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G l o ba l izati on
George Mode/ski

In clear contrast with all other historical societies, the contemporary world society is
global. The process by which a number of historical world societies were brought together
into one global system might be referred to as globalization. The nature and the shape
assumed as a result of that process remain even today one of the basic factors of world
politics.
Throughout recorded history, a trend can be observed toward the enlargement of
the geographical scope of human communities; it has been one aspect of the increas­
ing scale of social organization. Six thousand years ago, when a Great Society began
to take form among the city states of Mesopotamia, the effective radius of its area
may have been two or three hundred miles; two thousand years ago, when the Roman
Empire dominated the Mediterranean basin, the radius of its control may have been
one thousand miles or more (for a time it included Mesopotamia). The spread and
enlargement of areas of civilization were at the same time occurring in the Chinese
and Indian realms, so much so that what McNeill calls the "closure of the Eurasian
ecumene" occurred between 500 Be and 200 AD, 1 some two millennia ago. Within that
timespan, Hellenic culture reached India, while the Han Empire established a degree
of contact with India and its missions established the existence of the Roman Empire.
The epidemics that swept the ancient world around that time may have been the first
practical consequence of the establishment of some pattern of interaction in the Old
World. Generally, however, these interactions remained for a long time intermittent,
indirect, nonpolitical, and not yet truly global.

The Moslem Wo rld

At the opening of the period of globalization, at about 1000 AD, the nearest approx­
imation to a worldwide political order was the Moslem world. Its origins lay in the
Arab conquests of the seventh century, and its binding force was Islam. At that
time it ranged from Spain and Morocco, through Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad, to
Persia and the North of India; in the centuries that followed, it reached as far as the
Indonesian islands, and Central and East Africa. Even by comparison with medieval
Europe, it was a prosperous, productive and culturally rich world. Its cities, Baghdad
and Cairo, were cosmopolitan and populous (Cairo had more than one million inhab­
itants during the medieval period), as well as being centers of artistic and literary
creation. Its scholars and scientists were the true successors of Greek learning, while
its universities predated Europe's by at least a century.
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56 George M odelski

For several hundred years, the Moslem world was the true seat of civilization. In
relation to it medieval Europe was for a long time not only politically on the defens­
ive, but also economically and culturally inferior. Indeed, by occupying a central
position in the Eurasian-African landmass and using it for their far-flung trade, the
Moslems had already brought together the major centers of world civilization. Only
the New World eluded them, and interoceanic shipping.
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After 1 500, the Moslem world was strategically outflanked by European naval opera­
tions, and its vitality continued to decline. While Islam continued to gain adherents
in Asia and Africa, the brilliance of the medieval period did not return.

The Expansion of E u rope

The work of political unification of the world n ow fell to Europe. In one sense, the
drive that produced it was a response to the prosperity of the Islamic world and the
threat that was perceived to emanate from it. Leading that drive were the Portuguese
and Spaniards, who had learned to respect and fear the Moslems during the centuries
of the Reconquista. It was a genuine explosion of energy and vitality, of a breadth and
scope hitherto unknown. Within a short space of time, soon after Copernicus reordered
the heavens, men not only circumnavigated the globe, but followed up this feat with
the establishment and maintenance of a permanent network of worldwide contacts.
The process of globalization was set in motion by people who lived in a small
corner of the earth, not in the centers of world civilization. For the five hundred years
that followed, it was they who determined the speed and the character of globaliza­
tion; they also thereby shaped the structure of world politics.
By 1 500, the characteristic features of modern world politics could already be
discerned in embryo in Europe; in the course of globalization these features became
characteristics of the entire global system.
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Some Oth e r Features

One striking feature of the process of globalization has been the quality of arrogance
and violence that fueled it. William McNeill notes the "deeprooted pugnacity and
recklessness" which, in combination with advanced military technology and acquired
immunity to a variety of diseases within a brief space of time, gave the Europeans
of the Atlantic Seaboard the command of the oceans.2 European warlikeness (even
of the merchants who on the high seas easily assumed the role of pirates) was most
pronounced when compared with the attitudes and aptitudes of all the other major
world civilizations (except for the Moslems, another "community of will "). None of
them could match the naked, if well-organized, force of their ruthless opponents. In
the process of globalization, European warlikeness might well have become a domin­
ant feature of the entire system of world politics.
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A great expansion in state activity and efficiency may well have been the most
profound influence of globalization. Royal governments in Portugal, Spain, England
 G l o b a l ization 57

and France organized and reaped the fruits of discovery and exploitation. I n this, they
learnt much from the Italian city states, Venice, Genoa and Florence: during the late
medieval period, these were models of administrative organization and efficiency. But
they soon had to expand their organization greatly in order to govern their newly acquired
posts and territories - that is, efficiently to conduct higher-level administration at a
distance. The Spanish Crown was the first to develop an elaborate machinery for the
government of its American possessions; it thus gave employment to the rising num­
ber of graduates of law schools and universities. In turn, strong bureaucracies under­
mined tendencies toward popular rule, created a steady flow of revenue, and made
the rulers independent of the control of assemblies, which had been so prominent in
the earlier period. "Bureaucracy, like absolutism, strengthened its grip upon the king­
doms of Europe, in part at least as the consequence of the needs experienced and
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experiments conducted overseas. 3
In military governmental operations, globalization was peculiarly favorable to, as
well as dependent upon, the development of the navy. Effective naval operations
over long distances require not only technology, but above all a sound political
organization: a steady tax base, because they are expensive; a shipbuilding and
supplies industry, geared to governmental demand; a manpower base that might
be relatively small, but had to be loyal and well trained; and a governmental system
that would be capable of coordinating these elements toward long-term goals.
Governments that were capable of equipping fleets for sailing the world would also,
as a rule, be efficient and strong governments, and it was they who set the tone of
political organization.
Good navies were, for their part, closely dependent on the organization of com­
merce. The first Portuguese explorations were organized and financed by the Royal
government; the monopoly of the spice trade that flowed from them was conducted
entirely for the benefit of the King. This fusion of political and commercial activities
probably contributed to the early decline of the trade. Spanish trade with the Amer­
icas was conducted by a monopoly of the merchants of Seville, with the financial
backing of Italian and German houses, but it was less lucrative. It was the injection
of Dutch and English enterprise, based on the long commercial experience of the
cities of the Netherlands, that led to the development of specialized, corporate trade
enterprises. The Dutch and English East Indies Companies became particularly
famous, but there were many others. They all began as devices for pooling efforts to
equip and supply fleets that sailed long distances. Voyages to the East, for instance,
could last several years, and their profits were far from certain, although they could
be spectacular. The organization, forethought, trust and care that were required for
launching such expeditions were of a high order. Practices evolved in the organiza­
tion and management of long-distance, hence higher-layered, trade and production
activities became the bases of modern corporate organization.4
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An Appraisal

The way in which the world has been brought together was a spectacular enterprise,
with a magnificence all its own. Its role in shaping human destiny has not often enough
been appreciated, even though the tales of exploration and adventure have long held
58 George M odelski

the fascination o f European audiences. But the spectacle and the splendor also had
their shadows, and some of these have been dark and long.
A most important characteristic of globalization was its marvelously uncontrolled
character. Despite the force and impetus of the process, this was not an organized
expansion of a centralized system, as were the contemporaneous Chinese expeditions
to Africa. This was not an expansion of one entity, called Europe, seizing overseas
territory; it was rather the spilling over of a multitude of enterprises from Europe onto
the world. In turn, the impact of the process also changed Europe. No one empire
emerged but rather a series of imperial domains, each in competition with the others.
Despite attempts at monopolization, no one rule attained overwhelming superiority;
conversely, no single empire gave its ruler sufficient power to establish dominion over
the whole of Europe.
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Globalization helped to consolidate the system of independent states for Europe,
and ultimately also for the world, by fostering the growth of a diversity of organiza­
tions, each one of which served as the seedbed of new autonomy and diversity. But
above all, this process strengthened the state, and by doing so it markedly affected
the course of future political development.
Who benefited from globalization? In a broad sense, the Western community did.
During the past few centuries, the share of the European stock in the world's popu­
lation has risen substantially. s In part, this is attributable to an earlier burst of popu­
lation growth in Europe; but this early growth had also made possible large-scale
migrations and the settlement of some of the world's most fertile and productive lands,
in the attractive temperate zones, by people of European descent. The abundant lands
and waters of North America, southern South America, South Africa and Australia
became extensions of Europe, and their exploitation significantly altered the distribu­
tion of global wealth in favor of the European groups. As the result of globalization,
the Europeans and their descendants today control the major part of cultivable land
and the most productive sources of food, and they could also control the resources of
the seas.6
Within Europe, those who benefited the most were those governments and states,
and their subjects, that led and controlled the process. At first, the Iberian mon­
archies grew powerful on its proceeds, then the Dutch, the English and the French.
Globalization altered the distribution of power away from Central Europe - including
the cities of Northern Italy, the German lands and the Baltic area - to the coastlands
of the North Atlantic. The process of growth redounded in the first place to the benefit
of those who organized it.
Side by side with the benefits of globalization must be put its considerable costs
and its range of adverse, indeed disintegrative effects. With regard to a number of
human societies, its impact has been deadly, both in terms of social organization and
for individual members of such societies, for whom the prospects of life declined trag­
ically as the result of European impact. The societies of Mexico and Peru disintegrated,
and in the century following the conquest the population of Central America declined
catastrophically, through violence, disease and depression.7 Similar disasters befell the
Indian populations of North America, the inhabitants of many Pacific islands and the
aboriginal populations of Australia.
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 G lobal ization 59

Most o f the time globalization was a process o f incorporating external parts into
the ongoing fabric of Western-centered world politics. Those governments, societies,
individuals that proved adept and adaptable enough were brought within the main­
stream by means of cooptation. The great majority were either dominated, con­
trolled, ignored or isolated. An alternative mode of adaptation - that of adjusting
Western-type life patterns to the requirements of the rest of the world - has not been
adequately considered. Cooptation certainly has been neither deep, rapid nor
sufficiently extensive. Complementary adaptation is yet to be explored - for instance,
through the selective slowing down of growth rates. The work of globalization could
yet be carried to completion in unsuspected ways.
Globalization ultimately raises the problem of whether the large community,
indeed the community of mankind, can be a good community. Renowned political
thinkers have consistently opted for an ideal community that is small and intimate.
By and large, contemporary political thought points to the lack of community in large­
scale organizations.
The historical experience of globalization does not permit us to make any optimistic
or easy conclusion. It offers no grounds for the opinion that the large community must,
of necessity, create wide benefits; indeed, there are reasons for thinking that it may
instead create opportunities for great dangers. But it also discloses no theoretical or
practical considerations that show that the large community is inherently unable to
be good. The large community is here and can no longer be avoided; perhaps it can
be made better.

Notes

W. H. McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), ch. 7.
2 Ibid., pp. 623-4.
3 J. H. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance (New York: New America Library, 1964), p. 320.
4 The prominence of corporate organization in the economic development of the United States
may have had its origins in the early influence of such commercial corporations. Virginia
was founded by an English chartered company; New York was a trading post of the Dutch
West India Company; the Hudson B ay Company had been prominent in Canadian history
for centuries.
5 C. M. Cipolla, The Economic History of World Population (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1964), pp. 102-4, quoting Kuczynski, according to whom the white population of the earth
was about 22 per cent of the human species in 1800 and about 35 per cent in 1 930; more
recently, this proportion may have been declining.
6 According to G. Borgstrom, The Hungry Planet (New York: Collier, 1965), "the privileged
nations of the world" - which include the United States and account for some 450 million
people - dispose of as many food calories per year as 1 ,300 million people at the bottom
of the scale, who live in the least developed countries. "We like to think that we owe our
abundance to our greater skill and ingenuity, completely forgetting that we owe it equally
or maybe even to a greater extent to our good fortune in the great lottery of mankind, which
has given us a disproportionate share of the world's agricultural resources" (p. 29).
7 Central Mexico had a population of 11 million in 1519 and one of 2.5 million in 1597 (quoted
by Parry, Age of Reconnaissance, p. 246) .