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González, Jorge. The Effect of Ambiguity in The Chilean Transition (Chapter - 1)
González, Jorge. The Effect of Ambiguity in The Chilean Transition (Chapter - 1)
González, Jorge. The Effect of Ambiguity in The Chilean Transition (Chapter - 1)
Chapter 1
Introduction
Fifteen years of military ruleÊ V>iÊ ÌÊ >Ê i`Ê Ê £nnÊ Ü
iÊ
Chileans voted in a national referendum. The electorate delivered
>ÊÃÕÀ«ÀÃ}ÊÀiLÕiÊÌÊiiÀ>Ê*V
iÌ]ÊÜ
Ê
>`Ê
«i`ÊÌÊÀiViÛiÊ
>ÊÛÌiÊvÊVw`iVi°ÊÃÌi>`]ÊÜ
>ÌÊvÜi`ÊÜiÀiÊvÀiiÊ«ÀiÃ`iÌ>Ê
and parliamentary elections under a reformed constitution in 1989.
*V
iÌÊÜ>ÃÊÌÊ>ÊV>``>ÌiÊÊÌ
>ÌÊiiVÌ°Ê/
ÀiiÊ>ÀÊVÌi`-
ers emerged in the race for president: Büchi on the right, Errázuriz
ÊÌ
iÊViÌiÀÊÀ}
Ì]Ê>`ÊÞÜÊÊÌ
iÊViÌiÀÊivÌ°ÊÊiViLiÀÊ£n]Ê
ÞÜÊÀiViÛi`Êxx¯ÊvÊÌ
iÊÛÌiÊ>`Ê
ÃÊ«>ÀÌÞ]ÊÌ
iÊpdc (Christian
iVÀ>Ìî]ÊiiÀ}i`Ê>ÃÊÌ
iÊ>À}iÃÌÊÛÌiÊ}iÌÌiÀ°ÊÃÊViÌiÀivÌÊV>-
tion elected 22 senators and 72 deputies, against 16 and 48 for the
right rn-udi coalition led by Büchi. In 1994, after presiding over the
most prosperous and stable period in modern Chilean history, Ayl-
ÜÊLiV>iÊÌ
iÊwÀÃÌÊ
i>Ê«ÀiÃ`iÌÊÊxäÊÞi>ÀÃÊÌÊLiÊÃÕVVii`i`Ê
LÞÊ>ÊiLiÀÊvÊ
ÃÊÜÊ«>ÀÌÞ°
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
more than a decade have made Chile an intriguing case for identify-
ing the factors contributing to the transition to a stable democracy.
ÌÊ
>««iÃÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÊ>ÕÌ
ÀÊÜ>ÃÊÊ
iÊ>ÌÊÌ
iÊÌiÊvÊÌ
iÊ£nÊ
L>ÌÃÊ>`ÊÜ>ÃÊÛÛi`ÊÊÌ
iÊ>`ÃÌÀ>ÌÊvÊ>ÊÕLiÀÊvÊ>-
tional polls of the electorate before and during the presidential cam-
«>}°Ê /
ÃÊ ÜÀÊ ÃÊ L>Ãi`Ê Ê >>ÞÃÃÊ vÊ Ì
>ÌÊ «}Ê `>Ì>]Ê ÀÊ >Ê
ÌiV
V>Ê`iÃVÀ«ÌÊvÊÌ
iÊwi`ÜÀ]ÊÃiiÊ««i`ÝÊ£]Êi`ÜÀ®Ê
more precisely on the comparison of national surveys of the Chilean
electorate taken in April and November before the December elec-
tion.
/
iÊÌ>ʵÕiÃÌÊÌ
ÃÊÃÌÕ`ÞÊÃiiÃÊÌÊ>ÃÜiÀÊÃÊÜ
ÞÊÌ
iÊL>-
sic spatial theory of voting appears not to hold for the behavior of
Chilean voters in 1989. The spatial model predicts that in a situation
ÃÕV
Ê>ÃÊÌ
>ÌÊ«ÀiÛ>}ÊÊ
iÊÌ
iÊÌÜÊV>``>ÌiÃÊÊÌ
iÊiÝÌÀiiÃÊ
ÜÊÛiÊÌÊÌ
iÊViÌiÀÊÊ>Ê>ÌÌi«ÌÊÌÊÜÊ>Ü>ÞÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊvÀÊÌ
iÊ
ViÌÀÃÌÊV>``>Ìi°Ê"ÛiÀÊÌ
iÊVÕÀÃiÊvÊÌ
iÊ£nÊV>«>}]Ê
ÜiÛiÀ]Ê
candidates on both the left and the right moved, not to the center
>`ÊÌ
iÀivÀiÊÌÜ>À`ÊÌ
iÊi`>ÊÛÌiÀ]ÊLÕÌÊÌÊÌ
iÀÊÀiëiVÌÛiÊiÝ-
tremes. In spite of this, the center candidate, Errázuriz came in a
«ÀÊÌ
À`°Ê/
ÃÊÌ
iÀiÌV>ÞÊÕiÝ«iVÌi`ÊÕÌViÊÃÊÜ
>ÌÊÌ
ÃÊ`Ã-
ÃiÀÌ>ÌÊwÀÃÌÊÃiiÃÊÌÊiÝ«>°
Ê Ì
iÊ £nÊ iiVÌÊ ÌÕÀÕÌÊ Ü>ÃÊ ÛiÀÊ iÌÞÊ «iÀViÌÊ vÊ Ì
iÊ
i}LiÊiiVÌÀ>Ìi]Ê>`ÊÌ
iÀiÊiÝÃÌÃÊ>Ê}iiÀ>ÊVÃiÃÕÃÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÊiiV-
ÌÊÜ>ÃÊv>ÀÊ>`ÊÌ
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Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
V>``>ÌiÊÃÊÌÊ«ÀiÃiÌÊ
ÃivÊÊÃÕV
Ê>ÊÜ>ÞÊ>ÃÊÌÊ>««i>ÀÊ>ÃÊVÃiÊ
>ÃÊ«ÃÃLiÊÌÊ>ÃÊ>ÞÊvÊÌ
iÊÛÌiÀÃÊ>ÃÊ
iÊii`ÃÊÊÀ`iÀÊÌÊÜÊÌ
iÊ
race under the given institutional arrangements and the character-
istics of the competition. In this modified model I no longer assume
Ì
>ÌÊÌ
iÀiÊÃÊ>ÊÃ}iÊ«ÌÊÊÌ
iÊë>ViÊVÃÌÌÕÌi`ÊLÞÊÛÌiÀýÊ`i>Ê
«ÌÃÊ>ÌÊÜ
V
ÊÌ
iÊV>``>ÌiÊÃ
Õ`Ê«ÃÌÊ
ÃivÊÌÊ>ÝâiÊ
his support. Rather, there is a deliberately ambiguous space that is
>ÃÊ>À}iÊ>ÃÊiViÃÃ>ÀÞÊÌÊÜÊÌ
iÊÃ
>ÀiÊvÊÌ
iÊÛÌiÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÊÃÌÌÕÌÃÊ
require.
ÀÊV>``>ÌiÃÊÌÊ«ÕÀÃÕiÊÌ
ÃÊÀiÊV«V>Ìi`ÊÃÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊÊ>À-
gue that they must engage not only in deception of the voters, that is
>««i>À}ÊÌÊLiÊÜ
>ÌÊÌ
iÞÊ>ÀiÊÌ]ÊLÕÌÊÊÃiv`iVi«ÌÊ>ÃÊÜi°Ê/
>ÌÊ
ÊÌ
iÊ`>«Ìi`Ê`Ê>`ÊÀi>Ìi`ÊÜÀÊÊiÛÕÌ>ÀÞÊ«ÃÞV
}ÞÊ
I am able to interpret the cognitive maps of voters and solve certain
problems spatial theorists have had in interpreting or labeling the at-
titudinal dimensions they have uncovered. They have tended to give
them issue-related, ideological, or substantive-policy labels. In other
ÜÀ`ÃÊ Ì
iÞÊ
>ÛiÊ ÃiiÊ Ì
iÊ >ÃÊ «À`ÕVÌÃÊ vÊ Ì
iÊ Ã«iVwVÊ VÌiÝÌÊ Ê
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iÊ`>Ì>Ê>ÀiÊViVÌi`]ÊÜ
iÊÊÜÊ>À}ÕiÊÌ
iÞÊ>ÀiÊÌ
iÊëiVwVÊ
political manifestation of universal dimensions of cognitive struc-
ÌÕÀiÊÌ
>ÌÊ
>ÛiÊLiiÊÕVÛiÀi`ÊÊ>ÊVÕÌÕÀ>ÊÃiÌÌ}ÃÊÜ
iÊÃÕÌ>LiÊ
studies have been undertaken.
/
iÊ`iw}ÊV
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iÊ LÞÊ Ì
iÊ ÀiëiVÌÛiÊ V>``>ÌiÃÊ ÌÜ>À`ÃÊ iiÀ>Ê *V
iÌÊ >`Ê Ì
iÊ
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iÊÌ>ÀÞÊÀi}iÊ
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i>`i`°Ê*>ÌÀVÊÞÜÊ
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Ê>Üi`ÊViÌiÀÊ>`ÊivÌÃÌÊÛÌiÀÃÊÌÊLiiÛiÊÌ
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}}ÊÌÊ«ÀÌiÊV
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iÀÊ>Ài>ðÊi>Ü
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iÊ
economic elite and voters on the right held the opposite perception
vÊ
ÃÊÌiÌðÊ/
iÊ>ÊLiVÌÛiÊvÊÌ
iÊÞÜÊV>«>}ÊÜ>ÃÊ
ÌÊ>ÃÃV>ÌiÊ ØV
ÊÜÌ
Ê*V
iÌÊ>`ÊiëiV>ÞÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊvÀiiÊ>À-
iÌÊiVVÊ`i°ÊÜiÛiÀ]ÊViÊÊvwViÊÞÜÊ>Ì>i`ÊÌ
iÊ
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
candidate or party does not select one point on the left-right scale,
LÕÌÊ>ÊÃi}iÌÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÞÊÌÀÞÊÌÊiÝ«>`ÊÊiÊ`ÀiVÌÊÀÊ>Ì
iÀÊ>ÃÊ
much as possible given the competitive pressures and the informa-
tion available to the voters.
Vi«ÌÕ>Þ]ÊÌ
ÃÊV>ÊLiÊiÝÌi`i`ÊÌÊÀiÊÌ
>ÊÌ
iÊëiÊivÌ
À}
ÌÊ`iÃ]ÊÜ
V
ÊÃÊVÃÃÌiÌÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ>Ì
i>ÌV>ÊvÀÕ-
>ÌÊvÊ
iÜÊ>`ÊV
°ÊÃÊ>ÊVVi«Ì]ÊÌÊÃÊiÛiÊÀiÊv>Ì
vÕÊ
ÌÊÌ
iÀÊÜÊ>ÃÃÕ«ÌÊÌ
>ÌÊ>ÊVÊÃiÌÊvÊ«Ài`VÌÛiÊ>LiÃÊÃÊ
used to describe political candidates, but that each label may suggest
different policy positions to different voters. Thus, political debate is
5
Ibid.
6
>iÃÊ°Ê
iÜÊ>`ÊiÛÊ°ÊV
]ÊThe Spatial Theory of Voting. An
IntroductionÊ iÜÊ9À\Ê
>LÀ`}iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ*ÀiÃÃ]Ê£n{®\Ê«>}iÊ{ä°
Aylwin’s History
*>ÌÀVÊÞÜÊLiV>iÊ
i>Ê«ÀiÃ`iÌÊ>ÃÊ>ÊiLiÀÊvÊÌ
iÊ
ÀÃ-
Ì>ÊiVÀ>ÌVÊ*>ÀÌÞ]ÊÜ
V
ÊiiÀ}i`ÊvÀÊÌ
iÊ
ÃiÀÛ>ÌÛiÊ*>ÀÌÞÊ
Ì
>ÌÊvÀÊÌÃÊvÕ`}ÊÜ>ÃÊi`ÊÌÊÌ
iÊ
>Ì
VÊ
ÕÀV
°
A group of Catholics committed to the defense of the Church even-
tually became the Conservative Party in 1857. Scully has argued that
LÞÊ`iÌvÞ}ÊÌ
iÊV>ÕÃiÊvÊÌ
iÊ
ÕÀV
ÊÃÊVÃiÞÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ
ÃiÀÛ>-
tive Party, the Church hierarchy not only captured a loyal constitu-
ency for the Conservatives but also defined the political arena for
their adversaries.7
In 1925 President Arturo Alessandri reached an acceptable
V«ÀÃiÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ6>ÌV>ÊÌÊâiÊ«ÕLVÊ`Ã>}ÀiiiÌÊ>`Ê
brought about one of the smoothest transitions to formal separation
LiÌÜiiÊ V
ÕÀV
Ê >`Ê ÃÌ>ÌiÊ Ê >ÌÊ iÀV>°Ê ÀÊ Ì
iÊ `£ÎäÃÊ
ÕÌÊÌ
iÊ>ÌiÊ£xäÃ]ÊÌ
iÀiÊÜ>ÃÊ>Ê}À>`Õ>ÊLÕÌÊÃÌi>`ÞÊVÃ`>ÌÊvÊ
«À}ÀiÃÃÛiÊiiiÌÃÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊV
ÕÀV
Ê
iÀ>ÀV
Þ]Ê>ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊ>Ê}ÀÜ-
ing number of lay groups committed to the increasingly anti-liberal
and anti-capitalist social principles of the Church.8
In 1935 a group of progressive Catholic youths entered the
ÃiÀÛ>ÌÛiÊ *>ÀÌÞÊ ii«}Ê ÌÃÊ ÌiÃÊ ÌÊ Ì
iÊ
ÕÀV
Ê Ü
iÊ ÀiÌ>}Ê
certain autonomy from the party hierarchy. At the time, their anti-
LiÀ>ÊÌiÃÊÜiÀiÊÀiÊVÀ«À>ÌÛÃÌÊÌ
>ÊÃV>ÃÌÊ>ÃÊV>ÊLiÊÃiiÊvÀÊ
iÝ>«iÊÊÌ
iÊ>iÊÌ
iÞÊ>`«Ìi`]ÊFalange Nacional (National Pha-
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
>Ý®°Ê/
iÊ>iÊÜ>ÃÊëÀi`Ê>`ÊiÛi`ÊÌ
iÊVÀ«À>ÌÛÃÌÊÛi-
iÌÊÌ
>ÌÊ>ÌÊÌ
iÊÌiÊÜ>ÃÊÌ
iÊLi>VÊÊÌ
iÊw}
ÌÊ>}>ÃÌÊÃV>ÃÊÊ
Ì
iÊ-«>Ã
ÊVÛÊÜ>À°
ÌÊÌ
>ÌÊÌi]ÊÌ
iÀiÊÜ>ÃÊ>Ê>ÀÊÃV
ÃÊ>}ÊÌ
iÊV
ÕÀV
Ê
iÀ-
>ÀV
ÞÊÛiÀÊ
ÜÊÌÊ`i>ÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ
ÕÃÌÊ«>ÀÌÞ½ÃÊ>`Û>ViÃÊ>}Ê
Ì
iÊÜÀ}ÊV>ÃÃiðÊ7
iÊÌ
iÊ
ÃiÀÛ>ÌÛiÊ*>ÀÌÞÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊ
ÕÀV
Ê
iÀ>ÀV
ÞÊÌ
ÀiÜÊÌ
iÀÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊLi
`ÊÌ
iÊÀi«ÀiÃÃÛiÊvÀÕ>ÊvÊÌ
iÊ
â>iâÊ 6`i>Ê >`ÃÌÀ>ÌÊ £{È£xÓ]Ê Ê Ì
iÊ V`Ê Ü>ÀÊ Ì
iÊ
7
Timothy R. Scully, Rethinking the Center Party Politics in Nineteenth and
Twentieth Century Chile (California: Stanford University Press, 1992): page
21.
8
Ibid., page 115.
9
Arturo Valenzuela, Chile: The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Balti-
Ài\Ê/
iÊ
Ê«ÃÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ*ÀiÃÃ]Ê£Çn®\ΣäÈ°
10
vÀi`ÊViÞÌ]ÊEl Chile perplejo (Santiago: Planeta/Ariel, 1998).
11
*>ÌÀVÊÞÜ]ÊEl reencuentro de los demócratas: del golpe al triunfo del
no (Santiago: Ediciones B Chile, 1998).
ÃÌÊ*>ÀÌÞ®Ê>`Ê`ivi>Ìi`Ê*V
iÌÊÊÌ
iÊ£nnÊÀiviÀi`ÕÊÌÊiÝÌi`Ê
ÃÊÀÕi°ÊÕÀÌ
iÀÀi]ÊÌ
ÀÕ}
Ê
ÃÊÃÌÀ>Ìi}ÞÊvÊÕÃ}ÊÌ
iÊÃÌÌÕÌÃÊ
of the 1980 Constitution, he kept and legitimized the free market
economic system, thereby changing the Chilean political landscape.
ÀÊ«ÌV>ÊÀi>ÃÃÊ>`ÊÌiÀ>ÊVÃÕ«Ì®ÊÞÜÊ>ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊ
ÝiÞÊ>`Ê i}iÀÊ
>ÛiÊ>À}Õi`ÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÀiÊ>ÀiÊÃÕLÃÌ>ÌÛiÊ`vviÀ-
iViÃÊ LiÌÜiiÊ Ì
iÊ iVVÊ `iÊ vÊ *V
iÌÊ >`Ê Ì
iÊ `iÊ vÊ
their administration12°Ê*ÌV>ÊÃViÌÃÌÃÊ>`Ê
ÃÌÀ>ÃÊvÀÊ>ÊÜ`iÊ
ëiVÌÀÕÊVÌÀ>`VÌÊÌ
ÃÊÛiÜ13.
iÊ«ÕÌÊÌ}iÌ
iÀÊ>ÊV>ÌÊÜÌ
Ê
ÃÊvÀiÀÊÀÛ>ÃÊÊÌ
iÊps-ppd,
Ì
iÊ `ivi>Ìi`Ê *V
iÌ]Ê >`Ê >ÌiÀÊ ÜÊ ÛiÀÊ ØV
Ê >`Ê
ÀÀ?âÕÀâ°Ê
Presiding over the mostly successful transition period from 1990-
£{]Ê
ÃÊ «ÀiÃ`iVÞÊ i`i`Ê ÜÌ
Ê Ì
iÊ iiVÌÊ vÊ >Ì
iÀÊ
ÀÃÌ>Ê
iVÀ>ÌVÊ«ÀiÃ`iÌÊÊiViLiÀÊ£ÎÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ>À}iÃÌÊ>ÀÌÞÊÊ
i>Ê
ÃÌÀÞ°Ê/
iÊiÝ«VÌÊVÕÃÊvÊÌ
iÊ>Ìi>ViÊvÊÌ
iÊiV-
VÊ`iÊÊÌ
iÊ«ÌV>Ê«>ÌvÀÊvÊÀiÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊConcertacion)
in the 1993 election did settle this issue14, despite the fact that there
are still significant arguments about the costs of the model15.
After the military coup of 1973 and the death of Allende, Chil-
i>Ê ÃV>ÃÌÃÊ `Û`i`Ê ÌÊ ÃiÛiÀ>Ê }ÀÕ«Ã°Ê /
iÊ >Ê Vi>Û>}iÊ Ü>ÃÊ
12
*>ÌÀVÊÞÜ]ÊEl reencuentro de los demócratas: del golpe al triunfo del
noÊ ->Ì>}\Ê
`ViÃÊ Ê
i]Ê £n®ÆÊ i>`ÀÊ ÝiÞ]Ê La economía
política de la transición. El camino del diálogo (Santiago: Dolmen, 1993);
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
16
Ê >iÃÊ°Ê*iÌÀ>ÃÊ>`ÊÀÀÃÊÀiÞ]Ê>ÌÊiÀV>ÊÊÌ
iÊ/iÊvÊÌ
iÊ
>iÃÊ°Ê*iÌÀ>ÃÊ>`ÊÀÀÃÊÀiÞ]Ê>ÌÊiÀV>ÊÊÌ
iÊ/iÊvÊÌ
iÊ
-
era (London: Routledge, 1992): Chapter 2.
L>ÃÃ>`ÀÊÌÊÌ
iÊ1--,°ÊiëÌiÊÌ
iÊ
i>ÛÞÊV«ÌÊ«ViÃÊÌÜ>À`Ê
Ì
iÊÀÌ
`ÝÊÃV>ÃÌÊLÞÊÌ
iÊConcertacion]ÊÌ
iÀiÊ>ÀiÊÃÌÊÃiÊÜ
Ê
have denounced the betrayal of the people and their disenchantment
ÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ>L>`iÌÊvÊÌ
iÊÀiÊi}>Ì>À>ÊiVVÊ>««À>V
Ê
and the human rights issue17.
17
*
«Ê"Ý
À]ÊOrganizing Civil Society. The Popular Sector and the Strug-
gle for Democracy in Chile. (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
*ÀiÃÃ]Ê£x®ÆÊ>iÃÊ°Ê*iÌÀ>ÃÊ>`ÊiÀ>`ÊiÛ>]ÊDemocracy and Poverty
in Chile: The Limits to Electoral PoliticsÊ Õ`iÀ\Ê7iÃÌÊ6iÜÊ*ÀiÃÃ]Ê£{®ÆÊ
Joseph Collins and John Lear, Chile’s Free Market Miracle: A Second Look
">>`\Ê /
iÊ ÃÌÌÕÌiÊ vÊ `Ê >`Ê iÛi«iÌÊ *VÞ]Ê £x®ÆÊ /?ÃÊ
Moulián, El Chile Actual. Anatomía de un mito (Santiago: Lom-Arcis,
1997).
The Transition
ÀÊ£nÎäÊÌÊ£ÇÎÊ
i>Ê«ÌVÃÊÜiÀiÊÀi}>À`i`Ê>ÃÊÀi>À>LÞÊ
ÃÌ>LiÊ >}Ê Ì
iÊ >ÌÃÊ vÊ >ÌÊ iÀV>°Ê
ÝVi«ÌÊ vÀÊ ÌÜÊ LÀivÊ
Ì>ÀÞÊ ÌiÀÕ`iÃ]Ê }ÛiÀiÌÃÊ ÜiÀiÊ VÃÌÌÕÌ>]Ê `iVÀ>ÌV]Ê
>`ÊVÛ>°ÊÊÌ
ÃÊ«iÀ`ÊiÝiVÕÌÛiÊ«ÜiÀÊÜ>ÃÊÌÀ>ÃviÀÀi`Ê>VVÀ`-
ing to the institutions of the 1833 and 1925 Constitutions. Politics
ViÌiÀi`ÊÊÀÕÌiÊVyVÌÃÊ>`Ê>VV`>ÌÃÊLiÌÜiiÊ«ÌV>Ê
alliances that shifted quickly and easily.
ÃÌÊ
ÃÌÀ>ÃÊ>`ÊÃV>ÊÃViÌÃÌÃÊÃÌÊÌ`>ÞÊvÜÊ
V>½ÃÊ
suggestion that during the nineteenth century, despite the many and
VvÕÃ}Ê >ÀÀ>ÞÃÊ vÊ «ÌV>Ê Ìi`iViÃ]Ê Ü
>ÌÊ Ài>ÞÊ >ÌÌiÀi`Ê ÜiÀiÊ
Ì
iÊ ÌÜÊ >À}iÀÊ `i}V>Ê VÕÀÀiÌÃ]Ê °i°]Ê VÃiÀÛ>ÌÛiÃÊ >`Ê LiÀ>ð18
/
ÃÊÀi}iÊÜ>ÃÊV>«>LiÊvÊ`i>}ÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊV
>i}iÃÊvÊiÜÊÃ-
V>Ê}ÀÕ«Ã]Ê>ÞÊLiV>ÕÃiÊÌ
iÊiÝ«>ÃÊvÊÌ
iÊvÀ>V
ÃiÊLiiwÌi`Ê
both parties at different times: the conservatives from their control
of the rural areas, the liberals from the crescent of urbanization.
ÕÌÊLÞÊ£Óä]Ê
i]ÊÜ
V
Ê>ÃÌÊ>ÊViÌÕÀÞÊLivÀiÊ
>`ÊiÃÌ>L-
Ã
i`Ê>Ê`iÊÀi«ÕLV]ÊÜ>ÃÊVÃ`iÀi`Ê>ÊiÃÃÊ>`À>LiÊiÝ>«iÊvÊ
>Ê}>ÀV
VÊ«>À>iÌ>ÀÞÊÀi}i°ÊÌÊÜ>ÃÊÌÊ>LiÊÌÊ`i>ÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ
««ÀÌÕÌiÃÊÌ
>ÌÊ>ÊÀiÊV«iÝÊÃViÌÞÊvviÀi`ÊÌÊ«ÌV>ÃÊiÊ
Ì
iÊÕ«>`V}ÊLiÀ>Ê«ÌV>ÊÀÌÕÀÊiÃÃ>`ÀÊÜ
ÊL-
âi`ÊÌ
iÊiÜÊÃV>ÊvÀViðÊvÌiÀÊiÃÃ>`ÀÊ«iiÌi`ÊÌ
iÊ£ÓxÊ
ÃÌÌÕÌ]ÊÌ
iÊLiÀ>Ê>`Ê
ÃiÀÛ>ÌÛiÊ«>ÀÌiÃÊÃÜÞÊ`iVi`Ê
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
Ü
iÊiÜÊ«ÌV>Ê}ÀÕ«ÃÊ>ÀÃi°ÊvÌiÀÊÌ
iÊiiVÌÊvÊÌ
iÊ
ÀÃÌ>Ê
iVÀ>ÌVÊvÕ`iÀÊ>`Êi>`iÀÊ
`Õ>À`ÊÀiÊÊ£È{Ê>`ÊiëiV>ÞÊ
after the electoral disaster of the parliamentary elections of 1965, the
LiÀ>Ê>`Ê
ÃiÀÛ>ÌÛiÊ«>ÀÌiÃÊ>}Àii`ÊÌÊÕvÞÊÜÌ
ÊÃiÊÀÊ
nationalistic groups into the Partido Nacional (National Party).
ÀÊiÊvÊÌ
iÃiÊ}ÀÕ«ÃÊV>iÊÌ
iÊ>ÀV
ÌiVÌÊvÊÌ
iÊÕÊvÊÌ
iÊ
right and their only relevant figure: Sergio Onofre Jarpa. The party
««Ãi`ÊÌ
iÊ
`Õ>À`ÊÀiÊ>`ÃÌÀ>ÌÊ£È{£Çä®]Ê«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÊ
ÃÊ ViVÌÛÃÌÊ iVVÊ «ViÃ]Ê >`Ê Ã}i`Ê ÕÌÊ >ÀÝÃÊ >ÃÊ Ì
iÊ
>ÊÌ
Ài>ÌÊÌÊ
i½ÃÊ`iÃÌÞ°ÊÊÌ
iÊvÜ}ÊÞi>ÀÃ]ÊÌ
ÃÊ«>ÀÌÞÊÀi-
18
Ê À>VÃVÊ
V>]ÊHistoria de Chile desde la prehistoria hasta 1891 (Santia-
go: Editorial Nacimiento, 1952): page 143.
ViÛi`ÊÌ
iÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊvÊÌ
ÃiÊÜ
ÊÜiÀiÊ`ÃiV
>Ìi`ÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊivÌÃÌÊ
leanings of the Christian Democrats.
Ì
Õ}
Ê>À«>ÊÜ>ÃÊÌ
iÊ>Êi>`iÀÊvÊÌ
iÊ«>ÀÌÞ]ÊÊ£ÇäÊÌ
iÊ
Nationals supported the independent candidacy of Jorge Alessandri.
After the election of Allende, the party assumed the hardest opposi-
tion line to the socialist government and Jarpa emerged as a national
w}ÕÀiÊ LÞÊ «ÕÌÌ}Ê Ì}iÌ
iÀÊ >Ê ««ÃÌÊ V>ÌÊ ÜÌ
Ê Ì
iÊ ÀiÊ
«ÜiÀvÕÊ
ÀÃÌ>ÊiVÀ>ÌðÊÌ
Õ}
ÊÌ
ÃÊV>ÌÊ`ivi>Ìi`ÊÌ
iÊ
Socialist-Communist coalition in the 1973 parliamentary elections,
ÌÊÜ>ÃÊÕ>LiÊÌÊÀi>V
ÊÌ
iÊÌÜÌ
À`ÃÊ>ÀÌÞÊÌ
>ÌÊÜÕ`Ê
>ÛiÊ>-
Üi`ÊÌÊÌÊÌ
Ü>ÀÌÊÀÊÀiÛiÊi`iÊÕ`iÀÊÌ
iÊÀÕiÃÊvÊÌ
iÊ£ÓxÊ
Constitution.
After the military takeover in 1973, the National Party volun-
Ì>ÀÞÊ`ÃÃÛi`Ê>`ÊV>i`ÊÊÌÃÊvÜiÀÃÊÌÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊÌ
iÊÌ>ÀÞÊ
Ài}i°Ê"ÞÊ>ÊviÜÊiLiÀÃÊÀiÃÃÌi`ÊÌ
ÃÊ`ÀiVÌÛiÊ>`ÊV>ÀÀi`ÊÊ
>Ê «>ÀÌÞÊ >VÌÛÌiÃ°Ê }Ê Ì
iÊ >ÀÌÞÊ Ì
>ÌÊ ÃÕ««ÀÌi`Ê Ì
iÊ
`ÃÃÕÌÊvÊÌ
iÊ«>ÀÌÞ]ÊÃiÊÜiÀiÊ>i`ÊÌÊ«ÃÌÃÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ
Ì>ÀÞÊ}ÛiÀiÌ]Ê>}ÊÌ
iÊ>À«>ÊÜ
Ê>ÃÃÕi`ÊÌ
iÊ>L>Ã-
sadorship to Argentina.
ÕÌÊÌ
iÊÃÌÊÀiiÛ>ÌÊvÊ>ÊÜ>ÃÊ>À«>½ÃÊ>««ÌiÌÊ>ÃÊÃ-
ter of the Interior in August of 1983, as the mobilization against the
military regime reached its peak. When Jarpa assumed his position,
the opposition had been able to organize three national strikes, on
May 11, June 14, and July 12. Political and union leaders, mainly
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
Christian Democrats, had for the first time in a decade been able to
ivviVÌÛiÞÊV
>i}iÊÌ
iÊÀi}i]ÊLÕÌÊÌÊÜÌ
ÕÌÊ>ÊVÃÌ°Ê/
iÊL-
zation of the people to oppose first the economic policies and second
the human rights abuses has been thoroughly documented by Aman
>`Ê *>ÀiÀ]Ê "Ý
À]Ê ,LiÀÌÃ]Ê >`Ê -V
i`iÀ19. In the first strike,
19
Kenneth Aman and Cristian Parker, Popular Culture in Chile. Resistance
and SurvivalÊ Õ`iÀ\Ê7iÃÌÛiÜÊ*ÀiÃÃ]Ê££®ÆÊ*
«Ê"Ý
À]Ê/
iÊ*«Õ>ÀÊ
-iVÌÀ°Ê ,iëÃiÊ ÌÊ >Ê ÕÌ
ÀÌ>À>Ê ,i}i°Ê -
>ÌÞÌÜÊ "À}>â>ÌÃÊ
since the Military Coup», Latin American Perspectives 67(1991):66-91;
*
«Ê"Ý
À]ÊOrganizing Civil Society. The Popular Sector and the Strug-
gle for Democracy in Chile (University Park: Pennsylvania State University
*ÀiÃÃ]Ê £x®ÆÊ iiÌ
Ê ,LiÀÌÃ]Ê ÀÊ Ì
iÊ >ÀÀV>`iÃÊ ÌÊ Ì
iÊ >ÌÊ Ý\Ê
Redemocratization and Political Realignment in the Chilean Left», Politics
ÌÜÊ«i«iÊÜiÀiÊi`]ÊÛiÀÊÈääÊ«ÀÃi`Ê>`Ê
Õ`Ài`ÃÊÕÀi`Ê
ÊÌ
iÊ`iÃÌÀ>ÌÃÊ>`ÊV>Ã
iÃÊÜÌ
Ê«Vi°ÊÊÌ
iÊÃiV`ÊÃÌÀi]Ê
three people died in confrontations. And in the third one, in spite of
>ÊVÕÀviÜÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊ«ÀiÛÕÃÊV>ÀViÀ>ÌÊvÊÌ
iÊ«ÀiÃ`iÌÊvÊÌ
iÊpdc,
>LÀiÊ6>`iÃ]Ê>`ÊÌ
iÀÊi>`iÀÃ]ÊÌ
iÊVÕÌÀÞÊÜ>ÃÊLÀÕ}
ÌÊÌÊ>Ê
>Ì]Ê
>`ÊÌÜÊÞÕÌ
ÃÊ`i`°
By August, the opposition formalized its cooperation by form-
ing the Alianza DemocraticaÊ iVÀ>ÌVÊ >Vi]Ê ®Ê Ê Ü
V
Ê
ÀÃÌ>ÊiVÀ>ÌÃ]Ê-V>ÃÌÃÊÌ
iÊ`iÀ>ÌiÊÜ}®]Ê,>`V>ÃÊ>`Ê
others (but no Communists) agreed on three basic points:
£®ÊÊiÜÊVÃÌÌÕÌÆ
2) The resignation of Pinochet;
3) A transition government.
"ÊÕ}ÕÃÌÊ££ÊÌ
iÀiÊÜ>ÃÊ>ÊÃÌÀiÊÌ
>ÌÊÜ>ÃÊV>i`ÊÌ
iÊ«À«Ã>Ê«À-
ÌiÃÌÊÌÊÃÌÀiÃÃÊÌ
iÊv>VÌÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
ÃiÊÌ
ÀiiÊ«ÌÃÊÜiÀiÊLi}Ê`i>`i`°Ê
/
ÃÊ ÌiÊ Ì
iÊ
Õ>Ê VÃÌÊ Ü>ÃÊ
ÀÀi`ÕÃÊ LÞÊ
i>Ê ÃÌ>`>À`ðÊ
/ÜiÌÞÃÝÊ«i«iÊ`i`Ê>`ÊÌ
iÊ«ÌV>Êi>`iÀÃÊ
>`ÊÌÊv>ViÊÌÊÞÊ
Ì
iÊ`ÃVÌiÌÊvÊÌ
iÊ``iÊV>ÃÃÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊÃÌÀi½ÃÊÛiVi]ÊLÕÌÊ>ÃÊ
the increasing pressure of the Communist leaders to participate not
only in mobilization activities but also in the AD leadership. What
LiV>iÊVi>ÀÊÜ>ÃÊÌ
>ÌÊ*V
iÌÊ
>`ÊÌ
iÊV>«>LÌÞÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊÀiÃÕÌÊ
to prevail by force, since the opposition leaders through the mobili-
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
â>ÌÊÜi>ii`ÊÌ
iÊÌ>ÀÞÊÀi}iÊLÕÌÊÜiÀiÊv>ÀÊvÀÊÛiÀÌ
ÀÜ-
ing it20.
and SocietyÊÓΣx®\{xx£ÆÊ
>Ì
ÞÊ-V
i`iÀ]Ê-
>ÌÞÌÜÃÊ>`Ê,iÃÃ-
tance in Authoritarian Chile», Latin American Perspectives 67(1991):92-
112; Cathy Schneider, Shantytown Protest in Pinochet’s Chile (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1995).
20
>ÕiÊ >ÀÀiÌ]Ê /
iÊ *ÌV>Ê "««ÃÌÊ >`Ê Ì
iÊ *>ÀÌÞÊ -ÞÃÌiÊ Õ`iÀÊ
the Military Regime» en Drake, Paul; Jaksic, Iván (editors) The Struggle
for Democracy in Chile. 1982-1990 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
£Ó®ÆÊ vÀi`Ê ViÞÌ]Ê El Chile perplejo (Santiago: Planeta/Ariel.
1998); Edgardo Boeninger, Democracia en Chile. Lecciones para la gobern-
abilidadÊ->Ì>}\Ê`ÀjÃÊ i]ʣǮÆÊ*>ÌÀVÊÞÜ]ÊEl reencuentro de
los demócratas: del golpe al triunfo del no (Santiago: Ediciones B Chile,
1998).
and Fall of the Chicago Boys (London: Latin American Bureau, 1983);
*>ÌÀVÊ-Û>]ÊÀÊÌ
iÊ
V>}Ê ÞÃÊÌÊÌ
iÊ
* ÊÃ]ÊJournal
of Latin American Studies°ÊÓΣ£®\Înx{£äÆÊ>ÀÊ>Vvv]ÊModern Chile
1970-1989: A Critical HistoryÊ iÜÊiÀÃiÞ\Ê/À>Ã>VÌÊ*ÕLÃ
iÀÃ]Ê£n®ÆÊ
Ascanio Cavallo, Manuel Salazar, and Oscar Sepúlveda. La historia oculta
del Regimen Militar. Chile 1973-1988 (Santiago: Antártica, 1990); Barry
*°Ê ÃÜÀÌ
]Ê ,Õ`}iÀÊ ÀLÕÃV
]Ê >`Ê ,>ÕÊ >L?Ê i`ÌÀÃ®Ê The Chilean
Economy. Policy Lessons and Challenges (Washington D.C.: Brookings In-
stitution, 1994); Gary Walton, (editor) The National Economic Policies of
ChileÊÀiiÜV
]Ê
iVÌVÕÌ\ÊÊ*ÀiÃÃ]Ê£nx®°
22
i>`ÀÊÝiÞ]ÊDespués del monetarismo (Santiago: Aconcagua, 1983);
i>`ÀÊ ÝiÞ]Ê Chile y su futuro: un país posible (Santiago: Cieplan,
£nÇ®ÆÊ i>`ÀÊ ÝiÞ]Ê Experimentos neoliberales en América Latina
jÝV\Ê`Ê`iÊ
ÕÌÕÀ>Ê
VV>]Ê£nn®ÆÊ`ÀiÃÊ<>`Û>À]ÊExilio en
MadridÊ>`À`\Ê
*
]Ê£nήÆÊ*>ÌÀVÊÞÜ]ÊLa Alternativa Democráti-
caÊ->Ì>}\Ê`>ÌiÊ£n{®ÆÊÃiÊ*°ÊÀi>Ê>`Ê,iiÊ
ÀÌ>â>À°Êy>V]Ê
vÀiiÊ >ÀiÌiÀÃÊ >ÃÊ ÜiÊ >ÃÊ >iÊ Õâ>Ê >`Ê -iÀ}Ê iÀ>`iâÊ
founded the Union Democratica Independiente (Democratic Inde-
pendent Union, udi®ÊÌÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊÌ
iÊÌ>ÀÞÊÀi}iÊLÕÌÊvÀÊ>Ê-
`i«i`iÌÊ>`ÊVÀÌV>Ê«iÀëiVÌÛi°Ê/
iÀÊÌÀÕiÊÌiÌÊÜ>ÃÊÌÊ«-
«ÃiÊ>À«>°ÊÊÌ
>ÌÊ>ÃÌʵÕ>ÀÌiÀÊvÊ£nÎ]Ê>Ì
iÀÊ}ÀÕ«ÊÜ>ÃÊvÀi`Ê
on the right. The Movimiento de Union Nacional (mun or National
Union Movement), formed by former members of the National Par-
ty, intended to have a broader appeal than the old right party and to
become the unifying force of all the different movements around the
center-right and right.
yVÌÃÊ >VÀiVVÃÊ ÞÊ iVÀ>Ìâ>VÊ iÊ
iÊ Pensamiento
Iberoamericano 9(1986):331-363.
/
iÊÌ
iÀÊÃ`iÊvÊÌ
iÊVÊÜ>ÃÊiÀ>Ê ØV
½ÃÊV>``>VÞ°ÊÃÊ
*V
i̽ÃÊ>ViÊÃÌiÀ]Ê ØV
ÊÜ>ÃÊÌ
iÊÃÌÊ«ÀiÌÊvÊÌ
iÊ
ÃiV`Ê}iiÀ>ÌÊvÊÞÕ}ÊiVÃÌÃÊÜ
ÊÀivÀi`ÊÌ
iÊ
i>Ê
iVÞ°Ê-ViÊLiV}ÊÃÌiÀÊÊiLÀÕ>ÀÞÊ£nxÊÜ
iÊ*V
iÌÊ
ousted Jarpa and his associates), the military government had re-
turned to the pro-market policies of the late seventies and in many
Ü>ÞÃÊ ÜiÌÊ ÕV
Ê vÕÀÌ
iÀ°Ê /
ÃÊ ÌiÊ Ì
iÊ >ÀiÌÊ ÀivÀÃÊ ÜiÀiÊ i-
LÀ>Vi`ÊLÞÊÌ
iÊLÕÃiÃÃÊVÕÌÞÊÜ
i
i>ÀÌi`ÞÊ>`ÊÜiÀiÊÃiiÊ>ÃÊ
23
>ÀÊ>Vvv]Ê1°-°Ê*VÞÊi>ÊForeign Affairs (Spring, 1986):833-
848.
24
`}>À`Ê i}iÀ]Ê /
iÊ
i>Ê ,>`Ê ÌÊ iVÀ>VÞÊ Foreign Affairs
(Spring, 1986):812-832.
Ì
iÊ>ÃÌÊV
>ViÊvÀÊÌ
i°Ê/
ÃÊÜ>ÃÊÊÃ}wV>ÌÊ«>ÀÌÊ>ÊÀiÃÕÌÊvÊÌ
iÊ
intense anti-market position of the pdc and the ps25. The intensity
vÊÌ
iÊ`vviÀiViÃÊLiÌÜiiÊÌ
iÊLÕÃiÃÃÊi>`iÀÃÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊ««ÃÌÊÌÊ
Pinochet has been thoroughly documented by Constable and Valen-
âÕi>Ê>ÃÊÜiÊ>ÃÊLÞÊÀ>iÊ>`Ê>ÃV26.
iÌÜiiÊ £nxÊ >`Ê £n]Ê Ì
iÃiÊ ÞÕ}Ê iVÃÌÃÊ «ÀÛ>Ìâi`Ê
the companies and banks that had been taken over by the state as a
ÀiÃÕÌÊvÊÌ
iÊw>V>Ê`iL>ViÊvÊ£nΰÊÕÀÌ
iÀÀi]ÊÌ
iÞÊ«ÀÛ>Ìâi`Ê
many public enterprises that had been either formed by the state or
}ÊÕ`iÀÊÌÃÊVÌÀÊ>`ÊÜiÀiÊ>}ÊÌ
iÊ>À}iÃÌÊiÃÊÊÌ
iÊ
-
i>ÊiVÞ°Ê/
ÃÊÜ>ÃÊ`iÊÌ
ÀÕ}
Ê>ÊÃÞÃÌiÊV>i`Ê«i«i½ÃÊV>«-
talism» (capitalismo popular®Ê Ì
>ÌÊ >`iÊ >ÞÊ
i>ÃÊ Ü
Ê
>`Ê
iÛiÀÊ
>`Ê>VViÃÃÊÌÊV>«Ì>ÊÜiÀÃÊvÊVÀ«À>ÌiÊÃÌVð
ÕÀÌ
iÀÀi]Ê Ì
ÀÕ}
Ê Ã«iV>Ê VÀi`ÌÊ >`Ê Ì>ÝÊ iÝi«ÌÊ -
centives many employees of the state and former public companies
LiV>iÊ Ã
>ÀiÜiÀÃÊ vÊ Ì
iÊ iÜÞÊ «ÀÛ>Ìâi`Ê iÌiÀ«ÀÃiÃ°Ê /
ÃÊ >`Ê
other policies contributed to the second pro-market reforms being
ÕV
ÊLiÌÌiÀÊÀiViÛi`ÊLÞÊÌ
iÊ«ÕLV]ÊÜ
V
ÊÊ«>ÀÌÊiÝ«>ÃÊ ØV
½ÃÊ
««Õ>ÀÌÞ°ÊÃÊ ØV
½ÃÊÞÕÌ
Ê
iÊÜ>ÃÊ{äÊÊ£n®Ê>`ÊiëiV>ÞÊ
his non-conventional appearance and eccentric personality gave cre-
`iViÊÌÊÌ
iÊiÊÌ
>ÌÊ
iÊÜ>ÃÊ`vviÀiÌ]Ê>ÃÊ
ÃÊÜiÀ}>âi`ÊÃÕ«-
«ÀÌiÀÃÊÜiÀiÊÃ>Þ}ÊÊÌ
iÊV>«>}°
/
iÊV>«>}ÊÜ>ÃÊ>ÕV
i`Êi`>ÌiÞÊ>vÌiÀÊ*V
i̽ÃÊ`i-
vi>ÌÊLÞÊ>Ê}ÀÕ«ÊvÊÃ>ÊiÌÀi«ÀiiÕÀÃÊ>`Ê«ÀviÃÃ>Ã]ÊÜ
Ê
>`Ê
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
25
Sergio Bitar, (editor) Chile, liberalismo económico y dictadura política
(Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1980); Centro de Estudios Latino-
americanos (editor). Chile. Convergencia Socialista. Fundamentos de una
PropuestaÊ jÝV\Ê 1ÛiÀÃ`>`Ê >V>Ê ÕÌ>Ê `iÊ jÝV]Ê £n£®ÆÊ
i>`ÀÊÝiÞ]ÊDespués del monetarismo (Santiago: Aconcagua, 1983);
i>`ÀÊ ÝiÞ]Ê Chile y su futuro: un país posible (Santiago: Cieplan,
1987); Luis Maira, La Constitución de 1980 y la ruptura democrática (San-
tiago: Emisión, 1988); Gonzalo Martner, (editor) Diseños para el cambio
>À>V>Ã\Ê ÕiÛ>Ê-Vi`>`]Ê£nÇ®ÆÊÀ}iÊÀÀ>ÌiÊ>`Ê*>ÕÊ`>}]ÊPasión
y razón del socialismo chileno (Santiago: Ornitorrinco, 1989); Manuel Gar-
retón, Propuestas políticas y demandas socialesÊ->Ì>}\Ê>VÃ]Ê£n®°
26
Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela. A Nation of Enemies. Chile Un-
der PinochetÊ iÜÊ9À\Ê ÀÌ]Ê££®ÆÊ*>ÕÊÀ>iÊ>`ÊÛ>Ê>ÃVÊi`-
tors) The Struggle for Democracy in Chile. 1982-1990 (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1995).
ÊÜÊ«ÌV>Ê>vw>ÌÃÊ>`ÊÜ
ÊV>iÊvÀÊLÌ
ÊV>«Ã]Ê«ÀÊ
>`Ê>Ì*V
iÌ°ÊÌÊÜ>ÃÊÌVi>LiÊÌ
>ÌÊÊÌ
ÃÊV>«>}ÊiÊvÊ
the political figures from the military government or the parties of
Ì
iÊÀ}
ÌÊÜ>ÃÊ«ÀiÌÞÊÛÛi`°ÊÕÀÌ
iÀÀi]Ê>ÌÊÌ
iÊÌiÊ ØV
Ê
resigned from the Cabinet to launch his presidential bid in April,
Ì
iÊ >Ê «ÀÌiÀÊ vÊ
ÃÊ V>``>VÞÊ Ü>ÃÊ -iL>ÃÌ>Ê *iÀ>°Ê *iÀ>Ê
Ü>ÃÊ >Ê ÞÕ}Ê iVÃÌÊ >`Ê iÌÀi«ÀiiÕÀÊ Ü
Ê
>`Ê LiiÊ >Ê «À-
iÌÊ««iÌÊÌÊ*V
iÌÊ>`ÊÜ
Ê
>`ÊVÃiÊÌiÃÊÌÊLÌ
ÊÌ
iÊpdc
and to the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. But if before the refer-
i`ÕÊ>ÞÊ>Ì>ÃÌÃÊÜiÀiÊÕÃÞ«>Ì
iÌVÊÌÜ>À`Ê ØV
ÊÀÊ
ÃÊ
«ViÃ]Ê>vÌiÀÊÌ
iÊÀiviÀi`Õ½ÃÊ`ivi>ÌÊÌ
iÀÊ`ÃÌ>ÃÌiÊ}ÀiÜ°Ê ÌÊÞÊ
did they blame the economists and their policies for the defeat, they
>ÃʵÕiÃÌi`ÊÌ
iÀÊÞ>ÌÞÊÌÊ*V
iÌ°Ê ØV
ÊV>«>}i`ÊÞÊÃÝÊ
ÜiiÃÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊÜÌ
`ÀiÜ]ÊV>}ÊÌÊÌÊ
>ÛiÊÌ
iÊ«iÀÃ>ÌÞÊÌÊLiÊ
a politician.
À>VÃVÊ>ÛiÀÊ
ÀÀ?âÕÀâ½ÃÊV>``>VÞÊV>Ê>ÃÊLiÊiÝ«>i`ÊÊ
Ài>ÌÊÌÊ
ÃÊ«ÃÌÊÌÜ>À`ÃÊÌ
iÊiVVÊÀivÀðÊÀÊÞi>ÀÃ]Ê
À-
rázuriz had been one of the most outspoken detractors of the young
iVÃÌýʫViÃ]ÊÜ
V
Ê
iÊ«ÀÌÀ>Þi`Ê>ÃÊÌÊ
>À`ÊÊÌ
iÊ«i«i]Ê
Ü
iÊii«}Ê>Ê«ÀÌ>ÀÞÊ««ÕÃÌÊ>}i°ÊÃÊÃÕV
Ê
iÊvÀi`Ê>Ê
coalition named the Union de Centro-Centro (Center-Center Union,
ucc®°ÊiÊÀiViÛi`ÊÌ
iÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊvÊÌ
ÃiÊÜ
Ê>Ì
Õ}
ÊLi}ÊÊv>ÛÀÊ
vÊ Ì
iÊ Ì>ÀÞÊ Ài}iÊ ÜiÀiÊ ÌÊ «>ÀÌÊ vÊ Ì
iÊ «À>ÀiÌÊ V>Ì°Ê
/
iÊÃÌÊ«ÀiÌÊ>}ÊÌ
iÊÜ>ÃÊiiÀ>Ê>ÕiÊ
ÌÀiÀ>Ã]Ê
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
Ü
Ê>ÃÊÌ
iÊvÀiÀÊ
i>`ÊvÊ*V
i̽ÃÊÃiVÀiÌÊÌi}iViÊÃiÀÛVi]ÊÜ>ÃÊ
the real force behind Avanzada Nacional (National Advance Guard,
an).
In 1976, a group of nationalists published a magazine orient-
ed to the armed forces called Avanzada (Advance Guard) to stress
their commitment to be the first in the fight against the enemies of
Ì
iÊ>ÌÊÜ
ÊvÀÊÌ
iÊÜiÀiÊÌ
iÊ>ÀÝÃÌÊ««ÃÌ®°Ê/
ÃÊ}ÀÕ«Ê
later formed a political party called Avanzada Nacional. Often this
}ÀÕ«ÊvÜi`Ê>ÊVÕÀÃiÊÌ
>ÌÊÀiyiVÌi`ÊÌ
iÊLÌÌiÀÊ`ëÕÌiÃÊvÀÊyÕ-
iViÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊÌ>ÀÞÊÀi}i]Ê°i°ÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊÀiÊyÕiÌ>ÊiV-
mists (and their associates, the later udi®]ÊÜ
ÊiÛiÀÊ
>`Ê>ÞÊÃÞ«>-
thy for General Contreras. After the defeat of Pinochet in the 1988
Interpreting Behavior
ÕÃiÊvÊÛiViÊÜ>ÃÊÀi>Ìi`ÊÌÊÌ
iÊ>À}ÕiÌÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÊÕÃiÊvÊvÀViÊÜ>ÃÊ>Ê
necessary cost to implement the market economy.
ÀÊÌ
ÃÊÌ
iÃÃÊÌ
iÊÃiV`ʵÕiÃÌÊ>ÌÌiÀÃ]ÊLÕÌÊÌ
iÊwÀÃÌÊ`iÃÊ
Ì°Ê/
iÊÀi>ÃÊÃÊÌ
>ÌÊÌÊ`iÃÊÌÊ>ÌÌiÀÊ
ÜÊÌÌiÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊÀÊ
ÜÊ
V
>}iÊÊ«ÃÌÊÜ>ÃÊÌ
iÊ>}ÀiiiÌÊÀi>V
i`ÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊÌ>ÀÞÊÀi-
}iÊ>LÕÌÊÌ
iÊ >À`ÊvÊÌ
iÊ
iÌÀ>Ê >]ÊÜiiÃÊLivÀiÊÌ
iÊiiVÌÊ
vÊÞÜÊÊ£n33.
After that event the official rhetoric of the ConcertacionÊÜ>ÃÊ
supportive of the maintenance of the economic model34. At that time
32
`>Ê*ÀâiÜÀÃ]ÊDemocracy and the MarketÊ iÜÊ9À\Ê
>LÀ`}iÊ1-
versity Press, 1991).
33
Edgardo Boeninger, Democracia en Chile. Lecciones para la gobernabilidad
->Ì>}\Ê`ÀjÃÊ i]ʣǮÆÊi>`ÀÊÝiÞ]ÊLa economía política de la
transición. El camino del diálogo (Santiago: Dolmen, 1993): Cavallo, Ascanio.
Historia oculta de la transición: Chile 1990-1998Ê->Ì>}\ÊÀ>L]Ê£n®°
34
*>ÌÀVÊÞÜ]ÊEl reencuentro de los demócratas: del golpe al triunfo del
no (Santiago: Ediciones B Chile, 1998)
ÝiÞÊ «ÕLÃ
i`Ê >Ê ÌÀ>VÌÊ ÃiÀÌi`Ê Ê Ì
iÊ >ÀÊ iÜë>«iÀÃ]Ê V>i`Ê
/
iÀiÊÃÊ>Ê
VVÊ
ÃiÃÕÃÊÊ
i35Ê>`ÊvÜi`ÊÌÊÜÌ
Ê>Ê
concerted effort to silence any opposition to this dramatic change36.
This question first manifested itself to me in a conversation
ÜÌ
Ê*ÀViÌÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ«ÀviÃÃÀÊ*>ÕÊ-}Õ`°Ê7iÊÜiÀiÊëi>-
ing about the difficulty that Juan G. Valdes (a prominent socialist
«ÌV>Ê>`ÊÌ
iÊVÕÀÀiÌÊÃÌiÀÊvÊÀi}Êvv>ÀÃÊvÊ
i®Ê
>`Ê
ÊÀiVV}Ê
ÃÊ«ÃÌÊ>ÃÊiLiÀÊvÊÌ
iÊÞÜÊÀi}iÊÜÌ
ÊÌ
iÊ
>ÊÌ
iÃÃÊvÊ6>`iýÊL°ÊÊÌ
iÊLÊL>Ãi`ÊÊ
ÃÊ`ÃÃiÀÌ>ÌÊ
that Sigmund directed and published in Spanish in 1989 and English
1995)37 the young Valdes argued about a conspiracy of the Chicago
economists and some North American organizations to dismantle
the Chilean state and destroy the political structure of pre-Pinochet
`iVÀ>ÌVÊ
i°ÊÊÌ
iÊ1°-°°Ê>`ÊÃÌÊVÕÌÀiÃÊÌ
>ÌÊLÊÜÕ`Ê
have been used to attack Juan G. Valdes politically. Why did this not
>««iÊÊ
i¶ÊÕÀÌ
iÀÀi]ÊÜ
ÞÊÃÊÌÊÌ
>ÌÊÝiÞÊ>`ÊÌ
iÀÊ«À
>ÀiÌÊÃV>ÃÌÃÊÜiÀiÊVÃÌ>ÌÞÊ>VVÕÃi`ÊvÊVÃÃÌiVÞÊÊ«ÀÛ>ÌiÊ
(among the right) but have not been attacked publicly?
/
iÊ >ÃÜiÀÊ ÃÊ Ì
>ÌÊ Ì
iÊ ViÛiÀÊ ÕÃiÊ vÊ >L}ÕÌÞÊ
>ÃÊ vÀÊ >ÞÊ
years been a mayor asset among Chilean elites and that for the sup-
«ÀÌiÀÃÊvÊÌ
iÊ>ÀiÌÊiVÞÊÌÊÜ>ÃÊLiÌÌiÀÊÌÊii«ÊÃiÌÊÊÌ
iÃiÊ
contradictions.
In the 1960s, before the election of Allende and the later mili-
Ì>ÀÞÊÛiÀÌ
ÀÜÊvÊ
ÃÊ}ÛiÀiÌ]Ê
i½ÃÊ`iVÀ>VÞÊÜ>ÃÊVÃ`iÀi`Ê
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
ÕµÕiÊÊ>ÌÊiÀV>°Ê*ÌV>ÊÃViÌÃÌÃÊiÊ>>Ê-ÛiÀÌ]Êi`-
erico Gil and Peter Cleaves38 stressed that Chile had one of the lon-
35
i>`ÀÊÝiÞ]ÊHay un consenso economico en Chile (Santiago: Inserto,
1989).
36
iÀ>À`Ì>Ê iÊ ->ÀÊ >`Ê >À>Ê /°Ê }ÕÀÀi]Ê ÃÊ ÕiÛÃÊ LÞÃÊ `iÊ >Ê
iV>°Ê Que Pasa 1.044(1991):24-29; Crisostomo Pizarro, Dagmar
Raczynski, and Joaquin Vial (editors) Políticas económicas y sociales en el
Chile democrático (Santiago: Cieplan-Unicef, 1995).
37
Juan G. Valdes, La Escuela de Chicago: Operacion Chile (Buenos Aires:
Grupo Editorial Zeta, 1989); Juan G. Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists: The
Chicago School of Economics in ChileÊ iÜÊ9À\Ê
>LÀ`}iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊ
Press, 1995).
38
>>Ê °Ê -ÛiÀÌ]Ê Chile: Yesterday and TodayÊ iÜÊ 9À\Ê Ì]Ê ,i-
>ÀÌÊ7ÃÌ]Ê£Èx®ÆÊi`iÀVÊ]ÊThe Political System of Chile (Boston:
}iÃÌÊ`iVÀ>ÌVÊÌÀ>`ÌÃÊÊÌ
iÊÜÀ`°Ê*>ÀÌÞÊ>vw>ÌÊ
>`ÊÌi`i`Ê
to be strong and political parties resembled more the North Ameri-
can and West European parties than those in other Latin American
VÕÌÀiÃ°Ê ÕÌÊ
iÊ Ü>ÃÊ >ÃÊ VÃ`iÀi`Ê ÕµÕiÊ Ê ÌÃÊ >L}ÕÌÞ°Ê
-ÛiÀÌ]ÊÜ
ÊÌ
Õ}
ÌÊÌ
>ÌÊ`iVÀ>VÞÊii`ÃÊ>L}ÕÌÞ]Ê>À}Õi`Ê>`>-
mantly that Chile had more than its share39. Cleaves, in his analysis
of the pre-military regime state-managed economy, gives a detailed
>VVÕÌÊvÊÌ
iÊVÃÃÌiVÞÊLiÌÜiiÊÌ
iÊÀiÃÕÌÃÊvÊÌ
iÊVÀ«À>ÌÃÌÊ
economy and the ideologically egalitarian democratic system40.
There are many observations that can be brought to support
Ì
ÃÊVÌiÌ°Ê
i>Ê«ÌVÃÊvviÀÃÊÕ«ÊÃiÊÃÕÀ«ÀÃ}ÊÌÜÃÌÃÊ
and turns, but the prevalence of ambiguity in Chilean society is
>Ê«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÞÊ`vwVÕÌÊiÊvÀÊÌ
iÊvÀi}ÊLÃiÀÛiÀ°ÊÀÊiÝ>«i]Ê
VÃ`iÀÊÌ
iÊÛiiÀ>ÌÊvÊÌ
iÊVL>ÌÛiÊ`}iÕÃÊi}>VÞÊÜ
iÊ
ignoring the presence of indigenous cultures in contemporary so-
ViÌÞÊ ÀÊ Ì
iÊ «À>VÌViÊ vÊ >ÕiÌÊ vÊ >ÀÀ>}iÃÊ Ü
iÊ ii«}Ê
divorce illegal.
/
iÊ wiÀViÊ ÃÌÀÕ}}iÊ vÊ Ì
iÊ >«ÕV
iÊ ÃÊ Ê Ã
>À«Ê VÌÀ>ÃÌÊ ÜÌ
Ê
Ì
iÊ-«>Ã
ÊiÝ«iÀiViÊiÃiÜ
iÀiÊÊiÀV>]ÊÌÊÞÊLiV>ÕÃiÊÌ
iÞÊ
often defeated the Europeans but also because they forced Span-
ish recognition of Indian territorial sovereignty. As in other parts
vÊ-«>Ã
iÀV>]ÊÃVi}i>ÌÊÜ>ÃÊVÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊiÝÌiÃÛiÊ
ÌiÀ>ÀÀ>}iÊvÊ-«>>À`ÃÊÜÌ
Ê`>ÊÜiÊ«À`ÕVi`ÊÌ
iÊmes-
tizosÊÌ
>ÌÊvÀÊÌ
iÊ>ÀÌÞ]Ê>LÕÌÊÇä¯ÊvÊÌ
iÊ««Õ>Ì°Ê/`>Þ½ÃÊ
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
`>Ê««Õ>ÌÊÊ
iÊÃÊ>LÕÌÊx¯Ê>`ÊÌ
iÊÀi>}ÊÓä¯ÊÌÊ
Óx¯ÊÃÊvÊ
ÕÀ«i>ÊÀ}]Ê>ÞÊ-«>Ã
°Ê,>ViÊÃÌÀ}ÞÊVÀÀi>ÌiÃÊ
ÜÌ
Ê V>ÃÃ]Ê ÜÌ
Ê
ÕÀ«i>ÃÊ Ê Ì«Ê >`Ê `>ÃÊ >ÌÊ Ì
iÊ LÌÌ°Ê Ê
LiÌÜiiÊiÊw`ÃÊÌ
>ÌÊÌÊÃÊ«ÃÃLiÊÌÊ«Ài`VÌÊÌ
iÊÀi>ÌÛiÊÃÌ>`}Ê
of a Chilean by the closeness of their resemblance to either group.
Despite this being obvious to any foreign observer, it is largely ig-
Ài`ÊLÞÊ
i>ðÊÀÊÌ
iÊiÀV>ÊLÃiÀÛiÀÊÌ
iÊVÌÀ>`VÌÊvÊ
Õ}
ÌÊ vyÊ
°]Ê £Èn®ÆÊ *iÌiÀÊ -°Ê
i>ÛiÃ]Ê Bureaucratic politics and
administration in Chile (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
39
>>Ê°Ê-ÛiÀÌ]ÊThe Conflict Society: Reaction and Revolution in Latin
AmericaÊ iÜÊ"Ài>Ã\Ê>ÕÃiÀÊ*ÀiÃÃ]ʣȣ®°
40
Peter S. Cleaves, Bureaucratic politics and Administration in Chile (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1974).
ÃV>Ê}ÀÕ«ÊqÌ
ÃiÊ Ü
Ê V>Ê «>ÞÊ Ì
iÊ VÃÌÃÊ vÊ >Ê ÌÀ>Ê >`Ê >ÀÌ>Ê
>ÀÀ>}iiÌ°Ê`ii`ÊÌ
iÀiÊ>ÀiÊ
i>ÃÊÜ
Ê
>ÛiÊLiiÊ>ÀÀi`ʼi-
}>Þ½ÊÃiÛiÀ>ÊÌiÃ]ÊVvÀÌ}ÊÊ«ÀLiÃÊÀÊLÃÌ>ViÃÊ«Ãi`Ê
LÞÊÌ
iÊÕ`V>ÊÃÞÃÌi°ÊÌÊ>Ê`i«i`ÃÊÊÌ
iÊÀiÃÕÀViÃÊiÊ
>ð
ÀÊ Ãi]Ê
iÊ ÃÊ >Ê `ÛÀVii½ÃÊ «>À>`ÃiÊ V«>À>LiÊ ÞÊ ÌÊ
that of some states in North America. One obtains an annulment of
41
Glen Dealy, The Tradition of Monistic Democracy in Latin America. in
Ü>À`Ê 7>À`>Ê i`ÌÀ®Ê Politics and Social Change in Latin America:
The Distinct Tradition (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press,
1974):71-103.
42
/ÕÊ >«iÀÊ }
]Ê >VÜ>À`ÊÃÊ >`ÊÀÜ>À`Ê «ÃiÃÊ vÀÊ >Ê
Quincentennial Vantage Point.» Journal of Latin American Studies Supple-
ment (1992):219-234.
the marriage in the Civil Registry Office based on the sole reason of
incompetence. This procedure in itself is so simple that it may cost
iÃÃÊÌ
>Ê>Ê
Õ`Ài`Ê`>ÀÃÊ>ÜÞiÀýÊviiÃÊVÕ`i`®°Ê/
ÃÊiV
>ÃÊ
ÃÊ Ã«iV>ÞÊ ÃÕÌi`Ê ÌÊ ÃV>ÞÊ `iV«ÀiÃÃÊ >Ê «ÌiÌ>ÞÊ iÝ«ÃÛiÊ
«ÀLi°Ê ÕÌÊvÀÊÃi]ÊÌÊV«ÀÃiÃÊÌ
iÊ`}ÌÞÊvÊ>ÜÞiÀÃÊqÜ
Ê
ÕÃÌÊVÃVÕÃÞÊiq]ÊÌ
iÊÕ`}iÃÊqÜ
ÊÜÊÌÊÃÊ>Ê>Êv>Ãi
`Ê>`Ê
invented parody–, the respective ministers of the Appellate Court
qÜ
ÊÕÃÌÊ>««ÀÛiÊÌ
iÃiÊ`ÃVÕÃÃÃqÊ>`Ê>ÊÕLiÀÊvÊÌ
iÀÊÜÀ-
ers in the Judicial System.
/
iÊ«À«ÃÌÊÌ
>ÌÊ`iVi«ÌÊ>ÌÌiÀÃÊÃÊL>Ãi`ÊwÀÃÌÊÊÌ
iÊ
v>VÌÊÌ
>ÌÊ*V
iÌÊÃÌÊ«ÜiÀÊLiV>ÕÃiÊ
iÊ>`Ê>ÞÊvÊ
ÃÊÃÕ««ÀÌ-
iÀÃÊÜiÀiÊ`iViÛi`ÊLÞÊÌ
iÊ«Ã44°ÊÊÌ
iÊÌ
Ê«ÀiÛÕÃÊÌÊ*V
i̽ÃÊ
`ivi>Ì]ÊÌ
iÊÃÌVÊ>ÀiÌÊ``ÊÌÊiÝ«iÀiViÊÃ}wV>ÌÊV
>}iÃÊÜ
iÊ
Ì
iÊ`>ÞÊ>vÌiÀÊÌ
iÊ«iLÃVÌiÊÌ
iÀiÊÜ>ÃÊ>Ê`ii«Ê«Õ}i°Ê/
iÊ«ÃÊ>ÃÊ
43
Ê /
iÊÜÀ`}ÊvÊÌ
iÊ«iLÃVÌiʵÕiÃÌÊÜ>Ã\ÊÌiÊ>Ê«À«ÕiÃÌ>Ê`iÊ>ÊÀ
/
iÊÜÀ`}ÊvÊÌ
iÊ«iLÃVÌiʵÕiÃÌÊÜ>Ã\ÊÌiÊ>Ê«À«ÕiÃÌ>Ê`iÊ>ÊÀ-
able Junta de Gobierno de nombrar Presidente de la Republica a Augusto
*V
iÌÊ «>À>Ê iÊ «ÀÝÊ «iÀ`Ê ÛÌÊ -Ê Ê °Ê /Ê Ì
iÊ «À«Ã>Ê vÊ Ì
iÊ
À>LÞÊÌ>ÀÞÊÕÌ>ÊÌÊ>iÊÕ}ÕÃÌÊ*V
iÌÊ«ÀiÃ`iÌÊvÀÊÌ
iÊiÝÌÊ
«iÀ`ÊÊÛÌiÊ9iÃÊÀÊ °
44
This is, of course, a manifestation of a traditional mode of deception long
appreciated by such observers as Machiavelli and is not pertinent to the
`iVi«ÌÛiÊÀi>ÌÃ
«ÊLiÌÜiiÊV>``>ÌiÃÊ>`ÊÛÌiÀÃÊÜ
V
ÊÃÊÌ
iÊ>ÊV-
cern of this thesis.
`iViÛi`ÊÌ
iÊÛiÃÌÀÃÊ>`ÊVÀi>Ìi`Êv>ÃiÊiÝ«iVÌ>ÌðÊÃÊ>ÌiÊ>ÃÊ"V-
ÌLiÀÊ{Ê>Ê
i>ÊiÜë>«iÀÃÊ«ÕLÃ
i`Ê>Ê«ÊLÞÊÌ
iÊ1ÛiÀÃÌÞÊvÊ
iÊ«Ài`VÌ}Ê>ÊÛÌiÊvÊxä°Ç¯ÊvÀÊ>««ÀÛ>Ê>`Ê{x°Ó¯ÊvÀÊÀiiV-
tion of his continued presidency.
ÜÊÌ
ÃÊVÕ`Ê
>ÛiÊ
>««ii`ÊÃÊ«Õââ}ÊVÃ`iÀ}ÊvÀÊiÝ-
ample that three months before the plebiscite, the Center for Public
Studies (Centro de Estudios Publicos, cep) had made public the re-
ÃÕÌÃÊvÊ>Ê«ÊÌ>iÊÌ
>ÌÊÃ>iÊÌ
ÊÜ
V
Ê`V>Ìi`Ê>ÊÌiÊLiÌÜiiÊ
Ì
iÊ9iÃÊ>`ÊÌ
iÊ °ÊÌÊÃÊÌÊÜÊÜ
ÞÊEl Mercurio]Ê
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nity, did not publish the results, considering that cepÊ Ü>ÃÊ iµÕ>ÞÊ
VÃiÊÌÊÌ
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prominent research center.
*ÃÊ Ì>iÊ LÞÊ Ì
iÊ ««ÃÌÊ VV`i`Ê ÜÌ
Ê Ì
ÃiÊ Ì>iÊ LÞÊ
cep°Ê >VýÃÊ >Ê ÀiÃi>ÀV
Ê ViÌiÀÊ VÃiÊ ÌÊ Ì
iÊ ps-ppd) polls of June
££]Ê vÀÊ iÝ>«i]Ê `V>Ìi`Ê >Ê Ìi°Ê ÃÊ Ì
iÊ `>ÌiÊ vÊ Ì
iÊ «iLÃVÌiÊ }ÌÊ
closer, the situation became more confusing. On October 2, pro-
}ÛiÀiÌÊ>>ÞÃÌÃÊÃÌ>Ìi`ÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÊ9iÃÊÜÕ`ÊÜÊLÞÊx{¯ÊÛiÀÊ
{ȯÊvÀÊÌ
iÊ °Ê"Ê"VÌLiÀÊx]ÊÌ
iÊÃ>iÊ`>ÞÊvÊÌ
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Mercurio½ÃÊvÀÌÊ«>}iÊ«ÕLÃ
i`Ê>Ê
i>`iÊ>LÕÌÊÌ
iÊ«ÃÊÜÌ
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iÊ
mathematically absurd outcome of 55% for the «Yes», 46,1% for
the «No».
"iÊvÊÌ
iÊVÃiµÕiViÃÊvÊÌ
iÃiÊÃi>`}ÊiÛiÌÃÊÜ>ÃÊÌ
>ÌÊ
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
ÌÊÌ
Ü>ÀÌi`ÊÌ
iÊ«ÃÃLÌÞÊvÊÌ
iÊ>ÊVÛ>Ê«ÌV>ÊvÊÌ
iÊÀ}
ÌÊ
(Jarpa) presenting his candidacy or another civilian candidate com-
}ÊvÀÜ>À`°Ê7Ì
Ê>ÊVÛ>]ÊÌ
iÊ9iÃÊÃ`iÊ}
ÌÊ
>ÛiÊ
>`Ê}Ài>ÌiÀÊ
V
>ViÃÊvÊÜ}°Ê/
iÊÀi>ÃÊÌ
iÊÌ>ÀÞÊÕÌ>Ê``ÊÌÊÃiiVÌÊ>Ê
V>``>ÌiÊ`vviÀiÌÊvÀÊ*V
iÌÊÃÊ«>ÀÌ>ÞÊiÝ«>i`ÊLÞÊÌ
iÊ«ÃÊ
that assured a Pinochet victory. Some in the military regime also had
been misled and deceived by the public opinion polls.
/ÊÀiV>«ÌÕ>Ìi]ÊÌ
iÊ«ÕÀ«ÃiÊvÊÌ
ÃÊÜÀÊÃÊÌÊ`vÞÊÌ
iÊV>ÃÃV>Ê
spatial model by introducing the roles of deception and self-decep-
ÌÊ Ê Ì
iÊ ÃÌÀ>Ìi}VÊ ÌiÀ>VÌÃÊ LiÌÜiiÊ ÛÌiÀÃÊ >`Ê V>``>ÌiÃÊ Ê
Ì
iÊ
i>ÊÃÌÌÕÌ>ÊÃiÌÌ}°Ê/
iÊÌ
iÀiÌV>ÊÕÃÌwV>ÌÊvÀÊÌ
ÃÊ
`wV>ÌÊ vÊ Ì
iÊ ÃÌ>`>À`Ê `iÊ ÃÊ Ì
iÊ ÃÕLiVÌÊ vÊ V
>«ÌiÀÊ ÌÜ°Ê
/
iÀiÊ>ÀiÊÌ
ÀiiÊ>ÊÌ
iÀiÌV>ÊiiiÌÃÊÊÌ
ÃÊÜÀ\ÊiÛÕÌ>ÀÞÊ
«ÃÞV
}Þ]Ê Ì
iÊ iÜÊ ÃÌÌÕÌ>Ê iVVÃ]Ê >`Ê Ã«>Ì>Ê Ì
iÀÞ°Ê Ê
begin by introducing the idea that the human mind is an adapta-
tion over relevant evolutionary time. I argue that recent advances
ÊÌ
iÊwi`ÊvÊiÛÕÌ>ÀÞÊ«ÃÞV
}ÞÊV>ÊLiÊÕÃivÕÞÊiÝ«Ìi`ÊLÞÊ
«ÌV>ÊÃViVi°ÊÊiÝÌÊÃ
ÜÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÊVVi«ÌÊvÊ`iVi«Ì]ÊÜ
V
Ê
is critical to the theory of the Adapted Mind, can be incorporated
ÌÊÌ
iÊ>>ÞÃÃÊvÊ«ÌV>Ê`i}Þ°Ê`i}iÃ]Ê
ÜiÛiÀ]Ê`iÛi«Ê
ÊÌ
iÊVÌiÝÌÊvÊ«>ÀÌVÕ>ÀÊÃÌÌÕÌ>ÊÃiÌÌ}ðÊ/
iÀivÀi]ÊÊÌÕÀÊ
ÌÊ >Ê VÃ`iÀ>ÌÊ vÊ ÜÀÊ Li}Ê `iÊ Õ`iÀÊ Ì
iÊ
i>`}Ê vÊ Ì
iÊ
iÜÊ ÃÌÌÕÌ>ÃÊ Ê À`iÀÊ ÌÊ «ÀÛ`iÊ >Ê Ì
iÀiÌV>ÞÊ vÀi`Ê
>VVÕÌÊvÊÌ
iÊÀÕiÃÊ>`ÊÃÌÌÕÌÃÊvÊ>ÀiÌÊ`iVÀ>VÞ°Ê>Þ]ÊÊ
VÃ`iÀÊÌ
iÊÃÌ>`>À`ÊÜÃ>Ê>`Ê>ÌiÀÊÛiÀÃÃÊvÊë>Ì>Ê`iÃÊ
vÊ`iVÀ>ÌVÊiiVÌðÊÊ«ÌÊÕÌÊÌ
iÀÊÜi>iÃÃiÃÊÊ`i>}ÊÜÌ
Ê
multi-candidate races and suggest an alternative conceptualization
of candidate strategy.
>«ÌiÀÊÌ
ÀiiÊ«ÀiÃiÌÃÊÌ
iÊ`wi`Ê`iÊÜÌ
ÊÌÜÊV}ÌÛiÊ
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.
`>Ì>Ê`V>ÌiÊÌ
>ÌÊÞÜÊVÀi>Ãi`Ê
ÃÊÃÕ««ÀÌÊÛiÀÊÌ
ÃÊ«iÀ`Ê«À-
marily by moving his perceived position in the ideological space of
ÛÌiÀýÊV}ÌÛiÊ>«ÃÊÌÊÌ
iÊÀ}
ÌÊ>`ÊÜ}Ê>ÊÃ}wV>ÌÊÃ
>ÀiÊ
vÊ ØV
½ÃÊÛÌiÀð
In Chapter 4 I lay out the political situation in Chile in the
aftermath of the Pinochet plebiscite and the main configurations of
the political institutions and rules as established by the 1980 Con-
stitution. I discuss the evolution of the candidacies to succeed Pi-
V
iÌ°Ê Ê ÕÃiÊ Ì
iÊ «ÃÌÃÊ vÊ ÛÌiÀÃÊ Ê Ì
iÊ ÌÜ`iÃ>Ê >«ÃÊ
constructed in Chapter 3 to divide the electorate into four distinct
ideological categories and trace the evolution of these groups from
«ÀÊÌÊ ÛiLiÀ°ÊÊÃ
ÜÊÌ
>ÌÊÌ
iÊVÀi>ÌÊvÊÌ
iÊvÕÀÊV>Ìi}ÀiÃÊ
permits an illuminating analysis of changes in vote intentions during
the campaign.
>«ÌiÀÊxÊ«ÀÛ`iÃÊ>Ê`iÌ>i`ÊiÝ>>ÌÊvÊÌ
iÊÜ>ÞÊÌ
iÊÃÃÕiÊ
preferences of voters and their perceptions of the issue positions of
candidates affected the evolution of vote intentions over the period
vÊÌ
iÊÃÌÕ`Þ°Ê/
iÊÕÃiÊvÊÌ
iÊÌÜ`iÃ>Ê`iÊ«iÀÌÃÊ>ÊÀiÊ
>VVÕÀ>ÌiÊ>`Ê«iiÌÀ>Ì}Ê>>ÞÃÃÊvÊÌ
iÃiʵÕiÃÌÃÊÌ
>ÊÜÕ`ÊLiÊ
«ÃÃLiÊLÞÊ>ÊëiÊVÀÃÃÌ>LÕ>ÌÊvÊÃÃÕiÊ«ÀiviÀiViðÊÊiÝ«ÀiÊ
>ÌÌÌÕ`iÃÊ ÌÜ>À`Ê V
>}i]Ê
Õ>Ê À}
ÌÃÊ Û>ÌÃ]Ê >`Ê Ì
iÊ >ÀiÌÊ
economy.
In the final chapter I summarize my analysis and lay out its im-
plications for the application of evolutionary psychology to spatial
Copyright © 2008. RIL editores. All rights reserved.