Petitioners Vs Vs Oppositors Fortun Narvasa & Salazar Saguisag Carao & Associates

EN BANC
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001.]
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG
PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO , petitioners, vs . JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES , oppositors.
Fortun Narvasa & Salazar and Saguisag Carao & Associates for former Pres. J.
Estrada and Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada.
SYNOPSIS
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas sent a letter

requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other
criminal cases led against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan. The letter was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April
2001 to the Chief Justice, and still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Richard
Romulo. On 17 April 2001, Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally led the instant
petition to allow live radio and television coverage of the court hearings on the Plunder and
Other Criminal Cases led against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al. before
the Sandiganbayan. The petition also sought a re-examination of the 23 October 1991
resolution of the Court in a libel case led by then President Corazon C. Aquino which
prohibits live radio and television coverage of court proceedings.
In denying the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that when the constitutional
guarantees of the freedom of the press and of the right to public information, on the one
hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on other hand, along with the
constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial
trial, race against one another, the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due
process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in
a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of a public's
attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or
in uence but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where tting dignity and
calm ambiance is demanded.
The Court is not unmindful of recent technological and scienti c advances, but to
chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even
before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns are aptly addressed, is a price too
high to pay.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, RIGHT

TO PUBLIC INFORMATION, RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AND POWER OF COURT TO
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
CONTROL ITS PROCEEDINGS IN ENSURING A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL; AMONG
THESE RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED ARE PREFERRED. — The propriety of granting or
denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the
fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power
of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights
race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be
preferred to win.
2. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS; WHAT CONSTITUTES A JUST VERDICT. — With the
possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the
basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testi ed to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind
of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that
might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper in uence, and
decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; GUARANTEES ACCUSED A PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE UNTIL
CONTRARY IS PROVEN IN A TRIAL. — Due process guarantees the accused a presumption
of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual
settings nor made an object of public's attention and where the conclusions reached are
induced not by any outside force or in uence but only by evidence and argument given in
open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHIN THE COURTHOUSE, OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION IS
STILL PARAMOUNT RIGHT OF ACCUSED THERETO, WHICH MUST NEVER BE ALLOWED
TO SUFFER DIMINUTION IN ITS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPORTIONS. — The courts recognize
the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It
also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive
means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with the
judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration
is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to
suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while
a maximum freedom must be allowed the press in carrying out the important function of
informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to
the maintenance of absolute fairness in the judicial process." ACDIcS
5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL; CONSTRUED. — An accused has a right to

a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or
liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt
with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only
implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available
seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the
constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number
of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness
negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions,
who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the proceedings.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT REITERATED ITS RESOLUTION OF 23 OCTOBER 1991 IN
CASE AT BAR DISALLOWING LIVE TELEVISION AND RADIO COVERAGE OF COURT
PROCEEDINGS WHICH IS PRESENT CASE LAW ON THE MATTER. — En passant, the
minority would view the ponencia as having modi ed the case law on the matter. Just to
the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution of 23 October 1991.
Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter, and when it did in its
23rd October resolution, it con rmed, in disallowing live television and radio coverage of
court proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional Commission (were) bereft of
discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom" and that "Philippine courts
(had) not (theretofore) had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely."
7. ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT; DUTY OF COURTS; TO ADJUDICATE
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSIES ON THE BASIS OF WHAT ALONE IS SUBMITTED BEFORE
THEM. — Unlike other government o ces, courts do not express the popular will of the
people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies
on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. A trial is not a free trade of ideas. Nor
is a competing market of thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom.
KAPUNAN, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; LIVE RADIO AND
TELEVISION COVERAGE; NOT ONLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS BUT ALSO INIMICAL TO THE FAIR, ORDERLY ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. —
The instant petitions, if granted, would throw overboard a well-established policy that
considers such live radio and television coverage not only as prejudicial to the defendant's
right to due process, but also as inimical to the fair and orderly administration of justice.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; IN WEIGHING THE FREEDOMS OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS AND
THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC INFORMATION AS AGAINST THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A
FAIR TRIAL, THE BALANCE IS NEVER WEIGHED AGAINST THE ACCUSED. — While the
rights to press freedom and to information on matters of public concern are
constitutionally protected in acknowledgement of media's role as a potent catalyst in
increasing public awareness and interest in governmental affairs as well as other
signi cant events and occurrences, including court proceedings, and of the importance of
the free ow of ideas and information in a democracy, these are not absolute and must be
taken hand-in-hand with other public interests. In weighing the freedoms of speech and the
press and the right to public information, on one hand, and the right of the accused to a fair
trial, on the other, the balance is never weighed against the accused.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A CURTAILMENT OF THE RIGHTS TO FREE PRESS AND
TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN. — It must be made clear that there
is no curtailment nor substantial diminution of the rights to free press and to information
on matters of public concern brought about by the prohibition on live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings. These rights remain amply protected even with the
existence of such prohibition. In the criminal cases against Mr. Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan, the press can still report on the proceedings being conducted therein.
Media out ts can send their representatives to the trials and make their reports and
comments thereon to their viewers or listeners. What is not allowed is for them to bring
inside the courtroom their broadcasting equipment that would tend to hamper the orderly
administration of justice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL BELONGS TO THE ACCUSED;
PUBLIC TRIAL, NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH "PUBLICIZED TRIAL". — It bears emphasizing
that the right to a public trial belongs rst and foremost to the accused. Said right requires
that proceedings be open to the public to ensure that the accused is fairly dealt with and
not unjustly condemned. The openness of a trial safeguards against attempts to employ
the courts as instruments of persecution since it induces all the participants therein, e.g .
judge, lawyers, witnesses, to perform their duties conscientiously, and provides the public
with an opportunity to observe the events therein. However, a public trial is not to be
equated with a "publicized trial," one characterized by pervasive adverse publicity that
violates the accused's constitutional right to due process. That the live broadcast
coverage of the criminal proceedings may undermine the right of the accused to a fair trial
cannot be ignored. Undoubtedly, television is one of the most powerful sources of
information and news in our society. However, it is also one of the most manipulative. It
can, intentionally or inadvertently, destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the
public. It cannot deny the accused of his right to due process, including the right to a fair
trial.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE. —
Television does not simply mirror or re ect events as they unfold. The images transmitted
onscreen are the end products of a series of technical modi cations employed by
television editors and cameramen. Editors may eliminate or cut certain scenes of a trial in
order to appeal to a mass audience. Cameramen may also manipulate what the public
sees through the use of space, camera angles, lighting, juxtaposition, and editing
techniques, thereby limiting the public's perception of the events being covered. Sadly, the
public in general lack an understanding of how these tools work and more often than not
fail to realize the distorting effects of these devices executed by an experienced
cameramen. The negative effects that live television coverage of criminal proceedings may
have thereon may even exceed those resulting from the biases created in the mind of the
viewers from watching the images appearing onscreen. It is not unlikely that the television
stations may decide that the trial itself does not contain su cient drama to sustain an
audience and thus provide "expert commentary" on the proceedings by hiring persons with
legal backgrounds to anticipate possible trial strategy, in the same manner as a basketball
expert anticipates plays for his audience. Arguably, this may be bene cial in the sense that
the viewing public is offered guidance in understanding the events that transpire at a court
proceeding. However, it cannot be denied that such live commentaries may intensify the
biases shaped by the images of the trial on television, or worse, create wrong impressions
in the viewers' minds. The same might also subvert our sub judice rule that media should
refrain from publishing or airing comments regarding a pending case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESENCE OF TELEVISION CAMERAS INSIDE THE COURTROOM
PLACES ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES ON THE TRIAL JUDGE. — The presence of
television cameras inside the courtroom also places additional responsibilities on the trial
judge. In addition to his duties of listening to the testimonies of the witnesses, receiving
documentary and object evidence, ruling on motions and objections and ensuring that the
accused receives a fair trial, he must also supervise the television crew present in his
courtroom to make sure that they do not disrupt the proceedings. Even the behavior of the
judges themselves may be unduly in uenced by such media presence, for although they
are supposed to be more impervious to external pressures with respect to the cases
pending before them, they still experience the same psychological reactions as laymen.
Judges and justices are also human beings. They cannot remain oblivious to the pressures
that media can bear on them both directly and in the shaping of public opinion. Thus, any
occasion that would give the impression that in rendering judgment, the judge was swayed
by public opinion or any other factor extraneous to the evidence at hand should be
avoided.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFICACY OF MEASURES TO ENSURE FAIR TRIAL IN A CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING COVERED BY LIVE RADIO AND TELEVISION, DOUBTFUL; PROCEEDINGS
MAY BE DELAYED DUE TO COLLATERAL MATTERS. — With due respect, I doubt the
e cacy of the measures suggested by the dissenting opinions to ensure fair trial in a
criminal proceeding covered by live radio and television. These are: (1) no witness can be
compelled to have his testimony televised; (2) the cameras and other equipment must be
placed in the courtroom in such a manner as to be unobtrusive, possibly only a single xed
camera be installed in the courtroom to feed the broadcast stations; (3) no lm, videotape,
photography and audio reproductions may be used for advertising and commercial
purposes; and (4) the radio and television broadcasters should give a balanced coverage
of the prosecution and the defense. It is not merely the obtrusive location in the courtroom
of the cameras or their effects on the decorum, solemnity and dignity of the court that
impinges on the accused's right to a fair trial. It is the beaming of or transmission of all
events, testimonies and faces inside the courtroom directly to the viewing public, including
the milling crowd outside the court's premises, coupled with the running accounts of the
proceedings by the radio and television networks, which may be slanted or distorted by
bias, self-interests and hate, thus whipping up passion and rage among the viewers, that
offends the right of the accused to a fair trial. Depending upon the mood of the crowd,
whether approving or threatening, witnesses may exaggerate, hesitate, backtrack or
cower. The judge has no immediate control over how the lm, videotapes, etc. are used,
whether for advertising or commercial purposes, although he may later on impose
sanctions for their misuse, but then the deleterious effects to a fair trial are beyond recall.
Further, how can the court enforce guidelines that radio and television broadcasters
should give a balanced coverage of the prosecution and the defense? Even if the court's
rulings over the proposed guidelines are promptly made, they are subject to appeal, thus
possibly delaying the court proceedings over collateral matters. And even if the trial should
proceed and the accused convicted pending appeal on the court's rulings, the accused
may seek the reversal of said conviction on the ground of mistrial due to the deprivation of
his right to due process. The damage then to all concerned is irreparable.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., concurring opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW, DUE PROCESS,
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL HEARING; VIOLATED, IF THE LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE OF
FORMER PRESIDENT ESTRADA'S TRIAL IS ALLOWED. — I believe that to allow the live
television coverage of Mr. Joseph Ejercito Estrada's trial in the Sandiganbayan will violate
his right to equal protection of the law, to due process and to a fair and impartial hearing.
Not even the other constitutionally-guaranteed rights, such as the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern, to free speech and to a free press, can serve as
more weighty justi cations. Equal protection is afforded in a criminal proceeding where
the trial is conducted fairly and impartially in the same manner and under the same
procedure as all other people are tried within the state. In the myriad of criminal cases that
passed our trial courts, this is only the second time that the issue of the propriety of a
televised trial is directly raised. In the rst instance, this Court prohibited the live radio and
television coverage of a criminal proceeding in order to protect the parties' right to due
process, to prevent the distraction of the proceedings and to avoid a miscarriage of
justice. I see no reason why the case of Mr. Estrada should be treated differently. caHCSD
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN

CANNOT BE GIVEN PREFERENCE OVER THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL. — I do not discount the claim of the proponents of the televised trial
that the people has the right to information on matters of public concern. But I am
convinced that such right cannot be given preference over the right of an accused to a fair
and impartial trial. To my mind, the fair administration of criminal justice cannot be
subordinated to the people's right to information, particularly in the present case, where
what at stake is the life of an individual.
3. ID.; ID.; STATURE OF A PERSON JUSTIFIES THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST OF
A TELEVISION TRIAL; ACCUSED ENTITLED TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL; CASE AT
BAR. — The fact that the accused held the highest position in the land is signi cant. As a
matter of fact, his stature strongly justi es the denial of the request for a televised trial. To
be sure, even before the camera starts moving, the case would have already achieved a
sensational status. When a case is sensationalized, there is a greater di culty in
safeguarding the rights of the accused, particularly, his right to due process, which
basically requires that the court trying the case should be impartial, free from outside
pressure and interference. The presence of news media can deny a defendant that "judicial
serenity and calm" which due process of law guarantees. This should not be allowed. Every
person accused of a crime is entitled to a fair and impartial trial in which his legal rights are
protected, that is, a trial of facts, in accordance with the law and the evidence before an
unbiased tribunal, in an atmosphere free from harmful error and from any extraneous
influence that might be to his prejudice. . . .
4. ID.; ID.; COURTS; LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE DOES NOT ASSIST THE
SANDIGANBAYAN IN ITS DUTY TO BE IMPARTIAL DURING THE PROCEEDINGS. —
Assuming that this Court authorizes the desired media coverage, will it be fair to the
Sandiganbayan Justices concerned to subject them to the massive and unfair scolding of
what Estrada's counsel calls "a by and large hostile and at times cruel media?" Criticism
and ridicule will likely arise from members of the media unfamiliar with the technical rules
of the legal profession. I submit that live TV coverage will not assist the Sandiganbayan in
its duty to be temperate, attentive and impartial during the proceedings. Quite the contrary,
live TV coverage will divert the attention of the Sandiganbayan from the testimonies of
witnesses and serious arguments of counsel, thus affecting the court's understanding of
the case. The same adverse effects are true insofar as the lawyers are concerned. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines states that live coverage will only pander to the desire for
publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. Ever conscious of the instant public reaction, the
Sandiganbayan may hesitate to correct the highly unprofessional conduct of a popular
attorney. More importantly, the general public is unaware of procedural rules. If the
Sandiganbayan's rulings are adverse to their expectations, this may start another massive
action which may culminate to an "EDSA IV." Needless to state; the effects are disastrous
to the nation.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TRIAL; LIVE RADIO AND
TELEVISION COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS; 1991 RESOLUTION ABSOLUTELY
BANNING SUCH COVERAGE, SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED IN LIGHT OF THE CONTINUING
PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY. — After the lapse of ten (10) years, I
respectfully submit that the 1991 resolution of this Court absolutely banning live radio and
television coverage of criminal proceedings should be re-examined to re-adjust the
balance between a free press and a fair trial in light of the continuing progress in
communications technology and to expand the right of access of the press and the public
to information without, however, impairing the right of an accused to due process.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE CASE OF ESTES VS. TEXAS (381 US 532 [1965]),
CITED IN THE 1991 RESOLUTION WHICH RESOLVED THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS OF IN-
COURT CAMERA TO THE RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW, WAS
MODIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT CASES. — Estes vs. Texas , the linchpin of this Court's 1991
resolution is a 1965 decision where the US Supreme Court rst resolved the prejudicial
effects of in-court camera to the right of an accused to due process of law. In a 5-4
decision, the conviction of the accused Estes was set aside in light of the factual nding
that television coverage infringed his right to fair trial. It found that during the preliminary
hearing, "cables and wires were snaked across the courtroom oor, three microphones
were on the judge's bench and others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel's table."
The Court considered the circus-like atmosphere created by media as incongruous to the
due process right of the accused. The Estes decision resulted in most of the states
completely banning cameras in the courtroom but a few others experimented with the
cameras and subjected their use to strict guidelines. Among the states that experimented
was Florida. . . . After Estes, the US Supreme Court in a series of landmark cases also
struck the proper balance between freedom of the press and restrictions on media's
access to courtrooms vis-a-vis the right of an accused to fair trial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OBJECTION AS TO ILL EFFECT OF CAMERAS ON THE
DIGNITY AND DECORUM IN THE COURTROOM HAD LONG RECEDED DUE TO THE
QUANTUM LEAP IN COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY. — The Court resolution of 1991
absolutely banning televised trial was also premised on the disruptive effect of cameras
on the dignity and decorum in the courtroom. It should be noted, however, that this
debasement of dignity and decorum argument relied upon in Estes was due to the
intolerable physical disturbances caused by annoying equipment, cables, lighting and
unsophisticated technicians in the decade of the sixties. With the quantum leap in
communications technology in the last twenty (20) years, TV cameras are now less
intrusive and disruptive. Indeed, various states have imposed rules successfully regulating
whatever interference cameras may have on the dignity and decorum of judicial
proceedings. Maryland, for example, has clear rules setting down the technical
requirements for television and still cameras and photographers, types of microphones to
be used, noise limitations, placement in courtroom and restrictions on movement of
personnel and equipment. More progress in audio-visual technology can be expected in
the immediate future and this objection that TV cameras in the courtroom will create
chaos in judicial proceedings will just be a part of the museum of history.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE STATES IN THE UNITED
STATES NOW ALLOW RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL TRIALS. — The absolute ban
against radio-TV coverage of criminal trial has now been lifted in majority of the states in
the United States. After the 1965 decision in Estes, and for eleven (11) years, all the states
prohibited TV coverage of criminal trials. By 1978 , however, six (6) states — Alabama,
Colorado, Georgia, New Hampshire, Texas and Washington allowed televised trials; twelve
(12) states — Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin — permitted televised trial on
an experimental basis. After the decision in Chandler, forty-seven (47) states now allow
television coverage. Only three (3) states ban cameras in the courtroom — New York,
South Dakota and Mississippi. ATaDHC
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSOLUTE BAN ON TELEVISED TRIALS, A VIOLATION OF THE

PRESS AND PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS. — Television is today arguably the most powerful
medium of communication. Its communicative in uence is qualitatively different and is
distinctively unique. For this reason and more, there is clear growing body of literature
from known legal scholars postulating that an absolute ban on televised trials constitutes
a violation of the press and public right of access.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS FAVORING TELEVISED TRIAL. — The
principal arguments favoring televised trial are well laid out and can hardly be refuted.
Firstly, an open trial has a great value. . . . In Richmond Newspaper, it was rightly out that
openness is more important in the trial of high pro le cases because of its prophylactic
effect. . . . Second. It is a truism that an educated, enlightened and vigilant citizenry makes
democracy work. The need for the citizenry to comprehend how its government ful lls its
task of e ciently serving the people cannot be overemphasized. Again, Richmond
emphasized the educative effect of televised trials to the people. Third. In a very
informative article, Lassiter has revealed that empirical studies show that cameras in the
courtroom do not have any negative effect on judicial proceedings. Fourth. Televised trial
helps the press ful ll its role of exposing miscarriage of justice. In Sheppard v. Maxwell ,
the Court acknowledged this checking power of the press when it held that "the press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism."
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL; ADVERSE EFFECTS OF
TELEVISED TRIAL IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS ON THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO
HAVE ACCESS TO EVIDENCE, AVOIDED BY ISSUANCE OF APPROPRIATE RULES
REGULATING TELEVISED TRIALS. — It should, however, be stressed that televising trial is
still not without its danger to the constitutional right of an accused to fair trial. Today, the
greatest of these remaining dangers is its adverse effect on the right of the accused to
have access to evidence, a right rmly anchored on the constitutional rights to compulsory
process and due process. Doubtless, the presence of television in the courtroom can
affect a witness. The accuracy of his testimony may be compromised. His physical
demeanor, so important to trial judges to determine his credibility, may become less
natural under the klieglight. More importantly, the fear of too much public exposure may
cause reticent witnesses not to testify. Any of these circumstances will prejudice the right
of an accused to a fair trial just as it will frustrate the discovery of truth which is the
objective of judicial trial. But these probable dangers are not insurmountable as other
jurisdictions have demonstrated that they can be minimized if not avoided by appropriate
rules regulating televised trials. An example will be a rule which will not compel the
televised testimony of any witness for the accused upon his objection thereto. Such a rule
will also meet the objection that cameras in the courtroom cause psychological
intimidation to witnesses.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHILE LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF A CRIMINAL TRIAL IS NOT A
MATTER OF RIGHT, ITS DENIAL IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSPECT. — Live radio-TV
coverage of a criminal trial cannot be demanded as a matter of right but its absolute denial
is also constitutionally suspect. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the matter of
whether or not the proceedings in a criminal trial should be televised, totally or partially,
should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge on a case to case basis. The
exercise of this discretion will depend on the facts of each case and will involve the
delicate balancing of the constitutional right of the accused to fair trial and due process of
law, the press and the public right of access to trials in criminal cases, the right of the state
to prosecute crimes effectively and the duty of courts to ensure the fair and orderly
administration of justice. To be able to reasonably exercise his discretion, the trial judge
has to hear a party's motion seeking to televise the proceedings or any portion thereof to
determine, among others, the standing of the movant, the factual and legal bases of his
asserted right and the opposition thereto. No witness, especially a witness for the
accused, upon his written objection, should be compelled to have his testimony televised.
In balancing the above rights, the judge should deny the motion to televise trial upon
speci c proof of prejudice and of reasonable likelihood that the right to fair trial of the
accused will be endangered.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TRIAL; TELEVISING CRIMINAL
TRIALS IS ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. — Additionally,
it shall be the duty of the trial judge to provide and impose the necessary rules and
regulations to assure that the televised trial will not detract from the solemnity, decorum
and dignity of the court. Among others, the rules and regulations should insure that: (1) the
television cameras and related equipments must be unobtrusive, must not produce
distracting sounds and shall not in any manner interfere with the proceedings; (2) the
media representatives shall present a neat appearance in keeping with the dignity of the
proceedings and should not move unnecessarily about the court while it is in session; (3)
no lm, videotape, photography and audio reproductions may be used for advertising or
commercial purpose; (4) only a single xed camera set-up shall be installed in the
courtroom and the audio-video output of the xed set-up will be fed only to broadcast
stations to avoid too many photographers and TV camera crew in the courtroom; and (5)
that radio-television broadcasters should give a balanced coverage of the prosecution and
the defense. The trial judge should be given the power at any time to terminate the
televised proceedings upon a showing that the right to a fair trial of the accused is being
prejudiced by its continuance.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC TRIAL; RIGHT TO ATTEND AND WITNESS A
CRIMINAL TRIAL OR HEARING BASED ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF
TRANSPARENCY, AND OF FREE, OPEN AND PUBLIC HEARING. — The basic premise of this
Dissent is that, as a general rule, everyone has a right to attend and witness a trial or
hearing, especially if criminal in nature, under the constitutional principles of transparency,
and of free, open and public hearings of cases. However, given the limitations of time and
space in a courtroom, it is not always possible to physically accommodate all persons
interested in witnessing a court hearing. That is why court salas have been enlarged.
Moreover, microphones equipped with electronic ampli ers, and sometimes with closed
circuit television, have in the past been used to project the proceedings to the immediate
vicinity of the courtroom via radio speakers, TV monitors and projection screens. In this
manner, people outside have been able to listen to and watch the proceedings, as if they
were inside the courtroom. As the 21st century dawns, it is now possible to use even more
advanced technology to enable more people to watch judicial proceedings in the privacy of
their homes and o ces without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused or to the
integrity of orderly justice.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MECHANICS OF OPENING COURT HEARINGS TO MEDIA
COVERAGE. — Indeed, a single xed camera under the control of the court, could catch,
live, the incidents in the trial. The audio-video output of the camera could be ashed on big,
wide TV monitors or projection screens inside and outside the courtroom. This will also
enable TV and radio crews outside the courtroom to beam the output to their respective
stations for broadcasting to the public, without the ubiquitous and intimidating wiring,
lights or media cameras inside the courthouse. The video camera will be placed in the rear
of the courtroom and its position shall be locked to wide-angle, so that only a "stationary
audience view" is attained. There will be no other cameras, lights or other media
equipment, which can cause nervousness or anxiety to witnesses, lawyers and other
personalities directly involved in a judicial trial.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT DESTROY THE CONSTITUTIONALLY RECOGNIZED
JUDICIAL ATMOSPHERE AND DECORUM. — Needless to state, this method will prevent
editorializing or sensationalism, which the Court in 1991 feared. In this manner, there will
be no unwelcome camera focusing, probing, angling, panning or other kinds of
manipulation. Radio and TV reporters, by patching their connectors to the distribution
ampli ers, will be able to do live broadcasts of the proceedings without hustling the
judges, lawyers, parties or witnesses. They will be able to broadcast only such matters as
a spectator in the courtroom can see and hear. After a long and serious re ection on this
matter, I think that the setting up of a single xed camera inside the courtroom, to which
broadcast stations could connect, is the answer to the opposing positions of the parties
and the intervenors in the present matter. To repeat, this single xed camera will give its
viewers the chance to be similarly situated as a spectator inside the court who can see,
watch and hear the unfolding drama of the court proceedings. Surely, the recipients of the
TV signals beamed by broadcast stations cannot interfere and prejudice the fair and
orderly administration of justice, for the simple reason that they are outside the vicinity of
the courtroom. Thus, they cannot by any means be the "hooting throng" that the IBP scorns
and fears, thinking they would destroy the constitutionally recognized judicial atmosphere
and decorum.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC TRIAL NOT ONLY SAFEGUARDS THE RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED, BUT ENSURES PUBLIC TRUST IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL; PROPER
BALANCING OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS. — A trial must be public and transparent,
because openness is vital to the effective administration of criminal justice in a
democracy. Not only does it safeguard the rights of the accused; it likewise ensures public
trust in the conduct of the trial. Therefore, after balancing the interests of the parties
concerned — the constitutional rights of the accused and the requirements of orderly
procedures vis-à-vis the people's fundamental freedom of expression and right to
information on matters of public concern — I respectfully submit that live coverage via a
single xed camera inside the courtroom, through which the media can access and
therefore broadcast the proceedings to the entire nation and to the world, is the best
technological and legal solution to the concerns raised by the Court in 1991 and to the
objections now aired by the accused (former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada) and the
IBP.
DECISION
VITUG , J : p
The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start

hearing the criminal charges against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media seeks to cover the
event via live television and live radio broadcast and endeavors this Court to allow it that
kind of access to the proceedings.
On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an
association representing duly franchised and authorized television and radio networks
throughout the country, sent a letter 1 requesting this Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases led against former President
Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full
transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." 2 The request
was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and,
still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. EcASIC
On 17 April 2001, the Honorable Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally led
the instant petition, 3 submitting the following exegesis:
"3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the
former highest o cial of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and,
therefore, it cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, de nitely
involves a matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire
citizenry has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
"4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to

be informed on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be
recognized, served and satis ed by allowing the live radio and television coverage
of the concomitant court proceedings.
"5. Moreover, the live radio and television coverage of the proceedings
will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the
administration of justice in order to disabuse the minds of the supporters of the
past regime of any and all unfounded notions, or ill-perceived attempts on the
part of the present dispensation, to 'railroad' the instant criminal cases against
the Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada." 4
Public interest, the petition further averred, should be evident bearing in mind the right
of the public to vital information affecting the nation.
In effect, the petition seeks a re-examination of the 23rd October 1991 resolution of
this Court in a case for libel filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino. The resolution read:
"The records of the Constitutional Commission are bereft of discussion
regarding the subject of cameras in the courtroom. Similarly, Philippine courts
have not had the opportunity to rule on the question squarely.
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the
current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the United States prohibits the
presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of
judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the
courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to
all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat
it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the
orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are
formulated. cIHSTC
"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by

forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper
reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same
privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing
press into the courtroom. cDTCIA
"In Estes vs. Texas , the United States Supreme Court held that television
coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process
rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court through Mr. Justice Clark,
identi ed four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact
of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The
decision in part pertinently stated:
"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of

telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court
in uences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only
increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human
beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as
laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and
subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the
effective presentation of his defense.
'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or

inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the
public.'
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ
of mandate to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the
courtroom, a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other
member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media
into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial
atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due
process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding
should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time
he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process

as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further
that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be
served and satis ed by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to
shots of the courtroom, the judicial o cers, the parties and their counsel taken
prior to the commencement of o cial proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
"Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent
the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to
avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and
television coverage of court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings for
news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated."
Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it

has become an important instrument in the quest for truth. 5 Recent history exempli es
media's invigorating presence, and its contribution to society is quite impressive. The
Court, just recently, has taken judicial notice of the enormous effect of media in stirring
public sentience during the impeachment trial, a partly judicial and partly political exercise,
indeed the most-watched program in the boob-tubes during those times, that would soon
culminate in EDSA II.
The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information,
on the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with
the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and
impartial trial. 6
When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence 7 tells us that the right of
the accused must be preferred to win.
With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an
accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict
solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only
after the presentation of credible evidence testi ed to by unbiased witnesses unswayed
by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of
histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from
improper in uence, 8 and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by
running emotions or passions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary
is proved in a trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of
public's attention 9 and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside
force or in uence 1 0 but only by evidence and argument given in open court, where tting
dignity and calm ambiance is demanded.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in
hardy climate, with every reason to presume rmness of mind and resolute endurance, but
it must also be conceded that "television can work profound changes in the behavior of the
people it focuses on." 1 1 Even while it may be di cult to quantify the in uence, or pressure
that media can bring to bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it
is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The
conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the testimony of
witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is
not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. 1 2 It might be farcical to build
around them an impregnable armor against the in uence of the most powerful media of
public opinion. 1 3
To say that actual prejudice should rst be present would leave to near nirvana the
subtle threats to justice that a disturbance of the mind so indispensable to the calm and
deliberate dispensation of justice can create. 1 4 The effect of television may escape the
ordinary means of proof, but it is not far-fetched for it to gradually erode our basal
conception of a trial such as we know it now. 1 5
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights
are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous
with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial
process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small as to render
the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their
proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during
the proceedings. 1 6
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the
right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due
process 1 7 which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions. Justice Clark thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be allowed
the press in carrying out the important function of informing the public in a democratic
society, its exercise must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of absolute fairness in
the judicial process." 1 8
This Court, in the instance 1 9 already mentioned, citing Estes vs. Texas, 2 0 the United
States Supreme Court holding the television coverage of judicial proceedings as an
inherent denial of due process rights of an accused, also identi ed the following as being
likely prejudices: STaCIA
"1. The potential impact of television . . . is perhaps of the greatest

signi cance. . . . From the moment the trial judge announces that a case will be
televised it becomes a cause celebre. The whole community, . . . becomes
interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status in the public press and the accused is
highly publicized along with the offense with which he is charged. Every juror
carries with him into the jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the
chance of prejudice that is present in every criminal case. . . .
"2. The quality of the testimony in criminal trials will often be impaired.
The impact upon a witness of the knowledge that he is being viewed by a vast
audience is simply incalculable. Some may be demoralized and frightened, some
cocky and given to overstatement; memories may falter, as with anyone speaking
publicly, and accuracy of statement may be severely undermined. . . . . Indeed, the
mere fact that the trial is to be televised might render witnesses reluctant to
appear and thereby impede the trial as well as the discovery of the truth.
"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the

presence of television places on the trial judge. His job is to make certain that the
accused receives a fair trial. This most di cult task requires his undivided
attention. . . .
"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the

defendant. Its presence is a form of mental — if not physical-harassment,
resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-up of his
gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his
personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the
proceedings before him — sometimes the difference between life and death —
dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A
defendant on trial for a speci c crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a
stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. The heightened public clamor resulting
from radio and television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice."
In his concurring opinion in Estes, Mr. Justice Harlan opined that live television and
radio coverage could have mischievous potentialities for intruding upon the detached
atmosphere that should always surround the judicial process. 2 1
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, in its Resolution of 16 April 2001, expressed
its own concern on the live television and radio coverage of the criminal trials of Mr.
Estrada; to paraphrase: Live television and radio coverage can negate the rule on exclusion
of witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial; at stake in the criminal trial
is not only the life and liberty of the accused but the very credibility of the Philippine
criminal justice system, and live television and radio coverage of the trial could allow the
"hooting throng" to arrogate unto themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused,
such that the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular; and live television and
radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of justice but will only pander to the
desire for publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers.
It may not be unlikely, if the minority position were to be adopted, to see protracted
delays in the prosecution of cases before trial courts brought about by petitions seeking a
declaration of mistrial on account of undue publicity and assailing a court a quo's action
either allowing or disallowing live media coverage of the court proceedings because of
supposed abuse of discretion on the part of the judge.
En passant, the minority would view the ponencia as having modi ed the case law
on the matter. Just to the contrary, the Court effectively reiterated its standing resolution
of 23 October 1991. Until 1991, the Court had yet to establish the case law on the matter,
and when it did in its 23rd October resolution, it con rmed, in disallowing live television
and radio coverage of court proceedings, that "the records of the Constitutional
Commission (were) bereft of discussion regarding the subject of cameras in the
courtroom" and that "Philippine courts (had) not (theretofore) had the opportunity to rule
on the question squarely."
But were the cases decided by the U.S. courts and cited in the minority opinion really
in point?
In Nebraska Press Association vs. Stewart, 2 2 the Nebraska State trial judge issued
an order restraining news media from publishing accounts of confession or admissions
made by the accused or facts strongly implicating him. The order was struck down. In
Richmond Newspaper, Inc., vs. Virginia, 2 3 the trial judge closed the courtroom to the public
and all participants except witnesses when they testify. The judge was reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court which ruled that criminal trials were historically open. In Globe Newspaper
vs. Superior Court, 2 4 the US Supreme Court voided a Massachusetts law that required trial
judges to exclude the press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a
minor victim of certain sexual offenses.
Justice Stewart, in Chandler vs. Florida, 2 5 where two police o cers charged with
burglary sought to overturn their conviction before the US Supreme Court upon the ground
that the television coverage had infringed their right to fair trial explained that "the
constitutional violation perceived by the Estes Court did not stem from the physical
disruption that might one day disappear with technological advances in the television
equipment but inhered, rather, in the hypothesis that the mere presence of cameras and
recording devices might have an effect on the trial participants prejudicial to the accused."
26
Parenthetically, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts do not
allow live television and radio coverage of their proceedings.
The sad reality is that the criminal cases presently involved are of great dimensions
so involving as they do a former President of the Republic. It is undeniable that these
cases have twice become the nation's focal points in the two con icting phenomena of
EDSA II and EDSA III where the magnitude of the events has left a still divided nation. Must
these events be invited anew and risk the relative stability that has thus far been achieved?
The transcendental events in our midst do not allow us to, turn a blind eye to yet another
possible extraordinary case of mass action being allowed to now creep into even the
business of the courts in the dispensation of justice under a rule of law. At the very least, a
change in the standing rule of the court contained in its resolution of 23 October 1991 may
not appear to be propitious. aEIcHA
Unlike other government o ces, courts do not express the popular will of the
people in any sense which, instead, are tasked to only adjudicate justiciable controversies
on the basis of what alone is submitted before them. 2 7 A trial is not a free trade of ideas.
Nor is a competing market of thoughts the known test of truth in a courtroom. 2 8
The Court is not all that unmindful of recent technological and scienti c advances
but to chance forthwith the life or liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply
them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed
are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo and Quisumbing, JJ., join the dissenting opinion of Puno, J.
Kapunan and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Puno and Panganiban, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Melo, J., joins the dissents.
Mendoza, J., concurs in the majority opinion of Vitug, J., and joins the separate
opinion of Kapunan, J.
Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
KAPUNAN , J., concurring :
Of course freedom of speech and of the press are essential to the

enlightenment of a free people and in restraining those who wield power.
Particularly should this freedom be employed in comment upon the work of
courts who are without many in uences ordinarily making for humor and
humility, twin antidotes to the corrosion of power. But the Bill of Rights is not self-
destructive. Freedom of expression can hardly carry implications that nullify the
guarantees of impartial trials. And since the courts are the ultimate resorts for
vindicating the Bill of Rights, a state may surely authorize appropriate historic
means to assure that the process for such vindication be not wrenched from its
rational tracks into the more primitive melee of passion and pressure. The need is
great that courts be criticized but just as great that they be allowed to do their
duty.
— Bridges v. California
314 US 252, 284

In their separate petitions, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and the
Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez would want this Court to allow live radio and
television coverage of the court hearings on the plunder and other criminal cases led
against Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al. pending before the
Sandiganbayan.
In support of their request, they invoke the constitutional guarantees on the right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the freedoms of speech
and the press including the right to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without censorship:
xxx xxx xxx
3. The foregoing criminal cases involve the previous acts of the former
highest o cial of the land, members of his family, his cohorts and, therefore, it
cannot be over emphasized that the prosecution thereof, de nitely involves a
matter of public concern and interest, or a matter over which the entire citizenry
has the right to know, be informed and made aware of.
4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to

be informed on matters of public concern, as in the instant cases, can best be
recognized, served and satis ed by allowing the live radio and television coverage
of the concomitant court proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx 1
Mr. Estrada, in his Comment on the petitions, expressed his opposition to the
proposed live television and radio coverage of his trial arguing that such coverage would
be prejudicial to his right to fair trial because radio and television as media can be easily
manipulated for propaganda purposes; such coverage will play to the gallery; it may lead
to the possibility that the trial court may be ultimately in uenced by what sits well with the
public; its rulings and decisions may take into account what will please the crowd; it would
"allow live play-by-play annotation of the hearings by people on radio and television with
varying degrees of expertise and biases, in seeming mockery of the sub judice rule"; 2 and
that "it was the live TV coverage which ignited EDSA II." 3
For its part, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) likewise has taken the stand
against the live broadcast coverage of criminal proceedings for the following reasons:
1. Live TV and radio coverage will negate the rule on exclusion of
witnesses during the hearings intended to assure a fair trial.
2. At stake in the criminal trial is not only the life and liberty of the
accused but the very credibility of the Philippine criminal justice system. Live TV
and radio coverage of the trial will allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate unto
themselves the task of judging the guilt or innocence of the accused, such that
the verdict of the court will be acceptable only if popular.
3. Live TV and radio coverage of the trial will not subserve the ends of
justice but will only pander to the desire for publicity of few grandstanding
lawyers. Instead of promoting the ends of justice, live TV and radio coverage will
become the very instrument to distract litigants and judges, expose the judges to
undue public scrutiny and pressure every step of the way, and undermine the
integrity of the Sandiganbayan.
xxx xxx xxx 4

I do not find merit in the petitions.
In a clash between the rights to free speech, free press and of access to information
on matters of public concern, and the right to a fair trial, the right of the accused should be
the utmost concern of the Court. TaDCEc
The instant petitions, if granted, would throw overboard a well-established. policy

that considers such live radio and television coverage not only as prejudicial to the
defendant's right to due process, but also as inimical to the fair and orderly administration
of justice. In its Resolution, dated October 22, 1991, this Court laid down the guidelines for
broadcast media coverage of courtroom trials, to wit:
. . . Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due
process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and
considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satis ed by less distracting, degrading and
prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall
not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be
restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial o cers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of o cial proceedings. No
video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
The restrictions set forth in our Resolution of October 22, 1991, have remained
sound and valid. I cannot nd a rational basis to change the rule at this time, simply to suit
the prosecution in the cases against Ex-President Estrada.
While the rights to press freedom and to information on matters of public concern
are constitutionally protected 5 in acknowledgment of media's role as a potent catalyst in
increasing public awareness and interest in governmental affairs as well as other
signi cant events and occurrences, including court proceedings, 6 and of the importance
of the free ow of ideas and information in a democracy, these are not absolute and must
be taken hand-in-hand with other public interests. In weighing the freedoms of speech and
the press and the right to public information, on one hand, and the right of the accused to a
fair trial, on the other, the balance is never weighed against the accused. 7
It must be made clear that there is no curtailment nor substantial diminution of the
rights to free press and to information on matters of public concern brought about by the
prohibition on live radio and television coverage of court proceedings. These rights remain
amply protected even with the existence of such prohibition. In the criminal cases against
Mr. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan, the press can still report on the proceedings being
conducted therein. Media outfits can send their representatives to the trials and make their
reports and comments thereon to their viewers or listeners. What is not allowed is for
them to bring inside the courtroom their broadcasting equipment that would tend to
hamper the orderly administration of justice. As aptly observed by Chief Justice Warren in
his concurring opinion in Estes: 8
Television is one of the great inventions of all time and can perform a large
and useful role in society. But the television camera, like other technological
innovations, is not entitled to pervade the lives of everyone in disregard of
constitutionally protected rights. The television industry, like other institutions,
has a proper area of activities and limitations beyond which it cannot go with its
cameras. That area does not extend into an [American] courtroom. On entering
that hallowed sanctuary, where the lives, liberty and property of people are in
jeopardy, television representatives have only the rights of the general public,
namely, to be present, to observe the proceedings, and thereafter, if they choose,
to report them. 9
It bears emphasizing that the right to a public trial belongs rst and foremost to the
accused. Said right requires that proceedings be open to the public to ensure that the
accused is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. 1 0 The openness of a trial
safeguards against attempts to employ the courts as instruments of persecution since it
induces all the participants therein, e.g . judge, lawyers, witnesses, to perform their duties
conscientiously, and provides the public with an opportunity to observe the events therein.
1 1 However, a public trial is not to be equated with a "publicized trial," one characterized by
pervasive adverse publicity that violates the accused's constitutional right to due process.
That the live broadcast coverage of the criminal proceedings may undermine the
right of the accused to a fair trial cannot be ignored. Undoubtedly, television is one of the
most powerful sources of information and news in our society. However, it is also one of
the most manipulative. 1 2 It can, intentionally or inadvertently, destroy an accused and his
case in the eyes of the public. 1 3 It cannot deny the accused of his right to due process,
including the right to a fair trial. 1 4
Television does not simply mirror or re ect events as they unfold. The images
transmitted onscreen are the end products of a series of technical modi cations
employed by television editors and cameramen. Editors may eliminate or cut certain
scenes of a trial in order to appeal to a mass audience. Cameramen may also manipulate
what the public sees through the use of space, camera angles, lighting, juxtaposition, and
editing techniques, thereby limiting the public's perception of the events being covered.
Sadly, the public in general lack an understanding of how these tools work and more often
than not fail to realize the distorting effects of these devices executed by an experienced
cameramen. 1 5
The negative effects that live television coverage of criminal proceedings may have
thereon may even exceed those resulting from the biases created in the mind of the
viewers from watching the images appearing onscreen. It is not unlikely that the television
stations may decide that the trial itself does not contain su cient drama to sustain an
audience and thus provide "expert commentary" on the proceedings by hiring persons with
legal backgrounds to anticipate possible trial strategy, in the same manner as a basketball
expert anticipates plays for his audience. 1 6 Arguably, this may be bene cial in the sense
that the viewing public is offered guidance in understanding the events that transpire at a
court proceeding. However, it cannot be denied that such live commentaries may intensify
the biases shaped by the images of the trial on television, or worse, create wrong
impressions in the viewers' minds. The same might also subvert our sub judice rule that
media should refrain from publishing or airing comments regarding a pending case.
The transmission of edited images on television or the accompanying
commentaries are not the only possible sources of bias which may unduly in uence the
outcome of a trial. The mere presence of the television camera inside the courtroom also
inevitably affects the proceedings being covered for television can work profound changes
in the behavior of the people it focuses on. 1 7
A study explained the effects of the presence television cameras inside the
courtroom on the witnesses in this wise:
The marketing consciousness of witnesses increases with the awareness
of being on national or global television. There is a risk that a witness will alter his
story in order to appeal to the television audience instead of ful lling his
evidentiary role. His testimony becomes more important for its entertainment
value which may cause embellishment of certain aspects of his testimony. Many
people dream of becoming a celebrity, and for many witnesses, this may be their
only opportunity to shine in the limelight. This consciousness poses a danger of
improper and inaccurate testimony. . . . 1 8
Even the behavior of lawyers may be in uenced by the fact that their case is being
covered by live television:
In addition, cameras pose a risk that lawyers will modify their roles. In a
televised trial, the public becomes an extrajudicial audience that they must
persuade. Lawyers may become preoccupied with the cameras which interferes
with their devoting full attention to the fact- nder at trial. As a result, some
lawyers direct at least part of their case to the television viewers instead of fully
representing their clients to the presiding judge and the jury. Lawyers are
motivated to present themselves well in the eyes of the public. In a highly
televised trial, the marketing consciousness of lawyers may be affected. There is
a danger that the media's production of the trial may transform into an excellent
opportunity for the lawyers to gain free personal advertisement. 1 9
The presence of television cameras inside the courtroom also places additional
responsibilities on the trial judge. In addition to his duties of listening to the testimonies of
the witnesses, receiving documentary and object evidence, ruling on motions and
objections and ensuring that the accused receives a fair trial, he must also supervise the
television crew present in his courtroom 2 0 to make sure that they do not disrupt the
proceedings. Even the behavior of the judges themselves may be unduly in uenced by
such media presence, for although they are supposed to be more impervious to external
pressures with respect to the cases pending before them, they still experience the same
psychological reactions as laymen.
Judges and justices are also human beings. They cannot remain oblivious to the
pressures that media can bear on them both directly and in the shaping of public opinion.
Thus, any occasion that would give the impression that in rendering judgment, the judge
was swayed by public opinion or any other factor extraneous to the evidence at hand
should be avoided. As Chief Justice Taft in Tumey vs. Ohio 2 1 eloquently put it: ADHcTE
. . . the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not

satis ed by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-
sacri ce could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man . . . to forget the burden of
proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter
due process of law. 2 2
Further, the negative impact of live broadcast media coverage of the trial on the
accused is not inconsequential:
. . . Its presence is a form of mental — if not physical — harassment,
resembling a police line-up or the third degree. The inevitable close-ups of his
gestures and expressions during the ordeal of his trial might well transgress his
personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate on the
proceedings before him — sometimes the difference between life and death —
dispassionately, freely and without the distraction of wide public surveillance. A
defendant on trial for a speci c crime is entitled to his day in court, not in a
stadium, or a city or nationwide arena. . . 2 3
There are those who believe that live media coverage would enhance the fair and
orderly administration of justice. However, this belief ignores the fact that the behavior of
the participants of the proceedings, e.g ., lawyers and witnesses, may be unnaturally
affected by their knowledge that their actions and testimonies are recorded on live
television and radio. This was particularly observed by a law professor in the O.J. Simpson
criminal trial in the United States:
Within the Simpson criminal trial, most of the media's participant-observer
glitches were attributable to the real-time electronic media broadcast of the
proceedings on a gavel-to-gavel basis, especially by television camera. As Ellis
Cose opined, "Many journalists and others idealistically believed that televised
trials would enhance the quality of justice and increase general knowledge about
the courts by providing public oversight not previously available. Unfortunately,
this was not the case. Television did not deter lying witnesses; instead it rendered
many truthful ones nervous and inarticulate.
Television provided the temptation, and the opportunity, for media-savvy

lawyers and a media-conscious judge to sell their respective cases not merely to
the jury, but literally to the world. The camera in this case and in this courtroom
proved to be a world class platform for rhetorician, a snare for the unwary, a
seducer and mirror to the vain, an indiscriminate and often harsh recorder of
humor, wit, guile, trickery, and lies, and the transmitter to the world of both
excellent and poor lawyering on both sides. 2 4
It is argued that the ruling in Estes vs. Texas 2 5 that radio and television coverage
infringes upon the accused's right to a fair trial has been abandoned in Chandler vs. Florida
2 6 where the U.S. Supreme Court said:
An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be

justi ed simply because there is a danger that, in some cases, prejudicial
broadcast accounts of pre-trial and trial events may impair the ability of jurors to
decide the issue of guilt or innocence unin uenced by extraneous matter. The risk
of juror prejudice in some cases does not justify an absolute ban on news
coverage of trials by the printed media; so also the risk of such prejudice does not
warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast coverage. The
appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right to
demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case — be it printed or broadcast —
compromised the ability of the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate
fairly. 2 7
It should be pointed out that there are no television cameras permitted in federal
courts in the United States 2 8 despite experiments with their use. In contrast, there is no
constitutional impediment to the use of television cameras in state courts, provided they
do not distract the jurors and witnesses, or unduly burden the judge, thereby depriving the
defendant of a fair trial. 2 9
It is evident that our policy banning live radio and television coverage of criminal
proceedings is the same as that provided in U.S. federal courts. There is no convincing
reason that the practice in some state courts is better than that followed in the federal
courts concerning the banning of such radio and television coverage.
In any event, Chandler would necessarily imply that if the defendant's right to fair
trial is compromised by the broadcast coverage, then the ban should be imposed. Here,
the fears expressed by Mr. Estrada and the IBP should live radio and television be allowed
to cover his trial are not without bases. The pervasive radio and television coverage of Mr.
Estrada's impeachment hearing and of his arrest appear to have moved the crowd to
march in the so-called EDSA II and EDSA III mass actions that toppled a government and
tried to topple another.
With due respect, I doubt the e cacy of the measures suggested by the dissenting
opinions to ensure fair trial in a criminal proceeding covered by live radio and television.
These are: (1) no witness can be compelled to have his testimony televised; (2) the
cameras and other equipment must be placed in the courtroom in such a manner as to be
unobtrusive, possibly only a single xed camera be installed in the courtroom to feed the
broadcast stations; (3) no lm, videotape, photography and audio reproductions may be
used for advertising and commercial purposes, and (4) the radio and television
broadcasters should give a balanced coverage of the prosecution and the defense. 3 0
It is not merely the obtrusive location in the courtroom of the cameras or their
effects on the decorum, solemnity and dignity of the court that impinges on the accused's
right to a fair trial. It is the beaming of or transmission of all events, testimonies and faces
inside the courtroom directly to the viewing public, including, the milling crowd outside the
court's premises, coupled with the running accounts of the proceedings by the radio and
television networks, which may be slanted or distorted by bias, self-interests and hate,
thus whipping up passion and rage among the viewers, that offends the right of the
accused to a fair trial. Depending upon the mood of the crowd, whether approving or
threatening, witnesses may exaggerate, hesitate, backtrack or cower.
The judge has no immediate control over how the lm, videotapes, etc. are used,
whether for advertising or commercial purposes, although he may later on impose
sanctions for their misuse, but then the deleterious effects to a fair trial are beyond recall.
Further, how can the court enforce guidelines that radio and television broadcasts
should give a balanced coverage of the prosecution and the defense? Even if the courts
rulings over the proposed guidelines are promptly made, they are subject to appeal, thus
possibly delaying the court proceedings over collateral matters. And even if the trial should
proceed and the accused convicted pending appeal on the court's rulings, the accused
may seek the reversal of said conviction on the ground of mistrial due to the deprivation of
his right to due process. The damage then to all concerned is irreparable.
I believe that the present prohibition on the live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings strikes the balance between the rights to free speech and press and to
information on matters of public concern, and the accused's right to a fair trial, and
remains to be the practical rule on the matter.
Finally, as I have earlier stressed, recent history has shown that television
broadcasts of signi cant national events have a strong tendency to incite pent-up
emotions and feelings of an emotional populace. Undeniably, the events that occurred on
January 16, 2001 which led to the abrupt conclusion of Mr. Estrada's impeachment trial,
witnessed by thousands of viewers on their television screens, triggered EDSA II. In the
same manner, the broadcast coverage of Mr. Estrada's arrest caused pro-Estrada groups
to express their outrage at EDSA III. caSEAH
It is not unlikely that the televised coverage of Mr. Estrada's trial would induce either
or both of these groups to again resort to demonstrations aimed at pressuring the
Sandiganbayan to come up with a verdict favorable to them. Any attempt to pressure or
interfere with the judicial process should be avoided, for court proceedings are not like
elections, to be won through the use of the meeting hall, the radio, and the newspaper. 3 1
The nature of judicial proceedings requires that the conclusions to be reached in a case
will be induced only by evidence, and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence. 3 2
Our nation has only begun the reconciliation process between the pro and anti
Estrada groups. Broadcasting Mr. Estrada's trial would only ignite the spark that brought
forth EDSA II and EDSA III and resurrect the division between these groups.
I vote to DENY the petitions.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ , J., concurring :
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, and that of Mr. Justice Santiago M.
Kapunan, to which I concur, easily join the rank of the well-written opinions in Constitutional
law. Incisive in their analysis, realistic in their approach, and instructive in their
rationalization, there is so much in them to which any concurrence may easily yield.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the mandate that "[N]o person shall be deprived of
his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the law." 1 This stands as a guaranty to every man's civil liberties
regardless of his race, sex, character, station in life, and reputation. 2
I believe that to allow the live television coverage of Mr. Joseph Ejercito Estrada's
trial in the Sandiganbayan will violate his right to equal protection of the law, to due
process and to a fair and impartial hearing. Not even the other constitutionally-guaranteed
rights, such as the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, to free
speech and to a free press, can serve as more weighty justifications. HSaEAD
Equal protection is afforded in a criminal proceeding where the trial is conducted

fairly and impartially in the same manner and under the same procedure as all other people
are tried within the state. 3 In the myriad of criminal cases that passed our trial courts, this
is only the second time that the issue of the propriety of a televised trial is directly raised.
In the rst instance, this Court prohibited the live radio and television coverage of a
criminal proceeding in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the
distraction of the proceedings and to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 4 I see no reason why
the case of Mr. Estrada should be treated differently.
I do not discount the claim of the proponents of the televised trial that the people
has the right to information on matters of public concern. But I am convinced that such
right cannot be given preference over the right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial. To
my mind, the fair administration of criminal justice cannot be subordinated to the people's
right to information, particularly in the present case, where what at stake is the life of an
individual.
The job of the judiciary is not to teach the public of its inner workings but to
preserve fairness within the system. 5 No empirical evidence exists which indicates that
televised criminal proceedings broaden the public's understanding of the judiciary. 6 The
New York University conducted a study following an enactment of legislation prescribing
an eighteen-month experimental period of televising criminal trials. 7 The results indicated
that viewing criminal trials had virtually no effect on the level of the public understanding of
even the most rudimentary aspects of court proceedings.
The fact that the accused held the highest position in the land is signi cant. As a
matter of fact, his stature strongly justi es the denial of the request for a televised trial. To
be sure, even before the camera starts moving, the case would have already achieved a
sensational status. When a case is sensationalized, there is a greater di culty in
safeguarding the rights of the accused, particularly, his right to due process, which
basically requires that the court trying the case should be impartial, 8 free from outside
pressure and interference. The presence of news media can deny a defendant that "judicial
serenity and calm" which due process of law guarantees. This should not be allowed. Every
person accused of a crime is entitled to a fair and impartial trial in which his legal rights are
protected, 9 that is, a trial of facts, in accordance with the law and the evidence before an
unbiased tribunal, in an atmosphere free from harmful error and from any extraneous
in uence that might be to his prejudice. The Supreme Court of the United States gives this
right a ringing tone of support in its numerous decisions. Thus, in Irvin v. Dowd, 1 0 the
defendant was convicted of murder following intensive and hostile news coverage. On
review, the Court vacated the conviction and death sentence and remanded the case to the
court a quo to allow a new trial for "[w]ith his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that
petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion. . . . "
Similarly, in Rideau v. Lousiana 1 1 , the Court reversed the conviction of a defendant whose
staged, highly emotional confession had been lmed with the cooperation of local police
and later broadcast on television for three days while he was awaiting trial, holding: "[a]ny
subsequent court proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle
could be but a hallow formality."
In Estes v. Texas , 1 2 the Court ruled that the defendant had not been afforded due
process where the volume of trial publicity, the judge's failure to control the proceedings,
the telecast of the hearing and the trial itself "inherently prevented a sober search for the
truth." It was further held that the televising of " notorious" criminal trials is prohibited by
the "due process of law." 1 3 Justice Harlan, supplying the winning vote, agreed but only
because the Estes trial was one of " great notoriety." He made clear that he would reserve
judgment on more routine cases. 1 4
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1 5 with only Mr. Justice Black dissenting, the Court ordered a
new trial for the petitioner, even though the rst trial had occurred 12 years before. The
Court noted that "unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending trial has become
increasingly prevalent" and issued a strong warning, thus:
". . . Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial
jury free from outside in uences. Given the pervasiveness of modern
communications and the di culty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the
minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the
balance is never weighed against the accused. . . . If publicity during the
proceedings threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But
we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts must
take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement o cers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
between the counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a
criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy
of disciplinary measures." (Italics supplied)
In KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court , 1 6 the said US Supreme Court
ruled that courts "may insist that the only performance which goes on in the courtroom is
the trial of the case at hand." The Court said further that " the fact that media coverage has
transformed events such as professional sports contests into a framework designed to
accommodate that coverage does not mean that the First Amendment requires criminal
trials to undergo the same transformation." In reaching these conclusions, the Court
addressed the importance of a trial with no outside distractions. While the Court
recognizes the media's right to freedom of the press within the First Amendment, it also
recognizes the right of a court to close its doors. The Court condemns the transformation
of a criminal trial into a spectacle created by intense media coverage.
In the Philippines, the legal aspect of prejudicial publicity through television has not
yet been fully considered. To reiterate, the last time this Court directly came across with
such an issue was on October 22, 1991, in "Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing
of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel Case ." Relying on Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the case of Estes v. Texas, this Court issued an En Banc Resolution
on the said date prohibiting the live radio and television coverage of court proceedings.
I see no justification to modify the said Resolution. It was relevant then as it is now.
Moreover, to allow media coverage of the Estrada trial would be to open a veritable
Pandora's box of a ictions which will stymie the judiciary's efforts to make certain that
the administration of justice is effected with equanimity, speed and judiciousness . To be
sure, our ruling will apply to all lower courts, including the Sandiganbayan and the Court of
Appeals. Therefore, we should not be overly swayed by the passing passions generated by
the Estrada cases into promulgating a doctrine which this Court will rue in its supervision
of lower courts and in the exercise of its own original and appellate jurisdiction.
Assuming that this Court authorizes the desired media coverage, will it be fair to the
Sandiganbayan Justices concerned to subject them to the massive and unfair scolding of
what Estrada's counsel calls "a by and large hostile and at times cruel media?" Criticism
and ridicule will likely arise from members of the media unfamiliar with the technical rules
of the legal profession. ETDHSa
I submit that live TV coverage will not assist the Sandiganbayan in its duty to be
temperate, attentive and impartial during the proceedings. Quite the contrary, live TV
coverage will divert the attention of the Sandiganbayan from the testimonies of witnesses
and serious arguments of counsel, thus affecting the court's understanding of the case.
The same adverse effects are true insofar as the lawyers are concerned. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines states that live coverage will only pander to the desire for
publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers. Ever conscious of the instant public reaction, the
Sandiganbayan may hesitate to correct the highly unprofessional conduct of a popular
attorney.
More importantly, the general public is unaware of procedural rules. If the
Sandiganbayan's rulings are adverse to their expectations, this may start another massive
action which may culminate to an "EDSA IV." Needless to state, the effects are disastrous
to the nation.
In sum, the theory that televising the trial ensures that justice is served is not true.
With intense coverage, the media becomes less of a defensive force against injustice and
more of an offensive force by intimidating witnesses, distracting the lawyers and
distorting the unfolding drama in the courtroom. 1 7 It gives rise to prejudiced opinion and
publicity and creates bias and sometimes confusion among the people. All these factors
de nitely render the accused's right to a fair and impartial trial illusory. Thus, until and
unless the media can secure the rights of the accused and eliminate all the adverse
effects, speci cally on the general public, the television should remain outside the
courtroom.
PUNO, J., dissenting :
On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, thru its
President, Mr. Ruperto S. Nicdao, Jr., wrote to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., "to be
allowed the privileged (sic) of covering the anticipated trials in the Sandiganbayan of the
plunder cases against former President Joseph E. Estrada." On April 3, 2001, the Court,
among others, required Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan to
comment on the request.
On April 5, 2001, Mr. Cesar N. Sarino wrote a similar letter to the Chief Justice
requesting ". . . the Supreme Court to allow live television coverage of the trial" of former
President Estrada. On April 16, 2001, Senator Renato Cayetano also prayed for the live
coverage by media of the said trial subject to the conditions that the Supreme Court may
impose. On the same date, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thru its President, Arthur
D. Lim, opposed the live radio-TV coverage of said trial.
On April 17, 2001, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez also led a petition "for
live radio and television coverage" of the said cases "subject to whatever guidelines the
Honorable Supreme Court may provide under the premises." The petition carried the
conformity of the Honorable Aniano A. Desierto, Ombudsman. On April 24, 2001, the same
request for live media coverage was made by a group of businessmen led by Atty. Ricardo
Romulo of the Makati Business Club.
On April 30, 2001, Presiding Justice Garchitorena submitted his Comment. He
informed the Court that he sought the opinion of the other members of the Sandiganbayan.
He stated that six (6) of the Justices of the Sandiganbayan were against the radio-TV
coverage while eight (8) were in favor. He submitted their varying views for the
consideration of this Court.
On May 4, 2001, the Court required former President Estrada to comment on the
petition of the Secretary of Justice. On May 21, 2001 former President Estrada, thru
counsel, opposed the petition for live radio-TV coverage of his trials in the Sandiganbayan.
He cited the need to preserve the rule of law and warned that "radio and television as
media can be easily manipulated for propaganda purposes." He alleged that "the
communicative effect of live TV and radio coverage is much greater than print coverage"
and "the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than
the freedom accorded in newspaper and print media." The opposition was forti ed by a
Supplemental Comment filed on May 30, 2001.
The Court's en banc resolution of October 22, 1991 absolutely prohibits live TV and
radio coverage of court hearings. Its rationale is explained, thus:
"While we take notice of the September 1990 report of the United States
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Cameras in the Courtroom, still the
current rule obtaining in the Federal Courts of the United States prohibits the
presence of television cameras in criminal trials. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure forbids the taking of photographs during the progress of
judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of such proceedings from the
courtroom. A trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to
all concerned and should not be treated as a means of entertainment. To so treat
it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the
orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial proceedings are
formulated.
Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by
forbidding the broadcasting or televising of a trial while permitting the newspaper
reporter access to the courtroom, since a television or news reporter has the same
privilege, as the news reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing
press into the courtroom.
I n Estes vs. Texas , the United States Supreme Court held that television
coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due process
rights of a criminal defendant. Voting 5-4, the Court through Mr. Justice Clark,
identi ed four (4) areas of potential prejudice which might arise from the impact
of the cameras on the jury, witnesses, the trial judge and the defendant. The
decision in part pertinently stated:
'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of
telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses might be frightened, play to the
camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary out-of-court
in uences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only
increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the
defendant, it may as well affect his own performance. Judges are human
beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions as
laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and
subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from the
effective presentation of his defense.
The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or

inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the
public.'
Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of

mandate (sic) to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the
courtroom a reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other
member of the public. Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media
into the trial itself can so alter or destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial
atmosphere and decorum that the requirements of impartiality imposed by due
process of law are denied the defendant and a defendant in a criminal proceeding
should not be forced to run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time
he enters or leaves the courtroom.
Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process

as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further
that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be
served and satis ed by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live
radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to
shots of the courtroom, the judicial o cers, the parties and their counsel taken
prior to the commencement of o cial proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper." (italics supplied) AIaHES

In banning live radio and television coverage of criminal proceedings, the Court
stressed that it weighed "the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the
right of the public to information and the right to public trial on one hand, and on the
other hand, the due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional
power of the courts to control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial
administration of justice." It also considered "the nature of media, particularly television
and its role in society and of the impact of new technologies on law."
After the lapse of ten (10) years, I respectfully submit that the 1991 resolution of
this Court absolutely banning live radio and television coverage of criminal proceedings
should be re-examined to re-adjust the balance between a free press and a fair trial in light
of the continuing progress in communications technology and to expand the right of
access of the press and the public to information without, however, impairing the right of
an accused to due process.
I.
Estes case has been modified by subsequent cases
Estes vs. Texas , 1 the linchpin of this Court's 1991 resolution is a 1965 decision
where the US Supreme Court rst resolved the prejudicial effects of in-court camera to the
right of an accused to due process of law. In a 5-4 decision, the conviction of the accused
Estes was set aside in light of the factual nding that television coverage infringed his
right to fair trial. It found that during the preliminary hearing, "cables and wires were
snaked across the courtroom oor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and
others were beamed at the jury box and the counsel's table." 2 The Court considered the
circus-like atmosphere created by media as incongruous to the due process right of the
accused. The Estes decision resulted in most of the states completely banning cameras in
the courtroom but a few others experimented with the cameras and subjected their use to
strict guidelines. Among the states that experimented was Florida. 3
In 1981, the Florida rules allowing television coverage of criminal trials were
challenged in Chandler v. Florida . 4 The case involved a charge of burglary against two
police o cers of Miami Beach. Over objections of the two accused, their trial was
televised and they were convicted. On appeal, they contended that the TV coverage
infringed their right to fair trial. The US Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Burger,
a rmed their conviction. It held that the appellants " did not present empirical data
su cient to establish that the mere presence of the broadcast media inherently has an
adverse effect on that process." 5 It ruled that appellants failed to prove speci c prejudice .
Chief Justice Burger observed that since the Estes case, technological progress had
allowed media to minimize the disruptive effects of cameras in the courtroom. The Court
concluded:
"An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be
justi ed simply because there is a danger that, in some cases, prejudicial
broadcast accounts of pre-trial and trial events may impair the ability of jurors to
decide the issue of guilt or innocence unin uenced by extraneous matter. The risk
of juror prejudice in some cases does not justify an absolute ban on news
coverage of trials by the printed media; so also the risk of such prejudice does not
warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast coverage. The
appropriate safeguard against such prejudice is the defendant's right to
demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case — be it printed or broadcast —
compromised the ability of the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate
fairly." 6 (italics supplied)
After Estes, the US Supreme Court in a series of landmark cases also struck the
proper balance between freedom of the press and restrictions on media's access to
courtrooms vis-a-vis the right of an accused to fair trial. The rst signi cant case is the
1976 case of Nebraska Press Association v. Stewart . 7 In this case, the accused was
charged with six (6) counts of murder. The Nebraska state trial judge issued an order
restraining the press from reporting, inter alia, on the following subjects: the existence and
contents of the accused's confession; the nature of his statements to other persons; and
the contents of a note written by the accused on the night of the crime. Reviewing the
order, the US Supreme Court held that when imposing a prior restraint on publication, a
trial judge must examine "(a) the nature and extent of pre-trial news coverage; (b) whether
other measures would be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pre-trial publicity;
and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened
danger." 8 It held that "pre-trial publicity — even pervasive, adverse publicity — does not
inevitably lead to an unfair trial." 9 It a rmed the right of the press to publish information
concerning court proceedings even as it held that trial judges have the major responsibility
to protect the accused's right to a fair trial. 1 0
In 1980, the US Supreme Court decided Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia , 1 1 a
murder case where the accused's motion that the courtroom be closed to the public was
granted by the trial judge. Richmond Newspapers moved to vacate the order but its
motion was denied both by the trial court and the Virginia Supreme Court. On certiorari, the
US Supreme Court reversed. Writing the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger held that
criminal trials were historically open; that there is an implicit right of access to criminal
trials under the rst amendment guarantees of free press, free speech and freedom of
assembly and the right to publish would be negated if the press was denied access to a
trial. He also opined that for the justice system to work, the system must satisfy the
appearance of justice, which is best provided by allowing people to observe the judicial
process. 1 2 Be that as it may, he stressed that media's right of access is not absolute but
subject to limitations. 1 3
In 1982 came the case of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court , 1 4 where the US
Supreme Court reviewed a Massachusetts law that required trial judges to exclude the
press and the public from the courtroom during the testimony of a minor victim of certain
sexual offenses. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan voided the law on the ground
that it violated the rst amendment. Again, the court emphasized that criminal trials have
been historically open to the public and that access to trial allows for public scrutiny of the
judicial process, which in turn enhances the integrity of the fact- nding process . 1 5 The
Court again stressed that the right of access is not absolute. 1 6
II.
Objection as to ill effect on dignity and decorum has long receded
The Court resolution of 1991 absolutely banning televised trial was also premised
on the disruptive effect of cameras on the dignity and decorum in the courtroom. It should
be noted, however, that this debasement of dignity and decorum argument relied upon in
Estes was due to the intolerable physical disturbances caused by annoying equipment,
cables, lighting and unsophisticated technicians in the decade of the sixties. With the
quantum leap in communications technology in the last twenty (20) years, TV cameras are
now less intrusive and disruptive. Indeed, various states have imposed rules successfully
regulating whatever interference cameras may have on the dignity and decorum of judicial
proceedings. Maryland, for example, has clear rules setting down the technical
requirements for television and still cameras and photographers, types of microphones to
be used, noise limitations, placement in courtroom and restrictions on movement of
personnel and equipment. 1 7 More progress in audio-visual technology can be expected in
the immediate future and this objection that TV cameras in the courtroom will create
chaos in judicial proceedings will just be a part of the museum of history. 1 8 aHTEIA
III.
An overwhelming majority of the states now allow radio-TV coverage of criminal trials.
The absolute ban against radio-TV coverage of criminal trial has now been lifted in
majority of the states in the United States. After the 1965 decision in Estes, and for eleven
(11) years, all 1 9 the states prohibited TV coverage of criminal trials. 2 0 By 1978, however,
six (6) states — Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, New Hampshire, Texas and Washington
allowed televised trials, twelve (12) states — Alaska, California, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wisconsin —
permitted televised trial on an experimental basis. 2 1 After the decision in Chandler, forty-
seven (47) states now allow television coverage. 2 2 Only three (3) states ban cameras in
the courtroom — New York, South Dakota and Mississippi. 2 3
Television is today 2 4 arguably the most powerful medium of communication. Its
communicative in uence is qualitatively different and is distinctively unique. For this
reason and more, there is clear growing body of literature from known legal scholars
postulating that an absolute ban on televised trials constitutes a violation of the press and
public right of access. 2 5
The principal arguments favoring televised trial are well laid out and can hardly be
refuted.
Firstly, an open trial has a great value. In Press Enterprise v. Superior Court , 2 6 it was
underscored:
"The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending
trials can have con dence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure
knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance that established
procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness
thus enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of
fairness so essential to public confidence in the system." (italics supplied)
I n Richmond Newspaper, 2 7 it was rightly out that openness is more important in the
trial of high profile cases because of its prophylactic effect, viz:
"When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and
public protest often follows . . . . Thereafter, the open processes of justice serve
an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern,
hostility and emotion. Without an awareness that society's responses to criminal
conduct are underway, natural human reactions of outrage and protest are
frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful "self help," as
indeed they did regularly in the activities of vigilante "committees" on our
frontiers. . . . It is not enough to say that results will alone will satiate the natural
community desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may undermine
public con dence, and where trial has been concealed from public view an
unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and
at worst has been corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that society's
criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice" . . . and the appearance of
justice can best be provided by allowing people to observe it." (italics supplied)
Without doubt, television can convey more completely and accurately the substance
and subtleties of judicial proceedings to the public. As pointedly observed by Gardner,
"unlike the print medium, television has the capability to cover a trial in its entirety — every
word, every sentence and every gesture." 2 8 Thus, it has been perceptively opined that the
"pervasiveness of television makes a superior device to disseminate information about a
trial." 2 9
Second. It is a truism that an educated, enlightened and vigilant citizenry makes
democracy works. The need for the citizenry to comprehend how its government ful lls its
task of e ciently serving the people cannot be overemphasized. Again, Richmond
emphasized the educative effect of televised trials to the people, viz:
"When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an
opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a
particular case. The educative effect of public attendance is a material
advantage. Not only is respect for the law increased and intelligent acquaintance
acquired with the methods of government, but a strong con dence on judicial
remedies is secured which could never have been inspired by a system of
secrecy." 3 0 (italics supplied)
Of the three branches of government, the judiciary is the least known to the public
because its nature does not allow total transparency. Thus, testimonies which can
compromise national security are given in closed sessions, court deliberations are
traditionally not open to the public, etc. Public, open trials of criminal cases under
regulated conditions furnish rare opportunities for the people to understand and
appreciate the business of the courts. In the same vein, they give the courts the chance
to gain the people's faith and con dence on the system of justice. As well put by
Justice Frankfurter, "the public con dence in the judiciary hinges on the public's
perception of it, and that perception necessarily hinges on the media's portrayal of the
legal system. 3 1
Third. In a very informative article, Lassiter has revealed that empirical studies show
that cameras in the courtroom do not have any negative effect on judicial proceedings, viz:
32
"Several states have conducted studies on the potential impact of

electronic media coverage on courtroom proceedings, particularly focusing on the
effect cameras have upon courtroom decorum and upon witnesses, jurors,
attorneys and judges. In all of these states, the courts permitted electronic media
coverage in both civil and criminal proceedings, although the majority of coverage
was in criminal cases. The results from the state studies were unanimous: the
impact of electronic media coverage of courtroom proceedings, whether civil or
criminal, shows few side effects.
In September 1990, the Judicial Conference of the United States
implemented what was to be a three year pilot program that permitted electronic
media coverage in civil proceedings in six federal district courts and two circuit
courts. The Federal Evaluation indicated, among other things, that:
• overall, attitudes of judges towards electronic media were neutral and

became more favorable after experience under the experimental
program; EHaCID

• generally, judges and attorneys who had experience with electronic
media coverage reported observing small or no effects on camera
presence on proceedings participants, courtroom decorum, or the
administration of justice;
• overall, judges and court personnel reported that the media were very
cooperative and complied with program guidelines and other
restrictions that were imposed.
Indeed, the Federal Judicial Center's "Summary of Findings" concluded that
no negative impact resulted from having cameras in the courtroom. In 1994, the
Federal Judicial Center speci cally found that results from state court
evaluations of the effects of electronic media on jurors and witnesses indicate
that most respondents believe electronic media presence has minimal or no
detrimental effects on jurors or witnesses. As with the handful of state surveys,
the federal survey found that "[m]ost participants [say] electronic media presence
has no or minimal detrimental effects on jurors or witnesses." (italics supplied)
Fourth. Televised trial helps the press ful ll its role of exposing miscarriage of
justice. In Sheppard v. Maxwell , 3 3 the Court acknowledged this checking power of the
press when it held that "the press does not simply publish information about trials but
guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."
It should, however, be stressed that televising trial is still not without its danger to
the constitutional right of an accused to fair trial. Today, the greatest of these remaining
dangers is its adverse effect on the right of the accused to have access to evidence, a right
rmly anchored on the constitutional rights to compulsory process and due process .
Doubtless, the presence of television in the courtroom can affect a witness. The accuracy
of his testimony may be compromised. His physical demeanor, so important to trial
judges to determine his credibility, may become less natural under the klieglight. More
importantly, the fear of too much public exposure may cause reticent witnesses not to
testify. Any of these circumstances will prejudice the right of an accused to a fair trial just
as it will frustrate the discovery of truth which is the objective of judicial trial. But these
probable dangers are not insurmountable as other jurisdictions have demonstrated that
they can be minimized if not avoided by appropriate rules regulating televised trials. An
example will be a rule which will not compel the televised testimony of any witness for the
accused upon his objection thereto. Such a rule will also meet the objection that cameras
in the courtroom cause psychological intimidation to witnesses.
IV.
On a case to case basis, televising criminal trials should be addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial judge.
Live radio-TV coverage of a criminal trial cannot be demanded as a matter of right
but its absolute denial is also constitutionally suspect. It is therefore respectfully
submitted that the matter of whether or not the proceedings in a criminal trial should be
televised, totally or partially, should be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge
on a case to case basis. The exercise of this discretion will depend on the facts of each
case and will involve the delicate balancing of the constitutional right of the accused to fair
trial and due process of law, the press and the public right of access to trials in criminal
cases, the right of the state to prosecute crimes effectively and the duty of courts to
ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice. To be able to reasonably exercise his
discretion, the trial judge has to hear a party's motion seeking to televise the proceedings
or any portion thereof to determine, among others, the standing of the movant, the factual
and legal bases of his asserted right and the opposition thereto. No witness, especially a
witness for the accused, upon his written objection, should be compelled to have his
testimony televised. In balancing the above rights, the judge should deny the motion to
televise trial upon speci c proof of prejudice and of reasonable likelihood that the right to
fair trial of the accused will be endangered.
Additionally, it shall be the duty of the trial judge to provide and impose the
necessary rules and regulations to assure that the televised trial will not detract from the
solemnity, decorum and dignity of the court . Among others, the rules and regulations
should insure that: (1) the television cameras and related equipments must be unobtrusive,
must not produce distracting sounds and shall not in any manner interfere with the
proceedings; (2) the media representatives shall present a neat appearance in keeping
with the dignity of the proceedings and should not move unnecessarily about the court
while it is in session; (3) no lm; videotape, photography and audio reproductions may be
used for advertising or commercial purpose; (4) only a single xed camera set-up shall be
installed in the courtroom and the audio-video output of the xed set-up will be fed only to
broadcast stations to avoid too many photographers and TV camera crew in the
courtroom; and (5) that radio-television broadcasters should give a balanced coverage of
the prosecution and the defense. The trial judge should be given the power at any time to
terminate the televised proceedings upon a showing that the right to a fair trial of the
accused is being prejudiced by its continuance.
EPILOGUE
With due respect, the majority has struck the balance between free press and fair
trial much too much to the prejudice of the press and public right to information. It has
unduly sustained former President Estrada's generalized grievance that cameras in the
courtroom will bring about the collapse of the rule of law and the hypothetical fear that
they will psychologically intimidate witnesses. It is all too obvious that the fear is a mere
gment of imagination for former President Estrada has not named any witness with a
phobia against publicity. Indeed, the myth that television intimidates witnesses has long
been shattered to smithereens by empirical studies. For not even requiring former
President Estrada to show actual prejudice to his right to fair trial, the majority has
modi ed our ruling case law on the matter. The unjusti ed change to favor the former
President will cause undeserved damage to values we revere. It will, to a large degree,
throttle the right of the press to access to information and choke the ow of knowledge to
the people. It is the people who govern in a democracy and they can only govern well if
they are fully informed. A people kept in the dark by the blindfold of ignorance will only
govern with mistakes. Let it be stressed that the right of the people to know is strongest in
times of turbulence for it is when the stakes to the State are high that they cannot afford to
err due to ignorance.
The majority refuses to see that the revolution on communications technology is
still going on. We have radio, TV, telephones, cables, satellites, computers, wireless
communications, faxes, the internet, etc. Even our rules of court now allow certain
witnesses to testify in and off the court via video teleconferencing. By outlawing television
in the trial of former President Estrada, the majority has denied our people the opportunity
to know completely and accurately whether or not his trial will be fair and impartial. All
these because the majority has persisted in the primitive belief that the courtroom is
limited to the pad and pencil reporters. The majority will bring about new Rip Van Winkles
in this age of electronic media — We. I dissent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully submit that the absolute ban on televising criminal
trials be lifted and the petitions of the Secretary of Justice, the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas, Mr. Cesar Sariño, Atty. Ricardo Romulo, et al., and Senator Renato
Cayetano, to televise the trial of the plunder cases against former President Joseph E.
Estrada as well as the oppositions of former President Estrada and the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines thereto, be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition in
accordance with the suggested guidelines set forth above.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting :
With due respect, I dissent from the majority's ruling, written by Justice Jose C.
Vitug, absolutely banning live media coverage of judicial trials.
In justifying this proscription, the majority relies mainly on an en banc Resolution
dated October 22, 1991, 1 in which this Court resolved to totally prohibit live radio and
television coverage of court hearings, mainly because of "the prejudice it poses (1) to
defendant's right to due process, (2) and to the fair and orderly administration of justice";
(3) while pointing out, on the other hand, that "the right of the people to information may be
served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means."
That was in 1991. Today in 2001, I respectfully submit that it is technologically
possible to uphold the right of the people to public information without violating the right
of the accused to due process and without impeding the orderly administration of justice.
It is now feasible to satisfy the people's right to information "by less distracting, degrading
and prejudicial means."
At bottom, I would like to believe that media and the judiciary are natural partners,
because they are bound together by the same reasons for being — the search for truth, the
protection of the peoples' rights, and the defense of the basic norms of society. By
proscribing live coverage of trials and hearings, the Court has lost an indispensable
teammate in discovering, processing and reporting the raw, unadulterated and unvarnished
truth. Why is the majority afraid of the truth? More pointedly, why is it fearful of the whole
truth and nothing but the unedited truth? Does it not believe that the "truth shall set us
free?"
Basic Premise: Free,
Open and Public Hearing
The basic premise of this Dissent is that, as a general rule, everyone has a right to
attend and witness a trial or hearing, especially if criminal in nature, under the
constitutional principles of transparency, and of free, open and public hearings of cases. 2
However, given the limitations of time and space in a courtroom, it is not always possible
to physically accommodate all persons interested in witnessing a court hearing. That is
why court salas have been enlarged. Moreover, microphones equipped with electronic
ampli ers, and sometimes with closed circuit television, have in the past been used to
project the proceedings to the immediate vicinity of the courtroom via radio speakers, TV
monitors and projection screens. In this manner, people outside have been able to listen to
and watch the proceedings, as if they were inside the courtroom.
As the 21st century dawns, it is now possible to use even more advanced
technology to enable more people to watch judicial proceedings in the privacy of their
homes and o ces without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused or to the
integrity of orderly justice.
Mechanics of Opening Court
Hearings to Media Coverage
Indeed, a single xed camera under the control of the court, could catch, live, the
incidents in the trial. The audio-video output of the camera could be ashed on big, wide
TV monitors or projection screens inside and outside the courtroom. This will also enable
TV and radio crews outside the courtroom to beam the output to their respective stations
for broadcasting to the public, without the ubiquitous and intimidating wiring, lights or
media cameras inside the courthouse.
The video camera will be placed in the rear of the courtroom and its position shall be
locked to wide-angle, so that only a "stationary audience view" is attained. There will be no
other cameras, lights or other media equipment, which can cause nervousness or anxiety
to witnesses, lawyers and other personalities directly involved in a judicial trial.
No Prejudice to
the Accused
Needless to state, this method will prevent editorializing or sensationalism, which
the Court in 1991 feared. In this matter, there will be no unwelcome camera focusing,
probing, angling, panning or other kinds of manipulation.
Radio and TV reporters, by patching their connectors to the distribution ampli ers,
will be able to do live broadcasts of the proceedings without hustling the judges, lawyers,
parties or witnesses. They will be able to broadcast only such matters as a spectator in
the courtroom can see and hear.
After a long and serious re ection on this matter, I think that the setting up of a
single xed camera inside the courtroom, to which broadcast stations could connect, is
the answer to the opposing positions of the parties and the intervenors in the present
matter. To repeat, this single xed camera will give its viewers the chance to be similarly
situated as a spectator inside the court who can see, watch and hear the unfolding drama
of the court proceedings. Surely, the recipients of the TV signals beamed by broadcast
stations cannot interfere and prejudice the fair and orderly administration of justice, for the
simple reason that they are outside the vicinity of the courtroom. Thus, they cannot by any
means be the "hooting throng" that the IBP scorns and fears, thinking they would destroy
the constitutionally recognized judicial atmosphere and decorum.
Proper Balancing of
Conflicting Interests
A trial must be public and transparent, because openness is vital to the effective
administration of criminal justice in a democracy. Not only does it safeguard the rights of
the accused; it likewise ensures public trust in the conduct of the trial.
Therefore, after balancing the interests of the parties concerned — the constitutional
rights of the accused and the requirements of orderly procedures vis-a-vis the people's
fundamental freedom of expression and right to information on matters of public concern
— I respectfully submit that live coverage via a single xed camera inside the courtroom,
through which the media can access and therefore broadcast the proceedings to the
entire nation and to the world, is the best technological and legal solution to the concerns
raised by the Court in 1991 and to the objections now aired by the accused (former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada) and the IBP.
Epilogue
A new world order brought about by the information highway and the in ux of new
technology in communications is dawning. And yet the Court, by its Decision today, has
turned its back and refused to march in cadence with the music created by the chimes of
changing technology. Our people, long awakened from the dark ages in Philippine history,
are now clamoring to be veritable witnesses to the truth, and this clamor can be answered
technologically by giving them a rsthand view of how the justice system operates. To
keep public trust and esteem, transparency and accountability were cornerstones of this
Court's avowed policies as it celebrated its centenary on June 11, 2001. What better proof
that it is sincere in realizing its goal of judicial renaissance than by opening up its
proceedings without, however, compromising the rights of the accused and the integrity of
orderly justice.
Indeed, in a free society where transparency and accountability are the desirable
standards of public office, 3 this Court can no longer totally prohibit live media coverage of
trials and hearings, given the reality that the technology of modern communications has
adequately overcome the obsolete reasons for the ban.
These advances in communication facilities have now made it possible to satisfy
the people's constitutional right to information without violating the constitutional right of
the accused to a fair trial and without subverting the orderly administration of justice.
Indeed, it is now technologically feasible to give people in their homes and o ces the
same access to trials as spectators inside the courthouse. DCIEac
Let the light of truth be beamed to all the people through the advances of science
and technology in the 21st century!
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the request of the KBP and the Petition of the justice
secretary, subject to the safeguards prescribed above.
Footnotes
1. Signed by KBP President Ruperto S. Nicdao, Jr.
2. Letter to Hon. Hilario Davide Jr. by Ruperto Nicdao, 13 March 2001.
3. "Petition to Allow Live Radio and Television Coverage of the Court Hearings on the
Plunder and Other Criminal Cases Filed Against Former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, et al., Pending Before the Sandiganbayan."
4. Petition, pp. 3-4.

5. Perfecto Fernandez, Law of the Press, 2nd Edition, p. 210.
6. Re: Live TV and radio coverage of the hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino Libel Case;
infra.
7. People vs. Alarcon, 60 Phil. 265; Estes vs. Texas, 381 US 532; Sheppard vs. Maxwell, 384
US 333.
8. People vs. Stapleton, 18 Colo. 568, 33 p. 167, 23. L.R.A 787, (1983).
9. 75 American Jurisprudence 2d, p. 569.
10. Patterson vs. Colorado, 205 US 454.
11. Keating, American Jurisdiction 2d, p. 565.
12. US Supreme Court Reports, 14 L ed 2d, p. 552.
13. As Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Craig vs. Harney , 331 U.S. 396, aptly said: "Who
does not prefer good to ill report of his work? And if fame — a good public name — is, as
Milton said, the "last Infirmity of the noble mind," it is frequently the "first infirmity of a
mediocre one."
14. "Freedom of the Press vs. Impartial Justice," MLQ Quarterly, Volume 6, No. 2, p. 100.
15. Cf. Fay v. New York, 332 US 261; Offut vs. United States, 348 US 11.
16. Ibid., p. 574.
17. Mr. Justice Harran concurring in Estes vs. Texas, supra.
18. Mr. Justice Tom Clark concurring in Estes vs. Texas, supra.
19. Re: Live TV and radio coverage of Pres. Corazon Aquino's Libel case, 23 October 1991.
20. 381 U.S. 532, 14 L ed. 2d 543, 85 S Ct 1628.
21. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Estes vs. Texas, supra.

22. 427 US 539.
23. 448 US 555.
24. 457 US 596.
25. 449 US 560.

26. Ibid, p. 758.
27. Supra, p. 6.
28. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Bridges vs. California, 314 U.S. 252, 283.
KAPUNAN, J., concurring:
1. Petition of the Secretary of the Department of Justice, p. 3.
2. Supplemental Comment on Petition for Live Radio-TV Coverage, p. 3.

3. Comment on Petition for Live Radio-TV Coverage, p. 4.
4. Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated April
8, 2001, pp. 1-2.
5. Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances.
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
6. Estes vs. Texas, 381 US 532, 539 (1965).
7. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US 333, 362 (1966).
8. Estes v. Texas, supra.
9. Id., at 585.
10. In re Oliver, 333 US 257.
11. Estes v. Texas, supra, p. 583.
12. P. THALER, THE WATCHFUL EYE: AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN THE AGE OF THE
TELEVISION TRIAL (1994).

14. Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution provides:
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
15. T. Smith, The Distortion of Criminal Trials Through Televised Proceedings. 21 LAW
AND PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 257 (Spring, 1997). [hereafter referred to as Smith]
16. Separate Opinion of Warren, J. in Estes vs. Texas, supra, p. 572.
17. Id., at 569.

18. Smith, supra, p. 261.
19. Id., at 262.
21. 273 U.S. 510, 71 L ed. 749.
22. Id. at 532.
24. R. Pugsley, This Courtroom Is Not A Television Studio: Why Judge Fujisaki Made The
Correct Call In Gagging The Lawyers And Parties, And Banning The Cameras From The
O.J. Simpson Civil Case. Mr. Pugsley is a professor at the Southwestern University of
School of Law, Los Angeles. His essay was included in the symposium entitled "The
Sound of Silence: Reflections on the Use of the Gag Order" sponsored by the Loyola of
Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal in 1997.
25. Supra.
26. 449 US 560 (1981).
27. Id., at 574-575.
28. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
The taking of photographs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial

proceedings or the radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom shall
not be permitted by the court.
29. Th[e United States Supreme] Court has no supervisory jurisdiction over state courts, and
in reviewing a state court judgment, the Supreme Court is confined to evaluating it in
relation to the Federal Constitution. (Chandler v. Florida, 449 US 560, 570 [1981]) . . . [The
U.S. Supreme Court is] not empowered by the Constitution to oversee or harness state
procedural experimentation, only when the state action infringes fundamental
guarantees, [is the U.S. Supreme Court] authorized to intervene. [The U.S. Supreme Court]
must assume state courts will be alert to any factors impairing an accused's
fundamental rights (Chandler v. Florida, supra, p. 582).
30. See Dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban.
31. Bridges v. California, 314 US 252, 271 (1941).
32. Estes v. Texas, supra, p. 551, citing Patterson v. Colorado, 205 US 454, 462.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., concur:
1. Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
2. As Justice Harlan of the US Supreme Court decreed: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerated classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards
man as man and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil
rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. (Plessy v. Fergusson,
163 U.S. 537).
3. State v. Gill, 172 So. 412.
4. Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel
Case, October 22, 1991.
5. Smith, "The Distortion of Criminal Trials Through Televised Proceedings" Law and
Psychology Review, 1997.
6. Ibid., Thaler, The Watchful Eye: American Eye: American Jurisprudence in the Age of the
Television Trial (1994).
7. Ibid., See also Petkanas, Cameras on Trial: An Assessment of Educational Effects of
News Cameras in Trial Courts (1990) (Ph. D. Dissertation, New York University).
8. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510; See also Banco Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 927; US v.
Samio, 8 Phil. 691; Paterson v. Colorado, 205 US 454 [1907]; Impartiality, in theory,
requires that the conclusion to be reached in the case will be induced only by evidence
and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or
public print.

9. Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 14. . . . (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence
in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appeal is
unjustifiable.
10. 6 L Ed 2d 751, 81 S Ct 1639 (1961).

11. 373 US 723, 10 L Ed 2d 663, 83 S Ct 1417 [1963]; 373 US 723, 10 L Ed 2d 663, 83 S Ct
1417 [1963]); 373 US 723, 10 L Ed 2d 663, 83 S Ct 1417 [1963].
12. 381 US 532, 14 L Ed 2d 543, 85 S Ct 1628 [1965]; see also Marshall v. United States,
360 US 310, 3 L Ed 2d 1250, 79 S Ct 1171 [1959].
13. Abraham, Perry, Freedom and the Court, Seventh Edition, 1998, p. 177.
14. Ibid., p. 178.
15. 384 US 333, 16 Led 2d 600, 86 S Ct 1507 [1966].
16. 459 US 1302, 1306 (1982).
17. Smith, supra.

PUNO, J., dissenting:
1. 381 US 532 (1965).
2. Id. at 544.
3. Colorado was the first state to allow televised trial after Estes.
4. 449 US 560 (1981).
5. Id. at 578-579.
6. Id. at 574-575.
7. 427 US 539 (1976).
8. Id. at 562.
9. Id. at 554.
10. Id. at 555.
11. 448 US 555 (1980).
12. Id. at 571.

13. Id. at 581.
14. 457 US 596 (1982).
15. Id. at 605.

16. Id. at 606.
17. See Md. R Ct. Admin. 1209, Md. Ann. Code (1985).
18. See In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35, 296 P.2d 465, 468 (Colo. 1956) where
following demonstrations of camera equipment, the Court held that prohibition of
cameras in the courtroom is no longer required to maintain dignity and decorum.
19. Except Colorado.
20. See McCall, Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, Vol. 85
Col. Law Rev, 1546, 1549 (1985).
21. Lassiter, TV or Not TV — That is the Question, The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology, 928, 1940 Vol. 86, No. 3 (1996).
22. 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1519 citing Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n., News Media
Coverage of Judicial Proceedings with Cameras and Microphones: A Survey of the
States i-iii (1994). Federal courts, however, have maintained the ban. Rule 53 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that the "taking of photographs in the
courtroom during the progress of judicial proceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial
proceedings from the courtroom shall not be permitted by the court."
23. Cameras in Court Judge Lets the Light Shine In, Syracuse Herald-Journal, January 27,
2000, p. A10.
24. Statistics show that as of 1985, television was the principal source of news for 64% of
the American public and the sole source of news for nearly half of the country's
population. Lassiter, op cit., p. 913.
25. Lassiter, op cit., p. 959 citing among others; Reimer, supra, Krigier, The 13th Juror:
Electronic Media's Struggle to Enter State and Federal Courtrooms, 3 Comm. Law
Conspectus 71 (1995); Lively, Modern Media and the First Amendment: Rediscovering
Freedom of the Press, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 599 (1992); Katsh, The First Amendment and
Technological Change: The New Media Have a Message, 57 Geo Wash L Rev 1459
(1989); Frank, Cameras in the Courtroom: A First Amendment Right of Access, T.V., 9
Hasting Comm. and Ent. LJ. 749 (1987); Gardner, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines
for State Criminal Trials, 84 Mich L Rev 475 (1985).
26. 478 US I (1984).
27. Op cit. at 571-572.

28. Reimer, supra, at p. 1299.
29. Gardner, supra, at p. 493.
30. Op Cit at p. 572. This is an echo of Justice Clark's opinion in Estes that "television is
capable of performing an educational function by acquainting the public with the
judicial process in action." Estes, supra at p. 589.
31. Lassiter, op cit at p. 963.

32. Ibid., pp. 964-965.
33. 384 US 333, 350 (1966).
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

1. In Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel
Case, the Court en banc held as follows:
"Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of mandate
to compel a court to permit them to attend a trial, since within the courtroom a reporter's
constitutional rights are no greater than those of any other member of the public.
Massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter or
destroy the constitutionally necessary judicial atmosphere and decorum that the
requirements of impartiality imposed by due process of law are denied the defendant
and a defendant in a criminal proceeding should not be forced to run a gauntlet of
reporters and photographers each time he enters or leaves the courtroom.
"Considering the prejudice it poses to defendant's right to due process as well as to
the fair and orderly administration of justice, and considering further that the freedom of
the press and the right of the people to information may be served and satisfied by less
distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes
shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video
shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
"ACCORDINGLY, in order to protect the parties' right to due process; to prevent the
distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in the last analysis, to avoid
miscarriage of justice, the Court Resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage
of court proceedings. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be
limited and restricted as above indicated."
2. Sec. 14, Art. III of the Constitution, provides:

xxx xxx xxx
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
public trial, to meet witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. . . . (italics
ours)
3. See also Panganiban, Transparency, Unanimity and Diversity , 2000 ed., pp. 46-64.

Petitioners Vs Vs Oppositors Fortun Narvasa & Salazar Saguisag Carao & Associates

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EN BANC

[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001.]

RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE

On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Broadcaster ng Pilipinas sent a letter

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, RIGHT

5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL; CONSTRUED. — An accused has a right to

2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSOLUTE BAN ON TELEVISED TRIALS, A VIOLATION OF THE

The travails of a deposed President continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to start

"4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to

"Courts do not discriminate against radio and television media by

"'Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of

'The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or

"Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process

Admittedly, the press is a mighty catalyst in awakening public consciousness, and it

"1. The potential impact of television . . . is perhaps of the greatest

"3. A major aspect of the problem is the additional responsibilities the

"4. Finally, we cannot ignore the impact of courtroom television on the

Of course freedom of speech and of the press are essential to the

314 US 252, 284

4. There is no gainsaying that the constitutional right of the people to

xxx xxx xxx 1

xxx xxx xxx 4

The instant petitions, if granted, would throw overboard a well-established. policy

. . . the requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not

Television provided the temptation, and the opportunity, for media-savvy

An absolute constitutional ban on broadcast coverage of trials cannot be

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ , J., concurring :

Equal protection is afforded in a criminal proceeding where the trial is conducted

PUNO, J., dissenting :

The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or

Representatives of the press have no special standing to apply for a writ of

Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

"Several states have conducted studies on the potential impact of

• overall, attitudes of judges towards electronic media were neutral and

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting :

4. Petition, pp. 3-4.

21. Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in Estes vs. Texas, supra.

25. 449 US 560.

2. Supplemental Comment on Petition for Live Radio-TV Coverage, p. 3.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of

13. Estes v. Texas, supra, p. 554.

17. Id., at 569.

The taking of photographs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

10. 6 L Ed 2d 751, 81 S Ct 1639 (1961).

17. Smith, supra.

12. Id. at 571.

15. Id. at 605.

27. Op cit. at 571-572.

31. Lassiter, op cit at p. 963.

PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:

2. Sec. 14, Art. III of the Constitution, provides:

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