ARTICLE II Section 1

Landmark Case: Villavicencio vs. Lukban, G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 (Digested Case)

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

In 1918, the mayor of Manila had 170 "women of ill repute" forcibly rounded up, put on a ship, and sent
to Davao as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against him. The Supreme Court said that the
women were not chattels but Filipino citizens who had the fundamental right not to be forced to change
their place of residence. This case justifies one of the basic rights of citizen, the right of domain.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce
around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised
versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge
in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took
custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and
thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said
women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that
those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao
instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could
have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have
shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100
pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any
municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly
fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no
jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with
the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If
the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from
Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a
fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in
the courts, while the person who has lost her birth right of liberty has no effective recourse. The great
writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Ocampo vs HRET G.R. No. 158466, 15 June 2004

Facts: Mario B. Crespo aka Mark Jimenez, a duly-elected congressman of the 6th district of Manila, was
declared ineligible for the position in which he was elected for lack of residency in the district and was
ordered to vacate his office. Ocampo then averred that since Crespo was declared as such, he should be
declared the winner, having garnered the second highest number of votes.

Issue: Whether or not the candidate who has the second highest vote should be declared as winner
considering that the duly-elected representative is not eligible for the office.

Ruling: No. The fact that the candidate who had the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or ineligible for office does not give rise to the right of the candidate who garnered the
second highest vote to be declared winner. To do otherwise would be anathema to the most basic
precepts of republicanism and democracy. Therefore, the only recourse to ascertain the new choice of
the electorate is to hold another election.

Free Telephone Workers Union vs Minister of Labor

Non-delegation of Legislative Power Doctrine

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS MINISTER OF LABOR

G.R. No. L-58184 108 SCRA 757 October 30, 1981

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, petitioner,

vs.

THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, and THE PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, respondents.

Facts:

There was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor for unfair labor practices stating the following
grounds:

Unilateral and arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct, a copy of which is attached, to the
detriment of the interest of our members.

Illegal terminations and suspensions of our officers and members as a result of the implementation of
said Code of Conduct
Unconfirmation (sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence Without Official Leave of
Absence (AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation of our Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Several conciliation meetings were called by the Ministry followed, with petitioner manifesting its
willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in
the meanwhile the Code of Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the
approval of private respondent.

Subsequently, respondent certified the labor dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for
compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at the private respondent’s establishment. The labor
dispute was set for hearing by respondent National Labor Relations Commission. Private respondent,
following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the controversy regarding the Code of
Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed
indefinite preventive suspension apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute.

It is the submission of petitioner labor union that “Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends article
264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment the power and
discretion to assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor
Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is an undue
delegation of legislative powers. There is likewise the assertion that such conferment of authority “may
also ran contrary to the assurance of the State to the workers’ right to self-organization and collective
bargaining.

Issues:

Whether or not Batas Pambansa 130, in so far as it amends Art. 264 of the Labor Code, constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative powers.

Discussions:

The amended provision in the Article of Labor Law states that “In labor disputes causing or likely to
cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to
public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and
those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction
over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employers shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The Minister may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with
this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.”

Rulings:

No. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes
causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter
decide it or certify the same the National Labor Relations Commission is not on its face unconstitutional
for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.
To repeat, there is no ruling on the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally applied in
this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization and free collective bargaining, as on the
facts alleged, disputed by private respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must
be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the
Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free
from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate
of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due care that in the decision to be
reached, there is no violation of “the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI v. MINISTER OF FINANCE, GR No. 58289, 1982-07-24

Facts:

The petition contains the following allegations:

That said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers granted him under
Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution proclaimed in full force and effect as of October 27, 1976
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1595

That said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution '(T)he Legislative power
shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa' (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only
'with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art.

VII)

That Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution as amended
in the plebiscite of April 7, 1981

Issues:

Whether the 1973 Constitution as amended by Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained the same
amendments, more particularly Amendment No. 6, after it was again amended in the Plebiscite held on
April 7,... 1981?

Ruling:

Our considered conclusion and judgment is that Amendment No. 6 of October 1976 of the Constitution
of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or modified, much less repealed by the constitutional
amendments of 1981.

ACCFA v. ACCFA Supervisors’ Ass’n, G.R. No. L-21484, November 29, 1969

FACTS:

The unions and ACCFA entered into collective bargaining agreement (CBA), but after a few months the
Unions started protesting because of alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. The
Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers voluntarily returned to work on 26
November 1962.

In October 1962, the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) against the ACCFA for acts of unfair labor practice violation of the CBA in order to discourage the
members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said
members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain.

ACCFA denied the charges asserted lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the
bargaining contract, expiration of said Contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the
fringe benefits provided for therein.

CIR decision ordered the ACCFA (1) to cease and desist from committing further acts tending to
discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self organization; (2) to
comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining contract executed in September
1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living allowance; and (3) to bargain in good faith and
expeditiously with the herein complainants

During the pendency of the ACCFA’s case, the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844) was
signed into law, which required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the ACCFA and
changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). So, ACCFA Supervisors’ Association and
the ACCFA Workers’ Association filed a petition for certification election with the Court of Industrial
Relations praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-
and-file employees in the ACA.

ACA denied that the Unions represented the majority of the supervisors and rank-and-file workers,
respectively, in the ACA. It further alleged that the petition was premature, that the ACA was not the
proper party to be notified and to answer the petition, and that the employees and supervisors could
not lawfully become members of the Unions, nor be represented by them

The trial court certified the ACCFA Workers’ Association and the ACCFA Supervisors’ Association as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representatives of the rank-and-file employees and supervisors of ACA.
Said order was affirmed by the CIR in its resolution.

ISSUE:

Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental functions – YES

RATIO

The ACA is a government office or agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These
functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as “constituent” (as distinguished from
“ministrant”), such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those
regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the
determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of
the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies,
the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes.

There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is
beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental
function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals.

Aside from the governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of the
land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the
formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of
the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its
personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and
salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears.

The Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the lower Court. Such certification is
admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions
of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions
did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (GR L-21824). This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act 875.
With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the Land Reform Code and
in view of the Court’s ruling as to the governmental character of the functions of the ACA, the decision
of the lower Court, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed by the
ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in GR L- 21484, has become moot and
academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain collectively with the Unions is concerned.

G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989

RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO
OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL
CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners,

vs.

FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or

(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or

(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. (Petition, pp. 4-5;
paragraphing supplied.]

The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:

June 4, 1986

Hon. Feliciano Belmonte

GSIS General Manager

Arroceros, Manila

Sir:

As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished
with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure
a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel
Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true
copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.

If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?

We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the
present regime.

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).

We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on the
matter.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE

[Rollo, p. 7.]

To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:

June 17, 1986

Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street

Caloocan City

Dear Compañero:

Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President & General
Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986
requesting a list of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan
of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.

My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this
confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.

As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I
regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO

Deputy General Counsel

[Rollo, p. 40.]

On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter,
saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action
necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p.
8.]

On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.

On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the
defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted
housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]

Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed
a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their
memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among
which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of
the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore
asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of
action.

To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they
are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is
argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the
courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law.
The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a
question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al.,
G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984,
129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the
exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of
whether or not mandamus hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information.

We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which involve
the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted
by the GSIS.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the
constitutional right to information. In Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and
in the recent case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987,150 SCRA 530,
the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and
ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which
provided:

The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall
be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data
relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the
democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of
government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies
and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and
caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public
trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of
governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to
the Constitution.

Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to
check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is
not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures
that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent
information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that
the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in
the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear
fruit.

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this
is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application
by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes
hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure * and honesty in the public service.
** It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as
in checking abuse in government.

Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi,
the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."

Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest"
or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee
[Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p. 542.]

The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As
observed in Legazpi:

In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which
can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citezen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]

In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was
the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and
conduct of citezens. In Legaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p.
539.]

The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda Marcos.

The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest
and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which
the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the
GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old
GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of
the funds administered by the System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as
respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the
end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover,
the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were above board.

In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.

A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.

Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is
argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.

Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the
Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be
deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.

There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe
v. Mutuc [130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando,
stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt:
"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short
of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
between absolute and limited government. UItimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute. state, In contrast, a system of limited government
safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public
sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as modem society has
developed. All the forces of technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]

When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential
conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of
these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court
in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public
and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like
the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a
corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to
the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.

Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80
N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and
hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.

It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not
succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding
at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding
responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary
individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf. Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]

Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in
nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern which guarantees "(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.

It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions,
are outside the coverage of the people's right of access to official records.

It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance
function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure
and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-
21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government, whether
carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service
to the people.

Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not
justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.

Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-
owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the
State policy of fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).

Commissioner Suarez is recognized.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?

MR. OPLE. Very gladly.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.

When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" — referring to the transactions
of the State — and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the various agencies,
departments, ministries and instrumentalities of the government....

MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.

MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?

MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.

MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.

MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.

In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject
to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons
entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538,
quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts
sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.

However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."

Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records
to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.

It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of
defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the
required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA
203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners
fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records
evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify,
subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this
decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Cabanas v Pilapil Digest

58 SCRA 94

Facts:

1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise
indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his brother
Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took charge of
Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child Melchora Cabañas filed a
complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow herself to be the child’s
trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended that as a private contract its
terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and intended beneficiaries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms of the
insurance policy?

YES.

The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that whenever
any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest be affected then the
judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best interest of that person.

The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the immediate relative of
the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the child than an uncle.

It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as
parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to accord
priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims. It would
be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the country for a
parent to be preferred. It could have been different if the conflict were between father and mother.
Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the instrumentality
of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her plea.

GONZALES vs. MARCOS

65 SCRA 624

GR No. L-31685 July 31, 1975

"With the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest owing from the public, a taxpayer may not
have the right to question the legality of an issuance creating a trust for the benefit of the people but
purely funded by charity."

FACTS: The petitioner questioned the validity of EO No. 30 creating the Cultural Center of the
Philippines, having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations received,
financial commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the
future. It was likewise alleged that the Board of Trustees did accept donations from the private sector
and did secure from the Chemical Bank of New York a loan of $5 million guaranteed by the National
Investment & Development Corporation as well as $3.5 million received from President Johnson of the
United States in the concept of war damage funds, all intended for the construction of the Cultural
Center building estimated to cost P48 million. The petition was denied by the trial court arguing that
with not a single centavo raised by taxation, and the absence of any pecuniary or monetary interest of
petitioner that could in any wise be prejudiced distinct from those of the general public.
ISSUE: Has a taxpayer the capacity to question the validity of the issuance in this case?

HELD: No. It was therein pointed out as "one more valid reason" why such an outcome was unavoidable
that "the funds administered by the President of the Philippines came from donations [and]
contributions [not] by taxation." Accordingly, there was that absence of the "requisite pecuniary or
monetary interest." The stand of the lower court finds support in judicial precedents. This is not to
retreat from the liberal approach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by
People v. Vera, where the doctrine of standing was first fully discussed. It is only to make clear that
petitioner, judged by orthodox legal learning, has not satisfied the elemental requisite for a taxpayer's
suit. Moreover, even on the assumption that public funds raised by taxation were involved, it does not
necessarily follow that such kind of an action to assail the validity of a legislative or executive act has to
be passed upon. This Court, as held in the recent case of Tan v. Macapagal, "is not devoid of discretion
as to whether or not it should be entertained." The lower court thus did not err in so viewing the
situation.