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Mcdaniel Ropersimmons Final
Mcdaniel Ropersimmons Final
Ellie McDaniel
Mrs. Conway
19 February 2020
Roper v. Simmons
first-degree murder. Simmons, colluding with Charles Benjamin (age fifteen) and John Tessmer
(age sixteen), planned, committed, and later boasted about the murder of Shirley Crook on
September 9, 1993 (“Roper v. Simmons” Legal Information). Simmons and Benjamin both
confessed to breaking into Crook’s home and stealing approximately six dollars before
kidnapping her. The two drove her in her van to the nearby Meramec River, where they wrapped
her face in duct tape, tied her hands and feet with electrical wire, and threw her into the river.
Shirley Crook drowned, and her body was recovered later that day (Raeburn, “Too Immature for
Death”).
It was the rampant boasting of Simmons that lead the police to the trio of boys.
Christopher Simmons was taken for questioning, and shortly thereafter confessed to the crime.
Per Missouri law, as he was 17, Simmons was tired as an adult and charged by the state with
burglary, kidnapping, stealing and first-degree murder (“Roper v. Simmons” Legal Information).
Tessmer, who knew of the intent to murder but did not accompany Simmons and Benjamin, was
cleared of charges in exchange for testimony. Benjamin was convicted of being an accomplice to
As for Simmons, as he was found guilty, the state pressed for the death penalty, stating
amongst other things that the crime “involved depravity of mind and was outrageously and
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wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman” (“Roper v. Simmons” Justia Law), all criteria for the
death penalty. The jury was instructed to account for Simmons’ age and the nature of the crime
when determining his sentence. Regardless, the jury recommended capital punishment, despite
Simmons being a minor. The judge complied, and he was sentenced to death. Simmons would go
on to get a new attorney and file for post-conviction relief- a form of appeal in which new
evidence may be entered- on the account that he had insufficient counsel during his trial. After
having this reviewed and the plea denied by appellate courts, Simmons filed a direct appeal, only
The case was not appealed again until a ruling was passed in the case of Atkins v.
Virginia, in which the Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty could not be used on those
who were found to be mentally retarded (“Atkins v. Virginia”). By the standard set in Atkins,
which stated the legal definition of mentally retarded as someone who, while capable of
determining the difference between right and wrong, lacks among other things, an ability to
control impulses, the defense argued that being a minor made Simmons mentally retarded by
legal definition. The State of Missouri Supreme Court agreed and lowered the sentence to life in
Historically, the court had put a significant determination of what the legal requirements
for the death penalty were on the international consensus (“Roper v. Simmons” Legal
Information). The most recent case brought to the Supreme Court regarding age and the death
penalty had been Stanford v. Kentucky, which determined that those under the age of eighteen
and above sixteen were eligible for capital punishment due to the national consensus at the time
(“Stanford v. Kentucky”). The case of Roper v. Simmons was brought before the Supreme Court
by the US government out of concern that the Missouri State Supreme Court contradicted the
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ruling in Stanford. The question at hand was: “Does the execution of minors violate the
prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" found in the Eighth Amendment and applied to
the states through the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment?” (“Roper v.
Simmons” Oyez).
The trial, as noted in briefs submitted by the American Psychological Association and
development had previously been thought to reach its completion at approximately twelve years,
scientific studies were being performed, which pointed to a much later growth at closer to twenty
years (“Roper v. Simmons” American Psychological). Because of this, the case attracted the
Amici Curiae (friend of the court) briefs were filed by numerous interested parties, most
notably the European Union (EU), who expressed interest in the US maintaining a refusal to
execute minors when the case was still at the state level (Wilson, In the Supreme Court). Nearly
all these briefs called for the court to set the standard that juveniles were not subject to the threat
In the Supreme Court, James Layton argued the case of the petitioner, named formally as
Donald Roper, superintendent of the Potosi Correctional Center, where Simmons was held. Seth
Waxman argued the case for the respondent, Christopher Simmons. The case was submitted on
October 13, 2004, and decided March 1, 2005, by the Rehnquist Court (“Roper v. Simmons”
Oyez).
Layton’s case revolved primarily around the idea that having a set standard of age is
unfounded by scientific proof. Scientific studies show a gradual stretch towards maturity, and
everyone is different in when and how they reach a fully matured age. The significant interest of
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Supreme Court Justices focused on the position of the EU (“Roper v. Simmons” Oyez). They
historically have barred the practice of executing minors in accordance with their rules. The EU
itself had submitted an amicus curiae brief when the case was at the level of Missouri State
Supreme Court, which strongly suggested that the court rule against the execution of minors
(Wilson, In the Supreme Court). Layton was quick to dismiss the idea that America should
model itself after the practices of Europe and that even though allowing the execution of minors
in the US would make it one of the only countries to do so, this would not make it “unusual.”
Layton argued that the court should adopt a principle, as had already been decided in Stanford,
which set the absolute minimum at sixteen years of age, and leave the ultimate decision up to the
Waxman, similarly to Layton in the use of scientific research, was particularly insistent
on driving home the idea that the morality of one so young as sixteen to seventeen is adaptable
and will change many times over the years, more so than adult’s personalities do. Waxman
argued that the young so frequently change characters as they and their brains are still
developing. The death penalty used on someone who was underdeveloped would, therefore,
constitute “cruel and unusual.” The Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia counter-argued: “We
punish people, criminals, for what they were, not for that they are.” (qtd. Oyez).
The court ruled in a 5-4 opinion that yes, capital punishment of a minor did constitute as
“cruel and unusual” and is prohibited by the eighth amendment. The opinion cited the
overwhelming push from state legislators to declare the death penalty of minors unconstitutional
(“Roper v. Simmons” Oyez). The court pointed out that only the worst offenders are subject to
the death penalty. Those who are underage, and thus by legal definition set in Stanford, are
The opinion of the court was written by Justice Kennedy, who was sided by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Stephens wrote a concurring opinion, joined by
Justice Ginsburg. In the court opinion, Justice Kennedy explained that the standards used for the
death penalty reflect the views of society. In cases such as Stanford, the societal consensus held
that the minimum age of capital punishment was sixteen. The amount of resistance that the court
met in response showed a shift in ideology and that sixteen was no longer an appropriate age
The court stressed that though capital punishment of minors was legal, it had only been
used in three states. Many states had adopted specific laws regarding the minimum age. In cases
such as Atkins, the opinion states, the court yet again evolved to meet the standard set by
consensus. Those who are by law mentally retarded cannot be subject to the death penalty as
they are held to be emotionally and psychologically underdeveloped compared to those who are.
Because of the severity of capital punishment, the highest form of scrutiny is essential to
determining the culpability. The court cites three criteria that set adolescent offenders apart from
adults. First, that juveniles are immature, second, that they are incredibly susceptible to outward
influence, and third, that the characteristics of their personalities are considerably unformed.
These combine to provide mitigating, or lessening, factors in the ability of a minor to be held
accountable to the degree of the death penalty (“Roper v. Simmons” Justia Law).
Regarding the concern that the raising of the minimum age in that it may encourage
crime by those who are in that sixteen to seventeen range, the court does not expect a significant
rise in cases. The fact is that the US was the only first-world country to allow the use of the death
penalty on minors. While the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is solely in the hands of
the US government, there have been other cases by which the court deferred to laws in other
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countries. In concurrence, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg only further reinforce the idea that the
court’s interpretation of the amendments must be willing to change in accordance with societal
Justice O’Connor wrote a separate dissenting opinion from the others, which highlighted
her strong feelings that though adolescents are generally less mature, there are certainly some
who are capable of comprehending the outcomes of their actions and committing vicious crimes.
She stressed the idea that because of the widely varying state laws on capital punishment, there
has yet to be a national consensus reached. Thus, the court should not force standards upon the
states, as it is entirely within their power to decide the legality and requirements of the death
penalty. O’Connor also brought to attention the actions of the Missouri State Supreme Court,
which ruled in contradiction to the decision in Stanford, which set the age at sixteen. She
addressed the court’s refusal to acknowledge the occurrence where the other justices would not.
She made it clear that the Supreme Court was to remain superior, and the actions taken by the
Missouri State Supreme Court would not be tolerated again (“Roper v. Simmons” Justia Law).
Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion, joined in opposition by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. The dissent was scathing to say the least,
in which Justice Scalia made it clear that the definition of change does not extend to the
constitution, but only to the court. By this, he stated that while the court may be subject to
evolving societal views, the Eighth Amendment is not. This cements the idea that the moral
standards of the nation are not to be decided by nine individuals but left up to the states and,
therefore, the people to determine what is morally acceptable in the case of capital punishment.
The dissent cited the fact that only eighteen states had passed laws prohibiting the execution of
those under the age of eighteen and pointed out that this hardly constitutes a majority consensus.
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The twelve states that have banned the use of the death penalty did not consider the criteria that
were employed in the ruling of Roper: maturity, impressionability, and character. The dissent
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that by drawing a clear line at the age of eighteen, the
court thereby states that no one under said age is capable of a murder worthy of the death
penalty. This interpretation is something that Justice Scalia and his associates found to be both
inaccurate and of increasing concern. The dissent rebuked the idea that one had to be of a certain
age to understand the gravity of murder. Similarly, it dismissed the notion that the US should
conform to the standards set by the rest of the world, citing that the US is under the rule of its
constitution and not the constitutions of other nations (“Roper v. Simmons” Justia Law).
It is important to note that for the exceptions of Justice O'Connor, who dissented, and
Justice Kennedy, who concurred, the justices' opinions follow a pattern that resembles their
ideologies. While Justice Scalia, writer of the dissenting opinion, held a doctrine that was less
conservative than that of Justice Thomas, the tone and passion of his dissent made it clear that
his position was strong and sharp. Justice Stevens, who's doctrines are the farthest left of the
Rehnquist Court, wrote the concurring opinion. His associates who agreed with him all hold
beliefs that err on the side of liberal. This pattern coincides with the respective views of the
liberals (left) and the conservatives (right) on the matter of capital punishment. Justice O'Connor,
who broke the trend by dissenting, issued a personal opinion as to why she did so separate from
Interestingly enough, it was Justice Kennedy who wrote the opinion for the court though
his ideologies were farther right than that of Justice O'Connor. With the dissent of O'Connor, it
was Kennedy, therefore, who provided the swing vote needed to secure the verdict in favor of
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Simmons. Despite these two outliers, the trend remains that those more liberal justices are prone
Simmons” Oyez).
Before the ruling of Roper v. Simmons, thirty states prohibited capital punishment of
minors and the mentally retarded. Twelve of those states had banned the death penalty, while
eighteen had forbidden the practice specifically on those groups. Effective immediately after the
ruling in Simmons, no state was permitted to execute offenders who had committed the crime
when under the age of eighteen. The twenty states who previously allowed this were required to
demote the sentences to life in prison without the opportunity of parole ("Roper v. Simmons"
Justia Law).
While those on death row experienced a significant impact, Roper had little to no effect
on the court system's treatment of juvenile offenders. Those under the age of eighteen are still
able to be tried as adults and sentenced to adult prisons as opposed to juvenile correctional
facilities. The outcome of the case did, however, create several new questions, particularly
regarding the point at which a criminal is considered beyond reform and whether or not a life in
prison really is better than death. It was questions like these that lead to the rulings of Graham v.
Florida (2010), which prohibits a mandatory sentence of life without parole for minors convicted
of homicide, and Miller v. Alabama (2012), which prohibits sentencing minors to life without
In regards to the correctness of the ruling, the court's decision in Roper has yet to be
overturned. If the exasperation expressed by the justices during the case- as Roper was the
second death penalty case to be argued before the Supreme Court in fifteen years- is anything to
go by, it will not be brought to court again for some time. However, as Justice Scalia alluded to
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in his passionate dissent, the court is anything but stagnant, as are the American people. Though
the ruling in Roper has yet to be reconsidered by the court, the national consensus that the
leniency toward minors shown by cases like Miller and Graham. Thus, the correctness currently
remains a matter of opinion more than a fact, and until the consensus changes and the justices
As for Christopher Simmons, he is a few months away from turning forty-five. While he
was never executed, he continues to serve his sentence of life without the opportunity of parole
in Missouri State Correctional Center and will be doing so for the foreseeable future (Levik,
.
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Works Cited
“Atkins v. Virginia.” Legal Information Institute, Legal Information Institute, 20 June 2002,
www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/00-8452.ZS.html.
Levick, Marsha, et al. “Celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of Roper v. Simmons: One Small Step
for Christopher Simmons, One Giant Step for Juvenile Justice Reform.” HuffPost, 7 Dec.
2017, www.huffpost.com/entry/celebrating-the-tenth-anniversary-of-roper-v-
simmons_b_6777134.
attorney/post-conviction-relief/.
Raeburn, Paul. “Too Immature for the Death Penalty?” The New York Times, The New York
death-penalty.html.
Association, www.apa.org/about/offices/ogc/amicus/roper.
“Roper v. Simmons.” Legal Information Institute, Legal Information Institute, 1 Mar. 2005,
www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-633.ZS.html.
supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/543/551/.
www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/492/361.
capitalpunishmentincontext.org/files/resources/juveniles/juvSimmonsEUamicus.pdf.