Jakub Jirsa

ALCIBIADES’ SPEECH IN THE SYMPOSIUM

AND ITS ORIGINS

Jakub Jirsa

“I have no knowledge I could teach the man to improve him,

but I thought that by associating with him
I could improve him through my love.”
Aeschines Socraticus, Alcibiades (fr. 11c, Dittmar)

Alcibiades and Socrates

The encomium on Plato’s teacher and friend is delivered by a person

who was charged with impiety because of parodying the Eleusinian
mysteries, betrayed Athens to Sparta, associated with another seri-
ous enemy of Athens, the Persians, and later gave up Sparta for Ath-
ens again to be finally expelled from the city and killed in 404 B.C.
Socrates’ contacts and relationships with Charmides, Critias and
Alcibiades seem to be behind the charges of corrupting the youth,
which brought him to his trial and death.1 And yet it is Alcibiades
whom Plato chose to deliver the long praise of Socrates.2
Michael Gagarin claims that in the speech Plato actually pictures
Socrates’ failure as a teacher and educator.3 In the following paper

1
Xenophon closely ties the charge against Socrates to Critias and Alci-
biades (Mem. I,2,12); the same goes for Libanius’ Defence of Socrates (§
160), and it is highly likely that these two men were mentioned in the Ac-
cusation of Socrates by Polycrates.
2
For a literary overview cf. D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, Oxford
1999. For a biographical account cf. W. M. Ellis, Alcibiades, London 1989.
3
M. Gagarin, Socrates’ hybris and Alcibiades’ failure, in: Phoenix,
XXXI, 1977, p. 23: “I will suggest that Alcibiades’ criticism illuminates an

280

16jirsa.pm6 280 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Alcibiades’ Speech in the Symposium and its Origins

I want to argue that presenting Socrates as being a faulty teacher of

Alcibiades actually supports the charge against Socrates and this,
I believe, cannot be Plato’s intention. On the other hand, I believe,
the encomium on Socrates in the Symposium could be interpreted to-
gether with the Alcibiades I. There, Plato offers a fuller picture of
the relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades, one that gives
a possible explanation of Alcibiades’ failure and moral collapse,
while keeping Socrates’ position as a moral teacher intact. This ap-
proach presupposes that Plato wrote some of the dialogues in a de-
liberate order of the fictional chronology.4 Interpreting the Sym-
posium together with the Alcibiades I allows me then to make a
broader claim concerning Plato’s conception of the personal self.
In the following interpretation I make use of the fictional chro-
nology Plato incorporates into his dialogues. It is actually the only
chronological order of the Platonic writings which finds support in
the texts themselves. The fictive or dramatic chronology cannot
make any claims about the dates of the composition of the dialogues
and does not need to use the standard chronology. It is not essential
for me now whether Plato wrote first the Symposium and later the
Alcibiades I or vice versa.5 Rather, I am interested in the connec-
tions which Plato suggests between the dialogues regarding their (a)
philosophical issues; (b) dramatic setting, and (c) quasi-historical
framework.

important feature of Socrates’ character, his hybris; that this hybris is con-
sistent with Socrates’ doctrine of eros; and that this hybris helps to explain
Socrates’ failure as a teacher.”
4
Cf. C. L. Griswold Jr., Unifying Plato: Charles Kahn on Platonic Pro-
lepsis, in: Ancient Philosophy, 10, 1990, pp. 256 ff.; C. L. Griswold, E Plu-
ribus Unum? On the Platonic Corpus, in: Ancient Philosophy, 19, 1999,
pp. 387 ff.; and C. L. Griswold, Comments on Kahn, in: J. Annas – C.
Rowe (eds.), New Perspectives on Plato, Modern and Ancient, Washington
D.C. 2002, pp. 138 ff.
5
The actual debate in the Symposium is set on the second evening after
the young tragedian Agathon had his first victorious production, which
could be dated to 416 B.C. (cf. R. G. Bury, The Symposium of Plato, Cam-
bridge 19692, p. LXVI). Alcibiades is in the position of his greatest influ-
ence (cf. Symp. 216b). There is no explicit textual remark for setting the
date of the debate in the Alcibiades I. It occurred before Alcibiades’ partici-

281

16jirsa.pm6 281 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Jakub Jirsa

Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium

I am not going to offer a comprehensive interpretation of Alci-

biades’ speech. Rather, I will focus on selected passages that (a)
throw some light on the development of the relation between So-
crates and Alcibiades and, when interpreted together with the Alci-
biades I, (b) show several interesting features of the care of the soul,
so that they (c) serve as an apology for Socrates against the charge
of corrupting the Athenian youth.
At the very beginning of his speech Alcibiades uses an image
(eikôn) to describe Socrates and says that this image should not be a
matter of laugher; rather, it is employed for the sake of truth (tou
alêthous heneka; 215a4–6). This image is the well-known statue of
Silenus with his flute, usually to be found in the market-place, a
statue that is inside full of tiny statues of the gods. Indeed, according
to Alcibiades, Socrates looks like Marsyas, whose melodies are di-
vine (Symp. 215c–d). This brings about the collision between the in-
ner, true character and the outer appearance.
After explicating Socrates’ virtues Alcibiades comes back to this
image and claims that even Socrates’ ideas and arguments are just
like those hollow statues of Silenus (221d7 ff.),6 as they are totally
ridiculous and laughable from outside, but

pation in the battle of Potidaea (432 B.C.) and he is still very young in the
dialogue, yet already confidently heading to the assembly to advise the
polis. Since eighteen- and nineteen-year old Athenians were not sent on
military campaigns outside Attica (cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 42,3–5), Alci-
biades had to be born before 450 B.C. and a probable date of the fictional
meeting of Socrates and Alcibiades might be the years 435/434 B.C. (Cf.
D. Nails, The People of Plato, Indianapolis – Cambridge 2002, pp. 10–12.)
6
Whereas Alcibiades has uncovered the inner centre of Socrates’ spee-
ches, his dramatic counterpart, Callicles from the Gorgias, remains at their
surface when he criticises and despises them (Gorg. 490e–491b); more-
over, it was Callicles who envisaged the trial of Socrates and its end (Gorg.
486a–b, 521e–522c), caused by Socrates’ relation to Alcibiades. For Calli-
cles as a dramatic counterpart for Alcibiades, see D. Gribble, Alcibiades
and Athens, Oxford 1999, pp. 231 ff.

282

16jirsa.pm6 282 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Alcibiades’ Speech in the Symposium and its Origins

“if you see them when they open up, like the statues, if you go
behind their surface, you’ll realize that no other arguments ma-
ke sense. They are truly worthy of a god, bursting with figures
of virtue inside. They’re of great – no, of the greatest – im-
portance for anyone who wants to become a truly good man.”
(Symp. 222a1–6; tr. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff)
As Alcibiades reports, he once caught Socrates opened like a Sile-
nus’ statue and he saw the figures of gods kept inside him. They
were god-like, bright and beautiful, absolutely amazing (Symp.
216e–217a).
Socrates’ words cause Alcibiades to be beside himself when he
hears them (215e) and they bite him in the most sensitive part of his
self, whether one wants to call it the heart or the soul (218a). It is
then his soul that under the influence of Socrates’ speeches protests
against the way Alcibiades lives (215e6). Charmed by Socrates and
his speeches, at first Alcibiades behaved as if he was the lover of
Socrates, not the beloved, as one would expect in Athenian society
(217c7–8). He invites Socrates for dinner several times and tries to
seduce him by promising him that together with sex, all his posses-
sions will arrive as well (218d).
But Socrates refuses this exchange of fake beauty for real virtue,
bodily love for turning a better man.7 While Socrates’ speeches are
necessary for anyone who wants to take care of him- or herself,
paradoxically, Alcibiades does not have much to offer back. So-
crates simply does not care about things such as wealth or fame, as
other people do (216d–e). Thus he is also the only man in the world
who makes Alcibiades feel ashamed and humiliated (216b; 219d).
Socrates shows to Alcibiades how futile his political and social am-
bitions are without the proper care of oneself, without being a virtu-
ous man.
These are the grounds for Alcibiades’ mixed, or perhaps even
schizophrenic attitude towards Socrates. There’s more beyond won-
dering whether he ought to hate Socrates for humiliating him and so
to lose his friendship (219d). Alcibiades’ life had become one con-
stant effort to escape from Socrates and keep away from him. He
says:

7
Cf. Socrates’ speech in the Symposium, esp. 210a ff.

283

16jirsa.pm6 283 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Jakub Jirsa

“Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were

dead. And yet I know that if he dies I’ll be even more miserable.
I can’t live with him, and I can’t without him! What can I do
about him!” (Symp. 216c1–3; tr. A. Nehamas and P. Woodruff)
This is the final result of Alcibiades’ encounter with Socrates. But
how could this picture of his schizophrenic attitude be taken as a de-
fence of Socrates? Doesn’t it after all show that he did indeed fail in
attracting this gifted and well-disposed young man for philosophy
and the virtuous life?
I will argue that an answer to this question becomes somewhat
clearer when one takes a quick look at the first fictional meeting of
Socrates and Alcibiades, as it is presented in the Alcibiades I.

Care of the soul in the Alcibiades I

Let me briefly sketch the main points about the care of one’s soul or
the care of one’s self as introduced in the second half of the Alci-
biades I. After it has been said that Alcibiades should “take care of
himself” (119a8–9 ff.), the new question Socrates raises is: what
does it actually mean, “to take care of oneself”?8 In the first part of
the argument Socrates distinguishes the art that takes care of what
belongs to a given x on the one hand, and another art that takes care
of x itself on the other (128d3–4). While shoemaking takes care of
what belongs to our bodily parts, it is gymnastics that takes care of
these bodily parts on their own. Since it is now clear that Socrates
and Alcibiades have to be aware of this distinction between the arts,
the question is, what kind of art can be used to take care of oneself
(128d12)?
In the following passages Socrates applies the results of the in-
vestigation about the self to his relation with Alcibiades (131c–
132b, cf. with 104e–106c): while everyone so far has loved only
Alcibiades’ body, Socrates loves his soul, which means that he is the
only true lover of Alcibiades himself. In order not to lose this only
true lover, Alcibiades agrees that he will try to be, in his soul, as

8
Plato, Alc. I,127e8: tø ¯stin tÎ ²ayto× ¯pimeleÁsuai.

284

16jirsa.pm6 284 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Alcibiades’ Speech in the Symposium and its Origins

beautiful as possible, and asks Socrates how exactly they should

cultivate themselves (132b4–5).
Even though Socrates describes his reply as a “step forward”,9 in-
stead of responding what kind of technê could help us to take care of
ourselves he introduces an epistemological problem concerning the
cognition of the soul. While Alcibiades asks how or in what manner
(tropos) they should cultivate themselves, Socrates twists the ques-
tion into the following query: in what manner (tropos) can we get
the most distinct knowledge of the self? And he goes on to say that
this would then bring about to them knowledge of themselves as
well (132c7–9).
Though previously he has said several times that it is a craft or
skill they are looking for (cf. 128d8–11), he now subordinates this
question to the problem of cognizing the true self, namely getting to
know one’s soul. He proceeds further with the help of an image
(paradeigma). To describe the method of “knowing oneself”, So-
crates uses the simile of sight. An eye can see itself not only in mir-
rors but in another eye as well. In this way it observes itself in some-
thing that is different but also same, as it is an eye, after all. In the
same manner the soul should look into another soul in order to know
itself (133a–b). And it must look especially into the region of the
soul where its virtue, wisdom, resides (133b9–10).10 In this manner,
then, the soul can attain a degree of self-knowledge.
If the soul, i.e. a particular self, is to know itself (herself, him-
self), it must look at a soul. The contact is pictured as a sensual vi-
sion. The simile stands for some kind of cognition which is not
specified in any detail. The region (topos) of the soul inhabited by
wisdom is the most divine (theion) in us, and so self-knowledge is

9
Plato, Alc. I,132b6: eÅq tÎ prÍsuen pep­rantai.
10
This passage presupposes the doctrine of the complex soul as we
know it from the Republic, or at least some parts of this theory. What it
seems to lack is the theory of virtues applied to each part of the soul,
known from the Republic as well. The notion of the soul is still associated
with rationality more than with anything else. So wisdom is called the “vir-
tue of soul”, while in the Republic there are several virtues in the soul, wis-
dom is only one of them, and belongs merely to one part of the soul, even
though to the best and the ruling one.

285

16jirsa.pm6 285 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Jakub Jirsa

achieved by contact with this divine aspect of our self (133c1–6, cf.
Resp. 589d).11 Alcibiades can achieve knowledge of his true self by
contact with another soul, another true self, in which he can find
wisdom – this trace of the divine in us.

Alcibiades I as a dramatic origin

for Alcibiades’ speech

The main pattern of thought in both Platonic texts is based on a con-

flict between the inside and the outside, between the inner truth and
the outer appearances, or some inner self and whatever outwardly
belongs to this self. Socrates’ unsightly figure12 – his outer appear-
ance – is in Alcibiades’ eikôn contrasted with the beautiful statues of
the gods inside him, the divine, bright and beautiful inside of So-
crates (Symp. 215a–b; 216e–217a). The Sileni were not famous for
their beauty, quite the opposite, and Marsyas charmed people not by
his outer appearance, as beautiful Alcibiades did,13 but rather by his
flute playing. Socrates does the same with his logoi, and his spee-
ches are then truly worthy of what is inside him, as they are truly
worthy of god (Symp. 222a).

11
This is suggested by the mutually supportive ideal relation between
the true lover and his beloved, as pictured in the Phaedrus (252e; 255e ff.).
If the true self is the soul, and so true beauty is the beauty of the soul, then
it is by looking into this beautiful and divine soul of the beloved that the
lover gets to the stage when “neither human wisdom nor divine inspiration
can confer upon man any greater blessing than this” (Phdr. 256b5–7). In-
deed, there can be no greater blessing than this one, which enables us to
become similar to god according to the divine in our souls.
12
Indirectly mentioned in the Theaetetus. Talking about the young
Theaetetus, Theodorus says: “as a matter of fact – if you’ll excuse my say-
ing such a thing – he is not beautiful at all [oÚk °sti kalÍq], but is rather
like you [pros­oike d­ soø] snub-nosed, with eyes that stick out...” (Tht.
146e6–9; tr. M. J. Levett, revised by M. Burnyeat).
13
Athenaeus, 534b–f; Antisthenes, fr. 30 Caizzi; Plutarch, Alc. I,4 or
IV,1 etc.

286

16jirsa.pm6 286 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Alcibiades’ Speech in the Symposium and its Origins

Not even Socrates could deny that he resembles these creatures in

his outer appearance (eidos), i.e. in what is apparent at first sight
(Symp. 215b5). But when Socrates opened up, he became most vir-
tuous (spoudasantos), and Alcibiades saw the inner (entos) statues
(Symp. 216e5–6). These then seemed divine, gold, outstandingly
beautiful and amazing to him (216e7–217a1). Thus the outer ap-
pearance stands here in clear opposition to the inner beauty and di-
vine character of Socrates’ inside.
The proper care of one’s true self, as described in the Alcibiades I,
then starts with self-knowledge, i.e. moderation, sôphrosynê (Alc.
I,133c). This equals knowledge of one’s own soul, as that is exactly
the true self. As the eikôn of Socrates in the Symposium shows, body
is always only the outer case for the true self which resides in it, that
is, for the soul (cf. Alc. I,130b). While in the Symposium it is made
clear that it is a mistake to judge Socrates or his speeches prima fa-
cie, or according to their outer appearances, the dialogue Alcibiades
I declares that none of the outer and visible features of one’s person-
ality, such as beauty or property, count as one’s true self.
In both dialogues the metaphorical language describing the close
contact of one’s inner self with the inner self of someone else is that
of sensory vision. This language thus makes the pair of opposites
‘inner–outer’ even more explicit. In the Alcibiades I, Plato, besides
illustrating his intention by taking an example from the realm of vi-
sion (one eye looking into another), also uses sensory terminology
for describing the relation between the souls themselves (cf. e.g.
blepteon and blepôn at 133b8 and c5).14 Alcibiades in the Sympo-
sium then uses the metaphor of opening (anoichthentos on 216e6)
the statue of Silenus so as to see the beauty and the divine that are
hidden inside, in order to express how he looked (heôraken and
eidôn at 216e6–7) into Socrates’ soul.15

14
Moreover, one should look into a certain place or region (topos) of
the soul (Alc. I,133b9). The language is metaphorical and the topos of the
soul corresponds to the topos of the eye in the analogy (Alc. I,133b3); still,
Plato might well hold that the soul, though immaterial and invisible, occu-
pies certain space (e.g. Tim. 34b, 42a, 43a etc.)
15
A further metaphor used by Alcibiades to depict his relationship with
Socrates is that of the snake and its victim. Whoever was not “bitten” by

287

16jirsa.pm6 287 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Jakub Jirsa

To know oneself, Socrates argues in the Alcibiades I, is to know

one’s soul. Since a person is the soul (Alc. I,130c5–6), the soul has
to know itself. And to do so it must look at another soul (eis psychên
blepteon, Alc. I,133b7–8). Especially it should look into that place
(topon) in the soul where the virtue of the soul, wisdom (ê psychês
aretê, sophia), resides and whatever is similar to it (Alc. I,133b8–
10). There is nothing more divine (theioteron) in the soul than whe-
re the knowing and understanding takes place, and therefore that
place in the soul resembles the divine. Thus, the soul which looks
into another soul and gets grasp of what is godlike in it will get the
best picture of itself as well (Alc. I,133c4–6).
From Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium it seems clear that he
actually saw what is divine in Socrates himself. Alcibiades speaks
metaphorically about the statues inside of Socrates and how they
seemed to him divine (theia), beautiful and amazing (Symp. 216e7–
217a1). Further on, Socrates’ speeches, according to Alcibiades, are
inside full or virtue (aretê) and most divine (theotatous, Symp.
222a3–4) – as it was demanded in the Alcibiades I.
Alcibiades in the Symposium admits that these logoi are of the
greatest importance for anyone who wants to become a truly good
and prime man (kalôi kagathôi; Symp. 222a). This is, actually, what
Socrates tells him at the beginning of the Alcibiades I: he, Socrates,
is worth the world for Alcibiades since only he is capable of provid-
ing him with what he wants (Alc. I,105e). And Alcibiades, as he
says, definitely wants to be one of the truly good and prime men of
Athens (Athênaiôn oi kaloi kagathoi, Alc. I,124e16). Moreover, the
corruption of Alcibiades due to the love of the crowds – which, ac-
cording to the Symposium, he seeks (Symp. 216b5) – was also envis-
aged already in the Alcibiades I (131e11–132a4).

Socrates (Symp. 217e–218a), cannot understand what then actually hap-

pens. And Alcibiades was bitten in his most sensitive part (to algeino-
taton), his soul. A snake’s poisonous bite penetrates inside through the
outer surface and injects what is inside of the snake to the inside of its vic-
tim. Socrates’ speeches cause Alcibiades to be outside of himself and seem-
ingly at a loss about himself: his heart starts leaping in his chest, tears flow
on his face. These are not only signs of some mysterious frenzy but rather
symptoms of an intoxication, too. However, all this is just the first step to-
wards realizing that all Alcibiades has so far cared about does not constitute
his self, and indeed, is worthy of nothing (Symp. 215e, 216a–b).

288

16jirsa.pm6 288 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Alcibiades’ Speech in the Symposium and its Origins

General conclusions about Platonic psychology

What can we conclude from the parallels shown above, and gener-
ally, from reading Alcibiades’ speech in the Symposium against the
background of the Alcibiades I? First, Socrates did not fail in his
role as a teacher for young Alcibiades. In the Symposium it is made
clear that Alcibiades saw or got in touch with what was necessary
for the proper care of oneself leading to virtuous character. The nec-
essary cognitive condition, as stated in the Alcibiades I (133b–c),
was fulfilled. Moreover, Socrates’ logoi met Alcibiades’ most sensi-
tive part, his soul. Insofar it seems that Alcibiades was on the right
track and Socrates fulfilled his role as moral teacher and educator.
But something went wrong with Alcibiades. When confessing his
deeply conflicting feelings about Socrates, Alcibiades concludes: “I
do not know what to do with this man” (Symp. 216c3). He does not
understand the message of the Alcibiades I and of Socrates’ god-
worthy speeches, as in fact he ought to wonder what to do about
himself, instead of worrying what to do about Socrates.16 Having
looked into Socrates, Alcibiades saw his beauty and the divine that
resides in the souls. Yet he did not accomplish the reflexive and
practical moment of self-knowledge, which would consist in an at-
tempt to shape one’s own soul into a divine-like form; instead, he
went and sought popularity with the crowd, and a political career.17
In fact, Alcibiades himself says that he submits himself to the
stronger desire to please the crowd (hêttêmenôi tês timês, Symp.
216b5). Alcibiades knows that he cannot contradict Socrates; never-
theless, when Socrates is not around, he reverts to his old habits, his
desire to please the crowd. Yet even then he knows that this is not the

16
This perhaps shows Plato’s worry about any ordinary politician: too
much concerned with what to do with others, and therefore having no time,
no scholê for the concern about her- or himself.
17
In this way one could explain the role of the divine (ueÁon) in our
souls: it enables us to fulfil the ultimate task of the human life, namely, to
become as similar to god as possible. Cf. Tht. 176a–b and the interpretation
by J. Annas, Platonic Ethics Old and New, Ithaca – London 1999; ch. 3:
“Becoming Like God”.

289

16jirsa.pm6 289 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Jakub Jirsa

correct way of life and he remains aware of the Socratic option.

Moreover he knows that whenever he meets Socrates he will be per-
suaded by his logoi again. This creates a conflict in Alcibiades’ self.
And the entire passage Symp. 216a–c suggests that it represents an
internal conflict in Alcibiades’ motivation. As I have said earlier,
Alcibiades is in a rather schizophrenic state: he knows he cannot live
without Socrates, and yet he wishes Socrates did not exist (Symp.
216b5–c3).
At the same time Alcibiades is aware that only Socrates could
help him to be the right person for the highest political tasks (Alc. I,
105d and 106a): if he wants to be one of the kaloi kagathoi (Alc. I,
124e15–16), Socrates is for him of the greatest value (Symp. 222a).
Nevertheless, Alcibiades started to avoid Socrates and tried not to
meet with him anymore (Symp. 216b5 ff.). What else could count as
an internal psychic conflict if not the situation when Alcibiades does
not do what he acknowledges as the best for him?
An explanation of this conflict is to be found neither in the Alci-
biades I nor in the Symposium. For a response to the problem of
conflicting desires raised above, we have to look in the Republic,
where Plato introduces his tripartite psychology and a theory of mo-
tivation. Human virtue, according to the Republic, is a complex in-
terrelationship among three separate psychological elements, each
of which makes its contribution to the whole.18 What one needs to
achieve, the virtuous state of being, is not a mere intellectual capac-
ity but rather a harmonious order of all three parts of one’s soul.
Moreover, on Plato’s theory in the Republic, all three parts of the
soul are independent sources of motivation (cf. Resp. 580d–581b).
As each of these desires is aiming at its own pleasure, a deep psy-
chological conflict may easily result:
“It seems to me that there are three pleasures (triôn ontôn trittai
kai hêdonai) corresponding to the three parts of the soul, one pe-
culiar to each part (henos hekastou mia idia), and similarly with
desires (epithumiai) and kinds of rule.” (Resp. IX,580d6–7, tr.
G. M. A. Grube, revised by C. D. C. Reeve)

18
J. M. Cooper, Plato’s theory of Human Motivation, in: Reason and
Emotion, New Jersey 1999, p. 118. Cf. J. Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and
New, p. 125–128.

290

16jirsa.pm6 290 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Alcibiades’ Speech in the Symposium and its Origins

The conflict of different desires (epithumiai) could then result in the

split of the personality at the same time when a given person is
aware of the state he or she is in. Moreover, there might be some
conditions (a close circle of friends, some drinking) when the very
person that is in this schizophrenic state of mind or soul can intelli-
gibly explain it.19
But let’s come back to conclusions we can draw from meshing
the Alcibiades I with the Symposium. In the very shaping of our
souls, i.e. taking care of oneself, the teacher in a certain sense serves
as a model or pattern.20 Yet the process of shaping one’s soul into its
proper form is entirely a personal or even existential task, fully de-
pendent on one’s decisions and actions. The care of oneself is not a
technê simply to be learnt; rather, it requires an authentic and strong
involvement of the entire personality in shaping and forming one-
self. It is a matter of one’s own responsibility, which cannot be taken
over by anyone else.
Alcibiades’ schizophrenic feelings about Socrates, as expressed in
the Symposium, might even play another role in Plato’s apology of
Socrates. Alcibiades gives the true picture of his feelings towards So-
crates in the same way that Aristophanes depicts the feelings of
Athens about Alcibiades himself. In the Symposium, Alcibiades says:

19
A few lines later, at Resp. 581b7, Plato’s Socrates tells us that the in-
tellect is always straining [¤eù t­tatai]. In the Phaedo (65a6), the same
word is used in relation to pursuing or not pursuing the pleasures of the
body. Though a non-technical term, teinô is clearly used as a term for some
desire or strain.
20
The Apollodorus of the beginning of the Symposium is an extreme
example of this approach in its superficial aspect. He describes his last
three years of life as taking care to know “exactly what <Socrates> says
and does each day” (172c6). This opening of the dialogue and Alcibiades’
closing thus seems to exhibit two opposed but equally problematic views
and relations to Socrates himself. Both of them exhibiting a certain misun-
derstanding of Socrates’ message. Perhaps it was the author of the dialogue
– aware of both of these extremes – who tried to found the proper way of
following Socrates, one that consists in taking care of one’s soul by means
of doing philosophy. Whereas Alcibiades can overcome the effect of
Socrates’ speeches, it seems that Apollodorus highly admires them and
does not dare to challenge them at all, yet perhaps understands their mean-
ing less than the well-disposed but psychologically torn Alcibiades.

291

16jirsa.pm6 291 21.7.2008, 14:42

 Jakub Jirsa

“Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were

dead. And yet I know that if he dies I’ll be even more miserable.
What can I do about him!” (Symp. 216c2–3; tr. A. Nehamas and
P. Woodruff)
And in the Frogs, the god Dionysus reports the feelings of the city
about the exiled Alcibiades in the following way:
“The city of Athens loves <him>, and hates <him>, and longs to
have him back.”21 (Aristophanes, Ran. 1425)
However, Plato shows that Athens actually needs someone like
Socrates. Socrates seems to be the only one who can possibly pacify
and set right such people as Alcibiades. As a virtuous Alcibiades
was perhaps one of the last chances for Athens to prosper and win
over the Spartans, so was Socrates the only chance for Alcibiades to
become virtuous. But then, Alcibiades got spoiled on the account of
desires arising from his appreciation of his own beauty and influ-
ence, these features – as Xenophon tells us – so much admired by
the city itself.22

21
B. B. Rogers suggests that this expression about a collision of desires
might be traced back to the Guards by Ion, where Helen says to Odysseus:
sigî£ m­n, ¯xuairei d­, boÕletaø ge mµn (Schol. 428). Cf. Aristophanes’
Frogs, transl. and ed. by B. B. Rogers in Loeb Classical Library, London –
New York 1974, comment ad line 1425.
22
Xenophon, Mem. I,2,24; cf. Isocrates, Busiris, XI,4.

292

16jirsa.pm6 292 21.7.2008, 14:42