Institute of

Power Engineers
July 2005

Panglobal on Canada/ U.S. issues

Algoma Steel
 Institute of
Power Engineers
Ta b l e o f C o n t e n t s

Editor-
George Reid 3 Headlines

Contributors
4 Nuts and Bolts
Robert Cumming
Algoma Steel
6 Man, This Blows
Tony Conner
TBP Industrial
Steam Systems
8 Condensate Induced
John Cerniuk WaterHammer

12 Power Engineering
Wayne Kirsner,
A North American Profession in
P.E.
Transition
A. Banweg,
Nalco Company 14 Nalco water treatment

Check us out at http://www.nipe.ca

 Headlines
National IPE
Convention
The 2005 annual IPE
national convention will be held in
Toronto this year from September
14 through to the 18th. The main
convention will be held at the Days
Inn and Conference Centre at 6257
Airport Road Mississauga Ontario.
For all the details check out the
Toronto branch’s web site at
www.ipe.org
Bruce nuclear
The potential restart of Units 1
and 2 at the Bruce facility would
result in an additional 1,540
megawatts of electricity generating
capacity, which is enough to power
over one million homes across
Ontario. Restarting these units would
also potentially replace over 20 per
cent of Ontario's current coal
capacity and related harmful
emissions
http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.cf
m?fuseaction=english.news&body=y
es&news_id=91
Ontario’s New Energy
Market Emerges
Ontario’s energy minister Dwight
Duncan announced new developments in
the Ontario energy market that will add
another 1600MW to Ontario’s energy
supply to help offset the replacement of its
coal plant ….
http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.cf
m?fuseaction=english.news&body=yes
&news_id=93
New Brunswick Point
Lepreau Nuclear Station
The province of New
Brunswick and Atomic Energy of
Canada Ltd are looking into
extending the operational life of the
Point Lepreau nuclear station. With
this project the operational life of the
station will hopefully be extended 25
years…..
http://www.canelect.ca/english/a
rticle.html?SMContentIndex=4&
SMContentSet=0
 Flanged Joints
By Tony Conner of TBP Industrial Steam Systems
The most common flanges found in
general industrial & institutional steam plants are
Class 125 & 250 cast iron, Class 150 & 300
forged steel. These are used to connect flanged
components, such as boilers, valves, strainers,
pumps, etc.
Cast iron components like valves &
strainers are typically much cheaper than cast
steel, for the same sizes. This is because iron is
much easier to cast than steel. This lower cost for
cast iron components that are dimensionally the
same, means that they are often chosen over steel,
especially in the 125/150 Classes. As with most
things, cost should not be the only consideration.
It is very common for boiler safety valves
to be set for 150 PSIG, while the boiler fires to
maintain a header pressure of 125 PSIG. Systems
like this are routinely filled with Class 125 cast
iron gate & globe valves, control valves, strainers,
trap bodies, etc., because everyone is looking at
the operating pressure. These Class 125
components drop nicely between Class 150
flanges. They’re a perfect fit. Unfortunately, if the
safety valves protecting these steam system
components lift at anything over 125 PSIG, the
installation does not meet pressure piping code
requirements. Even if the safety valves are set for
125 or below, the installation still may not be
code compliant.
If a Class 125 cast iron flanged component
is connected to a Class 150 steel flange (which is
very common), more factors come into play. 125
cast iron flanges have a flat face designed for a
full-face gasket, while 150 steel flanges have a
raised face, designed for a ring gasket. For
pressure piping applications, it is required by the
ASME B31.1 Power Piping Code that the raised
face on the Class 150 flange be removed, and that
a full-face gasket be used to join the 125 & 150
flanges.
The use of a full-face gasket leaves no
gap between the flanges outside of the bolt circle
diameter. If this gap exists, it can allow the
relatively thin and brittle cast iron flange to spring
into it, possibly splitting the flange when the
flange bolts are tightened. If a ring gasket is used
to join two Class 125 flanges, then “low strength”
bolts, such as A 307 Gr B, must be used, along
with nuts of a corresponding material. In addition
to a minimum listed tensile strength, these bolts
also have maximum tensile strength, meaning that
the fastener will fail before the flanges, if the
bolts are over-torqued during installation.
From the ASME B31.1 Power Piping
Code: “When bolting Class 150 standard steel
flanges to flat face cast iron flanges, the steel
flange shall be furnished with a flat face. Steel
flanges of Class 300 raised face standard may be
bolted to Class 250 raised face cast iron.”
Many people don’t realize that the
fasteners themselves also need to be code
compliant. There are a huge number of fastener
grades available. Among the most common are
SAE Gr. 5 and Gr. 8. However, these are not
listed as approved for use in pressure piping,
falling under ASME B31.1. The most commonly
available code compliant grade is B7, which can
be either studs, or bolts. “B7” will be in raised
lettering on bolt heads, or stamped into one end of
factory-cut studs. B7 material is also available in
a range of diameters, as lengths of threaded rod,
which can be cut field-cut to length. The
matching nut grade is 2H, which has a noticeably
heavier wall and higher profile than the
corresponding size of SAE grades. The “2H” will
be shown in raised lettering on one face of the
nut. The B7 studs and 2H nuts are suitable for
most of the steel flanged piping joints found in
typical powerhouse applications. Table 112 in the
B31.1 Code lists

approved fastener grades & materials for various
applications. The use of steel flanges and
components eliminates trying to keep track of the
various requirements regarding flange faces and
fasteners.
From IPT’s “Industrial Fasteners
Handbook” by Bruce Basaraba:
“The functional (clamp load) strength of any nut
and bolt system is dependent upon both the proof
load strength of the bolt and the proof load
strength of the nut. Functional nut strength is
determined by both nut hardness and the shape of
the nut. Nuts generally fail under high loading by
thread stripping that begins at the threads next to
the bearing surface of the nut.”
When tightening flange bolts, the nut
acting against the flange is subjected to very high
stress. Because of this, the wall of the nut tends to
dilate or mushroom the bottom of the nut against
the flange. If the nut fails, it typically results in
the nut threads stripping progressively from the
inner (against the flange surface) outward, much
like undoing a zipper. This dilating or
mushrooming of the nut can only be controlled by
strengthening the nut wall through heat treatment,
or by increasing the thickness of the nut wall and/
or height of the nut. The use of “2H” nuts vs
many other grades such as SAE, means that a
fastener with a heavier wall that resists
“mushrooming”, and the higher profile provides
more threads to engage.
For those that think this is all academic,
with no relationship to the “real world”, please
refer at the photographs below. These are
posted on Wayne Kirsner’s website
www.kirsner.org . He’s a professional engineer
from Atlanta, who specializes in the
investigation of steam system water hammer
events resulting in fatalities. Note that the valve
itself (a Class 150 cast steel) did not fail. The
flange fasteners however, did fail, resulting in
the death of the operator. Note that the fatality
DID NOT occur as a result of operator error,
but rather a piping design flaw. Steam valves
should not be installed in vertical piping runs.
Where it is not possible to avoid this, an
overseat drain must be provided so that any
accumulated condensate on top of the valve
disk can be drained, prior to opening the valve.
It is NOT POSSIBLE to slowly “crack” the
valve, in order to avoid “condensation induced
water hammer”. It is not clear (the accident
may still be under investigation) if the correct
grades of bolts or studs & nuts were used to join
this flange. Even if they were code compliant
fasteners, it is obvious that they were subjected
to forces beyond what they could withstand,
with the nuts being stripped-off. It is certain that
any plant people involved in the accident
investigation regarding this failure would very
much like to be able to assure the investigators
that the correct size & grade of fasteners were
used, and that all of the available threads were
fully engaged
MAN, This Blows
By Robert Cumming and photos by Paul Lalonde, Courtesy of
Algoma Steel
Steam turbines play a vital role in many
of today’s industrial and commercial
operations. Applications range from small,
single-stage units used to drive pumps, all the
way up to the large, multi-stage turbines that
produce thousands of megawatts of power.
Steam turbines are found in many industrial
applications ranging from co-generations to
pulp and paper production, where the majority
of their use is for the generation of power.
Steel mills are no different. They often
have large steam-driven turbo-generator units
used to supply some of the power demand for
the mill. However, the need for steam turbines
at a steel mill does not stop at the electrical
grid. Most integrated steel mills that operate a
blast furnace require a high volume of low
pressure air called “wind” in order to operate.
This wind is usually supplied by a steam
turbine driven blower. These units are known
as turbo-blowers and are basically large air
compressors. These units are vital to the safe
operation of a blast furnace.
Algoma Steel is an integrated steel mill
located in Sault Ste. Marie Ontario. Onsite is one of
the largest operational blast furnaces in North
America. The furnace, known as #7 Blast Furnace is
the heart of the operation, supplying all of the liquid
iron for the BOSP (Basic Oxygen Steelmaking
Process). At full capacity, the furnace can produce
up to five tons of liquid iron per minute.
A blast furnace is a vessel in which liquid
iron is produced. Raw materials such as iron ore
pellets and coke (large pieces of carbon) are added
to the top of the furnace to form what is called a
“burden”. The burden is held in suspension by the
wind which is supplied by the turbo-blower. This
wind, known as “cold blast” discharges from the
blower at approximately 350 degrees Fahrenheit and
travels through a large line known as a header to the
blast furnace stoves. At the stoves, the wind is
heated to approximately 2300 degrees Fahrenheit.
The wind, now “hot blast,” continues to the
furnace where it collects at what is called the “bustle
pipe” and then enters the furnace proper through
nozzles called “tuyers”. The hot blast is then mixed
with fuels like oxygen and natural gas to start a
chemical reaction needed to melt the burden. Once
liquefied, a hole is drilled at the bottom of the
furnace and the liquid iron is poured. The iron is
then sent to the steel making shop where it is
processed into steel. It takes approximately six
hours to melt raw material to liquid iron.
Algoma Steel’s #7 Furnace

#1 Turbo Blower
The #7 Blast Furnace at Algoma Steel
gets all of its required wind from #5 Turbo-
Blower. This blower was installed in the mid
1970’s specifically for #7 Blast Furnace. The
turbine is a 28 stage impulse-reaction machine
built by Brown Boveri. It operates on 600 lbs.
superheated steam and exhausts under vacuum to
a condenser. The machine has five admission
valves and uses up to 180 000 lbs. of steam per
hour and operates at a rated speed of 3800 RPM
producing up to 30, 800 horse power. The
blower end of the machine was originally a 16
stage axial compressor, but was upgraded in
October of 2002 with a more efficient 13 stage
axial rotor. The rotor is surrounded by a stator
blade carrier that is equipped with adjustable
blades. Both the rotor and blade carrier were
supplied by MAN Turbo.
The controls for this machine were
upgraded in the mid 1990’s from the original “P”
to “H” controls to the more efficient “I” to “H”
controls. The control systems were supplied by
Compressor Controls Corporation. The machine
is operated by three separate control systems : a
Speed Controller maintains the machine at a
rated speed of 3800 RPM when the unit is
online: a Performance Controller maintains the
flow of wind to the blast furnace by adjusting the
angle of the blades on the stator blade carrier ;
and an Anti-Surge Controller, which is a safety
relief device designed to protect the blower from
surging under a reverse flow condition.
At full production, the blast furnace
requires up to 150 000 CFM of wind at pressures
up to 48 PSI. The Turbo-Blower can easily meet
these requirements.
As stated before, a turbo-blower is a key
piece of equipment needed to safely run the blast
furnace. Thus, if anything were to happen to the
operational unit, a stand by would be required to
maintain the blast furnace until the main blower
can be returned to service. Algoma Steel has two
stand-by units that can be used to operate the
blast furnace if the need arises. Number 1 Turbo-
Blower is the main stand-by machine, rolling
over at 1200 RPM and is located in the Turbo-
Blower Building. This machine is a steam
turbine-driven centrifugal compressor produced
by Ingersol-Rand Company. The second stand-
by machine is #4 Turbo-Blower and it is located
at the Main Boiler House. This is a smaller steam
turbine- driven axial compressor also produced
by Brown-Boveri. This unit is on a barring gear
and can be put into service from a cold start up
in two hours.
EngineersInspectingAdmissonValveson#5Turbo-
Blower1
Operating a turbo blower within an integrated
steel mill such as Algoma, has its own unique
challenges. This can be one of the most complex
systems for a power engineer to operate, due to the
ever-changing operating parameters of these machines
and conditions present at the blast furnace. Although
operating turbo blowers is only one job that a power
engineer may perform in an integrated steel company,
it is one of the most critical to the safe and efficient
operation of a blast furnace.
Condensate Induced Water Hammer
Part 2—continued from last issue

This article is from Wayne Kirsner, P.E.

Who investigates industrial steam accidents. For more of his work
visit his web site http://www.kirsner.org

What Happened
For four weeks asbestos workers had been removing asbestos insulation from the 2,200
foot section of steam main known as the G-Line and the 120 foot H-Line. (See Figure
1) Like all steam mains at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, the G and H Lines ran underground
in narrow utilidors filled with pipe. Originally, the contractor had tried to abate the
steam main with the lines energized. This proved to be near impossible for the workers.
Utilidor temperatures reached 160 degree F as insulation was removed from the 325
degree F pipe carrying 80 psig steam. Laborers who had to be suited-up and masked to
work in the asbestos laden environment were dropping like flies from the heat and/or
quitting. The contractor was forced to seek relief from the Owner. A compromise was
negotiated after the first week-- steam would be de-energized at midnight before each
workday, asbestos abators would start work at 4:00 a.m. and finish by noontime at
which time steam would be restored. The asbestos removal contractor would be
responsible for de-energizing and re-energizing the steam line daily. For the three
weeks before the accident this was the procedure. By the beginning of the laborers'
workday, temperatures in the utilidors were still around 120 degree F but, with frequent
breaks to cool off and re-hydrate, conditions were tolerable.

Fig 1 Isometric view of G- and H-Lines (no scale).

 Unfortunately, the discomfort to the workers was not the only consequence of
removing the insulation from active steam mains that had gone unforeseen. There was
also the effect on the steam traps. 3/8" thermodynamic traps were installed at each
manhole except C-4 which contained a 1/2" trap. At the system's operating conditions,
the 3/8" traps could remove 295 pounds of condensate per hour . With 3-1/2" of
insulation, 300 feet of 12" pipe generates 41 pounds of condensate per hour.
Thus, for a typical pipe segment, the traps had better than a 7 to 1 safety factor
for condensate removal with the line insulated. With the insulation removed, however,
heat loss increased almost 18 fold so that condensate formation jumped to 729 #'s/hr
over 300 feet of pipe. At this rate of heat loss, the 3/8" traps had less than one-half the
capacity needed to keep up with the condensate production. This was not good.
ThAbatement began at Manhole G-1 and headed south toward C-4 at the rate of
about 125 feet a day. As abatement proceeded down the G-Line, local traps serving the
uninsulated portion of the line were overwhelmed with condensate during the period
the lines were energized each day. In the first two weeks, however, this didn't cause a
problem. Excess condensate merely rolled down to C-4 on the south end and G-1 on
the North end. Traps on the south end still serving insulated portions of the line had
adequate capacity to remove the excess condensate. On the north end, the steam valve
was left closed so trouble was avoided. After two weeks of daily start-ups without
serious incident, save some minor waterhammers, asbestos crew operators grew
confident that start-up of the steam line was no big deal. By the beginning of the third
week, insulation removal had reached Manhole G-9. Calculations show that at this
point the rate of condensate being generated in the southern section of the G-Line
began to exceed the net capacity of the traps to remove it.
Condensate accumulation during steam operation is potentially destructive, but even
so, as long as condensate is religiously drained everyday before start-up, a catastrophic
waterhammer accident might still be averted. The problem was--condensate wasn't
being drained religiously. The asbestos workers given responsibility for energizing the
steam main daily didn't fully appreciate the danger inherent in starting up a high
pressure steam system with condensate in it.
They did not routinely open drain valves to bleed the system of excess
condensate either at night, when they shut the system down, or at noontime, when they
re-admitted steam through the C-4 valve to re-energize the steam main. Their belief
was that steam admitted through the C-4 valve would blow condensate to the far end
of the main at G-1. Thus, in their view, only the drain at G-1 "really" needed to be
opened at start-up. Accordingly, there was a tacit understanding that the bleeder valve
at G-1 would be opened daily by the quality control supervisor for the prime
contractor, and any condensate that wasn't drained at start-up, they apparently thought,
would be mopped up by traps after start-up.
 As the third week began, the severity and frequency of waterhammer began to
accelerate. Residual condensate accumulated in the steam pipe at C-4 due not only to
operation of the uninsulated steam main, but also due to condensate formed at start-up
that went undrained. Early in the third week, heavy banging forced workers to evacuate
the utilidor. Clyde, one of the more vocal evacuees, warned the abatement supervisor "this
thing sounds like its ready to explode... What are you going to do about it?"

By Wednesday of the third week, all the insulation had been stripped from the G
and H Lines. The lines were completely bare. By the next morning, the day of the
Accident, I calculate that enough condensate would have accumulated at C-4 to
completely fill the line adjacent the valve and extend over 300 feet up the steam line
toward G-9 . In addition, condensate accumulated in the 120 foot long H Line. Due to a
design oversight, there was no drain or trap upstream of the gate valve at H-1. The
contractor, not comprehending the pitch of the H Line, did not realize that condensate
would accumu-late against the H-1 valve during the three weeks of on-off steam
operation. Hence the line filled with condensate as depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2 H-Line full of condensate to overflowing.

Condensate also accumulated each night in the double-elbow riser to the south of the C-4
valve. (See Figure 3 below). During the period after midnight when the C-4 valve was
closed, steam would condense in the uninsulated double-elbow riser and come to rest
against the south side of the closed valve. From midnight until noon the following day,
enough condensate accumulated to almost fill the riser.
One other event shaped the conditions just prior to the accident. On the day of the
accident, there was a change in the start-up procedure. In order to isolate another steam
main for repair work, the contractor needed to energize the G Line early. The asbestos
crew was instructed to start up the G Line an hour and fifteen minutes before their quitting
time. In addition, but unbeknownst to the asbestos crew, the contractor's quality control
supervisor decided to expedite warm up the G-Line by admitting steam through the G-1
valve at the far end of the G Line as well as through C-4. The G-1 valve was opened as
much as 30 minutes before Bobby first cracked open the C-4 steam valve.
This had the likely effect of sweeping undrained condensate residing against the G-1
valve on the north end of the line south to C-4, and completely filling the H-Line as
explained in the sequence of figures a thru c in sidebar at end of article.
The situation, then, 15 minutes before the Accident as Bobby readied to crack
open the C-4 valve, is as shown in Figure 3.

Subcooled condensate filled the steam line on both sides of the C-4 valve as
well as completely filling the H Line. High pressure steam admitted through G-1 had
pressurized the steam main and was sitting atop the condensate on the north side of C-
4. The south side of the valve was also under steam pressure which, based on
testimony, was likely slightly less that that on the north side.
Now, put yourself in Bobby's place, except, assume you know all the
information described above, i.e., in your mind's eye, you can 'see' the build up of
condensate shown in Figure 3 and figure out, based on the ease with which the valve's
handwheel spun, that there is full steam pressure atop the condensate. Ask yourself two
questions:
#1. Is this Situation Dangerous? Some steam people would say "no, as long as
there is no fast moving steam, there's no danger of waterhammer. Opening C-4
slowly and incrementally should prevent steam or condensate from moving
quickly and thus prevent a waterhammer." This is wrong, dead wrong.
High pressure steam in contact with subcooled condensate is dangerous. It's a recipe
for Condensation Induced Waterhammer. The sidebar (See sidebar near bottom page)
explains why this type event is 10 to 100 times more powerful that conventional
"steam flow" driven waterhammer.
#2. What Would You have Done in Bobby's place? If your answer is, "I'd first
open the C-4 bleeder valve to drain the condensate," you're toast. Although this is the
answer most steam operators would give, it will trigger the accident. Neither the
bleeder valve nor the steam valve can be opened without provoking this accident. To
understand why, it's crucial for steam fitters and operators to understand the
mechanism of Condensation Induced Waterhammer.
 Power Engineering
A North American Profession in Transition
R. A. Clarke,
President and Chief Operating Officer
PanGlobal Training Systems Ltd.

Introduction
At the heart of most industrial complexes lies a steam-driven utility system. Whether control-
ling thermal processes or generating power, modern steam production facilities are extremely complex
and require skilled professionals for efficient, and even more importantly, safe operation. Throughout
North America and around the world, these professionals are known by any number of titles but are
commonly referred to as Power Engineers.
The power and heating plants at the core of every industrial and commercial complex are criti-
cal to the success of each facility. The safe and efficient operation of these plants has been the respon-
sibility of the Power Engineer for more than 120 years in Canada and many parts of the world. As the
profession looks forward to new challenges and opportunities, it is prudent to reflect on where we
have come from and where we may go.
There are many similarities throughout the industries supported by this profession. A North
American design and construction standard for boilers has existed for a number of years. The code
was developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers originally in 1914 and has been up-
dated continuously ever since. Recent versions are updated every three years. The most recent version
(2004) has included both SI and USCS units, for the first time since 1983. The code has been adopted
by most jurisdictions that use qualified Inspectors to administer the standards. Uniformity of inspector
qualification is provided through a single group; the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel In-
spectors.
The pressure and energy created by steam production, if improperly managed, is potentially
devastating to plant and personnel. The ramifications of boiler accidents have been recognized for
many years. As a result, all facets of boiler design and construction are rigorously specified by profes-
sional and regulatory bodies, closely monitored, and require highly trained and certified professionals.
Why then would we condone a lesser standard for the Power Engineers operating the equipment?
One of the most important differences throughout the industries supported by this profession is
a significant variance in operator certification standards and training. The lack of a uniform standard
of training across North America has created an environment wherein unnecessary litigation, insur-
ance claims and injuries continue to exist.
Each year, boiler incidents cause billions of dollars worth of damage. At times, injuries and
human fatalities add to the physical damage resulting from the incidents. According to the National
Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI) statistics, the cause of approximately 80% of
these accidents can be directly or indirectly attributed to Operator error.
 On a per capita basis, however, Canada has less than 1/6th of the number of accidents that
occur in the US. This serious discrepancy needs to be addressed, ideally with an overall solution
meeting the needs of all stakeholders in a common North American vision.
Specific training and certification standards may exist in each jurisdiction, but in Canada
over the past twenty years what is essentially a single standard has been achieved. Working collabo-
ratively, Industry Groups, Certifying Bodies and Regulators have facilitated the adoption of a uni-
versal Certification and Training Standard across jurisdictions. Similar opportunities still exist in
collaboratively developing a broader standard amongst National Board jurisdictions across North
America.
The future of Power Engineering has many technological and staffing challenges. Rapid ad-
vances in technology, increasing operational automation and the convergence of Power, Heating and
Pressure Plants combine with the aging operator population to add complexity to corporate staffing
decisions. These challenges can be met successfully if an effective partnership model is adopted by
all stakeholders, including; industry, regulators, educators and professional organizations. Together
we can produce a North American Standard.

US and Canadian Historical Perspectives on Operator Certification

Over the years, many schools in Canada participated in the instruction of Power Engineers as
industry and jurisdictions realized that educator-based training preparation produced better qualified
and more importantly, more competent operators. Most of these educators chose to utilize the al-
ready-established instructional materials prepared for SAIT’s correspondence courses.
The wide-spread use of the same instructional material created a uniform educational stan-
dard which in turn naturally produced a pathway towards uniform operator certification. This proc-
ess culminated in 1971 with the formation of the Standardization of Power Engineering Examina-
tions Committee (SOPEEC). A sub-committee of the Canadian Chief Inspectors Association (ACI).
, SOPEEC was established to allow for the standardization of power engineering examinations and
certifications as well as to promote the free movement of Power Engineers across Canada. In 1972,
SOPEEC approved the SAIT correspondence courses as the standard curriculum and along with its
uniform set of examinations created a national program for education and Certification of Power En-
gineers. At its' inception 2000 students were educated each year within the system. Currently, over
5000 courses are purchased each year from across Canada, the United States, Australia, and the Car-
ibbean.
In the US, operator certification standards vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and in many
states, there is no existing standard. Differences in certification standards are seen at the National,
State and Local levels. The largest third party certifying body in the United States is the National
Institute for the Uniform Licensing of Power Engineers (NIULPE) which is recognized in forty one
states and by the US Military. A large portion of US industry has historically depended upon power
engineering training obtained in the military as the basis of background experience qualification
when recent direct experience was not documented.
Recognition is different than adoption however, and less than 10 states have formally
adopted regulatory licensure or indeed any standard for certification. In Canada there is one standard
for Operator Certification administered under the authority of Canada’s NBBI members (ACI).

The next issue will continue this article with US and Canadian comparisons in accident rates;
design and construction standards; education, training, and certification; and conclusions .
Evaluation of New Condensate Corrosion Filming
Technologies in Steam Trap Devices

By Melissa Kegley, Nalco Company and Jim Daugherty, Armstrong

International Inc.

Steam traps are essential for maximizing efficiency in a steam system. It is important to under-
stand how corrosion inhibitors affect these units. Since the 1940’s, volatile amine treatments have
been used in condensate systems to minimize corrosion. These compounds neutralize carbonic acid
formed in the condensate system and raise the condensate pH to a non-corrosive level. Amine-based
inhibitors are effective if proper concentrations and performance parameters are maintained.
Although effective in reducing condensate system corrosion, many of these chemicals are
somewhat hazardous and have permissible exposure limits (PEL’s) established by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). If the concentrations of these
compounds exceed these limits, adverse health effects can occur. Chemical odors can result well be-
low these limits, raising questions about the safety of the inhibitors.
Often, sophisticated monitoring practices are put into place to avoid this problem – most commonly in
hospitals, universities and commercial buildings. A new, innovative condensate corrosion treatment
was developed in 1998, in response to increasing regulatory,
safety, technical, and economical needs voiced by managers of steam systems. Based on emulsifiers
commonly used in the food industry, this chemistry presented concerned facility personnel with a
safer material that met all their regulatory, technical, and
economic needs. As with any new technology, its long-term impact on the steam system equipment,
such as steam traps, was unclear as it was brought to market.

CORROSION INHIBITORS

There are four common types of condensate corrosion inhibitors: neutralizing amines, filming
amines, oxygen scavengers, and a new emulsifier technology. The most common type of corrosion
inhibitor is the neutralizing amine (such as morpholine, cyclohexylamine, and diethylaminoetha-
nol). These chemicals are volatile, nitrogen-bearing compounds that condense with the steam and
neutralize any carbonic acid formed in the condensate system. Neutralizing amines increase the
condensate pH to reduce corrosion.
 There are several drawbacks to neutralizing amines. First, these chemicals are not effective in
protecting against oxygen corrosion. This is a problem for many HVAC systems that operate intermit-
tently and experience air in-leakage. Second, neutralizing amines have a distinct odor that can be trou-
blesome in public areas where direct steam humidification is used and indoor air quality is imperative.
Third, in systems with high CO2 levels (created from the breakdown of carbonate and bicarbonate in
the boiler), carbonic acid production is high. Thus, to keep the condensate less corrosive, neutralizing
amine use is excessive and costly. Last, these amines are hazardous, have low reportable quantities
and can raise some health issues if overfed.

Filming amines are used most commonly in industrial systems. These amines form a film on
piping surfaces. They inhibit oxygen and carbonic acid corrosion effectively but are difficult to feed.
Because of their strong cationic charges, they act as detergents, “scrubbing” old deposits and loose
material out of the condensate system. These corrosion products are commonly deposited in low
points in the condensate system and routinely clog strainers or other steam equipment.3 Filming
amines also tend to form “gunk balls” in traps and strainers, causing downtime and high maintenance
costs.

Oxygen corrosion inhibitors prevent damaging oxygen pitting in the system. The most com-
mon types of oxygen corrosion inhibitors used in condensate systems are erythorbic acid and diethy-
hydroxylamine (DEHA). These chemicals offer oxygen scavenging and passivation abilities. If oxy-
gen concentrations are high, their use can become uneconomical.

Over the past several years, blends of emulsifiers commonly used in the food industry have
been shown to effectively inhibit oxygen and carbonic acid corrosion. They are similar to filming
amine technologies in that they form a non-wettable, substantive barrier on the metal surfaces. This
barrier protects the metal surface from water containing oxygen, carbonic acid, or ammonia. Since
steam and condensate can wash away the film, these emulsifiers need to be fed continuously to main-
tain the effectiveness of the program. Since this emulsifier-based chemical is non-ionic and repels it-
self, it does not form “gunk balls” commonly seen with filming amine technology.4 This inhibitor is
also non-volatile and contributes no odors, an important property to have in HVAC steam systems.
This technology is approved by the FDA for contact with food and safer to use than the alternatives.
Since the dosage rate is dependent on steam flow, and not carbon dioxide production, it can also be an
economical solution to expensive neutralizing amine programs.
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