Dr.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY, LUCKNOW
ACADEMIC SESSION:
2014 – 2015

STUDY OF BASICS OF CASE LAW

PROJECT
ON
‘IMPACT OF A DISSENTING OPINION
IN THE LIGHT OF
A.D.M. JABALPUR Vs. SHIVKANT SHUKLA’

SUBMITTED FOR THE PROJECT WORK UNDERTAKEN IN THE PARTIAL

FULFILLMENT OF B.A.LL.B (Hons.) FIVE YEARS INTEGRATED COURSE AT
Dr. RMLNLU, LUCKNOW.

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

MR. SHASHANK SHEKHAR AISHWARYA SHUKLA

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR (LAW) ROLL NO. 18, SECTION A

Dr. RMLNLU, LUCKNOW B.A. LL.B (H), SEMESTER I

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to extend my sincere thanks to our Hon’ble teachers Dr. C. M. Jariwala and Mr.
Shashank Shekhar for giving me the opportunity to work on this Project and for their able
guidance which helped me to steer out this Project successfully. Their continuing support was
the guiding light in this Project.

I would also like to thank my seniors for their constant encouragement and valuable tips. I
would like to thank my classmates also for their enthusiasm.

And lastly, I would like to thank my Family and our Hon’ble Vice Chancellor for providing
me with the facilities which were required to complete this Project.

-Aishwarya Shukla
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

 LIST OF CASES

 INTRODUCTION

 OBJECTIVE

 HYPOTHESIS

 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

 LITERATURE REVIEW

 TEXT OF THE PROJECT

 THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE :AN INTRODUCTION
 BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

 FACTS OF THE CASE

 JUDGEMENT OF THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE
 JUSTICE KHANNA AND THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE-
JUDGMENT
 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE KHANNA
 AFTERMATH OF THE DECISION
 CRITICAL COMMENT ON THE CASE
 THE AMENDMENT
 CONCLUSION

 BIBLIOGRAPHY

List Of Abbreviations
1. A.I.R. -All India Reporter
2. C.J. -Chief Justice
3. C. J. I. -Chief Justice Of India
4. H.C. -High Court
5. S.C.C. -Supreme Court Cases
6. S.C. -Supreme Court
7. S.C.R. -Supreme Court Reporter
8. vol. -volume

LIST OF CASES
  A.D.M. Jabalpur V Shivkant Shukla
 State of Uttar Pradesh V Raj Narain
 Leversidge Vs Anderson
 Advocates-on-Record case
 Makhan Singh Vs. State of Punjab

INTRODUCTION
Emergency provisions given in Part XVIII of the Constitution of India have been used a few
times in the History of India. One such usage was the Emergency imposed in 1975 till 1977.
This emergency was declared after the verdict in the case State of Uttar Pradesh V. Raj
Narain. In this case the then Prime Minister of India, Mrs Indira Gandhi’s election to the seat
was declared invalid. Her appeal to the Supreme Court had granted her only conditional stay.
She could not vote or speak in the Lok Sabha rendering her dysfunctional.

Emergency was imposed under article 352 of the Constitution of India. During this time
under article 359 (1), the right to move the Court to enforce Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the
Constitution and all the proceedings pending in any Court concerned with the enforcement of
the aforementioned articles would remain suspended.

This period was seen as the Period of Arbitrariness.

A case was filed in the Supreme Court in order to challenge the Government’s arbitrariness,
A.D.M. Jabalpur V. Shivkant Shukla. The main question in the case was whether, under
Presidential Orders the High Court could entertain a writ of Habeas Corpus filed by a person
challenging the ground for his detention. The arguments began on 14th December, 1975.

The judgment in this case favoured the Government, Justices A. N. Ray (C.J.I.), M. H. Beg,
Y. V. Chandrachud and P. N. Bhagwati were in Majority Opinion while Justice H. R. Khanna
was in Dissenting Opinion.

It is regarded that as a result of this Dissenting Opinion came the 44 th Amendment of the
Constitution in 1978.

OBJECTIVE

Objective of this research project is to study the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Khanna and
look into its impact in the 44 th Amendment, 1978. My research project will answer all the
questions regarding the relation between the A. D. M. Jabalpur Case and the 44 th
Amendment.

HYPOTHESIS
The purpose of the Constitution of India is to guarantee certain rights and duties to the
citizens and people on the Indian Territory, set up the basic framework within which the
country is to be governed. This framework should not be misused either legally or illegally.
The procedures of law should be such that Democracy should prevail and there should be no
room for Arbitrariness.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology for this project will be doctrinal under which various primary and
secondary sources would be used to serve the purpose of the project. I will adopt the methods
of analytical study to undergo the research for the project.

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments by A. Lakshminath

2. Amending Powers and Constitutional Amendments by Paras Diwan & Peeyush
Diwan.
The Text
THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE :AN INTRODUCTION

The Latin term "habeas corpus" means 'you must have the body' and a writ for securing the
liberty of the person was called habeas corpus. The writ affords an effective means of
immediate release from an unlawful or unjustifiable detention whether in prison or in private
custody. The writ is of highest constitutional importance being a remedy available to the
lowliest subject against the most powerful government.

The writ of habeas corpus is described by May in his 'Constitutional History of England’ as
the first security of civil liberty”. Julius Stone in 'Social Dimensions of Law and Justice’ calls
it a picturesque writ with an extraordinary scope and flexibility of application.

Article 21 of the Constitution RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY, now cannot be suspended.
Not even during emergency, 44th Constitutional Amendment Act, passed unanimously,
ensured it. It is instructive to look back on the Habeas Corpus case during internal emergency
(1975-77), the reason for 44th Constitutional Amendment Act and Leversidge Vs Anderson
which played such an important role before the Supreme Court in deciding that even article
21 can be suspended during emergency

The Shah Commission, in its authoritative account of the emergency, mentions,

“The one single item which had affected the people most, over the entire country was the
manner in which the power under the amended MISA was misused at various levels”

Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) was an Act for preventive detention and
detentions made there under were held valid. A.D.M. Jabalpur Vs Shiv Kant Shukla
(Commonly known as the Habeas Corpus case) was to a large extent, responsible for this.
Writ of Habeas Corpus has been described as ‘a key, which unlocks the door to freedom,' and
as the case dealt with its maintainability, it has come to be known as the Habeas Corpus Case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

It all began by a judgment delivered on June 12, 1975 by Justice Jagmohan Lal Sinha of the
Allahabad High Court. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Raj Narain, the petitioner challenged
Indira Gandhi’s election to the Lok Sabha and consequent victory from the Rae Barelli
constituency in Uttar Pradesh. On June 12, Justice Sinha convicted the then Prime Minister,
of having indulged in corrupt practices and declared her election invalid, which meant she
could not contest elections or hold office for six years. Her appeal to the Supreme Court only
granted her a conditional stay. She could not vote or speak in the Lok Sabha rendering her
dysfunctional. Upon increasing hostility by the opposition and in desperation to hold on to
the chair of the PM, she requested the President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed to declare a state of
emergency under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Indian Constitution which he did so
obediently on June 26th, 1975. The government cited ‘a grave emergency existed whereby the
security of India was threatened by internal disturbances’. The war with Pakistan that had just
ended (1971) and the drought (1972) were said to have damaged the economy greatly and
paralyzed the nation. On June 27 1975, the exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of
Article 359 of the Indian constitution were enforced, within which the right of any person
including a foreigner to move to the court to enforce Article 14 (right to equality), Article 21
and Article 22 (prevention against detention in certain cases) of the Constitution and all the
proceedings pending in any court concerned with the enforcement of the aforementioned
articles will remain suspended for the period of Emergency.
What ensued was a string of illegal and hasty detentions without charge or trial, including
those of the major leaders of the opposition party such as Moraji Desai, Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
Jayprakash Narayan and L.K.Advani under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act,
Preventive Detention Law (MISA). Consequently several writ petitions were filed all over the
country. Records show that nine High Courts ruled in favour of the petitioners stating that
even though Article 21 was not enforceable, a person could still demonstrate that their
detention was not in compliance of the law under which they were detained, or that the action
by the State was mala fide or that it was a case of mistaken identity. Highly perturbed the
government decided to appeal against these decision in the Supreme Court, which became
what is called the Additional District Manager of Jabalpur vs. Shiv Kant Shukla case or the
Habeas Corpus case.

FACTS OF THE CASE

On June 25th, 1975 the President in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Articles
352 (Proclamation of Emergency) of the Constitution declared that a grave emergency
existed whereby the security of India was threatened by internal disturbances. On June 27th,
1975 in exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Articles 359 the President declared that
the right of any person including a foreigner to move any court for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by Article 14, Article 21 and Article 22 of the Constitution and all
proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the abovementioned rights shall
remain suspended for the period during which the proclamations of emergency made under
clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on December 3rd, 1971 and on June 25th, 1975
were in force. The Presidential Order of June 27th, 1975 further stated that the same shall be
in addition to and not in derogation of any order made before the date of the aforesaid order
under clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution.

On January 8th, 1976 there was a notification passed in the exercise of powers conferred by
clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution whereby the President declared that the right of
any person to move any to court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Article 19 of
the Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of the
abovementioned rights would remain suspended for the period during which the proclamation
of emergency made under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution on December 3rd,
1971 and on June 25th, 1975 were in force. Several illegal detentions were thereupon made
across the country, pursuant to which various writ petitions were filed throughout the
country. Nine High Courts gave decision in favour of detunes, holding that that though
Article 21 cannot be enforced, yet the order of detention was open to challenge on other
grounds such as that the order passed was not in compliance of the Act or was mala fide.
Against these orders, many appeals were filed before the Supreme Court. Disposing of all the
appeals together, the Supreme Court set aside that the decisions of the High Courts which had
held the declaration and the subsequent detentions as illegal and upheld the declaration and
suspension of the said rights.

JUDGEMENT OF THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE

The habeas corpus case was argued for more than two months after which the Supreme Court
reserved judgment. The judgment was not pronounced even after a considerable time had
elapsed. An application, with a prayer that either the judgment is pronounced or stay order be
vacated, was filed. It was expected that the government might lose the case by three to two.

Judgements were read in the open court by the judges on 28th April 1976 Marking the
BLACK DAY OF INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY, the Supreme Court rejected the arguments
of the Respondents and held that Article 21 of the Constitution was the sole repository of
right to life and liberty and therefore, the suspension of it implied that all the remedies
protecting this right under any other law shall also be suspended. The Court while construing
Article 21 as the sole repository of life and personal liberty denied all available remedies to
the detenus on any ground that any challenge to the detention order for the enforcement of the
right to personal liberty under Article 21 could not be so done on account of the presidential
order suspending it being in force. The majority further held that even the order of detention
could not be challenged even on any other ground, even if the detention order was passed
mala fide, rendering the detenu without any remedy even against an illegal detention.

JUDGEMENT (Per majority A.N. Ray C.J., M.H. Beg. Y.V. Chandrachud and P.N.
Bhagwati JJ.)

Therefore, the Court declared, “in view of the Presidential Order dated June 27th, 1975 no
person has any locus standi to move any writ petition under Article 226 before a High Court
for habeas corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge the legality of an
order of detention on the ground that the order is not under or in compliance with the Act or
is illegal or is vitiated by mala fides factual or legal or is based on extraneous
considerations”, closing its doors to any sort of relief whatsoever to any person suffering
from illegal detention.

Secondly, Article 21 is the Sole Repository of Right to Life and Personal Liberty against the
State. Any claim to a writ of habeas corpus is enforcement of Article 21 and, is, therefore,
barred by the Presidential order

Thirdly, Section 16A(9) of the Act is valid. It is a rule of evidence and it is not open either to
the detenu or to the court to ask for grounds of detention.

Fourthly, it is not competent for any court to go into questions of mala fides of the order of
detention or ultra vires character of the order of detention or that the order was not passed on
the satisfaction of the detaining authority.

The appeals are accepted. The judgments of the High Courts are set aside.

The majority’s rationale portrayed by Chief Justice Ray was that the judiciary was ‘ill
equipped to determine whether a given configuration of events threatens the life of the
community and thus constitutes an emergency.’ The implication was that the judiciary should
abandon all scrutiny of governmental control of individual activities once an emergency was
proclaimed, even if there was egregious misuse of such power by the executive. The court’s
decision was reviled by many as the nadir of justice and weakened the court’s legitimacy.

J. Bhagwati wrote a concurring judgement in the infamous ADM JABALPUR case in which
he held that, ‘There can be no doubt that in the view of the presidential order which mentions
Art 21, the detenus would have no locus standi to maintain the writ petition if it could be
shown that the writ petitions were for the enforcement of rights conferred by Art 21’. The
Supreme Court in effect held that because it was a time of emergency, no person had the right
to life under the Indian Constitution.

JUSTICE KHANNA AND THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE-JUDGMENT

Justice Khanna is renowned for his courage and independence during the period that has been
called the DARKEST HOUR OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY, during the Indian Emergency
(1975-1977) of Indira Gandhi.

Given the important nature of the case, a bench comprising the five senior most judges was
convened to hear the case.

During the arguments, Justice Khanna at one point asked the Attorney General Niren De:
"Life is also mentioned in Article 21 and would Government argument extend to it also?" He
answered, "Even if life was taken away illegally, courts are helpless".

Justice Khanna resisted the pressure to concur with this majority view. He wrote in his
dissenting opinion:

“The Constitution and the laws of India do not permit life and liberty to be at the
mercy of the absolute power of the Executive . . . . What is at stake is the rule of law.
The question is whether the law speaking through the authority of the court shall be
absolutely silenced and rendered mute... detention without trial is an anathema to all
those who love personal liberty.”

In the end, he quoted Justice Charles Evans Hughes:

 “A dissent is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future
day, when a later decision may possibly correct the error into which the dissenting
Judge believes the court to have been betrayed.”

Before delivering this opinion, Justice Khanna mentioned to his sister: I have prepared
my judgment, which is going to cost me the Chief Justice-ship of India.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUSTICE KHANNA

Justice Khanna, in his powerful dissent, held that Article 21 could not be considered to be the
sole repository of the right to life and personal liberty, and such right could not be taken away
under any circumstance without the authority of law, in a society governed by rule of law. He
elaborated in detail all the points in consideration and concluded that

Even in the absence of article 21 in the Constitution, the State has got no power to deprive a
person of his life or liberty.

Under Article 359 the Presidential orders have been of two types. On 3rd November, 1962 in
exercise of powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 359 of the Constitution the President
declared that "the right of any person to move any court for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by Article 21 and Article 22 shall remain suspended for the period during which
the Proclamation of Emergency issued under clause (1) of Article 352 on 26 October, 1962 is
in force, if such a person has been deprived of any right under the Defense of India ordinance
1962 or of any rule or order made there under"

The 1975 Presidential order under Article 359(1) does not have the words "if such a person
has been deprived of any such right under the Defense of India ordinance 1962 or any rule or
order made there under". In other words, the 1962 Presidential order is limited to the
condition of deprivation of rights under the Defense of India ordinance or any rule or order
made there under whereas in the 1975 Presidential order no statute is mentioned. The
illegality of orders was challenged in Makhan Singh's case in spite of the Presidential order
under the 1962 Proclamation on the ground that the impeached orders are not in terms of the
statute or they are made in abuse of law.

That there is no sufficient ground to interfere with the view taken by all the nine High Courts
which went into the matter, that the Presidential order of June 27, 1975 did not affect the
maintainability of the habeas corpus petitions to question the legality of the detention orders
and that such petitions could be proceeded with despite that order.

Justice Khanna, conscious of his aloneness, ended his judgment with a quote:

"As observed by Chief Justice Hughes, Judges are not there simply to decide cases, but to
decide them as they think they should be decided, and while it may be regrettable that they
cannot always agree… A dissent in a Court of last resort, to use his words is an appeal to the
brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may
possible correct the error into which the dissenting Judge believes the court to have been
betrayed."

AFTERMATH OF THE DECISION

True to his apprehensions, his junior, M. H. Beg, was appointed Chief Justice in January
1977. This was against legal tradition and was widely protested by bar associations and the
legal community. Justice Khanna resigned on the same day. After his resignation Bar
Associations all over India, in protest, abstained from the courts and took out black-coat
processions, though to no avail. However, his was the last supersession in the history of the
Supreme Court, and eventually the judiciary even wrested the power of judicial appointments
from the executive in a landmark ruling in the Advocates-on-Record case in 1993 (also
known as the Second Judges Case)

The New York Times, wrote at the time:

If India ever finds its way back to the freedom and democracy that were proud hallmarks of
its first eighteen years as an independent nation, someone will surely erect a monument to
Justice H R Khanna of the Supreme Court. It was Justice Khanna who spoke out fearlessly
and eloquently for freedom this week in dissenting from the Court's decision upholding the
right of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Government to imprison political opponents at will
and without court hearings... The submission of an independent judiciary to absolutist
government is virtually the last step in the destruction of a democratic society; and the
Indian Supreme Court's decision appears close to utter surrender.

This judgment has been consistently lauded by lawyer, scholars and intellectual alike and has
been compared to the dissent of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson.
Nani Palkhivala's book, which came out soon after the emergency was revoked, carried a
full-fledged chapter on him titled, "Salute to Justice Khanna". At one point in the chapter
he says of Justice Khanna, "his statue must be installed in every street and corner of the
country for the yeoman service rendered by him for the cause of justice".

In December 1978, his full-size portrait was unveiled in his former court, courtroom number
2 of the Supreme Court. To this day, nobody else has had the singular honour of having their
portrait put up in the Supreme Court during their lifetime. In fact, when the Supreme Court
Bar Association asked for contributions from its members to collect Rs 10,000 for the
portrait, within half-an-hour Rs 30,000 was on the table and the members of the bar had to be
forcibly stopped.

CRITICAL COMMENT ON THE CASE

Dubbed as “a scar on Indian Judiciary”, the judgment exposed the dangers facing the
Constitution (read total anarchy) if the judicial wing was unwilling to stand firm and
intolerant to violation of constitutional mandate. Justice SD Agarwal, former Chief Justice,
Punjab & Haryana High Court says,

'The experience ... written in black and of the Emergency will go down in the history of the
judiciary, and will ever remind the citizens of the country, the manner in which the people
were dealt with during the said period.'

However Justice Khanna, who gave the dissenting judgment, was praised for his integrity of
duty to deliver justice. Unfortunate decision in Shukla Vs ADM, Jabalpur 1976, emergency
days, laid down that Art.21 is the sole repository of right to life and that during emergency
when by Presidential order, enforcement of Fundamental rights remains suspended, the State
can even shoot citizens with immunity (This argument for Union of India, was advanced by
Niren De, the then Attorney General and upheld by the Supreme Court).

Unfortunate, because, Constitution or no Constitution, everyone has a basic right to life, and
because the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not consider that the Constitution is a document,"
WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA GIVE UNTO OURSELVES", as per the preamble, and thus
the people of India pre-existed the Constitution, and the latter cannot be used as an instrument
to obliterate the former by an agency created by the former. Later, with the next government
came in power, the Constitution was amended whereby it was provided that Article 21 could
not be ever suspended, even in case of emergency. Thus the reoccurrence of such a
situation has been amended by a Constitutional Amendment where the right of life and
personal liberty cannot be suspended in any situation.

THE AMENDMENT

The Forty-fourth Amendment Act of 1978 (officially the "Constitution (Forty-second

Amendment) Act, 1978") was an amendment to the Constitution of India that reduced or
removed the provisions made by 42nd amendment. This amendment was taken place during
the government of Janta Party.

SALIENT FEATURES OF THE FORTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT ACT, 1978

In view of the special position sought to be given to fundamental rights, the right to property,
which has been the occasion for more than one amendment of the Constitution, would cease
to be a fundamental right and become only a legal right. Necessary amendments for this
purpose are being made to article 19 and article 31 is being deleted.

A Proclamation of Emergency under article 352 has virtually the effect of amending
the Constitution by converting it for the duration into that of a Unitary State and enabling the
rights of the citizen to move the courts for the enforcement of fundamental rights---including
the right to life and liberty---to be suspended. Adequate safeguards are, therefore, necessary
to ensure that this power is properly exercised and is not abused. It is, therefore, proposed
that a Proclamation of Emergency can be issued only when the security of India or any part
of its territory is threatened by war or external aggression or by armed rebellion. Internal
disturbance not amounting to armed rebellion would not be a ground for the issue of a
Proclamation.

Further, in order to ensure that a Proclamation is issued only after due consideration, it is
sought to be provided that an Emergency can be proclaimed only on the basis of written
advice tendered to the President by the Cabinet. In addition, as a Proclamation of Emergency
virtually has the effect of amending the Constitution, it is being provided that the
Proclamation would have to be approved by the two Houses of Parliament by the same
majority which is necessary to amend the Constitution and such approval would have to be
given within a period of one month. Any such Proclamation would be in force only for a
period of six months and can be continued only by further resolutions passed by the same
majority. The Proclamation would also cease to be in operation if a resolution disapproving
the continuance of the Proclamation is passed by Lok Sabha. Ten percent or more of the
Members of Lok Sabha can requisition a special meeting for considering a resolution for
disapproving the Proclamation.

As a further check against the misuse of the Emergency provisions and to put the right to life
and liberty on a secure footing, it would be provided that the power to suspend the right to
move the court for the enforcement of a fundamental right cannot be exercised in respect of
the fundamental right to life and liberty. The right to liberty is further strengthened by the
provision that a law for preventive detention cannot authorized, in any case.

Article 356 of the Constitution confers a power upon the President to be exercised only where

he is satisfied that a situation has arisen where the Government of a State cannot be carried
on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Under our Constitution, the power is
really that of the Union Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at its head. The
satisfaction contemplated by the article is subjective in nature. However, the subjective
satisfaction if based on malice may be questioned in court of law.

The proclamation of emergency can be done by governor only after the approval by both
Houses of Parliament under clause (3) of Article 356, and not before. Until such approval, the
President can only suspend the Legislative Assembly by suspending the provisions
of Constitution relating to the Legislative Assembly under sub-clause (c) of clause (1).
However, the dissolution of Legislative Assembly can be resorted on only where it is found
necessary for achieving the purposes of the Proclamation.

According to Article 356, clause (3) in case both Houses of Parliament disapprove or do not
approve the Proclamation, the Proclamation lapses at the end of the two-month period, and in
such a situation the government which was dismissed revives. Also the Legislative Assembly,
which may have been kept in suspended gets reactivated. Similarly, as the Proclamation
lapses, the acts done, orders made and laws passed during the period of two months do not
become illegal or void. However, the same laws may be considered for judicial review, repeal
or modification by various authorities.

On the other hand, if the Proclamation is approved by both the Houses within two months,
the Government which is dismissed does not revive on the expiry of period of the
proclamation or on its revocation. Similarly, if the Legislative Assembly has been dissolved
after the approval under clause (3), the Legislative Assembly does not revive on the expiry of
the period of Proclamation or on its revocation.

CONCLUSION

The history of Indian constitution with respect to fundamental rights and their stability with
emergency provisions is full of vagueness and ambiguity. From the very beginning of “the
case of habeas corpus” till today the provisions and conditions are getting better and better.
Initially even the suspension of art. 20 and 21 during emergency was valid, though those
rights are not given by “the constitution” but by nature itself.
No courts had the right and power to look into the matter of cases related to emergency. But
now the condition is different. Now, the government of India cannot refuse to furnish reasons
behind its action. However, the court will not go into the correctness of the material or its
adequacy, still it will enquire whether the material was relevant to the action. And,
conclusively, it would be enough for court to see if there are some valid reasons for the
imposition.

CITIZENS of the country live at peace having implicit trust on the judicial system. Hence,
the judiciary should be independent, fearless to germinate social balance and strengthen
confidence of our people. We, the people of India live fearless mainly on account of security
provided by Law and defense on our borders. Although, the judiciary has no separate body to
enforce its orders, yet its sanctity is maintained owing to the faith o the people of the country
in its judicial system. The judiciary can be regarded to be the sanctum sanctorum of the
freedom and liberty of the people.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

1. P. M. Bakshi, The Constitution Of India.

2. A. Lakshminath, Basic Structure and Constitutional Amendments.
3. Paras Diwan & Peeyush Diwan, Amending Powers and Constitutional Amendments
4. Mahendra P. Singh, V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India.
5. Durga Das Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India.

WEBSITES:

1. http://www.scconline.com/
2. http://www.manupatrafast.com/
3. http://www.thehindu.com/

INFORMATIVE ARTICLES from:

1. The Hindu
2. The Indian Express
3. Outlook
4. Frontline

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