Chapter 3

Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory
Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory is an academic

Petty's Place in the History
article, written by Charles Henry Hull and published in The
of Economic Theory
Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1900.
The article gives an overview of the life and work of William

Petty, with a strong emphasis on the contribution of Petty to the
development of early economic thinking. The article has reached
some fame because Hull proposes in it the division of the
writings of Petty into three chronological groups.
Contents
Bibliographical information
Background
Contents
Critical reception
Footnotes
Bibliography
Title page of Petty's Place 1900
External link
Author Charles Henry Hull
Language English
Bibliographical information Subject William Petty
Hull, Charles Henry (1900). "Petty's Place in the History of Publisher The Quarterly Journal
Economic Theory". The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 14 (3): of Economics, vol. 14,
307–340. doi:10.2307/1882563 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F1882 no. 3
563). ISSN 0033-5533 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0033-553 Publication 1900
date
3). JSTOR 1882563 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/1882563).
OCLC 5545673036 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/5545673036) Pages 307-340
– via Wikisource.[1] OCLC 5545673036 (https://w
ww.worldcat.org/oclc/5
The text was reprinted in Blaug 1991. 545673036)
Text Petty's Place in the
Background History of Economic
The contribution of William Petty to the early development of Theory at Wikisource
economic theory had already been a subject of research by
different scholars. Hull mentions Zuckerkandl and von Bergmann in the introduction, and Ingram,
Roscher, Kautz, McCulloch and Travers Twiss in the final chapter of 'Petty's Place in the History of
Economic Theory'.[2]
Hull himself had published The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty (in 2 volumes), in 1899, in which
he had already written a large 'Introduction', containing biographic information on Petty (and Graunt),
and in which he spend quite some space on the debate concerning the authorship of the Observations
upon the Bills of Mortality, concluding that Graunt was the author of it.
Nowadays, Hull's article is often mentioned in the same breath with Wilson Lloyd Bevan's Sir William
Petty: A Study in English Economic Literature, published a few years earlier,[3] and demonstrating the
revival of interest in Petty and his role in the development of (economic) thinking in the seventeenth
century.[4]
Contents
After a short introductory paragraph, 'Petty's place in the history of economic theory' holds 5 chapters.
The first chapter contains a short biography of Petty, and a general description of the economic writings,
in which Hull makes a division in three (or four) groups, relating to distinct periods in Petty's life, and to
books with "a common provocation and common characteristics":[5]
the first group was written when Petty had returned to London after finishing his "Down
Survey" in Ireland and consists mainly of A Treatise of Taxes & Contributions (written and
first published 1662) and Verbum Sapienti (written 1665, printed 1691). Both texts relate to
the discussions about fiscal issues, following the Restoration and the expenses in the first
Dutch war.
the second group contain The Political Anatomy of Ireland and Political Arithmetick. They
were written some ten years later in Ireland. As Hull points out, the "direct impulse to their
writing came from Dr. Edward Chamberlayne's Present State of England, published 1669".
Again ten years later the group of pamphlets was written, that were contributions to the
dispute whether London were a larger city than Paris, and that are titled the Essays in
Political Arithmetick by Hull. This group of pamphlets has a close relation to John Graunt's
Observations upon the Bills of Mortality of London.
The Quantulumcunque concerning Money (written in 1682, and printed 1695, and perhaps
in 1682), can probably be considered as belonging to a group of its own.
The division given here was still used by scholars at the end of the twentieth century.[6]
The second chapter describes the method and content of the economic writings of Petty. Perhaps this
chapter is biased because of Hull's interest in the use of the statistical method in history and economics.
He mentions Petty's method a statistical method, which is as such inapplicable to many subjects, and
therefore restricting to some extent the content of the writings. Petty's predilection for a statistical method
is due to the influence of Bacon. The well-known quote of Petty is "The Method I take is not very usual;
for, instead of using only comparative and superlative Words, and intellectual Arguments, I have taken
the course (as a Specimen of the Political Arithmetick I have long aimed at) to express myself in Terms
of Number, Weight, or Measure; to use only Arguments of Sense, and to consider only such Causes, as
have visible Foundations in Nature".[7]
But statistical sources were scarce in the 17th century. So a great number of basic facts, like the
population of London, of England and of Ireland, had to be calculated, with all the risks of inaccuracies.
And although he was aware of the fact that most of his calculations were mere guesses, he sometimes
drew conclusions, that were far behind real. "He did not hesitate to advance, in all seriousness, the most
astounding proposals for increasing the national wealth of the three kingdoms by a wholesale deportation
of the Irish and Scotch into England,—proposals based solely upon the results of a complicated series of
guesses and multiplications."[8]
Chapter three is devoted to the content of Petty's work. As far as his contributions to economic theory
are concerned, Hull thinks, that the writings in the first group (and the Quantulumcunque) are most
important. This brings the focus to the Treatise of Taxes & Contributions, and thus on taxation.[9]But out
of the discussion of taxes also proceeds the treatment of rent.[10] Also Petty's theory of value "is
developed incidentally to the discussion of taxation. It is an uncompromising quantity-of-labor theory.[11]
In the fourth chapter attention is first given to the second group of Petty's writings, the Political
Anatomy of Ireland (1672) and the Political Arithmetick (1676). They are "predominantly descriptive"
and economically, they add "little or nothing new to Petty's know ideas."[12] The Political Arithmetick, in
contrast to the Political Anatomy, deals chiefly with England, and especially tries to prove that England
is stronger and wealthier than France. To prove this, Petty uses clever calculations.
In this same chapter Hull treats the third group of Petty's writings, the Essays in Political Arithmetick,
together with the Quantulumcunque. The Essays had a public purpose: to prove that London "was a
greater city than Paris, and, indeed, the greatest in the world. (…) The present interest of the Essays lies
chiefly in the light which they throw upon Petty's statistical method. Economically, they are barren. The
Quantulumcunque, on the other hand, is full of meat."[13]
The final chapter tries to give a summary of the findings.
Critical reception
The division of the writings of Petty into three groups, which was proposed by Hull in this article, was
still referred to at the end of the twentieth century, for instance by Hutchison in 1988[14] and by Yang in
1994.[15]
In 1955 Matsukawa [16] criticized Hull, for not giving proper appraisal to some of the later essays of
Petty. In Hull's opinion, these essays, generally regarded as his works on vital statistics, "added
practically nothing of economic interest to these earlier books"[17], while Matsukawa thinks they are "in
final analysis his arguments for the increase of the 'Superlucration'."[16]
Roll, in his A History of Economic Thought,[18] is annoyed by Hull's characterization of Petty as "a sort
of English cameralist".[19] According to Roll, identifying Petty with the "pseudo-economist advisers of
absolute monarchs" is based on "misconception" and "must seriously interfere with a just estimate of
Petty's position in the history of economic thought."[20]
In 1991 Mark Blaug published the first volume in the series on "Pioneers in Economics" on Pre-
Classical Economists.[21] This volume was dedicated to Charles Davenant (1656-1687) and William
Petty. It contained ten scholarly articles, all previously published. The first article in the (chronologically
ordered) volume was Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory. In the short introduction to the
volume Blaug did not further explain his choice of articles.
In 1993 Hong-Seok Yang referred to the classification of Petty's writings in chronological groups by Hull
in his treatment of Petty's concept of 'natural price' in The political economy of trade and growth : an
analytical interpretation of Sir James Steuart's Inquiry.[22]
In 2002 Dooley referred to Hull 1900 as a "notable commentator" on Petty in the context of the early
development of the labour theory of value.[23]
In 2011 Erba, in an analysis of the contribution of Giammaria Ortes (1713-1790) to economic science,
remarks that Erba's calculations on income, consumption and distribution "are significantly more
complete and accurate than those obtained by Petty".[24] He cites Hull 1900 who says that no good
grounds for Petty's assumptions can be found.[25]
Footnotes
1. A transcription (http://historyofeconomicthought.mcmaster.ca/petty/hull.html) is also
available in the Archive for the History of Economic Thought at McMaster University; see
also this entry (https://econpapers.repec.org/article/hayhetart/hull1900.htm) in EconPapers.
2. Most of the writers on the early development of economic thought are only mentioned in a
few sentences. They are:
BERGMANN, EUGEN VON (1895) - Die Wirtschaftskrisen. Geschichte der
nationalökonomischen Krisentheorieen. copy (https://archive.org/details/diewirtschaftsk0
0berggoog) at the Internet Archive. There is only one place where Petty is mentioned: p.
235.
INGRAM, JOHN KELLS (1885) – 'Petty, Sir Willliam (https://archive.org/stream/encyclopediab
rit18newyrich#page/723/mode/1up)' in Encyclopædia Britannica, vol. XVIII, p. 724. See
Chisholm, Hugh, ed. (1911). "Petty, Sir William". Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.).
Cambridge University Press. (Hull (p. 339) mentions vol. XIX, p. 358).
KAUTZ, GYULA (1860) - Die geschichtliche Entwickelung der National-Oekonomik und
ihrer Literatur (Theorie und Geschichte der National-Oekonomik. Propyläen zum volks-
und staatswirtschaftlichen Studium; vol. 2). Wien : Gerold. OCLC 64744129 (https://ww
w.worldcat.org/oclc/64744129); also spelled as "Die geschichtliche Entwicklung...."
(OCLC 603617578 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/603617578)). (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=rEU-AAAAcAAJ)Die geschichtliche Entwicklung der National-Oekonomik
und ihrer Literatur (https://books.google.com/books?id=rEU-AAAAcAAJ) at Google
Books. Reprint 1970: Glashütten im Taunus : Auvermann, OCLC 74196935 (https://ww
w.worldcat.org/oclc/74196935). See for instance p. 311f. (https://books.google.nl/books?
id=rEU-AAAAcAAJ&hl=nl&pg=PA311). The paragraph is entitled "Die anti-
merkantilistische Richtung und die Anfänge der wissenschaftlicheren Nationalökonomie
in England" (p. 307-322) and comprises also Dudley North (1641-1691) and others.
MCCULLOCH, JOHN RAMSAY (1845) – The Literature of Political Economy. Hull mentions
McCulloch only once in 'Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory' (without
mentioning a publication), but in his Economic Writings of 1899 (Hull (1899)), Hull does
mention McCulloch on a few more place: on p. xxxix and p. l in regard to the relation of
Petty and Graunt; on p. 257 on Political Arithmetick, ref Evelyn in "A select
collection…."; on p. 639 = 638/9/40: bibl. [10e] on the reprint Quantulumcunque 1856 in
"A select collection…." by McCulloch. In the list of books used (p. 668) he only mentions
McCulloch 1845.
ROSCHER, WILHELM GEORG FRIEDRICH (1851) – Zur Geschichte der englischen
Volkswirthschaftslehre im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert. In: Abhandlungen der k. sächs.
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Bd. 3. Leipzig. OCLC 741741146 (https://www.worldc
at.org/oclc/741741146). copy (https://archive.org/details/zurgeschichtede00roscgoog) at
the Internet Archive; see ch. VII – 'Der politische Arithmetiker Petty', pp. 67-85
(mentioned by Hull on p. 339).
TWISS, TRAVERS (1847) - View of the Progress of Political Economy in Europe since the
Sixteenth Century. London : Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.
OCLC 1026140282 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1026140282). Copy (https://archive.o
rg/details/viewprogresspol00twisgoog) at the Internet Archive, 2nd copy (https://archive.
org/details/viewofprogressof00twis), 3rd copy (https://archive.org/details/viewprogresspo
l01twisgoog), 4th copy (https://archive.org/details/viewofprogressof00twisuoft).
ZUCKERKANDL, ROBERT (1889) - Zur Theorie des Preises. OCLC 186012050 (https://www.w
orldcat.org/oclc/186012050), copy (https://archive.org/details/zurtheoriedespr00zuckgoo
g) at the Internet Archive and 2nd copy (https://archive.org/details/zurtheoriedespre00zu
ckuoft), e.g. p. 12-15, 229-233. See also summary (in German) (http://www.gleichsatz.d
e/b-u-t/can/101/zuckerka1.html).
One of the writers, that credited Petty for his contribution to the history of economic thought,
was of course Karl Marx (especially in Theorien über den Mehrwert (Theories of Surplus
Value), written 1861-1863, first published 1905-1910). Hull does not mention Marx here, nor
in his Economic Writings, although he does mention Petty a "founder of political economy".
(Hull 1900, p. 338)
Inglis Palgrave published the first edition of his Dictionary of Political Economy between
1894 and 1899. Edmond Fitzmaurice wrote an article on Petty in the third volume, p. 99-102
(https://archive.org/stream/cu31924032511242#page/n128/mode/1up). It is not mentioned
by Hull.
3. Bevan 1894.
4. See for instance Roncaglia 1985, p. 17, Reyes 2002, p. 73 and McCormick 2009, p. 1.
5. Hull 1900, p. 311f.
6. One may wonder why Hull does not mention A Treatise of Ireland in this list. He was the first
to have this manuscript, dated 1687, printed. (Hull 1899, p. 545-621).
7. Hull 1900, p. 314/5 see also: Petty's Political Arithmetick (Preface) in Hull 1899 The
Economic Writings of Sir William Petty vol. 1, p. 244. The quote dates back to 1672-6.
8. Hull 1900, p. 318.
9. Hull 1900, p. 322-325.
10. Hull 1900, p. 325-330.
11. Hull 1900, p. 330 Hull's peremptory statement is in contrast with for instance Kühnis 1960,
who did extensive research on the value and price theoretical concepts of Petty and the
"dogmenhistorische" background. Kühnis does not mention Hull's essay.
12. Hull 1900, p. 332.
13. Hull 1900, p. 337.
14. Hutchison 1988, p. 29.
15. Yang 1994, p. 62 (footnote 6).
16. Matsukawa 1955, p. 76.
17. Hull 1900, p. 322.
18. Roll 1973.
19. Hull 1900, p. 339.
20. Roll 1973, p. 101. See also: Granados 2005.
21. Blaug 1991.
22. Yang 1994, p. 62.
23. Dooley 2002, p. 2.
24. Erba 2011, p. 66; Erba dates Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory 1907.
25. Hull 1900, p. 324.
Bibliography
Bevan, Wilson Lloyd (1894). "Sir William Petty: A Study in English Economic Literature".
Publication of the American Economic Association. IX (4): 1–102. OCLC 615596640 (http
s://www.worldcat.org/oclc/615596640) – via Wikisource.
Blaug, Mark, ed. (1991). Pre-Classical Economists; Volume 1. Aldershot: Edward Elgar
Publishing. ISBN 978 1 85278 468 3. OCLC 991657150 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/991
657150).
Dooley, P.C. (2002). "The Labour Theory of Value: Economics or Ethics?" (http://www.compi
lerpress.ca/Competitiveness/Anno/Anno%20Dooley%20Labour%20Theory%20of%20Valu
e.htm). Discussion Paper, Dep. of Economics, University of Saskatchewan.
OCLC 71242912 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/71242912). Retrieved 2019-03-20. (see
also: this link (http://copejournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Dooley-The-Labour-Theo
ry-of-Value-Economics-or-Ethics-2002.pdf); accessed 2019-03-20)
Erba, Alighiero (2011). "Economic structure and national accounting: G. Ortes' contribution
to economic science". History of Economic Ideas. 19 (1): 55–83. JSTOR 23723559 (https://
www.jstor.org/stable/23723559).
Granados, José A. Tapia (2005). "Economía y Mortalidad en las Ciencias Sociales: Del
Renacimiento a las Ideas sobre la Transición Demográfica" (https://www.scielosp.org/articl
e/scol/2005.v1n3/285-308). Salud Colectiva (in Spanish). 1 (3): 285–308.
doi:10.18294/sc.2005.48 (https://doi.org/10.18294%2Fsc.2005.48). OCLC 7180240395 (all
editions) (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/7180240395/editions). Retrieved 2019-03-20.
Hull, Charles Henry, ed. (1899). The Economic Writings of Sir William Petty; together with
the Observations upon the Bills of Mortality, more probably by Captain John Graunt.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. OL 4007495W (https://openlibrary.org/works/OL40
07495W). OCLC 803827975 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/803827975) – via Wikisource.
Hutchison, Terence (1988). Before Adam Smith : The Emergence of Political Economy,
1662-1776 (https://archive.org/details/beforeadamsmithe0000hutc). Oxford / New York:
Basil Blackwell. ISBN 0 631 15898 7.
Kühnis, Sylva (1960). Die wert- und preistheoretischen Ideen William Pettys (in German).
Winterthur: Verlag P.G. Keller. OCLC 244978509
(https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/244978509).
Matsukawa, Shichiro (1955). "Origin and Significance of Political Arithmetic" (http://hermes-i
r.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/11835/1/annals0060100530.pdf) (PDF). The Annals of
the Hitotsubashi Academy. 6 (October) (1): 53–79. doi:10.15057/11835 (https://doi.org/10.1
5057%2F11835).
McCormick, Ted (2009). William Petty And the Ambitions of Political Arithmetic. Oxford etc.:
Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-954789-0. OCLC 361888129 (https://www.worldca
t.org/oclc/361888129). (Google Books (https://books.google.com/books?id=Ag4UDAAAQB
AJ))
Roll, Eric (1973) [1st pub.: 1938]. A History of Economic Thought (revised and enlarged
1973; reprinted 1978, 4th. ed.). London & Boston: Faber & Faber Ltd. ISBN 0 571 04804 8.
Roncaglia, Alessandro (1985). Petty. The Origins of Political Economy. Translated by

Isabella Cherubini. Cardiff etc: University College Cardiff Press. ISBN 0 906449 91 X.
(translation of Petty: la nascita dell' economia politica,1977)
Reyes, Verónica Villarespe (2002). Pobreza: Teoría e Historia (http://ru.iiec.unam.mx/1947/
1/PobrezaTeoriaHistoria.pdf) (PDF) (in Spanish). Mexico: Casa Juan Pablos.
OCLC 1029896990 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1029896990). Retrieved 2019-03-19.
Yang, Hong-Seok (1994). The Political Economy of Trade and Growth: An Analytical
Interpretation of Sir James Steuart's Inquiry (https://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=LD
uNeTqxODoC). Edward Elgar. OCLC 645239001 (all editions) (https://www.worldcat.org/ocl
c/645239001/editions). (especially section 'Petty's Natural Price', p. 61 - 68; see also pdf (htt
p://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5539/1/5539_2978.PDF) of thesis 1993.)
External link
Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory (https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hay:h
etart:hull1900) in EconPapers.
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title=Petty%27s_Place_in_the_History_of_Economic_Theory&oldid=935560674"
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Richard Cantillon
Richard Cantillon (French: [kɑ̃ tijɔ̃ ]; 1680s – May 1734) was an
Richard Cantillon
Irish-French economist and author of Essai sur la Nature du
Commerce en Général (Essay on the Nature of Trade in General),
a book considered by William Stanley Jevons to be the "cradle of
political economy".[4] Although little information exists on
Cantillon's life, it is known that he became a successful banker
and merchant at an early age. His success was largely derived
from the political and business connections he made through his
family and through an early employer, James Brydges. During the
late 1710s and early 1720s, Cantillon speculated in, and later
helped fund, John Law's Mississippi Company, from which he
acquired great wealth. However, his success came at a cost to his
debtors, who pursued him with lawsuits, criminal charges, and
even murder plots until his death in 1734. Born 1680s[1]
Tralee, County Kerry,
Essai remains Cantillon's only surviving contribution to Ireland
economics. It was written around 1730 and circulated widely in Died 1734[2] (aged about 54)
manuscript form, but was not published until 1755. His work was London, England,
translated into Spanish by Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, Great Britain
probably in the late 1770s, and considered essential reading for
political economy. Despite having much influence on the early Era Age of Reason
development of the physiocrat and classical schools of thought, Region Western philosophy
Essai was largely forgotten until its rediscovery by Jevons in the School Physiocracy
late 19th century.[5] Cantillon was influenced by his experiences
Main Political economy
as a banker, and especially by the speculative bubble of John interests
Law's Mississippi Company. He was also heavily influenced by Notable Entrepreneur as risk-
prior economists, especially William Petty. ideas bearer,
monetary theory,
Essai is considered the first complete treatise on economics, with
spatial economics,
numerous contributions to the science. These contributions
theory of population
include: his cause and effect methodology, monetary theories, his
growth,
conception of the entrepreneur as a risk-bearer, and the
cause and effect
development of spatial economics. Cantillon's Essai had
methodology
significant influence on the early development of political
economy, including the works of Adam Smith, Anne Turgot, Influences
Jean-Baptiste Say, Frédéric Bastiat and François Quesnay.[6] Jean Boisard · Cicero · Charles
Davenant · John Law · Livy · John
Locke · William Petty · Pliny the
Elder · Edmond Halley · Isaac
Contents Newton · Pliny the Younger ·
Biography Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban[3]
Contributions to economics Influenced

Methodology Mirabeau · Jean-Baptiste Say ·
Monetary theory Adam Smith · Anne Turgot ·
Other contributions François Quesnay
Influence Signature
References
Bibliography
Biography
While details regarding Richard Cantillon's life are scarce,[7] it is thought that he was born sometime
during the 1680s in County Kerry, Ireland.[1][6] He was son to land-owner Richard Cantillon of
Ballyheigue.[8] Sometime in the middle of the first decade of the 18th century Cantillon moved to
France, where he attained French citizenship.[9] By 1711, Cantillon found himself in the employment of
British Paymaster General James Brydges, in Spain, where he organised payments to British prisoners of
war during the War of Spanish Succession.[10] Cantillon remained in Spain until 1714, cultivating a
number of business and political connections, before returning to Paris.[11] Cantillon then became
involved in the banking industry working for a cousin, who at that time was lead-correspondent of the
Parisian branch of a family bank.[12] Two years later, thanks in large part to financial backing by James
Brydges, Cantillon bought his cousin out and attained ownership of the bank.[13] Given the financial and
political connections Cantillon was able to attain both through his family[14] and through James Brydges,
Cantillon proved a fairly successful banker, specialising in money transfers between Paris and
London.[15]
At this time, Cantillon became involved with British mercantilist John Law through the Mississippi
Company.[16] Based on the monetary theory proposed by William Potter in his 1650 tract The Key of
Wealth,[17] John Law posited that increases in the money supply would lead to the employment of unused
land and labour, leading to higher productivity.[18] In 1716, the French government granted him both
permission to found the Banque Générale and virtual monopoly over the right to develop French
territories in North America, named the Mississippi Company. In return, Law promised the French
government to finance its debt at low rates of interest.[19] Law began a financial speculative bubble by
selling shares of the Mississippi Company, using the Banque Générale's virtual monopoly on the issue of
bank notes to finance his investors.[20]
Richard Cantillon amassed a great fortune from his speculation, buying Mississippi Company shares
early and selling them at inflated prices.[21] Cantillon's financial success and growing influence caused
friction in his relationship with John Law, and sometime thereafter Law threatened to imprison Cantillon
if the latter did not leave France within twenty-four hours.[22] Cantillon replied: "I shall not go away; but
I will make your system succeed."[22] To that end, in 1718 Law, Cantillon, and wealthy speculator Joseph
Gage formed a private company centred on financing further speculation in North American real
estate.[23]
In 1719, Cantillon left Paris for Amsterdam, returning briefly in early 1720. Lending in Paris, Cantillon
had outlying debt repaid to him in London and Amsterdam.[24] With the collapse of the "Mississippi
bubble", Cantillon was able to collect on debt accruing high rates of interest.[25] Most of his debtors had
suffered financial damage in the bubble collapse and blamed Cantillon—until his death, Cantillon was
involved in countless lawsuits filed by his debtors, leading to a number of murder plots and criminal
accusations.[26]
On 16 February 1722, Cantillon married Mary Mahony, daughter of Count Daniel O'Mahony—a wealthy
merchant and former Irish general—spending much of the remainder of the 1720s travelling throughout
Europe with his wife.[27] Cantillon and Mary had two children, a son who died at an early age and a
daughter, Henrietta,[28] wife successively of the 3rd Earl of Stafford and the 1st Earl of Farnham.
Although he frequently returned to Paris between 1729 and 1733, his permanent residence was in
London.[29] In May 1734, his residence in London was burned to the ground, and it is generally assumed
that Cantillon died in the fire.[2] While the fire's causes are unclear, the most widely accepted theory is
that Cantillon was murdered.[30] One of Cantillon's biographers, Antoine Murphy, has advanced the
alternative theory that Cantillon staged his own death to escape the harassment of his debtors, appearing
in Suriname under the name Chevalier de Louvigny.[31]
Contributions to economics
Although there is evidence that Richard Cantillon wrote a wide variety of manuscripts, only his Essai Sur
La Nature Du Commerce En Général (abbreviated Essai) survives.[6][32] Written in 1730,[33] it was
published in French in 1755,[34] and was translated into English by Henry Higgs in 1932.[35] Evidence
suggests that Essai had tremendous influence on the early development of economic science. However,
Cantillon's treatise was largely neglected during the 19th century.[5] In the late 19th century and it was
"rediscovered" by William Stanley Jevons, who considered it the "cradle of political economy".[4] Since
then, Cantillon's Essai has received growing attention. Essai is considered the first complete treatise on
economic theory,[36] and Cantillon has been called the "father of enterprise economics".[6][37]
One of the greatest influences on Cantillon's writing was English

economist William Petty and his 1662 tract Treatise on Taxes.[39]
Although Petty provided much of the groundwork for Cantillon's
Essai,[38] Anthony Brewer argues that Petty's influence has been
overstated.[40] Apart from Petty, other possible influences on
Cantillon include John Locke,[41] Cicero, Livy, Pliny the Elder,
Pliny the Younger, Charles Davenant, Edmond Halley, Isaac
Newton, Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, and Jean Boisard.[3]
Cantillon's involvement in John Law's speculative bubble proved
invaluable and likely heavily influenced his insight on the
relationship between increases in the supply of money, price, and
production.[42]
William Petty is considered to be one Methodology

of Richard Cantillon's greatest
Cantillon's Essai is written using a distinctive causal
influences.[38]
methodology, separating Cantillon from his mercantilist
predecessors.[6][43] Essai is peppered with the word "natural",
which in the case of Cantillon's treatise is meant to imply a cause and effect relationship between
economic actions and phenomena.[44] Economist Murray Rothbard credits Cantillon with being one of
the first theorists to isolate economic phenomena with simple models, where otherwise uncontrollable
variables can be fixed.[45] Cantillon made frequent use of the concept of ceteris paribus throughout Essai
in an attempt to neutralise independent variables.[46] Furthermore, he is credited with employing a
methodology similar to Carl Menger's methodological individualism,[47] by deducing complex
phenomena from simple observations.[48]
A cause and effect methodology led to a relatively value-free approach to economic science, in which
Cantillon was uninterested in the merit of any particular economic action or phenomenon, focusing rather
on the explanation of relationships.[49] This led Cantillon to separate economic science from politics and
ethics to a greater degree than previous mercantilist writers.[45] This has led to disputes on whether
Cantillon can justly be considered a mercantilist or one of the first anti-mercantilists,[50] given that
Cantillon often cited government-manipulated trade surpluses and specie accumulation as positive
economic stimuli.[51] Others argue that in instances where Cantillon is thought to have supported certain
mercantilist policies, he actually provided a more neutral analysis by explicitly stating possible
limitations of mercantilist policies.[52]
Monetary theory
Differences between prior mercantilists and Cantillon arise early in Essai, regarding the origins of wealth
and price formation on the market.[53] Cantillon distinguishes between wealth and money, considering
wealth in itself "nothing but the food, conveniences, and pleasures of life."[54] While Cantillon advocated
an "intrinsic" theory of value, based on the input of land and labour (cost of production),[55] he is
considered to have touched upon a subjective theory of value.[56] Cantillon held that market prices are
not immediately decided by intrinsic value, but are derived from supply and demand.[57] He considered
market prices to be derived by comparing supply, the quantity of a particular good in a particular market,
to demand, the quantity of money brought to be exchanged.[58] Believing market prices to tend towards
the intrinsic value of a good, Cantillon may have also originated the uniformity-of-profit principle—
changes in the market price of a good may lead to changes in supply, reflecting a rise or fall in profit.[59]
In Essai, Cantillon provided an advanced version of John Locke's

quantity theory of money, focusing on relative inflation and the
velocity of money.[61] Cantillon suggested that inflation occurs
gradually and that the new supply of money has a localised effect
on inflation, effectively originating the concept of non-neutral
money.[62] Furthermore, he posited that the original recipients of
new money enjoy higher standards of living at the expense of
later recipients.[63] The concept of relative inflation, or a
disproportionate rise in prices among different goods in an Rendition of Cantillon's primitive
economy, is now known as the Cantillon Effect.[64] Cantillon also circular flow model[60]
considered changes in the velocity of money (quantity of
exchanges made within a specific amount of time) influential on
prices, although not to the same degree as changes in the quantity of money.[65] While he believed that
the money supply consisted only of specie, he conceded that increases in money substitutes—or bank
notes—could affect prices by effectively increasing the velocity of circulating of deposited specie.[66]
Apart from distinguishing money from money substitute, he also distinguished between bank notes
offered as receipts for specie deposits and bank notes circulating beyond the quantity of specie—or
fiduciary media—suggesting that the volume of fiduciary media is strictly limited by people's confidence
in its redeemability.[67] He considered fiduciary media a useful tool to abate the downward pressure that
hoarding of specie has on the velocity of money.[68]
Addressing the mercantilist belief that monetary intervention could cause a perpetually favourable
balance of trade, Cantillon developed a specie-flow mechanism foreshadowing future international
monetary equilibrium theories.[69] He suggested that in countries with a high quantity of money in
circulation, prices will increase and therefore become less competitive in relation to countries where
there is a relative scarcity of money.[70] Thus, Cantillon also held that increases in the supply of money,
regardless of the source, cause increases in the price level and therefore reduce the competitiveness of a
particular nation's industry in relation to a nation with lower prices.[71] However, Cantillon did not
believe that international markets tended toward equilibrium, and instead suggested that government
hoard specie to avoid rising prices and falling competitiveness.[69] Furthermore, he suggested that a
favourable balance of trade can be maintained by offering a better product and retaining qualitative
competitiveness.[72] Cantillon's preference towards a favourable balance of trade possibly stemmed from
the mercantilist belief in exchange being a zero-sum game, in which one party gains at the expense of
another.[73]
A relatively advanced theory of interest is also presented.[74] Cantillon believed that interest originates
from the need of borrowers for capital and from the fear of loss of the lenders, meaning that borrowers
have to recompense lenders for the risk of the possible insolvency of the debtor.[75] In turn, interest is
paid out of earned profits originating from the return on invested capital.[76] While previously it was
believed that the rate of interest varied inversely to the quantity of money, Cantillon posited that the rate
of interest was determined by the supply and demand on the loanable funds market[77]—an insight
usually attributed to Scottish philosopher David Hume.[78] As such, while saved money impacts the rate
of interest, new money that is instead used for consumption does not; Cantillon's theory of interest is
therefore similar to John Maynard Keynes's liquidity preference theory.[79]
Other contributions
Traditionally, it is Jean-Baptiste Say who is credited for coining the word and advancing the concept of
the entrepreneur, but in fact it was Cantillon who first introduced the term in Essai.[6][80] Cantillon
divided society into two principal classes—fixed income wage-earners and non-fixed income earners.[81]
Entrepreneurs, according to Cantillon, are non-fixed income earners who pay known costs of production
but earn uncertain incomes,[82] due to the speculative nature of pandering to an unknown demand for
their product.[83] Cantillon, while providing the foundations, did not develop a dedicated theory of
uncertainty—the topic was not revisited until the 20th century, by Ludwig von Mises, Frank Knight, and
John Maynard Keynes, among others.[84] Furthermore, unlike later theories of entrepreneurship which
saw the entrepreneur as a disruptive force, Cantillon anticipated the belief that the entrepreneur brought
equilibrium to a market by correctly predicting consumer preferences.[85]
Spatial economics deal with distance and area, and how these may affect a market through transportation
costs and geographical limitations. The development of spatial economics is usually ascribed to German
economist Johann Heinrich von Thünen; however, Cantillon addressed spatial economics nearly a
century earlier.[86] Cantillon integrated his advancements in spatial economic theory into his
microeconomic analysis of the market, describing how transportation costs influence the location of
factories, markets and population centres—that is, individuals strive to lower transportation costs.[87]
Conclusions on spatial economics were derived from three premises: cost of raw materials of equal
quality will always be higher near the capital city, due to transportation costs; transportation costs vary on
transportation type (for example, water transportation was considered cheaper than land-based
transportation); and larger goods that are more difficult to transport will always be cheaper closer to their
area of production.[88] For example, Cantillon believed markets were designed as they were to decrease
costs to both merchants and villagers in terms of time and transportation.[89] Similarly, Cantillon posited
that the locations of cities were the result in large part of the wealth of inhabiting property owners and
their ability to afford transportation costs—wealthier property owners tended to live farther from their
property, because they could afford the transportation costs.[90] In Essai, spatial economic theory was
used to derive why markets occupied the geographical area they did and why costs varied across different
markets.[91]
Apart from originating theories on the entrepreneur and spatial

economics, Cantillon also provided a dedicated theory on population
growth. Unlike William Petty, who believed there always existed a
considerable amount of unused land and economic opportunity to
support economic growth, Cantillon theorised that population grows
only as long as there are economic opportunities present.[92]
Specifically, Cantillon cited three determining variables for
population size: natural resources, technology, and culture.[93]
Therefore, populations grow only as far as the three aforementioned
variables allowed.[94] Furthermore, Cantillon's population theory
was more modern than that of Malthus in the sense that Cantillon
recognised a much broader category of factors which affect
population growth, including the tendency for population growth to
fall to zero as a society becomes more industrialised.[95]
Cover of the Ludwig von Mises

Institute's edition of Cantillon's
Influence
Essai While Essai was not published until 1755 as a result of heavy
censorship in France, it did widely circulate in the form of an
unpublished manuscript between its completion and its
publication.[96] It notably influenced many direct forerunners of the classical school of thought, including
Turgot and other physiocrats.[97] Cantillon was a major influence on physiocrat François Quesnay, who
may have learned of Cantillon's work through Marquis of Mirabeau.[98] While it is evident that Essai
influenced Quesnay, to what degree remains controversial. There is evidence that Quesnay did not fully
understand, or was not completely aware of, Cantillon's theories.[99] Many of Quesnay's economic
beliefs were elucidated previously in Essai,[100] but Quesnay did reject a number of Cantillon's premises,
including the scarcity of land and Cantillon's population theory.[101] Also, Quesnay recognised the
scarcity of capital and capital accumulation as a prerequisite for investment.[99] Nevertheless, Cantillon
was considered the "father of physiocracy" by Henry Higgs, due to his influence on Quesnay.[102] It is
also possible that Cantillon influenced Scottish economist James Steuart, both directly and indirectly.[103]
Cantillon is one of the few economists cited by Adam Smith, who directly borrows Cantillon's
subsistence theory of wages.[6][104] Large sections of Smith's economic theory were possibly directly
influenced by Cantillon, although in many respects Adam Smith advanced well beyond the scope of
Cantillon.[105] Some economic historians have argued that Adam Smith provided little of value from his
own intellect, notably Schumpeter[6][106] and Rothbard.[107] In any case, through his influence on Adam
Smith and the physiocrats, Cantillon was quite possibly the pre-classical economist who contributed most
to the ideas of the classical school.[108] Illustrative of this was Cantillon's influence on Jean-Baptiste Say,
which is noticeable in the methodology employed in the latter's Treatise on Political Economy.[6][109]
References
1. Brewer 1992, p. 2; Brewer notes two suggested dates of birth, but puts greater weight on
the validity of Antoine Murphy's estimate, "Murphy thinks that Cantillon was probably born in
the 1680s, at Ballyronan in County Kerry, Ireland; Walsh says that he was born in 1697
(which is hard to square with the fact that he was in a position of responsibility in 1711)".
Spengler August 1954, p. 283; Spengler cites Hone and mentions the same uncertainty in
Cantillon's date as birth, "He was born in Ireland, in March 1697, according to Hone, and
some seven to seventeen years earlier according to others."
2. Rothbard 1995, p. 347; Hayek 1991, p. 246; Higgs 1891, p. 290
3. Higgs 1892, p. 437
4. Jevons 1881, p. 342; writes Jevons, "Cantillon's essay is, more emphatically than any other
single work, 'the cradle of political economy.'" Cantillon 2010, p. 15; Editors Mark Thornton
and Chantal Saucier write, "The influence of Cantillon's manuscript was largely unknown
and the book had fallen so far into neglect that William Stanley Jevons was said to have
"rediscovered" it in the late 19th century."
5. Cantillon 2010, p. 15
6. Nevin, Seamus (2013). "Richard Cantillon: The Father of Economics". History Ireland. 21
(2): 20–23. JSTOR 41827152 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/41827152).
7. Spengler August 1954, p. 283; writes Spengler, "Much of the life of Richard Cantillon, author
of the Essai, remains enveloped in mystery."
8. Higgs 1891, p. 270; Higgs cites the so-called Burke's Heraldic Illustrations, 1845, plate 51.
9. Brewer 1992, p. 2; Higgs 1891, pp. 271–72
10. Brewer 1992, p. 2
11. Finegold September 2010; "Paymaster General James Brydges was a very wealthy man
with much influence, which allowed Cantillon to make political and business connections
before again leaving for France in 1714."
12. Brewer 1992, p. 4; Finegold September 2010; Rothbard 1995, p. 345
13. Brewer 1992, p. 4; Finegold September 2010
14. Rothbard 1995, p. 345; writes Rothbard, "Moreover, Richard's mother's uncle, Sir Daniel
Arthur, was a prominent banker in London and Paris ..."
15. Brewer 1992, pp. 4–5
16. Rothbard 1995, pp. 345–46; Brewer 1992, p. 5
17. Potter, William (1650). "The Key of Wealth" (https://archive.org/details/keywealthoranew00p
ottgoog). England: Johnson Reprint Corp.
18. Rothbard 1995, pp. 327–30; Finegold September 2010
19. Brewer 1992, pp. 5–6; Finegold September 2010
20. Brewer 1992, p. 6; Finegold September 2010; Rothbard 1995, pp. 329, 345–46
21. Brewer 1992, p. 6; writes Brewer, "He was introduced to Law at an early stage ... Most
important, he bought shares early and sold at a large profit, thinking that the scheme was
unsound and was bound to fail." Brewer also notes that Cantillon was acting as John Law's
personal banker, at the time.
22. Higgs 1891, 276; Cantillon's reply is according to Higgs, who records Law as follows: "His
great credit during the Regency aroused the jealousy of John Law, who held blunt language
with him: 'I can send you to the Bastille to-night if you don't give me your word to quit the
kingdom in four and twenty hours!' "
23. Finegold September 2010; Rothbard 1995, p. 346
24. Brewer 1992, p. 7; Brewer suggests that Cantillon stored his wealth in London to avoid high
French taxes levied on those who had profited from the speculative bubble. Hyse 1971, p.
815; Hyse writes that profits were remitted both to London and Amsterdam, "The English
records indicate that Cantillon remitted his speculative profits from Paris to Amsterdam and
London."
25. Rothbard 1995, p. 346; Rothbard notes that these high interest rates incorporated an
inflation premium.
26. Brewer 1992, pp. 7–8; Rothbard 1995, pp. 346–47
27. Higgs 1891, pp. 282–83; Rothbard 1995, pp. 346–47
28. Higgs 1871, pp. 282, 288
29. Higgs 1891, p. 286; Spengler August 1954, p. 284
30. Brewer 1992, p. 8
31. Brewer 1992, p. 8; Brewer restates Murphy's argument, where Murphy cites the fact that the
so-called Chevalier de Louvigny carried a large number of documents related to Cantillon.
32. Brewer 1992, p. 9
33. Cantillon 2010, p. 13; In the introduction to the Ludwig von Mises Institute's 2010 edition of
Essai, Mark Thornton and Chantal Saucier write, "Based on the book itself and other
evidence, we are now reasonably confident that Cantillon completed the manuscript in
1730." Brewer, p. 9
34. Spengler August 1954, p. 61; Essai was published roughly twenty-one years after
Cantillon's death.
35. Hone 1994, p. 96
36. Jevons 1881, pp. 341–43; writes Jevons, "The Essai is far more than a mere essay or even
collection of disconnected essays like those of Hume. It is a systematic and connected
treatise, going over in a concise manner nearly the whole field of economics, with the
exception of taxation." Rothbard 1995, p. 345; Cantillon 2010, p. 13; Brewer 1992, p. 11
38. Schumpeter 1954, p. 210; Schumpeter states, "What Petty failed to accomplish—but for
what he had offered almost all the essential ideas—lies accomplished before us in
Cantillon's Essai."
39. Jevons 1881, p. 343; Like Cantillon, Petty proposed that the value of an object was the
aggregate of the land and labor involved in its production.
40. Brewer 1992, p. 15; Brewer states, "I shall argue that Cantillon took very little from Petty,
and that he completely remade the little that he did take." Schumpeter 1954, p. 210;
Schumpeter concedes, "True, it was not accomplished in the style of a pupil who at every
step looks back over his shoulder for the master's guidance, but in the style of an
intellectual peer who strides along confidently according to his own lights."
41. Brewer 1992, p. 15
42. Hyse 1971, p. 823
43. Salerno 1985, p. 305
44. Hayek 1991, pp. 259–60
45. Rothbard 1995, p. 348
46. Hayek 1991, pp. 260–61; Cantillon 2010, pp. 70–71; an example Cantillon's use of ceteris
paribus can be found in chapter twelve, part one, of Essai, "The land belongs to the owners
but would be useless to them if it were not cultivated. The more labor is expended on it,
other things being equal, the more it produces ..."
47. Finegold June 2010; Carl Menger is credited with providing the Austrian School the
methodological insight which would lead to Ludwig von Mises's development of praxeology.
48. Salerno 1985, p. 306
49. Hayek 1991, p. 260
50. Brewer 1988; Thornton December 2007; Thornton 2007
51. Brewer 1988, p. 447
52. Thornton 2007, p. 4; Mark Thornton writes, "When this handful of selected quotes is placed
into the proper historical and textual context they can even take on the possibility of being
arguments against mercantilism and for a more laissez faire economy."
53. Finegold September 2010; writes Finegold, "Cantillon's insights on the source of economic
wealth also set him apart from typical mercantilists before him."
54. Cantillon 2010, p. 21; Editors Mark Thornton and Chantal Saucier provide an abstract,
stating, "Cantillon defines wealth as the consumption goods produced by land and labor.
This contrasted with the Mercantilists who thought money was wealth."
55. Rothbard 1995, pp. 349–50; Cantillon 2010, pp. 53–56
56. Rothbard 1995, pp. 349–50; Cantillon 2010, p. 55; writes Cantillon, "But it often happens
that many things, which actually have a certain intrinsic value, are not sold in the market
according to that value; that will depend on the desires and moods of men, and on their
consumption."
57. Hülsmann 2002, p. 696
58. Cantillon 2010, p. 119; "The price of meat will be determined after some bargaining, and a
pound of beef will be valued in silver [i.e., money] approximately the same as all beef
offered for sale in the market [i.e., supply], is to all the silver brought there to buy beef [i.e.,
demand]."
59. Cantillon 2010, p. 119; Finegold September 2010; Tarascio 1985, p. 252
61. Cantillon 2010, p. 148; "Mr. Locke lays it does as a fundamental maxim that the quantity of
goods in proportion to the quantity of money is a regulator of market prices. I have tried to
elucidate his idea in the preceding chapters: he had clearly seen that the abundance of
money makes everything more expensive, but he has not considered how this happens.
The great difficulty of this question consists in knowing in what way and in what proportion
the increase of money raises the prices of things."
62. Rothbard 1995, p. 355
63. Rothbard 1995, p. 356
64. Cantillon 2010, p. 155; Bordo 1983, p. 242
65. Cantillon 2010, pp. 147–48
66. Bordo 1983, p. 237
67. Spengler October 1954, pp. 414–15
68. Cantillon 2010, pp. 227–30
69. Rothbard 1995, p. 359
70. Spengler October 1954, p. 418; Rothbard 1995, pp. 358–59
71. Bordo 1983, p. 244
72. Brewer 1992, p. 114
73. Brewer 1992, pp. 117–18
74. Hayek 1991, p. 265; Hayek notes that Cantillon's theory of interest was overlooked by
Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk, who wrote Capital and Interest as a critique of existing theories
of interest in order to set up the introduction of his own time-preference theory of interest.
This is meant to illustrate the obscurity of Cantillon's Essai to the economics profession prior
to its "rediscovery" by Jevons.
75. Cantillon 2010, pp. 169–70
76. Cantillon 2010, pp. 170–71
77. Bordo 1983, p. 247; Brewer 1992, p. 91
78. Hayek 1991, pp. 265–66
79. Bordo 1983, pp. 247–48, 253
80. Brewer 1992, p. 51; Anthony Brewer, however, distinguishes between Say's and Cantillon's
use of the term "entrepreneur", noting that while Cantillon saw the entrepreneur as a risk-
taker, Say predominately considered the entrepreneur a "planner".
81. Rothbard 1995, p. 351; Hülsmann 2002, p. 698. Hülsmann argues that Cantillon divided
society into four classes: politicians, property owners, entrepreneurs, and wage-earners.
82. Tarascio 1985, p. 251
83. Cantillon 2010, p. 74; "They [entrepreneurs] pay a fixed price for them at the place where
they are purchased, to resell wholesale or retail at an uncertain price ... These
entrepreneurs never know how great the demand will be in their city ..."
84. Tarascio 1985, pp. 251–52
85. Rothbard 1995, p. 352
86. Hébert 1981, p. 71
87. Rothbard 1995, p. 354
88. Hébert 1981, p. 72
89. Cantillon 2010, pp. 31–32
90. Cantillon 2010, pp. 35–36
91. Hébert 1981, p. 75
92. Brewer 1992, p. 36; Brewer notes that Cantillon's theory on population was nearly identical
to that of Malthus, who presented his own theory decades after Cantillon's death.
93. Tarascio 1985, pp. 249–50
94. Rothbard 1995, p. 353
95. Tarascio 1985, pp. 250–51
96. Rothbard 1995, p. 360
97. Rothbard 1995, pp. 360–61
98. Schumpeter 1954, pp. 209–10; writes Schumpeter, "Cantillon's great work fared better both
because of its well-rounded systematic or even didactic form and because it had the good
fortune to gain, long before its actual publication, the enthusiastic approval and the effective
support of two very influential men, Gournay and Mirabeau." Furthermore, Schumpeter
establishes, "An analogy may be helpful: Cantillon was to Quesnay, and Petty was to
Cantillon, what Ricardo was to Marx."
99. Brewer 1992, p. 168; Brewer cites a conversation between Quesnay and Mirabeau, as
chronicled by the latter.
100. Brewer 1992, pp. 174–75
101. Brewer 1992, pp. 159–75
102. Higgs 1892, p. 454
103. Brewer 1992, p. 175; Brewer cites Steuart's reference to a tract by Phillip Cantillon, which in
turn was based largely on Essai, and the many similarities between Steuart's Inquiry into
the Principles of Political Oeconomy and Cantillon's Essai.
104. Smith 2009, p. 45; "Mr. Cantillon seems, upon this account, to suppose that the lowest
species of common labourers must everywhere earn at least double their own maintenance,
in order that, one with another, they may be enabled to bring up two children." Cantillon
2010, pp. 59–65; Marx 2007, p. 608, n. 1
105. Brewer 1992, pp. 192–93
106. Schumpeter 1954, p. 179; Schumpeter charged, "But no matter what he actually learned or
failed to learn from predecessors, the fact is that the Wealth of Nations does not contain a
single analytic idea, principle, or method that was entirely new in 1776."
107. Rothbard 1995, p. 435; Rothbard wrote, "The problem is that he originated nothing that was
true, and that whatever he originated was wrong; that, even in an age that had fewer
citations or footnotes than our own, Adam Smith was a shameless plagiarist, acknowledging
little or nothing and stealing large chunks, for example, from Cantillon."
108. Hayek 1991, p. 246
109. Salerno 1985, p. 312
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History of Economic Thought. 29 (4): 417–35. doi:10.1080/10427710701666495 (https://doi.
org/10.1080%2F10427710701666495). (subscription required)
Thornton, Mark (1999). "Chapter 2. Richard Cantillon: The Origin of Economic Theory" (http
s://mises.org/system/tdf/The%20Great%20Austrian%20Economists_2.pdf?file=1&type=doc
ument) (PDF). In Holcombe, Randall G. (ed.). The Great Austrian Economists. Auburn,
Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute. ISBN 978-0945466048.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Richard_Cantillon&oldid=932696701"
This page was last edited on 27 December 2019, at 17:53 (UTC).
David Hume
David Hume (/hjuːm/; born David Home; 7 May 1711 NS
David Hume
(26 April 1711 OS) – 25 August 1776)[9] was a Scottish
Enlightenment philosopher, historian, economist, and
essayist, who is best known today for his highly influential
system of philosophical empiricism, scepticism, and
naturalism.[1] Beginning with A Treatise of Human Nature
(1739–40), Hume strove to create a naturalistic science of
man that examined the psychological basis of human nature.
Hume argued against the existence of innate ideas, positing
that all human knowledge derives solely from experience.
This places him with Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke, and George Berkeley, as a British Empiricist.[10]
Hume argued that inductive reasoning and belief in causality

cannot be justified rationally; instead, they result from
custom and mental habit. We never actually perceive that Portrait by Allan Ramsay
one event causes another, but only experience the "constant Born David Home
conjunction" of events. This problem of induction means 7 May NS [26 April OS] 1711
that to draw any causal inferences from past experience it is Edinburgh, Scotland, Great
necessary to presuppose that the future will resemble the Britain
past, a presupposition which cannot itself be grounded in Died 25 August 1776 (aged 65)
prior experience.[11] Edinburgh, Scotland, Great
Britain
An opponent of philosophical rationalists, Hume held that
passions rather than reason govern human behaviour, Nationality Scottish
famously proclaiming that "Reason is, and ought only to be Alma mater University of Edinburgh
the slave of the passions".[10] Hume was also a
Era 18th-century philosophy
sentimentalist who held that ethics are based on emotion or
sentiment rather than abstract moral principle. He Region Western philosophy
maintained an early commitment to naturalistic explanations School Scottish Enlightenment ·
of moral phenomena, and is usually taken to have first Naturalism[1] · Scepticism ·
clearly expounded the is–ought problem, or the idea that a Empiricism ·
statement of fact alone can never give rise to a normative Foundationalism[2] ·
conclusion of what ought to be done.[12] Newtonianism[3] ·
Conceptualism[4] · Indirect
Hume also denied that humans have an actual conception of realism[5] · Correspondence
the self, positing that we experience only a bundle of theory of truth[6] · Moral
sensations, and that the self is nothing more than this bundle sentimentalism · Liberalism
of causally-connected perceptions. Hume's compatibilist Main Epistemology · Metaphysics
theory of free will takes causal determinism as fully interests
compatible with human freedom.[13] His views on Ethics · Aesthetics
Philosophy of mind
philosophy of religion, including his rejection of miracles Political philosophy
and the argument from design for God's existence, were Philosophy of religion
especially controversial for their time.
Classical economics
Hume influenced utilitarianism, logical positivism, the Notable Problem of causation
philosophy of science, early analytic philosophy, cognitive ideas
Problem of induction
science, theology, and many other fields and thinkers.
Constant conjunction
Immanuel Kant credited Hume as the inspiration who had
awakened him from his "dogmatic slumbers". Bundle theory
Association of ideas
Is–ought problem
Contents Fact–value distinction

Impression–idea distinction
Biography
Personal Identity
Early life and education
Career Hume's fork
Later years Deductive and inductive
reasoning
Writings
Impressions and ideas Science of man
Induction and causation Moral sentiments
The self Influences
Practical reason Bayle · Berkeley · Cicero · Hobbes ·
Ethics Hutcheson · Locke · Malebranche[7] ·
Aesthetics Newton · Rousseau · Smith
Free will, determinism, and responsibility
Influenced
Writings on religion
Religious views Virtually all subsequent Western
Design argument philosophy, especially Ayer, Blackburn,
Problem of miracles Borges,[8] Deleuze, Dennett, Einstein,
Fodor, Hamann, Hamilton, Husserl,
As historian of England
Jefferson, James, Kant, Mackie, Madison,
Political theory
Mill, Popper, Reid, Russell,
Contributions to economic thought
Schopenhauer, Smith
Influence
Family
Works
See also
Notes
References
Sources
Further reading
External links
Biography
Early life and education
Born on 26 April 1711 (Old Style) in a tenement on the north side of the Lawnmarket in Edinburgh,
Hume was the second of two sons of Joseph Home of Ninewells, an advocate. Hume's mother, Katherine
(née Falconer), was the daughter of Sir David Falconer.[14] Hume's father died just after his second
birthday, and he was raised by his mother, who never remarried.[15] He changed the spelling of his name
in 1734, because of the fact that his surname "Home", pronounced "Hume", was not known in England.
Hume never married and lived partly at his family home at Chirnside in Berwickshire, which had
belonged to the family since the sixteenth century. His finances as a young man were very "slender". His
family was not rich, and, as a younger son, he had little patrimony to live on so needed to make a
living.[16]
Hume attended the University of Edinburgh at the unusually early age of 12 (possibly as young as 10) at
a time when 14 was typical. At first, because of his family, he considered a career in law, but came to
have, in his words, "an insurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of Philosophy and general
Learning; and while [my family] fanceyed I was poring over Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were
the Authors which I was secretly devouring".[16] He had little respect for the professors of his time,
telling a friend in 1735 that "there is nothing to be learnt from a Professor, which is not to be met with in
Books".[17] Hume did not graduate.[18]
Aged around 18, he made a philosophical discovery that opened up to him "a new Scene of Thought",
which inspired him "to throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it".[19] He did not
recount what this scene was, and commentators have offered a variety of speculations.[20] One popular
interpretation, prominent in contemporary Hume scholarship, is that the new "scene of thought" was
Hume's realization that Francis Hutcheson's "moral sense" theory of morality could be applied to the
understanding as well. Due to this inspiration, Hume set out to spend a minimum of 10 years reading and
writing. He soon came to the verge of a mental breakdown, suffering from what a doctor diagnosed as the
"Disease of the Learned". Hume wrote that it started with a coldness, which he attributed to a "Laziness
of Temper", that lasted about nine months. Later, some scurvy spots broke out on his fingers. This was
what persuaded Hume's physician to make his diagnosis. Hume wrote that he "went under a Course of
Bitters and Anti-Hysteric Pills", taken along with a pint of claret every day. Hume also decided to have a
more active life to better continue his learning.[21] His health improved somewhat, but in 1731 he was
afflicted with a ravenous appetite and palpitations of the heart. After eating well for a time, he went from
being "tall, lean and raw-bon'd" to being "sturdy, robust [and] healthful-like".[22] Indeed, Hume would
become well known for being obese and a fondness for good port and cheese.[23]
Career
At 25 years of age, Hume, although of noble ancestry, had no source of income and no learned
profession. As was common at his time, he became a merchant's assistant, but he had to leave his native
Scotland. He travelled via Bristol to La Flèche in Anjou, France. There he had frequent discourse with
the Jesuits of the College of La Flèche.[24]
Hume was derailed in his attempts to start a university career by protests over his alleged "atheism"[25]
and bemoaned that his literary debut, A Treatise of Human Nature, "fell dead-born from the press".[26]
However, he found literary success in his lifetime as an essayist, and a career as a librarian at the
University of Edinburgh. His tenure there, and the access to research materials it provided, ultimately
resulted in Hume's writing the massive six-volume The History of England, which became a bestseller
and the standard history of England in its day. For over sixty years, Hume was the dominant interpreter of
English history.[27] Hume described his "love for literary fame" as his "ruling passion"[28] and judged his
two late works, the so-called "first" and "second" enquiries, An Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, respectively, as his greatest literary
and philosophical achievements,[28] asking his contemporaries to judge him on the merits of the later
texts alone, rather than the more radical formulations of his early, youthful work, dismissing his
philosophical debut as juvenilia: "A work which the Author had projected before he left College."[29]
Despite Hume's protestations, a general consensus exists today that Hume's most important arguments
and philosophically distinctive doctrines are found in the original form they take in the Treatise. Hume
was just 23 years old when he started this work and it is now regarded as one of the most important in the
history of Western philosophy.[12]
He worked for four years on his first major work, A Treatise of Human Nature, subtitled "Being an
Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects", completing it in 1738
at the age of 28. Although many scholars today consider the Treatise to be Hume's most important work
and one of the most important books in Western philosophy, the critics in Great Britain at the time did not
agree, describing it as "abstract and unintelligible".[30] As Hume had spent most of his savings during
those four years,[21] he resolved "to make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to
maintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as contemptible except the
improvements of my talents in literature".[31] Despite the disappointment, Hume later wrote: "Being
naturally of a cheerful and sanguine temper, I soon recovered from the blow and prosecuted with great
ardour my studies in the country."[31] There, in an attempt to make his larger work better known and
more intelligible, he published the An Abstract of a Book lately Published as a summary of the main
doctrines of the Treatise, without revealing its authorship.[32] Although there has been some academic
speculation as to who actually wrote this pamphlet,[33] it is generally regarded as Hume's creation.[34]
After the publication of Essays Moral and Political in 1741, which was included in the later edition
called Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, Hume applied for the Chair of Pneumatics and Moral
Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. However, the position was given to William Cleghorn[35]
after Edinburgh ministers petitioned the town council not to appoint Hume because he was seen as an
atheist.[36]
During the 1745 Jacobite rising, Hume tutored the Marquess of Annandale (1720–92), but this
engagement ended in disarray after about a year.[37] Hume then started his great historical work The
History of England, taking fifteen years and running to over a million words. During this time he was
also involved with the Canongate Theatre through his friend John Home, a preacher.[38]
In this context, he associated with Lord Monboddo and other Scottish Enlightenment luminaries in
Edinburgh. From 1746, Hume served for three years as secretary to General James St Clair, who was
envoy to the courts of Turin and Vienna. At that time Hume also wrote Philosophical Essays Concerning
Human Understanding, later published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Often called
the First Enquiry, it proved little more successful than the Treatise, perhaps because of the publishing of
his short autobiography, My Own Life, which "made friends difficult for the first Enquiry".[39] In 1749 he
went to live with his brother in the countryside.
Hume's religious views were often suspect. It was necessary in the 1750s for his friends to avert a trial
against him on the charge of heresy. However, he "would not have come and could not be forced to
attend if he said he was not a member of the Established Church".[40] Hume failed to gain the chair of
philosophy at the University of Glasgow because of his religious views. He had published the
Philosophical Essays by this time which were decidedly anti-
religious. Even Adam Smith, his personal friend who had vacated
the Glasgow philosophy chair, was against his appointment out of
concern public opinion would be against it.[41]
Hume returned to Edinburgh in 1751. In the following year "the

Faculty of Advocates chose me their Librarian, an office from
which I received little or no emolument, but which gave me the
command of a large library".[42] This resource enabled him to
continue historical research for The History of England. Hume's
volume of Political Discourses, written in 1749 and published by
Kincaid & Donaldson in 1752,[43] was the only work he
considered successful on first publication.[44]
Eventually, with the publication of his six-volume The History of

An engraving of Hume from the first
England between 1754 and 1762, Hume achieved the fame that
volume of his The History of
England, 1754 he coveted.[45] The volumes traced events from the Invasion of
Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688, and was a bestseller in
its day.
Hume was also a longtime friend of bookseller Andrew Millar, who sold Hume's History (after acquiring
the rights from Scottish bookseller Gavin Hamilton[46]), although the relationship was sometimes
complicated. Letters between them illuminate both men's interest in the success of the History.
In 1762 Hume moved from Jack's Land on the Canongate to James Court on the Lawnmarket. He sold
the house to James Boswell in 1766.[47]
Later years
From 1763 to 1765, Hume was invited to attend Lord Hertford in
Paris, where he became secretary to the British embassy.[48]
Hume was well received in Paris, and while there he met with
Isaac de Pinto.[49] In 1766, Hume left Paris to accompany Jean-
Jacques Rousseau to England. Once in England, Hume and
Rousseau fell out.[50] Hume was sufficiently worried about the
damage to his reputation from the quarrel with Rousseau (who is
generally believed to have suffered from paranoia) to have
authored an account of the dispute, which he titled, appropriately
enough "A concise and genuine account of the dispute between
Mr. Hume and Mr. Rousseau."[51] In 1765, he served as British
Chargé d'affaires, writing "despatches to the British Secretary of
State".[52] He wrote of his Paris life, "I really wish often for the
plain roughness of The Poker Club of Edinburgh ... to correct and
qualify so much lusciousness".[53] In 1766, upon returning to David Hume's mausoleum by Robert
Britain, Hume encouraged Lord Hertford to invest in a number of Adam in the Old Calton Burial
slave plantations, acquired by George Colebrooke and others in Ground, Edinburgh.
the Windward Islands.[54] In 1767, Hume was appointed Under
Secretary of State for the Northern Department. Here he wrote
that he was given "all the secrets of the Kingdom". In 1769 he returned to James' Court in Edinburgh, and
then lived, from 1771 until his death in 1776, at the southwest corner of St. Andrew's Square in
Edinburgh's New Town, at what is now 21 Saint David Street.[55] A popular story, consistent with some
historical evidence, suggests the street may have been named after Hume.[56]
In the last year of his life, Hume wrote an extremely brief autobiographical essay titled "My Own
Life"[57] which summed up his entire life in "fewer than 5 pages",[58] and notably contains many
interesting judgments that have been of enduring interest to subsequent readers of Hume.[59][60] The
scholar of 18th-century literature Donald Seibert judged it a "remarkable autobiography, even though it
may lack the usual attractions of that genre. Anyone hankering for startling revelations or amusing
anecdotes had better look elsewhere."[59] Hume here confesses his belief that the "love of literary fame"
had served as his "ruling passion" in life, and claims that this desire "never soured my temper,
notwithstanding my frequent disappointments." One such disappointment Hume discusses in the mini-
autobiography was his disappointment that with the initial literary reception of the Treatise, which he
claims to have overcome by means of the success of the Essays: "the work was favourably received, and
soon made me entirely forget my former disappointment". Hume, in his own retrospective judgment,
suggested that his philosophical debut's apparent failure "had proceeded more from the manner than the
matter." Hume thus suggests that "I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too
early." Hume provides an unambiguous self-assessment of the relative value of his works: "my Enquiry
concerning the Principles of Morals; which, in my own opinion (who ought not to judge on that subject)
is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best." Hume also makes a
number of self-assessments in the essay, writing of his social relations that "My company was not
unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the studious and literary", noting of his complex
relation to religion, as well as the state, that "though I wantonly exposed myself to the rage of both civil
and religious factions, they seemed to be disarmed in my behalf of their wonted fury", and professing of
his character that "My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character and
conduct." Hume concludes the essay with the frank admission: " I cannot say there is no vanity in making
this funeral oration of myself, but I hope it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is
easily cleared and ascertained."[57]
Diarist and biographer James Boswell saw Hume a few weeks before his death from a form of abdominal
cancer. Hume told him he sincerely believed it a "most unreasonable fancy" that there might be life after
death.[61] This meeting was dramatised in semi-fictional form for the BBC by Michael Ignatieff as
Dialogue in the Dark.[62] Hume asked that his body be interred in a "simple Roman tomb". In his Will he
requests that it be inscribed only with his name and the year of his birth and death, "leaving it to Posterity
to add the Rest".[63] It stands, as he wished it, on the southwestern slope of Calton Hill, in the Old Calton
Cemetery. Adam Smith later recounted Hume's amusing speculation that he might ask Charon to allow
him a few more years of life in order to see "the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of
superstition." The ferryman replied, "You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred
years ... Get into the boat this instant".[64]
Writings
In the introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume wrote, "'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a
relation, more or less, to human nature ... Even Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion,
are in some measure dependent on the science of Man." He also wrote that the science of man is the
"only solid foundation for the other sciences" and that the method for this science requires both
experience and observation as the foundations of a logical argument.[65] On this aspect of Hume's
thought, philosophical historian Frederick Copleston wrote that it was Hume's aim to apply to the science
of man the method of experimental philosophy (the term that was current at the time to imply Natural
philosophy), and that "Hume's plan is to extend to philosophy in general the methodological limitations
of Newtonian physics".[66]
Until recently, Hume was seen as a forerunner of logical positivism; a form of anti-metaphysical
empiricism. According to the logical positivists, unless a statement could be verified by experience, or
else was true or false by definition (i.e. either tautological or contradictory), then it was meaningless (this
is a summary statement of their verification principle). Hume, on this view, was a proto-positivist, who,
in his philosophical writings, attempted to demonstrate how ordinary propositions about objects, causal
relations, the self, and so on, are semantically equivalent to propositions about one's experiences.[67]
Many commentators have since rejected this understanding of Humean empiricism, stressing an
epistemological (rather than a semantic) reading of his project.[68] According to this opposing view,
Hume's empiricism consisted in the idea that it is our knowledge, and not our ability to conceive, that is
restricted to what can be experienced. Hume thought that we can form beliefs about that which extends
beyond any possible experience, through the operation of faculties such as custom and the imagination,
but he was sceptical about claims to knowledge on this basis.
Impressions and ideas

A central doctrine of Hume's philosophy, stated in the very first lines of the Treatise, is that the mind
consists of perceptions, or the mental objects which are present to it, and which divide into two
categories: impressions and ideas. Hume's Treatise thus begins: "All the perceptions of the human mind
resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS." Hume states that "I
believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction" and
commentators have generally taken Hume to mean the distinction between feeling and thinking.[69]
Controversially, Hume may regard the difference as in some sense a matter of degree, as he takes
"impressions" to be distinguished from ideas, on the basis of their force, liveliness, and vivacity, or what
Henry Allison calls the "FLV criterion" in his book on Hume.[70] Ideas are therefore "faint" impressions.
For example, experiencing the painful sensation of touching the handle of a hot pan is more forceful than
simply thinking about touching a hot pan. According to Hume, impressions are meant to be the original
form of all our ideas, and Don Garret has thus coined the term "the copy principle" to refer to Hume's
doctrine that all ideas are ultimately all copied from some original impression, whether it be a passion or
sensation, from which they derive.[70][71]
After establishing the forcefulness of impressions and ideas, these two categories are further broken
down into simple and complex: simple impressions and ideas, and complex impressions and ideas. Hume
states that “simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor
separation,” while “the complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts.”[72] When
looking at an apple, a person experiences a variety of color-sensations, which Hume sees as a complex
impression. Similarly, a person experiences a variety of taste-sensations, tactile-sensations, and smell-
sensations when biting into an apple, with the overall sensation again being a complex impression.
Thinking about an apple allows a person to form complex ideas, which are made of similar parts as the
complex impressions they were developed from, but which are also less forceful. Hume believes that
complex perceptions can be broken down into smaller and smaller parts until perceptions are reached that
have no parts of their own, and these perceptions are thereby referred to as being simple.
A person's imagination, regardless of how boundless it may seem, is confined to the mind's ability to
recombine the information it has already acquired from the body's sensory experience (the ideas that have
been derived from impressions). In addition, "as our imagination takes our most basic ideas and leads us
to form new ones, it is directed by three principles of association, namely, resemblance, contiguity, and
cause and effect."[73] The principle of resemblance refers to the tendency of ideas to become associated if
the objects they represent resemble one another. For example, a person looking at an illustration of a
flower can conceive of an idea of the physical flower because the idea of the illustrated object is
associated with the idea of the physical object. The principle of contiguity describes the tendency of ideas
to become associated if the objects they represent are near to each other in time or space, such as when
the thought of one crayon in a box leads a person to think of the crayon contiguous to it. Finally, the
principle of cause and effect refers to the tendency of ideas to become associated if the objects they
represent are causally related, which explains how remembering a broken window can make someone
think of the baseball that caused the window to shatter.
Hume elaborates more on this last principle of cause and effect. When a person observes that one object
or event consistently produces the same object or event, it results in "an expectation that a particular
event (a 'cause') will be followed by another event (an 'effect') previously and constantly associated with
it."[74] Hume calls this principle custom, or habit, saying that "custom...renders our experience useful to
us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the
past."[75] However, even though custom can serve as a guide in life, it still only represents an
expectation. In other words, "experience cannot establish a necessary connection between cause and
effect, because we can imagine without contradiction a case where the cause does not produce its usual
effect...the reason why we mistakenly infer that there is something in the cause that necessarily produces
its effect is because our past experiences have habituated us to think in this way."[76] Continuing this
idea, Hume argues that "only in the pure realm of ideas, logic, and mathematics, not contingent on the
direct sense awareness of reality, [can] causation safely...be applied – all other sciences are reduced to
probability."[77] He uses this scepticism to reject metaphysics and many theological views on the basis
that they are not grounded in fact and observations, and are therefore beyond the reach of human
understanding.
Induction and causation

The cornerstone of Hume's epistemology is the problem of induction. This may be the area of Hume's
thought where his scepticism about human powers of reason is most pronounced.[78] The problem
revolves around the plausibility of inductive reasoning, that is, reasoning from the observed behaviour of
objects to their behaviour when unobserved. As Hume wrote, induction concerns how things behave
when they go "beyond the present testimony of the senses, or the records of our memory".[79] Hume
argues that we tend to believe that things behave in a regular manner, meaning that patterns in the
behaviour of objects seem to persist into the future, and throughout the unobserved present.[80] Hume's
argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will continue to be uniform, as
justification comes in only two varieties—demonstrative reasoning and probable reasoning[note 1]—and
both of these are inadequate. With regard to demonstrative reasoning, Hume argues that the uniformity
principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is "consistent and conceivable" that nature might stop being
regular.[82] Turning to probable reasoning, Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature will continue to
be uniform because it has been in the past. As this is using the very sort of reasoning (induction) that is
under question, it would be circular reasoning.[83] Thus, no form of justification will rationally warrant
our inductive inferences.
Hume's solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the human
practice of making inductive inferences. He asserts that "Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable
necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel." In 1985, and in agreement with
Hume, philosopher John D. Kenyon writes: "Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a
conclusion of natural inductive inference just for a moment ... but the sheer agreeableness of animal faith
will protect us from excessive caution and sterile suspension of belief."[84] Years after Hume,
commentators such as Charles Sanders Peirce have demurred from Hume's solution,[85] while some, such
as Kant and Karl Popper, saw that Hume's analysis "had posed a most fundamental challenge to all
human knowledge claims."[86]
The notion of causation is closely linked to the problem of induction. According to Hume, we reason
inductively by associating constantly conjoined events. It is the mental act of association that is the basis
of our concept of causation. There are at least three interpretations of Hume's theory of causation
represented in the literature: (1) the logical positivist; (2) the sceptical realist; and (3) the quasi-realist.[87]
Hume acknowledged that there are events constantly unfolding, humanity cannot guarantee that these
events are caused by events prior or if they are independent instances. Hume opposed the widely
accepted theory of Causation that 'all events have a specific course or reason.' Therefore, Hume crafted
his own theory of causation, which he formed through his empiricist and sceptic beliefs. He split
Causation, into two realms "All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two
kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact".[88] Relations of Ideas are a priori, and represent
universal bonds between ideas that mark the cornerstones of human thought. Matters of Fact are
dependent on the observer and experience. They are often not universally held to be true among multiple
persons. Hume was an Empiricist, meaning he believed "causes and effects are discoverable not by
reason, but by experience".[89] Hume later goes on to say that even with the perspective of the past,
humanity cannot dictate future events because thoughts of the past are limited, compared to the
possibilities for the future. Hume's separation between Matters of Fact and Relations of Ideas is often
referred to as "Hume's fork".[1]
Hume explains his theory of Causation and causal inference by division into three different parts. In these
three branches he explains his ideas, in addition to comparing and contrasting his views to his
predecessors. These branches are the Critical Phase, the Constructive Phase, and Belief.[90] In the Critical
Phase, Hume denies his predecessors' theories of causation. Next, Hume uses the Constructive Phase to
resolve any doubts the reader may have while observing the Critical Phase. "Habit or Custom" mends the
gaps in reasoning that occur without the human mind even realizing it. Associating ideas has become
second nature to the human mind. It "makes us expect for the future, a similar train of events with those
which have appeared in the past".[90] However, Hume says that this association cannot be trusted because
the span of the human mind to comprehend the past is not necessarily applicable to the wide and distant
future. This leads Hume to the third branch of causal inference, Belief. Belief is what drives the human
mind to hold that expectancy of the future based on past experience. Throughout his explanation of
causal inference, Hume is arguing that the future is not certain to be repetition of the past and the only
way to justify induction is through uniformity.
The logical positivist interpretation is that Hume analyses causal propositions, such as "A caused B", in
terms of regularities in perception: "A causes B" is equivalent to "Whenever A-type events happen, B-
type ones follow", where "whenever" refers to all possible perceptions.[91] In his Treatise of Human
Nature, Hume wrote:
power and necessity ... are ... qualities of perceptions, not of objects ... felt by the soul and
not perceiv'd externally in bodies.[92]
This view is rejected by sceptical realists, who argue that Hume thought that causation amounts to more
than just the regular succession of events.[68] Hume said that when two events are causally conjoined, a
necessary connection underpins the conjunction:
Shall we rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a
complete idea of causation? By no means ... there is a necessary connexion to be taken into
consideration.[93]
Philosopher Angela Coventry writes that, for Hume, "there is nothing in any particular instance of cause
and effect involving external objects which suggests the idea of power or necessary connection" and that
"we are ignorant of the powers that operate between objects".[94] However, while denying the possibility
of knowing the powers between objects, Hume accepted the causal principle, writing, "I never asserted so
absurd a proposition as that something could arise without a cause."[95]
It has been argued that, while Hume did not think causation is reducible to pure regularity, he was not a
fully fledged realist either. Philosopher Simon Blackburn calls this a quasi-realist reading.[96] Blackburn
writes that "Someone talking of cause is voicing a distinct mental set: he is by no means in the same state
as someone merely describing regular sequences."[97] In Hume's words, "nothing is more usual than to
apply to external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion".[98]
The self
Empiricist philosophers, such as Hume and Berkeley, favoured
the bundle theory of personal identity.[99] In this theory, "the
mind itself, far from being an independent power, is simply 'a
bundle of perceptions' without unity or cohesive quality".[100]
The self is nothing but a bundle of experiences linked by the
relations of causation and resemblance; or, more accurately, that
the empirically warranted idea of the self is just the idea of such a
bundle. This view is forwarded by, for example, positivist
Statue of Hume by Alexander
Stoddart on the Royal Mile in interpreters, who saw Hume as suggesting that terms such as
Edinburgh "self", "person", or "mind" referred to collections of "sense-
contents".[101] A modern-day version of the bundle theory of the
mind has been advanced by Derek Parfit in his Reasons and
Persons.[102]
However, some philosophers have criticised Hume's bundle-theory interpretation of personal identity.
They argue that distinct selves can have perceptions that stand in relations of similarity and causality with
one another. Thus, perceptions must already come parcelled into distinct "bundles" before they can be
associated according to the relations of similarity and causality. In other words, the mind must already
possess a unity that cannot be generated, or constituted, by these relations alone. Since the bundle-theory
interpretation portrays Hume as answering an ontological question, philosophers, like Galen Strawson,
who see Hume as not very concerned with such questions have queried whether the view is really
Hume's. Instead, it is suggested by Strawson that Hume might have been answering an epistemological
question about the causal origin of our concept of the self.[103] In the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume
declares himself dissatisfied with his earlier account of personal identity in Book 1. Philosopher Corliss
Swain notes that "Commentators agree that if Hume did find some new problem" when he reviewed the
section on personal identity, "he wasn't forthcoming about its nature in the Appendix."[104] One
interpretation of Hume's view of the self has been argued for by philosopher and psychologist James
Giles. According to his view, Hume is not arguing for a bundle theory, which is a form of reductionism,
but rather for an eliminative view of the self. That is, rather than reducing the self to a bundle of
perceptions, Hume is rejecting the idea of the self altogether. On this interpretation, Hume is proposing a
"no-self theory" and thus has much in common with Buddhist thought (see anattā).[105] On this point,
psychologist Alison Gopnik has argued that Hume was in a position to learn about Buddhist thought
during his time in France in the 1730s.[106]
Practical reason
"Practical reason" relates to whether standards or principles exist that are also authoritative for all
rational beings, dictating people's intentions and actions. Hume is mainly considered an anti-rationalist,
denying the possibility for practical reason, although other philosophers such as Christine Korsgaard,
Jean Hampton, and Elijah Millgram claim that Hume is not so much of an anti-rationalist as he is just a
sceptic of practical reason.[107]
Hume denied the existence of practical reason as a principle because he claimed reason does not have
any effect on morality, since morality is capable of producing effects in people that reason alone cannot
create. As Hume explains in A Treatise of Human Nature (1740): "Morals excite passions, and produce or
prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are
not conclusions of our reason."[108]
Since practical reason is supposed to regulate our actions (in theory), Hume denied practical reason on
the grounds that reason cannot directly oppose passions. As Hume puts it, "Reason is, and ought only to
be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."
Reason is less significant than any passion because reason has no original influence, while "A passion is
an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence".[109]
Practical reason is also concerned with the value of actions rather than the truth of propositions,[110] so
Hume believed that reason's shortcoming of affecting morality proved that practical reason could not be
authoritative for all rational beings, since morality was essential for dictating people's intentions and
actions.
Ethics
Hume's writings on ethics began in the Treatise and were refined in his An Enquiry Concerning the
Principles of Morals (1751). His views on ethics are that "[m]oral decisions are grounded in moral
sentiment." It is not knowing that governs ethical actions, but feelings.[111] Arguing that reason cannot be
behind morality, he wrote:
Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason itself is utterly impotent in
this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.[112]
Hume's moral sentimentalism about morality was shared by his close friend Adam Smith,[113] and Hume
and Smith were mutually influenced by the moral reflections of their older contemporary Francis
Hutcheson.[114] Peter Singer claims that Hume's argument that morals cannot have a rational basis alone
"would have been enough to earn him a place in the history of ethics".[115]
Hume also put forward the is–ought problem, later called Hume's Law,[115] denying the possibility of
logically deriving what ought to be from what is. He wrote in the Treatise that in every system of
morality he has read, the author begins with stating facts about the world, but then suddenly is always
referring to what ought to be the case. Hume demands that a reason should be given for inferring what
ought to be the case, from what is the case. This is because it "seems altogether inconceivable, how this
new relation can be a deduction from others".[116]
Hume's theory of ethics has been influential in modern-day meta-ethical theory,[117] helping to inspire
emotivism,[118] and ethical expressivism and non-cognitivism,[119] as well as Allan Gibbard's general
theory of moral judgment and judgments of rationality.[120]
Aesthetics
Hume's ideas about aesthetics and the theory of art are spread throughout his works, but are particularly
connected with his ethical writings, and also the essays Of the Standard of Taste and Of Tragedy. His
views are rooted in the work of Joseph Addison and Francis Hutcheson.[121] In the Treatise he wrote of
the connection between beauty and deformity and vice and virtue,[122] and his later writings on this
subject continue to draw parallels of beauty and deformity in art, with conduct and character.[123]
In Of the Standard of Taste, Hume argues that no rules can be drawn up about what is a tasteful object.
However, a reliable critic of taste can be recognised as being objective, sensible and unprejudiced, and
having extensive experience.[124] Of Tragedy addresses the question of why humans enjoy tragic drama.
Hume was concerned with the way spectators find pleasure in the sorrow and anxiety depicted in a
tragedy. He argued that this was because the spectator is aware that he is witnessing a dramatic
performance. There is pleasure in realising that the terrible events that are being shown are actually
fiction.[125] Furthermore, Hume laid down rules for educating people in taste and correct conduct, and his
writings in this area have been very influential on English and Anglo-Saxon aesthetics.[126]
Free will, determinism, and responsibility

Hume, along with Thomas Hobbes, is cited as a classical compatibilist about the notions of freedom and
determinism.[127][128] Compatibilism seeks to reconcile human freedom with the mechanist view that
human beings are part of a deterministic universe, which is completely governed by physical laws.
Hume, on this point, was influenced greatly by the scientific revolution, particularly by Sir Isaac
Newton.[129] Hume argued that the dispute between freedom and determinism continued over two
thousand years due to ambiguous terminology. He wrote: "From this circumstance alone, that a
controversy has been long kept on foot ... we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the
expression", and that different disputants use different meanings for the same terms.[130][131]
Hume defines the concept of necessity as "the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where
similar objects are constantly conjoined together",[132] and liberty as "a power of acting or not acting,
according to the determinations of the will".[133] He then argues that, according to these definitions, not
only are the two compatible, but liberty requires necessity. For if our actions were not necessitated in the
above sense, they would "have so little in connexion with motives, inclinations and circumstances, that
one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other". But if our actions are not thus
connected to the will, then our actions can never be free: they would be matters of "chance; which is
universally allowed to have no existence".[134] Australian philosopher John Passmore writes that
confusion has arisen because "necessity" has been taken to mean "necessary connexion". Once this has
been abandoned, Hume argues that "liberty and necessity will be found not to be in conflict one with
another".[131]
Moreover, Hume goes on to argue that in order to be held morally responsible, it is required that our
behaviour be caused or necessitated, for, as he wrote:
Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from
some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can
neither redound to his honour, if good; nor infamy, if evil.[135]
Hume describes the link between causality and our capacity to rationally make a decision from this an
inference of the mind. Human beings assess a situation based upon certain predetermined events and
from that form a choice. Hume believes that this choice is made spontaneously. Hume calls this form of
decision making the liberty of spontaneity.[136]
Education writer Richard Wright considers that Hume's position rejects a famous moral puzzle attributed
to French philosopher Jean Buridan. The Buridan's ass puzzle describes a donkey that is hungry. This
donkey has on both sides of him separate bales of hay, which are of equal distances from him. The
problem concerns which bale the donkey chooses. Buridan was said to believe that the donkey would die,
because he has no autonomy. The donkey is incapable of forming a rational decision as there is no
motive to choose one bale of hay over the other. However, human beings are different, because a human
who is placed in a position where he is forced to choose one loaf of bread over another will make a
decision to take one in lieu of the other. For Buridan, humans have the capacity of autonomy, and he
recognises the choice that is ultimately made will be based on chance, as both loaves of bread are exactly
the same. However, Wright says that Hume completely rejects this notion, arguing that a human will
spontaneously act in such a situation because he is faced with impending death if he fails to do so. Such a
decision is not made on the basis of chance, but rather on necessity and spontaneity, given the prior
predetermined events leading up to the predicament.[129]
Hume's argument is supported by modern-day compatibilists such as R. E. Hobart, a pseudonym of

philosopher Dickinson S. Miller.[137] However, P. F. Strawson argued that the issue of whether we hold
one another morally responsible does not ultimately depend on the truth or falsity of a metaphysical
thesis such as determinism. This is because our so holding one another is a non-rational human sentiment
that is not predicated on such theses.[138][139]
Writings on religion
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy states that Hume wrote "on almost every central question in the
philosophy of religion", and these writings "are among the most important and influential contributions
on this topic."[140] They touch on the philosophy, psychology, history, and anthropology of religious
thought. Hume's 1757 dissertation, The Natural History of Religion, covers all of these topics and argues
that the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam all derive from earlier polytheistic
religions. He also suggested that all religious belief "traces, in the end, to dread of the unknown."[141]
Hume had also written on religious subjects in the first Enquiry, as well as later in the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion.[142]
Religious views
Although he wrote a great deal about religion, Hume's personal views have been the subject of much
debate.[143] Some modern critics have described Hume's religious views as agnostic or have described
him as a "Pyrrhonian skeptic."[144] Contemporaries considered him to be an atheist, or at least un-
Christian, and the Church of Scotland seriously considered bringing charges of infidelity against
him.[145] Evidence of his un-Christian beliefs can be seen in his writings on miracles. In his treatise on
miracles, he attempts to separate historical method from the narrative accounts of miracles.[144] The fact
that contemporaries thought that he may have been an atheist is exemplified by a story Hume liked to
tell:
The best theologian he ever met, he used to say, was the old Edinburgh fishwife who, having
recognized him as Hume the atheist, refused to pull him out of the bog into which he had
fallen until he declared he was a Christian and repeated the Lord's prayer.[146]
However, in works such as Of Superstition and Enthusiasm, Hume specifically seems to support the
standard religious views of his time and place. This still meant that he could be very critical of the
Catholic Church, dismissing it with the standard Protestant accusations of superstition and
idolatry,[147][148] as well as dismissing as idolatry what his compatriots saw as uncivilised beliefs.[149]
He also considered extreme Protestant sects, the members of which he called "enthusiasts", to be
corrupters of religion.[150] By contrast, in his The Natural History of Religion, Hume presented
arguments suggesting that polytheism had much to commend it over monotheism.[151] Additionally,
when mentioning religion as a factor in his History of England, Hume uses it to show the deleterious
effect it has on human progress. In his Treatise on Human Nature, Hume wrote: "Generally speaking, the
errors in religions are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous."[144]
Philosopher Paul Russell writes that Hume was plainly sceptical about religious belief, although perhaps
not to the extent of complete atheism. He suggests that Hume's position is best characterised by the term
"irreligion",[152] while philosopher David O'Connor argues that Hume's final position was "weakly
deistic". For O'Connor, Hume's "position is deeply ironic. This is because, while inclining towards a
weak form of deism, he seriously doubts that we can ever find a sufficiently favourable balance of
evidence to justify accepting any religious position." He adds that Hume "did not believe in the God of
standard theism ... but he did not rule out all concepts of deity", and that "ambiguity suited his purposes,
and this creates difficulty in definitively pinning down his final position on religion".[153]
Design argument
One of the traditional topics of natural theology is that of the existence of God, and one of the a
posteriori arguments for this is the argument from design or the teleological argument. The argument is
that the existence of God can be proved by the design that is obvious in the complexity of the world.
Encyclopædia Britannica states that this is "the most popular, because [it is] the most accessible of the
theistic arguments ... which identifies evidences of design in nature, inferring from them a divine
designer ... The fact that the universe as a whole is a coherent and efficiently functioning system
likewise, in this view, indicates a divine intelligence behind it."[154]
In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume wrote that the design argument seems to
depend upon our experience, and its proponents "always suppose the universe, an effect quite singular
and unparalleled, to be the proof of a Deity, a cause no less singular and unparalleled".[155] Philosopher
Louise E. Loeb notes that Hume is saying that only experience and observation can be our guide to
making inferences about the conjunction between events. However, according to Hume, "we observe
neither God nor other universes, and hence no conjunction involving them. There is no observed
conjunction to ground an inference either to extended objects or to God, as unobserved causes."[156]
Hume also criticised the argument in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779). In this, he
suggested that, even if the world is a more or less smoothly functioning system, this may only be a result
of the "chance permutations of particles falling into a temporary or permanent self-sustaining order,
which thus has the appearance of design."[154]
A century later, the idea of order without design was rendered more plausible by Charles Darwin's
discovery that the adaptations of the forms of life are a result of the natural selection of inherited
characteristics.[154] For philosopher James D. Madden, it is "Hume, rivaled only by Darwin, [who] has
done the most to undermine in principle our confidence in arguments from design among all figures in
the Western intellectual tradition."[157]
Finally, Hume discussed a version of the anthropic principle, which is the idea that theories of the
universe are constrained by the need to allow for man's existence in it as an observer. Hume has his
sceptical mouthpiece Philo suggest that there may have been many worlds, produced by an incompetent
designer, whom he called a "stupid mechanic". In his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume
wrote:
Many worlds might have been botched and bungled throughout an eternity, ere this system
was struck out: much labour lost: many fruitless trials made: and a slow, but continued
improvement carried on during infinite ages in the art of world-making.[158]
American philosopher Daniel Dennett has suggested that this mechanical explanation of teleology,
although "obviously ... an amusing philosophical fantasy", anticipated the notion of natural selection, the
'continued improvement' being like "any Darwinian selection algorithm."[159]
Problem of miracles
In his discussion of miracles, Hume argues that we should not believe miracles have occurred and that
they do not therefore provide us with any reason to think God exists.[160] In An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding (Section 10), Hume defines a miracle as "a transgression of a law of nature by a
particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent". Hume says we believe an
event that has frequently occurred is likely to occur again, but we also take into account those instances
where the event did not occur. Hume wrote:
A wise man [...] considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments [...]
A hundred instances or experiments on one side, and fifty on another, afford a doubtful
expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is
contradictory, reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must
balance the opposite experiments [...] and deduct the smaller number from the greater, in
order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.[161]
Hume discusses the testimony of those who report miracles. He wrote that testimony might be doubted
even from some great authority in case the facts themselves are not credible. "[T]he evidence, resulting
from the testimony, admits of a diminution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less
unusual."[162]
Although Hume leaves open the possibility for miracles to occur and be reported, he offers various
arguments against this ever having happened in history.[163] He points out that people often lie, and they
have good reasons to lie about miracles occurring either because they believe they are doing so for the
benefit of their religion or because of the fame that results. Furthermore, people by nature enjoy relating
miracles they have heard without caring for their veracity and thus miracles are easily transmitted even
when false. Also, Hume notes that miracles seem to occur mostly in "ignorant and barbarous
nations"[164] and times, and the reason they do not occur in the civilised societies is such societies are not
awed by what they know to be natural events. Finally, the miracles of each religion argue against all other
religions and their miracles, and so even if a proportion of all reported miracles across the world fit
Hume's requirement for belief, the miracles of each religion make the other less likely.[165]
Hume was extremely pleased with his argument against miracles in his Enquiry. He states "I flatter
myself, that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned,
be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently, will be useful as long as
the world endures."[166] Thus, Hume's argument against miracles had a more abstract basis founded upon
the scrutiny, not just primarily of miracles, but of all forms of belief systems. It is a common sense notion
of veracity based upon epistemological evidence, and founded on a principle of rationality,
proportionality and reasonability.[165]
The criterion for assessing a belief system for Hume is based on the balance of probability whether
something is more likely than not to have occurred. Since the weight of empirical experience contradicts
the notion for the existence of miracles, such accounts should be treated with scepticism. Further, the
myriad of accounts of miracles contradict one another, as some people who receive miracles will aim to
prove the authority of Jesus, whereas others will aim to prove the authority of Muhammad or some other
religious prophet or deity. These various differing accounts weaken the overall evidential power of
miracles.[167]
Despite all this, Hume observes that belief in miracles is popular, and that "The gazing populace [...]
receive greedily, without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder."[168]
Critics have argued that Hume's position assumes the character of miracles and natural laws prior to any
specific examination of miracle claims, thus it amounts to a subtle form of begging the question. To
assume that testimony is a homogeneous reference group seems unwise- to compare private miracles
with public miracles, unintellectual observers with intellectual observers and those who have little to gain
and much to lose with those with much to gain and little to lose is not convincing to many. Indeed, many
have argued that miracles not only do not contradict the laws of nature, but require the laws of nature to
be intelligible as miraculous, and thus subverting the law of nature. For example, William Adams
remarks that "there must be an ordinary course of nature before anything can be extraordinary. There
must be a stream before anything can be interrupted".[169] They have also noted that it requires an appeal
to inductive inference, as none have observed every part of nature nor examined every possible miracle
claim, for instance those in the future. This, in Hume's philosophy, was especially problematic.[170]
Little appreciated is the voluminous literature either foreshadowing Hume, in the likes of Thomas
Sherlock[171] or directly responding to and engaging with Hume- from William Paley,[172] William
Adams,[173] John Douglas,[174] John Leland[175] and George Campbell,[176] among others. Of Campbell,
it is rumoured that, having read Campbell's Dissertation, Hume remarked that "the Scotch theologue had
beaten him".[177]
Hume's main argument concerning miracles is that miracles by definition are singular events that differ
from the established laws of nature. Such natural laws are codified as a result of past experiences.
Therefore, a miracle is a violation of all prior experience and thus incapable on this basis of reasonable
belief. However, the probability that something has occurred in contradiction of all past experience
should always be judged to be less than the probability that either ones senses have deceived one, or the
person recounting the miraculous occurrence is lying or mistaken. Hume would say, all of which he had
past experience of. For Hume, this refusal to grant credence does not guarantee correctness. He offers the
example of an Indian Prince, who, having grown up in a hot country, refuses to believe that water has
frozen. By Hume's lights, this refusal is not wrong and the Prince "reasoned justly"; it is presumably only
when he has had extensive experience of the freezing of water that he has warrant to believe that the
event could occur.[162]
So for Hume, either the miraculous event will become a recurrent event or else it will never be rational to
believe it occurred. The connection to religious belief is left unexplained throughout, except for the close
of his discussion where Hume notes the reliance of Christianity upon testimony of miraculous
occurrences. He makes an ironic remark that anyone who "is moved by faith to assent" to revealed
testimony "is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all principles of his
understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and
experience."[178][179] Hume writes that "All the testimony which ever was really given for any miracle,
or ever will be given, is a subject of derision."[162]
As historian of England
From 1754 to 1762 Hume published The History of England, a 6-
volume work, which extends, says its subtitle, "From the Invasion
of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688". Inspired by Voltaire's
sense of the breadth of history, Hume widened the focus of the
field away from merely kings, parliaments, and armies, to
literature and science as well. He argued that the quest for liberty
was the highest standard for judging the past, and concluded that
after considerable fluctuation, England at the time of his writing
had achieved "the most entire system of liberty that was ever
known amongst mankind".[180] It "must be regarded as an event
of cultural importance. In its own day, moreover, it was an
innovation, soaring high above its very few predecessors."[181]
Hume's History of England made him famous as a historian
before he was ever considered a serious philosopher. In this work, David Hume by Allan Ramsay, 1766
Hume uses history to tell the story of the rise of England and
what led to its greatness and the disastrous effects that religion
has had on its progress. For Hume, the history of England's rise may give a template for others who
would also like to rise to its current greatness.[144]
Hume's The History of England was profoundly impacted by his Scottish background. The science of
sociology, which is rooted in Scottish thinking of the eighteenth century, had never before been applied to
British philosophical history. Because of his Scottish background, Hume was able to bring an outsider's
lens to English history that the insulated English whigs lacked.[182]
Hume's coverage of the political upheavals of the 17th century relied in large part on the Earl of
Clarendon's History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (1646–69). Generally, Hume took a
moderate royalist position and considered revolution unnecessary to achieve necessary reform. Hume
was considered a Tory historian, and emphasised religious differences more than constitutional issues.
Laird Okie explains that "Hume preached the virtues of political moderation, but ... it was moderation
with an anti-Whig, pro-royalist coloring."[183] For "Hume shared the ... Tory belief that the Stuarts were
no more high-handed than their Tudor predecessors".[184] "Even though Hume wrote with an anti-Whig
animus, it is, paradoxically, correct to regard the History as an establishment work, one which implicitly
endorsed the ruling oligarchy".[185] Historians have debated whether Hume posited a universal
unchanging human nature, or allowed for evolution and development.[186]
The debate between Tory and the Whig historians can be seen in the initial reception to Hume's History
of England. The whig-dominated world of 1754 overwhelmingly disapproved of Hume's take on English
history. In later editions of the book, Hume worked to "soften or expunge many villainous whig strokes
which had crept into it."[187]
Hume did not consider himself a pure Tory. Before 1745, he was more akin to an "independent whig." In
1748, he described himself as "a whig, though a very skeptical one." This description of himself as in
between whiggism and toryism, helps one understand that his History of England should be read as his
attempt to work out his own philosophy of history.[188]
Robert Roth argues that Hume's histories display his biases against Presbyterians and Puritans. Roth says
his anti-Whig pro-monarchy position diminished the influence of his work, and that his emphasis on
politics and religion led to a neglect of social and economic history.[189]
Hume was an early cultural historian of science. His short biographies of leading scientists explored the
process of scientific change. He developed new ways of seeing scientists in the context of their times by
looking at how they interacted with society and each other. He covers over forty scientists, with special
attention paid to Francis Bacon, Robert Boyle, and Isaac Newton. Hume particularly praised William
Harvey, writing about his treatise of the circulation of the blood: "Harvey is entitled to the glory of
having made, by reasoning alone, without any mixture of accident, a capital discovery in one of the most
important branches of science".[190]
The History became a best-seller and made Hume a wealthy man who no longer had to take up salaried
work for others.[191] It was influential for nearly a century, despite competition from imitations by
Smollett (1757), Goldsmith (1771) and others. By 1894, there were at least 50 editions as well as
abridgements for students, and illustrated pocket editions, probably produced specifically for
women.[192]
Political theory
It is difficult to categorise Hume's political affiliations using modern terminology without being
anachronistic. His writings might be described both as conservative and liberal.[193] Thomas Jefferson
banned the History from University of Virginia, feeling that it had "spread universal toryism over the
land".[194] By comparison, Samuel Johnson thought Hume "a Tory by chance ... for he has no principle.
If he is anything, he is a Hobbist", a follower of Thomas Hobbes.[195] A major concern of Hume's
political philosophy is the importance of the rule of law. He also stresses throughout his political essays
the importance of moderation in politics: public spirit and regard to the community.[196]
Throughout the period of the American Revolution, Hume had varying views. For instance, in 1768 he
encouraged total revolt on the part of the Americans. In 1775, he became certain that a revolution would
take place and said that he believed in the American principle and wished the British government would
let them be. Hume's influence on some of the Founders can be seen in Benjamin Franklin's suggestion at
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that no high office in any branch of government should receive a
salary, which is a suggestion Hume had made in his emendation of James Harrington's Oceana.[197]
The legacy of religious civil war in 18th-century Scotland, combined with the relatively recent memory
of the 1715 and 1745 Jacobite risings, had fostered in Hume a distaste for enthusiasm and factionalism.
These appeared to him to threaten the fragile and nascent political and social stability of a country that
was deeply politically and religiously divided.[198] Hume thought that society is best governed by a
general and impartial system of laws; he is less concerned about the form of government that administers
these laws, so long as it does so fairly. However, he does write that a republic must produce laws, while
"monarchy, when absolute, contains even something repugnant to law."[199]
Hume expressed suspicion of attempts to reform society in ways that departed from long-established
custom, and he counselled peoples not to resist their governments except in cases of the most egregious
tyranny.[200] However, he resisted aligning himself with either of Britain's two political parties, the
Whigs and the Tories. Hume wrote:
My views of things are more conformable to Whig principles; my representations of persons

to Tory prejudices.[201]
Canadian philosopher Neil McArthur writes that Hume believed that we should try to balance our
demands for liberty with the need for strong authority, without sacrificing either. McArthur characterises
Hume as a "precautionary conservative",[202] whose actions would have been "determined by prudential
concerns about the consequences of change, which often demand we ignore our own principles about
what is ideal or even legitimate."[203] Hume supported the liberty of the press, and was sympathetic to
democracy, when suitably constrained. American historian Douglass Adair has argued that Hume was a
major inspiration for James Madison's writings, and the essay "Federalist No. 10" in particular.[204]
Hume offered his view on the best type of society in an essay titled "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth",
which lays out what he thought was the best form of government. He hoped that, "in some future age, an
opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old
government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world". He
defended a strict separation of powers, decentralisation, extending the franchise to anyone who held
property of value and limiting the power of the clergy. The system of the Swiss militia was proposed as
the best form of protection. Elections were to take place on an annual basis and representatives were to
be unpaid.[205] Political philosophers Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, writing of Hume's thoughts about
"the wise statesman", note that he "will bear a reverence to what carries the marks of age". Also, if he
wishes to improve a constitution, his innovations will take account of the "ancient fabric", in order not to
disturb society.[206]
In the political analysis of philosopher George Sabine, the scepticism of Hume extended to the doctrine
of government by consent. He notes that "allegiance is a habit enforced by education and consequently as
much a part of human nature as any other motive."[207]
In the 1770s, Hume was critical of British policies toward the American colonies and advocated for
American independence. He wrote in 1771 that "our union with America... in the nature of things, cannot
long subsist".[50]
Contributions to economic thought

Hume expressed his economic views in his Political Discourses,
which were incorporated in Essays and Treatises as Part II of
Essays, Moral and Political.[9] To what extent he was influenced
by Adam Smith is difficult to stress, however both of them had
similar principles supported from historical events.[9] At the same
time Hume did not demonstrate concrete system of economic
theory which could be observed in Smith's Wealth of Nations.
However, he introduced several new ideas around which the
"classical economics" of the 18th century was built.[9] Through
his discussions on politics, Hume developed many ideas that are
prevalent in the field of economics. This includes ideas on private
property, inflation, and foreign trade.[208] Referring to his essay
"Of the Balance of Trade", economist Paul Krugman has
remarked that "David Hume created what I consider the first true
economic model."[209] Statues of David Hume and Adam
Smith by David Watson Stevenson
In contrast to Locke, Hume believes that private property is not a on the Scottish National Portrait
natural right. Hume argues it is justified, because resources are Gallery in Edinburgh
limited. Private property would be an unjustified, "idle
ceremonial", if all goods were unlimited and available freely.[210]
Hume also believed in an unequal distribution of property, because perfect equality would destroy the
ideas of thrift and industry. Perfect equality would thus lead to impoverishment.[211][212]
David Hume anticipated modern monetarism. First, Hume contributed to the quantity theory and interest
rate theory. Hume has been credited with being the first to prove that, on an abstract level, there is no
quantifiable amount of nominal money a country needs to thrive. He understood that there was a
difference between nominal money and real money. Second, Hume has a theory of causation which fits in
with the Chicago school "black box" approach. According to Hume, cause and effect are related only
through correlation. Hume shared the belief with modern monetarists that changes in the money supply
can affect consumption and investments. Lastly, Hume was a vocal advocate of the stability of the private
sector. However, Hume also had some non-monetarist aspects to his economic philosophy. For example,
he had a stated preference for rising prices and thought of government debt as a sort of substitute for
actual money. He called government debt "a kind of paper credit." He also believed in heavy taxation
because he thought it increases effort. As can be seen, Hume's economic approach resembles his other
philosophies in that he does not choose one side indefinitely, but sees gray in the situation[213]
Influence
Due to Hume's vast influence on contemporary philosophy, a
large number of approaches in contemporary philosophy and
cognitive science are today called "Humean."[214]
The writings of Scottish philosopher and contemporary of Hume,

Thomas Reid, were often criticisms of Hume's scepticism. Reid
formulated his common sense philosophy in part as a reaction
against Hume's views.[215]
Hume influenced and was influenced by the Christian

philosopher Joseph Butler. Hume was impressed by Butler's way
of thinking about religion, and Butler may well have been
influenced by Hume's writings.[216][217]
Attention to Hume's philosophical works grew after the German

philosopher Immanuel Kant, in his Prolegomena to Any Future Statue on Edinburgh's Royal Mile
Metaphysics (1783), credited Hume with awakening him from his
"dogmatic slumber".[218]
According to Schopenhauer, "there is more to be learned from each page of David Hume than from the
collected philosophical works of Hegel, Herbart and Schleiermacher taken together."[219]
A. J. Ayer, while introducing his classic exposition of logical positivism in 1936, claimed: "The views
which are put forward in this treatise derive from ... doctrines ... which are themselves the logical
outcome of the empiricism of Berkeley and David Hume."[220] Albert Einstein, in 1915, wrote that he
was inspired by Hume's positivism when formulating his theory of special relativity.[221]
Hume's problem of induction was also of fundamental importance to the philosophy of Karl Popper. In
his autobiography, Unended Quest, he wrote: "Knowledge ... is objective; and it is hypothetical or
conjectural. This way of looking at the problem made it possible for me to reformulate Hume's problem
of induction". This insight resulted in Popper's major work The Logic of Scientific Discovery.[222] Also,
in his Conjectures and Refutations, he wrote:
I approached the problem of induction through Hume. Hume, I felt, was perfectly right in
pointing out that induction cannot be logically justified.[223]
Hume's rationalism in religious subjects influenced, via German-Scottish theologian Johann Joachim
Spalding, the German neology school and rational theology, and contributed to the transformation of
German theology in the age of enlightenment.[224][225] Hume pioneered a comparative history of
religion,[226][227] tried to explain various rites and traditions as being based on deception[228][229] and
challenged various aspects of rational and natural theology, such as the argument from design.[226]
Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard adopted "Hume's suggestion that the role of
reason is not to make us wise but to reveal our ignorance." However, Kierkegaard took this as a reason
for the necessity of religious faith, or fideism. The "fact that Christianity is contrary to reason ... is the
necessary precondition for true faith." Political theorist Isaiah Berlin, for example, has pointed out the
similarities between the arguments of Hume and Kierkegaard against rational theology.[230] Berlin also
writes about Hume's influence on what Berlin calls the counter-enlightenment, and German anti-
rationalism.[231]
According to philosopher Jerry Fodor, Hume's Treatise is "the founding document of cognitive
science".[232]
Hume engaged with contemporary intellectual luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, James
Boswell, and Adam Smith (who acknowledged Hume's influence on his economics and political
philosophy).
Isaiah Berlin once said of Hume that "No man has influenced the history of philosophy to a deeper or
more disturbing degree."[233]
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy writes that Hume is "[g]enerally regarded as one of the most
important philosophers to write in English."[234]
Family
His nephew and namesake, David Hume of Ninewells (1757–1838), was a co-founder of the Royal
Society of Edinburgh in 1783. He was a Professor of Scots Law at Edinburgh University and rose to be
Principal Clerk Of Session in the Scottish High court and Baron of the Exchequer. He is buried with his
uncle in Old Calton Cemetery.[235]
Works
A Kind of History of My Life (1734) Mss 23159 National Library of Scotland.[236] A letter to
an unnamed physician, asking for advice about "the Disease of the Learned" that then
afflicted him. Here he reports that at the age of eighteen "there seem'd to be open'd up to
me a new Scene of Thought" that made him "throw up every other Pleasure or Business"
and turned him to scholarship.[237]
A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of
Reasoning into Moral Subjects (1739–40). Hume intended to see whether the Treatise of
Human Nature (https://web.archive.org/web/20141215001902/https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.a
u/h/hume/david/h92t/) met with success, and if so to complete it with books devoted to
Politics and Criticism. However, as Hume explained, "It fell dead-born from the press,
without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots"[31] and so
his further project was not completed.
An Abstract of a Book lately Published: Entitled A Treatise of Human Nature etc. (1740)
Anonymously published, but almost certainly written by Hume[238] in an attempt to
popularise his Treatise. Of considerable philosophical interest, because it spells out what he
considered "The Chief Argument" of the Treatise, in a way that seems to anticipate the
structure of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding.
Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (first ed. 1741–2) A collection of pieces written and
published over many years, though most were collected together in 1753–4. Many of the
essays are on politics and economics; other topics include aesthetic judgement, love,
marriage and polygamy, and the demographics of ancient Greece and Rome. The Essays
show some influence from Addison's Tatler and The Spectator, which Hume read avidly in
his youth.
A Letter from a Gentleman to His Friend in Edinburgh: Containing Some Observations on a
Specimen of the Principles concerning Religion and Morality, said to be maintain'd in a Book
lately publish'd, intituled A Treatise of Human Nature etc. Edinburgh (1745). Contains a
letter written by Hume to defend himself against charges of atheism and scepticism, while
applying for a chair at Edinburgh University.
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) Contains reworking of the main
points of the Treatise, Book 1, with the addition of material on free will (adapted from Book
2), miracles, the Design Argument, and mitigated scepticism. Of Miracles, section X of the
Enquiry, was often published separately.
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) A reworking of material on morality
from Book 3 of the Treatise, but with a significantly different emphasis. It "was thought by
Hume to be the best of his writings".[239]
Political Discourses (part II of Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary within vol. 1 of the larger
Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects) Edinburgh (1752). Included in Essays and
Treatises on Several Subjects (1753–56) reprinted 1758–77.
Political Discourses/Discours politiques (1752–1758), My Own Life (1776), Of Essay
Writing, 1742. Bilingual English-French, translated by Fabien Grandjean. Mauvezin, France:
Trans-Europ-Repress, 1993.
Four Dissertations London (1757). Included in reprints of Essays and Treatises on Several
Subjects (above).
The History of England (Sometimes referred to as The History of Great Britain) (1754–62)
More a category of books than a single work, Hume's history spanned "from the invasion of
Julius Caesar to the Revolution of 1688" and went through over 100 editions. Many
considered it the standard history of England in its day.
The Natural History of Religion. Included in "Four Dissertations" (1757)
"Sister Peg" (1760) Hume claimed to have authored an anonymous political pamphlet
satirizing the failure of the British Parliament to create a Scottish militia in 1760. Although
the authorship of the work is disputed, Hume wrote Dr. Alexander Carlyle in early 1761
claiming authorship. The readership of the time attributed the work to Adam Ferguson, a
friend and associate of Hume's who has been sometimes called "the founder of modern
sociology." Some contemporary scholars concur in the judgment that Ferguson, not Hume,
was the author of this work.
"My Own Life" (1776) Penned in April, shortly before his death, this autobiography was
intended for inclusion in a new edition of Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. It was
first published by Adam Smith, who claimed that by doing so he had incurred "ten times
more abuse than the very violent attack I had made upon the whole commercial system of
Great Britain".[240]
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) Published posthumously by his nephew,
David Hume the Younger. Being a discussion among three fictional characters concerning
the nature of God, and is an important portrayal of the argument from design. Despite some
controversy, most scholars agree that the view of Philo, the most sceptical of the three,
comes closest to Hume's own.
See also
Age of reason
Contributions to liberal theory
George Anderson
Human science
Hume Studies
Hume's principle
Mencius
Scientific scepticism
The Missing Shade of Blue
Notes
1. These are Hume's terms. In modern parlance, demonstration may be termed deductive
reasoning, while probability may be termed inductive reasoning.[81]
References
1. William Edward Morris, "David Hume" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/), The
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(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/#4). Stanford Encyclopedia of
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3. 1975-, Demeter, Tamás (2016). David Hume and the culture of Scottish Newtonianism :
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31. Hume 1993, p. 352.
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81. Millican 1996, p. ?.
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84. Kenyon & Craig 1985, p. 254.
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91. For this account of Hume's views on causation cf. Ayer (1946, pp. 40–42)
92. Hume 1739, p. 167.
93. Hume 1739, p. 78, original emphasis
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95. Hume 2011, p. 187.
96. Blackburn 1990, p. ?.
97. Quoted by Dauer (2010, p. 97)
98. Hume 1777, p. 78, fn 17.
99. Dicker 2002, p. 15.
100. Maurer 2013.
101. Ayer 1946, pp. 135–136.
102. Parfit 1984, p. ?.
103. Strawson 2011, p. ?.
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105. Giles 1993, p. ?.
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aesthetics" (http://www.britannica.com/topic/aesthetics/Taste-criticism-and-judgment#toc116
86). Encyclopædia Britannica.
Sgarbi, M. (2012). "Hume's Source of the 'Impression-Idea' Distinction", Anales del
Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía, 2: 561–576 (https://www.academia.edu/2422259/_Hu
me_s_Source_of_the_Impression-Idea_Distinction_Anales_del_Seminario_de_Historia_de
_la_Filosof%C3%ADa_2_2012_561_576)
Sher, Richard B. (2008). The Enlightenment and the Book: Scottish Authors and Their
Publishers in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Ireland, and America (https://books.google.com/bo
oks?id=gB9liJb5o7UC). Chicago Studies in Ethnomusicology Series. University of Chicago
Press. ISBN 9780226752549.
Singer, Peter (4 March 2015). "The climax of moral sense theory: Hutcheson and Hume" (ht
tp://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/194023/ethics/252540/The-climax-of-moral-sense
-theory-Hutcheson-and-Hume). Encyclopædia Britannica.
Smith, Michael Andrew (January 1987). "The Humean Theory of Motivation". Mind (New
Series ed.). 96 (381): 36–61. doi:10.1093/mind/XCVI.381.36 (https://doi.org/10.1093%2Fmi
nd%2FXCVI.381.36).
Spencer, Mark G., ed. David Hume: Historical Thinker, Historical Writer (Penn State
University Press; 2013) 282 pages; Interdisciplinary essays that consider his intertwined
work as historian and philosopher
Spiegel, Henry William, (1991). The Growth of Economic Thought, 3rd Ed., Durham: Duke
University Press.
Strawson, Galen (2011). The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity (http://www.oxf
ordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608508.001.0001/acprof-9780199608
508). Oxford Scholarship Online. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608508.001.0001 (https://
doi.org/10.1093%2Facprof%3Aoso%2F9780199608508.001.0001). ISBN 9780199608508.
Strawson, Galen (2014). The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism, and David Hume (http
s://books.google.com/books?id=htRFAwAAQBAJ). Chicago Studies in Ethnomusicology
Series. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199605859.
Strawson, Sir Peter Frederick (2008). Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (https://
books.google.com/books?id=S4R8AgAAQBAJ). Routledge. ISBN 9781134060870.
Stroud, B. (1977). Hume, Routledge: London & New York.
Swain, Corliss Gaida (2008). "Personal Identity" (https://books.google.com/books?id=Qoh7
_nZbBjYC). In Traiger, Saul (ed.). The Blackwell Guide to Hume's Treatise. Blackwell
Guides to Great Works. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 9781405153133.
Taylor, A. E. (1927). David Hume and the Miraculous, Leslie Stephen Lecture. Cambridge,
pp. 53–54.
Taylor, W. L. (1965). Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of Adam Smith.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Waldmann, Felix (2014). Further Letters of David Hume. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
Bibliographical Society.
Wertz, S. K. (1975). "Hume, History, and Human Nature". Journal of the History of Ideas. 36
(3): 481–496. doi:10.2307/2708658 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2708658). JSTOR 2708658
(https://www.jstor.org/stable/2708658).
Wertz, S. K. (1993). "Hume and the Historiography of Science". Journal of the History of
Ideas. 54 (3): 411–436. doi:10.2307/2710021 (https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2710021).
Wiley, James (2012). Theory and Practice in the Philosophy of David Hume (https://books.g
oogle.com/books?id=Q94tuawjdYUC). Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 9781137026439.
Wright, John P. (2009). Hume's 'A Treatise of Human Nature': An Introduction (https://books.
google.com/books?id=tgm8yY6-eGkC). Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical
Texts. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521833769.
Wright, John P. (1983). The Sceptical Realism of David Hume (https://books.google.com/bo
oks?id=vhoNAQAAIAAJ). Studies in intellectual history and the history of philosophy.
Manchester University Press. ISBN 9780719008825.
Wright, Richard (2010). Understanding Religious Ethics: A Complete Guide for OCR AS
and A2. Studies in intellectual history and the history of philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Further reading
Ardal, Pall (1966). Passion and Value in Hesselberg, A. Kenneth (1961). Hume,
Hume's Treatise, Edinburgh, Edinburgh Natural Law and Justice. Duquesne
University Press. Review, Spring 1961, pp. 46–47.
Bailey, Alan & O'Brien, Dan (eds.) (2012). Kail, P. J. E. (2007) Projection and Realism
The Continuum Companion to Hume, New in Hume's Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford
York: Continuum. University Press.
Bailey, Alan & O'Brien, Dan. (2014). Kemp Smith, Norman (1941). The
Hume's Critique of Religion: Sick Men's Philosophy of David Hume. London:
Dreams, Dordrecht: Springer. Macmillan.
Beauchamp, Tom & Rosenberg, Alexander Norton, David Fate (1982). David Hume:
(1981). Hume and the Problem of Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical
Causation, New York, Oxford University Metaphysician. Princeton: Princeton
Press. University Press.
Campbell Mossner, Ernest (1980). The Norton, David Fate & Taylor, Jacqueline
Life of David Hume, Oxford University (eds.) (2009). The Cambridge Companion
Press. to Hume, Cambridge: Cambridge
Gilles Deleuze (1953). Empirisme et University Press.
subjectivité. Essai sur la Nature Humaine Radcliffe, Elizabeth S. (ed.) (2008). A
selon Hume, Paris: Presses Universitaires Companion to Hume, Malden: Blackwell.
de France; trans. Empiricism and Rosen, Frederick (2003). Classical
Subjectivity, New York: Columbia Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (Routledge
University Press, 1991. Studies in Ethics & Moral Theory). ISBN 0-
Demeter, Tamás (2012). "Hume's 415-22094-7
Experimental Method". British Journal for Russell, Paul (1995). Freedom and Moral
the History of Philosophy. 20 (3): 577. Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing
doi:10.1080/09608788.2012.670842 (http Responsibility. New York & Oxford: Oxford
s://doi.org/10.1080%2F09608788.2012.67 University Press.
0842). hdl:11858/00-001M-0000-002A- Russell, Paul (2008). The Riddle of
7F3A-B (https://hdl.handle.net/11858%2F0 Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism
0-001M-0000-002A-7F3A-B). and Irreligion. New York & Oxford: Oxford
Demeter, Tamás (2014). "Natural Theology University Press.
as Superstition: Hume and the Changing Stroud, Barry (1977). Hume, London &
Ideology of Moral Inquiry." In Demeter, T. New York: Routledge. (Complete study of
et al. (eds.), Conflicting Values of Inquiry, Hume's work parting from the
Leiden: Brill. interpretation of Hume's naturalistic
Garrett, Don (1996). Cognition and philosophical programme).
Commitment in Hume's Philosophy. New Wei, Jua (2017). Commerce and Politics in
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hume’s History of England, Woodbridge:
Gaskin, J.C.A. (1978). Hume's Philosophy Boydell and Brewer online review (http://e
of Religion. Humanities Press h.net/?s=Hume+wei)
International.
Wilson, Fred (2008). The External World
Harris, James A. (2015). Hume: An and Our Knowledge Of It : Hume's critical
Intellectual Biography. Cambridge: realism, an exposition and a defence,
Cambridge University Press. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
External links
Media related to David Hume at Wikimedia Commons
Works written by or about David Hume at Wikisource
Quotations related to David Hume at Wikiquote
The Hume Society (http://www.humesociety.org/) scholarly organization holds conferences
and publishes Hume Studies
Hume Texts Online (davidhume.org) (http://www.davidhume.org) All of Hume's philosophical
works in authoritative searchable editions, with related resources (including articles,
bibliography, and the original manuscript of the Dialogues)
The David Hume Collection (http://digital.library.mcgill.ca/hume/) at McGill University Library
Works by David Hume (https://www.gutenberg.org/author/Hume,+David) at Project
Gutenberg
Works by or about David Hume (https://archive.org/search.php?query=%28%28subject%3
A%22Hume%2C%20David%22%20OR%20subject%3A%22David%20Hume%22%20OR%
20creator%3A%22Hume%2C%20David%22%20OR%20creator%3A%22David%20Hume%
22%20OR%20creator%3A%22Hume%2C%20D%2E%22%20OR%20title%3A%22David%2
0Hume%22%20OR%20description%3A%22Hume%2C%20David%22%20OR%20descripti
on%3A%22David%20Hume%22%29%20OR%20%28%221711-1776%22%20AND%20Hu
me%29%29%20AND%20%28-mediatype:software%29) at Internet Archive
Works by David Hume (https://librivox.org/author/70) at LibriVox (public domain audiobooks)
Books by David Hume (http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/search?amode=st

art&author=Hume%2c%20David) at the Online Books Page
David Hume (https://web.archive.org/web/20141207124622/http://www.utilitarian.net/hume/)
bibliography of Hume's influence on Utilitarianism.
David Hume (http://www.earlymoderntexts.com) readable versions of the Treatise, the
Abstract of the Treatise, the two Enquiries, the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, and
four essays
Peter Millican. Critical Survey of the Literature on Hume and his First Enquiry (https://web.ar
chive.org/web/20190411204843/https://davidhume.org/scholarship/millican) (numerous
essays and scholarly articles on Hume and early modern philosophy by Millican, a leading
Hume specialist at Oxford U.
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Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory

Petty's Place in the History of Economic Theory is an academic

The article gives an overview of the life and work of William

The final chapter tries to give a summary of the findings.

Roncaglia, Alessandro (1985). Petty. The Origins of Political Economy. Translated by

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This page was last edited on 13 January 2020, at 09:25 (UTC).

Contributions to economics Influenced

One of the greatest influences on Cantillon's writing was English

William Petty is considered to be one Methodology

In Essai, Cantillon provided an advanced version of John Locke's

Apart from originating theories on the entrepreneur and spatial

Cover of the Ludwig von Mises

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Richard_Cantillon&oldid=932696701"

This page was last edited on 27 December 2019, at 17:53 (UTC).

Hume argued that inductive reasoning and belief in causality

Contents Fact–value distinction

Hume returned to Edinburgh in 1751. In the following year "the

Eventually, with the publication of his six-volume The History of

Impressions and ideas

Induction and causation

Free will, determinism, and responsibility

Hume's argument is supported by modern-day compatibilists such as R. E. Hobart, a pseudonym of

My views of things are more conformable to Whig principles; my representations of persons

Contributions to economic thought

The writings of Scottish philosopher and contemporary of Hume,

Hume influenced and was influenced by the Christian

Attention to Hume's philosophical works grew after the German

Books by David Hume (http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/search?amode=st

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=David_Hume&oldid=943730675"

This page was last edited on 3 March 2020, at 16:30 (UTC).

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