Vil. Givi Labilty Arising rom Crime ules of Court) |B. Effects |2. Extinction of Civil Liabity Rule 111/26] ROC, MANANTAN v. CA GR 107125 | Jan. 28, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner George Manantan (Manantan) was acquitted by the RTC of Isabela of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liabiity.On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in the aforementioned criminal case, the CA found Manantan civily liableand ordered him to indemnify private respondent Sps. Marcelino and Maria Nicolas P104.4k representing loss of support, P50kas death indemnity, ‘and moral damages of P20k or a total of P174.4k for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas. In finding Manantan civil liable, theCA noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was ina state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in al, a total of at least 12 bottles of beer between 9AM and 11PM. It found that Manantan's act of driving while intoxicated wes a clear violation of Sec. 53 of the Land ‘Transportation and Traffic Code (RA 4136)and pursuant to Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, a statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that Manantan's act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in itsef because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation. Manantan moved for reconsideration, but the CA. nits resolution denied the motion. Hence, the present case. ISSUES: 4) WAN the acquittal of petitioner Manantan foreclosed any further inquiry by the CA as to his negligence or reckless imprudence. ~ NO. 2) WIN the CA erred in finding that petitioner Manantan’s acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability. — YES. HELD: 1) NO. Manantan opines that the CA should not have disturbed the findings of the RTC on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil iabilty. He argues that the RTC’s ‘finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the CA not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy, ‘Sps. Nicolas contend that while the RTC found that Manantan’s uit had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that Manantan was NOT recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the RTC acquitted him on reasonable doubt Since civ labilty is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acouitta is based on reasonable doubt, the CA had to review the findings of the RTC to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages, Preliminarily, jgapardy is MISPLAGED. The Constition proves that no person shall be twice putin jeopardy forthe same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (aa first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first. In the instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the fling of the original criminal case and the jeopardy was terminated by hs Gscharae The udoment ot secu became immeciatey al Note, however, that case. Petitioner was NO ffiense, The records Cleerly show that no sscond criminal offense was being imputed to Manentenion coped In.modifying the FTC's judgment, the CA did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor dd it order the fling ofVil. Ovi Labilty Arising fom Grime ules of Court) |B. Effects |2. Extinct n of Civil Liabity Rule 111/25] ROC. a second criminal case against Manantan for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Manantan’s claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground tht the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of This instance closes the door to cil abilty, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act ‘or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which instituted m n ‘grounds OTHER THAN the delict complained of This is the situation contemplated in Bule 111 of the Rules, ‘of Court The second instance is an acquittal based an reasonable doubt on the quilt of the accused. In this case, even ifthe guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is NOT exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the stuation contemplated in Adticle 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is for the same act ar omission Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission. The reason for this rule is thatthe parties are not the same and seconderiy,cferent rules of evidence are applicable acauiltal, 2) YES. Manantan insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civ liabilty is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, cv ability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action, SSps. Nicolas counter that a closer look at the RTC’s judgment shows that the judament of acquittal did not Clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of Manantan’s negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 ofthe Civil Code to come into play. Our scrutiny of the RTC's decision in the original criminal case supports the conclusion of the CA that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, Manantan’s civil liability was NOT extinguished by his discharge. We note the BIC's declaration that did not discount the possibilty that the anqused was realy negligent, However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court and since said hypothesis is consistent with the record, the Court's mind cannot rest on a verdict of conviction. The foregoing clearly shows that Manantan’s acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his quit had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, itis an acquittal based on nab Land a suil to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission li WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, The assailed decision of the CA, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying Manantan’s MR, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Manantan. ‘SO ORDERED.