Philippine Airlines, Inc. v.

NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 (1998)

By: Jebelle Puracan

Facts: Private respondents were flight stewards of petitioner. They were dismissed for violations of the
Code of Discipline based on claims of being involved in currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Private
respondents filed for a writ of temporary injunction with the NLRC.

Issues: (1) Whether or not NLRC had jurisdiction to issue a writ of temporary injunction; and

(2) Whether or not NLRC can entertain an action for injunction and issue such writ enjoining
petitioner from enforcing its Orders of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to
reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions even without a complaint for illegal
dismissal.

Held: In the present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and private respondents as
there has yet been no complaint for illegal dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private
respondents against the petitioner.

Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private respondents disregarded
this rule and directly went to the NLRC through a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be
enjoined from enforcing its dismissal orders. 

Furthermore, an examination of private respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis
since there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private respondents might
suffer.

Hence, since the issue of illegal dismissal could have been filed with the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC
exceeded its jurisdiction. It also cannot entertain an action for injunction as private respondents did not
file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter.

Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. CIR

By: Luz Celine Arat- Cabading

FACTS: Union demands the recognition of the Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for
managers and supervisors of the respondent.

Respondent countered stating that the distinction between representatives of management and
individuals employed as supervisors; managerial employees are not qualified for membership in a labor
organization.

Union issued a certification proceeding to remove any question with regard to position titles; filed notice
to strike for reasons of refusal to bargain and act on demands by the respondent.

Respondent filed petition to declare the strike as illegal; that a temporary injunction be issued to
restrain the Union and its members from doing acts that would disrupt the respondent’s activities.

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ISSUE: Whether or not an injunction may be issued against a strike.

HELD: Generally, NO.

There can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one instance: when a labor dispute
arises in an industry indispensable to national interest and such dispute is certified. The injunction
should not be directed against the strike itself but on the unlawful activities.252

The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a comparable bargaining power with
capital and must be liberally construed to that end.

Injunction is an employer’s most effective remedy in a labor dispute. Its issuance will tip the scales and
can critically sway the balance of the struggle against the union. An injunction in an uncertified case
must be based on the strict requirement.

The strike of the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is legal in all respects and
ordered the respondent company to reinstate specific employees to their former positions without loss
of seniority and privileges, with backwages from the time of dismissal. No reinstatement is ordered as to
those who have voluntarily left the Company.

San Miguel Corporation V NLRC

By: By: Luz Celine Arat- Cabading

FACTS: Union Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) 2 different notices of strike against the company for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of
union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by
union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-
recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice.

Company San Miguel Corporation filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to
Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four
corporations which are separate and distinct from each other.

During the conciliation meetings, NLRC established that the real issues involved are non-strikable issues
(illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal union disputes), which affect not only the interest
of the San Miguel Corporation but also the interests of the MAGNOLIA-NESTLE CORPORATION, the SAN
MIGUEL FOODS, INC., and the SAN MIGUEL JUICES, INC; also noted the question on union leadership.

NLRC issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into
preventive mediation.

Despite pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, Union went on strike, paralyzing the
company’s operation, causing it losses allegedly worth P29.98 million.

To lessen damage, Company entered MOA with the Union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and
resumption of work in exchange of "good faith talks" between the management and labor.

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Company filed with NLRC a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order.

Union sought to dismiss the petition for injunction in view of the cessation of its picketing activities as a
result of the signed MOA, there being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they actual or
threatened.

Company opposed and submitted copies of flyers being circulated by Union as proof of the union’s
alleged threat to revive the strike.

NLRC denied the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis citing that the circumstances at the time
did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the issuance of injunction.

HELD: Yes, Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be issued by any court or
other entity except as otherwise provided in Article 218.

Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to "enjoin or restrain
actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute:

#1 which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable

damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party . . .
."

At the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to revive the unlawful strike as
evidenced by the flyers then being which categorically declared: "Ipaalala n’yo sa management na hindi
iniaatras ang ating Notice of Strike (NOS) at anumang oras ay pwede nating muling itirik ang picket line.“

NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the petition for injunction to restrain the
union from declaring a strike based on non-strikeable grounds. It is the "legal duty and obligation" of the
NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of the law. Failure to promptly issue an injunction is an
abuse of discretion.

Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code:

#2 when the labor organization or the employer engages in any of the "prohibited
activities" enumerated in Article 264.

A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve
the terms and conditions of their employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within
legal bounds.

When NCMB converted Union’s notices to strike into preventive, the conversion has the effect of
dismissing the notices of strike. When the Union defiantly proceeded with the strike while mediation

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was ongoing, it blatantly violates the law. Article 264(a) of the Labor Code states that a declaration of
strike without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which may be prevented
through an injunction in accordance with Article 254.

NLRC should have granted the injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by the
unlawful strike.

Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) v. NLRC

By: Darwin Polido

FACTS: "Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM) is a union said to represent 4,500 employees of San
Miguel Corporation, more or less, w presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the
"significant distortion in the workers' wages.

When the COMPANY rejected the reduced proposal of the UNION the members thereof, on their own
accord, refused to render overtime services, most especially at the Beer Bottling Plants at Polo, starting
October 16, 1989.

SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against
the Union and its members "to declare the strike or slowdown illegal" and to terminate the employment
of the union officers and shop stewards

SMC filed another complaint against the Union and members thereof, this time directly with the
National labor Relations Commission, "to enjoin and restrain illegal slowdown and for damages, with
prayer for the issuance of a cease-and-desist and temporary restraining order.

The Union filed the petition which asserted that the members of the NLRC had no authority to act as
Commissioners because their appointments had not been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointment; and even assuming the contrary, the NLRC, as an essentially appellate body, had no
jurisdiction to act on the plea for injunction in the first instance.

ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining order or otherwise grant the
preliminary injunction

HELD: Yes. Among the powers expressly conferred on the Commission by Article 225 is the power to
"enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts or to
require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in
favor of such party . . ."

As a rule, such restraining orders or injunctions do not issue ex parte, but only after compliance with the
following requisites, to wit:

a) a hearing held "after due and personal notice thereof has been served, in such manner as the
Commission shall direct, to all known persons against whom relief is sought, and also to the Chief
Executive and other public officials of the province or city within which the unlawful acts have been
threatened or committed charged with the duty to protect complainant's property;"

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b) reception at the hearing of "testimony of witnesses, with opportunity for cross-examination, in
support of the allegations of a complaint made under oath," as well as "testimony in opposition thereto,
if offered . . .;

c) a finding of fact by the Commission, to the effect:

(1) That prohibited or unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed and will be continued
unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any
threat, prohibited or unlawful act, except against the person or persons, association or organization
making the threat or committing the prohibited or unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the
same after actual knowledge thereof;

(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will follow;

(3) That as to each item of relief to be granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the
denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;

(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and

(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant's property are unable or
unwilling to furnish adequate protection.

A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte under the following conditions:

a) the complainant "shall also allege that, unless a temporary restraining order shall be issued without
notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property will be unavoidable;

b) there is "testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the Commission in issuing a
temporary injunction upon hearing after notice;"

c) the "complainant shall first file an undertaking with adequate security in an amount to be fixed by the
Commission sufficient to recompense those enjoined for any loss, expense or damage caused by the
improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction, including all reasonable costs, together
with a reasonable attorney's fee, and expense of defense against the order or against the granting of any
injunctive relief sought in the same proceeding and subsequently denied by the Commission;" and

d) the "temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than twenty (20) days and shall
become void at the expiration of said twenty (20) days.

The record reveals that the Commission exercised the power directly and plainly granted to it by sub-
paragraph (e) Article 225 in relation to Article 266 (254) of the Code, and that it faithfully observed the
procedure and complied with the conditions for the exercise of that power prescribed in said sub-
paragraph (e) It acted on SMC's application for immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order ex
parte on the ground that substantial and irreparable injury to its property would transpire before the
matter could be heard on notice;

 No irregularity may thus be imputed to the respondent Commission in the issuance of that order.

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 Ravago v. Eastern Marine, Ltd., 453 SCRA 381 (2005)
By: Darwin Polido

FACTS: Roberto Ravago was hired by Trans-Global to work as a seaman on board various Esso vessels.
One night, Ravago met an accident. The company physician, Dr. Virginia G. Manzo, found him to have
lost his dexterity, making him unfit to work once again as a seaman.
Consequently, instead of rehiring Ravago, Esso paid him his Career Employment Incentive Plan (CEIP) as
of and his final tax refund. However, Ravago filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorney’s fees against Trans-Global and Esso with the POEA
Adjudication Office. 

The Labor Arbiter resolved that an employer cannot terminate a worker’s employment on the ground of
disease unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the said disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper
medical treatment. The Labor Arbiter concluded that Ravago was illegally dismissed.

The NLRC, likewise, declared that Ravago was illegally dismissed and that the quitclaim executed by him
could not be considered as a waiver of his right to question the validity of his dismissal and seek
reinstatement and other reliefs.

The respondents filed an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin and restrain the Labor Arbiter from enforcing his decision. On
September 5, 2001, the CA issued a Resolution temporarily restraining NLRC Sheriff Manolito Manuel
from enforcing and/or implementing the decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the NLRC.

The CA granted the application for preliminary injunction upon filing by the respondents of a bond in the
amount of ₱500,000.00. Thus, the respondents filed the surety bond as directed by the appellate court.
Before the approval thereof, however, Ravago filed a motion to set aside the Resolution dated
November 14, 2001, principally arguing that the instant case was a labor dispute, wherein an injunction
is proscribed under Article 266 (254) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of restraining order and thereafter a writ of preliminary injunction
by the CA was valid.

HELD: YES . The law proscribes the issuance of injunctive relief only in those cases involving or growing
out of a labor dispute. The case before the NLRC neither involves nor grows out of a labor dispute. It did
not involve the fixing of terms or conditions of employment or representation of persons with respect
thereto. In fact, the petitioner’s complaint revolves around the issue of his alleged dismissal from service
and his claim for backwages, damages and attorney’s fees. Moreover, Article 254 of the Labor Code
specifically provides that the NLRC may grant injunctive relief under Article 218 thereof.

Besides, the anti-injunction policy of the Labor Code, basically, is freedom at the workplace. It is more
appropriate in the promotion of the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including
voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor and industrial disputes.

The application of an injunctive writ rests upon the presence of an exigency or of an exceptional reason
before the main case can be regularly heard. The indispensable conditions for granting such temporary
injunctive relief are: (a) that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be satisfactory to establish a

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proper basis for injunction, and (b) that on the entire showing from the contending parties, the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation.
It bears stressing that in the present case, the respondents’ petition contains facts sufficient to warrant
the issuance of an injunction under Article 218, paragraph (e) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Further, respondents had already posted a surety bond more than adequate to cover the judgment
award.
 

National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Vera, 133 SCRA 259 (1984)
By: Angeli Vidal

FACTS: The Union filed an unfair labor case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
against Philippine Iron Mines. The Union was then awarded four million pesos representing payments
due them and a writ of execution was granted against the real and personal properties of the company,
Philippine Iron Miles.

The sheriff levied the properties of Phil. Iron Mines. But, the parties learned that the properties levied
and set to be auctioned had been purchased by the respondents, Manila Banking Corporation and
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank in a separate auction sale. So, the respondents filed a
complaint for injunction with preliminary injunction against the union. It was alleged that the properties
were covered by the mortgage contract executed by the Philippine Iron Mines in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and that the mortgage rights of DBP over the said properties
had been assigned by the said bank to Manila Banking Corporation and Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank in a Deed of Assignment of Mortgage Credits, Rights and Interest.

The Court of First Instance (which is now the Regional Trial Court) issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) ordering the Union and the Sheriff to desist from further conducting the auction sale.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction.

RULING: Yes. The NLRC decision sought to be executed is against the Philippine Iron Mines, the
judgment debtor. But here, the sheriff levied upon the properties not of Philippine Iron Mines, but of
the respondents, Manila Banking Corporation and Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank who were
not parties in the NLRC case filed by the union against Philippine Iron Mines.

Thus, the respondents have every right to file a separate action to vindicate their property rights. It is
noted that simply because a writ of execution was issued by the NLRC, it does not authorize the sheriff
implementing the same to levy on anybody's property.

The court held that the union’s reliance on the provision of the Labor Code prohibiting the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute is not well-taken
because this case does not involve any labor dispute.

The only labor dispute involved here is the NLRC case between the union and the judgment debtor,
Philippine Iron Mines. The respondents are not parties to the said NLRC case. What is sought to be tried
here is whether the NLRC’s decision and writ of execution shall be permitted to be satisfied and

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executed against the properties of respondents, and not of the judgment debtor named in the NLRC
decision and writ of execution.