subject Real Estate Mortgage
was in blank at the time it was submitted to Asia United Bank; 2) respondents filled-in the blanks
in the Real Estate Mortgage; and 3) Guy did not appear before the notary public.
Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to the lower courts since Goodland failed
to meet the quantum of proof required in criminal cases to overturn the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

WHEREFORE, , we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 112769.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SILVESTRE
DOMALAON,
G.R. Nos. L-9111-9113 August 28, 1956 (EN BANC)

DOCTRINE: A promulgation of judgment by a judge who left the Bench has no binding effect.

FACTS:
The provincial fiscal of Sorsogon filed an information charging herein accused with
violation of Republic Act No. 145. The accused entered the plea of not guilty on arraignment.
Hearings on the merits were had before the Hon. Anatolio Manalac, then presiding judge over
the CFI of Sorsogon, who, after the cases were submitted, reserved his decisions.
Shortly after these cases had been submitted for decisions, Judge Manalac who had filed
an application for retirement under the provisions of Republic Act No. 660, went on terminal
leave of absence. He was, however, duly authorized by the Secretary of Justice to deide in the
decide in the City of Manila the cases he had tried in Sorsogon which were pending decision.
The President appointed Judge Genara Tan Torres ad intermid, to preside over the CFI of
Sorsogon, in which he accepted and assumed office.
Under the authority granted to him, Judge Manalac drafted his judgments in these cases
placed them in an envelope addressed to the Clerk of Court Sorsogon, and deposited said
envelope in the Manila Post Office. This envelope was received by the office of the clerk of
court of Sorsogon, and the judgments therein contained, duly signed by Judge Manalac were
promilgated on the same date.
Hence the accused appealed from said judgment of conviction. The appellate court
declared that the autority of Judge Manalac to decide those case ended upon the qualification of
the new judge and as such, the judgments promulgated after the said qualification were not valid
nor binding.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the promulgation of Judge Manalac’s judgment were valid and binding

RULING:
NO. Promulgation of judgment means the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for
filing and publication. Promulgation takes place when the clerk receives the decision and enters
it in the criminal docket. The decisions of Judge Manalac were received and promulgated by the
Clerk of Court of Sorsogon after the new judge qualified to his position. Wherefore, because he
had left the bench before the date of promulgation, his decisions have no binding effect.

IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the appellate court's

ruling on the validity of the decisions must be, as it is hereby affirmed.
 CESAR B. VILLANUEVA, petitioner, vs. JUDGE NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO,
CFI OF ZAMBALES, BRANCH I, OLONGAPO CITY, and JESUS RAMOS,
respondents
G.R. L-30050 June 27, 1975Ponente: ANTONIO, J.

Facts:

After several postponements asked by accused, the case was submitted for decision to
Judge Lucas Lacson sometime in September 1966. The accused must appear before the court on
October 30, 1968 for promulgation of judgment in Criminal Case No. 4480 Petitioner Cesar B.
Villanueva, brother of the deceased Arnulfo Villanueva and who appeared as private prosecutor
in said criminal case, received also a copy of said notice. November 4, 1968, pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 276 of the Department of Justice, respondent Judge Numeriano G.
Estenzo in the same court was ordered to try and decide the case in that court for a period of not
less than three months. Judge Estenzo, upon the failure of the accused to appear for the
promulgation of judgment, ordered for the arrest of the accused and the confiscation of the bail
bond for his personal liberty. The warrant of arrest was never served becaues the accused could
not be located and on December 1, 1968, Judge Lacson, who had been on terminal leave, retired
from the judicial service. Judge Lacson stated that the case has still not been promulgated.

The accused Jesus Ramos, assisted by his counsel, asked for the immediate promulgation
of the decision. Acting on his petition, respondent Judge promulgated the questioned decision
dated December 7, 1968 imposing upon the accused the penalty, among others, of three (3)
months imprisonment by which accused began to serve such sentence. Petitioner instituted the
petition for certiotari to annul and/or modify the final judgment rendered by respondent Judge in
so changing the decision of Judge Lucas Lacson and in rushing the promulgation of his own
decision in a case he never heard as it is tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and
committed a grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling:
No. There is no provision of law which would preclude a Judge of the Court of First
Instance from deciding a case on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence presented
before the first judge who resigned from the service without deciding the case. Sometimes it is
impossibility for the judge who tried the case to be the same judicial officer to decide it. The
judge who tried the case may die, resign or retire from the bench before he could render
judgment thereon. In any event, the judgment rendered could no longer be altered or modified.
Pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judgment in a criminal case
becomes final when the sentence has been partially or totally served. 11 In the case at bar,
respondent Jesus Ramos had already served his sentence of three (3) months imprisonment and
had been released from prison on January 21, 1969. Before a judgment becomes final, the trial
court has plenary power to alter or revise the same in accordance with the requirements of law
and justice. However, when the sentence imposed upon the accused has already become final, it
can no longer be reopened with the end in view of modifying the sentence
Dispositve Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari should be, as it is hereby,
dismissed. Costs against petitioner Cesar B. Villanueva.

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. CAYETANO

ABALOS, Defendant-Appellant.G.R. No. 412. November 16, 1901.
Ponente: ARELLANO, C.J.
Facts:

Six unknown persons presented themselves in the immediate vicinity of the house of
Pedro Pascua. One of these ordered that the man within the house come down, and as Pascua did
not do so because of his fear, one of the unknown, who was recognized Cayetano Abalos, went
up into the house. There the accused, without any apparent motive, struck Pascua repeated blows
with a dagger, inflicting upon him five wounds. Cayetano Abalos was the fully convicted as
principal by direct participation of the crime of assault of grave character on the person of Pedro
Pascua. However, Solicitor-General asks that the final judgment of the Court of First Instance be
annulled on the ground that the same was pronounced after the 16th day of June last, from which
he infers that it was rendered by one who was not a judge. By article 65 of the law organizing
courts of justice for the Philippine Islands, No. 136 of those promulgated by the legislative
commission, the Courts of First Instance which then existed became extinguished by the
substitution of those which that same act created. The latter was passed the 11th day of June, of
the present year and went into effect on the 16th day of the same month. Consequently the said
judges should have ceased to act on the 16th, the day on which the new organic law commenced
to operate, but in fact almost all of them continued exercising their functions until the newly
appointed judges arrived to take charge.

Issue:
Whether or not the actions of the judges are tenable?

Ruling:
Yes, their actions were valid. The reason for this continuation was that certain prior acts
were necessary. Their abandonment would be injurious to the interest of justice and the public
which would have been without an administration of justice during the days that elapsed until the
new judges assumed charge. Therefore they were judges of the new courts de facto and in good
faith. No usurpation of jurisdiction can be imputed to them. As such judges they were accepted
by common error. Thus, it is a universally professed doctrine that the acts of judges, considered
such by common error, whether there be color of title or not (as in this case there was), are valid
and effective in favor of the public welfare.
Dispositive Portion
For the foregoing considerations it is proper that Cayetano Abalos be sentenced to
the penalty of four years of prision correccional together with the accessory penalties
prescribed in article 61 of the Code and to indemnify the injured party in the sum of 100
pesos and in the event of insolvency to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment; and
to the payment of the costs in both instances. In the penalty imposed there is not to be
 computed the provisional imprisonment of the defendant for the reason that he is within
the exception provided in No. 3 of the ninety-third rule of the provisional law for the
application of the Penal Code. The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed in so far
as the same is in accord with the foregoing opinion and reversed in so far as it is not so.
So ordered.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,vs.

DOMINGO MOBE (alias DOMING) ET AL,. defendants. DOMINGO
MOBE (alias DOMING), appellantGR No. L-1292, May 24, 1948
Ponente: Tuason J.
Facts:

This is an appeal by Domingo Mobe from a sentence of "imprisonment for life" for
murder. Emilio Deiparine, a watchman in a drug store) was found dead and Juan Saldo lying on
the ground and groaning in a small alley behind the drug store as testified by Wenceslao Robles.
When they asked Juan Saldo, after the latter had given his name, what was the matter, Saldo said
he was wounded and four others of his companions robbed the drug store with Domingo Mobe,
the accused, shot Deiparine which caused the latter’s death. The crime committed was properly
held by the trial court to be murder qualified by treachery. Even though at the inception of the
aggression the deceased carried a carbine and was at liberty to defend himself against the
possible attacks by the malefactors, it is a fact that at the time the fatal wounds were inflicted he
was defenseless. However, it was questioned if there should be any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances as the crime was commited at nighttime and was committed by a band.

Issue:

Whether or not those aggravating circumstances are already absorbed by treachery?

Ruling:

Yes, the other aggravating circumstances were already absorbed by the qualifying
circumstance of murder which is treachery. The aggravating circumstance of band has not been
clearly established, as only three of the malefactors have been shown positively to have been
armed. As for nocturnity, this circumstance is embraced in treachery and cannot be considered
separately from the latter. Like nighttime, the circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength is inherent in, and comprehended by, the circumstance of treachery. When treachery is
taken into account as a qualifying circumstance in murder, it is improper again to consider in
addition to that circumstance the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength,
since the latter is necessarily included in the former.

There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the judgment of
the court below is correct in its result, except that the "imprisonment for life" should be
changed to reclusíon perpetua.
Dispositive Portion:
With this modification, the appealed decision is affirmed with costs of the appeal
against the appellant.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LICERIO (alias FELIX TOANQUIN), defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-41966.April 4, 1935.Ponente: HULL, J.

Facts:

This appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Abra, finding the appellant, Licerio (alias Felix Toanquin), guilty of the offense of rape and
sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for an indeterminate period running from eight years
and one day, prision mayor, to seventeen years, four months and one day, reclusion temporal,
with the accessories prescribed by law, and requiring him to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P500 in case she should have an offspring, and requiring him to pay the costs. The
appellant would also have this court believe that he was at first reluctant to have carnal
knowledge of her, but, after she had fondled his genital organ and raised her skirt, and as he was
previously assured that he could do to her what he wanted, he yielded to his passion. Also he
would like the Court to believe that they were lovers. Felisa Reyes, was alone in her house, when
the accused and as she met the defendant after inquring what he wanted, the latter held her by the
arms and, covering her mouth with a hand, threw her down on the bed. He then placed himself
on top of her and, by means of force, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape? Whether or not the judgment shall be modified?

Ruling:

Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. It is highly improbable that she, a young
country girl, who never had sexual relation prior to the occasion in question, would have invited
him to her house, knowing fully well that he is a married man, and would have suggested that
she would give up herself to him. If it is true, also, that they were sweethearts and he — in his
own words — was still "un varon vivo", it was unusual why he should have hesitated in
conquering her then and there.
Dispositive Portion
It being understood, therefore, that the judgment appealed from is modified in the
sense that the requirement to indemnify the injured girl in the amount of P500 is made
absolute, and not subject to the condition that it should be paid in case there should be an
offspring, and that the appellant is also sentenced to support the offspring, should there be
any, the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
 THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee,vs. LEOCADIO
TANJUANCO et al., defendants and appellants
No. 500 January 30, 1902. Ponente: Torres J.

Facts:

Causes Nos. 10 and 11 were commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Bulacan against the Tanjuanco and Domingo Bernardo for robbery in a gang. He was convicted
and was imposed of the penalty of presidio mayor for each one of the crimes which are subject
matter of the complaints. Both crimes were decided by the trial court judge in one single
judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the the trial court judge erred in deciding both cases in in one single judgment?

Ruling:
Yes, the action of the trial court Judge is erroneous. The said two crimes are not
punishable by one single penalty according to Art. 89 of the Penal Code. Verily, there is no law
which authorizes the court to enter a single judgment for two offenses as what the lower court
did. Without the consolidation of these causes, the judge has considered together the proofs
adduced in each of them and rendered judgment not only on cause No. 11 but also on cause No.
12. The procedure followed by the lower court violates the essential rights of the accused to a
trial in each omne of the two cases in question upon the proofs in each individual case and upon
the allegation set forth in each information.
Dispositive Portion
Therefore, since each of the two robberies should be punished independently and
separately, it follows that the single judgment rendered for the two actions rendered in
cause No. 11(one of them) is a nullity, and the sentenced appealed from must be reversed
and the two causes remanded to Bulacan with instructions to enter the proper judgment in
accordance with law in each one of them.

ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

the SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.Ponente: Davide Jr., J

Facts:

In the Court’s of 14 November 1994, it modified the appealed judgment of the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844.

The Court held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged,
viz., violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended—because the said section penalizes
only consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not consummated—he
could, nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification
of official and commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that after having been
acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special law, he could not be
convicted anymore of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial
documents, an offense punishable under the Revised Penal Code, a general law; otherwise, the
constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be violated.

The Office of the Solicitor General rejects the theory of the petitioner and submits that
the information in this case contains the essential ingredients of estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents; therefore, assuming there is sufficient evidence, the petitioner
could be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution on the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

Issue:

Whether or not he can be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents?

Ruling:

Yes, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner’s claim that he could not be convicted
of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. What determines the real
nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the
information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of
law. This is provided under section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by
the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or
of the offense charged included in that which is proved. It follows then that an accused may be
convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the latter.
However, the quantum of proof was not satisfied. There is no sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre to commit
the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents.
Neither is there evidence of petitioner’s active participation in the commission of the
crime.
 There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be
doubted.
Dispositive portion
“WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our
decision of 14 November 1994 is SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered
REVERSING the challenged decision of 28 June 1993 and resolution of 12 August 1993
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844 and ACQUITTING petitioner ODON
PECHO of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, without, however, prejudice to any appropriate administrative
action which his office may take against him as may be warranted by the circumstances
in this case. SO ORDERED.”

G.R. No. L-3951 August 7, 1950 JESUS ALVARADO, in behalf of his brother,
Aniceto Alvarado y Como, Petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
Respondent. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3951 August 7, 1950

Facts:

On June 21, 1947, Jesus Alvarado was found guilty of theft by the Court of First Instance
of Manila and sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment of four months and one day to two
years, four months and one day. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Petitioner claims
that having he has garnered to his credit a total imprisonment, due to his good conduct, two
years, eight months and sixteen days as against two years, four months, and one day which is the
maximum of his indeterminate penalty, he should already be discharge. The Court of First then
set decision of the CA for another reading or promulgation of the judgment as the latter
remanded the case to the former for execution.

Issue:

Whether or not the action of CFI was erroneous? Whether or not petitioner be
discharged?

Ruling:
Yes, CFI was wrong, Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 in relation to section 17 of Rule 120 of
Rules of Court, a judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the
records are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution.
The certified copy of the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court,
not for the promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of the
judgment against him. The duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is
merely to see that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of the court of first
instance is necessary to that end. Thus, it was unnecessary for the Court of First Instance to set
the decision of the Court of Appeals for reading or promulgation for October 18, 1948, as it did,
and it was error to make the period of imprisonment commence on that date as was done in this
case.

Yes. Computed as above stated, the imprisonment expired on June 30, 1950, without
good conduct allowance, or on March 30, 1950, with good conduct allowance. In either case the
petitioner is entitled to be discharged.

Dispositive Portion

The respondent is ordered forthwith to release the petitioner from custody unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause.
 BERNARDINO MARCELINO, petitioner,vs. THE HON. FERNANDO
CRUZ, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN
OF THE PROVINCIAL JAIL OF RIZAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983. Ponente: ESCOLIN, J.

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII. Trial was conducted and on August 4, 1975. On the same date, however, the
attorneys for both parties moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda
within 30 days from such motion. November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy
Clerk of Court his decision in said case for promulgation date. On the date set for promulgation
of the decision, counsel for accused moved for postponement, raising for the first time the
alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for failure to decide the case within 90 days from
submission thereof for decision. The promulgation of judgment was moved up to January 26,
1976. On January 12, 1976, the counsel for the accused filed before the present petition for
prohibition and writ of habeas corpus to enjoin respondent.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court loss jurisdiction to decide the case?

Ruling:

No. The rendition of the judgment in courts refers to the filing of the signed decision with
the clerk of court. The three-month period prescribed by Section 11(1) of Article X of the 1973
Constitution refers to the rendition of judgment and not to the promulgation thereof. Thus, it is
the date of rendition of judgment that should be considered in determining whether or not
respondent judge had resolved the case within the allotted period. The date of promulgation of a
decision could not serve as the reckoning date because the same necessarily comes at a later date,
considering that notices have to be sent to the accused as well as to the other parties involved, an
event which is beyond the control of the judge.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that on November 28, 1975, or eighty- five(85)
days from September 4, 1975 the date the case was deemed submitted for decision,
respondent judge filed with the deputy clerk of court the decision in Criminal Case No.
5910. He had thus veritably rendered his decision on said case within the three-month
period prescribed by the Constitution.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner and appelant, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and SILVESTRE DOMALAON,
respondents and appellees. NOS. L-9111-91113. August 28, 1956.
Ponente: Bengzon J.

Facts:
On Feb 5 and 7,1954, Silvestre Domolaon was charged of violation of Republic Act No.
145. The case was presided by Honorable Antonioo Manalac(Judge Manalac) of the Court of
First Instance of Sorsogon. After the case was submitted for decision, Judge Manalac filed an
application for retirement, since March 4, 1954, but was duly authorized by the Secretary of
Justice to decide in the City of Manila the cases he tried in Sorsogon which were pending
decision. On June 21, 1954, Honorable Genaro Tan was appointed as ad interim Judge oto
preside over the CFI of Sorsogon. Consequeentl, Judge Manalac then drafted the judgments in
the pending cases and was received in the office of the clerk of court of Sorsogon on July 1,
1954. The judgment contained the date bearing June 12, 1954 by which the accused was
convicted. The accused appealed and decided that the authority of Judge Manalac to decide cases
ended on July 1, 1954, upon the qualification of the new judge as such judgment was not valid
nor binding. Also, the Solicitor General contends that promulgation of judgment is done when
Judge Manalac deposited his decision on July 1, 1954 with the Manila Post Office.

Issue:
Whether or not promulgation was executed on July 1, 1954
Whether or not Judge Manalac still had authority to decide during the promulgation of
the judgment?

Ruling:
The promulgation of judgment was on July 1, 1954. Sec. 9 of Rule 124 states that
promulgation takes place after the clerk of court receives the decision and enters it on the
criminal docket. Thus, it was the receipt and not the sending is that which constitutes the filing.
In this case, the clerk of court received the judgment on July 3, 1954. Thus, the judgment was
promulgated at that time.

No, Judge Manalac was already divested of his authority to decide on the case. The
decisions of Judge Manalac were promulgated on July 3, 1954. During that time he already left
the Bench and went on a terminal leave. The theory that he had applied for retirement “effective
September 1954” as stated in his written request could not be construed that he retired on that
date. Such would imply illegality of Judge Torres’s appointment and qualification, which the
prosecution does not suggest, perhaps because Judge Manalac did not object to his earlier
retirement, having urged approval of his resignation “as soon as convenient”.

Dispositive Portion
 In consequence of the foregoing considerations, the appellate court’s ruling on the
validity of the decisions must be, as hereby affirmed. These cases will be returned to the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon for adjudication. No new trial shall be held; the judge
presiding that court will decide on the strength of the evidence already introduced. So
ordered.

EDUARDO JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES and JUDGE PEDRO NAVARRO, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-24529. February 17, 1968. Ponente: Angeles J.

FACTS:

Eduardo Jimenez, herein petitioner, together with others, was charged with homicide in
an information, dated May 13, 1960, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The case was
heard and tried before Judge Eulogio Mencias. The decision was prepared and signed by Judge
Mencias and he delivered it to the clerk of court on January 16, 1965 as the latter issued a service
of notice to petitioner for promulgation of judgment on January 21 1965. On the date of
promulgation of judgment, Judge Mencias retired and was succeeded by Respondent Judge
Pedro Navarro by whom promulgation shall be, after unwanted postponement, be held on March
1, 1965. On that date, petitioner Jimenez filed a motion to set aside decision and promulgation as
the promulgation of judgment must not only be rendered by a judge legally appointed and acting
either as de jure or de facto, but that the decision must also be promulgated during the
incumbency of the judge who penned the decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the decision be promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who
penned the decision?

Ruling:

Yes. Section 6, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court has states, “Judgment is promulgated by
reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the defendant and the judge of the court who
has rendered it. If the defendant is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment
of conviction may be promulgated by the judge of the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction
over the place of confinement or detention upon the request of the court that rendered the
judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of
appeal and to approve the appeal bond.” Thus, the dispensability of the presence of the judge in
the reading of a sentence refers only to the physical absence of the judge, and not to his inability
to be present during the promulgation of the judgment because of the cessation of or his removal
from office.
In the case at bar, when the notice for the promulgation of the decision was sent
out, the judge who signed the decision was no longer the judge of the court. Hence, the
respondent cannot render promulgation of judgment.

Dispostive Portion
UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We hold that the decision
rendered by the retired Judge Eulogio Mencias cannot be validly promulgated and
acquire a binding effect for the same has become null and void under the circumstances.
 DULCISIMO TONGCO JANDAYAN, petitioner vs. THE
HONORABLE JUDGE FERNANDO S. RUIZ, as Executive Judge,
Court of First Instance of Bohol THE CHIEF OF POLICE, Anda,
Bohol and CANDELARIA ARANA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37471.January 28, 1980. Ponente: FERNANDO, C.J.

Facts:

On May 10, 1973 petitioner was convicted of Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless
Imprudence by the Municipal Court of Loay, Bohol and sentenced to suffer three (3) months of
Arrests Mayor. On appeal, the case (Crim. Case No. 706) was raffled to the CFI of Bohol,
Branch 1, presided over by the Honorable Paulino Marquez. On June 26, 1973, an order was
served on petitioner that the promulgation of the decision would take place on July 6, 1973. On
June 27, 1973, Judge Paulino Marquez retired from service. With that petitioner motioned for
postponement of promulgation and executed on July 16, 1973 as prepared and signed by retired
Judge Marquez. The Solicitor General in his comment stated that the promulgation made by
respondent judge on July 16, 1973 of the decision dated June 22, 1973, signed and prepared by
Judge Marquez who retired on June 27, 1973 is submitted to be null and void.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of retired Judge Marquez is null and void?

Ruling:

Yes, the decision of Judge Marquez is null and void. Citing the case of Jimenez v.
Republic, the Court held that “the decision rendered by the retired Judge Eulogio Mencias cannot
be validly promulgated and acquire a binding effect for the same has become null and void under
the circumstances." The latest case in point is Vera v. People, 11 where it was noted by this
Court that a decision of a judge promulgated after his retirement could have been set aside on the
authority of the above two cases of People v. Court of Appeals and Jimenez v. Republic, except
for their non-applicability in view of the failure to raise such an objection in the lower court as
well as in the Court of Appeals. There was no thought, however, of deviating from the principle
that a judge who had retired had no legal authority to promulgate a decision.

Petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan was already released for having fully served out
his sentence. The Petition of writ of habeas corpus has already been rendered moot and
academic.

Dispositive Portion
WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed for being moot and academic, petitioner
having been released in the meanwhile. No costs.
 MARILYN PASCUA V. CA
G.R. NO. 140243. DECEMBER 14, 2000
J. MELO
FACTS:
Petitioner (Marilyn Pascua) was charged under 26 Informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. The Informations alleged that in 1989, petitioner issued 26 Philippine
National Bank (PNB) checks to apply on account or for value in favor of Lucita Lopez with the
knowledge that at the time of issue, petitioner did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the face value of the checks in full. Upon presentment of the
subject checks, they were dishonored by the drawee bank for having been drawn against
insufficient funds and against a closed account. he judgment was initially scheduled for
promulgation on March 31, 1998. However, considering that the presiding judge was on leave,
the promulgation was reset to May 5, 1998.
 When the case was called on May 5, 1998, Public Prosecutor Rogelio C. Sescon and defense
counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias appeared and manifested their readiness for the promulgation of
judgment, although the latter intimated that petitioner would be late. Hence, the case was set for
second call. After the lapse of two hours, petitioner still had not appeared. The trial court again
asked the public prosecutor and the defense counsel if they were ready for the promulgation of
judgment. Both responded in the affirmative. The dispositive portion of the decision was thus
read in open court. Afterwards, the public prosecutor, the defense counsel, and private
complainant Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies of the subject
decision by signing at the back of the original copy of the decision on file with the record of the
case.

Forthwith, the public prosecutor moved for the forfeiture of the cash bond posted by
petitioner as well as for the issuance of a warrant for her arrest. Acting on the motion, the trial
court issued, also on May 5, 1998, the following order:

When this case was called for the promulgation of judgment, the accused failed to appear despite
due notice. Upon motion of the Public Prosecutor, that the cash bond posted for her provisional
liberty be forfeited in favor of the government, being well-taken, the same is hereby
granted. Likewise, let a warrant of arrest be issued against her.

SO ORDERED.

On June 8, 1998, a notice of change of address was filed by petitioner with the trial court,
sent through a private messengerial firm. On the same date, without terminating the services of
her counsel of record, Atty. Marcelino Arias, the one who received the copy of the judgment of
conviction, petitioner, assisted by another counsel, Atty. Rolando Bernardo, filed an urgent
omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and confiscation of bail bond, as well as to set anew the
promulgation of the subject decision on the following allegations: that petitioner failed to appear
before the trial court on the scheduled date of promulgation (May 5, 1998) because she failed to
get the notices sent to her former address at No. 21 La Felonila St., Quezon City; that she had no
intention of evading the processes of the trial court; that in February 1998, she transferred
residence to Olongapo City by reason of an ejectment case filed against her by her landlord
concerning her former residence in Quezon City; and that due to the abrupt dislocation of their
family life as a result of the transfer of their residence to Olongapo City, there were important
matters that she overlooked such as the filing of a notice of change of address to inform the trial
court of her new place of residence.

After an exchange of pleadings, on June 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the decision
assailed herein. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.

Hence, the instant petition on the basis of the following grounds: (1) that petitioner was not
properly notified of the date of promulgation and therefore, there was no valid promulgation;
hence petitioner's period to appeal has not commenced; (2) that the promulgation in absentia of
the judgment against petitioner was not made in the manner set out in the last paragraph of
Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which then provided that
promulgation in absentia shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket
and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel; (3) that the decision of the trial
court is contrary to applicable laws and that it disregarded factual evidence and instead resorted
to make a conclusion based on conjectures, presumptions, and misapprehension of facts.

The resolution of the instant petition is dependent on the proper interpretation of Section 6,
Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment – xxx The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the
accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present
at the promulgation of the decision.  In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation
shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be
served upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and the accuseds failure to
appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who
may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel. (Italics
supplied)
Incidentally, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which took effect
December 1, 2000 adds more requirements but retains the essence of the former Section 6, to
wit:

Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. – xxx In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled
date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording
the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or
thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court
shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall
state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence
was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days
from notice.  (Italics supplied)

Trial Court - After trial, a judgment of conviction was rendered on February 17, 1998,
disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, MARILYN C. PASCUA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of twenty six (26) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and
hereby sentences her to suffer ONE (1) YEAR imprisonment in each case and to pay the private
complainant, LUCITA LOPEZ in the sum of SIX HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P605,000.00), Philippine Currency without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.

Court of Appeals – Dismissed the Petition for certiorari, for failure to contain an
explanation why the respondent therein was not personally served a copy of the
petition. However, upon reconsideration, said petition was reinstated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in dismissing the Petition for certiorari

HELD:
NO, Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her non- receipt of the
notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice of change of
address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides, promulgation could be properly
done even in her absence, subject to the service of a copy of the decision upon her or her counsel
and the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket.

However, in line with petitioner's second argument, petitioner has presented evidence
sufficient to controvert the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty as regards
the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the
court. Attached to the petition is a piece of evidence that cannot be ignored by this Court -- a
certification dated October 26, 1998 signed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, which reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that this Office has not yet been furnished, as of this date, with copies of
the decisions in Criminal Cases Nos. 85283-306 and 86064-65, entitled People of the Philippines
versus Marilyn C. Pascua, which were assigned to Branch 153 of this Court.

This certification is issued upon request of Romulo D. San Juan and Porfirio Bautista, both
counsels for the accused.

City of Pasig, October 26, 1998, 1:30 p.m.

(Sgd.) GREGORIO P. SUBONG, JR.

Administrative Officer I In-Charge

Criminal Cases Unit

(Sgd.) GRACE S. BELVIS

Clerk of Court

Thus, on May 5, 1998, although the second kind of notification was satisfied when defense
counsel Atty. Arias received a copy of the February 17, 1998 decision, the solemn and operative
act of recording was not done, making the promulgation in absentia  invalid. This being so, the
period to appeal did not begin to run.

The next matter we have to consider is the effect of the service of a copy of the judgment
upon petitioner, who admits having received a copy thereof on June 17, 1998. Did the 15-day
period to appeal begin to run on said date of receipt?

We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does not in any
way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in the criminal docket
later, such piece-meal compliance with the Rules will still not validate the May 5, 1998
promulgation which was invalid at the time it was conducted. The express mention in the
provision of both requirements for a valid promulgation in absentia clearly means that they
indeed must concur.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 1999 decision and
the September 28, 1999 order of the Court of Appeals are hereby set aside. The instant case is
hereby remanded to the trial court for proper promulgation of its decision in accordance with
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SALVADOR ESPANOL Y ELMERANES

G.R. NO. L-57597-99 JUNE 29, 2982
EN BANC

FACTS:

This is a case of robbery with homicide. Between two and three o'clock in the early
morning of Christmas Eve, December 24, 1979, Anselma Marcelo-Arellano, 32, and her
housemaid, Cirila Moscoso, 20, were feloniously killed in the master bedroom of Juan Arellano's
residence located at 7855 Makati Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila.
 
On the same occasion, cash and checks amounting to P140,908.50 were taken from
Arellano's safe inside the bedroom and an attempt was made to choke to death his three-year-old
daughter, Catherine, who was also in the bedroom. The cash and checks were recovered by the
police and turned over to Victor R. Marcelo, Anselma's nephew (Exh. E).
 
The autopsy disclosed that Anselma had contused abrasions on the chin, left jaw and
neck, covering an area eleven by twelve centimeter, and a fracture in the thyroid region of the
neck. There was hemorrhage in the anterior portion of the neck. Death was due to "asphyxia by
strangulation" (Exh. U). Cirila had contused abrasions and hematoma in the head, neck and
shoulders. Death was due to the injuries to her brain (Exh. Y). Catherine had an abrasion in the
neck and a hematoma in the shoulder (Exh. K)

A few hours after the incident, the police got the statements of Salvador Español, 19,
Nicanor Rivera, 20, and Pablito Bomballes, 20, all natives of Masbate and employees in the
Arellano wine and liquor store which was a part of the said residence (Exh. FF).

Español in his confession revealed that he conspired with Rivera and Bomballes to steal
the money in Arellano's safe. He said that at around midnight of December 23, 1979, after
Bomballes and Rivera arrived from the discotheque, the three of them entered the master
bedroom. Rivera got the money from the safe. Later, he struck Anselma Marcelo with a lead
pipe. She fell from the bed. She was bloodied all over.

At the arraignment on January 16, 1980, the trial judge personally read to the three
accused the informations in Tagalog and interrogated them in Tagalog. With the assistance of
counsel de oficio, Rivera and Bomballes pleaded not guilty while Español pleaded guilty in spite
of the repeated warnings given to him that he would be sentenced to death.
 Trial Court - The trial court convicted Español of homicide for having killed the
housemaid, Cirila Moscoso, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal
as maximum and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P16,700 to the victim's heirs.
Español was also convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
four years, two months and one day of prision correccional as minimum to ten years of prision
mayor as maximum and to reimburse Catherine's father the sum of P624.90 as medical expenses.
Thus, the trial court denied the oral motion to quash of the accused and sustained the procedure
followed by the fiscal in filing separate informations for three distinct offenses instead of only
one information for the special complex crime of robo con homicidio. The three cases were
elevated for automatic review.

Rivera and Bomballes contend that their liability as accessories after the fact has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, they should be acquitted. That contention cannot
be sustained. The record contains many indications that they had knowledge of the robbery with
double homicide and attempted murder when they concealed the bag containing the loot in the
house of Rivera's aunt.

Their alternative contention is that the trial court erred in amending its decision and
convicting them as accessories in robbery with homicide and imposing upon them the
indeterminate penalty of six years of prision correccional as minimum to ten years of prision
mayor as maximum.

The Solicitor General in his brief and in his comment of May 11, 1982 recommends that
Bomballes and Rivera be released because the original decision allegedly became final as to
them on April 1, 1981, when they waived their right to appeal, or on April 7, 1981, when the
reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal expired.

The original decision convicting Rivera and Bomballes as accessories in simple robbery
and sentencing each of them to four months of arresto mayor was promulgated on March 23,
1981.
ISSUE:

Whether the trial judge could amend his decision by increasing the penalty and promulgate the
amendatory order sixteen days after the original decision was promulgated. Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court

HELD:

NO, "SEC. 7.  Modification of judgment. - A judgment of conviction may be modified or

set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become final or appeal has been
perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."

It is a fact that on April 1, 1981, or nine days after the promulgation of the original
decision, Bomballes and Rivera filed a manifestation wherein they stated that they were not
appealing from the decision convicting them as accessories in simple robbery and sentencing
each of them to four months of arresto mayor (p. 248, Record). They waived expressly in writing
their right to appeal. That waiver had the effect of causing the judgment against them to become
final.
That being so, the trial court could not modify or amend that final judgment in an order
dated April 2, 1981 which was promulgated on April 8, 1981 or sixteen days after the
promulgation of the original decision. Regardless of the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration, the original judgment became final after the lapse of fifteen days or on April
7,1981

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
 WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgments in Criminal Cases Nos. 33274 and 33276,
convicting Salvador Español of homicide and attempted murder, are set aside. Its judgment in
Criminal Case No. 33275 is modified. Español is hereby convicted of robbery with double
homicide and attempted murder and sentenced to death. The lower court's judgment as to his
civil liability in the three cases is affirmed.  
 The trial court's amendatory order on April 2, 1981, convicting Nicanor Rivera and Pablito
Bomballes as accessories in robbery with homicide is set aside. Said accused should be released
immediately from imprisonment unless they are detained for some other offense. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED

AURORA P. DE LEON V. SERAFIN SALVADOR

G.R. NO. L-30871 DECEMBER 28, 1970
J. TEEHANKEE
FACTS:
 A judgment for P35,000.00-actual, moral and exemplary damages obtained by Enrique de
Leon against private respondent Eusebio Bernabe in Civil Case No. C-189 of Branch XII of
the Rizal court of first instance, Caloocan City branch presided by Judge Fernando A. Cruz,
having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by said court.  Pursuant
thereto, the city sheriff, on November 8, 1966 levied on execution on two parcels of land of
682.5 square meters each registered in the names of Bernabe under T. C. T. Nos. 94985 and
94986 of Caloocan City.  At the execution sale held on February 14, 1967, the city sheriff sold
the said properties to herein petitioner, Aurora (sister of the judgment creditor) as the highest
bidder for the total sum of P30,194.00, (the property then being subject to an existing mortgage
lien in the amount of P120,000.00).  The sheriff executed the corresponding certificate of sale in
her favor, which was duly registered on February 21, 1967 with the Caloocan City register of
deeds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Branch XIV presided by Judge Salvador has exclusive jurisdiction to set aside
for alleged irregularities the execution sale held on February 14, 1967 by virtue of the writ for
the execution of the final judgment in the first case (No. C-189) issued by Judge Cruz court and
to order a new auction sale

HELD:

NO, It is patent that such exclusive jurisdiction was vested in Judge Cruz' court.  Having
acquired jurisdiction over Case No. C-189 and rendered judgment that had become final
and executory, it retained jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other co-ordinate
courts for its execution and all incidents thereof, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of its ministerial officers in connection therewith.

As early as 1922, in Cabigaovs. del Rosario, this Court laid down the doctrine that "no
court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction having power to grant the relief sought by injunction'', pointing out that
"(T)he various branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts
and to allow them to interfere with each other's judgments or decrees by injunctions would
obviously lead to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

ACCORDINGLY, in Case L-30871, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted;

respondent Judge Salvador's court is declared without jurisdiction over Civil Case No. C-1217
other than to dismiss the same and the writ of preliminary injunction of February 19, 1968
therein issued and the orders of May 20, 1969 and June 23, 1969 therein issued, as well as
respondent sheriff's certificate of redemption issued on May 21, 1969 are set aside and declared
null and void; and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court on September 2, 1969 is
made permanent.  In Case L-31603, the petition for certiorari is dismissed and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by this Court on February 11, 1970 is dissolved.  No
pronouncement as to costs. 

THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF RIZAL V. THE HON. JUDGE CECILIA

MUNOZ-PALMA
G.R. NO. L-15325 AUGUST 31, 1960
J. CONCEPCION
FACTS:

It appears that on June 26, 1958, respondent Alfonso Samosa y Lizardo was charged, in
Criminal case No. 21101 of the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan, Rizal, with having raped
his daughter, Erlinda Samosa y Mañalac. After appropriate proceedings, the records were,
subsequently, forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where the corresponding
information was filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. 7954. In due course, decision was
rendered by said court, presided over by respondent Judge, Hon. Cecilia Muñoz-Palma,
convicting the accused of qualified seduction and imposing upon him an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional to 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of
prision mayor, with accessory penalties provided by law, and sentencing him to indemnify
Erlinda Samosa in the sum of P2,000, as well as to support the offspring, should there be any,
and to pay the costs. This decision, dated January 6, 1959, was promulgated on January 13, 1959,
whereupon an order of commitment of the accused to the provincial jail of Rizal was issued.

At the hearing thereof, on February 9, 1959, counsel de oficio stated that complainant

was unwilling to appear before the court in order to bear out the allegations of said motion, in
view of which she (counsel) was withdrawing the same, with the request that the penalty
imposed upon the accused be reduced to the minimum. By an order dated February 18, 1959,
respondent Judge amended the dispositive part of her aforementioned decision by reducing the
penalty meted out to the accused to a minimum of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional and a maximum of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days of prision mayor, and also, by
eliminating the provision, in the original decision, requiring the accused to support the offspring,
it appearing that complainant was not pregnant at the time of the hearing of the case, as well as
by directing that the accused be credited with one-half of the preventive imprisonment he may
have suffered by reason of this case. The prosecution moved to reconsider and set aside this
order of February 18, 1959, to no avail. Hence, this original action for certiorari, instituted by the
prosecution upon the ground that said order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, the
original decision dated January 6, 1959, having become final and executory on January 26, 1959,
or 15 days after its promulgation on January 13, 1959.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is wrong in amending her first judgment

HELD:

NO, This conclusion is bolstered up by the circumstance that, when the accused wrote his second
letter, dated January 29, 1959 — stating that he had a communication of the complainant
exonerating him from any liability — respondent Judge deemed it imperative to issue the order
of February 6, 1959, providing the accused with a counsel de oficio for such action as may be
deemed fit to safeguard the rights of the accused. Eight (8) days having already elapsed since
January 28, 1959 — when, otherwise, the decision promulgated on January 13, 1959, would
have become final and executory said order of February 6, 1959, shows that respondent Judge
has issued the same upon the theory that the period to appeal from the aforementioned decision
had been suspended by said letter of January 14, 1959 operating as a petition for a new trial, for,
otherwise, it would be useless for counsel de officio to take the action alluded to in the order.
Needless to say, since respondent Judge had ample discretion to amend or modify motu proprio
her original decision, before it became final, within the limits fixed by law, she was, likewise,
clothed with authority to consider the letter of January 14, 1959, as sufficient cause to clear the
way for the eventual exercise of said discretion, by suspending, before January 28, 1959, the
running of the period of appeal. And this, in effect, is what respondent Judge did, with the result
that when the order complained of was issued on February 18, 1959, the original decision was
not, as yet, final and executory, as stated in said order.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE the writ prayed for is hereby denied, and the petition herein dismissed,
without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
US V. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
G.R. NO. 8195 FEBRUARY 14, 1913
PER CURIAM

FACTS:
 It appears from the record that on or about the 24th of June, 1912, a complaint was
presented against the respondents, Joseph M. Heery and Joseph J. Capurro, in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila, charging them with a violation of the Opium Law, Upon the
complaint the respondents were duly arrested and brought to trial.

After hearing the evidence, the respondent judge, the Honorable A. S. Crossfield, on the
30th of July, 1912, found the respondents Heery and Capurro guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for a period of six months and each to pay a fine of
P800 and one-half the costs.

On the 5th of August, 1912, the respondents Heery and Capurro presented a petition for a
modification of said sentence. Said petition was set for hearing before the respondent judge on
the 10th of August, 1912. On the 10th of August the hearing on said motion was suspended until
the 16th of August, 1912. Later the respondent judge, after considering said motion, dictated an
order modifying the original sentence and sentenced each of the defendants to pay a fine only of
P2,000'and each to pay one-half the costs

The basis of the present petition is the alleged fact that the respondent judge, having
permitted more than fifteen days to elapse before modifying the original sentence, lost
jurisdiction to modify it; that in modifying the same after the expiration of fifteen days he did so
without authority of law; that such modification having been made without authority of law and
after the respondent judge had lost jurisdiction over said sentence, the modification was null and
void.  The petitioner relies upon section 47 of General Orders, No. 58, in support of his
contention. Said section 47 provides that:

"An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from the rendition of the judgment or order
appealed from."

It will be noted that the original sentence was read to the defendants on the 2d of August,
1912; that the modified sentence was read to the defendants on the 19th of August, 1912; that
seventeen days had elapsed from the announcement of the original sentence before the
announcement of the modified sentence.

The respondents contend that the motion for a rehearing or for a modification of the first
sentence had the effect of extending the fifteen days within which sentences become final.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge can change its decision 17 days after the original decision was
announced

HELD:

NO, In the case of United States vs. Flemister (1 Phil. Rep. 317), Mr. Justice Willard,
speaking for the court, said (p. 321):

"Our conclusions are (1) that within the fifteen days allowed for an appeal the trial court may
reopen the case on either of two grounds; (2) that if the defendant does not appeal he can make
no motion in this court on either ground; (3) that if he does appeal he can move in this court on
either ground. If the defendant makes a motion in the lower court and that is denied, he can still
appeal if the fifteen days allowed therefor have not expired. If the defendant fails to appeal and
limits himself to a motion in the trial court to reopen the case, this motion fails if it is not decided
within the nonextendable period of fifteen days."

From all the foregoing, the following conclusions necessarily follow:

1. That after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of the sentence of August 2, 1912, the
respondent judge was without authority to alter, amend, modify or annul said sentence, except
for the purpose of correcting clerical errors.

2. That the modification complained of was null and without the force of law.
3. That the sentence of August 2, 1912, is the sentence of the lower court and is in full force and
effect.  Said alleged modification in no way affected the sentence read to the defendants on
August 2.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Therefore, after the lapse of ten days from the promulgation hereof, let a judgment be
entered decreeing the annulment of the modified sentence of the respondent judge, read or
announced to the defendants on the 19th of August, 1912; and without any finding as to costs it
is so ordered.

US V. BALLAD, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 11372 SEPTEMBER 29, 1916
J. JOHNSON
FACTS:

That on or about June 16, 1915, in the municipality of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Philippine
Islands, the said Jacinto Ballad and Vicente Tamaray did, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
and with intent of gain, take and steal a carabao worth P120, two caraballas worth P250, and one
carabao calf worth P60 (the value of all being P430, equivalent to 2,150 pesetas) belonging to
another person, Bias Taguinod; taken against the will of the owner thereof

Upon said complaint the defendants were duly arrested, arraigned, pleaded not guilty,
were tried, found guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced, by the Honorable J.
P. Weissenhagen, judge the said Jacinto Ballad to be imprisoned for a period of four years nine
months and eleven days of presidio correccional, and the defendant Vicente Tamaray to be
imprisoned for a period of three years six months and twenty-one days of presidio correccional,
each to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the offended person in
the sum of P430, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and each to pay one-
half the costs.

From that sentence the defendants appealed to this court.

The appellants in their third assignment of error allege that the lower court committed an
error in denying the motion for a new trial by them, on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

On the 14th of August, 1915, the Honorable J. P. Weissenhagen, judge, after hearing the
respective parties and considering the motion for a new trial together with the request for a
withdrawal of the appeal, held that, the appeal of the defendants having been perfected, he as
judge of the Court of First Instance had lost jurisdiction to grant their request. To that order of
the lower court the defendants and appellants duly excepted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court had lost jurisdiction after the appeal of the defendants having been
perfected
HELD:
YES, The rule is well established that when an appeal is perfected from a particular court
that court loses all jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, except for the purpose of
protecting the property interests involved. While General Orders No. 58 gives the defendant in a
criminal case a period of fifteen days after the entry of the judgment within which to perfect his
appeal yet he may perfect his appeal within a less number of days and, whenever the appeal is
perfected, the lower court loses jurisdiction over the same and has no right to make any further
order in said case, except for the purpose of preserving the status of the parties. By virtue of the
provisions of section 47 of General Orders No. 58 the sentence in criminal cases becomes final
after the mere lapse of fifteen days after its rendition. The lapse of fifteen days from the rendition
of a sentence in the Philippine Islands has the same effect upon the finality of the sentence as the
expiration of the term of court in other jurisdictions.  After the sentence has become final any
attempt by the judicial department to alter, amend, or modify the same, except to correct clerical
errors, is unwarranted in law and can in no way affect the sentence. 

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Therefore, considering the nature of the crime, together with the aggravating
circumstances mentioned, the defendants should be punished in the maximum degree of the
penalty provided for by law. Therefore the sentence of the lower court should be modified and
the defendants should be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article
518 of the Penal Code, in relation with article 81 thereof and Act No. 2030 as follows the said
Jacinto Ballad to be imprisoned for a period of eight years of presidio mayor and Vicente
Tamaray to be imprisoned for a period of seven years of prision mayor, and each to jointly and
severally indemnify Blass Taguinod in the sum of P430, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half the costs.  So ordered.

PEOPLE V. BENEDICTO URSUA

G.R. NO. 40198 AUGUST 1, 1934
C.J. AVACEA’A
FACTS:
 On November 17, 1932, in the municipality of Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, the
accused, who was acting as municipal president, ordered the policeman Alejro Quiro to ask the
municipal president for the latter's revolver. When Alejro Quiro delivered the revolver to the
accused (Benedicto Ursua), the latter, noticing that it was not loaded, requested the chief of
police to load it. The chief of police loaded it with four cartridges delivered it to the accused,
with the cylinder in proper place the trigger locked. Shortly after the accused had taken the
revolver in his hands, a discharge was heard which hit Alejro Quiro in the abdomen, resulting in
his death.

Upon these facts, the trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence, as charged in the information, sentenced him to one year one day
of prision correccional. The court, however, failed to enter judgment with respect to the civil
liability of the accused in favor of the heirs of the deceased.

The judgment of the trial court was rendered on July 8, 1933, the accused was notified
thereof on July 13th, on which date the accused filed notice of appeal. On the 18th of the same
month, the private prosecution filed with the court a motion for reconsideration of its judgment
on the ground that it failed to make any finding relative to the civil liability of the accused to
sentence him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. The trial court, believing that, because the
cause had been appealed by the accused said appeal had been allowed, it had already lost its
jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of the private prosecution, denied the said motion. The
private prosecution excepted to this ruling appealed therefrom.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court can still acquire jurisdiction over the case even after the accused
already filed an appeal

HELD:
 YES, The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution to
appeal for purposes of the civil liability of the accused (section 107, General Orders, No. 58),
necessarily implies that such right is protected in the same manner as the right of the accused to
his defense. If the accused has the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of
conviction, the offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, his appeal should not be made dependent on that
of the accused. If upon appeal by the accused the court altogether loses its jurisdiction over the
cause, the offended party would be deprived of his right to appeal, although fifteen days have not
yet elapsed from the date of the judgment, if the accused files his appeal before the expiration of
said period. Therefore, if the court, independently of the appeal of the accused, has jurisdiction,
within fifteen days from the date of the judgment, to allow the appeal of the offended party, it
also has jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration filed by the private prosecution
in connection with the civil liability of the accused.

As to the rest, it was an error for the court not to have entered judgment with respect to
the civil liability of the accused (Springer vs.Odlin, 3 Phil., 344). Section 107 of General Orders,
No. 58 expressly imposes upon the courts the duty of entering judgment with respect to the civil
liability arising from the offense, if no reservation has been made to ventilate it in a separate
action.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for the
purpose of determining the civil liability of the accused (U. S. vs. Henry, 25 Phil., 600, 602). So
ordered

PEOPLE V. SISON
 G.R. NO. L-11669 JANUARY 20, 1959
J. PARAS

FACTS:

The defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of Manila with a violation of
Ordinance No.  2646, otherwise known as Traffic Rules and Regulations of the City of Manila.
He moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the act imputed to him did not constitute an
offense. The judge dismissed the case. Later, however, when informed by the defendant himself
that he had filed an administrative complaint against the police officer who issued the Traffic
Violation Report, the judge forthwith ordered his clerk of court to set the case for trial, after
which the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P50.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance wherein he asked for the dismissal
of the case, alleging among other things that said court had no jurisdiction because of the invalid
information.  The Court of First Instance denied the motion and proceeded to try the case on the
merits.  It sustained the judgment of conviction rendered by the Municipal Court, but imposed a
reduced fine of P25.00.  The defendant has appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sison is guilty

HELD:

NO, The appellant contends that this case was not validly reinstated when the municipal
judge motu proprio cancelled his signature which attested to the fact that the case had already
been dismissed, and that therefore he was convicted on an invalid information.  This is stitute an
offense.  The defendant could accordingly no longer be convicted under said information, and
only a new and valid information clearly meritorious. The municipal judge had no power to
reinstate the case by the simple expedience of obliterating his signature below the words” case
dismissed" appearing in the aforesaid exhibits. We have ruled time and again that a judgment of
acquittal becomes final immediately after promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or
amendment.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case dismissed with
costs de oficio.  So ordered
 EUGENIO CATILO V. HON. ABAYA
G.R. NO. L-6921 MAY 14, 1954
J. MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:

Petitioner, a member of the Philippine Army attached to the 21st BCT was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Batangas presided over by respondent Judge with kidnapping with
murder in Criminal Case No. 698 of that Court. He was arraigned and the case was tried on July
15, 1953. After the prosecution had closed its evidence and rested its case, counsel for the
defendant move for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of sufficient evidence. After a
thorough discussion of the motion for dismissal the respondent Judge in open court dictated his
order of July 15, 1953 (Annex "A") which we reproduce below:

ORDER

After the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution and after the Fiscal has
submitted his case Atty. Remigio Perez of the defense presented by the prosecution. This
motion to dismiss was fully discussed and forthwith the Court believes and so holds that
said motion to dismiss is well taken because even if it cannot be discussed that there is a
dead person and that this dead person was found before in company with the accused and
his companions, there has not been presented in the presentation of evidence by the Fiscal
even any slight proof that the herein accused was the author of the death in question and
that the case against the accused herein is hereby dismissed with costs.

DICTATED AND PROMULGATED IN OPEN COURT. SO ORDERED.

Batangas, Batangas, July 15, 1953.

GAVINO S. ABAYA
Judge

It would appear, however, that on the same day the respondent Judge changed his mind about his
order of dismissal and issued the following order:
 ORDER

The court, motu proprio, and due to some misinterpretation of facts, reconsiders its ruling
given verbally this morning, dismissing the present case; and

ACTING ON THE PETITION of the defense counsel for continuance of the trial of this
case, the 27th day of this month is hereby set for the presentation of the evidence of the
accused. SO ORDERED.

Batangas, Batangas, July 15, 1953.

GAVINO S. ABAYA
Judge

The second paragraph of the aforequoted order presumably refers to a previous petition for
continuance filed by the defense before the trial of the case but which petition was denied, after
which, trial proceeded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can continue trial after the same dismissed the case

HELD:

NO, From whatever angle we may view the order of dismissal Annex "A", the only
conclusion possible is that it amounted to an acquittal was due to some "misrepresentation of
facts" as stated in the order of reconsideration, which alleged misrepresentation is vigorously
denied by the defendant-petitioner, or to a misapprehension of the law or of the evidence
presented by the prosecution, the fact is that it was a valid order or judgment of acquittal, and
thereafter the respondent Judge himself advised the accused in open court that he was a free man
and could not again be prosecuted for the same offense.

The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under section 5, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside his order of dismissal, does not
extend to an order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case; and
the power of a court to modify a judgment or set aside before it has become final or an appeal
has been perfected, under section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers to a judgment of
conviction and does not and cannot include a judgment of acquittal.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

In conclusion, we hold that to continue the criminal case against the petitioner after he
had already been acquitted would be putting him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. Therefore, the petition for certiorari with prohibition is hereby granted and the order of
respondent reconsidering his order of dismissal Annex "A" is hereby set aside and he is hereby
commanded to desist from further proceeding with the trial of criminal case No. 698, which case
is now to be regarded as closed. No pronouncement as to costs.
 PEOPLE V. BENJAMIN YELO
G.R. NO. L-2014 MAY 16, 1949
J. TUASON

FACTS:

It appears that on March 25, 1947, the city attorney of Bacolod filed with the municipal
court information Benjamin Z. Yelo, the present appellant, with slight physical injuries. Having
been found guilty of the offense charged, I was sentenced to pay a fine of P25 and costs. From
that decision the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance where the information filed
with the municipal court was reproduced.
On December 23, 1947, the latter court dismissed the case in an order which reads as
follows:
"ORDER
"When this case was heard, the defendant assisted by his lawyer, Mr. Amado B. Parreño,
appeared before the Prosecutor, Mr. Sola, who stated that this case has been initiated by the City
of Bacolod Prosecutor and in view of the that no Prosecutor of said office has appeared,
requested the postponement of the hearing of the same.
"This case is before this Court in the degree of appeal and the complaint was reproduced on June
23, 1947. The hearing has been postponed: the first time on November 20 and the second time on
November 27.
"As of today, none of the government witnesses has appeared, except the aggrieved Aguinaldo
Absalon.
"The petition is denied and this case is dismissed with the costs of office.
"Mr. Amado B. Parreño, defense lawyer, manifested continuous act that the accused is a
policeman of the City of Bacolod and has been suspended from his position since the date of the
filing of the complaint, that is, March 25 This year, having been dismissed, I argue that, by virtue
of Art. 2272 of the Revised Administrative Code, you are entitled not only to be reinstated in the
position but also to receive the corresponding salary from the date of its suspension until its
replacement. and asked, in virtue, that the Court issue an order to that effect.
"As requested, the defendant is declared entitled to receive the corresponding salary at the time
of his suspension."
 On the same date, the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge Arellano,
presiding over the court, refused to reconsider the dismissal of the case. But I have set aside and
declared null and without effect the order in so far as it was provided for the payment of the
salary of the accused during the period of his suspension.
It is the contention of the appellant that the lower court had no jurisdiction to make this
modification in its judgment.
Section 2272 of the Revised Administrative Code reads:
"When a chief of the municipal police is accused of a felony or violation of the law by the
provincial prosecutor, the municipal president shall immediately suspend the accused from office
pending final decision of the case by the courts and, in case of Acquittal, the accused shall be
entitled to payment of the entire salary and failed to receive during his suspension if the court
should be provided in his sentence. "

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can modify its judgment

HELD:

YES, the power of the courts to review, correct and change the sentences before the
expiration of the period for appeal and before anything has been done, was recognized in United
States vs. Vayson, 27 Phil., 447, in which the subject was treated at great length with abundant
citations of authorities. In the Vayson case and in the cases therein cited, the authority of the
court to increase or mitigate the penalty imposed on the accused before the judgment became
final and before it was put in operation was affirmed.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

The appealed order is affirmed with the costs of appeal against the appellant.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-54641 NOVEMBER 28, 1980
J. MELENCIO-HERRERA

FACTS:

On 20 December 1969, private respondents, together with eight other co-accused, in

Criminal Case No. CCC VI-465 of the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, were convicted in a
joint judgment rendered by said Court in Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VI-464, 465 and 466, of
violation of section 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937 (Tariff and Customs Code), as amended by
Republic Act No. 4712, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 each. All
the convicted accused in the three criminal cases appealed the said joint judgment of conviction
to respondent Court, docketed therein as CA-G.R. Nos. 10780-82-CR. We are here actually
concerned only with the appeal of private respondents Concon and Crisostomo in CA-G.R. No.
10781 CR.

On 27 August 1980, the present Petition for Review on certiorari was filed on the
People's behalf by the Solicitor General assailing the validity of respondent Court's Resolution of
acquittal dated 3 July 1980 for the reason that its principal Decision of 13 July 1978 had already
then become final.

In our Resolution of 9 September 1980, we required "private respondents to answer and

the members of respondent Court who voted for acquittal likewise to answer, the pleading to be
filed to be signed by each of them. We also issued a temporary restraining Order enjoining
respondent Court "from implementing or otherwise enforcing one way or the other the resolution
of acquittal dated July 3, 1980

The principal question for resolution is whether respondent Court acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained and thereafter
granted private respondents' Fourth Motion for Reconsideration. In turn this would depend on
the date that judgment of respondent Court affirming conviction, dated 13 July 1978, attained
finality.
 The record clearly establishes that the main Decision of respondent Court affirming the
trial Court's judgment of conviction had become final on 26 July 1976. Copy of respondent
Court's Resolution dated 27 June 1979 denying their Second Motion for Reconsideration was
received by private respondents on 11 July 1979. They had fifteen days from said date, or until
26 July 1979, within which to appeal by certiorari to this Court. However, it was only on 27 July
1979, or one day late, that private respondents filed by registered mail on that date their Third
Motion for Reconsideration with respondent Court. And what is more, said Third Motion was
filed without prior express leave of Court, in violation of section 15, Rule 124, providing that
more than one Motion for Reconsideration shall not be filed in any case without express leave of
Court.

The statement in the covering Notice of respondent Court's Resolution of 20 August 1979
sent by its Division Clerk of Court that:

Upon expiration of FIFTEEN (15) DAYS from receipt hereof with a copy of this
RESOLUTION (Section 10, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court) final judgment will be
entered.

In other words, the answering Justices were of the opinion that since the Resolution
denying private respondents' Third Motion for Reconsideration was received by the latter on 22
August 1979, the reglementary period commenced to run on 23 August 1979 and would have
ended on 6 September 1979 had not this Court granted private respondents an extension of thirty
days or until 6 October 1979 within which to file a Petition for Review. Since private
respondents filed their Motion for leave to file a Fourth Motion for Reconsideration on 5
September 1979, that Motion was, allegedly, filed on time.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in passing the fourth MR after its judgment of conviction had
already become final

HELD:
 NO, Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal ends the case which
cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they would be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out,
however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued
without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect,
no judgment at all.  By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being
worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.  That the records
may have already been remanded to the Court of origin is no deterrent to a pronouncement of the
nullity of a judgment.

For their part, private respondents, on their own behalf, contend that certiorari is not the
proper remedy and that even if it were, it was filed out of time; that the Petition is, in effect, an
appeal from a judgment of acquittal and would, therefore, place private respondents in double
jeopardy; that the filing of the Fourth Motion for Reconsideration was within the reglementary
period; that the end justifies the means if it results in the triumph of justice for the innocent; and
finally, that the authorities cited by the Solicitor General do not support his position.

In respect of the filing not only of the Third but also of the Fourth Motions for
Reconsideration, we have already found above that they were both filed beyond the reglementary
period.

Private respondents invoke "justice for the innocent". For justice to prevail, the scales
must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society, which
they have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily
a denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the
party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts
play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, granting Certiorari, the Resolution of acquittal dated 3 July 1980 of

respondent Court of Appeals in "CA-G.R. Nos. 10781-10782-CR", in respect of private
respondents Isidoro Concon and Inocencio Crisostomo, is hereby declared null and void, as well
as all proceedings had and Resolutions issued by said Court subsequent to 26 July 1979, the date
that its judgment affirming conviction dated 13 July 1978 become final and executory.

Respondent Court of Appeals is hereby ordered to remand the records of said appealed
criminal cases to the Court of origin for the execution of the former Court's final judgment of
affirmance of conviction against private respondents Isidoro Concon and Inocencio Crisostomo.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. DOMINADOR SANCHEZ
G.R. NO. L-9768 JUNE 21, 1957
J. MONTEMAYOR

FACTS:

Dominador Sanchez y Aglibut was charged with a violation of Circulars Nos. 20 and 45,
as amended by Circular No. 55, all of the Central Bank of the Philippines, in relation to Section
34 of Republic Act No. 265, alleged to have been committed as follows:

That on or about the 20th day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, having in his possession the amount of $400.00, did then and there wilfully
and unlawfully fail and refuse to declare the same with any authorized agent of the
Central Bank of the Philippines upon his arrival in the Philippines as prescribed by
Circulars 20 and 42 as amended by Circular 55 of the Central Bank.

When first arraigned, he entered the plea of not guilty. Later on, however, he was allowed by the
court on rearraignment to change his former plea to that of guilty, on the basis of which, he was
sentenced thus:

WHEREFORE, upon recommendation of Asst. Fiscal Jose T. M. Mayo, the accused

Dominador Sanchez is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of FIFTY (P50.00) PESOS and
five (5) days imprisonment, and to pay the costs.

The $400.00 taken from the accused, referred to in the aforecited information, are hereby
ordered to be exchanged at the Central Bank of the Philippines with Philippine Currency
and delivered to Dominador Sanchez, the owner of said money.

Defendant Sanchez did not appeal the decision. But the Government, through the Solicitor
General, took an appeal from it, particularly, the last paragraph of the dispositive portion of the
decision aforequoted, claiming that inasmuch as under the provisions of Article 10 of the
Revised Penal Code, the said code shall be supplementary to special laws punishing offenses,
unless such laws specially provide otherwise. The Solicitor General cite a long line of decisions
in support of his contention and we are inclined to agree with him. However, counsel for
defendant-appellee says that the appealed decision is already final and conclusive, for the reason
that the terms thereof had been satisfied and complied with by the accused, he having not only
paid the fine of P50.00, but also served the five-day imprisonment. We also agree with
defendant's counsel who cites several decisions of this Tribunal to the effect that a sentence in a
criminal case in this jurisdiction may become final in two ways: First, by the lapse of fifteen
days after rendition thereof; and second, by defendant complying with the terms of the
same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can still reopen the case

HELD:

NO, In the present case, the defendant-appellee did not file any brief, naturally, this point
of the legality of the appeal of the Government is not raised; even so, this Tribunal feels it is its
duty to apply the law, specially when it favors the accused in a criminal case. In the second
place, the record shows that at the time the appealed resolution was issued on July 30, 1955, the
decision of June 10, 1955 had already become final and no longer subject to modification for the
reason that the accused had already served the sentence, not partially but totally.

In the first place, the confiscation or forfeiture of the above-mentioned sum would be an
additional penalty and would amount to an increase of the penalty already imposed upon the
accused. To reopen the case for the purpose of increasing the penalty, as is sought in the
Government's appeal, would be placing the accused in double jeopardy, and under Rule 118,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court, the Government cannot appeal in a criminal case if the defendant
would be placed thereby in double jeopardy.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
In view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby dismissed, with costs de oficio.
 FELINO LIM, petitioner and appellee, vs. HON. JOSE F.ORETA, Justice of
the peace of Caloocan, Rizal,respondent and appellant
GR No. L-6247, Nov 27, 1953 (BENGZON, J.)

A judgment, in a criminal case for gambling, fining the accused and setting a date to hear the
question whether the money taken from the pocket of the accused should be confiscated, is not
final even if the accused has paid the fine, for something is left to be done upon the merits; and
he cannot prevent, by invoking double jeopardy, further actuation of the court as to the money
thus seized.

FACTS:
On September 4, 1952, the petitioner-appellee Felino Lim with twenty-one others was charged
for gambling in criminal case No. 14452 before the Justice of the Peace Court of Caloocan,
Rizal. That same day, the defendants were arraigned before the respondent-appellant and all of
them pleaded guilty.After making his plea, the petitioner-appellee manifested to the court that,
since he had no lawyer at the time, he was reserving his right to present evidence to prove that
the sum of P1,000 which was seized from his pocket during the gambling raid by the peace
officers and which was then in the custody of the authorities of Caloocan was not a part of the
proceeds or instrument of the Crime and for this purpose requested the court to set a day to
enable him to introduce such evidence with the assistance of counsel. Whereupon the
respondent-appellant rendered a decision imposing a fine against all the bettors and made a
reservation as regard to the sum of P1,000 which has been taken from the pocket of one of the
herein accused, where further hearing was set for September 15, 1952, in order to determine
whether said amount should be confiscated in favor of the government or not.

In compliance with decision, the petitioner-appellee immediately paid the fine of P100 and his
proportionate share of the costs imposed upon him by respondent-appellant.On September 15,
1952, the respondent-appellant called the case for hearing in order to pass upon the remaining
question of the disposition of the said amount of P1,000. Instead of complying with his previous
commitment, however, petitioner-appellee through counsel questioned during the hearing the
right of respondent-appellant to proceed further on grounds of double jeopardy. On October 6,
1952, in view of respondent-appellant's insistence in hearing the case over and above petitioner-
appellee's opposition, a petition for prohibition was filed by the latter against the former before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision September 4, 1952 could be legally considered "final"?

RULING:

When the order or judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be
done upon the merits" it is not final. In the instant case however, the justice of the peace had not
attempted to "modify" his decision. He took further steps in consonance therewith. Although it
was quite irregular, it cannot be held that he lacked jurisdiction. Here the justice of the peace had
expressly reserved the power to continue hearing the matter.

Wherefore it was a mistake to prohibit the justice of the peace of Caloocan to further act on the
case. Judgment reversed, without costs.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
 ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner, vs. HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his
capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, and the CHIEF OF
POLICE OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-27191. February 28, 1967
(SANCHEZ, J.)

The elements of evasion of sentence are that the offender is a convict by final judgment; he is
serving a sentence for deprivation of liberty and he evades service of sentence by escaping
during the term of his sentence. Evasion of sentence is „jail breaking. In order that prescription
of the penalty of imprisonment may run, the culprit should evade his sentence, meaning that he
should escape during the term of such imprisonment. Where an accused was sentenced to twenty
days of arresto menor and the execution of the sentence was deferred to February 12, 1965, but
on this date, she did not show up in court, and her arrest was ordered, but she was never arrested
and then on December 10, 1966, she moved to quash the warrants of arrest on the ground of
prescription (light penalties prescribe in one year), it was held that there was no prescription
because the accused did not evade the service of her sentence.

FACTS:
Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner appealed. Found guilty once
again by the Court of First Instance,1 she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to
indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City,on
January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for January 27,1965. On
petitioners motion,execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed
day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted therespondent judge, on February
15,1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and OR March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
Petitioner was never arrested.Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23,1965. PetitionerÊs ground:
Penalty has prescribed. The respondent judge rejected the plea of prescription of penalty and,
instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty has prescribed.

RULING:
Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. In Article 92 of the Revised Penal
Code, light penalties „imposed by final sentence prescribe in one year,. A convict evades service
of his sentence, by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment.That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions
of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such. „evasion or
escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,windows, gates, walls,
roofs, or floors,or by using picklocks, false keys,disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivancewith other convicts or employees of the penal institution, x x
x"8 Indeed,evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term „jail breaking". We,
therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to
commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment. Adverting to
the facts, we have here the case of a convict who·sentenced to imprisonment by final
judgment·was thereafter neverplaced in confinement. Prescription ofpenalty, then, does not run
in her favor. the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition. No costs. So
ordered
 DANILO BUSTAMANTE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMO MACEREN
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents
EN BANC, (FERNANDO, J.)

No re-opening may be ordered of a criminal case after accused has started serving sentence

FACTS:
a) The petitioner was accused of murder in an information filed with the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, Branch II, docketed as Criminal Case No. SC-145 of said court.

b) Upon arraignment on December 14, 1970, petitioner entered a plea of guilty, and after proving
the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense and three (3) ordinary
mitigating circumstances, petitioner was sentenced by the trial court guilty of the crime of
murder as charged in the information. Considering in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstances of incomplete self-defense, plea of guilty, voluntary surrender and lack of intent to
commit so grave a wrong, he is hereby sentenced to serve [one] (1) year imprisonment, to
indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. The
accused is entitled to the full benefit of preventive imprisonment he has so far served. [It is so
ordered]”

c) On the very same day, December 14, 1970, the judgment above-quoted was promulgated to
the petitioner, who thereupon made an express waiver of his right to appeal.

d) Accordingly, the Hon. Judge Jorge Coquia, who rendered the aforesaid judgment, issued a
commitment order dated December 14, 1970, addressed to the Provincial Warden of Laguna ...,
and the Provincial Warden, also on the same day, acknowledged receipt of the body of the
Petitioner, who forthwith started serving his sentence of imprisonment on that date.

e) Three days later or on December 17, 1970, the Provincial Fiscal of Laguna filed a motion for
Modification of Penalty and upon receipt of said motion, counsel for the petitioner on the same
day filed a Motion for Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty and Waiver of Commitment.
f) On December 21, 1970, the Hon. Judge Jorge Coquia issued the following order: "Submitted
for resolution is the motion for modification of penalty filed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal.
Or the other hand accused through counsel in view of the motion of the prosecution filed a
motion for withdrawal of plea of guilty and waiver of commitment. But in view of the motion of
accused, the motion of the prosecution has become moot and academic and the motion filed by
the accused is hereby granted and the judgment in this case dated December 14, 1970 is hereby
set aside and the case shall be tried on the merit on January 18, 1970 at 8: 30 A.M."

g) Subsequently, Judge Coquia was transferred to Manila, and the case against petitioner was
reassigned to the sala presided over by the Honorable Maximo Maceren, before whom petitioner
was re-arraigned on February 1, 1971; and after petitioner entered a plea of not guilty, said judge
held a new hearing of the case on the merits and thereafter, Judge Maceren rendered a new
judgment against petitioner on February 28, 1972, promulgated to the petitioner on March 17,
1972, the dispositive portion of which reads: "[Wherefore], premises considered, the accused
Danilo Bustamante y Villanueva is hereby declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide, and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in his favor, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the
offended party in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and to pay the costs. Considering that the accused is now serving under preventive
imprisonment, he shall be credited for the period of his preventive imprisonment pursuant to the
provisions of Rep. Act 6127. h) Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
decision on March 29, 1971, in which motion petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial
court to try his case anew after he had fully served the judgment rendered by Judge Coquia
against him on December 14, 1970. Petitioner, in said motion, argued that the judgment of
December 14, 1970 against him had already become final when he started serving his sentence
thereunder and that therefore, the Court thereafter lost jurisdiction over his case; and that no
amount of waiver or consent on his part could bestow on said court jurisdiction that it had
already lost. At the hearing of said motion, however, the respondent Judge Maximo Maceren
took the position that he could not nullify an order of another judge of equal rank and that only a
higher court had the authority to nullify said order, but that he would hold his ruling on said
motion in abeyance until petitioner could file a petition for certiorari before the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the re-opening of the case proper?

RULING :
No, the re-opening of the case is not proper. Petitioner has in his favor the protection afforded by
the jeopardy clause. He was arraigned on valid information before a competent court, and he
pleaded guilty. What was more, the judgment was rendered. On the very same day, he was
committed to jail and actually started serving sentence. There was no valid justification then for
the order of Judge Coquia setting aside a decision already in the process of execution. That
amounted to a defiance of a constitutional command. What the fundamental law states cannot be
any clearer. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from
harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult
in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary
litigation, in itself time consuming and expense-producing for the state as well.
What is more, as it is equally beyond dispute that petitioner has served the full one-year period
imposed in such valid judgment, he is entitled to be released as prayed for.
Support for this result is likewise supplied by the pertinent provision of the Rules of Court. It
reads thus: "A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside by the court rendering it
before the judgment has become final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in a criminal
case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfection appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal."
It is not to be lost sight of that the above rule has been interpreted to mean that even this Court,
after the finality of the judgment has been shown, is devoid of competence to modify, much less
reverse the same. So it was announced in the above-cited Quebral decision. Thus: "Although the
parties filed their respective briefs on the merits and raised no question as to the appealability of
the sentence of the trial court, we cannot ignore our lack of jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.
As stated by the trial court and concurred in by counsel de oficio for the appellant in this court,
the sentence against the accused had become final under section 7 of Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, inasmuch as the said accused had commenced to serve or extinguish it.... Needless to say,
a final and executory judgment is not appealable and the appellate court has no jurisdiction to
review, reverse, or modify it.
Nor did the Solicitor General, in the above answer, ignore the possible query that may be raised
as to whether or not the withdrawal of the plea of guilty by petitioner could, in law, amount to a
waiver. Considering that defense counsel raised the question of double jeopardy in favor of
petitioner during the new trial and before Judge Maceren rendered judgment based on said new
trial, it is believed that the above principle can be applied to this case by analogy and that said
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, should have entertained said plea of double jeopardy in
the interest of justice, especially since at the time such plea was made, petitioner had already
fully served the one-year straight sentence imposed upon him by Judge Coquia on December 14,
1970, and was already entitled to be released from custody after such full service of his penalty
under said judgment. There is thus implicit in the approach taken by the Solicitor General the
thought that the rights assured an accused, while intended for his protection, being relieved of the
apprehension that once indicted, conviction must automatically follow, are impressed with a
larger end in view. Their presence in the Constitution attests to a belief, underlying our
governmental system, that public interest is thereby promoted. It is of course desirable that crime
should not go unpunished, but every one unfortunate enough to be proceeded against must be
shown to be guilty thereof. What is more, the state as the dispenser of justice should not subject
him to greater and other punishment than the law allows.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted and the order of Judge Coquia of December
21, 1970 as well as the decision of respondent Judge Maceren of February 28, 1972 are hereby
set aside and declared null and void, and petitioner, having fully served his valid sentence of
December 14, 1970, is hereby ordered released forthwith. Without pronouncement as to costs.
 LILIA DOMALAON & NELIA SISON, Petitioners, versus HON. JUDGE
CARMELITA S. MANAHAN, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 16,
MANILA and LUZVIMINDA T.GELACIO & YAP Respondents.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 110684 ( REYES, JR., J.C., J.: )

FACTS:

This a Petition for Review under Rule 42 (with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order & Preliminary Injunction) of petitioners Lilia Domalaon & Nelia Sison
seeking toreverse and set aside the Resolution dated September 15, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila in Civil Case No. 09-120997, denying
petitioners' (appellants-movants) motion for reconsideration of the Resolution (On
the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution) dated July 30, 2009
granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution Pending Appealas against
herein petitioners

ISSUE:
Whether or not

RULING:

The Court opt to deny the petition. Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that:

“Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.- A party desiring

to appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for
 review with the Court of Appeals, . . . . .The petition shall be filed and
served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to
be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.”
It is clear from Section 1 that the subject in Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Herein, the subject of the petition filed is not a decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered in its appellate jurisdiction on the appeal
of the petitioners in the Decision dated January 12, 2009 in Civil Case No.185312-
CV for Ejectment filed against the petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch VIII , but the Resolution dated September 15, 2009 on the denial
of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 30, 2009
granting the motion for execution pending appeal. It presupposes that a motion for
the issuance of a writ of execution was filed by the herein respondent before the
Regional Trial Court which was granted as per Resolution dated July 30, 2009

Moreover, the petition suffers from other procedural infirmities such as: the
petitioners failed to attach necessary and relevant documents such as position
papers filed before the MeTC, memorandum of appeal filed before the RTC and
the decision of the RTC on the appeal of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 09-
120997; there is no statement of the date as to when the petitioners received the
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 09-120997 as required in Section 2 (b),
Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; and the attached verification and
certification against forum shopping did not comply with Section 12 (a) of the
2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative
Matter No. 12-8-13 as to the competent identity of the affiants indicated therein.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, herein Petition for Review under Rule 42 (with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction) is hereby
DISMISSED.

ALICIA V. CABATINGAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,

respondent
G.R. No. L-55333. January 22, 1981 (Abad-Santos, J.)

Necessity to determine whether probation would serve the ends of justice and the best interest of
The public and the applicant; The respondent court appears to have wholly relied on the
probation report and did not make its own determination as to whether or not probation would
serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and the applicant. It was not enough
for the respondent court to denypetitionerÊs application solely on the report that she was
involved in Âmasiao' and that she was facing another preliminary investigation for the
Âadditional shortageÊ of the funds of which she had already pleaded guilty. Likewise, the fact
that there is a pending preliminary investigation against her for the additional shortage does not
also constitute a sufficient basis for aconclusion that she was already guilty thereof.

FACTS:
Petitioner claims that the respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion when it denied her an
adequate opportunity to controvert the inaccurate post-sentence investigation in connection with
her application for probation. the Solicitor General agrees that the
Sandiganbayan did indeed commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner's
application for probation without giving her an adequate hearing.
.
In denying said application, Sandiganbayan relied mainly on the Post-Sentence Investigation
Report as well as the Supplemental Report submitted by the Probation Officer which
recommended disapproval of the application on the ground that (a) during the period of her
probation there is undue risk that she will again commit another crime and that (b) probation will
depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed
In support of the first ground, Sandiganbayan stated that Mrs. Cabatingan and her husband
jointly operate an illegal jai-alai betting station known as ‘masiao’and that she is facing another
charge for malversation of P12,350.40 before the Tanodbayan. On the second ground, the
Sandiganbayan that Mrs. Cabatingan had been telling her co-employees at the Mandaue City
government that she was already on probation when in fact her application had not yet been
acted upon by the court. Both grounds were based on the report of the Probation Officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not committed grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:
Yes.There is ample evidence showing that the petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation.
She does not appear to be a hardened criminal who is beyond correction or redemption. She has
shown repentance for the one offense she had committed in more ways than one. First, she
immediately restituted upon demand the amount she malversed. Second, she had expressed a
desire to reform herself if given the opportunity to do so. And, third, she promised to comply
with any condition that may be imposed on her if granted probation. respondent court merely
relied on a report of the probation officer which in itself, is mostly hearsay and is controverted by
prominent citizens of Mandaue City including the parish priest, the president of the Association
of Barangay Councils, the President of the Catholic WomenÊs League, the former city auditor
and the former city treasurer of Mandaue, among others. Indeed, petitioner does not appear to
have been afforded fully her right to due process as she was not given a chance by the respondent
court to be heard before it issued its Resolution of July 31, 1980 denying the application for
probation and before it denied the Second Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. ·Similarly,
the record is not persuasive that there is Âundue riskÊ that the applicant will commit another
crime during probation. The term undue riskÊ is to be interpreted in the light of the requirements
prescribed by the law for courts to observe in determiningwhether an offender should or should
not be placed on probation.These requirements are: ÂIn determining whether an offender may be
placed on probation, the court shall consider all information relative to the character, antecedents,
environment, mental and physical condition of the offender and available
institutional and community resources. In this regard we agree with petitionerÊs claim that
respondent court appears to have wholly relied on the probation report and did not make its own
determination as to whether or not probation would serve the ends of justice and the best interest
of the public and the applicant. It was not enough for the respondent court todeny petitionerÊs
application solely on the report that she was involved in ÂmasiaoÊ and that she was facing
anotherpreliminary investigation for the Âadditional shortageÊ of the funds of which she had
already pleaded guilty. Likewise, the fact that there is a pending preliminary investigation against
her for the additional shortage does not also constitute a sufficient basis for a conclusion that
she was already guilty thereof.

WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the Sandiganbayan which is ordered to conduct
further hearingson the application for probation, with the end in view of affording applicant full
opportunity to dispute the report of the proba-tion officer and prove her entitlement to probation.
In the meantime the petitioner shall be immediately released provisionally under her original
bail.
SO ORDERED.
PEDRO SANTOS TO,petitioner, vs HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII, and JUAN Y.
OCAMPO,respondents.
G.R. No. L-55130 January 17, 1983 (DE CASTRO,J.:)

FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight months of prision mayor as
minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor, as maximum.He appealed to the
Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as
minimum, to one year and eight months as maximum.

Upon the Court of Appeals' decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed therefrom,
he filed a petition for probation with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable
recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following
grounds:

(a) to grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and

(b) petitioner is not a penitent offender.

A motion for reconsideration was denied by the respondent judge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation despite
the recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office?

RULING: Yes. At the outset, it might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment was
required by this Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he points out, petitioner is not
among the offenders enumerated in the probation law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from
availing of the benefits of probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are
the following:

(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;

(c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred
pesos;

(d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and

(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree
became applicable, pursuant to Section 33.

Petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the benefits of probation. Some other
provisions have to be sought, if any, upon which to deny petitioner the benefits of probation
which, from a reading of the law in its entirety, should with liberality, rather than undue
strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified. In expressly enumerating offenders
not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear intent is to allow said benefits to those
not included in the enumeration.

The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the seriousness of the
offense committed." According to him, the State has shown serious concern with the above of
checks as a commercial paper, as shown by various measures taken to curb the pernicious
practice of issuing bouncing checks.

For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime.
The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the
probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to
maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least
as to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed with hardened
criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The
consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in peaceful
and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of
reformation in him.

The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid for probation, is that
petitioner is allegedly not a penitent offender, as shown by his protestation of innocence even
after his conviction by the trial court and the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of
Appeals.

We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner has not shown
repentance in committing the crime of which he has been found guilty by both the trial and
appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision of the respondent judge to the Court of
Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his version by which he could hope either to be
acquitted or at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of probation.The
recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on
appeal which placed him within the benign purpose of the Probation Law. By the move he took
by which to achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being within reach, petitioner cannot be
said to be a non-penitent offender, under serving of probation benefits. Once the opportunity was
laid open to him, he grasped it; for instead of appealing further to the Supreme Court, he
promptly applied for probation, made possible only by the reduced penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals. The penalty imposed by respondent court placed petitioner beyond the pale of the
Probation Law. How can he be said to be a non-penitent offender, as the law would judge one to
be so, just because he appealed, as he could not have them applied for probation even if he
wanted to? Who knows but that if the penalty imposed by the trial court is that imposed by the
Court of Appeals petitioner would have applied for probation forthwith?

WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside, and petitioner is
hereby declared admitted to probation, subject to the terms and conditions as are prescribed by
the law, and recommended by the probation officer.
 EDUARDOTOLENTINOySAMONTE,petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMANTE Q. ALCONCEL, Judge, Circuit Criminal Court, Sixth Judicial District,
Manila,respondent.
G.R. No. L-63400 March 18, 1983 (ESCOLIN,J.:)
For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the
crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which
the probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance
to maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at
least as to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed with
hardened criminals in anatmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The
consciousness of the State’s benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in peaceful
and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of
reformation in him

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged of violating Section 4, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Upon arraignment on September 4, 1981, petitioner entered
a plea of not guilty.
On October 8, 1981, petitioner manifested his desire to change his plea of not guilty to that of
guilty to the lesser offense of possession of Indian Hemp (marijuana), under Section 8 of Article
II of Rep. Act No. 6425. The court allowed the substitution of plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
Petitioner was then sentenced to imprisonment of six [6] months and one [1] day to two [2] years
and four [4] months, to pay a fine of P1,000.00, and to pay the costs, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. On October 13, 1981, petitioner applied for probation under
PD 968. After investigation, the probation officer recommended that petitioner be placed on a
two-year probation upon the claim that the latter was already on his way to reformation and that
a prison cell would turn him in to a hardened criminal. Such recommendation notwithstanding,
the respondent judge issued the challenged order of March 9, 1982, denying petitioner's
application on the ground that it will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Alconcel acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that "probation
will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed

RULING:
A persual of Sec. 52, PD 968 shows that the potentiality of the offender to reform is not the sole
factor that should be considered in the grant or denial of an application for probation. Equal
regard to the demands of justice and public interest must be observed. Thus, Sec. 83 of P.D. 968
lays down the criteria for the placing of an offender on probation. The decision of respondent
judge is based on the admission by the petitioner himself that he was actually caught in the act of
selling marijuana cigarettes. Such admission renders a hearing on the application for probation
an unnecessary surplusage and an idle ceremony. Probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests
solely upon the discretion of the court.

SALVADOR L. BUDLONG, in his capacity as Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal, City of
Tagbilaran, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE AQUILES T. APALISOK, in his capacity as Acting
City Judge, City Court, Branch II, City of Tagbilaran, and CAMILIO PUYO Y GALAGAR,
respondents.
G.R. No. 60151. June 24, 1983. FIRST DIVISION (GUTIERREZ, JR., J.)

Probation affects only the criminal aspect of the case. The suspension of the sentence imposed
on the accused who is granted probation has no bearing on his civil liability. The court must
hear the civil aspect of the case where accused pleads guilty and at the same time applies for
probation
FACTS:
In his capacity as Acting Third Assistant City Fiscal of Tagbilaran, the petitioner filed an
information before the respondent court charging private respondent Camilo Puyon y Galagar
with the crime of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Accused pleaded guilty
to the crime charged and immediately after the plea, the respondent judge rendered judgment in
open court and sentenced the accused to suffer 30 days of imprisonment and to pay the costs. No
civil liability was imposed. Accused manifested his intention to avail of the provisions of the
Probation Law. Respondent court then gave the counsel of the accused 5 days within which to
file the petition for probation. Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Set Case for Hearing for the
reception of evidence to prove the civil liability of the accused which was denied by the court for
having been filed out of time considering that the accused has already filed an application for
Probation. The court argued that prosecution should have asked leave to prove the civil liability
of the defendant right before it rendered its judgment not after for by doing so, would in effect
nullify the Order of suspension of the sentence and would defeat the very purpose of the
Probation Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order of the court denying the Assistant City Fiscal’s motion is proper.

HELD:
NO. The order of the respondent court denying the motion for hearing on the civil liability of the
accused was improper. Probation is defined by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 968, the
Probation Law as "a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is
released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer."
The "conviction and sentence" clause of the statutory definition clearly signifies that probation
affects only the criminal aspect of the case.
The Court, cited Art. 113 of the Revised Penal Code
ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability.— Except in case of extinction of his civil liability
as provided in the next preceding article, the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the
civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has
served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to
serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence, or any other reason.
If under Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, the obligation to satisfy civil liability continues
notwithstanding service of sentence or non-service due to amnesty, pardon, commutation of
sentence, or any other reason we fail to see what led the respondent judge to rule that an
application for probation should have an opposite effect insofar as determination of civil liability
is concerned. It could not have been delay because the motion was filed on the day after the
judgment of conviction was rendered in open court right after the plea of guilty and the
manifestation that the accused was applying for probation. As early as 1913, this Court in U.S. v.
Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it clear that the civil liability of the accused is not part of the penalty
for the crime committed. It is personal to the victim. Hence, extinguishing such civil liability in
the manner followed by the respondent judge who summarily denied the motion and declared the
case "closed and terminated" constitutes a violation of the victim's basic constitutional guaranty
of due process.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The respondent court's orders dated February
11, 1982 and February 19, 1982 respectively are hereby SET ASIDE. The respondent court is
ordered to set hearings on the civil liability of the accused.
 FLORENTINA L. BACLAYON, Petitioner, v. HON. PACITO G. MUTIA, as Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents. [G.R. No. 59298. April 30, 1984.] TEEHANKEE, J.

Conditions which a court may impose on a probationer classified into mandatory or general and
special or discretionary. The latter should be exercised realistically and purposively to rehabilitate the
probationer.

FACTS:
Petitioner, a school teacher, was convicted of the crime of Serious Oral Defamation by the then
Municipal Court of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental, then presided by respondent Pacito G. Mutia
for having quarrelled with and uttered insulting and defamatory words against Remedios
Estillore, principal of the Plaridel Central School. Her conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, taking into account the aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the
offended party on account of her rank and age and the fact that the crime was committed in the
office of the complainant in the public school building where public authorities are engaged in
the discharge of their duties during office hours.
The sentence was promulgated on September 9, 1981. On the same date petitioner applied for
probation with respondent judge who referred the application to a Probation Officer. The Post-
Sentence Investigation Report favorably recommended the granting of petitioner’s probation for
a period of three (3) years.
Respondent Judge issued an order granting petitioner’s probation, but modified the Probation
Officer’s recommendation by increasing the period of probation to five (5) years and by
imposing the following conditions:
"(a) To present herself to the probation officer designated to undertake her supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said order;
(b) To report to the Probation Office or any specified place designated by the Probation Officer at
least once a month in person;
(c) To reside at the premise approved by the Probation Officer and not change her residence
without prior written approval;
(d) To permit the Probation Officer to visit her house and place of work or an authorized Social
Worker;
(e) To refrain from drinking intoxicating liquor to excess;
(f) To pay the cost;
(g) To satisfy any other condition related to the rehabilitation of the defendant and not unduly
restrictive of her liberty or incompatible with her freedom of conscience; and
(h) To refrain from continuing her teaching profession." virtua1aw library Petitioner’s plea for
deletion of the last condition was rejected by respondent judge. Hence, the petition at bar
alleging grave abuse of discretion in the imposition of the said condition. The petitioner submits
that said condition is not only detrimental and prejudicial to her rights but is also not in
accordance with the purposes, objectives and benefits of the probation law and prays that the said
condition be deleted from the order granting her probation. On petitioner’s motion, the Court
issued a TRO enjoining respondent judge from enforcing the said questioned condition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is correct in contending that petitioner shall be suspended
from teaching as accessory by virtue of final conviction in principal penalty.

HELD: No. To order the petitioner to refrain from teaching would deprive the students and the
school in general the benefits that may be derived from her training and expertise. While it is true
that probation is a mere privilege and its grant rests solely upon the discretion of the court, this
discretion is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally
for the benefit of the accused. Equal regard to the demands of justice and public interest must be
observed. In this case, teaching has been the lifetime and only calling and profession of
petitioner. The law requires that she devote herself to a lawful calling and occupation during
probation. Yet, to prohibit her from engaging in teaching would practically prevent her from
complying with the terms of the probation. Respondents contend that petitioner’s final conviction
carries with it the accessory penalties in addition to the principal penalty of imprisonment. This
cannot apply to petitioner, however, because she was granted probation. The imposition of her
sentence of imprisonment was thereby suspended and necessarily, the imposition of the
accessory penalties was likewise thereby suspended. An order placing defendant on "probation"
is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a
final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order
placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be
followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with,
or by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. In view of all the foregoing, the
Court grants the petition and hereby orders that paragraph (h) of the questioned order granting
probation which requires that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession be
deleted. The temporary restraining order is hereby made permanent. No costs.
TEODULO RURA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. GERVACIO A. LOPENA, Presiding Judge
of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 69810-14 (ABAD SANTOS, J.:)

We hold for thepetitioner. When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final
judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment
which was the subject of his application. The statute relates “previous” to thedate of conviction,
not to the date of the commission of the crime.

FACTS:
Petitioner Teodulo Rura was accused, tried and convicted of five (5) counts of estafa committed
on different dates in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon-Clarin, Tubigon, Bohol,
denominated as Criminal Case Nos. 523, 524, 525, 526 and 527.

The five cases were jointly tried and a single decision was rendered on August 18, 1983. Rura
was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (17) months and twenty-five (25) days. In each
criminal case the sentence was three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.

Rura appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol but said court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. When the case was remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, Rura
applied for probation. The application was opposed by a probation officer of Bohol on the
ground Chat Rura is disqualified for probation under Sec. 9 (c) of the Probation law quoted
above. The court denied the application for probation. In denying the application for probation,
the respondent judge said, Though the five estafa cases were jointly tried and decided by the
court convicting the accused thereof, yet the dates of commission are different. Upon conviction
he was guilty of said offenses as of the dates of commission of the acts complained of. the
petitioner argues that there is no previous conviction by final judgment to speak of. The five (5)
cases of Estafa were tried jointly and there is only one decision rendered on the same date by
means of a Joint Decision, and not in a separate decision. A motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified for probation?

RULING:
We hold for the petitioner. When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final
judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the judgment
which was the subject of his application. The statute relates "previous" to the date of conviction,
not to the date of the commission of the crime.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the respondent judge is directed to give due course to
the petitioner's application for probation. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Atienza vs CAMANUEL ATIENZA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
G.R. NO 60892 (ESCOLIN,J.: )

Right of the accused to be presumed innocent; Probation Law, never intended to limit the right of
an accused person to present all relevant evidence to
secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty, nor does it require a plea of guilty by
the accused to avail of the benefits of probation, because a contrary view would negate the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. P-933 entitled "People v. Manuel Atienza", the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro, after trial, rendered a decision finding the accused, the petitioner herein, guilty
of "direct assault with less serious physical injuries." The petitioner appealed his conviction: but
pending the appeal, he applied for probation. Thus, the court, in its order of October 25, 1979,
declared the appeal withdrawn and referred the application for probation to the Provincial
Probation Officer for investigation, report and recommendation. The record before us does not
disclose whether the probation officer submitted a report to the court. Neither is there any
indication therein as to the tenor of such report, if one had in fact been submitted.  the trial court,
on July 10, 1980, issued an order denying the petition for probation. it held that "to grant probation to the
accused would depreciate the seriousness of the offense." Basis of its conclusion was that the crime was
committed in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank and age, the latter being
the president of the association of barangay captains, apart from his being 60 years of age at the time of the
incident, or 22 years older than the petitioner himself . The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the dismissal order; and upon denial thereof, he went to the appellate court on certiorari. The
respondent court likewise dismissed the certiorari case. Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is disqualified from availing of the benefits of Probation Law?

RULING:
No. The petition is impressed with merit. Under Section 9 of the Probation Law,the offenders disqualified from
availing of the benefits of the Probation Law are the following:

(a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

(b) those convicted of any offense against the security of the State;

(c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos;

(b) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and

(e) those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became
applicable, pursuant to Section 33.

It is undisputed that petitioner is not a disqualified offender under the above section. That the offended party
was the president of the association of barangay captains and that he was 60 years old at the time of the
incident hardly justify the inference that the grant of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed. Indeed, such conclusion contradicts the very finding of the trial court that the offense committed
by the accused was not attended by any aggravating circumstance. The petitioner is a first-time offender.
According to the trial court, the petitioner, a school teacher, was drunk at the time of the incident. Such state of
intoxication undoubtedly affected his mental faculties and diminished his capacity to understand the
consequences of his act. It is significant that the trial court found no evidence to prove that such drunkenness
on the part of the accused was habitual or intentional.
Equally untenable is the lower court's conclusion that the petitioner "did not feel any remorse for
his act" because "he fought the case to its bitter end" and insisted "on his unreliable version or
theory" of the incident. Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law was never
intended to limit the right of an accused person to present all relevant evidence he can avail of in
order to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty. Neither does the law require a
plea of guilty on the part of the accused to enable him to avail of the benefits of probation. A
contrary view would certainly negate the constitutional right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted. The questioned order of the respondent appellate
court is set aside and the trial court is hereby directed to give due course to the petitioner's application for
probation. No costs.
SO ORDERED.