G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
In September 1990, defendant
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON.
RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution 1dated
September 27, 1995 and the Decision 2 dated April 10,
1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. SP No.
36533,4 and the Orders5 dated August 29, 1994 6 and
February 2, 19957 that were issued by the trial court in
Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.8
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the
instant petition, as stated in the questioned Decision 9, are
as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA
hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco
dance with fellow crew members Thamer
Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their
hotels, they agreed to have breakfast
together at the room of Thamer. When
they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on
some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a
roomboy and several security personnel
heard her cries for help and rescued her.
Later, the Indonesian police came and
arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the
latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few
days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta
incident. They then requested her to go
back to Jakarta to help arrange the release
of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA
Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base
manager Baharini negotiated with the
police for the immediate release of the
detained crew members but did not
succeed because plaintiff refused to
cooperate. She was afraid that she might
be tricked into something she did not want
because of her inability to understand the
local dialect. She also declined to sign a
blank paper and a document written in the
local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed
plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her
from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities
agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant
1
SAUDI (sic).
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff
thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors
requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station where
the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident.
Miniewy simply stood by as the police put
pressure on her to make a statement
dropping the case against Thamer and
Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her
to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on lune 16,
1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight
to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to
board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA.
When she did, a certain Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court
where she was asked to sign a document
written in Arabic. They told her that this
was necessary to close the case against
Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear
before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff
then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA
summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27,
1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did
so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi,
that the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought
plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June
27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on
June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
plaintiff through an interpreter about the
Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was
about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her
that the airline had forbidden her to take
flight. At the Inflight Service Office where
she was told to go, the secretary of Mr.
Yahya Saddick took away her passport and
told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer
again escorted plaintiff to the same court
where the judge, to her astonishment and
shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Only then did she realize that the Saudi
court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and
listening to the music in violation of
 Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the
male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition. 10
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of
her employer, petitioner SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was
denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine
Embassy in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal.
Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked on the
domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah
continued to serve in the international
flights. 11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of
Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to
leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to
Manila, 12 she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA,
without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint 13 for
damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-
Balawi"), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To
Dismiss 14 which raised the following grounds, to wit: (1)
that the Complaint states no cause of action against
Saudia; (2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in
interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in the
Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To
Motion to Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed a reply 16 thereto on
March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended
Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party
defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint 18.
The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29, 1994
denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed
by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the Motion
to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20, 1994, its
Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Order dated August
29, 1994. It alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction
to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994,
Morada filed her Opposition 22(To Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration).
In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October 24,
1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for
Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of
action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not apply, even if
that ground is raised for the first time on appeal.
Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not
have any substantial interest in the prosecution of the
instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate
the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another
Order 24 dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's Motion
for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed
Order reads as follows:
2
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration
of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed,
thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and
the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff
filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994,
as well as the Reply therewith of
defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed,
thru counsel, on October 24, 1994,
considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs
Amended Complaint, which is one for the
recovery of actual, moral and exemplary
damages plus attorney's fees, upon the
basis of the applicable Philippine law,
Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, is, clearly, within the
jurisdiction of this Court as regards the
subject matter, and there being nothing
new of substance which might cause the
reversal or modification of the order
sought to be reconsidered, the motion for
reconsideration of the defendant, is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution
with Temporary Restraining Order 27 dated February 23,
1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further
conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in
the interim.
In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September 27,
1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied SAUDIA's
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED,
after considering the Answer, with Prayer
to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it
appearing that herein petitioner is not
clearly entitled thereto (Unciano
Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of
Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993,
Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable
Court the instant Petition 29 for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition,
respondent Court of Appeals rendered the
Decision 30dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled
that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering
that the Amended Complaint's basis for recovery of
damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly
within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held
that  certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a
Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have
proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find
recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for
Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order 31 dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this
Court. After both parties submitted their
Memoranda, 32 the instant case is now deemed submitted
for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear
and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based
on Article 21 of the New Civil Code since
the proper law applicable is the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch as this
case involves what is known in private
international law as a "conflicts problem".
Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines
will sit in judgment of the acts done by
another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II
Leave of court before filing a supplemental
pleading is not a jurisdictional
requirement. Besides, the matter as to
absence of leave of court is now moot and
academic when this Honorable Court
required the respondents to comment on
petitioner's April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For A
Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten
(10) Days From Notice Thereof. Further,
the Revised Rules of Court should be
construed with liberality pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the
April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO.
36533 entitled "Saudi Arabian Airlines v.
Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its
April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order on May 7, 1996 at 10:29
a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary
period as provided for under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO.
36533 has not yet become final and
executory and this Honorable Court can
take cognizance of this case. 33
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents,
the following issues emerge for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS
JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED
"MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI ARABIAN
AIRLINES".
II.
3
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT
ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS CASE
PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of
laws that must be settled at the outset. It maintains that
private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that
the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti commissi rule. 34
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since
her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19 35 and
21 36 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a
matter of domestic law. 37
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case,
there is no dispute that the interplay of events occurred in
two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended
Complaint 38 dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or
SAUDIA is a foreign airlines corporation
doing business in the Philippines. It may
be served with summons and other court
processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales
(Phils.). Inc., 3rd Floor, Cougar Building,
114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati,
Metro Manila.
x x x           x x x          x x x
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the
intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian authorities
agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention. Eventually, they
were again put in service by defendant
SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff
thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors
reauested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station where
the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident.
Miniewy simply stood by as the police put
pressure on her to make a statement
dropping the case against Thamer and
Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and allowed her
to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16,
1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight
to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to
board the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sigh a
document written in Arabic. They told her
 that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned
out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to
appear before the court on June 27,
1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA
summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27,
1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did
so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam Saleemi,
that the investigation was routinary and
that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer
brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court
on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then
but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident.
After one hour of interrogation, they let
her go. At the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA
officer told her that the airline had
forbidden her to take that flight. At the
Inflight Service Office where she was told
to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick
took away her passport and told her to
remain in Jeddah, at the crew quarters,
until further orders.
one State involves properties situated in another State. In
other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex
form. 42
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the
fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a
resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a
flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many
occasions of travel across national borders, particularly
from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice
versa, that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.
We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case
is purely domestic, imprecise. A  conflicts problem
presents itself here, and the question of
jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo.
After a careful study of the private respondent's Amended
Complaint, 44 and the Comment thereon, we note that she
aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21
of the New Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise
of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith.

11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer

On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code
again escorted plaintiff to the same court
provides:
where the judge, to her astonishment and
shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. loss or injury to another in a manner that
Only then did she realize that the Saudi is contrary to morals, good customs or
court had tried her, together with Thamer public policy shall compensate the latter
and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. for damages.
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of
listening to the music in violation of
Appeals, 45 this Court held that:
Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male
crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
The aforecited provisions on human
relations were intended to expand the
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a
concept of torts in this jurisdiction by
hand in the case, plaintiff sought the help
granting adequate legal remedy for the
of the Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The
untold number of moral wrongs which is
latter helped her pursue an appeal from
impossible for human foresight to
the decision of the court. To pay for her
specifically provide in the statutes.
upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flights of defendant SAUDIA while,
ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law,
the international flights. 39 Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with
private respondent's assertion that violations of Articles
19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the
remedies in the municipal forum.
existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner
that the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.
Based on the allegations 46 in the Amended Complaint,
read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction 47 we
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is
find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
affected by the diverse laws of two or more states is said
possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign
suit. 48 Its authority to try and hear the case is provided
element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception. 40
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby
many. 41 The foreign element may simply consist in the
amended to read as follows:
fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has
a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of

4
 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise jurisdiction of the court.
exclusive jurisdiction:
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several
x x x           x x x          x x x motions 50 praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended
Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante
Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent
(8) In all other cases in
and explicit from the motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed
which demand, exclusive
for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably,
of interest, damages of
petitioner SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial
whatever kind, attorney's
court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
fees, litigation expenses,
Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
and cots or the value of
jurisdiction.
the property in
controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos As held by this Court in  Republic vs. Ker and Company,
(P100,000.00) or, in such Ltd.: 51
other cases in Metro
Manila, where the demand,
We observe that the motion to dismiss
exclusive of the above-
filed on April 14, 1962, aside from
mentioned items exceeds
disputing the lower court's jurisdiction
Two hundred Thousand
over defendant's person, prayed for
pesos (P200,000.00).
dismissal of the complaint on the ground
(Emphasis ours)
that plaintiff's cause of action has
prescribed. By interposing such second
x x x           x x x          x x x ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and
Co., Ltd. availed of an affirmative defense
on the basis of which it prayed the court
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
to resolve controversy in its favor. For the
Court — the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
court to validly decide the said plea of
defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. — had to acquire jurisdiction upon the
[Now Regional Trial Court] latter's person, who, being the proponent
of the affirmative defense, should be
deemed to have abandoned its special
(a) xxx xxx xxx
appearance and voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
(b) Personal actions. — All other actions
may be commenced and tried where the
Similarly, the case of  De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that;
defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at When the appearance is by motion for the
the election of the plaintiff. purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of
to the jurisdiction of the court. If his
the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon
motion is for any other purpose than to
City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private
object to the jurisdiction of the court over
interest of the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one
his person, he thereby submits himself to
is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and
the jurisdiction of the court. A special
obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may
appearance by motion made for the
not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex", "harass",
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him
the court over the person will be held to
needless expense or disturbance. But unless the balance
be a general appearance, if the party in
is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice
said motion should, for example, ask for a
of forum should rarely be disturbed. 49
dismissal of the action upon the further
ground that the court had no jurisdiction
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a over the subject matter. 52
quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had
it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the
action elsewhere,  i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its
where she no longer maintains substantial connections.
exercise thereof, justified.
That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no
law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1)
unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been
What legal system should control a given situation where
shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the
some of the significant facts occurred in two or more
plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.
states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation. 53
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over
the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint
Several theories have been propounded in order to
and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private
identify the legal system that should ultimately control.

5
Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should
intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then
faced with the problem of deciding which of these two
important values should be stressed. 54
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to
determine under what category a certain set of facts or
rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or
the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule." 55The purpose of
"characterization" is to enable the forum to select the
proper law. 56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation,
but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. 57An
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a
"test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-
of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship
(such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting
factor or point of contact, such as the  situs of the  res, the
place of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing. 58
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to
serve as the possible test for the determination of the
applicable law. 59 These "test factors" or "points of
contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the
following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his
domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person,
such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place
where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the  lex situs is
decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done,
the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage
celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and
torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to
come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the
place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties
as to the law that should govern their
agreement, thelex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or
administrative proceedings are instituted
or done. The lex fori — the law of the
forum — is particularly important because,
as we have seen earlier, matters of
"procedure" not going to the substance of
the claim involved are governed by it; and
because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable
6
foreign law is excluded from application in
a given case for the reason that it falls
under one of the exceptions to the
applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases
is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master
or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly
contracts of affreightment. 60 (Emphasis
ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including
allegations in the Amended Complaint deemed admitted
for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced
that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's
assertion that although she was already working in
Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense
that she would merely testify in an investigation of the
charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members
for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As
it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very
serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic
laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that
the "handing over" or "turning over" of the person of
private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have
acted beyond its duties as employer. Petitioner's
purported act contributed to and amplified or even
proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and
suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby
allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution
of private respondent under the guise of petitioner's
authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust,
confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly
found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But
these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon
her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be
liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for
the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court  a quo is one
involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of
contact" could be the place or places where the tortious
conduct or  lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is
in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
According to her, she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the
performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due
and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner
failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is
of no moment. For in our view what is important here is
the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing
and human rights of complainant, had lodged, according
to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told,
it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the
situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional
rule of  lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules
on tort liability 61 have been advanced to offer fresh
judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping
abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find
here an occasion to apply the "State of the most
significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be
appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this
case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which
has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that
over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines.
There is likewise no question that private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business
of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship"
between the parties was centered here, although it should
be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law
violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines
has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute, 63 raised by private respondent as plaintiff below
against defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has
been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the
situs of the tort complained of and the place "having the
most interest in the problem", we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability
should have paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case.
Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial Court
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City,
which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we
find untenable petitioner's insistence that "[s]ince private
respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of
pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the
matter." 64As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no
obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles
19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In her
Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never
alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. 65 And as
correctly held by the respondent appellate court,
"considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking
the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the
burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish
what the law of Saudi Arabia is". 66
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent
appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial of
defendant's (herein petitioner's) motion to dismiss the
case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue properly
laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and
expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case
at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines is the state
intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the
case below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants, but
also for the vindication of the country's system of law and
justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in
mind, the trial court must proceed to try and adjudge the
case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due
consideration of the foreign element or elements involved.
Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as
prejudging the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.
7
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros
P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines" is hereby REMANDED
to Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-23678             June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. 
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. 
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA
BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, 
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A.
Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from
an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30,
1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom
he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife,
Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and
finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable
estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will,
paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00
in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three
(3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,
which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the
latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report
of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to
$240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina
Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each
or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor
— pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and
Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal
portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children
by his first and second marriages.
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity
of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may he the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three,
of the Civil Code, stating that —

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the property, and those which have for their object public
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate order, public policy and good customs shall not be
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him,
proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1 prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
final account, report and administration and project of partition.
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As
provide for legitimes.
further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new
provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
— Texas law or Philippine law.
may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two
that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile
wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine
thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming Texas
estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the
(law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in
decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to
would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo,
Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the
50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine
the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise,
law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that
the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. 3 Appellants'
national law should govern.
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As
stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas,
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
Amos G. Bellis.
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order
of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in
to succeed. They provide that — toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered

8
G.R. No. L-2935             March 23, 1909
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
appellee, 
vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant.
Bishop and O'Brien for appellant. 
Attorney-General Wilfley for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
Judgment was rendered in the lower court on the 5th day of
September, 1905. The defendant appealed. On the 12th day of
October, 1905, the appellant filed his printed bill of exceptions
with the clerk of the Supreme Court. On the 5th day of December,
1905, the appellant filed his brief with the clerk of the Supreme
Court. On the 19th day of January, 1906, the Attorney-General
filed his brief in said cause. Nothing further was done in said
cause until on or about the 30th day of January, 1909, when the
respective parties were requested by this court to prosecute the
appeal under the penalty of having the same dismissed for failure
so to do; whereupon the appellant, by petition, had the caused
placed upon the calendar and the same was heard on the 2d day
of February, 1909.
The facts from the record appear to be as follows:
First. That on or about the 17th day of April, 1903, in the city of
Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the United States, the
defendant, through a respective of the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, entered into a contract for a period of two
years with the plaintiff, by which the defendant was to receive a
salary of 1,200 dollars per year as a stenographer in the service
of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in
advance the expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
Second. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a
violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he should
become liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the
Government by way of expenses incurred in traveling from
Chicago to Manila and one-half salary paid during such period.
Third. The defendant entered upon the performance of his
contract upon the 30th day of April, 1903, and was paid half-
salary from that date until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in
the Philippine Islands.
Fourth. That on the 11th day of February, 1904, the defendant left
the service of the plaintiff and refused to make further compliance
with the terms of the contract.
Fifth. On the 3d day of December, 1904, the plaintiff commenced
an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover from the defendant the sum of 269.23 dollars, which
amount the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as
expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila, and as half
salary for the period consumed in travel.
Sixth. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said
contract that Laws No. 80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of
said contract.
To the complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general
denial and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that
the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No.
80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered the said
contract, and also that he was a minor at the time the contract
was entered into and was therefore not responsible under the law.
9
To the special defense of the defendant the plaintiff filed a
demurrer, which demurrer the court sustained.
Upon the issue thus presented, and after hearing the evidence
adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court rendered a
judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for
the sum of 265.90 dollars. The lower court found that at the time
the defendant quit the service of the plaintiff there was due him
from the said plaintiff the sum of 3.33 dollars, leaving a balance
due the plaintiff in the sum of 265.90 dollars. From this judgment
the defendant appealed and made the following assignments of
error:
1. The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's
special defenses.
2. The court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant
on the facts.
With reference to the above assignments of error, it may be said
that the mere fact that the legislative department of the
Government of the Philippine Islands had amended said Acts No.
80 and No. 224 by the Acts No. 643 and No. 1040 did not have
the effect of changing the terms of the contract made between
the plaintiff and the defendant. The legislative department of the
Government is expressly prohibited by section 5 of the Act of
Congress of 1902 from altering or changing the terms of the
contract. The right which the defendant had acquired by virtue of
Acts No. 80 and No. 224 had not been changed in any respect by
the fact that said laws had been amended. These acts,
constituting the terms of the contract, still constituted a part of
said contract and were enforceable in favor of the defendant.
The defendant alleged in his special defense that he was a minor
and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The
record discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in
the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the laws of that State
and had full authority to contract. The plaintiff [the defendant]
claims that, by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the
Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had
attained the age of 23 years, he was not liable under said
contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands
governed. It is not disputed — upon the contrary the fact is
admitted — that at the time and place of the making of the
contract in question the defendant had full capacity to make the
same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing
upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made.
(Scudder vs. Union National Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a
remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence,
and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place
where the suit is brought. (Idem.)
The defendant's claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago
but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult
at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the
plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year
later, is not tenable.
Our conclusions with reference to the first above assignment of
error are, therefore:
First. That the amendments to Acts No. 80 and No. 224 in no way
affected the terms of the contract in question; and
Second. The plaintiff [defendant] being fully qualified to enter into
the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he can
not plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is (2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24,
being enforced. 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
We believe that the above conclusions also dispose of the second
assignment of error.
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International
Builders Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the lower court is
Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
affirmed, with costs.
of Court:

(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September

2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-
555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims of
149 claimants; and

(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21,

G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994
1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the motions
for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp.
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. 2-59; 61-230).
EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-
COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty.
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modified
GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners, 
the decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary
vs.
benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor Arbiter
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION'S
Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence on
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial evidence
COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
or proof of employment.
AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION, respondents.
Consolidation of Cases
QUIASON, J.:
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the
Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin,
Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the Second
et. al. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's
Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division (G.R.
Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
Rules of Court:

In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division

(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2,
1991 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-
86-05-460; (2) to render a new decision: (i)
declaring private respondents as in default; (ii)
declaring the said labor cases as a class suit;
(iii) ordering Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root
International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the
1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv)
declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of
forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case
No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24,
1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M.
Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et.
al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September
2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-
555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and
L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-
year prescriptive period under the Labor Code
of the Philippines instead of the ten-year
prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (ii) denied the
"three-hour daily average" formula in the
computation of petitioners' overtime pay; and
granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the
consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32,
which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp. 369-377,
426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First
Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos. 104911-14
with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
I
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and
Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728
other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by
filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from
their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case
No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty.
Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas,
and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize
and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf of
its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was
terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the
interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest
on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary differential pay;
fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties

10
for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of
the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the
complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to
file its answer.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended
Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding
new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night
work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay,
retirement and savings benefits and their share of forfeitures
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA
Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the amended
complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).

On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and

On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for Summary
BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten
Judgment." On the same day, the POEA issued an order directing
days from receipt of the order and the movants to file their
AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the "Amended Complaint,"
answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to
POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on July
present evidence and the case would be resolved on the basis of
25, 1984.
complainant's evidence.

On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and

Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to Strike Out
of the Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance and
Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their
"Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among other matters, the
failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the pre-
trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that AIBC
and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had
defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the pre-trial
conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion
to Strike Out of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the
claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out
in the order.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as
Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended
Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants opposed the
motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his
directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-
84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the NLRC,
together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On
September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA Administrator from
hearing the labor cases and suspended the period for the filing of
the answers of AIBC and BRII.

On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator
comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent to include additional claimants in the case and to investigate
Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administrator direct the alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their respective lawyers.
parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after which
the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On the same
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed a
day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint for the same
complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII
money claims and benefits in behalf of several claimants, some of
with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to those
whom were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 (POEA
subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same month,
Case No. 85-10-779).
Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-
10-779) against AIBC and BRII.
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the
Order dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation,"
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro &
praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit simultaneously
Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of
their position papers after which the case would be deemed
record and the cancellation of the special powers of attorney
submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to
given the original counsel.
file its comment on the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation"
of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it filed a second motion for
extension of time to file the comment. On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice of
the claim to enforce attorney's lien.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that
its motion for extension of time was granted. On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money
claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants
including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-06-
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the
555.
motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be
declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals filed
on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment" praying,
among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend
their complaint. In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA
Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed
in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely — G.R. No. 72132
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order
on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No. 2858 on
directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten days from
March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a
receipt of the order.
resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA
Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions and
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-05-460
the reversal of the said order of the POEA Administrator. and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it was dilatory and
praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.

11
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their
questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA "Manifestation," stating among other matters that there were only
Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to answer the 728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed their
amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a resolution "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by informing
AIBC that all its technical objections may properly be resolved in
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for
the hearings before the POEA.
Execution" of the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds
that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not posted
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first was the supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18
co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and several NLRC
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to resolve
Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely referred the complaint
the labor cases.
to the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request for the
early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was
filed on April 28, 1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational
Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor Motion," praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their
and social legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, monetary claims for failure of private respondents to file their
Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and answers within the reglamentary period required by law.
BRII of violations of labor laws.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution,
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of disposing as follows:
the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA of the POEA in these consolidated cases is
Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an modified to the extent and in accordance with
answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the the following dispositions:
resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the
NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en
1. The claims of the 94
banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
complainants identified and
listed in Annex "A" hereof are
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the dismissed for having
complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a period of prescribed;
15 days from said date within which to submit their respective
position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed their "Urgent
2. Respondents AIBC and
Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the answer was filed
Brown & Root are hereby
out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed their "Supplement
ordered, jointly and severally,
to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply with the POEA Order
to pay the 149 complainants,
of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted
identified and listed in Annex
their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants filed their "Ex-
"B" hereof, the peso
Parte Motion to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of
equivalent, at the time of
AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was filed out of time.
payment, of the total amount
in US dollars indicated
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De opposite their respective
Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On names;
September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their Supplemental
Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed its "Reply to
3. The awards given by the
Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants
POEA to the 19 complainants
submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-
classified and listed in Annex
Supplemental Motion," together with 446 individual contracts of
"C" hereof, who appear to
employments and service records. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and
have worked elsewhere than
BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply."
in Bahrain are hereby set
aside.
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his
decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated
4. All claims other than those
cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 in favor of only
indicated in Annex "B",
324 complainants.
including those for overtime
work and favorably granted by
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal the POEA, are hereby
Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. dismissed for lack of
On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for reconsideration substantial evidence in
and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" filed earlier on support thereof or are beyond
February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC. the competence of this
Commission to pass upon.
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal,"
praying for the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII. In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of
its powers and authority under Article 218(c) of
the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715,
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to
hereby directs Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of
Complainants' Appeal Memorandum," together with their "newly
this Commission to summon parties, conduct
discovered evidence" consisting of payroll records.
hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously
as possible, and thereafter submit a written

12
 report to this Commission (First Division) of the
proceedings taken, regarding the claims of the
following:
(a) complainants identified
and listed in Annex "D"
attached and made an
integral part of this
Resolution, whose claims were
dismissed by the POEA for
lack of proof of employment in
Bahrain (these complainants
numbering 683, are listed in
pages 13 to 23 of the decision
of POEA, subject of the
appeals) and,
(b) complainants identified
and listed in Annex "E"
attached and made an
integral part of this
Resolution, whose awards
decreed by the POEA, to Our
mind, are not supported by
substantial evidence" (G.R.
No. 104776; Rollo, pp. 113-
115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
85-87; G.R. Nos. 105029-31,
pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-
44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January 27,
1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991
Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants
represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants
represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the
motions for reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by Atty.
Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty.
De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos.
105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro
and AIBC and BRII have submitted, from time to time,
compromise agreements for our approval and jointly moved for
the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-
parties to the compromise agreements were concerned (See
Annex A for list of claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a
compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the
approval of the agreements were filed by the parties and
approved by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47 co-claimants
dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R. Nos. 105029-
13
32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-
petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated September
17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 613-
722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 co-claimants
dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 co-claimants
dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4 co-
claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-claimants
dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other co-
claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-
32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-claimants dated
May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-
1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-
claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19 co-claimants
dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1173-1235; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-
959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimants
dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No.
 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37 co-claimants
dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co-claimants dated
January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo,
Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
Domingo B. Solano and six co-claimants dated
August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No.
104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over
the more than fifty volumes now comprising the
records of these cases. From the records, it
appears that the complainants-appellants allege
that they were recruited by respondent-
appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign
principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from
1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various
projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several
countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi
Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in
Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas
contract workers by the Philippine Government,
all the individual complainants signed standard
overseas employment contracts (Records, Vols.
25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records would
be sparingly made, considering their chaotic
arrangement) with AIBC before their departure
from the Philippines. These overseas
employment contracts invariably contained the
following relevant terms and conditions.
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate
and overtime rate as set out in Part B of this
Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by
the Employer, and Employer may, at his sole
option, change or adjust such hours as maybe
deemed necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and
conditions of this agreement, the Employer
may, at his sole discretion, terminate
employee's service with cause, under this
agreement at any time. If the Employer
terminates the services of the Employee under
this Agreement because of the completion or
14
termination, or suspension of the work on which
the Employee's services were being utilized, or
because of a reduction in force due to a
decrease in scope of such work, or by change in
the type of construction of such work. The
Employer will be responsible for his return
transportation to his country of origin. Normally
on the most expeditious air route, economy
class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service
and/or satisfactory completion of contract,
employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation
leave with pay. This shall be computed at the
basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service
will be computed on a pro-rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to the
employee for every year of service for non-work
connected injuries or illness. If the employee
failed to avail of such leave benefits, the same
shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which
said sick leave is granted.
11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross
income will be accrued and payable only upon
satisfactory completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be observed
as a day of rest with 8 hours regular pay. If work
is performed on this day, all hours work shall be
paid at the premium rate. However, this offday
pay provision is applicable only when the laws
of the Host Country require payments for rest
day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the
individual complainants were deployed, His
Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of
Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June
16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law
for the Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This
decree took effect on August 16, 1976. Some of
the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are
relevant to the claims of the complainants-
appellants are as follows (italics supplied only
for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall
receive payment for each
extra hour equivalent to his
wage entitlement
increased by a minimum of
twenty-five per
centum thereof for hours
worked during the day;
and by a minimum of fifty per
centum thereof for hours
worked during the night which
shall be deemed to being from
seven o'clock in the evening
until seven o'clock in
morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be
deemed to be a weekly day of
rest on full pay.
the of service thereafter. Such
worker shall be entitled to
payment of leaving indemnity
upon a quantum meruit in
proportion to the period of his
service completed within a
year.

. . . an employer may require

All the individual
a worker, with his consent, to
complainants-appellants have
work on his weekly day of
already been repatriated to
restif circumstances so
the Philippines at the time of
require and in respect of
the filing of these cases (R.R.
which an additional sum
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).
equivalent to 150% of his
normal wage shall be paid to
him. . . . IV

Art. 81: . . . When conditions The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
of work require the worker to
work on any official holiday,
First: — Whether or not complainants are
he shall be paid an additional
entitled to the benefits provided by Amiri
sum equivalent to 150% of his
Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
normal wage.

(a) Whether or not the

Art. 84: Every worker who has
complainants who have
completed one year's
worked in Bahrain are entitled
continuous service with his
to the above-mentioned
employer shall be entitled to
benefits.
leave on full pay for a period
of not less than 21 days for
each year increased to a (b) Whether or not Art. 44 of
period not less than 28 days the same Decree (allegedly
after five continuous years of prescribing a more favorable
service. treatment of alien employees)
bars complainants from
enjoying its benefits.
A worker shall be entitled to
such leave upon a quantum
meruit in respect of the Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23
proportion of his service in of Bahrain is applicable in these cases, whether
that year. or not complainants' claim for the benefits
provided therein have prescribed.
Art. 107: A contract of
employment made for a Third: — Whether or not the instant cases
period of indefinite duration qualify as a class suit.
may be terminated by either
party thereto after giving the
Fourth: — Whether or not the proceedings
other party thirty days' prior
conducted by the POEA, as well as the decision
notice before such
that is the subject of these appeals, conformed
termination, in writing, in
with the requirements of due process;
respect of monthly paid
workers and fifteen days'
notice in respect of other (a) Whether or not the
workers. The party respondent-appellant was
terminating a contract without denied its right to due
giving the required notice process;
shall pay to the other party
compensation equivalent to
(b) Whether or not the
the amount of wages payable
admission of evidence by the
to the worker for the period of
POEA after these cases were
such notice or the unexpired
submitted for decision was
portion thereof.
valid;

Art. 111: . . . the employer

(c) Whether or not the POEA
concerned shall pay to such
acquired jurisdiction over
worker, upon termination of
Brown & Root International,
employment, a leaving
Inc.;
indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the
basis of fifteen days' wages (d) Whether or not the
for each year of the first three judgment awards are
years of service and of one supported by substantial
month's wages for each year evidence;

15
 (e) Whether or not the awards
based on the averages and
formula presented by the
complainants-appellants are
supported by substantial
evidence;
(f) Whether or not the POEA
awarded sums beyond what
the complainants-appellants
prayed for; and, if so, whether
or not these awards are valid.
Fifth: — Whether or not the POEA erred in
holding respondents AIBC and Brown & Root
jointly are severally liable for the judgment
awards despite the alleged finding that the
former was the employer of the complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA
has acquired jurisdiction over
Brown & Root;
(b) Whether or not the
undisputed fact that AIBC was
a licensed construction
contractor precludes a finding
that Brown & Root is liable for
complainants claims.
Sixth: — Whether or not the POEA
Administrator's failure to hold respondents in
default constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh: — Whether or not the POEA
Administrator erred in dismissing the following
claims:
a. Unexpired portion of
contract;
b. Interest earnings of Travel
and Reserve Fund;
c. Retirement and Savings
Plan benefits;
d. War Zone bonus or
premium pay of at least 100%
of basic pay;
e. Area Differential Pay;
f. Accrued interests on all the
unpaid benefits;
g. Salary differential pay;
h. Wage differential pay;
i. Refund of SSS premiums not
remitted to SSS;
j. Refund of withholding tax
not remitted to BIR;
16
k. Fringe benefits under B &
R's "A Summary of Employee
Benefits" (Annex "Q" of
Amended Complaint);
l. Moral and exemplary
damages;
m. Attorney's fees of at least
ten percent of the judgment
award;
n. Other reliefs, like
suspending and/or cancelling
the license to recruit of AIBC
and the accreditation of B & R
issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of
Article 34 (prohibited
practices), not excluding
reportorial requirements
thereof.
Eighth: — Whether or not the POEA
Administrator erred in not dismissing POEA Case
No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity
of suits (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29,
51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof
of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of the
Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private
Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case without regard to the technicalities of law or procedure.
NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree
No. 23, being more favorable and beneficial to the workers,
should form part of the overseas employment contract of the
complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to
the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the
POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked
elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for
the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and
not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that
the labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple
reason that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain and
therefore, the subject matter of the action, the claims arising from
the Bahrain law, is not of common or general interest to all the
complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the
cardinal rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the
failure of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidence
presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence; and (3) some of the evidence
upon which the decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC
and BRII during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA
Administrator that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims
of the complainants and held that BRII was the actual employer of
the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with
AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the
POEA Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its
local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was
correct in denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not
based on the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the SSS
premiums and refund of withholding taxes and
the claimants should file their claims for said
refund with the appropriate government
agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they
are entitled to the claims which are not based
on the overseas employment contracts nor the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over claims for moral and exemplary
damages and nonetheless, the basis for
granting said damages was not established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of their contract may be
allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive
period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were
prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration
of their overseas contract was not established;
and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over the complaint for the
suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's
recruitment license and the cancellation of the
accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case
No. (L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the ground that
the claimants in said case were also claimants in POEA Case No.
(L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460,
the POEA just resolved the corresponding claims in POEA Case No.
(L) 84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass upon the
same claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on
the following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the
POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of
their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA
17
Administrator allowed private respondents to
file their answers in two years (on June 19,
1987) after the filing of the original complaint
(on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard
of its own rules, affirmed the action of the POEA
Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator
should have declared AIBC and BRII in default
and should have rendered summary judgment
on the basis of the pleadings and evidence
submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in
not holding that the labor cases filed by AIBC
and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of
the claims is ten years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator
should have dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-05-
460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro
(Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay
in the disposition of the labor cases, considering
the great difficulty of getting all the records of
the more than 1,500 claimants, the piece-meal
filing of the complaints and the addition of
hundreds of new claimants by petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints
and claimants, it was impossible to prepare the
answers within the ten-day period provided in
the NLRC Rules, that when the motion to
declare AIBC in default was filed on July 19,
1987, said party had already filed its answer,
and that considering the staggering amount of
the claims (more than US$50,000,000.00) and
the complicated issues raised by the parties, the
ten-day rule to answer was not fair and
reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's
finding that
there was no common or general interest in the
subject matter of the controversy — which was
the applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23.
Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some
being based on salaries pertaining to the
unexpired portion of the contracts while others
being for pure money claims. Each claimant
demanded separate claims peculiar only to
himself and depending upon the particular
circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the
claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and
not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of
whether POEA Case No. L-86-05-460 should be
dismissed, this being a private quarrel between
the two labor lawyers (Rollo, pp. 292-305).
 Attorney's Lien In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of the
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to
employment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime
strike out the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII
and leave indemnity pay and other benefits, on evidence
dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants
admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to
who entered into the compromise agreements subject of said
due process; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new
manifestations and motions were his clients and that Atty.
hearings for the 683 claimants whose claims had been dismissed
Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said
for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly,
agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less
they allege that assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro
was applicable, NLRC erred when it did not apply the one-year
collected additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he
prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
was entitled to receive; and that the consent of the claimants to
the compromise agreements and quitclaims were procured by
fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution VI
dated November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike
out the Joint Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
11, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).

All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although

On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and Claim
they disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within the
to Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who
prescriptive period.
entered into compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII with the
assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer agreement
with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535). To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years,
applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC
believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three years as
Contempt of Court
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del

Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt
of court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled this
Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered into
the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De
Castro, when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges
against Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the
voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition
for certiorari on the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period
under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the
claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of three
hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself
during the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money
claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated April 16,
1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in
G.R. No. 104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of
the Philippines, a special law, prevails over that provided in the
Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the
method of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed
that they were not bound by what appeared therein, because
such memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain
official and there was no showing that it was approved by the
Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the
averaging method was discussed in the course of the negotiation
for the amicable settlement of the dispute and any offer made by
a party therein could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo,
pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
invoking different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that
the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three years,
instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the
prescriptive period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative
law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the
Labor Code) refer to those arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right as
provided by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents
violated are not the rights of the workers as
provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions
of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain,
which ipso facto amended the worker's
contracts of employment. Respondents
consciously failed to conform to these
provisions which specifically provide for the
increase of the worker's rate. It was only after
June 30, 1983, four months after the brown
builders brought a suit against B & R in Bahrain
for this same claim, when respondent AIBC's
contracts have undergone amendments in
Bahrain for the new hires/renewals
(Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law
of prescription to this instant case is Article
1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides:
Art. 1144. The following
actions may be brought within
ten years from the time the
cause of action accrues:

18
 (1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created
by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants
against the respondents shall prescribe in ten
years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all
claims were filed within the ten-year
prescriptive period, no claim suffered the
infirmity of being prescribed (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the
prescriptive period is three years as provided in Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money claims
arising from employer-employee relations . . .
shall be filed within three years from the time
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they
shall be forever barred" (Art. 291, Labor Code,
as amended). This three-year prescriptive
period shall be the one applied here and which
should be reckoned from the date of
repatriation of each individual complainant,
considering the fact that the case is having (sic)
filed in this country. We do not agree with the
POEA Administrator that this three-year
prescriptive period applies only to money claims
specifically recoverable under the Philippine
Labor Code. Article 291 gives no such
indication. Likewise, We can not consider
complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued
from a violation of their employment contracts.
There was no violation; the claims arise from
the benefits of the law of the country where
they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as
provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that
the applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e.,
whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute
of limitation as "substantive" or "procedural." NLRC cited the
decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d.
152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the applicability of the
Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for
claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would have
prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the Statute
of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not
"specifically intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive
period provided in the law of the forum should apply. The Court
observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a
statute of limitations of a foreign country, and it
is not clear on the face of the statute that its
purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside
as well as within the foreign country concerned,
of the substantive rights to which the statute
pertains, we think that as a yardstick for
determining whether that was the purpose this
test is the most satisfactory one. It does not
lead American courts into the necessity of
examining into the unfamiliar peculiarities and
refinements of different foreign legal
systems. . .
The court further noted:
19
xxx xxx xxx
Applying that test here it appears to us that the
libelant is entitled to succeed, for the
respondents have failed to satisfy us that the
Panamanian period of limitation in question was
specifically aimed against the particular rights
which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama
Labor Code is a statute having broad objectives,
viz: "The present Code regulates the relations
between capital and labor, placing them on a
basis of social justice, so that, without injuring
any of the parties, there may be guaranteed for
labor the necessary conditions for a normal life
and to capital an equitable return to its
investment." In pursuance of these objectives
the Code gives laborers various rights against
their employers. Article 623 establishes the
period of limitation for all such rights, except
certain ones which are enumerated in Article
621. And there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave
special consideration to the impact of Article
623 upon the particular rights sought to be
enforced here, as distinguished from the other
rights to which that Article is also applicable.
Were we confronted with the question of
whether the limitation period of Article 621
(which carves out particular rights to be
governed by a shorter limitation period) is to be
regarded as "substantive" or "procedural" under
the rule of "specifity" we might have a different
case; but here on the surface of things we
appear to be dealing with a "broad," and not a
"specific," statute of limitations (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp.
92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291
of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC,
refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation of the
employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They assert that
their claims are based on the violation of their employment
contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and
therefore the claims may be brought within ten years as provided
by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo, G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have
prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that
there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is
Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such
kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common-law
conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on
prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or
a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment
shall not be actionable after the lapse of one
year from the date of the expiry of the contract.
(G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in
the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder
of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are
governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action
is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law, 131
[1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in
the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the
American court applied the statute of limitations of New York,
instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to
be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in
Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on prescription
of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the
forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A
"borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a
foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are several
kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be
enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run
against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153 [1938]).
Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said
Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section
48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of
Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot
be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application
in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum's public policy (Canadian Northern
Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed. 713
[1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987
Constitution emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development. (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987
Constitution provides:
20
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive
period governing the filing of the claims is three years, as
provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent
part provides:
Money claims-all money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within
three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the
claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at
bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct
computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective
bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not
make any reference as to the computation for overtime work
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and
instead insisted that work computation provided in the collective
bargaining agreements between the parties be observed. Since
the claim for pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written
contracts between the litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period
provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended
by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action under
this Act shall be commenced within three years
after the cause of action accrued otherwise such
action shall be forever barred, . . . .
The court further explained:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the
Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended)
will apply, if the claim for differentials for
overtime work is solely based on said law, and
not on a collective bargaining agreement or any
 other contract. In the instant case, the claim for
overtime compensation is not so much because
of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but
because the claim is demandable right of the
employees, by reason of the above-mentioned
collective bargaining agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive
period for filing "actions to enforce any cause of action under said
law." On the other hand, Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines provides the prescriptive period for filing "money
claims arising from employer-employee relations." The claims in
the cases at bench all arose from the employer-employee
relations, which is broader in scope than claims arising from a
specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of
the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R.
Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising
from the employer's violation of the employee's right," as
provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the
provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to
assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay.
The same factors may also be considered in
answering judicial inquiry whether or not a
person officially charged with the administration
of justice has violated the speedy disposition of
cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991),
we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justified
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served
with a copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been asking
that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file their
answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1, Rule III of
Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. At that time,
there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of the
records the amended complaint and the "Compliance" of
claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a bill
of particulars.

A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such
claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June
that their final disposition in the administrative level after seven
6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30,
years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by
1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the
case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of
declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp.
complainants.
31-35).

The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of

Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987
1,767 claimants. Said complaint had undergone several
Constitution, which provides:
amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a

The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983.
speedy disposition of their cases before all
They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the other
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling more
than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of
cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party 2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;

However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153

4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least
(1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like
100% of basic pay;
the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the
accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases"
is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends 5. Area Differential pay;
upon the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
render rights nugatory.

7. Salary differential pay;

Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into
consideration in determining whether or not the right to a "speedy
disposition of cases" has been violated, thus: 8. Wage Differential pay;

In the determination of whether or not the right 9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to
to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain Social Security System;
factors may be considered and balanced against
each other. These are length of delay, reason

21
 10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to
Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A
Summary of Employees Benefits consisting of
43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of
amounts;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or
cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and
issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited
practices) not excluding reportorial
requirements thereof (NLRC Resolution,
September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient
definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants were ordered
to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars. When
claimants filed their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved
to strike out the complaint from the records for failure of
claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the POEA
Administrator denied the motion to strike out the complaint, he
ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies" pointed out by
AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the
complaint, the records of employment of the more than 1,700
claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the Middle
East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA
Administrator were interrupted several times by the various
appeals, first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases
were filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases
Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on
May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in
exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had
never been completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991,
G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new cases were
consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in
terminating the proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long
and arduous route towards resolution had the
parties and their counsel been more interested
in pursuing the truth and the merits of the
claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance
on technicalities. Parties and counsel have
made these cases a litigation of emotion. The
intransigence of parties and counsel is
remarkable. As late as last month, this
Commission made a last and final attempt to
bring the counsel of all the parties (this
Commission issued a special order directing
respondent Brown & Root's resident agent/s to
appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance.
Even this failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
22
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the
delay in the disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which
complained:
It is very evident from the records that the
protagonists in these consolidated cases appear
to be not only the individual complainants, on
the one hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on
the other hand. The two lawyers for the
complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and
Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet to settle the
right of representation, each one persistently
claiming to appear in behalf of most of the
complainants. As a result, there are two appeals
by the complainants. Attempts by this
Commission to resolve counsels' conflicting
claims of their respective authority to represent
the complainants prove futile. The bickerings by
these two counsels are reflected in their
pleadings. In the charges and countercharges of
falsification of documents and signatures, and in
the disbarment proceedings by one against the
other. All these have, to a large extent, abetted
in confounding the issues raised in these cases,
jumble the presentation of evidence, and even
derailed the prospects of an amicable
settlement. It would not be far-fetched to
imagine that both counsel, unwittingly, perhaps,
painted a rainbow for the complainants, with the
proverbial pot of gold at its end containing more
than US$100 million, the aggregate of the
claims in these cases. It is, likewise, not
improbable that their misplaced zeal and
exuberance caused them to throw all caution to
the wind in the matter of elementary rules of
procedure and evidence (Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the
listing of some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the
two lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the problem created by this
situation is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the
parties and the public respondents would not know which claim of
which petitioner was dismissed and which was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be
consolidated in a "class suit" because "all the named
complainants have similar money claims and similar rights sought
irrespective of whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab
Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle East"
(Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are
so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain
Law, many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the
claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under
different terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that
inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present
(common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the
State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who worked in
Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the
nature of the claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there
is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are
based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never
worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each
claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the
claims of the other employees of defendants. The named
claimants have a special or particular interest in specific benefits
completely different from the benefits in which the other named
claimants and those included as members of a "class" are
claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears
that each claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims.
A claimants has no concern in protecting the interests of the other
claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have
abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate
compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle
basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the
record must fairly represent and protect the interests of the
others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 590
[1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can
not be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The
most that can be accorded to them under the Rules of Court is to
be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they
are the exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the
joinder of all indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if
the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem
arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which case the
others who were impleaded by their self-appointed
representatives, would surely claim denial of due process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De
Castro guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities,
falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his
appearances as counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo,
pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is
intended to put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing
multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with
the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same
issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed with the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional
Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of
Petitioners and Complainants." The first sentence of the circular
expressly states that said circular applies to an governs the filing
of petitions in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application
of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts and
administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on April 1,
1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for
unethical conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and
POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical
conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated
December 14, 1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to
protect his claim for attorney's fees for legal services rendered in
favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the
court or administrative agency which renders and executes the
money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The lawyer
shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his clients
and to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec.
23
37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del
Mundo should have been filed with the administrative agency that
rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante
De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and
appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not
accepting their formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime"
in computing the overtime payments. They claim that it was BRII
itself which proposed the formula during the negotiations for the
settlement of their claims in Bahrain and therefore it is in estoppel
to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of
Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of
the Vice President and the Area Manager,
Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the
Summary of the compensation offered by the
Company to the employees in respect of the
difference of pay of the wages of the overtime
and the difference of vacation leave and the
perusal of the documents attached thereto i.e.,
minutes of the meetings between the
Representative of the employees and the
management of the Company, the complaint
filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where they
have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of
the Service Contract executed between one of
the employees and the company through its
agent in (sic) Philippines, Asia International
Builders Corporation where it has been provided
for 48 hours of work per week and an annual
leave of 12 days and an overtime wage of 1 &
1/4 of the normal hourly wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the
following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service
of the employee is 35 months for the Philippino
(sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino
(sic) employee is US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours
plus in all public holidays and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of
service as compensation for the difference of
the wages of the overtime done for each
Philippino (sic) employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not
prepared by them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain
Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the
Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and
(3) that the offer was made in the course of the negotiation for an
amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not Employee hereunder are substituted for and in
admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due to the lieu of all other benefits provided by any
claimants. applicable law, provided of course, that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that
of the host country regulation or custom, it
While said document was presented to the POEA without
being understood that should applicable laws
observing the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign
establish that fringe benefits, or other such
government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989
benefits additional to the compensation herein
Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in
agreed cannot be waived, Employee agrees that
proceedings before an administrative body. The opposing parties
such compensation will be adjusted downward
have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could easily
so that the total compensation hereunder, plus
verify its authenticity and accuracy.
the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to
the compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp. 352-
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as 353).
contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section
27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer to
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted
settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due.
more felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the
compensation to the employee may be "adjusted downward so
Said Rule provides: that the total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable
benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation" therein agreed,
another part of the same provision categorically states "that total
Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the host
cases, an offer of compromise is not an
country regulation and custom."
admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93
the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public
SCRA 257 [1979]).
policy. There is great public interest in having the protagonists
settle their differences amicable before these ripen into litigation.
Every effort must be taken to encourage them to arrive at a Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers in the
negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a
The interpretation of obscure words or
party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do,
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
party who caused the obscurity.

G.R. Nos. 105029-32

A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides
for greater benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-
employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the belief that
"where the laws of the host country are more favorable and
beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract." It quoted with
approval the observation of the POEA Administrator that ". . . in
labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations
shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion
where there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations
of the employment contract and the employees merely "take it or
leave it." The presumption is that there was an imposition by one
party against the other and that the employees signed the
contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power
(Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-
employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.

The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be

AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically
governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In
when it refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts,
such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate
which became the law of the parties. They contend that the
the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity to
principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract applies
enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them,
only to provisions of Philippine law in relation to contracts
matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,
executed in the Philippines.
150-161).

The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by

Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall
country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms
be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms." By
and conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. It
such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract
was stipulated in said contracts that:
does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign
law. The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of
The Employee agrees that while in the employ contractual terms deemed written in the contract (Anton, Private
of the Employer, he will not engage in any other International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of
business or occupation, nor seek employment Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
with anyone other than the Employer; that he
shall devote his entire time and attention and
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the
his best energies, and abilities to the
parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16 Columbia
performance of such duties as may be assigned
Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party expectation
to him by the Employer; that he shall at all
is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice of the
times be subject to the direction and control of
applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465,
the Employer; and that the benefits provided to
467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however, bear some

24
relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles and Hayes,
Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct
connection with the Bahrain law because the services were
rendered in that country.
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of
the evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA
Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not
expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that
would only prolong the already protracted legal controversies.

In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board, 117
SCRA 486 (1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse
Management Co. and the late husband of the private respondent,
expressly provided that in the event of illness or injury to the
employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and
not due to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to
employee in accordance with and subject to the limitation of the
Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the Philippines or
the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is
greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the
vessel in which the late husband of private respondent served at
the time of his death, granted a better compensation package, we
applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the
contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon
by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the cases at bench.
The issue in that case was whether the amount of the death
compensation of a Filipino seaman should be determined under
the shipboard employment contract executed in the Philippines or
the Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard employment
contract was controlling, the court differentiated said case from
Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an
express stipulation in the employment contract that the foreign
law would be applicable if it afforded greater compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their
right to due process when said administrative agency granted
Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave
differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in
Annex B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the resolution
of the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding
that the POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence
presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of the
POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that
some of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo,
pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case to the
POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means further delay
in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the
validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII
complain of as being irregular and a "reversible error."
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for the
reception of evidence, where the same can be readily determined
from the uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of
the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 190 SCRA 653
[1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 127
SCRA 463 [1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for
683 claimants listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA
Administrator "for lack of proof" and for 69 claimants listed in
Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been found by
NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the
determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its
jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority
under Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which had
already been dismissed because such provision contemplates
only situations where there is still a question or controversy to be
resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the
technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the
proceedings conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian
Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542 [1986];
Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219 [1987]).
This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of
procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are
cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in
order to comply with the due process requirements of the
Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence

VIII
submitted on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to
have been "unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not
disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39). The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were
questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
submitted to the POEA administrator by the claimants after the
cases were deemed submitted for resolution and which were
taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
cases. While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said
evidence of the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they
SO ORDERED.
had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and BRII
themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence
which they failed to present before the POEA Administrator. G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, 
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is
vs.
enjoined to "use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the
JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE
facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due
process."

MEDIALDEA, J.:

25
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the This guarantee and all rights,
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated August obligations and liabilities
2, 1985, which reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court arising hereunder shall be
dated February 28,1985 denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by construed and determined
private respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj. under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of
the Republic of Singapore. We
A complaint for collection of a sum of money (pp. 49-52, Rollo)
hereby agree that the courts
was filed by petitioner Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
in Singapore shall have
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as petitioner BANK) against
jurisdiction over all disputes
private respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj,
arising under this guarantee,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-42850 before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 84.
the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. The Court finds and
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service
concludes otherwise. There is nothing in the
PTE, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as COMPANY), a company
Guarantee which says that the courts of
incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the
Singapore shall have jurisdiction to the
Singapore branch of petitioner BANK an overdraft facility in the
exclusion of the courts of other countries or
maximum amount of Singapore dollars 200,000.00 (which amount
nations. Also, it has long been established in law
was subsequently increased to Singapore dollars 375,000.00) with
and jurisprudence that jurisdiction of courts is
interest at 3% over petitioner BANK prime rate, payable monthly,
fixed by law; it cannot be conferred by the will,
on amounts due under said overdraft facility; as a security for the
submission or consent of the parties.
repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by petitioner
BANK to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, on October 7,
1982, both private respondents and a certain Robin de Clive On the second ground, it is asserted that
Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at such time, defendant Robert' , Sherman is not a citizen nor
executed a Joint and Several Guarantee (p. 53, Rollo) in favor of a resident of the Philippines. This argument
petitioner BANK whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to holds no water. Jurisdiction over the persons of
pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed by the defendants is acquired by service of summons
COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft and copy of the complaint on them. There has
facility. been a valid service of summons on both
defendants and in fact the same is admitted
when said defendants filed a 'Motion for
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
Extension of Time to File Responsive Pleading
on December 5, 1984.
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and
liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby
and determined under and may be enforced in
DENIED.
accordance with the laws of the Republic of
Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of
Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all SO ORDERED.
disputes arising under this guarantee. ... (p. 33-
A, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by private
respondents which was, however, denied (p. 66,Rollo).
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK
demanded payment of the obligation from private respondents,
Private respondents then filed before the respondent Intermediate
conformably with the provisions of the Joint and Several
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) a petition for prohibition
Guarantee. Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to
with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order
pay, petitioner BANK filed the above-mentioned complaint.
(pp. 39-48, Rollo). On August 2, 1985, the respondent Court
rendered a decision (p. 37, Rollo), the dispositive portion of which
On December 14,1984, private respondents filed a motion to reads:
dismiss (pp 54-56, Rollo) which was opposed by petitioner BANK
(pp. 58-62, Rollo). Acting on the motion, the trial court issued an
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition with
order dated February 28, 1985 (pp, 64-65, Rollo), which read as
preliminary injuction is hereby GRANTED. The
follows:
respondent Court is enjoined from taking further
cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same
In a Motion to Dismiss filed on December 14, for filing with the proper court of Singapore
1984, the defendants seek the dismissal of the which is the proper forum. No costs.
complaint on two grounds, namely:
SO ORDERED.
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint; and
The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 38, Rollo), hence,
the present petition.
2. That the court has no jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants.
The main issue is whether or not Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the suit.
In the light of the Opposition thereto filed by
plaintiff, the Court finds no merit in the motion.
The controversy stems from the interpretation of a provision in
"On the first ground, defendants claim that by
the Joint and Several Guarantee, to wit:
virtue of the provision in the Guarantee (the
actionable document) which reads —

26
 (14) This guarantee and all rights, obligations
and liabilites arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be
enforced in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that
the Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction
over all disputes arising under this guarantee. ...
(p. 53-A, Rollo)
In rendering the decision in favor of private respondents, the
Court of Appeals made, the following observations (pp. 35-
36, Rollo):
There are significant aspects of the case to
which our attention is invited. The loan was
obtained by Eastern Book Service PTE, Ltd., a
company incorporated in Singapore. The loan
was granted by the Singapore Branch of
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
The Joint and Several Guarantee was also
concluded in Singapore. The loan was in
Singaporean dollars and the repayment thereof
also in the same currency. The transaction, to
say the least, took place in Singporean setting
in which the law of that country is the measure
by which that relationship of the parties will be
governed.
xxx xxx xxx
Contrary to the position taken by respondents,
the guarantee agreement compliance that any
litigation will be before the courts of Singapore
and that the rights and obligations of the parties
shall be construed and determined in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of
Singapore. A closer examination of paragraph
14 of the Guarantee Agreement upon which the
motion to dismiss is based, employs in clear and
unmistakeable (sic) terms the word 'shall' which
under statutory construction is mandatory.
Thus it was ruled that:
... the word 'shall' is imperative, operating to
impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon vs.
Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714).lâwphî1.ñèt
There is nothing more imperative and restrictive
than what the agreement categorically
commands that 'all rights, obligations, and
liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed
and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of
Singapore.'
While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean
setting" and that the Joint and Several Guarantee contains a
choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates
that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all rights,
obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed and
determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the
laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the
Courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic principle
underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does
not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in
rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be
based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice (J. Salonga, Private
27
International Law, 1981, p. 46). Indeed, as pointed-out by
petitioner BANK at the outset, the instant case presents a very
odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone would be
disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, with more reason
as a defendant. However, in this case, private respondents are
Philippine residents (a fact which was not disputed by them) who
would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court
and in the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention
inconvenience, than to have a Philippine court try and resolve the
case. Private respondents' stance is hardly comprehensible,
unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the
payment of a just obligation.
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should
have been filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They
did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the action
here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or
expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that petitioner
BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.
In the case of Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033,
October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 187, it was ruled:
... An accurate reading, however, of the
stipulation, 'The parties agree to sue and be
sued in the Courts of Manila,' does not preclude
the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties
merely consented to be sued in Manila.
Qualifying or restrictive words which would
indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot
read into that clause that plaintiff and
defendant bound themselves to file suits with
respect to the last two transactions in question
only or exclusively in Manila. For, that
agreement did not change or transfer venue. It
simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed
to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which
they may resort. They did not waive their right
to pursue remedy in the courts specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio
non praesumitur.
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et
al. v. Lagamon, etc., et al., G.R. No. 57250, October 30, 1981, 108
SCRA 740, where the stipulation was "[i]n case of litigation,
jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City." We held:
Anent the claim that Davao City had been
stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a
stipulation as to venue does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, Rules of
Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words in the agreement which would indicate
that the place named is the only venue agreed
upon by the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not
thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the
exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in
question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In
International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a
State to exercise authority over persons and things within its
boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not
assume jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and
diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign military
units stationed in or marching through State territory with the
permission of the latter's authorities. This authority, which finds
its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and
throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take
hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and
agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought
before them (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, pp. 37-
38).lâwphî1.ñèt
As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers
that the objection to improper venue has been waived. However,
We agree with the ruling of the respondent Court that:
While in the main, the motion to dismiss fails to
categorically use with exactitude the words
'improper venue' it can be perceived from the
general thrust and context of the motion that
what is meant is improper venue, The use of the
word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt to
copy-cat the same word employed in the
guarantee agreement but conveys the concept
of venue. Brushing aside all technicalities, it
would appear that jurisdiction was used loosely
as to be synonymous with venue. It is in this
spirit that this Court must view the motion to
dismiss. ... (p. 35, Rollo).
At any rate, this issue is now of no moment because We hold that
venue here was properly laid for the same reasons discussed
above.
The respondent Court likewise ruled that (pp. 36-37, Rollo):
... In a conflict problem, a court will simply
refuse to entertain the case if it is not
authorized by law to exercise jurisdiction. And
even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to
entertain the case by applying the principle
of forum non conveniens. ...
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on
the basis of the principle of forum non conveniensdepends largely
upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court (J. Salonga, Private International
Law, 1981, p. 49).lâwphî1.ñèt Thus, the respondent Court should
not have relied on such principle.
Although the Joint and Several Guarantee prepared by petitioner
BANK is a contract of adhesion and that consequently, it cannot
be permitted to take a stand contrary to the stipulations of the
contract, substantial bases exist for petitioner Bank's choice of
forum, as discussed earlier.
Lastly, private respondents allege that neither the petitioner
based at Hongkong nor its Philippine branch is involved in the
transaction sued upon. This is a vain attempt on their part to
further thwart the proceedings below inasmuch as well-known is
the rule that a defendant cannot plead any defense that has not
been interposed in the court below.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court is hereby
REVERSED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is
REINSTATED, with costs against private respondents. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED
28
G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES
CORPORATION, petitioner, 
vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor;
HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy
Minister; ETHELYNNE B.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines
Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign corporation licensed to do business
in the Philippines, executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts
of employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne B. Farrales
and the other with private respondent Ma. M.C. Mamasig. 1The
contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in
pertinent portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of three (3)
years, but can be extended by the mutual
consent of the parties.
xxx xxx xxx
6. TERMINATION
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein
provided, PIA reserves the right to terminate
this agreement at any time by giving the
EMPLOYEE notice in writing in advance one
month before the intended termination or in lieu
thereof, by paying the EMPLOYEE wages
equivalent to one month's salary.
xxx xxx xxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and
governed under and by the laws of Pakistan,
and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall
have the jurisdiction to consider any matter
arising out of or under this agreement.
Respondents then commenced training in Pakistan. After their
training period, they began discharging their job functions as
flight attendants, with base station in Manila and flying
assignments to different parts of the Middle East and Europe.
On 2 August 1980, roughly one (1) year and four (4) months prior
to the expiration of the contracts of employment, PIA through Mr.
Oscar Benares, counsel for and official of the local branch of PIA,
sent separate letters both dated 1 August 1980 to private
respondents Farrales and Mamasig advising both that their
services as flight stewardesses would be terminated "effective 1
September 1980, conformably to clause 6 (b) of the employment
agreement [they had) executed with [PIA]."2
On 9 September 1980, private respondents Farrales and Mamasig
jointly instituted a complaint, docketed as NCR-STF-95151-80, for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of company benefits and
bonuses, against PIA with the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment ("MOLE"). After several unfruitful attempts at
conciliation, the MOLE hearing officer Atty. Jose M. Pascual
ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence
supporting their respective positions. The PIA submitted its
position paper, 3 but no evidence, and there claimed that both
private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in
the habit of bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of
"personal effects"; and that PIA personnel at the Manila
International Airport had been discreetly warned by customs
officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that
practice. PIA further claimed that the services of both private
respondents were terminated pursuant to the provisions of the
employment contract.
In his Order dated 22 January 1981, Regional Director Francisco L.
Estrella ordered the reinstatement of private respondents with full
backwages or, in the alternative, the payment to them of the
amounts equivalent to their salaries for the remainder of the fixed
three-year period of their employment contracts; the payment to
private respondent Mamasig of an amount equivalent to the value
of a round trip ticket Manila-USA Manila; and payment of a bonus
to each of the private respondents equivalent to their one-month
salary. 4 The Order stated that private respondents had attained
the status of regular employees after they had rendered more
than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the
period of the employment contract to three (3) years was null and
void as violative of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations on regular and casual
employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out
without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and
entitled private respondents to reinstatement with full backwages.
On appeal, in an Order dated 12 August 1982, Hon. Vicente
Leogardo, Jr., Deputy Minister, MOLE, adopted the findings of fact
and conclusions of the Regional Director and affirmed the latter's
award save for the portion thereof giving PIA the option, in lieu of
reinstatement, "to pay each of the complainants [private
respondents] their salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion
of the contract[s] [of employment] . . .". 5
In the instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner PIA assails the
award of the Regional Director and the Order of the Deputy
Minister as having been rendered without jurisdiction; for having
been rendered without support in the evidence of record since,
allegedly, no hearing was conducted by the hearing officer, Atty.
Jose M. Pascual; and for having been issued in disregard and in
violation of petitioner's rights under the employment contracts
with private respondents.
1. Petitioner's first contention is that the Regional Director, MOLE,
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint
initiated by private respondents for illegal dismissal, jurisdiction
over the same being lodged in the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") It appears to us
beyond dispute, however, that both at the time the complaint was
initiated in September 1980 and at the time the Orders assailed
were rendered on January 1981 (by Regional Director Francisco L.
Estrella) and August 1982 (by Deputy Minister Vicente Leogardo,
Jr.), the Regional Director had jurisdiction over termination cases.
Art. 278 of the Labor Code, as it then existed, forbade the
termination of the services of employees with at least one (1)
year of service without prior clearance from the Department of
Labor and Employment:
29
Art. 278. Miscellaneous Provisions — . . .
(b) With or without a collective agreement, no
employer may shut down his establishment or
dismiss or terminate the employment of
employees with at least one year of service
during the last two (2) years, whether such
service is continuous or broken, without prior
written authority issued in accordance with such
rules and regulations as the Secretary may
promulgate . . . (emphasis supplied)
Rule XIV, Book No. 5 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code, made clear that in case of
a termination without the necessary clearance, the
Regional Director was authorized to order the
reinstatement of the employee concerned and the
payment of backwages; necessarily, therefore, the
Regional Director must have been given jurisdiction over
such termination cases:
Sec. 2. Shutdown or dismissal without
clearance. — Any shutdown or dismissal without
prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed
to be termination of employment without a just
cause. The Regional Director shall, in such case
order the immediate reinstatement of the
employee and the payment of his wages from
the time of the shutdown or dismissal until the
time of reinstatement. (emphasis supplied)
Policy Instruction No. 14 issued by the Secretary of
Labor, dated 23 April 1976, was similarly very explicit
about the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over
termination of employment cases:
Under PD 850, termination cases — with or
without CBA — are now placed under the
original jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
Preventive suspension cases, now made
cognizable for the first time, are also placed
under the Regional Director. Before PD 850,
termination cases where there was a CBA were
under the jurisdiction of the grievance
machinery and voluntary arbitration, while
termination cases where there was no CBA were
under the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Section.
In more details, the major innovations
introduced by PD 850 and its implementing
rules and regulations with respect to
termination and preventive suspension cases
are:
1. The Regional Director is now required to rule
on every application for clearance, whether
there is opposition or not, within ten days from
receipt thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
2. The second contention of petitioner PIA is that, even if the
Regional Director had jurisdiction, still his order was null and void
because it had been issued in violation of petitioner's right to
procedural due process .6 This claim, however, cannot be given
serious consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the Regional
Director to submit not only its position paper but also such
evidence in its favor as it might have. Petitioner opted to rely
solely upon its position paper; we must assume it had no evidence
to sustain its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing
was conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to explain its
side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to appeal his case to the
Ministry of Labor and Employment. 7
There is another reason why petitioner's claim of denial of due
process must be rejected. At the time the complaint was filed by
private respondents on 21 September 1980 and at the time the
Regional Director issued his questioned order on 22 January 1981,
applicable regulation, as noted above, specified that a "dismissal
without prior clearance shall be conclusively presumed to be
termination of employment without a cause", and the Regional
Director was required in such case to" order the immediate
reinstatement of the employee and the payment of his wages
from the time of the shutdown or dismiss until . . . reinstatement."
In other words, under the then applicable rule, the Regional
Director did not even have to require submission of position
papers by the parties in view of the conclusive (juris et de jure)
character of the presumption created by such applicable law and
regulation. In Cebu Institute of Technology v. Minister of Labor
and Employment, 8 the Court pointed out that "under Rule 14,
Section 2, of the Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
termination of [an employee] which was without previous
clearance from the Ministry of Labor is conclusively presumed to
be without [just] cause . . . [a presumption which] cannot be
overturned by any contrary proof however strong."
3. In its third contention, petitioner PIA invokes paragraphs 5 and
6 of its contract of employment with private respondents Farrales
and Mamasig, arguing that its relationship with them was
governed by the provisions of its contract rather than by the
general provisions of the Labor Code. 9
Paragraph 5 of that contract set a term of three (3) years for that
relationship, extendible by agreement between the parties; while
paragraph 6 provided that, notwithstanding any other provision in
the Contract, PIA had the right to terminate the employment
agreement at any time by giving one-month's notice to the
employee or, in lieu of such notice, one-months salary.
A contract freely entered into should, of course, be respected, as
PIA argues, since a contract is the law between the parties. 10 The
principle of party autonomy in contracts is not, however, an
absolute principle. The rule in Article 1306, of our Civil Code is
that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations as
they may deem convenient, "provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Thus,
counter-balancing the principle of autonomy of contracting parties
is the equally general rule that provisions of applicable law,
especially provisions relating to matters affected with public
policy, are deemed written into the contract. 11 Put a little
differently, the governing principle is that parties may not
contract away applicable provisions of law especially peremptory
provisions dealing with matters heavily impressed with public
interest. The law relating to labor and employment is clearly such
an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations
by simply contracting with each other. It is thus necessary to
appraise the contractual provisions invoked by petitioner PIA in
terms of their consistency with applicable Philippine law and
regulations.
As noted earlier, both the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Minister,
MOLE, in effect held that paragraph 5 of that employment
contract was inconsistent with Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor
Code as they existed at the time the contract of employment was
entered into, and hence refused to give effect to said paragraph
5. These Articles read as follows:
Art. 280. Security of Tenure. — In cases of
regular employment, the employer shall not
30
terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause or when authorized by this Title
An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and to his backwages
computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time his
reinstatement.
Art. 281. Regular and Casual Employment. The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreements of the parties, an employment shall
be deemed to be regular where the employee
has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if
it is not covered by the preceding paragraph:
provided, that, any employee who has rendered
at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered as regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually
exists. (Emphasis supplied)
In Brent School, Inc., et al. v. Ronaldo Zamora, etc., et al.,  12 the
Court had occasion to examine in detail the question of whether
employment for a fixed term has been outlawed under the above
quoted provisions of the Labor Code. After an extensive
examination of the history and development of Articles 280 and
281, the Court reached the conclusion that a contract providing
for employment with a fixed period was not necessarily unlawful:
There can of course be no quarrel with the
proposition that where from the circumstances
it is apparent that periods have been imposed
to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by
the employee, they should be struck down or
disregarded as contrary to public policy, morals,
etc. But where no such intent to circumvent the
law is shown, or stated otherwise, where the
reason for the law does not exist e.g. where it is
indeed the employee himself who insists upon a
period or where the nature of the engagement
is such that, without being seasonal or for a
specific project, a definite date of termination is
a sine qua non would an agreement fixing a
period be essentially evil or illicit, therefore
anathema Would such an agreement come
within the scope of Article 280 which admittedly
was enacted "to prevent the circumvention of
the right of the employee to be secured in . . .
(his) employment?"
As it is evident from even only the three
examples already given that Article 280 of the
Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the
gamut of employment contracts to which the
lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but
would also appear to restrict, without
reasonable distinctions, the right of an
employee to freely stipulate with his employer
 the duration of his engagement, it logically considers that paragraphs 5 and 6 were intended to prevent any
follows that such a literal interpretation should security of tenure from accruing in favor of private
be eschewed or avoided. The law must be given respondents even during the limited period of three (3)
reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity years,13 and thus to escape completely the thrust of Articles 280
in its application. Outlawing the whole concept and 281 of the Labor Code.
of term employment and subverting to boot the
principle of freedom of contract to remedy the
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its
evil of employers" using it as a means to
employment agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of
prevent their employees from obtaining security
Pakistan as the applicable law of the agreement and, secondly,
of tenure is like cutting off the nose to spite the
lays the venue for settlement of any dispute arising out of or in
face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by
connection with the agreement "only [in] courts of Karachi
lopping off the head.
Pakistan". The first clause of paragraph 10 cannot be invoked to
prevent the application of Philippine labor laws and regulations to
xxx xxx xxx the subject matter of this case, i.e., the employer-employee
relationship between petitioner PIA and private respondents. We
have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose
with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine
behind the development of legislation
laws and regulations cannot be rendered illusory by the parties
culminating in the present Article 280 of the
agreeing upon some other law to govern their relationship.
Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as
Neither may petitioner invoke the second clause of paragraph 10,
already observed, to prevent circumvention of
specifying the Karachi courts as the sole venue for the settlement
the employee's right to be secure in his tenure,
of dispute; between the contracting parties. Even a cursory
the clause in said article indiscriminately and
scrutiny of the relevant circumstances of this case will show the
completely ruling out all written or oral
multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and
agreements conflicting with the concept of
Philippine courts, on the one hand, and the relationship between
regular employment as defined therein should
the parties, upon the other: the contract was not only executed in
be construed to refer to the substantive evil that
the Philippines, it was also performed here, at least partially;
the Code itself has singled out: agreements
private respondents are Philippine citizens and respondents, while
entered into precisely to circumvent security of
petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is licensed to do
tenure. It should have no application to
business (and actually doing business) and hence resident in the
instances where a fixed period of employment
Philippines; lastly, private respondents were based in the
was agreed upon knowingly and voluntarily by
Philippines in between their assigned flights to the Middle East
the parties, without any force, duress or
and Europe. All the above contacts point to the Philippine courts
improper pressure being brought to bear upon
and administrative agencies as a proper forum for the resolution
the employee and absent any other
of contractual disputes between the parties. Under these
circumstances vitiating his consent, or where it
circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement
satisfactorily appears that the employer and
cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and
employee dealt with each other on more or less
courts of the jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law.
equal terms with no moral dominance whatever
Finally, and in any event, the petitioner PIA did not undertake to
being exercised by the former over the
plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law on the matter; it
latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law
must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the
would be made to apply to purposes other than
law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of
those explicitly stated by its framers; it thus
Philippine law.14
becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its
effects and apt to lead to absurd and
unintended consequences. (emphasis supplied) We conclude that private respondents Farrales and Mamasig were
illegally dismissed and that public respondent Deputy Minister,
MOLE, had not committed any grave abuse of discretion nor any
It is apparent from Brent School that the critical
act without or in excess of jurisdiction in ordering their
consideration is the presence or absence of a substantial
reinstatement with backwages. Private respondents are entitled
indication that the period specified in an employment
to three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction.
agreement was designed to circumvent the security of
Should their reinstatement to their former or other substantially
tenure of regular employees which is provided for in
equivalent positions not be feasible in view of the length of time
Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code. This indication
which has gone by since their services were unlawfully
must ordinarily rest upon some aspect of the agreement
terminated, petitioner should be required to pay separation pay to
other than the mere specification of a fixed term of the
private respondents amounting to one (1) month's salary for
ernployment agreement, or upon evidence aliunde of the
every year of service rendered by them, including the three (3)
intent to evade.
years service putatively rendered.

Examining the provisions of paragraphs 5 and 6 of the

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for
employment agreement between petitioner PIA and private
lack of merit, and the Order dated 12 August 1982 of public
respondents, we consider that those provisions must be read
respondent is hereby AFFIRMED, except that (1) private
together and when so read, the fixed period of three (3) years
respondents are entitled to three (3) years backwages, without
specified in paragraph 5 will be seen to have been effectively
deduction or qualification; and (2) should reinstatement of private
neutralized by the provisions of paragraph 6 of that agreement.
respondents to their former positions or to substantially
Paragraph 6 in effect took back from the employee the fixed three
equivalent positions not be feasible, then petitioner shall, in lieu
(3)-year period ostensibly granted by paragraph 5 by rendering
thereof, pay to private respondents separation pay amounting to
such period in effect a facultative one at the option of the
one (1)-month's salary for every year of service actually rendered
employer PIA. For petitioner PIA claims to be authorized to
by them and for the three (3) years putative service by private
shorten that term, at any time and for any cause satisfactory to
respondents. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 13
itself, to a one-month period, or even less by simply paying the
September 1982 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.
employee a month's salary. Because the net effect of paragraphs
5 and 6 of the agreement here involved is to render the
employment of private respondents Farrales and Mamasig SO ORDERED.
basically employment at the pleasure of petitioner PIA, the Court

31
 May 2, 1988 from Mr. Gerhard R. Shmidt, General Manager,
Palace Hotel, Beijing, China. Mr. Schmidt informed respondent
Santos that he was recommended by one Nestor Buenio, a friend
G.R. No. 120077             October 13, 2000
of his.

THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL.

Mr. Shmidt offered respondent Santos the same position as
LTD., petitioners, 
printer, but with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits.
vs.
The position was slated to open on October 1, 1988.11
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER
CEFERINA J. DIOSANA AND MARCELO G.
SANTOS, respondents. On May 8, 1988, respondent Santos wrote to Mr. Shmidt and
signified his acceptance of the offer.
PARDO, J.:
On May 19, 1988, the Palace Hotel Manager, Mr. Hans J. Henk
mailed a ready to sign employment contract to respondent
The case before the Court is a petition for certiorari to annul the
1 
Santos. Mr. Henk advised respondent Santos that if the contract
following orders of the National Labor Relations Commission
was acceptable, to return the same to Mr. Henk in Manila,
(hereinafter referred to as "NLRC") for having been issued without
together with his passport and two additional pictures for his visa
or with excess jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion: 2
to China.

(1) Order of May 31, 1993.3 Reversing and setting aside

On May 30, 1988, respondent Santos resigned from the Mazoon
its earlier resolution of August 28, 1992. 4 The questioned
Printing Press, effective June 30, 1988, under the pretext that he
order declared that the NLRC, not the Philippine
was needed at home to help with the family's piggery and poultry
Overseas Employment Administration (hereinafter
business.
referred to as "POEA"), had jurisdiction over private
respondent's complaint;
On June 4, 1988, respondent Santos wrote the Palace Hotel and
acknowledged Mr. Henk's letter. Respondent Santos enclosed four
(2) Decision of December 15, 1994.5 Directing petitioners
(4) signed copies of the employment contract (dated June 4,
to jointly and severally pay private respondent twelve
1988) and notified them that he was going to arrive in Manila
thousand and six hundred dollars (US$ 12,600.00)
during the first week of July 1988.
representing salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract; three thousand six hundred dollars
(US$3,600.00) as extra four months salary for the two (2) The employment contract of June 4, 1988 stated that his
year period of his contract, three thousand six hundred employment would commence September 1, 1988 for a period of
dollars (US$3,600.00) as "14th month pay" or a total of two years.12 It provided for a monthly salary of nine hundred
nineteen thousand and eight hundred dollars dollars (US$900.00) net of taxes, payable fourteen (14) times a
(US$19,800.00) or its peso equivalent and attorney's year.13
fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the total award;
and
On June 30, 1988, respondent Santos was deemed resigned from
the Mazoon Printing Press.
(3) Order of March 30, 1995.6 Denying the motion for
reconsideration of the petitioners.
On July 1, 1988, respondent Santos arrived in Manila.

In May, 1988, private respondent Marcelo Santos (hereinafter

On November 5, 1988, respondent Santos left for Beijing, China.
referred to as "Santos") was an overseas worker employed as a
He started to work at the Palace Hotel.14
printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman.
Subsequently, in June 1988, he was directly hired by the Palace
Hotel, Beijing, People's Republic of China and later terminated Subsequently, respondent Santos signed an amended
due to retrenchment. "employment agreement" with the Palace Hotel, effective
November 5, 1988. In the contract, Mr. Shmidt represented the
Palace Hotel. The Vice President (Operations and Development) of
Petitioners are the Manila Hotel Corporation (hereinafter referred
petitioner MHICL Miguel D. Cergueda signed the employment
to as "MHC") and the Manila Hotel International Company, Limited
agreement under the word "noted".
(hereinafter referred to as "MHICL").

From June 8 to 29, 1989, respondent Santos was in the Philippines

When the case was filed in 1990, MHC was still a government-
on vacation leave. He returned to China and reassumed his post
owned and controlled corporation duly organized and existing
on July 17, 1989.
under the laws of the Philippines.

On July 22, 1989, Mr. Shmidt's Executive Secretary, a certain

MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
Joanna suggested in a handwritten note that respondent Santos
of Hong Kong.7 MHC is an "incorporator" of MHICL, owning 50% of
be given one (1) month notice of his release from employment.
its capital stock.8

On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos

By virtue of a "management agreement"9 with the Palace Hotel
by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that his employment at the Palace
(Wang Fu Company Limited), MHICL10 trained the personnel and
Hotel print shop would be terminated due to business reverses
staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.
brought about by the political upheaval in China. 15 We quote the
letter:16
Now the facts.
"After the unfortunate happenings in China and
During his employment with the Mazoon Printing Press in the especially Beijing (referring to Tiannamen Square
Sultanate of Oman, respondent Santos received a letter dated incidents), our business has been severely affected. To

32
 reduce expenses, we will not open/operate printshop for
the time being.
"We sincerely regret that a decision like this has to be
made, but rest assured this does in no way reflect your
past performance which we found up to our
expectations."
"Should a turnaround in the business happen, we will
contact you directly and give you priority on future
assignment."
On September 5, 1989, the Palace Hotel terminated the
employment of respondent Santos and paid all benefits due him,
including his plane fare back to the Philippines.
On October 3, 1989, respondent Santos was repatriated to the
Philippines.
On October 24, 1989, respondent Santos, through his lawyer,
Atty. Ednave wrote Mr. Shmidt, demanding full compensation
pursuant to the employment agreement.
On November 11, 1989, Mr. Shmidt replied, to wit: 17
His service with the Palace Hotel, Beijing was not
abruptly terminated but we followed the one-month
notice clause and Mr. Santos received all benefits due
him.
"For your information the Print Shop at the Palace Hotel
is still not operational and with a low business outlook,
retrenchment in various departments of the hotel is
going on which is a normal management practice to
control costs.
"When going through the latest performance ratings,
please also be advised that his performance was below
average and a Chinese National who is doing his job now
shows a better approach.
"In closing, when Mr. Santos received the letter of notice,
he hardly showed up for work but still enjoyed free
accommodation/laundry/meals up to the day of his
departure."
On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital
Region, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He prayed
for an award of nineteen thousand nine hundred and twenty three
dollars (US$19,923.00) as actual damages, forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) as exemplary damages and attorney's fees
equivalent to 20% of the damages prayed for. The complaint
named MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt as
respondents.
The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons
and neither participated in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter.18
On June 27, 1991, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana, decided the
case against petitioners, thus:19
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. directing all the respondents to pay complainant
jointly and severally;
33
"a) $20,820 US dollars or its equivalent in
Philippine currency as unearned salaries;
"b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
"c) P40,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
"d) Ten (10) percent of the total award as
attorney's fees.
"SO ORDERED."
On July 23, 1991, petitioners appealed to the NLRC, arguing that
the POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case.
On August 28, 1992, the NLRC promulgated a resolution, stating: 20
"WHEREFORE, let the appealed Decision be, as it is
hereby, declared null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Complainant is hereby enjoined to file his complaint with
the POEA.
"SO ORDERED."
On September 18, 1992, respondent Santos moved for
reconsideration of the afore-quoted resolution. He argued that the
case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an "overseas
contract worker."21
On May 31, 1993, the NLRC granted the motion and reversed
itself. The NLRC directed Labor Arbiter Emerson Tumanon to hear
the case on the question of whether private respondent was
retrenched or dismissed.22
On January 13, 1994, Labor Arbiter Tumanon completed the
proceedings based on the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented to and heard by him.23
Subsequently, Labor Arbiter Tumanon was re-assigned as trial
Arbiter of the National Capital Region, Arbitration Branch, and the
case was transferred to Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera.24
On November 25, 1994, Labor Arbiter de Vera submitted his
report.25 He found that respondent Santos was illegally dismissed
from employment and recommended that he be paid actual
damages equivalent to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
contract.26
On December 15, 1994, the NLRC ruled in favor of private
respondent, to wit:27
"WHEREFORE, finding that the report and
recommendations of Arbiter de Vera are supported by
substantial evidence, judgment is hereby rendered,
directing the respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant the following computed contractual
benefits: (1) US$12,600.00 as salaries for the unexpired
portion of the parties' contract; (2) US$3,600.00 as extra
four (4) months salary for the two (2) years period (sic)
of the parties' contract; (3) US$3,600.00 as "14th month
pay" for the aforesaid two (2) years contract stipulated
by the parties or a total of US$19,800.00 or its peso
equivalent, plus (4) attorney's fees of 10% of
complainant's total award.
"SO ORDERED."
On February 2, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
arguing that Labor Arbiter de Vera's recommendation had no
basis in law and in fact.28
On March 30, 1995, the NLRC denied the motion for
reconsideration.29
Hence, this petition.30
On October 9, 1995, petitioners filed with this Court an urgent
motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction and a motion for the annulment of
the entry of judgment of the NLRC dated July 31, 1995.31
On November 20, 1995, the Court denied petitioner's urgent
motion. The Court required respondents to file their respective
comments, without giving due course to the petition. 32
On March 8, 1996, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
stating that after going over the petition and its annexes, they
can not defend and sustain the position taken by the NLRC in its
assailed decision and orders. The Solicitor General prayed that he
be excused from filing a comment on behalf of the NLRC33
On April 30,1996, private respondent Santos filed his comment. 34
On June 26, 1996, the Court granted the manifestation of the
Solicitor General and required the NLRC to file its own comment to
the petition.35
On January 7, 1997, the NLRC filed its comment.
The petition is meritorious.
I. Forum Non-Conveniens
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum.
We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two
foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign
elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is
that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and
MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our
citizens can be tried here.
The employment contract. — Respondent Santos was hired
directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through
correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent
Santos was then employed. He was hired without the intervention
of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the
government.36
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or
agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do
so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is
in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the
facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have
power to enforce its decision.37 The conditions are unavailing in
the case at bar.
Not Convenient. — We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient
forum given that all the incidents of the case — from the time of
recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the
Philippines. The inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the
proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals
of the Philippines. Neither .are they "doing business in the
34
Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr.
Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. — Neither can an
intelligent decision be made as to the law governing the
employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This
calls to fore the application of the principle of lex loci contractus
(the law of the place where the contract was made). 38
The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines.
Respondent Santos signified his acceptance by writing a letter
while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the
Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of China.
No power to determine the facts. — Neither can the NLRC
determine the facts surrounding the alleged illegal dismissal as all
acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of
China. The NLRC was not in a position to determine whether the
Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of
the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. — Even
assuming that a proper decision could be reached by the NLRC,
such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the
Palace Hotel. The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under
the laws of China and was not even served with summons.
Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no
power to solve controversies involving foreign employers. Neither
are we saying that we do not have power over an employment
contract executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an
"overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum, specifically the
POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him.39 He is not an "overseas
contract worker" a fact which he admits with conviction. 40
Even assuming that the NLRC was the proper forum, even on the
merits, the NLRC's decision cannot be sustained.
II. MHC Not Liable
Even if we assume two things: (1) that the NLRC had jurisdiction
over the case, and (2) that MHICL was liable for Santos'
retrenchment, still MHC, as a separate and distinct juridical entity
cannot be held liable.
True, MHC is an incorporator of MHICL and owns fifty percent
(50%) of its capital stock. However, this is not enough to pierce
the veil of corporate fiction between MHICL and MHC.
Piercing the veil of corporate entity is an equitable remedy. It is
resorted to when the corporate fiction is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend a crime. 41 It
is done only when a corporation is a mere alter ego or business
conduit of a person or another corporation.
In Traders Royal Bank v. Court of Appeals,42 we held that "the
mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation
of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of
itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities."
The tests in determining whether the corporate veil may be
pierced are: First, the defendant must have control or complete
domination of the other corporation's finances, policy and
business practices with regard to the transaction attacked. There
must be proof that the other corporation had no separate mind,
will or existence with respect the act complained of. Second,
control must be used by the defendant to commit fraud or
wrong. Third, the aforesaid control or breach of duty must be the
proximate cause of the injury or loss complained of. The absence
of any of the elements prevents the piercing of the corporate
veil.43
It is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from those composing it as well as from that of any other
legal entity to which it may be related. 44 Clear and convincing
evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. 45 In this
case, we find no evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one
and the same entity.
Neither is there evidence to suggest that MHICL was a "labor-only
contractor."52 There is no proof that MHICL "supplied" respondent
Santos or even referred him for employment to the Palace Hotel.
Likewise, there is no evidence to show that the Palace Hotel and
MHICL are one and the same entity. The fact that the Palace Hotel
is a member of the "Manila Hotel Group" is not enough to pierce
the corporate veil between MHICL and the Palace Hotel.
IV. Grave Abuse of Discretion

Considering that the NLRC was forum non-conveniens and

III. MHICL not Liable
considering further that no employer-employee relationship
existed between MHICL, MHC and respondent Santos, Labor
Respondent Santos predicates MHICL's liability on the fact that Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana clearly had no jurisdiction over
MHICL "signed" his employment contract with the Palace Hotel. respondent's claim in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-02-01058-90.
This fact fails to persuade us.
Labor Arbiters have exclusive and original jurisdiction only over
First, we note that the Vice President (Operations and the following:53
Development) of MHICL, Miguel D. Cergueda signed the
employment contract as a mere witness. He merely signed under
"1. Unfair labor practice cases;
the word "noted".

"2. Termination disputes;

When one "notes" a contract, one is not expressing his agreement
or approval, as a party would.46 In Sichangco v. Board of
Commissioners of Immigration,47 the Court recognized that the "3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those
term "noted" means that the person so noting has merely taken cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of
cognizance of the existence of an act or declaration, without pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of
exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on the employment;
matter.
"4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
Mr. Cergueda merely signed the "witnessing part" of the of damages arising from employer-employee relations;
document. The "witnessing part" of the document is that which,
"in a deed or other formal instrument is that part which comes
"5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this
after the recitals, or where there are no recitals, after the
Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and
parties (emphasis ours)."48 As opposed to a party to a contract, a
lockouts; and
witness is simply one who, "being present, personally sees or
perceives a thing; a beholder, a spectator, or eyewitness." 49 One
who "notes" something just makes a "brief written statement" 50 a "6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social
memorandum or observation. Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims, arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household
Second, and more importantly, there was no existing employer-
service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand
employee relationship between Santos and MHICL. In determining
pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following
with a claim for reinstatement."
elements are considered:51

In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an

"(1) the selection and engagement of the employee;
indispensable jurisdictional requirement.

"(2) the payment of wages;

"(3) the power to dismiss; and
"(4) the power to control employee's conduct."
The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217
of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-
employee relationship which can be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, or other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreements.54

"To determine which body has jurisdiction over the present

MHICL did not have and did not exercise any of the
controversy, we rely on the sound judicial principle that
aforementioned powers. It did not select respondent Santos as an
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
employee for the Palace Hotel. He was referred to the Palace
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
Hotel by his friend, Nestor Buenio. MHICL did not engage
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims
respondent Santos to work. The terms of employment were
asserted therein."55
negotiated and finalized through correspondence between
respondent Santos, Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Henk, who were officers
and representatives of the Palace Hotel and not MHICL. Neither The lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter was obvious from the
did respondent Santos adduce any proof that MHICL had the allegations of the complaint. His failure to dismiss the case
power to control his conduct. Finally, it was the Palace Hotel, amounts to grave abuse of discretion.56
through Mr. Schmidt and not MHICL that terminated respondent
Santos' services.
V. The Fallo

35
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari a) In England, in its High Court
and ANNULS the orders and resolutions of the National Labor of Justice, Queen's Bench
Relations Commission dated May 31, 1993, December 15, 1994 Division, Commercial Court
and March 30, 1995 in NLRC NCR CA No. 002101-91 (NLRC NCR (1992-Folio No 2098) against
Case No. 00-02-01058-90). Liberian Transport Navigation
S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera
S.A., El Challenger S.A.,
No costs.
Espriona Shipping Company
S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp.,
SO ORDERED. S.A., Eduardo Katipunan
Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan
Litonjua on June 17, 1992.

b) In England, in its High Court

G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999
of Justice, Queen's Bench
Division, Commercial Court
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,  (1992-Folio No. 2245) against
vs. El Challenger S.A., Espriona
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF Shipping Company S.A.,
APPEALS, respondents. Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua &
Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on
July 2, 1992;
BUENA, J.:

c) In Hongkong, in the
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real
Supreme Court of Hongkong
estate mortgage constituted over a third party mortgagor's
High Court (Action No. 4039 of
property situated in the Philippines by filing an action for the
1992) against Eshley
collection of the principal loan before foreign courts?
Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review Shipping Company S.A. Pacific
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Navigators Corporation, Eddie
decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. Navigation Corporation S.A.,
51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its Litonjua Chartering (Edyship)
resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner's motion for Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan
reconsideration. Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo
Katipunan Litonjua on
November 19, 1992; and
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international
banking and financing institution duly licensed to do business in
the Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of the d) In Hongkong, in the
laws of the State of California, United States of America while Supreme Court of Hongkong
private respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC) is a High Court (Action No. 4040 of
domestic corporation. 1992) against Eshley
Compania Naviera S.A., El
Challenger S.A., Espriona
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is
Shipping Company, S.A.,
a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws
Pacific Navigators
of England.
Corporation, Eddie Navigation
Corporation S.A., Litonjua
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions Chartering (Edyship) Co., Jr.
granted three major multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans and Eduardo Katipunan
to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Litonjua on November 21,
Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania 1992.
Naviera S.A. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "borrowers"),
all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private
Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private
respondent ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was private not
respondent. 3
impleaded as party-defendant.

Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations,

BANTSA and the corporate borrowers signed and entered into
restructuring agreements. As additional security for the
restructured loans, private respondent ARC as third party
mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, 4 dated 17
February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land including
improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del
Monte, Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of
the restructured loans prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil
actions 5 before foreign courts for the collection of the principal
loan, to wit:
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office
of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines an application for
extrajudicial foreclosure 6 of real estate mortgage.
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the
mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with Integrated Credit and
Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest bidder for the sum
of Twenty four Million Pesos (P24,000.000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for damages 8 against
the petitioner, for the latter's act of foreclosing extrajudicially the
real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits before
foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.

36
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to
mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an ordinary suit pay the plaintiff the following sums, all with
for collection has been filed, is not applicable in the present case, legal interest thereon from the date of the filing
claiming that: of the complaint up to the date of actual
payment:
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party
mortgagor and not a party to the principal 1) Actual or compensatory damages in the
restructuring agreements, was never made a amount of Ninety Nine Million Pesos
party defendant in the civil cases filed in (P99,000,000.00);
Hongkong and England;
2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00); and
money filed in the Philippines since the civil
actions were filed in Hongkong and England. As
3) Costs of suit.
such, any decisions (sic) which may be rendered
in the abovementioned courts are not (sic)
enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate SO ORDERED.
action to enforce the foreign judgments is first
filed in the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39,
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of
Section 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
the lower court prompting petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
c) Under English Law, which is the governing
law under the principal agreements, the
Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari where herein
mortgagee does not lose its security interest by
petitioner BANTSA ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following
filing civil actions for sums of money.
assignment of errors:

On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for

1. The Honorable Court of
suspension 10 of the redemption period on the ground that "it
Appeals disregarded the
cannot exercise said right of redemption without at the same time
doctrines laid down by this
waiving or contradicting its contentions in the case that the
Hon. Supreme Court in the
foreclosure of the mortgage on its properties is legally improper
cases of Caltex Philippines,
and therefore invalid."
Inc. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Courtdocketed as
In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the G.R. No. 74730 promulgated
private respondent's motion for suspension after which a copy of on August 25, 1989
said order was duly received by the Register of Deeds of and Philippine Commercial
Meycauayan, Bulacan. International Bank vs. IAC,
196 SCRA 29 (1991 case),
although said cases were duly
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged
cited, extensively discussed
properties at the foreclosure sale, consolidated its ownership over
and specifically mentioned, as
the real properties, resulting to the issuance of Transfer
one of the issues in the
Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-186272, T-186273, T-16471
assignment of errors found on
and T-16472 in its name.
page 5 of the decision dated
September 30, 1997.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its
favor, ICCS sold the real properties to Stateland Investment
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals
Corporation for the amount of Thirty Nine Million Pesos
acted with grave abuse of
(P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
discretion when it awarded
T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-
the private respondent actual
16652P(m) were issued in the latter's name.
and exemplary damages
totalling P171,600,000.00, as
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in favor of of July 12, 1998 although such
private respondent ARC dated 12 May 1993, the decretal portion huge amount was not asked
of which reads: nor prayed for in private
respondent's complaint, is
contrary to law and is totally
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
unsupported by evidence
declaring that the filing in foreign courts by the
(sic).
defendant of collection suits against the
principal debtors operated as a waiver of the
security of the mortgages. Consequently, the In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
plaintiff's rights as owner and possessor of the
properties then covered by Transfer Certificates
1. Whether or not the
of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-
petitioner's act of filing a
78760 and T-78761, all of the Register of Deeds
collection suit against the
of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, were
principal debtors for the
violated when the defendant caused the
recovery of the loan before
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages
foreign courts constituted a
constituted thereon.
waiver of the remedy of
foreclosure.

37
 2. Whether or not the award
by the lower court of actual
and exemplary damages in
favor of private respondent
ARC, as third-party mortgagor,
is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits
that a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the
concurrence of two requisites: an ordinary civil action for
collection should be filed and subsequently a final judgment be
correspondingly rendered therein.
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to
collect the principal loan does not suffice; a final judgment must
be secured and obtained in the personal action so that waiver of
the remedy of foreclosure may be appreciated. To put it
differently, absent any of the two requisites, the mortgagee-
creditor is deemed not to have waived the remedy of foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and
upholds the jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach 15and similar
cases adjudicated thereafter, thus:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a
mortgage creditor may institute against the
mortgage debtor either a personal action or
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage.
In other words, he may he may pursue either of
the two remedies, but not both. By such
election, his cause of action can by no means be
impaired, for each of the two remedies is
complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a
personal action will leave open to him all the
properties of the debtor for attachment and
execution, even including the mortgaged
property itself. And, if he waives such personal
action and pursues his remedy against the
mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for
a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the
properties of the defendant, other than the
mortgaged property, are again open to him for
the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case,
his remedy is complete, his cause of action
undiminished, and any advantages attendant to
the pursuit of one or the other remedy are
purely accidental and are all under his right of
election. On the other hand, a rule that would
authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action
against the debtor and simultaneously or
successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not only in
multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice
(Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and
obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San
Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in subjecting the
defendant to the vexation of being sued in the
place of his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the
property lies.
In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating
jurisprudence enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply Co vs. Co
Kim 17 and Movido vs.
RFC, 18 invariably held:
38
. . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage
creditor may elect to waive his security and
bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the
indebtedness with the right to execute a
judgment thereon on all the properties of the
debtor, including the subject matter of the
mortgage . . . , subject to the qualification that
if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he
cannot pursue further the remedy he has
waived. (Emphasis Ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the
rule that a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage
debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage
creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an
election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this
purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit
for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of
the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial
foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage
creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but
with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to
be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real
estate mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of
the principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected
itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law,
third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter
by pledging or mortgaging their own property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in
our jurisdiction which makes a third person who secures the
fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his own property,
to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to
the principal contract—loan—remains to be primarily bound. It is
only upon default of the latter that the creditor may have
recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged
properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of
the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of
filing the action for collection and rendition of final judgment
therein should concur, is untenable.
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the
petitioner in said case, that the filing of a collection suit barred
the foreclosure of the mortgage:
A mortgagee who files a suit for collection
abandons the remedy of foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage constituted over the personal
property as security for the debt or value of the
promissory note when he seeks to recover in
the said collection suit.
. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for
collection, not foreclosure, thereby abandoning
the chattel mortgage as basis for relief, he
clearly manifests his lack of desire and interest
to go after the mortgaged property as security
for the promissory note . . . .
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the
rule, for clarity and emphasis, that the mere act of filing of an
ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the
mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the
mere filing of the ordinary action for collection against the
principal debtors, the petitioner in the present case is deemed to
have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other
necessarily must arise. Corollarily, no final judgment in the
collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-Appellate
Court, 23 a case relied upon by petitioner, supposedly to buttress
its contention, this Court had occasion to rule that the mere act of
filing a collection suit for the recovery of a debt secured by a
mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action
which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative
remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner
then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to
violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach
Motor Co., Inc, vs. Icarangal. 24
For non-payment of a note secured by
mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of
action against the debtor. This single cause of
action consists in the recovery of the credit with
execution of the security. In other words, the
creditor in his action may make two demands,
the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of
his mortgage. But both demands arise from the
same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and
for that reason, they constitute a single cause of
action. Though the debt and the mortgage
constitute separate agreements, the latter is
subsidiary to the former, and both refer to one
and the same obligation. Consequently, there
exists only one cause of action for a single
breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rules above stated, cannot split up
his single cause of action by filing a complaint
for payment of the debt, and thereafter another
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he
does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar
the subsequent complaint. By allowing the
creditor to file two separate complaints
simultaneously or successively, one to recover
his credit and another to foreclose his
mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him
plural redress for a single breach of contract at
so much cost to the courts and with so much
vexation and oppression to the debtor.
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly
disregarding the doctrine enunciated in Caltex wherein this High
Court relaxed the application of the general rules to wit:
In the present case, however, we shall not
follow this rule to the letter but declare that it is
the collection suit which was waived and/or
abandoned. This ruling is more in harmony with
the principles underlying our judicial system. It
is of no moment that the collection suit was filed
ahead, what is determinative is the fact that the
foreclosure proceedings ended even before the
decision in the collection suit was rendered. . . .
Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context.
We must stress that the Caltex case was never intended to
overrule the well-entrenched doctrine enunciated Bachrach, which
to our mind still finds applicability in cases of this sort. To
reiterate, Bachrach is still good law.
39
We then quote the decision 25 of the trial court, in the present
case, thus:
The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the
exception rather than the rule, dictated by the
peculiar circumstances obtaining therein. In the
said case, the Supreme Court chastised Caltex
for making ". . . a mockery of our judicial
system when it initially filed a collection suit
then, during the pendency thereof, foreclosed
extrajudicially the mortgaged property which
secured the indebtedness, and still pursued the
collection suit to the end." Thus, to prevent a
mockery of our judicial system", the collection
suit had to be nullified because the foreclosure
proceedings have already been pursued to their
end and can no longer be undone.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In the case at bar, it has not been shown
whether the defendant pursued to the end or
are still pursuing the collection suits filed in
foreign courts. There is no occasion, therefore,
for this court to apply the exception laid down
by the Supreme Court in Caltex by nullifying the
collection suits. Quite obviously, too, the
aforesaid collection suits are beyond the reach
of this Court. Thus the only way the court may
prevent the spector of a creditor having "plural
redress for a single breach of contract" is by
holding, as the Court hereby holds, that the
defendant has waived the right to foreclose the
mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on its
properties originally covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-
78760 and T-78761. (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe
criticism, to say the least. 26
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the
case of PCIB vs. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried to fit a square peg in
a round hole. It must be stressed that far from overturning the
doctrine laid down in Bachrach, this Court in PCIB buttressed its
firm stand on this issue by declaring:
While the law allows a mortgage creditor to
either institute a personal action for the debt or
a real action to foreclosure the mortgage, he
cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously or
successively as was done by PCIB in this case.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392
to enforce payment of the 1.3 million
promissory note secured by real estate
mortgages and subsequently filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the rule
against splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner,
by the expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts,
necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate
mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party
mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing
the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially
the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our
statute books.
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy
of foreclosure after the collection suit was filed, considering that
the creditor should not be afforded "plural redress for a single
breach of contract." For cause of action should not be confused
with the remedy created for its enforcement. 28
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the
efficacy of the remedy chosen in addressing the creditor's cause.
Hence, a suit brought before a foreign court having competence
and jurisdiction to entertain the action is deemed, for this
purpose, to be within the contemplation of the remedy available
to the mortgagee-creditor. This pronouncement would best serve
the interest of justice and fair play and further discourage the
noxious practice of splitting up a lone cause of action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which
according to petitioner is the governing law with regard to the
principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security
interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. 29
We rule in the negative.
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet
its crumbling cause. In the case at bench, Philippine law shall
apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to
prove the English law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded
principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any
foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved
as a fact. 30 Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or domestic or internal
law. 31 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual
presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on
the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a
sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective
by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up
of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
40
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 35
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private
respondent is entitled to the award of actual or compensatory
damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA in
extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a
clear violation of the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as
third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because
of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or
occupation and the same must be proved, otherwise if the proof is
flimsy and non-substantial, no damages will be given. 36 Indeed,
the question of the value of property is always a difficult one to
settle as valuation of real property is an imprecise process since
real estate has no inherent value readily ascertainable by an
appraiser or by the court. 37 The opinions of men vary so much
concerning the real value of property that the best the courts can
do is hear all of the witnesses which the respective parties desire
to present, and then, by carefully weighing that testimony, arrive
at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 38
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for
relying heavily on the valuation made by Philippine Appraisal
Company. In effect, BANTSA questions the act of the appellate
court in giving due weight to the appraisal report composed of
twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and submitted
as evidence by private respondent. The appraisal report, as the
records would readily show, was corroborated by the testimony of
Mr. Reynaldo Flores, witness for private respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:
The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee
formally offered as evidence the appraisal
report dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit J, Records,
p. 409), consisting of twenty three (23) pages
which set out in detail the valuation of the
property to determine its fair market value
(TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 4), in the amount of
P99,986,592.00 (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together with
the corroborative testimony of one Mr. Reynaldo
F. Flores, an appraiser and director of Philippine
Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN, ibid., p. 3). The
latter's testimony was subjected to extensive
cross-examination by counsel for defendant-
appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22). 39
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the
familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the
trial court should be respected. 40 The time-tested jurisprudence is
that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason
that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of
witnesses as they testify. 41
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, principally because they are in a better
position to assess the same than the appellate court. 42 Besides,
trial courts are in a better position to examine real evidence as
well as observe the demeanor of witnesses. 43
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses rest primarily with the trial court. 44 In the
case at bar, we see no reason that would justify this Court to
disturb the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, with regard to the award of actual damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial court
justified the award by presenting the following ratiocination in its
assailed decision 45, to wit:
Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the
matter of valuation. The size of the subject real
properties are (sic) set forth in their individuals
titles, and the Court itself has seen the
character and nature of said properties during
the ocular inspection it conducted. Based
principally on the foregoing, the Court makes
the following observations:
1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in
Bo. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
which is (sic) not distant from Metro Manila —
the biggest urban center in the Philippines —
and are easily accessible through well-paved
roads;
2. The properties are suitable for development
into a subdivision for low cost housing, as
admitted by defendant's own appraiser (TSN,
May 30, 1994, p. 31);
3. The pigpens which used to exist in the
property have already been demolished. Houses
of strong materials are found in the vicinity of
the property (Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the
vicinity is a growing community. It has even
been shown that the house of the Barangay
Chairman is located adjacent to the property in
question (Exh. 27), and the only remaining
piggery (named Cherry Farm) in the vicinity is
about 2 kilometers away from the western
boundary of the property in question (TSN,
November 19, p. 3);
4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of
the property, as indubitably shown by the fact
that on March 18, 1994, ICCS (the buyer during
the foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated real
estate properties to Stateland Investment
Corporation, in whose favor new titles were
issued, i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T-
187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and T-
166521(m) by the Register of Deeds of
Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject
properties to Stateland Investment Corporation
for Thirty Nine Million (P39,000,000.00) Pesos,
which is more than triple defendant's appraisal
(Exh. 2) clearly shows that the Court cannot rely
on defendant's aforesaid estimate (Decision,
Records, p. 603).
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial
judge on the credibility of witnesses command great respect and
consideration especially when the conclusions are supported by
the evidence on record. 46Applying the foregoing principle, we
therefore hold that the trial court committed no palpable error in
giving credence to the testimony of Reynaldo Flores, who
according to the records, is a licensed real estate broker,
appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since
1990. 47 As the records show, Flores had been with the company
for 26 years at the time of his testimony.
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine
itself to the appraisal report dated 29 March 1993, and the
testimony given by Mr. Reynaldo Flores, in determining the fair
41
market value of the real property. Above all these, the record
would likewise show that the trial judge in order to appraise
himself of the characteristics and condition of the property,
conducted an ocular inspection where the opposing parties
appeared and were duly represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we
affirm the ruling of the trial court as regards the valuation of the
property —
. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos
(P99,000,000.00) for the 39-hectare properties
(sic) translates to just about Two Hundred Fifty
Four Pesos (P254.00) per square meter. This
appears to be, as the court so holds, a better
approximation of the fair market value of the
subject properties. This is the amount which
should be restituted by the defendant to the
plaintiff by way of actual or compensatory
damages . . . . 48
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court awarding an
amount allegedly not asked nor prayed for in private respondent's
complaint.
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and
compensatory damages by the lower court exceeded that prayed
for in the complaint, the same is nonetheless valid, subject to
certain qualifications.
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize
presentation of evidence. — When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgement; but
failure to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within
the issues made by the pleadings, the court
may allow the pleadings to be amended and
shall do so with liberality if the presentation of
the merits of the action and the ends of
substantial justice will be subserved thereby.
The court may grant a continuance to enable
the amendment to be made.
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs.
Asociacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. 49citing Northern
Cement Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is
enlightening:
There have been instances where the Court has
held that even without the necessary
amendment, the amount proved at the trial may
be validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95
Phil. 106), where we said that if the facts shown
entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked
for, no amendment to the complaint was
necessary, especially where defendant had
himself raised the point on which recovery was
based. The appellate court could treat the
pleading as amended to conform to the
evidence although the pleadings were actually
not amended. Amendment is also unnecessary
when only clerical error or non substantial and proceed to adjudicate on the basis of all the
matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the evidence before it.
Philippine Islands vs. Laguna(48 Phil. 5). In Co
Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that
In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was afforded the
the rule on amendment need not be applied
opportunity to refute and object to the evidence, both
rigidly, particularly where no surprise or
documentary and testimonial, formally offered by private
prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in
respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed satisfied. In
the recent case of National Power Corporation
fact, the testimony of Reynaldo Flores was put under scrutiny
vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held
during the course of the cross-examination. Under these
that where there is a variance in the
circumstances, the court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction
defendant's pleadings and the evidence
and committed no reversible error in awarding actual damages
adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat
the amount of which is higher than that prayed for. Verily, the
the pleading as amended to conform with the
lower court's actuations are sanctioned by the Rules and
evidence.
supported by jurisprudence.

It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the

Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the
above-mentioned rule and in light of the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being
decisions cited, the trial court should not be
excessive, is subject to reduction. Exemplary or corrective
precluded from awarding an amount higher
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
than that claimed in the pleading
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
notwithstanding the absence of the required
compensatory damages. 51 Considering its purpose, it must be fair
amendment. But it is upon the condition that
and reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to
the evidence of such higher amount has been
unjustly enrich a prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of
presented properly, with full opportunity on the
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in the present case qualifies
part of the opposing parties to support their
the test of reasonableness.
respective contentions and to refute each
other's evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the amount awarded as
conform to the evidence adduced during trial
exemplary damages. According, petitioner is hereby ordered to
does not preclude an adjudication by the court
pay private respondent the sum of P99,000,000.00 as actual or
on the basis of such evidence which may
compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damage and
embody new issues not raised in the pleadings,
the costs of suit.
or serve as a basis for a higher award of
damages. Although the pleading may not have
been amended to conform to the evidence SO ORDERED.
submitted during trial, judgment may
nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
basis of the issues alleged but also the basis of
issues discussed and the assertions of fact
proved in the course of trial. The court may NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner, 
treat the pleading as if it had been amended to vs.
conform to the evidence, although it had not COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY
been actually so amended. Former Chief Justice INC., respondents.
Moran put the matter in this way:

When evidence is presented PADILLA, JR., J.:

by one party, with the
expressed or implied consent
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
of the adverse party, as to
decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of the
issues not alleged in the
petitioner's complaint to enforce the judgment of a Japanese
pleadings, judgment may be
court. The principal issue here is whether a Japanese court can
rendered validly as regards
acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine corporation doing business in
those issues, which shall be
Japan by serving summons through diplomatic channels on the
considered as if they have
Philippine corporation at its principal office in Manila after prior
been raised in the pleadings.
attempts to serve summons in Japan had failed.
There is implied consent to
the evidence thus presented
when the adverse party fails Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc.
to object thereto. (hereinafter NORTHWEST), a corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in Civil
Case No. 83-17637 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54,
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment
Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court
on the basis of the evidence before it even
against private respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc.,
though the relevant pleading had not been
(hereinafter SHARP), a corporation incorporated under Philippine
previously amended, so long as no surprise or
laws.
prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse
party. Put a little differently, so long as the basis
requirements of fair play had been met, as As found by the Court of Appeals in the challenged decision of 10
where litigants were given full opportunity to November 1993, 1 the following are the factual and procedural
support their respective contentions and to antecedents of this controversy:
object to or refute each other's evidence, the
court may validly treat the pleadings as if they
On May 9, 1974, plaintiff Northwest Airlines and
had been amended to conform to the evidence
defendant C.F. Sharp & Company, through its

42
Japan branch, entered into an International
Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby
the former authorized the latter to sell its air
transportation tickets. Unable to remit the
proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant
on behalf of the plaintiff under the said
agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued
defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for collection of the
unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with
claim for damages.
On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons was
issued by the 36th Civil Department, Tokyo
District Court of Japan against defendant at its
office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132,
Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa
Prefecture. The attempt to serve the summons
was unsuccessful because the bailiff was
advised by a person in the office that Mr.
Dinozo, the person believed to be authorized to
receive court processes was in Manila and
would be back on April 24, 1980.
On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to the
defendant's office to serve the summons. Mr.
Dinozo refused to accept the same claiming that
he was no longer an employee of the defendant.
After the two attempts of service were
unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo District
Court decided to have the complaint and the
writs of summons served at the head office of
the defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980, the
Director of the Tokyo District Court requested
the Supreme Court of Japan to serve the
summons through diplomatic channels upon the
defendant's head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant received from
Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of
summons (p. 276, Records). Despite receipt of
the same, defendant failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo Court
proceeded to hear the plaintiff's complaint and
on [January 29, 1981], rendered judgment
ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay
at the rate of 6% per annum from August 28,
1980 up to and until payment is completed (pp.
12-14, Records).
On March 24, 1981, defendant received from
Deputy Sheriff Balingit copy of the judgment.
Defendant not having appealed the judgment,
the same became final and executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in
Japan, hence, on May 20, 1983, a suit for
enforcement of the judgment was filed by
plaintiff before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 54.2
On July 16, 1983, defendant filed its answer
averring that the judgment of the Japanese
Court sought to be enforced is null and void and
unenforceable in this jurisdiction having been
rendered without due and proper notice to the
defendant and/or with collusion or fraud and/or
upon a clear mistake of law and fact (pp. 41-45,
Rec.).
43
Unable to settle the case amicably, the case
was tried on the merits. After the plaintiff rested
its case, defendant on April 21, 1989, filed a
Motion for Judgment on a Demurrer to Evidence
based on two grounds: 
(1) the foreign judgment sought to be enforced
is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2)
the said judgment is contrary to Philippine law
and public policy and rendered without due
process of law. Plaintiff filed its opposition after
which the court a quo rendered the now
assailed decision dated June 21, 1989 granting
the demurrer motion and dismissing the
complaint (Decision, pp. 376-378, Records). In
granting the demurrer motion, the trial court
held that:
The foreign judgment in the Japanese Court sought in
this action is null and void for want of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant considering that this is an action in personam;
the Japanese Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant because jurisprudence requires that the defendant
be served with summons in Japan in order for the Japanese Court
to acquire jurisdiction over it, the process of the Court in Japan
sent to the Philippines which is outside Japanese jurisdiction
cannot confer jurisdiction over the defendant in the case before
the Japanese Court of the case at bar. Boudard versus Tait 67 Phil.
170. The plaintiff contends that the Japanese Court acquired
jurisdiction because the defendant is a resident of Japan, having
four (4) branches doing business therein and in fact had a permit
from the Japanese government to conduct business in Japan
(citing the exhibits presented by the plaintiff); if this is so then
service of summons should have been made upon the defendant
in Japan in any of these alleged four branches; as admitted by the
plaintiff the service of the summons issued by the Japanese Court
was made in the Philippines thru a Philippine Sheriff. This Court
agrees that if the defendant in a foreign court is a resident in the
court of that foreign court such court could acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant but it must be served upon the
defendant in the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court. Such is
not the case here because the defendant was served with
summons in the Philippines and not in Japan.
Unable to accept the said decision, plaintiff on
July 11, 1989 moved for reconsideration of the
decision, filing at the same time a conditional
Notice of Appeal, asking the court to treat the
said notice of appeal "as in effect after and
upon issuance of the court's denial of the
motion for reconsideration."
Defendant opposed the motion for
reconsideration to which a Reply dated August
28, 1989 was filed by the plaintiff.
On October 16, 1989, the lower court
disregarded the Motion for Reconsideration and
gave due course to the plaintiff's Notice of
Appeal. 3
In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It
agreed with the latter in its reliance upon Boudard
vs.Tait  4 wherein it was held that "the process of the court has no
extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired over the
person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of
the state." To support its position, the Court of Appeals further
stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such as the
instant case, personal service of summons
within the forum is required for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over the defendant
(Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA
230). To confer jurisdiction on the court,
personal or substituted service of summons on
the defendant not extraterritorial service is
necessary (Dial Corp vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA
739).
But while plaintiff-appellant concedes that the
collection suit filed is an action in personam, it
is its theory that a distinction must be made
between an action in personam against a
resident defendant and an action in
personam against a non-resident defendant.
Jurisdiction is acquired over a non-resident
defendant only if he is served personally within
the jurisdiction of the court and over a resident
defendant if by personal, substituted or
constructive service conformably to statutory
authorization. Plaintiff-appellant argues that
since the defendant-appellee maintains
branches in Japan it is considered a resident
defendant. Corollarily, personal, substituted or
constructive service of summons when made in
compliance with the procedural rules is
sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to render
judgment in personam.
Such an argument does not persuade.
It is a general rule that processes of the court
cannot lawfully be served outside the territorial
limits of the jurisdiction of the court from which
it issues (Carter vs. Carter; 41 S.E. 2d 532, 201)
and this is regardless of the residence or
citizenship of the party thus served (Iowa-Rahr
vs. Rahr, 129 NW 494, 150 Iowa 511, 35 LRC,
NS, 292, Am. Case 1912 D680). There must be
actual service within the proper territorial limits
on defendant or someone authorized to accept
service for him. Thus, a defendant, whether a
resident or not in the forum where the action is
filed, must be served with summons within that
forum.
But even assuming a distinction between a
resident defendant and non-resident defendant
were to be adopted, such distinction applies
only to natural persons and not in the
corporations. This finds support in the concept
that "a corporation has no home or residence in
the sense in which those terms are applied to
natural persons" (Claude Neon Lights vs. Phil.
Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607). Thus, as cited
by the defendant-appellee in its brief:
Residence is said to be an attribute of a natural
person, and can be predicated on an artificial
being only by more or less imperfect analogy.
Strictly speaking, therefore, a corporation can
have no local residence or habitation. It has
been said that a corporation is a mere ideal
existence, subsisting only in contemplation of
law — an invisible being which can have, in fact,
no locality and can occupy no space, and
therefore cannot have a dwelling place. (18 Am.
Jur. 2d, p. 693 citing Kimmerle v. Topeka, 88
370, 128 p. 367; Wood v. Hartfold F. Ins. Co., 13
Conn 202)
Jurisprudence so holds that the foreign or
domestic character of a corporation is to be
determined by the place of its origin where its
44
charter was granted and not by the location of
its business activities (Jennings v. Idaho Rail
Light & P. Co., 26 Idaho 703, 146 p. 101), A
corporation is a "resident" and an inhabitant of
the state in which it is incorporated and no
other (36 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 49).
Defendant-appellee is a Philippine Corporation
duly organized under the Philippine laws.
Clearly, its residence is the Philippines, the
place of its incorporation, and not Japan. While
defendant-appellee maintains branches in
Japan, this will not make it a resident of Japan. A
corporation does not become a resident of
another by engaging in business there even
though licensed by that state and in terms given
all the rights and privileges of a domestic
corporation (Galveston H. & S.A.R. Co. vs.
Gonzales, 151 US 496, 38 L ed. 248, 4 S Ct.
401).
On this premise, defendant appellee is a non-
resident corporation. As such, court processes
must be served upon it at a place within the
state in which the action is brought and not
elsewhere (St. Clair vs. Cox, 106 US 350, 27 L
ed. 222, 1 S. Ct. 354).5
It then concluded that the service of summons effected in Manila
or beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan was null and did not
confer jurisdiction upon the Tokyo District Court over the person
of SHARP; hence, its decision was void.
Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the decision, NORTHWEST
elevated the case to this Court contending that the respondent
court erred in holding that SHARP was not a resident of Japan and
that summons on SHARP could only be validly served within that
country.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also
proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the
giving of due notice therein.6
Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an
action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having
jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a
subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also, under
Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official
duty.
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity. 7Being the
party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court,
SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such
judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends
that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home
office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and
the Japanese Court did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction over it.
It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those
relating to the service of process upon a defendant are governed
by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. 8 In this case, it is
the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered
that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of
process on SHARP. As to what this law is is a question of fact, not
of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded
and proved like any other fact. 9 Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official
publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It
was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what
that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the
assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly,
the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of
summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding
Japanese  Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the
law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called
processual presumption 10 may be invoked. Applying it, the
Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the
Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be
made: (1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law
for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any
of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive
summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of summons is
without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made
upon him. 11
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made
on the government official designated by law, to wit: (a) the
Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance
company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a
foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of
process is so made, the government office or official served shall
transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal proccess to
the corporation at its home or principal office. The sending of such
copy is a necessary part of the service. 12
SHARP contends that the laws authorizing service of process upon
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Superintendent of
Banks, and the Insurance Commissioner, as the case may be,
presuppose a situation wherein the foreign corporation doing
business in the country no longer has any branches or offices
within the Philippines. Such contention is belied by the pertinent
provisions of the said laws. Thus, Section 128 of the Corporation
Code 13 and Section 190 of the Insurance Code 14 clearly
contemplate two situations: (1) if the corporation had left the
Philippines or had ceased to transact business therein, and (2) if
the corporation has no designated agent. Section 17 of the
General Banking Act 15 does not even speak a corporation which
had ceased to transact business in the Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a
resident agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan.
This silence could only mean, or least create an impression, that it
had none. Hence, service on the designated government official
or on any of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed
of. The respondent, however, insists that only service of any of its
officers or employees in its branches in Japan could be resorted
to. We do not agree. As found by the respondent court, two
attempts at service were made at SHARP's Yokohama branch.
Both were unsuccessful. On the first attempt, Mr. Dinozo, who was
believed to be the person authorized to accept court process, was
in Manila. On the second, Mr. Dinozo was present, but to accept
the summons because, according to him, he was no longer an
employee of SHARP. While it may be true that service could have
been made upon any of the officers or agents of SHARP at its
three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse
45
would not preclude service upon the proper government official,
as stated above.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court
which ordered that summons for SHARP be served at its head
office in the Philippine's after the two attempts of service had
failed. 16 The Tokyo District Court requested the Supreme Court of
Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal
documents to the Philippines. Acting on that request, the
Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the
other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in
Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines,
then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its
principal office in Manila. This service is equivalent to service on
the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code.
Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not
valid under Philippine laws holds no water.17
In deciding against the petitioner, the respondent court sustained
the trial court's reliance on Boudard vs. Tait  18where this Court
held:
The fundamental rule is that jurisdiction in
personam over nonresidents, so as to sustain a
money judgment, must be based upon personal
service within the state which renders the
judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
The process of a court, has no extraterritorial
effect, and no jurisdiction is acquired over the
person of the defendant by serving him beyond
the boundaries of the state. Nor has a judgment
of a court of a foreign country against a resident
of this country having no property in such
foreign country based on process served here,
any effect here against either the defendant
personally or his property situated here.
Process issuing from the courts of one state or
country cannot run into another, and although a
nonresident defendant may have been
personally served with such process in the state
or country of his domicile, it will not give such
jurisdiction as to authorize a personal judgment
against him.
It further availed of the ruling in Magdalena Estate,
Inc. vs. Nieto 19 and Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, 20 as well as the
principle laid down by the Iowa Supreme Court in the 1911 case
of Raher vs. Raher. 21
The first three cases are, however, inapplicable. Boudard involved
the enforcement of a judgment of the civil division of the Court of
First Instance of Hanoi, French Indo-China. The trial court
dismissed the case because the Hanoi court never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant considering that
"[t]he, evidence adduced at the trial conclusively proves that
neither the appellee [the defendant] nor his agent or employees
were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased
Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard had never, at any time, been his
employee." In Magdalena Estate, what was declared invalid
resulting in the failure of the court to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendants in an action in personam was the
service of summons through publication against non-appearing
resident defendants. It was claimed that the latter concealed
themselves to avoid personal service of summons upon them.
In Dial, the defendants were foreign corporations which were not,
domiciled and licensed to engage in business in the Philippines
and which did not have officers or agents, places of business, or
properties here. On the other hand, in the instant case, SHARP
was doing business in Japan and was maintaining four branches
therein.
Insofar as to the Philippines is concerned, Raher is a thing of the
past. In that case, a divided Supreme Court of Iowa declared that
the principle that there can be no jurisdiction in a court of a
territory to render a personal judgment against anyone upon
service made outside its limits was applicable alike to cases of
residents and non-residents. The principle was put at rest by the
United States Supreme Court when it ruled in the 1940 case
of Milliken vs. Meyer  22 that domicile in the state is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the
state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means
of appropriate substituted service or personal service without the
state. This principle is embodied in section 18, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court which allows service of summons on residents
temporarily out of the Philippines to be made out of the country.
The rationale for this rule was explained in Milliken as follows:
[T]he authority of a state over one of its citizens
is not terminated by the mere fact of his
absence from the state. The state which accords
him privileges and affords protection to him and
his property by virtue of his domicile may also
exact reciprocal duties. "Enjoyment of the
privileges of residence within the state, and the
attendant right to invoke the protection of its
laws, are inseparable" from the various
incidences of state citizenship. The
responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of
the relationship to the state which domicile
creates. That relationship is not dissolved by
mere absence from the state. The attendant
duties, like the rights and privileges incident to
domicile, are not dependent on continuous
presence in the state. One such incident of
domicile is amenability to suit within the state
even during sojourns without the state, where
the state has provided and employed a
reasonable method for apprising such an absent
party of the proceedings against him. 23
The domicile of a corporation belongs to the state where it was
incorporated. 24 In a strict technical sense, such domicile as a
corporation may have is single in its essence and a corporation
can have only one domicile which is the state of its creation. 25
Nonetheless, a corporation formed in one-state may, for certain
purposes, be regarded a resident in another state in which it has
offices and transacts business. This is the rule in our jurisdiction
and apropos thereto, it may be necessery to quote what we
stated in State Investment House, Inc, vs. Citibank, N.A., 26 to wit:
The issue is whether these Philippine branches
or units may be considered "residents of the
Philippine Islands" as that term is used in
Section 20 of the Insolvency Law . . . or
residents of the state under the laws of which
they were respectively incorporated. The
answer cannot be found in the Insolvency Law
itself, which contains no definition of the
term, resident, or any clear indication of its
meaning. There are however other statutes,
albeit of subsequent enactment and effectivity,
from which enlightening notions of the term
may be derived.
46
The National Internal Revenue Code declares
that the term "'resident foreign corporation'
applies to a foreign corporation engaged in
trade or business within the Philippines," as
distinguished from a "'non-resident foreign
corporation' . . . (which is one) not engaged in
trade or bussiness within the Philippines." [Sec.
20, pars. (h) and (i)].
The Offshore Banking Law, Presidential Decree
No. 1034, states "that branches, subsidiaries,
affiliation, extension offices or any other units of
corporation or juridical person organized under
the laws of any foreign country operating in the
Philippines shall be considered residents of the
Philippines. [Sec. 1(e)].
The General Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337,
places "branches and agencies in the
Philippines of foreign banks . . . (which are)
called Philippine branches," in the same
category as "commercial banks, savings
associations, mortgage banks, development
banks, rural banks, stock savings and loan
associations" (which have been formed and
organized under Philippine laws), making no
distinction between the former and the latter in
so far as the terms "banking institutions" and
"bank" are used in the Act [Sec. 2], declaring on
the contrary that in "all matters not specifically
covered by special provisions applicable only to
foreign banks, or their branches and agencies in
the Philippines, said foreign banks or their
branches and agencies lawfully doing business
in the Philippines "shall be bound by all laws,
rules, and regulations applicable to domestic
banking corporations of the same class, except
such laws, rules and regulations as provided for
the creation, formation, organization, or
dissolution of corporations or as fix the relation,
liabilities, responsibilities, or duties of members,
stockholders or officers of corporation. [Sec.
18].
This court itself has already had occasion to
hold [Claude Neon Lights, Fed. Inc. vs. Philippine
Advertising Corp., 57 Phil. 607] that a foreign
corporation licitly doing business in the
Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit,
may not be considered a non-resident within
the scope of the legal provision authorizing
attachment against a defendant not residing in
the Philippine Islands; [Sec. 424, in relation to
Sec. 412 of Act No. 190, the Code of Civil
Procedure; Sec. 1(f), Rule 59 of the Rules of
1940, Sec. 1(f), Rule 57, Rules of 1964] in other
words, a preliminary attachment may not be
applied for and granted solely on the asserted
fact that the defendant is a foreign corporation
authorized to do business in the Philippines —
and is consequently and necessarily, "a party
who resides out of the Philippines."
Parenthetically, if it may not be considered as a
party not residing in the Philippines, or as a
party who resides out of the country, then,
logically, it must be considered a party who
does reside in the Philippines, who is a resident
of the country. Be this as it may, this Court
pointed out that:
. . . Our laws and
jurisprudence indicate a
purpose to assimilate foreign
 corporations, duly licensed to
do business here, to the
status of domestic
corporations. (Cf. Section 73,
Act No. 1459, and Marshall
Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser &
Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385,
411) We think it would be
entirely out of line with this
policy should we make a
discrimination against a
foreign corporation, like the
petitioner, and subject its
property to the harsh writ of
seizure by attachment when it
has complied not only with
every requirement of law
made specially of foreign
corporations, but in addition
with every requirement of law
made of domestic
corporations. . . .
Obviously, the assimilation of foreign
corporations authorized to do business in the
Philippines "to the status
of domestic corporations, subsumes their being
found and operating as corporations,
hence, residing, in the country.
The same principle is recognized in American
law: that the residence of a corporation, if it can
be said to have a residence, is necessarily
where it exercises corporate functions . . .;" that
it is considered as dwelling "in the place where
its business is done . . .," as being "located
where its franchises are exercised . . .," and as
being "present where it is engaged in the
prosecution of the corporate enterprise;" that a
"foreign corporation licensed to do business in a
state is a resident of any country where it
maintains an office or agent for transaction of
its usual and customary business for venue
purposes;" and that the "necessary element in
its signification is locality of existence." [Words
and Phrases, Permanent Ed., vol. 37, pp. 394,
412, 493].
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan
through its four duly registered branches at the time the
collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the
processual presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of
Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts
therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts'
lawful methods of serving process. 27
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the
Japanese Court was valid not only under the processual
presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
We find NORTHWEST's claim for attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and exemplary damages to be without merit. We find
no evidence that would justify an award for attorney's fees and
litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted.
Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to
moral, temperate, or compensatory damaged. There being no
such proof presented by NORTHWEST, no exemplary damages
may be adjudged in its favor.
47
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the
challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied
NORTHWEST's claims for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and
exemplary damages but REVERSED insofar as in sustained the
trial court's dismissal of NORTHWEST's complaint in Civil Case No.
83-17637 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private
respondent C.F. SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST
the amounts adjudged in the foreign judgment subject of said
case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the
complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35694         December 23, 1933
ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appelle, 
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-
appellant. 
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellants.
Allison D. Gibbs in his own behalf.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a final order of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, requiring the register of deeds of the City of Manila to
cancel certificates of title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, covering
lands located in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, and issue in
lieu thereof new certificates of transfer of title in favor of Allison
D. Gibbs without requiring him to present any document showing
that the succession tax due under Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code has been paid.
The said order of the court of March 10, 1931, recites that the
parcels of land covered by said certificates of title formerly
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs and Eva
Johnson Gibbs; that the latter died intestate in Palo Alto,
California, on November 28, 1929; that at the time of her death
she and her husband were citizens of the State of California and
domiciled therein.
It appears further from said order that Allison D. Gibbs was
appointed administrator of the state of his said deceased wife in
case No. 36795 in the same court, entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Eva Johnson Gibbs, Deceased"; that in said
intestate proceedings, the said Allison D. Gibbs, on September
22,1930, filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the
parcels of land hereunder described belong to the conjugal
partnership of your petitioner and his wife, Eva Johnson Gibbs",
describing in detail the three facts here involved; and further
alleging that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died
on November 28,1929; that in accordance with the law of
California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of
California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the
husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without
administration; that the conjugal partnership of Allison D. Gibbs
and Eva Johnson Gibbs, deceased, has no obligations or debts and
no one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land (and
seventeen others not here involved) to be the absolute property
of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted said
petition and on September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjucating
the said Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole and absolute owner of said
lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs
presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and
demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of
title".
Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code provides in part that:
Registers of deeds shall not register in the registry of
property any document transferring real property or real
rights therein or any chattel mortgage, by way of
gifts mortis causa, legacy or inheritance, unless the
payment of the tax fixed in this article and actually due
thereon shall be shown. And they shall immediately
notify the Collector of Internal Revenue or the
corresponding provincial treasurer of the non payment of
the tax discovered by them. . . .
Acting upon the authority of said section, the register of deeds of
the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of
court of September 22,1930, and refused to register the transfer
of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the
ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Thereupon, under date of December 26, 1930, Allison D. Gibbs
filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said
register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the
petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance
tax. After due hearing of the parties, the court reaffirmed said
order of September 22, 1930, and entered the order of March 10,
1931, which is under review on this appeal.
On January 3, 1933, this court remanded the case to the court of
origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to the
pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs.
Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with
reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved
in this suit and with reference to the California law in force at the
time of such acquisition. The case is now before us with the
supplementary evidence.
For the purposes of this case, we shall consider the following facts
as established by the evidence or the admissions of the parties:
Allison D. Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a
citizen of the State of California and domiciled therein; that he
and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married at Columbus, Ohio, in July
1906; that there was no antenuptial marriage contract between
the parties; that during the existence of said marriage the
spouses acquired the following lands, among others, in the
Philippine Islands, as conjugal property:lawphil.net
1. A parcel of land in the City of Manila represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 20880, dated March 16, 1920, and
registered in the name of "Allison D. Gibbs casado con Eva
Johnson Gibbs".
2. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 28336, dated May 14, 1927, in which it is
certified "that spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs are
the owners in fee simple" of the land therein described.
3. A parcel of land in the City of Manila, represented by transfer
certificate of title No. 28331, dated April 6, 1927, which it states
"that Allison D. Gibbs married to Eva Johnson Gibbs" is the owner
of the land described therein; that said Eva Johnson Gibbs died
intestate on November 28, 1929, living surviving her her husband,
the appellee, and two sons, Allison J. Gibbs , now age 25 and
Finley J. Gibbs, now aged 22, as her sole heirs of law.
Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code entitled "Tax
on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa"
provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of
inheritance ... of real property ... shall be subject to the following
tax." It results that the question for determination in this case is
48
as follows: Was Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death the
owner of a descendible interest in the Philippine lands above-
mentioned?
The appellee contends that the law of California should determine
the nature and extent of the title, if any, that vested in Eva
Johnson Gibbs under the three certificates of title Nos. 20880,
28336 and 28331 above referred to, citing article 9 of the Civil
Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under
said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands,
the laws of California govern the succession to such title, citing
the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code.
Article 9 of the Civil Code is as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country." It is argued that the conjugal right of
the California wife in community real estate in the
Philippine Islands is a personal right and must, therefore,
be settled by the law governing her personal status, that
is, the law of California. But our attention has not been
called to any law of California that incapacitates a
married woman from acquiring or holding land in a
foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitae.
There is not the slightest doubt that a California married
woman can acquire title to land in a common law
jurisdiction like the State of Illinois or the District of
Columbia, subject to the common-law estate by the
courtesy which would vest in her husband. Nor is there
any doubt that if a California husband acquired land in
such a jurisdiction his wife would be vested with the
common law right of dower, the prerequisite conditions
obtaining. Article 9 of the Civil Code treats of purely
personal relations and status and capacity for juristic
acts, the rules relating to property, both personal and
real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil Code.
Furthermore, article 9, by its very terms, is applicable
only to "Spaniards" (now, by construction, to citizens of
the Philippine Islands).
The Organic Act of the Philippine Islands (Act of
Congress, August 29, 1916, known as the "Jones Law") as
regards the determination of private rights, grants
practical autonomy to the Government of the Philippine
Islands. This Government, therefore, may apply the
principles and rules of private international law (conflicts
of laws) on the same footing as an organized territory or
state of the United States. We should, therefore, resort to
the law of California, the nationality and domicile of Mrs.
Gibbs, to ascertain the norm which would be applied
here as law were there any question as to her status.
But the appellant's chief argument and the sole basis of the lower
court's decision rests upon the second paragraph of article 10 of
the Civil Code which is as follows:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property or
the country in which it may be situated.
In construing the above language we are met at the outset with
some difficulty by the expression "the national law of the person
whose succession is in question", by reason of the rather
anomalous political status of the Philippine Islands. (Cf. Manresa,
vol. 1, Codigo Civil, pp. 103, 104.) We encountered no difficulty in
applying article 10 in the case of a citizen of Turkey. (Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil., 867.) Having regard to the practical autonomy of community lands here in question must be determined in
the Philippine Islands, as above stated, we have concluded that if accordance with the lex rei sitae.
article 10 is applicable and the estate in question is that of a
deceased American citizen, the succession shall be regulated in
It is admitted that the Philippine lands here in question were
accordance with the norms of the State of his domicile in the
acquired as community property of the conjugal partnership of
United States. (Cf. Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil.,
the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands,
130, 137; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.)
she was vested of a title equal to that of her husband. Article
1407 of the Civil Code provides:
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the
death of the wife, the entire community property without
All the property of the spouses shall be deemed
administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the
partnership property in the absence of proof that it
absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Article
the death of his wife, not by virtue of succession or by virtue of
1395 provides:
her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the
wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community
property, not as an heir or as the beneficiary of his deceased wife, "The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules of law
but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or applicable to the contract of partnership in all matters in which
expentancy which is extinguished upon her death. Quoting the such rules do not conflict with the express provisions of this
case of Estate of Klumpke (167 Cal., 415, 419), the court said: chapter." Article 1414 provides that "the husband may dispose by
"The decisions under this section (1401 Civil Code of California) will of his half only of the property of the conjugal partnership."
are uniform to the effect that the husband does not take the Article 1426 provides that upon dissolution of the conjugal
community property upon the death of the wife by succession, but partnership and after inventory and liquidation, "the net
that he holds it all from the moment of her death as though remainder of the partnership property shall be divided share and
required by himself. ... It never belonged to the estate of the share alike between the husband and wife, or their respective
deceased wife." heirs." Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the
jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the acquisition of
any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an
The argument of the appellee apparently leads to this dilemma: If
interest and title therein equal to that of her husband, subject to
he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can
the power of management and disposition which the law vests in
the second paragraph of article 10 be invoked? Can the appellee
the husband. Immediately upon her death, if there are no
be heard to say that there is a legal succession under the law of
obligations of the decedent, as is true in the present case, her
the Philippine Islands and no legal succession under the law of
share in the conjugal property is transmitted to her heirs by
California? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10
succession. (Articles 657, 659, 661, Civil Code; cf. also Coronel vs.
applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken
Ona, 33 Phil., 456, 469.)
place in the Philippines and in accordance with the law of the
Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard
to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the
in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest, equal to that
only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest in of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by certificates of
property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands. title Nos. 20880, 28336 and 28331, from the date of their
acquisition to the date of her death. That appellee himself
believed that his wife was vested of such a title and interest in
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S., 186, 191; 44 Law ed.,
manifest from the second of said certificates, No. 28336, dated
1028, 1031), the court said:
May 14, 1927, introduced by him in evidence, in which it is
certified that "the spouses Allison D. Gibbs and Eva Johnson Gibbs
It is principle firmly established that to the law of the are the owners in fee simple of the conjugal lands therein
state in which the land is situated we must look for the described."
rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer,
and for the effect and construction of wills and other
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands
conveyances. (United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; 3
aforesaid was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and
L. ed., 287; Clark vs. Graham, 6 Wheat., 577; 5 L. ed.,
this transmission plainly falls within the language of section 1536
334; McGoon vs. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; 19 L. ed., 545;
of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies
Brine vs. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S., 627; 24 L. ed.,
a tax on inheritances. (Cf. Re Estate of Majot, 199 N. Y., 29; 92 N.
858.)" (See also Estate of Lloyd, 175 Cal., 704, 705.) This
E., 402; 29 L. R. A. [N. S.], 780.) It is unnecessary in this
fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of
proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent
article 10 of our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property
of the successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which
is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof;
would be regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California
real property to the laws of the country in which it is
which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs.
situated.

It is stated in 5 Cal. Jur., 478:
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to
the lex rei sitae, the respective rights of husband and
wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial
contract, are determined by the law of the place where
the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of
the parties or to the place where the marriage was
celebrated. (See also Saul vs. His Creditors, 5 Martin [N.
S.], 569; 16 Am. Dec., 212 [La.]; Heidenheimer vs.
Loring, 26 S. W., 99 [Texas].)
The record does not show what the proper amount of the
inheritance tax in this case would be nor that the appellee
(petitioner below) in any way challenged the power of the
Government to levy an inheritance tax or the validity of the
statute under which the register of deeds refused to issue a
certificate of transfer reciting that the appellee is the exclusive
owner of the Philippine lands included in the three certificates of
title here involved.
The judgment of the court below of March 10, 1931, is reversed
with directions to dismiss the petition, without special
pronouncement as to the costs.

Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which
vested in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the

49
 Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best
was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999 by election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard,
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order
vs. that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective,
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant. namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be
RESOLUTION a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made
upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
KAPUNAN, J.:

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority"

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a
has been construed to mean a reasonable time
Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine
after reaching the age of majority which had
citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of
been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to
majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present
be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p.
case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar
51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940,
of Vicente D. Ching.
Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when a (sic)
The facts of this case are as follows: person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and
422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a
in Cuenco, it was held that an election done
Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
after over seven (7) years was not made within
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth,
a reasonable time.
Ching has resided in the Philippines.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of
elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to
the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable
the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship
in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 member of the Philippine Bar.
November 1998, the following documents:
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a states:
certified public accountant;
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997,
issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
declared myself as one in my school records
Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a
and other official documents;
registered voter of the said place; and

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also
Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that
Ching was elected as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during 4. I participated in electoral process[es] since
the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections. the time I was eligible to vote;

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were 5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as
released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992
oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 to 1995;
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15,
to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same
625;
resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required
to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and
on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship. 7. My election was expressed in a statement
signed and sworn to by me before a notary
public;
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching,
being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen 8. I accompanied my election of Philippine
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the
he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the Constitution and the Government of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Philippines;
Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a

50
 9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship
and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil
Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00)
as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July
1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino
mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship
was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that
"(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five"
are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the
1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however,
that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election
of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship
for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article
IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of
Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing
such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the
party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party
shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that
the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority."
The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one
(21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions
of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the
effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time"
after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable
time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be
made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to
mean a reasonable period after reaching the
age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice
has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable
51
time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above,
which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option
to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born
on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship
was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over
twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven
(7) years after he had reached the age of
majority. It is clear that said election has not
been made "upon reaching the age of
majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964,
was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen
(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority,"
Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It
should be stated, in this connection, that the special
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute
what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare
were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came
of age, constitutes a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. It has been established
that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as
of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925
(when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was
already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These
acts are sufficient to show his preference for
Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in
the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship
would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was
an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not
necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship
because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a
Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a
Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no
other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to
Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
 Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan
vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs.
Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could
any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he
is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship
privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co
vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where
we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election"
as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA
45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of
the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right
of suffrage when he came of
age constitutes a positive act
of Philippine citizenship. (p.
52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the
respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal
declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Entering a profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during
election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are
themselves formal manifestations for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship
presupposes that the person electing is an alien.
Or his status is doubtful because he is a national
of two countries. There is no doubt in this case
about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned
twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine
citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not only have been superfluous but it
would also have resulted in an absurdity. How
can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching.
However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life
of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation
of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly
52
elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of
electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has
offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the
nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay
in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that
can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship
has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should
avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly,
in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine
citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away
from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente
D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 28, MANILA and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105715 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105735 June 6, 1994
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner in G.R. No. 104654.
Yolando F. Lim counsel for private respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), this
Court declared private respondent, Juan G. Frivaldo, an alien and
therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon.
Once more, the citizenship of private respondent is put in issue in
these petitions docketed as G.R. No.104654 and G.R. No. 105715
and G.R. No. 105735. The petitions were consolidated since they
principally involve the same issues and parties.
I
G.R. No. 104654
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim
Rules, filed by the Republic of the Philippines: (1) to annul the
Decision dated February 27, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 28, Manila, in SP Proc. No. 91-58645, which re-admitted
private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the Revised
Naturalization Law (C.A. No. 63 as amended by C.A. No. 473); and
(2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private respondent on
February 27, 1992.
On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G.
Frivaldo to be Re-admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under
Commonwealth Act No. 63" (Rollo, pp. 17-23).
In an Order dated October 7, 1991 respondent Judge set the
petition for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation, for three consecutive
weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months
before the said date of hearing. The order further required the
posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a conspicuous place
in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila (Rollo, pp. 24-26).
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion to Set
Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention to
run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the
deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy was March 15, one
day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the hearing set
on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24 (Rollo, pp.
27-28).
The motion was granted in an Order dated January 24, 1992,
wherein the hearing of the petition was moved to February 21,
1992. The said order was not published nor a copy thereof posted.
On February 21, the hearing proceeded with private respondent
as the sole witness. He submitted the following documentary
evidence: (1) Affidavit of Publication of the Order dated October 7,
1991 issued by the publisher of The Philippine Star (Exh. "A"); (2)
Certificate of Publication of the order issued
by the National Printing Office (Exh. "B"); (3) Notice of Hearing of
Petition (Exh. "B-1"); (4) Photocopy of a Citation issued by the
National Press Club with private respondent’s picture (Exhs. "C"
and "C-2"); (5) Certificate of Appreciation issued by the Rotary
Club of Davao (Exh. "D"); (6) Photocopy
of a Plaque of Appreciation issued by the Republican College,
Quezon City (Exh. "E"); (7) Photocopy of a Plaque of Appreciation
issued by the Davao-Bicol Association (Exh. "F"); (8) Certification
issued by the Records Management and Archives Office that the
record of birth of private respondent was not on file (Exh. "G");
and (8) Certificate of Naturalization issued by the United States
District Court (Exh. "H").
Six days later, on February 27, respondent Judge rendered the
assailed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, is re-admitted as a
citizen of the Republic of the Philippines by
naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, all the
rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino
citizen (Rollo, p. 33).
On the same day, private respondent was allowed to take his oath
of allegiance before respondent Judge (Rollo, p. 34).
On March 16, a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to
Admit Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo.
He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional
defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the
requirements of the Naturalization Law.
53
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, 1992, the
Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal directly with the
Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 105715
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus with injunction under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of
Article VIII of the Constitution with prayer for temporary
restraining order filed by Raul R. Lee against the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and private respondent, to annul the en
banc Resolution of the COMELEC, which dismissed his petition
docketed as SPC Case No. 92-273. The said petition sought to
annul the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of
the Province of Sorsogon.
Petitioner was the official candidate of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) for the position of governor of the
Province of Sorsogon in the May 1992 elections. Private
respondent was the official candidate of the Lakas-National Union
of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) for the same position.
Private respondent was proclaimed winner on May 22, 1992.
On June 1, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul
the proclamation of private respondent as Governor-elect of the
Province of Sorsogon on the grounds: (1) that the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien,
whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the
State in G.R. No. 104654; and (3) that private respondent is not a
duly registered voter. Petitioner further prayed that the votes
case in favor of private respondent be considered as stray votes,
and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be
proclaimed winner.
On June 10, the COMELEC issued the questioned en
banc resolution which dismissed the petition for having been filed
out of time, citing Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166. Said section
provides that the period to appeal a ruling of the board of
canvassers on questions affecting its composition or proceedings
was three days.
In this petition, petitioner argues that the COMELEC acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue
of private respondent’s disqualification in the guise of
technicality.
Petitioner claims that the inclusion of private respondent’s name
in the list of registered voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon was
invalid because at the time he registered as a voter in 1987, he
was as American citizen.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to
private respondent is not yet conclusive because the case is still
on appeal before us.
Petitioner prays for: (1) the annulment of private respondent’s
proclamation as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) the
deletion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates
for the position of governor; (3) the proclamation of the governor-
elect based on the remaining votes, after the exclusion of the
votes for private respondent; (4) the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin private respondent from taking his oath
and assuming office; and (5) the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel the COMELEC to resolve the pending
disqualification case docketed as SPA Case No. 92-016, against
private respondent.
G.R. No. 105735
This is a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution, with prayer for temporary restraining order. The
parties herein are identical with the parties in G.R. No. 105715.
In substance, petitioner prays for the COMELEC’s immediate
resolution of SPA Case No. 92-016, which is a petition for the
cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of candidacy filed
on March 23, 1992 by Quiterio H. Hermo, the intervenor in G.R.
No. 104654 (Rollo, p. 18).
The petition for cancellation alleged: (1) that private respondent is
an American citizen, and therefore ineligible to run as candidate
for the position of governor of the Province of Sorsogon; (2) that
the trial court’s decision
re-admitting private respondent as a Filipino citizen was fraught
with legal infirmities rendering it null and void; (3) that assuming
the decision to be valid, private respondent’s oath of allegiance,
which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was
promulgated, violated Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a
two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be
taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on
February 27, 1992, was held less than four months from the date
of the last publication of the order and petition. The petition
prayed for the cancellation of private respondent’s certificate of
candidacy and the deletion of his name from the list of registered
voters in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon.
In his answer to the petition for cancellation, private respondent
denied the allegations therein and averred: (1) that Quiterio H.
Hermo, not being a candidate for the same office for which
private respondent was aspiring, had no standing to file the
petition; (2) that the decision re-admitting him to Philippine
citizenship was presumed to be valid; and (3) that no case had
been filed to exclude his name as a registered voter.
Raul R. Lee intervened in the petition for cancellation of private
respondent’s certificate of candidacy (Rollo, p. 37.).
On May 13, 1992, said intervenor urged the COMELEC to decide
the petition for cancellation, citing Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which provides that all petitions on matters
involving the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy must be
decided "not later than fifteen days before election," and the case
of Alonto v. Commission on Election, 22 SCRA 878 (1968), which
ruled that all pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily
decided (Rollo,
p. 50).
The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet
reacquired his Filipino citizenship because the decision granting
him the same is not yet final and executory (Rollo, p. 63).
However, it submits that the issue of disqualification of a
candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy, like SPC Case No. 92-273.
Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.
The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections
occupied much of its time, thus its failure to immediately resolve
SPA Case No. 92-016. It argues that under Section 5 of Rule 25 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a
disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons
beyond its control. It also assumed that the same action was
subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before it a
petition for quo warranto docketed as EPC No. 92-35. The quo
warranto proceedings sought private respondent’s disqualification
because of his American citizenship.
II
G.R. No. 104654
54
We shall first resolve the issue concerning private respondent’s
citizenship.
In his comment to the State’s appeal of the decision granting him
Philippine citizenship in G.R. No. 104654, private respondent
alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country
during Martial Law compelled him to seek political asylum in the
United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine
citizenship.
He claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available
remedy for his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He tried to
reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct
act of Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation
proceedings were limited to army deserters or Filipino women
who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to
foreigners (Rollo, pp. 49-50). His request to Congress for
sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement
of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor
(Rollo, p. 51). He attributed this to the maneuvers of his political
rivals.
He also claims that the re-scheduling of the hearing of the petition
to an earlier date, without publication, was made without
objection from the Office of the Solicitor General. He makes
mention that on the date of the hearing, the court was jam-
packed.
It is private respondent’s posture that there was substantial
compliance with the law and that the public was well-informed of
his petition for naturalization due to the publicity given by the
media.
Anent the issue of the mandatory two-year waiting period prior to
the taking of the oath of allegiance, private respondent theorizes
that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to
grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of
the applicant and to oppose the grant of Philippine citizenship if
there is basis to do so. In his case, private respondent alleges that
such requirement may be dispensed with, claiming that his life,
both private and public, was well-known. Private respondent cites
his achievement as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in SP
Proc. No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the
decision an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine
citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization
Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said
law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select
the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are
inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not
distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who
had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted,
the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein,
are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation respondent cites
his achievements as a freedom fighter and a former Governor of
the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
The appeal of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines is meritorious. The naturalization proceedings in
SP Proc.
No. 91-58645 was full of procedural flaws, rendering the decision
an anomaly.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine
citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised Naturalization
Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said
law. It is not for an applicant to decide for himself and to select
the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which he believes are
inconvenient or merely of nuisance value. The law does not
distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino
citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not provide
a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who
had lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings conducted,
the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein,
are null and void for failure to comply with the publication and
posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for
naturalization and the order setting it for hearing must be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation. Compliance
therewith is jurisdictional (Po Yi Bo v. Republic, 205 SCRA 400
[1992]). Moreover, the publication and posting of the petition and
the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire
jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic, 55 SCRA 724 [1974]).
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required
by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised Naturalization Law,
particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2)
that he resided continuously in the Philippines for at least ten
years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and any one
of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition until his
admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a
declaration of intention or if he is excused from said filing, the
justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition (Po Yi Bi v.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400 [1992]).
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least
two credible persons who vouched for the good moral character of
private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Private respondent also failed to attach a copy
of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by Section 7
of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order
advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the
petition was heard within six months from the last publication of
the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner
55
took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after
30 days from its promulgation and, insofar as the Solicitor General
is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of
the copy of the decision (Republic v. Court of First Instance of
Albay, 60 SCRA 195 [1974]).
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting
citizenship in naturalization proceedings shall be executory until
after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to
observe if: (1) the applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant
has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any
offense or violation of government promulgated rules; and (4) the
applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
country or contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot
implement any decision granting the petition for naturalization
before its finality.
G.R. No. 105715
In view of the finding in G.R. No. 104654 that private respondent
is not yet a Filipino citizen, we have to grant the petition in G.R.
No. 105715 after treating it as a petition for certiorari instead of a
petition for mandamus. Said petition assails the en
banc resolution of the COMELEC, dismissing SPC Case No. 92-273,
which in turn is a petition to annul private respondent’s
proclamation on three grounds: 1) that the proceedings and
composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were not in
accordance with law; 2) that private respondent is an alien, whose
grant of Filipino citizenship is being questioned by the State in
G.R. No. 104654; and 3) that private respondent is not a duly
registered voter. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the
grounds that it was filed outside the three-day period for
questioning the proceedings
and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers under
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7166.
The COMELEC failed to resolve the more serious issue — the
disqualification of private respondent to be proclaimed Governor
on grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship. In this aspect, the
petition is one for quo warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on
Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989), we held that a petition for quo
warranto, questioning the respondent’s title and seeking to
prevent him from holding office as Governor for alienage, is not
covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in Section
253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, we explained
that "qualifications for public office are continuing requirements
and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire
tenure; once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may
be seasonably challenged."
Petitioner’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of
the electorate, is untenable. Both the Local Government Code and
the Constitution require that only Filipino citizens can run and be
elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate,
at the time they voted for private respondent, was of the
mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner in G.R. No. 105715, prays that the votes cast in favor of
private respondent be considered stray and that he, being the
candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes, be
declared winner. In Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989), we
ruled that where the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes is later declared to be disqualified to hold the office to
which he was elected, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared winner (See
also Geronimo v. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985]; Topacio v.
Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 [1912]).
G.R. No. 105735
In view of the discussions of G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No.
105715, we find the petition in G.R. No. 105735 moot and
academic.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 104654 and G.R. No.
105715 are both GRANTED while the petition in G.R. No. 105735
is DISMISSED. Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve
as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to
VACATE his office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-
Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes
final and executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE
YU, petitioner,  prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR.,
MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY
HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU
SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for
petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for
petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA,  J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas
corpus filed with the Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release
from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing
a return of the writ on behalf of the CID, respondent
Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties
were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file
memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred
the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988
resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court
disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a
naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest
and detention of the same person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for
restraining order dated 24 November 1988. 4 On 29 November
1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid
motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the
urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order dated 28
November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer
for restraining order on 5 December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued
by the Court on 7 December 1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner
filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of which
is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the
CID Board of Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner
also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December
1988.
56
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary
detention 8 was filed by petitioner on 13 December 1988. A
memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14
December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a
vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court
on 7 December 1988 is urgently sought by respondent
Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from
immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of
hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. To finally
dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5
December 1988, 9 urgent motion for release from arbitrary
detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December
1988, 11 motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December
1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order
(issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9 December 1988, 13and the
vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December
1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible
period of three (3) days from notice within which to explain and
despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. 15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December
1988 on 20 December 1988 16 followed by an earnest request for
temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent filed on 2
January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6
January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued
a Portuguese passport in 1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and
renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper
Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a
Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner
applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial
N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport
expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While still a citizen of the Philippines
who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed,
specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed
in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered
together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's
Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents
even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such
resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with
the Board of Special Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted
before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have
unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his
Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not only established
by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A
rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and
superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when
petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of
continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has
renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial
court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become
unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of
petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on whether
or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is
meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the
second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release
from detention is DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the
temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in
Cebu), petitioner,  1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER
OSMEÑA, respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private
respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which
dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private
respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña
filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the
position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18,
1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council
(Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B.
Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed
with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino
citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation
submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and
Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying
that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on
March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").
57
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily
enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from
tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private
respondent and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the
main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to
order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the
proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner
presented the following exhibits tending to show that private
respondent is an American citizen: Application for Alien
Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by
private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-
enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D");
Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh.
"E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a
Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr.
Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that
he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth
and has not gone out of the country for more than six months;
and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of
Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained
the highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed
the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed
the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed
and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a
Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the
qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for
which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised under
the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78
thereof which provides that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than
twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after the notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
and
 (2) After election, pursuant to Section 253
thereof, viz:
'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any
voter contesting the election of any Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of
candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its
petition for disqualification of said private respondent on January
22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond
the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot
also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253
of the same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering
that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of
Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain
the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public
office to which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough
basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the
COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being
elected to the office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not
supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to
present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino
citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.
Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship
by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode
of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a
citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely
relied on the fact that private respondent was issued alien
certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to
re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing,
the respondent is an American and "being an American", private
respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance
required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino
citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered
an American under the laws of the United States does not concern
Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption
that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent
upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his
Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner
failed to positively establish this fact.
58
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No.
87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R.
No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a
citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from the
United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly
authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine
Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized
in the United States but claimed that he was forced to embrace
American citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of
the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this
suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that
there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly
situated as Frivaldo who did not find it necessary to abandon their
status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married
to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an
Australian citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian
Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later
affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo.
In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically
declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines,
therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court
considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are
indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a
foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having
taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He
is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country
since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate
(pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino
and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses
the fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien
Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was
24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be
regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To
Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow).
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino
and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating
he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named
Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother named
Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named
Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two
universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a
Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not
necessarily mean that he is not still a student of University Y. In
the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does
not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express
renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is
even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can
be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no
renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And
while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our
country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship
or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further
that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such dual
citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said
law has not yet been enacted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and
the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142840      May 7, 2001
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, 
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this
case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person
shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen."1
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He
was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.2
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the
United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a
foreign country." Said provision of law reads:
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following
ways and/or events:
xxx
(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in,
the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the
rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country,
and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto,
with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either
of the following circumstances is present:
(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or
offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on
Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of
the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or
acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of
allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
59
connection with his service to said foreign country; And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is
rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed
forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall
not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his
service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said
country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said
foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the
full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the
full enjoyment of his civil political rights as a Filipino
citizen x x x.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine
citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on
June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio
Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified
to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is
not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
the Constitution.4
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision 5 dismissing the
petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27,
2000.6
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the
HRET's decision on the following grounds:
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being
such in view of the loss and renunciation of such
citizenship on his part.
2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his
Philippine citizenship.
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not
legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born
status.7
The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-
born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be
considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995,
and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that
Article citizens are those who are from birth with out having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his
status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as
follow:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time
of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. 8
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2)
by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond
to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a
citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are
those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." 10
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have
become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. 11 To be naturalized,
an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification 13 provided by law
to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the
intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines;
(2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has
not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.14
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however
reacquire the same in the manner provided by law.
Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress.15
Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes
to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain
60
qualifications17and none of the disqualification mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.18
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various
statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of
the armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II; 20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time, 21 (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity. 23
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization,
repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to
RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire
Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of
his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines. [Italics in the original.25
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same
with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or
last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance
shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic
and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. 27 It bears stressing
that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a
natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in
Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such:
(1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not
have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories
of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17,
1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized
citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectively of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect
their Philippines citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of
Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority
age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1
hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the
present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens:
(1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized
in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized
depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition
thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go
through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution
to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House. 29 The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to
substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for the
simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to
inquire into the correctness of the assailed decision. 31 There is no
such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
61
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, 
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND
LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on
Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a
qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation
that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is
whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct
any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo
warranto against him was not filed on time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged
tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing
fee, which the petitioner contends was an indispensable
requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only.
This brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the
kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed
filed beyond the reglementary period, there is no question that
this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect
of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo
warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26,
1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally
paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his
proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual
without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when the fee
was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period
provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code
reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter
contesting the election of a Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city
officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required
under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC
providing that —
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be
given due course without the payment of a filing
fee in the amount of Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00) and the legal research fee as required
by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the
payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling
of the petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this
effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was
paid out of time. In fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His
point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with
Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining
Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it
as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case
No. 88-288. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It
was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat
his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it as EPC
Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He
immediately paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period
when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation
controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo
warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248
of the Omnibus Election Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36,
Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the
petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven
days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette
pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules could not
retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the
COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus
Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still
necessary under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of
the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and
February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent
counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local
elections held on January 30, 1980, and did not apply to the 1988
local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-
mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only on
March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its
publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January
5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of
the Commission. — The rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission shall take
effect on the seventh day after their publication
in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily
newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds
that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree
with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day
period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was
treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which
did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this
conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already
effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even
published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March
3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988
issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
or after the petition was filed.
The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that
the resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval"
simply because it was so provided therein. We held in that case
that publication was still necessary under the due process clause
despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and
whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the
private respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in
the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the
filing fee as a precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the
case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however
this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that
case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed filing fee. However,
the court may allow the payment of the said fee
within a reasonable time. In the event of non-
62
compliance therewith, the case shall be
dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If
the fees above prescribed are not paid,
the Commission may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the
action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the
petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay
the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time
minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It
is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship
as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is
worse is that it is regarded as an even less important
consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists
upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally
raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo
warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is
the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for
an early resolution of that more important question clearly and
urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it
now in this same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the
nature of the instant case, it would appear that
our sole function in this proceeding should be to
resolve the single issue of whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion
for new trial of the GSIS in question should
indeed be deemed pro forma.But going over the
extended pleadings of both parties, the Court is
immediately impressed that substantial justice
may not be timely achieved, if we should decide
this case upon such a technical ground alone.
We have carefully read all the allegations and
arguments of the parties, very ably and
comprehensively expounded by evidently
knowledgeable and unusually competent
counsel, and we feel we can better serve the
interests of justice by broadening the scope of
our inquiry, for as the record before us stands,
we see that there is enough basis for us to end
the basic controversy between the parties here
and now, dispensing, however, with procedural
steps which would not anyway affect
substantially the merits of their respective
claims. 6
xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for
appealing to the wrong court and thereby
allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the
more correct procedure was for the respondent
court to forward the case to the proper court
which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action. Considering, however, the length of time
that this case has been pending, we apply the
rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112
SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated
in Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135
SCRA 37) which states:
 ... it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to
always strive to settle the
entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this
case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision
raised again to the
Intermediate Appellate Court
and from there to this Court.
(p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et
al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141,
January 29, 1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before
this Court. And those facts dictate the rendition
of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There is
therefore no point in referring the case back to
the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal
propositions involved will not change, nor
should the ultimate judgment. Considerable
time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends
of justice, it is time that the controversy is
finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA
733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga
Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA
197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575;
Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628;
Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil.
162).lâwphî1.ñèt Sound practice seeks to
accommodate the theory which avoids waste of
time, effort and expense, both to the parties
and the government, not to speak of delay in
the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v.
Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked
characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where
the dictates of justice so demand ... the
Supreme Court should act, and act with
finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S.
v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the
dictates of justice do demand that this Court
act, and act with finality. 7
xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for
further reception of evidence is not necessary
where the court is in a position to resolve the
dispute based on the records before it. On many
occasions, the Court, in the public interest and
the expeditious administration of justice, has
resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice
would not be subserved by the remand of the
case or when public interest demands an early
disposition of the case or where the trial court
had already received all the evidence of the
parties. 8
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present
case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is
holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
63
In adopting private respondent's comment,
respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its
own" private respondent's repeated assertion
that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In
so doing, has not respondent COMELEC
effectively disqualified itself, by reason of
prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo
warranto filed by private respondent still
pending before it? 9
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule
directly on the merits of this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative
decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first
was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982,
and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The
second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner
was not a citizen of the Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente
Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion
concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the
dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the
respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case."
Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner
Felipe was for deferring decision until representations shall have
been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of
the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman
Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez
of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is
important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC,
there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been
formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture,
which was eventually rejected, was merely inferred from the fact
that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian
passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return
to this country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the
official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12,
1984, through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was
still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his
naturalization in 1976. That statement 12 is reproduced in full as
follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by
virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the
Australian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October
1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and
sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23
November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in
response to the subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in
regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR.
Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do hereby certify that the
statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23
December 1934, was married in the Philippines
to an Australian citizen. As the spouse of an
Australian citizen, he was not required to meet
normal requirements for the grant of citizenship
and was granted Australian citizenship by
Sydney on 28 July 1976.
 B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is
granted Australian citizenship must take an
oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance. The wording of the oath of
affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other
allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily
have any effect on his former nationality as this
would depend on the citizenship laws of his
former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the
Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June
1980 on the ground that the marriage had been
bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an
Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face
court action in respect of Section 50 of
Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which relates to
the giving of false or misleading information of a
material nature in respect of an application for
Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was
successful, he could be deprived of Australian
citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO
could divest himself of Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation
of Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the
Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for
example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act
other than marriage, then he would
automatically lose as Australian citizenship
under Section 17 of the Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET
MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN
EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th DAY OF APRIL
1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February
1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent by
the Department of Foreign Affairs reading as
follows: 13
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February
1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made
with the Australian Government through the
Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has
elicited the following information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired
Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for
Australian citizenship had to either swear an
oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all
other allegiance.
64
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant
Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every
naturalized Australian reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by
Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully
observe the laws of Australia and fulfill my
duties as an Australian citizen. 14
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly
and sincerely promise and declare that I will be
faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her
heirs and successors according to law, and that
I will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and
fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above
evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian
Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming back to the
Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration
authorities that he was an alien and registered as such under
Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked
for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning former
Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of
Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that he
was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements
voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction
of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these
acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his
citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined
in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The
petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the
consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted
by counsel when he performed these acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at
that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in
power then, but we need not go into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be
reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must
be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to questions of
citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it
does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only
when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to the private respondent's
comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit,
identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian
national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine
citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he
automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such
through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition
for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance
and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above.
Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear
true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of
Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made
him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his
Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand
against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these
are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country,
all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth
mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of
the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his
naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his
marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not
concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted
country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and
freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly
embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that
he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated
as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the
petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of
naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine
citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied
with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine
citizenship through repatriation by applying with
the Special Committee on Naturalization
created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the
necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and
Deportation shall thereupon cancel their
certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation
rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate
of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his
present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local
elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact,
he was not even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself
because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local
Government Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at
least twenty-three years of age on election day,
a qualified voter registered as such in the
barangay, municipality, city or province where
65
he proposes to be elected, a resident therein for
at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and
write English, Filipino, or any other local
language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a
"futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the
electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a "resonant and
thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all
that, for his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100
votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have,
even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no
power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that
privilege over their countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner
may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only
strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot
nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These
qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is
lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting
requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed
at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner
was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is
not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private
respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the
petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v.
Commission on Elections  22 decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the
votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was
supported by eight members of the Court then 23 with three
dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote. 25 One was on
official leave. 26
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it
should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Ramos,  27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule.
That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912
in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the
Court 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his
vote, 30 another took no part 31 and two others were on
leave. 32 There the Court held:
... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right
to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired
the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a
winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices
are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be
 declared carried unless he or it receives a
majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in
the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which
he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of
the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be
valid to vote the winner into office or maintain
him there. However, in the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes
were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they
should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take
pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out
of more than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to
grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this
precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer
him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own
country. To be sure, he has the right to renounce the Philippines if
he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more
allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he cannot expect to be
welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted
country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an
undesirable alien.
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily
recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the
country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his
total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
may not be accomplished by election to public office.
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT
a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to
VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of
Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-Aquino
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992
RAMON L. LABO, Jr., petitioner,  Clarification", filed by respondent (Labo) on May
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO
ORTEGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105384 July 3, 1992
66
ROBERTO C. ORTEGA, petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAMON L. LABO,
Jr., respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is the second time 1 that this Court is called upon to rule on
the citizenship of Ramon Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a
Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for mayor of Baguio City in
the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing his certificate of
candidacy on March 23, 1992.
Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on other hand, also
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office on March 25,
1992.
Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy,
petitioner Ortega filed on March 26, 1992, a disqualification
proceeding against Labo before the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to cancel Labo's
certificate of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false
representation when he stated therein that he (Labo) is a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec
on March 27, 1992 to petitioner Labo followed by a telegram
dated April 1, 1992, requiring him to file his Answer within three
(3) non-extendible days but the latter failed to respond.
On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default
for failure to file his Answer.
On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the
Election Registrar of Baguio City to personally deliver the
summons. On May 4, 1992, the disqualification case was set for
reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the
decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176
SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines.
Labo, on the other hand, though represented by counsel, did not
present any evidence. It was only on May 5, 1992 that petitioner
submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed
resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves,
to grant the petition; respondent's (Labo's)
certificate of candidacy is hereby DENIED due
course and ordered CANCELLED; the City
Election Registrar of Baguio City is hereby
directed to delete the name of the respondent
(Labo) from the list of candidates for City Mayor
of Baguio City. (Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No.
105111)
On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of
said resolution until after he shall have raised the matter before
this Court.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which
reads:
Acting on the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the
decision promulgated on May 9, 1992
disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr.,
shall become final and executory only after five
 (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18,
Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules
of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still
continue to be voted upon as candidate for City
Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to
the final outcome of this case in the event the
issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on
appeal or certiorari. (Rollo, p. 53; GR No.
105111; emphasis supplied)
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to
suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the
elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. (Rollo, pp. 64-65; GR No.
105111)
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for
review docketed as G.R. No. 105111 with prayer, among others,
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the
May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render
judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct
respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the
event he wins in the contested elections.
On the same date, or on May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed
before the Comelec an urgent motion for the implementation of
its May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of
candidacy.
After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec, in its
resolution dated May 26, 1992, denied Ortega's motion in view of
the pending case (G.R. No. 105111) earlier filed by Labo of the
same nature before this Court.
On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus docketed
as G.R. No. 105384 praying for the implementation of the
Comelec's May 9, 1992 resolution.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion when it refused to implement its May 9,
1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution
disqualifying Ramon Labo has already become final and
executory.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the
Court, on June 16, 1992, Resolved to consider the case submitted
for decision.
I. GR No. 105111
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a
Filipino citizen. Alleging lack of trial on the merits as well as the
lack of opportunity to be heard in Labo v. Commission on
Elections (supra), it is the submission of petitioner that he can
prove his Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US
252), wherein it was held that in proving expatriation, an
expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship must be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the
Commission on Immigration or the Comelec as regards his
specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated
proceedings in SPA No. 92-029 which denied him adequate
opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of his case. Thus:
67
a) only one (1) day was set for hearing of the case, i.e., May 4,
1992; b) two days later, May 6, 1992 the hearing was set; c)
instead of holding a hearing, the Comelec issued the questioned
resolution on May 9, 1992.
If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that of his
counsel, records disclose that summons were issued by
respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992 followed by a
telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the
same. Came April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to
declare petitioner Labo in default. Over-extending him (Labo) the
benefit of due process, respondent Comelec issued another order
dated April 24, 1992, this time directing the Acting City Election
Registrar of Baguio to personally serve the summons. The alleged
delay in the resolution of SPA No. 92-029 can only be attributed to
petitioner Labo and no one else. Thus, the respondent Comelec in
its resolution dated May 9, 1992 stated:
On May 4, 1992, the Acting Regional Election
Registrar called this case for reception of
evidence. Surprisingly, while as of that date
respondent had not yet filed his Answer, a
lawyer appeared for him.
The petitioner (Ortega) presented the certificate
of candidacy of respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr.,
which contained in item 9 thereof the verified
statement that respondent is a "natural-born"
Filipino citizen. To prove that respondent is not
a Filipino citizen, petitioner submitted the
decision of the Supreme Court in "Ramon L.
Labo, Jr., petitioner, v. Comelec, et al.," GR No.
86564, August 1, 1989, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, petitioner
Ramon J. (sic) Labo, Jr. is
hereby declared NOT a citizen
of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as Mayor
of Baguio City. He is ordered
to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the
Vice-Mayor of Baguio City
once this decision becomes
final and executory.
No evidence was adduced for the respondent as
in fact he had no Answer as of the hearing.
On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo) filed his
verified Answer, insisting that he is a Filipino
citizen and continue to maintain and preserve
his Filipino citizenship; that he does not hold an
Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res
judicata does not apply in citizenship; and that
"existing facts support his continuous
maintenance and holding of Philippine
citizenship" and "supervening events now
preclude the application of the ruling in the
Labo v. Comelec case and the respondent
(Labo) now hold and enjoys Philippine
citizenship.
No evidence has been offered by respondent to
show what these existing facts and supervening
events are to preclude the application of the
Labo decision. (emphasis supplied)
 The Commission is bound by the final
declaration that respondent is not a Filipino
citizen. Consequently, respondent's verified
statement in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a "natural-born" Filipino citizen is a false
material representation." (Rollo, pp. 45-48; GR
No. 105111)
Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed to submit a scintilla
of proof to shore his claim before this Court that he has indeed
reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
Instead, petitioner relies in the US case of Vance v. Terrazas
(supra). Suffice it to state that petitioner has already
pleaded Vance in his motion for reconsideration in Labo v.
Comelec (supra; Rollo, p. 375). Having been previously passed
upon, the Court sees no pressing need to re-examine the same
and make a lengthy dissertation thereon.
At any rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the
instant case any evidence, if there be any, to prove his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court or
the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondent Comelec in cancelling his
(Labo's) certificate of candidacy and declaring that he is NOT a
Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v.
Comelec (supra).
Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72 2 of the Omnibus
Election Code "operates as a legislatively mandated special
repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his proclamation as the
winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not
yet final at the time the election was held.
The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and
untenable. In the first place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, to wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to
be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or the Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis
supplied)
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the
Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo,
his reception of the winning number of votes notwithstanding,
especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any
evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship.
Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated
in Labo v. Comelec (supra), viz.,:
Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record,
nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
68
methods. He does not point to any judicial
decree of naturalization or to any statute
directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon
him. . . .
Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To
reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an
alien. His election does not automatically restore his Philippine
citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable
requirement for holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government
Code).
Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated
before the respondent Comelec. Petitioner claims that he has
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his application for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the
Solicitor General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No.
2703 (Rollo, pp. 116-119; G.R. No. 105111).
To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the
Solicitor General, the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet
acted upon said application for repatriation. Indeed, such fact is
even admitted petitioner. In the absence of any official action or
approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for
repratriation, does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic
reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
II. GR No. 105384
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a
temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution
of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy,
said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega
further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be
declared Mayor of Baguio City.
We agree with Ortega's first proposition.
At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on
May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec
cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy had already
become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992,
said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the
same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim
no restraining order was issued by this Court.
Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy —
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the
Commission shall, after five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final
and executory unless stayed by the Supreme
Court. (emphasis supplied)
A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec
Rules of procedure, to wit:
Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days.
— Decisions in
pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny
due course to or cancel certificates of
candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance
candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to
 postpone or suspend elections shall become
final and executory after the lapse of five (5)
days from their promulgation, unless restrained
by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on
May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his proclamation as
Mayor of Baguio City.
To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is
that he must be a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, the Local
Government Code provides:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local
official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to
read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect. (emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks
the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine
citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official must be a
citizen of the Philippines."
The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage — the very
essence which strikes at the very core of petitioner Labo's
qualification to assume the contested office, he being an alien and
not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected by the majority
of the electorate is of no moment. As we have held in Frivaldo v.
Commission on Elections(174 SCRA 245 [1989]):
. . . The fact that he was elected by the people
of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public
office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict
application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his
total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.
This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega, i.e.,
whether the disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the
candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to
be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.
We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo
does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate
with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the
Mayor of Baguio City.
We make mention of petitioner Ortega because in his petition, he
alleges that:
69
. . . the May 11, 1992 elections were held with
both herein petitioner (Roberto Ortega) and
respondent LABO having been voted for the
position of Mayor and unofficial results indicate
that if the name of respondent LABO were
deleted from the list of candidates, herein
petitioner (Ortega) will be entitled to be
proclaimed as Mayor-elect of Baguio City. (Rollo,
p. 7, GR No. 105384; emphasis supplied)
and further prays this Court "to proclaim as the Mayor-elect of
Baguio City the candidate who may have garnered the most
number of votes after the exclusion of the name of respondent
candidate LABO." (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.) Implicit, therefore, is
petitioner Ortega's desire to be proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio
City.
As discussed hereunder, however, the Court finds Ortega's prayer
devoid of merit.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of
votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not
the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in
the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio
City and his subsequent disqualification does not make
respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the
recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein
we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was
originally a petition to deny due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was
filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed, the
fact remains that the local elections of Feb. 1,
1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate.
The voters of the province voted for her in the
sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate
for the position of governor. Her votes was
counted and she obtained the highest number
of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in
the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. . . . What matters is that in the event
a candidate for an elected position who is voted
for and who obtains the highest number of
votes is disqualified for not possessing the
eligibility requirements at the time of the
election as provided by law, the candidate who
obtains the second highest number of votes for
the same position cannot assume the vacated
position. (emphasis supplied)
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see
no compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner
Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate.
He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a
disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029)
seeking to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the
same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for
petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent
Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification
having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus
Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not
the private respondent, who filed the quo
warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as
he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is
Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA
740) decided in 1985. In that case, the
candidate who placed second was proclaimed
elected after the votes for his winning rival, who
was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a
non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In
effect, the second placer won by default. That
decision was supported by eight members of
the Court then (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino JJ., concurring)
with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J.,
Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another
two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez,
Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and
so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136
SCRA 435), which represents the more logical
and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten
members of the Court (Gutierrez, Jr.,
J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring),
without any dissent, . . . . There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely
repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if
a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative
of a constituency, the majority
of which have positively
declared through their ballots
that they did not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are
filled by those who have
received the highest number
of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all
republican forms of
government that no one can
be declared elected and no
measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives
a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 676)
The fact that a candidate who
obtained the highest number
of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for
the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily
70
entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest
number of votes to be
declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast
for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may be
valid to vote the winner into
office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a
statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and
legislative policy on the
matter, if the votes were cast
in the sincere belief that that
candidate was alive, qualified,
or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority
or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849
(State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been
disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified candidate
should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount
to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At
the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to
elect petitioner Labo bona fide, without any intention to misapply
their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then
qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately,
petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified and cannot assume
the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or
cannot be installed, under no circumstances can a minority or
defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the
12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number
than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the
Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in
fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast
their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of
their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing
away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has
not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the
electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary,
petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec
itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the
office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992
denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy
had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this
case.
As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority
votes does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest
number of votes to be declared elected. Ortega failed to satisfy
the necessary requisite of winning the election either by a
majority or mere plurality of votes sufficient to elevate him in
public office as mayor of Baguio City. Having lost in the election Philippines as a non-
for mayor, petitioner Ortega was obviously not the choice of the immigrant. In the
people of Baguio City. interrogation made in
connection with her
application for a temporary
As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent
visitor's visa to enter the
vacancy in the contested office has occurred. This should now be
Philippines, she stated that
filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with Sec. 44 of the Local
she was a Chinese residing at
Government Code, to wit:
Kowloon, Hongkong, and that
she desired to take a pleasure
Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession trip to the Philippines to visit
her great (grand) uncle Lau
Ching Ping for a period of one
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of
month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and
the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-
"2"). She was permitted to
Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in
come into the Philippines on
the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-
March 13, 1961, and was
governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall
permitted to stay for a period
become the governor or mayor. . . . (emphasis
of one month which would
supplied)
expire on April 13, 1961. On
the date of her arrival, Asher
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of Y, Cheng filed a bond in the
merit. Petitioners both being ineligible for the Office of the City amount of P1,000.00 to
Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the vacancy created in said undertake, among others that
office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 said Lau Yuen Yeung would
elections is hereby declared Mayor of Baguio City after actually depart from the
proclamation by the City Board of Canvassers. No costs. Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country
SO ORDERED.
or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner
of Immigration or his
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971 authorized representative
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and might properly allow. After
LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,  repeated extensions,
vs. petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee. was allowed to stay in the
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants. Philippines up to February 13,
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January
General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for 25, 1962, she contracted
respondent-appellee. marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim
an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated
BARREDO, J.:
action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of her arrest and immediate
Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et deportation, after the
al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, expiration of her authorized
sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental stay, she brought this action
issues involved in this case thus: for injunction with preliminary
injunction. At the hearing
which took place one and a
In the instant case, petitioners seek the
half years after her arrival, it
issuance of a writ of injunction against the
was admitted that petitioner
Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the
Lau Yuen Yeung could not
latter and/or his authorized representative from
write either English or
ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the
Tagalog. Except for a few
Philippines and causing her arrest and
words, she could not speak
deportation and the confiscation of her bond,
either English or Tagalog. She
upon her failure to do so."
could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied except one, Rosa. She did not
in the complaint, having been denied, the case know the names of her
was heard on the merits and the parties brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-
submitted their respective evidence. law.

The facts of the case, as substantially and Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of
correctly stated by the Solicitor General are the considered opinion, and so holds, that the
these: instant petition for injunction cannot be
sustained for the same reason as set forth in the
Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the
On February 8, 1961, Lau
pertinent portions of which read:
Yuen Yeung applied for a
passport visa to enter the

71
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization
Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on
wife and children. — Any
woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its
import unequivocal and hence it should be held
to mean what it plainly and explicitly expresses
in unmistakable terms. The clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably
implies that an alien woman may be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her
marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications specified in the law, because
these are the explicit requisites provided by law
for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay,
Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang,
etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the
allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to
wit:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen
Yeung, Chinese by birth, who
might herself be lawfully
naturalized as a Filipino
citizen (not being disqualified
to become such by
naturalization), is a Filipino
citizen by virtue of her
marriage on January 25, 1962
to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO
alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO
LIM, under the Naturalization
Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be
disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she
possesses all the qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been
admitted as a temporary visitor only on March
13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at
least, the requisite length of residence in the
Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2,
Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the
law that the alien woman, to
be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of
marriage to a Filipino citizen,
need only be not disqualified
under the Naturalization Law,
it would have been worded
"and who herself is not
disqualified to become a
citizen of the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese
woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof,
was to expire last February 28, 1962, having
married her co-plaintiff only on January 25,
1962, or just a little over one month before the
72
expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said
marriage was effected merely for convenience
to defeat or avoid her then impending
compulsory departure, not to say deportation.
This cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung, having been admitted
as a temporary alien visitor on
the strength of a deliberate
and voluntary representation
that she will enter and stay
only for a period of one month
and thereby secured a visa,
cannot go back on her
representation to stay
permanently without first
departing from the Philippines
as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration,
G. R. No. L-9966, September
29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs.
Board of Commissioners, G. R.
No. L-6017, September 16,
1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil.
Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor
General is well buttressed not only by the
decided cases of the Supreme Court on the
point mentioned above, but also on the very
provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a
non-immigrant cannot remain
in the Philippines
permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart
voluntarily to some foreign
country and procure from the
appropriate Philippine Consul
the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by the
Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine
port of entry for determination
of his admissibility in
accordance with the
requirements of this Act. (This
paragraph is added by
Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9,
subparagraph (g) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of
1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of
Immigration is charged with the administration
of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com.
Act No. 613) and in the performance of his
duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law
gives the Commissioner of Immigration a wide
discretion, a quasi-judicial function in
determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy
So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R.
No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his
decision thereon may not be disturbed unless
he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of
his jurisdiction.
 It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau
Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently
talk in broken Tagalog and English, she
admitted that she cannot write either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor
which could have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is
the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in
the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru
the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not
possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course,
as an additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also
emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the
lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of
petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb
for seven months a child by her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the
court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE
LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15,
REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW)
INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN
WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL
THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A
WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS
ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR
CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO
CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN
AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH
(9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF
1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU
YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO
CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY
BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST
OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF
HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN
EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID
OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE
COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH
WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD
MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST
AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE
FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO
CITIZEN.
V
73
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN
REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE
COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU
YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A
TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR
COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19,
1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect,
the above decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of
the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been
admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only
for a period of one month and thereby secured a
visa, cannot go back on her representation to
stay permanently without first departing from
the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29,
1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners,
G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par.
Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to
an alien does not automatically confer on the
latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must
possess all the qualifications required by law to
become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and
none of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay,
Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R.
No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper
resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised in
appellants' assignments of error, hence, We will base our
discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the
matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth assignments
of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of
fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien
who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant
cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the
country first and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from
the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the
assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino
citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed
decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume
that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said
petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her
marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as
entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without
having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion
of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant
cannot remain in the Philippines permanently.
To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some
foreign country and procure from the
appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa
and thereafter undergo examination by the
officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as
temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire
Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows
upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not,
as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the
immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate
their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed
disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien to convert
their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in
circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision
already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to
the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that he will enter only
for a limited time, and thereby secures the
benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not
allow him subsequently to go back on his
representation and stay permanently, without
first departing from the Philippines as he had
promised. No officer can relieve him of the
departure requirements of section 9 of the
Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or
"correction", for the law makes no distinctions,
and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling
would, as stated in our previous decision,
encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false
pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for
a limited time, might then claim a right to
permanent admission, however flimsy such
claim should be, and thereby compel our
government to spend time, money and effort to
examining and verifying whether or not every
such alien really has a right to take up
permanent residence here. In the meanwhile,
the alien would be able to prolong his stay and
evade his return to the port whence he came,
contrary to what he promised to do when he
entered. The damages inherent in such ruling
are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an
alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the
meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the
Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-
entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled
to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible
as a necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality
by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him.
Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor children of
an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they
become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law
that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still
have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to
determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent
74
residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a
requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue
against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as
1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice
Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to
a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of
the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were
correct, it would follow that, in consequence of
her marriage, she had been naturalized as such
citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from
would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the
event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen
... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit
is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or
his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that
the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically
produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights
of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay
in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by
its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a
law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.
In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and
fourth assignments of error are well taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained
by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to
appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino
citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a
Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she
does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for
naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth
Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor
General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the
proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all
the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the
respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without
requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for
naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with
what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v.
Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated
December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713,1 for it was only in Zita
Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated
on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr.
Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman
who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply
for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization
proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has
complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other
applicant for naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of
our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration
is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us,
however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only
to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as
a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in
all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.3
Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization (b) Persons defending or
Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was teaching the necessity or
in the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at propriety of violence, personal
bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary assault, or assassination for
visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, the success and
1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On predominance of their ideas;
March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to
stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On
(c) Polygamists or believers in
March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of
the practice of polygamy;
Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had
become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for the
cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, (d) Persons convicted of
the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to crimes involving moral
do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her turpitude;
bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court
sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave,
(e) Persons suffering from
because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond
mental alienation or incurable
should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In
contagious diseases;
the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief
Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
(f) Persons who, during the
period of their residence in
The next and most important question for
the Philippines, have not
determination is whether her marriage to a
mingled socially with the
Filipino justified or, at least, excused the
Filipinos, or who have not
aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from
evinced a sincere desire to
the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In
learn and embrace the
maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners
customs, traditions, and ideals
alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly
of the Filipinos;
Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were
correct, it would follow that, in consequence of (g) Citizens or subjects of
her marriage, she had been naturalized as such nations with whom the ...
citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from Philippines are at war, during
would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of the period of such war;
Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in
the event of the naturalization as a Philippine
(h) Citizens or subjects of a
citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond
foreign country other than the
deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or
United States, whose laws
the sum deposited shall be returned to the
does not grant Filipinos the
depositor or his legal representative." Thus the
right to become naturalized
issue boils down to whether an alien female who
citizens or subjects thereof.
marries a male citizen of the Philippines
follows ipso facto his political status.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor
allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does
The pertinent part of section 15 of
not fall under any of the classes disqualified by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which
law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that,
petitioners rely, reads:
despite her failure to depart from the Philippines
within the period specified in the bond in
Any woman who is now or question, there has been no breach thereof,
may hereafter be married to a petitioners have the burden of proving her
citizen of the Philippines, and alleged change of political status, from alien to
who might herself be lawfully citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not
naturalized shall be deemed a made out, therefore a case against the
citizen of the Philippines. respondents-appellants.

Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she "herself may be lawfully
naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of
the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of
1950),* this limitation of section 15 excludes,
from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
those disqualified from being naturalized as
citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:
Considering, however, that neither in the
administrative proceedings, nor in the lower
court, had the parties seemingly felt that there
was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be
lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of
first impression in our courts, we are of the
opinion that, in the interest of equity and
justice, the parties herein should be given an
opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have
any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .

(a) Persons opposed to As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no
organized government or doubt was left in the above decision as regards the following
affiliated with any association propositions: .
or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized
governments;

75
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino
makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only
those disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the
law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be
presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by the
Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina;
and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law,
the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be
made as to qualifications,5 specially considering that the decision
cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the
most important of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as
amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act
No. 473), provided that "any woman who is now
or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines." A similar provision in the
naturalization law of the United States has been
construed as not requiring the woman to have
the qualifications of residence, good character,
etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race
of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v.
Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11,
12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F.
449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s.
1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I
stated that the clause "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized", should be construed as
not requiring the woman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc.,
as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race
of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79,
s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been
removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it
results that any woman who married a citizen of
the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939,
and the marriage not having been dissolved,
and on the assumption that she possesses none
of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the
citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s.
1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would
seem that the only material point of inquiry is as
to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be
found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife,
Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to
the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act
No. 473, which reads in part as follows:
76
Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized", as contained in the above
provision, means that the woman who is
married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to
any of the disqualified classes enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec.
of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95,
s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the
facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura
does not appear to be among the disqualified
classes mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or
Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a
Filipino mother, he should be considered as a
citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the
well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows
the citizenship of his only legally recognized
parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98
& 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband
being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily
be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by
marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No.
52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo
Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are,
must have so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May
22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil.
521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the
basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1,
1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On
December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for
purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she
married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the
Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review
of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners
insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so,
the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The
lower court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said
decision, it held, on the other hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has
ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang,
supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid
marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer
his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law requires that the alien
woman who marries a Filipino must show, in
addition, that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in
the decision cited, this last condition requires
proof that the woman who married a Filipino is
herself not disqualified under section 4 of the
Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the
claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by
Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner,
is untenable. The lower court, therefore,
committed no error in refusing to interfere with
the deportation proceedings, where she can
anyway establish the requisites indispensable
 for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well
as the alleged validity of her Indonesian
passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of
Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997,
May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis
supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this
Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove
the fact that they were not suffering from any of the
disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any
judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore,
that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on
the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven
that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization
Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization
proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no
reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need
also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary
of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need
not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus
Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this
Court,6 so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly
Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only
to show that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of
the statute, such as those relating to the
qualifications of an applicant for naturalization
through judicial proceedings, is not necessary.
(See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty.
Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s.
1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha
et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760,
promulgated May 17, 1957, where the Supreme
Court, construing the abovequoted section of
the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a
male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship
to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of
Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, those disqualified
from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the
decisive factor that defeats the right of the
foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of
these groups The Commissioner of Immigration
does not say so but merely predicates his
negative action on the ground that a warrant of
deportation for "overstaying" is pending against
the petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken.
Since the grounds for disqualification for
naturalization are expressly enumerated in the
77
law, a warrant of deportation not based on a
finding of unfitness to become naturalized for
any of those specified causes may not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine
citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op.
No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the
procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration
is as follows: The alien woman must file a
petition for the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration alleging, among other
things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen
and that she is not disqualified from acquiring
her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any
of the groups disqualified by the cited section
from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
(please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau
of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s.
19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha
et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760,
promulgated May 17, 1957), where the
Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted
section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held
that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless
she herself may be lawfully naturalized," and
that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from
the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of
the Philippines under Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the
decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice
Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine
enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new
one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that
under paragraph I of Section 15 Of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a
male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship
to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several
earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No.
95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950,
"this limitation of section 15 excludes from the
benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of
the Philippines under section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962
of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the
above construction of the law was importantly modified by this
Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's
authorized period of temporary stay in the
Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March 1955
the Commissioner of Immigration asked the
bondsman to present her to the Bureau of
Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of
notice, otherwise the bond will be
confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the
bondsman to comply with the foregoing order,
on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of
Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated
(Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration
confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike
in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal
proceedings, where the Court must enter an
order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman
must be given an opportunity to present his
principal or give a satisfactory reason for his
inability to do so, before final judgment may be
entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule
110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of
bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien
in the Philippines, no court proceeding is
necessary. Once a breach of the terms and
conditions of the undertaking in the bond is
committed, the Commissioner of Immigration
may, under the terms and conditions thereof,
declare it forfeited in favor of the Government.
(In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan
Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in
marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las
Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which
included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok
Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was
married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the
bondsman from his liability on the bond. The
marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the
violation of the terms and conditions of the
undertaking in the bond — failure to depart
from the Philippines upon expiration of her
authorized period of temporary stay in the
Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report
to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24
hours from receipt of notice — were committed
before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of
a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon
the latter. She must possess the qualifications
required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.* There is no showing that the
appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen
by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is
the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the
fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife
"must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15,
Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the
opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court
in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940,
78
above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion
rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not
requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good
character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings but merely that she is of the race by persons who
may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously
significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be
said that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new
posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should
have been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo
Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but
apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand
then of the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely
raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on
the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum,
Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of
the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the
Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," so
that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not
suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in
Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no
evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of
disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the
apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and
Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a separate
concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly
Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both
qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without
elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said first
two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto
Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San
Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA
638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese
woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary
visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a
Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry
date of her permit, and when she was requested to leave after her
authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she
had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position,
she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not
possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case
reached the court, the trial judge held for the government that in
addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to,
there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all
the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a
native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing
that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the
possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be
shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held
affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has
anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis
of the decision laid down in the case of Leonard
v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit
Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary
that the woman "should be a person of the class
or race permitted to be naturalized by existing
laws, and that in respect of the qualifications
arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the
wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as
qualified for citizenship, and therefore
considered a citizen." (In explanation of its
conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during
the life of the woman or afterwards, the
question of her citizenship arises in a legal
proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship
by reason of her marriage with a citizen must
not only prove such marriage, but also that the
woman then possessed all the further
qualifications necessary to her becoming
naturalized under existing laws, the statute will
be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a
share. The proof of the facts may have existed
at the time of the marriage, but years after,
when a controversy arises upon the subject, it
may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to
prove was that she was a free white woman or a
woman of African descent or nativity, in order to
be deemed an American citizen, because, with
respect to the rest of the qualifications on
residence, moral character, etc., she was
presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended
by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of
persons who alone might become citizens of the
Philippines, even as it provided who were
disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions of
that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become
Philippine citizens —
Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by (a) natives of the
Philippines who are not
citizens thereof under the
Jones Law; (b) natives of the
Insular possessions of the
United States; (c) citizens of
the United States,
foreigners who under the laws
of the United States may
become citizens of said
country if residing therein.
Section 3. Qualifications. —
The persons comprised in
subsection (a) of section one
of this Act, in order to be able
to acquire Philippine
citizenship, must be not less
than twenty-one years of age
on the day of the hearing of
their petition.
The persons comprised in
subsections (b) and (c) of said
section one shall, in addition
to being not less than twenty-
one years of age on the day of
the hearing of the petition,
have all and each of the
following qualifications:
First. Residence in the
Philippine Islands for a
continuous period of not less
than five years, except as
provided in the next following
section;
Second. To have conducted
themselves in a proper and
irreproachable manner during
the entire period of their
residence in the Philippine
Islands, in their relation with
the constituted government
as well as with the community
in which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine
Islands real estate worth not
or
less than one thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or have
some known trade or
profession; and

Fourth. To speak and write

Section 2. Who are
English, Spanish, or some
disqualified. — The following
native tongue.
cannot be naturalized as
Philippine citizens: (a) Persons
opposed to organized In case the petitioner is a
government or affiliated with foreign subject, he shall,
any association or group of besides, declare in writing and
persons who uphold and teach under oath his intention of
doctrines opposing all renouncing absolutely and
organized government; (b) perpetually all faith and
persons defending or teaching allegiance to the foreign
the necessity or propriety of authority, state or sovereignty
violence, personal assault or of which he was a native,
assassination for the success citizen or subject.
and predominance of their
ideas; (c) polygamists or
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v.
believers in the practice of
Grant supra, to our law as it then stood, alien
polygamy; (d) persons
women married to citizens of the Philippines
convicted of crimes involving
must, in order to be deemed citizens of the
moral turpitude; (e) persons
Philippines, be either (1) natives of the
suffering from mental
Philippines who were not citizens thereof under
alienation or incurable
the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular
contagious diseases; (f)
possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens
citizens or subjects of nations
of the United States or foreigners who under the
with whom the United States
laws of the United States might become citizens
and the Philippines are at war,
of that country if residing therein. With respect
during the period of such war.
to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the
former law, they were deemed to have the
same for all intents and purposes.

79
 But, with the approval of the Revised 875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous
Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong
on June 17, 1939, Congress has since discarded and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino
class or racial consideration from the citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting
qualifications of applicants for naturalization him nationalization and required her to leave and this order was
(according to its proponent, the purpose in contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
eliminating this consideration was, first, to
remove the features of the existing
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of
naturalization act which discriminated in favor
Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated
of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are
November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs. Commissioner
our neighbors, and are related to us by racial
of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October
affinity and, second, to foster amity with all
31, 1963), we held that the fact that the
nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]),
husband became a naturalized citizen does not
even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in
automatically make the wife a citizen of the
question. The result is that the phrase "who
Philippines. It must also be shown that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be
herself possesses all the qualifications, and
understood in the context in which it is now
none of the disqualifications, to become a
found, in a setting so different from that in
citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much
which it was found by the Court in Leonard v.
less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to
Grant.
become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore,
the fact that a decision was favorably made on
The only logical deduction from the elimination the naturalization petition of her husband is no
of class or racial consideration is that, as the assurance that he (the husband) would become
Solicitor General points out, the phrase "who a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now her temporary stay.
be understood as referring to those who under
Section 2 of the law are qualified to become
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136,
citizens of the Philippines.
December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the
same ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy,
There is simply no support for the view that the held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November
phrase "who might herself be lawfully 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino
naturalized" must now be understood as citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on
requiring merely that the alien woman must not January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she
belong to the class of disqualified persons under came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the
Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid law.
down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not
disqualified is not necessarily qualified to
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter
become a citizen of the Philippines, because the
under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination
law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications"
thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26,
in separate sections. And then it must not be
1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted
lost sight of that even under the interpretation
Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on
given to the former law, it was to be understood
January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the
that the alien woman was not disqualified under
Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and
Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not
Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to
rule that it was enough if the alien woman does
expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband
not belong to the class of disqualified persons in
asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien
order that she may be deemed to follow the
certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the reason
citizenship of her husband: What that case held
that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to
was that the phrase "who might herself be
the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted.
lawfully naturalized, merely means that she
Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice
belongs to the class or race of persons qualified
Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in
to become citizens by naturalization — the
Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in
assumption being always that she is not
line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine
otherwise disqualified.
citizenship.7

We therefore hold that under the first paragraph

No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-
of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien
20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily
woman, who is married to a citizen of the
reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of
Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her
mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of
husband only if she has all the qualifications
Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she
and none of the disqualifications provided by
did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had
law. Since there is no proof in this case that
submitted only an affidavit that she had none of the
petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in
disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold
any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino
eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June
citizen does not automatically make her a
30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that
she is not in any way disqualified to become a
citizen of this country was correctly disregarded Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L.
by the trial court, the same being self-serving. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee
by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on
the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner
other affirmative requirements of the law." 9
of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA

80
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July
30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien
woman who is widowed during the dependency of the
naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may
be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving
compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that
she possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the
process the decision to such effect discussed above, 11even as he
impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R.
No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the
assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on
the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and
children. — Any woman, who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this
law who have been born in the Philippines shall
be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the
Philippines at the time of the naturalization of
the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who
is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen
only during his minority, unless he begins to
reside permanently in the Philippines when still
a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a
Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the
naturalization of his parent, shall be considered
a Philippine citizen unless within one year after
reaching the age of majority he fails to register
himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and
to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a
Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently becomes a
Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not
suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law,
she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law?
if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as
recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an
affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable, specially,
if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for
decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang,
Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy
King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances,
however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court
take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in
the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who
were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members,
Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result,
precisely, according to them, because (they wanted to leave the
point now under discussion open in so far as they are
concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at
length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion for
reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici
curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and
81
summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful
manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also
the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual
situation of the thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so
long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have
always lived and acted as such, officially or otherwise, relying on
the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such
by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well
as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford
the Court an opportunity to consider the views of the five justices
who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion),
the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the
ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy
King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not
categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice
relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points
brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem
to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear
further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal
provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the
Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted
from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said
provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American
provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per
adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the
Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that of
March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of
the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the
Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United
States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of
1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express
authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the
Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and
immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine
Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws
on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own;
everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside herein who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April,
eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held
to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United
States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain
in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act
of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is
hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not
come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing
in the Philippine Islands who would become
citizens of the United States, under the laws of
the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: . twenty-one years at the time
of the naturalization of their
parents, shall, if dwelling in
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine
the Philippine Islands, be
Islands who were Spanish subjects on the
considered citizens thereof.
eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, SEC. 13(c). Children of
shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the persons naturalized under this
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have law who have been born in
elected to preserve their allegiance to the the Philippine Islands after the
Crown of Spain in accordance with the naturalization of their parents
provisions of the treaty of peace between the shall be considered citizens
United States and Spain, signed at Paris thereof.
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-
eight and except such others as have since
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was
become citizens of some other country:
enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision.
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by
As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do
except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it
not come within the foregoing provisions, the
could not have been on any other basis than this legislative
natives of the insular possessions of the United
history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the
States, and such other persons residing in the
decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty,
Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
discussed above, were rendered.
States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the
first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said
marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no
organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon
need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a
the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil
Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she
Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were,
does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section
however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was
4 of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of
unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed
whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof
that of the husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision
need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the
regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the
possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was
citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien
not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out
woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a
why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law
Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided
should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a
thus: .
Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.

SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of

petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision
has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The
decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned,
produce the same legal effect as if it had been
rendered during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act
3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were
added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are
hereby inserted between sections thirteen and
fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred
and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is
now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands and who
might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippine
Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of
persons who have been duly
naturalized under this law,
being under the age of
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice
Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United
States, our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons
who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were
disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our
Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section
providing who might become citizens, allegedly in order to
remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against
Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who
might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as
referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to
become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no
support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely
that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified
persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which
for ready reference may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform
ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The
alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first prove
that she has all the qualifications required by
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization
Law before she may be deemed a Philippine
citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30,
1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775,
Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner
of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963;
Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27,

82
1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted
the question anew to the court for a possible
reexamination of the said ruling in the light of
the interpretation of a similar law in the United
States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was
section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855
(Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed
on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the
former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No.
2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920.
Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of
Philippine citizenship was limited to three
classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines
who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the
other insular possessions of the United States;
and (c) citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who, under the laws of the United
States, may become citizens of the latter
country if residing therein. The reference in
subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become
American Citizens is restrictive in character, for
only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as
racial restrictions were concerned there was at
the time a similarity between the naturalization
laws of the two countries and hence there was
reason to accord here persuasive force to the
interpretation given in the United States to the
statutory provision concerning the citizenship of
alien women marrying American citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason
has ceased to exist since the enactment of the
Revised Naturalization Law, (Commonwealth Act
No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial
restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but
the provision found in Act No. 3448 has been
maintained. It is logical to presume that when
Congress chose to retain the said provision —
that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon
marriage the alien wife must be one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is
no longer to the class or race to which the
woman belongs, for class or race has become
immaterial, but to the qualifications and
disqualifications for naturalization as
enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute.
Otherwise the requirement that the woman
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be
meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled
norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in
other cases heretofore decided is believed to be
in line with the national policy of selective
admission to Philippine citizenship, which after
all is a privilege granted only to those who are
found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately
to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage
to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines,
irrespective of moral character, ideological
beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals,
customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she
has all the qualifications for naturalization,
even, indeed, that she has none of the
disqualifications, she is not entitled to
recognition as a Philippine citizen.
83
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the
arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to
establish that: (1) she has been residing in the
Philippines for a continuous period of at least
(10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation
(p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and
write English, or any of the principal Philippine
languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner
contends that the words emphasized indicate
that the present Naturalization Law requires
that an alien woman who marries a Filipino
husband must possess the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being
disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h")
subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by
marriage, both the appellee and the court below
(in its second decision) sustain the view that all
that the law demands is that the woman be not
disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to
the court of origin (1960) the question at issue
could be regarded as not conclusively settled,
there being only the concise pronouncement
in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-
11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect that:
The marriage of a Filipino
citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer
Philippine citizenship upon the
latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law
to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of
decisions of this Court has firmly established the
rule that the requirement of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act),
that an alien woman married to a citizen should
be one who "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," means not only woman free from
the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of
the Act but also one who possesses the
qualifications prescribed by section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-
18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of
Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok
Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v.
Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee
v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v.
Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The
qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the
Naturalization Act, and the disqualifications
enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is
that the wife of a Filipino be not disqualified
under section 4, the result might well be that
citizenship would be conferred upon persons in
violation of the policy of the statute. For
example, section 4 disqualifies only —
 (c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of
gambling or bawdy houses, not previously
convicted by a competent court would not be
thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the
law did not intend such person to be admitted
as a citizen in view of the requirement of
section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must
be of good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a
convinced believer in racial supremacy, in
government by certain selected classes, in the
right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk",
and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying
the Philippine Constitution; yet she would not be
disqualified under section 4, as long as she is
not "opposed to organized government," nor
affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching
doctrines opposing all organized governments",
nor "defending or teaching the necessity or
propriety of violence, personal assault or
assassination for the success or predominance
of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to
illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on
the absence of disqualifications, without taking
into account the other affirmative requirements
of the law, which, in the case at bar, the
appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does not
possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived
from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994)
and should be given the same territorial and
racial significance given to it by American
courts, this Court has rejected the same in Lon
San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30,
1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351,
March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing
rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot bat reveal
certain relevant considerations which adversely affect the
premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the
conclusions arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1
of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship,
the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised
Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for
naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to
Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians
only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note,
to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the
whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine
citizens. — Philippine citizenship may be
acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who
are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b)
natives of the other Insular possessions of the
United States; (c) citizens of the United States,
or foreigners who under the laws of the United
84
States may become citizens of said country if
residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole
provision was there any mention of race or color of the persons
who were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more
evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable
subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth
American regime to the understandable stations flowing from our
staffs as a territory of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of
Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved
pursuant to express authority without which it could not have
been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States
Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of
the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have
already been footed earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of
the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the
exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under
the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was
eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial
discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine
Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from
the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the fact
that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects
rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the
reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to
foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in
character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said
subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to
confine the grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the
three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which
were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who
could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the
provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any
particular race or color and of excluding others, but more
accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for
American citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact
is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927
became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States
already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of
the Congress of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or
who is opposed to organized government, or
who is a member of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining and teaching such
disbelief in or opposition to organized
government, or who advocates or teaches the
duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful
assaulting or killing of any officer or officers,
either of specific individuals or of officers
generally, of the Government of the United
States, or of any other organized government,
because of his or their official character, or who
is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made
a citizen of the United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for
Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they
happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact,
said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau
of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform
Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States"
contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to
Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly
repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was
enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any
connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced
back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912
already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the
rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory
that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth
Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial
discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual
basis. 17
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent
reason why the construction adopted in the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of
the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the
first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a
reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act
3448, and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy,
deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the
United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such
repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable construction
uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had
occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be
considered, as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost
trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they
knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that,
therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have
in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the
construction given to it by the American courts as well as the
Attorney General of the United States and all administrative
authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization
and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77
Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952];
Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct.
756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S
Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S.
110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus
Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the
American courts and administrative authorities is contained in
United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod,
Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided
November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp.
Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117)
provides as follows: "Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
United States, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to
originate in the Act of Congress of February 10,
1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which in its
second section provided "that any woman, who
might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws, married, or who shall be married to a
citizen of the United States, shall be deemed
and taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is
substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute
7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which provided
that "any woman married, or who shall be
married, to a natural-born subject or person
naturalized, shall be deemed and taken to be
herself naturalized, and have all the rights and
privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42
Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b,
Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p. 255), being "An
Act Relative to the Naturalization and
Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides
85
"that any woman who marries a citizen of the
United States after the passage of this Act, ...
shall not become a citizen of the United States
by reason of such marriage ..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of
the Revised Statutes ... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall
not terminate citizenship acquired or retained
under either of such sections, ..." meaning 2 and
6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has
no application to the facts of the present case,
as the marriage of the relator took place prior to
its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon
the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the
Revised Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7
Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed
this provision as found in the Act of 1855 as
follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be
naturalized under the existing laws," only limits
the application of the law to free white women.
The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the
time, only required that the person applying for
its benefits should be "a free white person," and
not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the
statute to those aliens who belonged to the
class or race which might be lawfully
naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other
provisions of the naturalization laws as to
residence or moral character, or to any of the
provisions of the immigration laws relating to
the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11,
District Judge Deady also construed the Act of
1855, declaring that "any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
United States, and might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." He held
that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not
the necessity, of the case," the statute must be
construed as in effect declaring that an alien
woman, who is of the class or race that may be
lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and
who marries a citizen of the United States, is
such a citizen also, and it was not necessary
that it should appear affirmatively that she
possessed the other qualifications at the time of
her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice
Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United
States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien woman, a
subject of Prussia came to the United States and
married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice
Harlan, with the concurrence of Judge Treat,
held that upon her marriage she became ipso
facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if
she had complied with all of the provisions of
the statutes upon the subject of naturalization.
He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19
L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of
persons" who might be lawfully naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1,
130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the
United States from France and entered the
country contrary to the immigration laws. The
immigration authorities took her into custody at
the port of New York, with the view of deporting
her. She applied for her release under a writ of
habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of
the matter she married a naturalized American
citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth
Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she
was entitled to be discharged from custody. The
court declared: "The rule is well settled that her
marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United
States entitled her to be discharged. The status
of the wife follows that of her husband, ... and
by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil
became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of
Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had
before it the application of a husband for his
final decree of naturalization. It appeared that
at that time his wife was held by the
immigration authorities at New York on the
ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous
and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides
agreed that the effect of the husband's
naturalization would be to confer citizenship
upon the wife. In view of that contingency
District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the
husband's application for naturalization, and
thought it best to wait until it was determined
whether the wife's disease was curable. He
placed his failure to act on the express ground
that the effect of naturalizing the husband
might naturalize her. At the same time he
express his opinion that the husband's
naturalization would not effect her
naturalization, as she was not one who could
become lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity
(to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a
prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If
herself lacking in that capacity, the married
status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing,
however, was actually decided in that case, and
the views expressed therein are really nothing
more than mere dicta. But, if they can be
regarded as something more than that, we find
ourselves, with all due respect for the learned
judge, unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v.
Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned
Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of the
Turkish Empire, who married an American
citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to
the United States, could not be excluded,
although she had, at the time of her entry, a
disease which under the immigration laws would
have been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if
she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case
was brought into this court on appeal, and in
1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed.
322. In that case, however at the time the
relators married, they might have been lawfully
naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume
the contention of the district attorney to be
correct that marriage will not make a citizen of
a woman who would be excluded under our
immigration laws, it does not affect these
relators."
86
We held that, being citizens, they could not be
excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be
inconsistent with the policy of our law that the
husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien. The distinction between that case and the
one now before the court is that, in the former
case, the marriage took place before any order
of exclusion had been made, while in this the
marriage was celebrated after such an order
was made. But such an order is a mere
administrative provision, and has not the force
of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel.
The administrative order is based on the
circumstances that existed at the time the order
of exclusion was made. If the circumstances
change prior to the order being carried into
effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an
order of exclusion should be based on the
ground that the alien was at the time afflicted
with a contagious disease, and it should be
made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual
deportation, that the alien had entirely
recovered from the disease, we think it plain
that the order could not be carried into effect.
So, in this case, if, after the making of the order
of exclusion and while she is permitted
temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries
an American citizen, we cannot doubt the
validity of her marriage, and that she thereby
acquired, under international law and under
1994 of the Revised Statutes, American
citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There
upon, the immigration authorities lost their
jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies
only to aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex
parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the
right of the officials to deport a woman under
the following circumstances: She entered this
country in July, 1910, being an alien and having
been born in Turkey. She was taken into
custody by the immigration authorities in the
following September, and in October a warrant
for her deportation was issued. Pending
hearings as to the validity of that order, she was
paroled in the custody of her counsel. The
ground alleged for her deportation was that she
was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious
disease at the time of her entry. One of the
reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that
the woman had married a citizen of the United
States pending the proceedings for her
deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself
unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect
claimed, in view of the facts shown." He held
that it was no part of the intended policy of
1994 to annul or override the immigration laws,
so as to authorize the admission into the
country of the wife of a naturalized alien not
otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien
woman, who is of a class of persons excluded by
law from admission to the United States does
not come within the provisions of that section.
The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained
in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were
cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte
Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and
held that where, pending proceedings to deport
an alien native of France as an alien prostitute,
she was married to a citizen of the United
States, she thereby became a citizen, and was solemnized after her arrest or after the
not subject to deportation until her citizenship commission of acts which make her liable to
was revoked by due process of law. It was his deportation under this act."
opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage
was conceived in fraud, and was entered into
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws
the above change in the law:
and preventing her deportation, such fact
should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the (1) Congress deemed legislation essential to
purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal prevent women of the immoral class avoiding
was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022. deportation through the device of marrying an
American citizen.
It is interesting also to observe the construction
placed upon the language of the statute by the (2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an
Department of Justice. In 1874, Attorney American citizen with an alien woman of any
General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, other of the excluded classes, either before or
passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held after her detention, should not confer upon her
that residence within the United States for the American citizenship, thereby entitling her to
period required by the naturalization laws was enter the country, its intention would have been
riot necessary in order to constitute an alien expressed, and 19 would not have been
woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of confined solely to women of the immoral class.
the United States abroad, although she never
resided in the United States, she and her
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on
husband having continued to reside abroad
the subject and We have found no warrant for the proposition that
after the marriage.
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar,
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and
Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression.
rendered by Attorney General Wickersham. It The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most
appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight cited among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:
years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in
New York and went at once to a town in
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges
Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About
of citizenship upon women married to citizens of
fifteen months after her arrival she was taken
the United States, if they are of the class of
before a United States commissioner by way of
persons for whose naturalization the previous
instituting proceedings under the Immigration
Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married"
Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat.
or "who shall be married," do not refer in our
4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her
judgment, to the time when the ceremony of
deportation, on the ground that she had entered
marriage is celebrated, but to a state of
this country for the purpose of prostitution, and
marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman,
had been found an inmate of a house of
who under previous Acts might be naturalized,
prostitution and practicing the same within
is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his
three years after landing. It appeared, however,
citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or
that after she was taken before the United
subsequently, or before or after the marriage,
States commissioner, but prior to her arrest
she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His
under a warrant by the Department of Justice,
citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under
she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen
the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction
of the United States. The woman professed at
which would restrict the Act to women whose
the time of her marriage an intention to
husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens,
abandon her previous mode of life and to
would exclude far the greater number, for
remove with her husband to his home in
whose benefit, as we think, the Act was
Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life
intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow
had been, but professed to believe in her good
her citizenship to follow that of her husband,
intentions. The question was raised as to the
without the necessity of any application for
right to deport her, the claim being advance
naturalization on her part; and, if this was the
that by her marriage she bad become an
object, there is no reason for the restriction
American citizen and therefore could not be
suggested.
deported. The Attorney General ruled against
the right to deport her as she had become an
American citizen. He held that the words, "who The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized
might herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a under the existing laws," only limit the
class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, application of the law to free white women. The
and that compliance with the other conditions of previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time
the naturalization laws was not required. 27 only required that the person applying for its
Ops. Atty. Gen. 507. benefits should be "a free white person," and
not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2
Stat. at L. 153.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that
it has not escaped our observation that
Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of A similar construction was given to the Act by
1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v.
to an American citizen of a female of the Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one which gives
sexually immoral classes ... shall not invest such the widest extension to its provisions.
female with United States citizenship if the
marriage of such alien female shall be

87
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might
lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the
application to free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that
the person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free
white person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply
because under the Naturalization Law of the United States at the
time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens
had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be
seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if
in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was
mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial
requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time;
and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to
make it clear that under the previous naturalization law, there
was also such requirement in addition to race. This is impotent,
since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The
expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms
"who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit
the application of the law to free white women, must be
interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the
incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning
that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a
citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more
necessarily, but on whether or not there were other
disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage
or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the
second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that because
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473,
it follows that in place of the said eliminated section particularly
its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien
wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not
only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that
she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2,
such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence
to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution,
irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of
real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and
one of the principal local languages, education of children in
certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section
2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of
Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We
have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not
sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We
have already explained above of the mentioned provisions has
been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear
intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15
is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States, which, at the time of the approval of
Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled construction by
American courts and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent
American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that in
the construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised
Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken,
from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United
States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of
residence, good moral character, adherence to the Constitution,
etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only
eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to
which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We
have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra,
discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for
such posture of the American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in
section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of
1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to be
88
a citizen" while it may imply that the person to
whom it relates has not actually become a
citizen by ordinary means or in the usual way,
as by the judgment of a competent court, upon
a proper application and proof, yet it does not
follow that such person is on that account
practically any the less a citizen. The word
"deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or
"judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as
true of any person or thing, must, in law, be
considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning "such person or thing,
and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien
woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
"deemed' an American citizen, the effect when
the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her
being naturalized directly by an act of Congress,
or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory
construction that in a situation like this wherein our legislature
has copied an American statute word for word, it is understood
that the construction already given to such statute before its
being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no
reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the
provision in question. At least, We have already seen that the
views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in
accurate factual premises related to the real legislative
background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present
form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility
requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny
from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as
Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-
existed already with practically the same provision as Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who may
be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended
by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in
Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions of
Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the
effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely,
according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at
the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such
qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their
counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not
supposed to be taken into account and that what should be
considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for
in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to
convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American
courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448
which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by
Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time,
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no
longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of
September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic
naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required,
instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings,
albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In
other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question,
which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in
American law, the Americans had already abandoned said
phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to
be natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that,
since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had
two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with
its settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all,
the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization and it appears these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law
that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already
conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had
Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was never been considered to be of any relevance in determining
approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the
then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens,
disregard the old American law and make one of our own, or, at and our law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from the
least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but American statutes.
still, our legislators chose to maintain the language of the old law.
What then is significantly important is not that the legislature
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal
maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was
provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the United
eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after
States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the
the Americans had amended their law in order to provide for what
same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for
is now contended to be the construction that should be given to
reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February
the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our legislature
23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American
courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by
those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to
adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, prove "qualifications" —
but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the
phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and
There is one practical consideration that
what is more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the
strongly militates against a construction that
modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the
Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife
old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in
of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she
defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to
possesses the qualifications prescribed under
say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation
Section 2, before she may be deemed a citizen.
and that it should be construed independently of the previous
Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife,
American posture because of the difference of circumstances here
becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance
and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the
therewith manifestly difficult. The
construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or
unreasonableness of such requirement is shown
perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view
by the following:
seems to indicate otherwise.

1. One of the qualifications

5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to
required of an Applicant for
emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so called racial
naturalization under Section 2
requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine
of the law is that the applicant
laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same
"must have resided in the
sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in
Philippines for a continuous
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have
period of not less than ten
always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that
years." If this requirement is
those who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be
applied to an alien wife
lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the
married to a Filipino citizen,
disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those
this means that for a period of
under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally,
ten years at least, she cannot
are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in
hope to acquire the
paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear
citizenship of her husband. If
impression anyone will surely get after going over all the
the wife happens to be a
American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest
citizen of a country whose law
USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first
declares that upon her
decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and
marriage to a foreigner she
Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the secretary of
automatically loses her
Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial
citizenship and acquires the
requirements were always treated as disqualifications in the same
citizenship of her husband,
light as the other disqualifications under the law, why should their
this could mean that for a
elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or
period of ten years at least,
a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination
she would be stateless. And
have instead the meaning that what were previously considered
even after having acquired
as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as
continuous residence in the
seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the
Philippines for ten years, there
effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473
is no guarantee that her
of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act
petition for naturalization will
2927 (as amended by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination
be granted, in which case she
of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature
would remain stateless for an
had in mind making the phrase in question "who may be lawfully
indefinite period of time.
naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to
the qualification under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473?
Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of 2. Section 2 of the law
persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under likewise requires of the
Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the applicant for naturalization
elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could that he "must own real estate
not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of in the Philippines worth not
increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that used less than five thousand pesos,
to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of Philippine currency, or must
logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into have some known lucrative

89
trade, profession, or lawful
occupation." Considering the
constitutional prohibition
against acquisition by an alien
of real estate except in cases
of hereditary succession (Art.
XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an
alien wife desiring to acquire
the citizenship of her husband
must have to prove that she
has a lucrative income derived
from a lawful trade, profession
or occupation. The income
requirement has been
interpreted to mean that the
petitioner herself must be the
one to possess the said
income. (Uy v. Republic, L-
19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa
Ong vs. Republic, L-20605,
June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v.
Republic, L-20912, November
29, 1965). In other words, the
wife must prove that she has
a lucrative income derived
from sources other than her
husband's trade, profession or
calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that
most wives in the Philippines
do not have gainful
occupations of their own.
Indeed, Philippine law,
recognizing the dependence
of the wife upon the husband,
imposes upon the latter the
duty of supporting the former.
(Art. 291, Civil Code). It should
be borne in mind that
universally, it is an accepted
concept that when a woman
marries, her primary duty is to
be a wife, mother and
housekeeper. If an alien wife
is not to be remiss in this
duty, how can she hope to
acquire a lucrative income of
her own to qualify her for
citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law,
the applicant for
naturalization "must have
enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the
public schools or private
schools recognized by the
Office of the Private Education
of the Philippines, where
Philippine history, government
and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the
school curriculum during the
entire period of residence in
the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his
petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen." If an alien
woman has minor children by
a previous marriage to
another alien before she
marries a Filipino, and such
minor children had not been
enrolled in Philippine schools
90
during her period of residence
in the country, she cannot
qualify for naturalization
under the interpretation of
this Court. The reason behind
the requirement that children
should be enrolled in
recognized educational
institutions is that they follow
the citizenship of their father.
(Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-
5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi
v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117
[1951]; Hao Lian Chu v.
Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950];
Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177,
May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong
v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26,
1950). Considering that said
minor children by her first
husband generally follow the
citizenship of their alien
father, the basis for such
requirement as applied to her
does not exist. Cessante
ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law,
the 10-year continuous
residence prescribed by
Section 2 "shall be understood
as reduced to five years for
any petitioner (who is)
married to a Filipino woman."
It is absurd that an alien male
married to a Filipino wife
should be required to reside
only for five years in the
Philippines to qualify for
citizenship, whereas an alien
woman married to a Filipino
husband must reside for ten
years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this
Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related
by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become such
citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so
related. And yet, it seems more than clear that
the general purpose of the first paragraph of
Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien
woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino,
a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens.
It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of
Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927
(the old Naturalization Law), there was no law
granting any special privilege to alien wives of
Filipinos. They were treated as any other
foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this
situation that the Philippine legislature enacted
Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation
made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is
enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22
of the (Spanish) Civil Code,
the wife follows the nationality
of the husband; but the
Department of State of the
United States on October 31,
1921, ruled that the alien wife
of a Filipino citizen is not a
Filipino citizen, pointing out
that our Supreme Court in the
 leading case of Roa v.
Collector of Customs (23 Phil.
315) held that Articles 17 to
27 of the Civil Code being
political have been abrogated
upon the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the
United States.
Accordingly, the stated taken
by the Attorney-General prior
to the envictment of Act No.
3448, was that marriage of
alien women to Philippine
citizens did not make the
former citizens of this
counting. (Op. Atty. Gen.,
March 16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous
condition, Act No. 3448 was
enacted in 1928 adding
section 13(a) to Act No. 2927
which provides that "any
woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippine
Islands, and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized, shall
be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22,
s. 1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law
were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such
a way as to require that the alien wife must
prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2,
the privilege granted to alien wives would
become illusory. It is submitted that such a
construction, being contrary to the manifested
object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed
with reference to its manifest
object, and if the language is
susceptible of two
constructions, one which will
carry out and the other defeat
such manifest object, it should
receive the former
construction. (In re National
Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051;
Singer v. United States, 323
U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See
also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil.
134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15
Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will
cause objectionable results
should be avoided and the
court will, if possible, place on
the statute a construction
which will not result in
injustice, and in accordance
with the decisions construing
statutes, a construction which
will result in oppression,
hardship, or inconveniences
will also be avoided, as will a
construction which will
prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting
unreasonableness, as well as
a construction which will
result in absurd
consequences.
So a construction should, if
possible, be avoided if the
result would be an apparent
inconsistency in legislative
intent, as has been
determined by the judicial
decisions, or which would
result in futility, redundancy,
or a conclusion not
contemplated by the
legislature; and the court
should adopt that construction
which will be the least likely to
produce mischief. Unless
plainly shown to have been
the intention of the
legislature, an interpretation
which would render the
requirements of the statute
uncertain and vague is to be
avoided, and the court will not
ascribe to the legislature an
intent to confer an illusory
right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes,
sec. 326, pp. 623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid
on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship."
But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in
the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it
more difficult if not practically impossible in some instances, for
an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any
ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been
demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume
that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien
women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves,
their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage
implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse."
Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal
conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may
motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are
bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law?
Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino
family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the
customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she
has to live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to
do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in
reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not
so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the
following observations anent the national policy rationalization in
Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite
persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of
the national policy begs the question. The
avowed policy of "selectives admission" more
particularly refers to a case where citizenship
is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding
for naturalization. In such a case, the courts
should no doubt apply the national policy
of selecting only those who are worthy to
become citizens. There is here a choice
between accepting or rejecting the application
for citizenship. But this policy finds no
application in cases where citizenship is
conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the
courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the
in
individual claiming citizenship by operation of
law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies
91
the statutory requirements, the courts cannot
do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen
of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is
able to prove that his father is a Philippine
citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines,
"irrespective of his moral character, ideological
beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals,
customs, and traditions." A minor child of a
person naturalized under the law, who is able to
prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is
likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has
lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles
of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife of
a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove
only that she may herself be lawfully
naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of
the law, in order to establish her citizenship
status as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver
import should not be overlooked in this regard,
for it explains and justifies the obviously
deliberate choice of words. It is universally
accepted that a State, in extending the privilege
of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens could have had no other objective than
to maintain a unity of allegiance among the
members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113
Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also
"Convention on the Nationality of Married
Women: Historical Background and
Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp.
8 et seq.). Such objective can only be
satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to
acquire citizenship derivatively through the
husband. This is particularly true in the
Philippines where tradition and law has placed
the husband as head of the family, whose
personal status and decisions govern the life of
the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look
with favor on the unity and solidarity of the
family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose
preservation of State as a vital and enduring
interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has
been said that by tradition in our country, there
is a theoretic identity of person and interest
between husband and wife, and from the nature
of the relation, the home of one is that of the
other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It
should likewise be said that because of the
theoretic identity of husband and wife, and the
primacy of the husband, the nationality of
husband should be the nationality of the wife,
and the laws upon one should be the law upon
the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v.
Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed.
839, held: "The status of the wife follows that of
the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage
her husband's domicile became her domicile."
And the presumption under Philippine law being
that the property relations of husband and wife
are under the regime of conjugal partnership
(Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also
that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a
husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien, and that the national treatment of one
should be different from that of the other. Thus,
it cannot be that the husband's interests in
property and business activities reserved by law
92
to citizens should not form part of the conjugal
partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that
she herself cannot, through her own efforts but
for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such
interests. Only in rare instances should the
identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of
our citizenship laws, it should only be in the
instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law. (Motion for
Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is
in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was
understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was
borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American
courts and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in
the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light
of Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our
naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the
circumstances between the United States, as the so-called
"melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and the
Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is
nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of this
opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to
American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and
respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and
indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the
undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has
no local origin and orientation; it is purely American, factually
taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under
the dominating influence of statutes of the United States
Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own
legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the
opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took
no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it
patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that
alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United
States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our
legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of
August 10, 1855 as embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised
Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently
and uniformly understood as conferring American citizenship to
alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to
submit to any naturalization proceeding and without having to
prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence,
moral character, adherence to American ideals and American
constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of
the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization
Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court
indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under
Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to
an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the
Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any
of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it,
doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will
attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into
fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot
as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the
construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal,
juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering
such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with
accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination
of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of
judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a
Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this
case which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964
yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing
discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court
could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications,
her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her
undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could
sustain, her claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of
the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the
question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina
without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to
this question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already
stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final
because there is still pending with Us a motion for its
reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of
serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the
reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an
occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman
married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen
of this country must apply therefore by filing a
petition for citizenship reciting that she
possesses all the qualifications set forth in
Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be
filed in the Court of First Instance where
petitioner has resided at least one year
immediately preceding the filing of the petition;
and (3) Any action by any other office, agency,
board or official, administrative or otherwise —
other than the judgment of a competent court of
justice — certifying or declaring that an alien
wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino
citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for
naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a
"petition for citizenship". This is as it should be.
Because a reading of the petition will reveal at
once that efforts were made to set forth therein,
and to prove afterwards, compliance with
Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization
law. The trial court itself apparently considered
the petition as one for naturalization, and, in
fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the
Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman
marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not
enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by
Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated
in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the
whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from
declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a
Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of
no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino
husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which
she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be
of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same
time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to
complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the
93
knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle local
languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire
real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own
independently of her husband, file her declaration of intention and
after one year her application for naturalization, with the
affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral character
and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in
her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of
probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as
citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen
only by judicial declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite
obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the
provision, in question, that the law intends by it to spell out what
is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an
alien, as plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the
language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that
some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it, rather than
that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves
Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether
or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant
consideration warranting a conclusion different from that
complained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of
grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of
thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein made by the
Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that
Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon
them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy
it seeks to endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by
their number and standing in the Bar and well known for their
reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and
comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the
quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case,
invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court
for the first time in the present case -- that an
alien woman who marries a Philippine citizen
not only does not ipso facto herself become a
citizen but can acquire such citizenship only
through ordinary naturalization proceedings
under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that
all administrative actions "certifying or declaring
such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null
and void" — has consequences that reach far
beyond the confines of the present case.
Considerably more people are affected, and
affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca.
The newspapers report that as many as 15
thousand women married to Philippine citizens
are affected by this decision of the Court. These
are women of many and diverse nationalities,
including Chinese, Spanish, British, American,
Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so
on. These members of the community, some of
whom have been married to citizens for two or
three decades, have all exercised rights and
privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens.
They will have acquired, separately or in
conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands,
real property, and they will have sold and
transferred such property. Many of these
women may be in professions membership in
which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless
stockholders or officers or employees in
companies engaged in business activities for
which a certain percentage of Filipino equity
content is prescribed by law. All these married
women are now faced with possible divestment
of personal status and of rights acquired and
 privileges exercised in reliance, in complete
good faith, upon a reading of the law that has
been accepted as correct for more than two
decades by the very agencies of government
charged with the administration of that law. We
must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines
which would visit such comprehensive and far-
reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of
Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny
and reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court
attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb.
21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when Chief Justice Concepcion
observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in
the Barretto and Delgado cases — although
referring to situations the equities of which are
not identical to those obtaining in the case at
bar — may have contributed materially to the
irregularities committed therein and in other
analogous cases, and induced the parties
concerned to believe, although erroneously,
that the procedure followed was valid under the
law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of
the issue under consideration, the Solicitor
General was required, not only, to comment
thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases
there are, like the one at bar, in which
certificates of naturalization have been issued
after notice of the filing of the petition for
naturalization had been published in the Official
Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from
January 28, 1950" (when the decision in
Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) "to May
29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided)
"and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29,
1965" (when the decision in the present case
was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the
reasons adduced in appellant's motion for
reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the
Government, as well as of the data contained in
the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid
down in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and
affect the validity of certificates of naturalization
issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the
Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective application of its
construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which had
already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In
the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already
observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while
the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and
others that followed them have at the most become the law of the
case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds
therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings
and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and
children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
94
Minor children of persons naturalized under this
law who have been born in the Philippines shall
be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the
Philippines at the time of naturalization of the
parents, shall automatically become a Philippine
citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is
not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen
only during his minority, unless he begins to
reside permanently in the Philippines when still
a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a
Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the
naturalization of his parent, shall be considered
a Philippine citizen, unless within one year after
reaching the age of majority, he fails to register
himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and
to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the
statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act
473, as a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the
judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified
aliens. After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its
elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the
possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our
citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of
the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it
prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife
and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains
that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the
Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor
children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling here at the
time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos
also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the
Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also redeemed
citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if
they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country
before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born
outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be
"considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves
by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American)
Consulate of the country where they reside and take the
necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized". 26
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly,
as to the point that the minor children, falling within the
conditions of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in
the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by
legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need
for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA).
Indeed, the language of the provision, is not susceptible of any
other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression
"shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the
wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship
status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase
requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only
after she has undergone the whole process of judicial
naturalization required of any person desiring to become a
Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section
15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor
children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently
and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the
constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to
confer or vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada &
Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it
has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious
prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or
groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the
members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos,
whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this
case is whether or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed
provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente
G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law in the
Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of
naturalization is often observed by some states with respect to
women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a
Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to
any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the
Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed.
1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in
the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in
construing the provision of the United States statutes from which
our law has been copied, 28a the American courts have held that
the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but
by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and
taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien
woman who marries a citizen of the United States becomes
perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization,
and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970
ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766,
affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question
was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an
insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and
that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that
time already had a long accepted construction among the courts
and administrative authorities in that country holding that under
such provision an alien woman who married a citizen became,
upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a
consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any
naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that
at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be
naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion
We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily
make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might
be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the
United States, the American Congress, recognizing the
construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as
stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such
construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly
requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization
albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for
citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead
of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act
3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the
aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby
indicating its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled
construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of
1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this
Court may feel that as the United States herself has evidently
found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the
alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic
incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing
through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it
used to be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing
any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the
Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in
which our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as
recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law
along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For
95
Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is
not institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this
court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit
Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it
seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that
under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and
children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the
proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another
naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the
proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of
petitioners who have died. — In case a
petitioner should die before the final decision
has been rendered, his widow and minor
children may continue the proceedings. The
decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned,
produce the same legal effect as if it had been
rendered during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA
383, this Court held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor,
petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said
Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are
allowed to continue the same proceedings and
are not substituted for the original petitioner;
(2) that the qualifications of the original
petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of
the widow and minor children, and (3) that said
Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies
before or after final decision is rendered, but
before the judgment becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments.
Even the second sentence of said Section 16
contemplate the fact that the qualifications of
the original petitioner remains the subject of
inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that
"The decision rendered in the case shall, so far
as the widow and minor children are concerned,
produce the same legal effect as if it had been
rendered during the life of the petitioner." This
phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to
continue the proceedings with the deceased as
the theoretical petitioner, for if it were
otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
consider the decision rendered, as far as it
affected the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the
appellee, declared that a dead person can not
be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of
allegiance, because an oath is a personal
matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be
allowed to take the oath of allegiance for the
deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin
merely asked that she be allowed to take the
oath of allegiance and the proper certificate of
naturalization, once the naturalization
proceedings of her deceased husband, shall
have been completed, not on behalf of the
deceased but on her own behalf and of her
children, as recipients of the benefits of his
naturalization. In other words, the herein
petitioner proposed to take the oath of
 allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by
virtue of the legal provision that "any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of
persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippines shall be considered
citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth
Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship
to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do
not show that the petitioning widow could not
have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee
Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his
9 minor children were all born in the Philippines.
(Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa
to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil
Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record
on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua
Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If
the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino
citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense
and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended
to treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments
advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see
no reason to disagree with the following views of counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is
a legislative declaration of who may be
considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a
proposition too plain to be disputed that
Congress has the power not only to prescribe
the mode or manner under which foreigners
may acquire citizenship, but also the very power
of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S.
v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890
[1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law
of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The
Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine
citizens "Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV,
Philippine Constitution). Citizens
naturalization, under this provision, include not
only those who are naturalized in accordance
with legal proceedings for the acquisition of
citizenship, but also those who acquire
citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by
operation of law, as, for example, the
"naturalization" of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of
an alien woman to a citizen. (See Tañada &
Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo,
Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965
ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also
3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines" found in Section 14 of the Revised
Naturalization Law clearly manifests an intent to
confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase
found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised
Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly
taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the
alien woman becomes by operation of law a
citizen of the United States as fully as if she had
complied with all the provisions of the statutes
upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v.
Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US
Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op.
4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1,
1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091
and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed
a citizen," in Section 1994
Revised Statute (U.S. Comp.
Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was
in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at
L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2),
"shall be deemed and taken to
be a citizens" while it may
imply that the person to
whom it relates has not
actually become a citizen by
the ordinary means or in the
usual way, as by the judgment
of a competent court, upon a
proper application and proof,
yet it does not follow that
such person is on that account
practically any the less a
citizen. The word "deemed" is
the equivalent of "considered"
or "judged," and therefore,
whatever an Act of Congress
requires to be "deemed" or
"taken" as true of any person
or thing must, in law, be
considered as having been
duly adjudged or established
concerning such person or
thing, and have force and
effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares
that an alien woman shall,
under certain circumstances,
be "deemed" an American
citizen, the effect when the
contingency occurs, is
equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an Act
of Congress or in the usual
mode thereby prescribed.
(Van Dyne, Citizenship of the
United States 239, cited in
by Velayo, Philippine Citizenship
and Naturalization 146-147
[1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the
Philippine legislature when it enacted the first
paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law is shown by a textual
analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its
entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be
considered," and "shall automatically become"
as used in the above provision, are undoubtedly
synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the
provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by
operation of law upon certain classes of
aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons
who are already citizens of the Philippines.
Whenever the fact of relationship of the
persons enumerated in the provision concurs
96
with the fact of citizenship of the person to
whom they are related, the effect is for said
persons to become ipso factocitizens of the
Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not
mean that all alien wives and all minor children
of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of
relationship, necessarily become such citizens
also. Those who do not meet the statutory
requirements do not ipso facto become citizens;
they must apply for naturalization in order to
acquire such status. What it does mean,
however, is that in respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a
citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact
which establishes the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also
determines the point of time at which such
citizenship commences. Thus, under the second
paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a
Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born
in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a citizen
of the Philippines from the time the fact of
relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship
of his parent, and the time when the child
became a citizen does not depend upon the
time that he is able to prove that he was born in
the Philippines. The child may prove some 25
years after the naturalization of his father that
he was born in the Philippines and should,
therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It
does not mean that he became a Philippine
citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien
woman who married a Philippine citizen may be
able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25
years after the marriage that her citizenship
status became in question), that she is one who
might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not
reasonable to conclude that she acquired
Philippine citizenship only after she had proven
that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized."
It is not reasonable to conclude that she
acquired Philippine citizenship only after she
had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is
that in adopting the very phraseology of the
law, the legislature could not have intended that
an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine
citizen unless and until she proves that she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from
it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The
proviso that she must be one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a
condition precedent to the vesting or
acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or
a state of fact necessary to establish her
citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a
fact established and proved in evidence. The
word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely
replies that at the time of her marriage to a
Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the)
power" to become such a citizen herself under
the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191
[1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed
283 [1869). That she establishes such power
long after her marriage does not alter the fact
that at her marriage, she became a citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a
Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a
97
citizen of the Philippines unless there is
proof that she herself may be lawfully
naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view,
the "acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife
depends on her having proven her qualifications
for citizenship, that is, she is not a
citizen unless and until she proves that she may
herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from
the words of the law that the proviso does not
mean that she must first prove that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall
be deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a
citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by
this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not
rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen
only after she has proven her qualifications for
citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that
the alien wives in those cases failed to prove
their qualifications and therefore they failed to
establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly
Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case
was remanded to the lower court for
determination of whether petitioner, whose
claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino
was disputed by the Government, "might herself
be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of
" proving her alleged change of political status
from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board,
101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was
being deported, claimed she was a Philippine
citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court
finding that there was no proof that she was not
disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such
evidence appearing on record, the claim of
assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu
Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is
untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in
these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of
proof that the alien wives "might (themselves)
be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily
imply that they did not become, in truth and in
fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos.
What the decisions merely held was that these
wives failed to establish their claim to that
status as a proven fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by
operation of law, the time when citizenship is
conferred should not be confused with the time
when citizenship status is established as a
proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put
in issue in any proceeding would be required to
prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of
the Philippines in order to factually establish his
claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status
commences from the time of birth, although his
claim thereto is established as a fact only at a
subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who
might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a
Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to
a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to
establish that status as a proven fact by
showing that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference
between a statutory declaration that a person is
deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his
father is such citizen from a declaration that an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the
Philippines provided she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by
operation of law; the former becomes a
citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso
facto upon marriage.
 It is true that unless and until the alien wife establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding,
proves that she might herself be lawfully depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.
naturalized, it cannot be said that she has
established her status as a proven fact. But
Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We
neither can it be said that on that account, she
have passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the
did not become a citizen of the Philippines. If
point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be
her citizenship status is not questioned in any
settled once and for all now.
legal proceeding, she obviously has no
obligation to establish her status as a fact. In
such a case, the presumption of law should be IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a
that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby
5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his
4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing
representation shown to have been made is the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of
true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have
Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321). become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the
foregoing views is, what substitute is them for naturalization
proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.
the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that
she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has
to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to
such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such
paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not
vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same
situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime G.R. No. L-24792 February 14, 1975
the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
PO SIOK PIN @ DY SAM, TAN DE ENG @ CHAN LAI YING, PO
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
KIM TIONG @ FU KUM CHUNG, PO SOY KUAN @ FOO SHUI
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
WAN and PO KIM SING @ FOO KAM SHING, the last three
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This,
represented by PO SIOK PIN @ DY SAM, petitioners-
as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to
appellants, 
"appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed,
vs.
only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently
MARTINIANO VIVO, Acting Commissioner of
inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for
Immigration, respondent-appellee.
the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent
official findings, even if these are not really binding.
Fabre Law Office for petitioners-appellants.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a
good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
public records may be kept in order, the following observations in General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor Francisco J. Bautista for
Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice respondent-appellee.
Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate
initial step by the interested parties:
AQUINO, J.:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in
Po Siok Pin, Tan De Eng, Po Kim Tiong, Po Soy Kuan, and Po Kim
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the
Sing appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration
Manila, dismissing their petition for prohibition wherein they
is as follows: The alien woman must file a
sought to restrain the Acting Commissioner of Immigration from
petition for the cancellation of her alien
deporting them (except Po Siok Pin) (Civil Case No. 52011).
certificate of registration alleging, among other
things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen
and that she is not disqualified from acquiring Presumably, the appeal was made direct to this Court because
her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 only legal issues would be raised. There is no dispute as to the
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. following facts:
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit
On April 23, 1960 Tan De Eng, the wife of Po Siok Pin, a Chinese
of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
resident, and their three minor children named Po Kim Tiong, Po
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any
Soy Kuan and Po Kim Sing, arrived from Hongkong as non-
of the groups disqualified by the cited section
immigrants with re-entry permits to Hongkong which, as
from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
extended, were valid up to September 27, 1965. For their
(please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau
temporary stay, they posted a cash bond in the amount of P4,000.
of Immigration conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates its order or decision
granting or denying the petition. On June 23, 1960 Po Sick Pin filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for naturalization.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's
registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in

98
On August 30, 1960 the Bureau of Immigration issued to Tan De
Eng and her minor children the corresponding alien certificates of
registration.
Sometime in September, 1960 Tan De Eng and her three minor
children filed a written request for the extension of their stay in
this country. The Commissioner of Immigration denied the request
on September 20, 1960. They asked for the reconsideration of the
denial order in a petition which was addressed to the Secretary of
Justice and which was coursed through the Commissioner of
Immigration. They alleged that their stay here was necessary in
order that Po Sick Pin could comply with the requirements of the
Naturalization Law. The Commissioner denied the petition for
reconsideration. He did not elevate it to the Secretary of Justice.
In a letter dated August 31, 1962 the Commissioner ordered Tan
De Eng and her children to leave the country not later than
October 23, 1962; otherwise, their cash bond would be
confiscated and warrants for their arrest would be issued.
On October 26, 1962 Tan De Eng and her minor children,
represented by their father, Po Siok Pin, filed the instant petition
for prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop the
Commissioner from deporting them.
In the meantime, the petition of Po Siok Pin for naturalization was
granted. He took his oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen on
May 23, 1964.
On May 3, 1965 the lower court rendered a judgment dismissing
the petition for prohibition. The petitioners appealed. They
contend (1) that the Commissioner of Immigration has no
authority to issue a warrant of arrest, (2) that their cash bond is
invalid because the form for the bond was never approved by the
Secretary of Justice and (3) that they are not obligated to comply
with the requirement in the last paragraph of section 9 of the
Immigration Law that, to change their status, they must leave the
country.
The appeal is meritorious. As correctly stated in appellants' third
assignment of error, this case is covered by section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law (quoted below), and section 9 of the
Immigration law, regarding change of status of aliens, is not
applicable to this case.
SEC. 15. Effect of naturalization on wife and
children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this
law who have been born in the Philippines shall
be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the
Philippines at the time of the naturalization of
the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor
child, who is not in the Philippines at the time
the parent is naturalized, shall he deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority,
unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he
will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
becoming of age.
xxx xxx xxx
99
The prevailing rule is that under section 15 an alien woman
marrying a Philippine citizen, native-born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Philippine citizen provided that she is not
disqualified under section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien, who subsequently becomes a
naturalized Filipino citizen, acquires Philippine citizenship the
moment her husband takes his oath as a Philippine citizen
provided that she does not have any of the disqualifications under
said section 4 (Burca vs. Republic, 
L-24252, June 15, 1973, 51 SCRA 248, 255, per Justice Antonio;
Resolution in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-
21289, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 292, 351; Lee vs. Commissioner
of Immigration, L-23446, December 20, 1971, 42 SCRA 561, 565;
Yap vs. Republic, L-27430, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 36; Tiu vs.
Vivo, L-21425, September 15, 1972, 47 SCRA 23).
Consequently, Tan De Eng, the wife of Po Siok Pin, became a
Philippine Citizen when the latter took his oath of allegiance as a
Philippine citizen on May 23, 1964 if she does not have any of the
disqualifications to become a Philippine citizen.
Likewise, by virtue of section 15, the three children of Tan De Eng
and Po Siok Pin, who were born in China, who were in the
Philippines at the time their father was naturalized, and who must
be of age now, automatically became Philippine citizens. They
should ask for the cancellation of their alien certificates of
registration.
As indicated in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of the Acting
Secretary of Justice, quoted in the Moy Ya Lim Yaocase, the
married alien woman must file with the Bureau of Immigration a
petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration,
alleging, inter alia, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that
she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship
under section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should be supported by the
joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that she does not belong to any of the groups disqualified
under section 4, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its decision (41 SCRA
367).
The Immigration Law provides:
NON-IMMIGRANTS
SEC. 9 Aliens departing from any place outside
the Philippines, who are otherwise admissible
and who qualify within one of the following
categories maybe admitted a non-immigrants:
(Subparagraphs (a) to (g) are omitted)
An alien who is admitted as a nonimmigrant
cannot remain in the Philippines permanently.
To obtain permanent admission, a
nonimmigrant alien must depart voluntarily to
some foreign country and proceeding from the
appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa
and thereafter undergo examination by the
officers of the Bureau of Immigration at the
Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of this Act.
This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Barredo in the Moy Ya
Lim Yao case, held that the above-quoted provisions do not apply
to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary
visitors legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino
citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon
them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as
they may choose, and if the elect to reside here, the immigration
authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds
(Moy Ya Lim Yao case, 41 SCRA at page 300; Tiu vs. Vivo, supra).
Since under section 15 petitioners Tan De Eng, Po Kim Tiong, Po
Soy Kuan and Po Kim Sing became Filipino citizens, they are
entitled to stay and reside in the Philippines. Any question as to
the validity of their citizenship should be resolved in an
appropriate proceeding and not in this case (Tiu vs. Vivo, supra,
47 SCRA at pages 27-28).
With reference to the other two issues raised by the appellants it
suffices to state that the constitutionality of section 37(a) of the
Immigration Law, which empowers the Commissioner of
Immigration to order the arrest of aliens who should be deported,
had already been upheld.
Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution (now section 3,
Article IV of the New Constitution) does not mean that only judges
can issue warrants of arrest. What it means is that it is the judge
who should issue the warrant of arrest where the proceeding is for
the determination of a probable cause in a given case. On the
other hand, the Commissioner of Immigration can issue a warrant
of arrest for the execution of a final deportation order. The
Commissioner cannot issue a warrant of arrest solely for purposes
of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued.
(Contemprate vs. Acting Commissioner of Immigration, L-28604,
October 30, 1970, 35 SCRA 623,630-1; Vivo vs. Montesa, L-24576,
July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155, 161; Morano vs. Vivo, L-22196, June
30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562, 568; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation
Board, L-10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27, 35-36; Ng Hua
To, vs. Galang, L-19140, February 29,1964, 10 SCRA 411).
As to appellants' other contention that the form for their bond was
defective because that form was never approved by the Secretary
of Justice, it should be noted that in Morano vs. Vivo, supra, it was
held that the provision in section 3 of the Immigration Law, that
the Department Head should approve the form for the bond, is
merely directory and that, inasmuch as the form in question had
been used for a long time, it can be assumed that it had been
approved by the Secretary of Justice. Moreover, the appellants,
having benefitted from their bond are estopped from impugning
its validity (See De Borja Vda. de Torres vs. Encarnacion 89 Phil.
678, 681).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed, the writ of
prohibition is granted, and the petitioner's are directed to follow
the procedure indicated in the Moy Ya Lim Yao case with
reference to the cancellation of their alien certification of
registration inasmuch as the factual findings of the Commissioner
of Immigration will serve as the bases of claim of Philippine
citizenship. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner,  In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and
HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court with preliminary injunction, to reverse and set aside the
100
Decision dated September 27, 1990 of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation (CID), ordering the deportation of
petitioner and its Resolution dated January 29, 1991, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
I
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia
as a contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On
May 17, 1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic
rites. He returned to the Philippines in January 1979.
On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her two children with Banez,
(two-year old Marina and nine-month old Nikulas) arrived in
Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it appear that he
was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely
repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in
Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with
Marina Cabael, met them.
Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and Support," for his
"guests," stating inter alia, that:
That I am the guarantor for the entry into the
Philippines of Mrs. Djumantan, 42 years old, and
her two minor children, MARINA, 2 years old,
and NIKULAS, 9 months old, all Indonesian
citizens, who are coming as temporary visitors.
That I am willing to guaranty them out of
gratitude to their family for the hospitality they
have accorded me during the few years that I
have stayed in Indonesia in connection with my
employment thereat.
That I guaranty they are law abiding citizens
and I guaranty their behavior while they are in
the Philippines; I also guaranty their support
and that they will not become a public charge.
That I guaranty their voluntary departure upon
the termination of the authorized stay granted
them by the Government (Rollo, p. 41).
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of
Banez.
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as
temporary visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of
1940.
husband and petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage"
with the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the
two. This case was, however, dismissed for lack of merit.
On March 25, 1982, the immigration status of petitioner was
changed from temporary visitor to that of permanent resident
under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14, 1982, petitioner
was issued an alien certificate of registration.
Not accepting the set-back, Banez' eldest son, Leonardo, filed a
letter complaint with the Ombudsman, who subsequently referred
the letter to the CID. On the basis of the said letter, petitioner was
detained at the CID detention cell. She later released pending the
deportation proceedings (DEP Case No. 90-400) after posting a
cash bond (Rollo, pp. 15-16). Thereafter, she manifested to the
CID that she be allowed to depart voluntarily from the Philippines
and asked for time to purchase her airline ticket (Rollo, p. 10).
However, she a change of heart and moved for the dismissal of
the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married
to a Filipino citizen (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
In the Decision dated September 27, 1990, the CID, through
public respondents, disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Board of Commissioners finds the second
marriage of Bernardo Banes to respondent
Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines. We revoke the
Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her
(Rollo, p. 23).
Public respondents denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in their Resolution dated January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 31-33).
Hence, this petition.
We issued a temporary restraining order, directing public
respondents to cease and desist from executing or implementing
the Decision dated September 27, 1990 and the Resolution dated
January 29, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 34-36).
On September 20, 1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his
father died on August 14, 1994 and that he and his mother were
withdrawing their objection to the granting of a permanent
resident visa to petitioner (Rollo, pp. 173-175).
II
Petitioner claims that her marriage to Banez was valid under
Article 27 of P.D. No. 1085, the Muslim Code, which recognizes
the practice of polyandry by Muslim males. From that premise,
she argues that under Articles 109 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Article 68 of the Family Code and Article 34 of the
Muslim Code, the husband and wife are obliged to live together
and under Article 110 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
husband is given the right to fix the conjugal residence. She
claims that public respondents have no right to order the couple
to live separately (Rollo, pp. 5-7).
When asked to comment on the petition, the Solicitor General
took the position that the CID could not order petitioner's
deportation because its power to do so had prescribed under
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 (Rollo, pp. 57-74).
III
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez,
if under the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an
"undesirable alien" regardless of her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Therefore, to be first resolved is the question on petitioner's
immigration status, particularly the legality of her admission into
the country and the change of her status from temporary visitor
to permanent resident. Upon a finding that she was not lawfully
admitted into the country and she did not lawfully acquire
permanent residency, the next question is whether the power to
deport her has prescribed.
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting
petitioner's entry into the country and the change of her
101
immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident.
All such privileges were obtained through misinterpretation.
Never was the marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the
immigration authorities in her applications for temporary visitor's
visa and for permanent residency.
The civil status of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary
visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise of discretion
on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration
authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman
who claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen,
who is married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shin Man v. Galang, 3
SCRA 871 [1961]).
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens
whose presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). this right is
based on the fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation,
their admission into the territory is a matter of pure permission
and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of
the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed
to continue to reside in the country, is protected only so far as
Congress may choose to protect it (United States ex rel. Kaloudis
v. Shauhnessy 180 F. 2d. 489).
There is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the
right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency,
in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her
from the operation of the immigration laws governing the
admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shauhnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low
Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734
[1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR 1213). Marriage of an alien woman to
a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen
and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the
country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien
(Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362 [1970]).
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not
mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a
visitor's visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no
right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien
allowed to stay temporarily may apply for a change of status and
"may be admitted" as a permanent resident. Among those
considered qualified to apply for permanent residency if the wife
or husband of a Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec.
13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country and their admission as
immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally
married to Filipino citizens.
IV
We now address the issue raised by the Solicitor General that the
right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed,
citing Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
Said Section 37(b) provides:
Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7,
8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of this section at
any time after entry, but shall not be effected
under any clause unless the arrest in the
deportation proceedings is made within five
years after the cause for deportation arises.
 Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be
effected if the court, or judge thereof, when
sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the
Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be
not deported (As amended by Rep. Act No. 503).
Section 37(a) of the said law mentioned in Section 37(b) thereof
provides:
The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of
the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:
1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection
and admission by the immigration authorities at
a designating port of entry or at any place other
than at a designated port of entry.
2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the
effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry;
3) Any alien who, after the effective date of this
Act, is convicted in the Philippines and
sentenced for a term of one year or more for a
crime involving moral turpitude committed
within five years after his entry, is so convicted
and sentenced more than once;
4) Any alien who is convicted and sentenced for
a violation of the law governing prohibited
drugs;
5) Any alien who practices prostitution or is an
inmate of a house of prostitution or is connected
with the management of a house of prostitution,
or is a procurer;
6) Any alien who becomes a public charge
within five years after entry from causes not
affirmatively shown to have arisen subsequent
to entry;
7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in
violation of any limitation or condition under
which he was admitted a non-immigrant;
8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates
or teaches the overthrow by force and violence
of the Government of the Philippines, or of
constituted law and authority, or who
disbelieves in or is opposed to organized
government, or who advises, advocates, or
teaches the assault or assassination of public
officials because of their office, or who advises,
advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction
of property, or who is a member of or affiliated
with any organization entertaining, advocating
or teaching such doctrines, or who on any
manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial
or otherwise, to the dissemination of such
doctrines;
102
9) Any alien who commits any of the acts
described in Sections forty-five and forty-six of
this Act, independent of criminal action which
may be brought against him: Provided, That in
the case of an alien who, for any reason, is
convicted and sentenced to suffer both
imprisonment and deportation, said alien shall
first serve the entire period of his imprisonment
before he is actually deported: Provided,
however, That the imprisonment may be waived
by the Commissioner of Immigration with the
consent of the Department Head, and upon
payment by the alien concerned of such amount
as the Commissioner may fix and approved by
the Department Head, and upon payment by
the alien concerned of such amount as the
Commissioner may fix and approved by the
Department Head (as amended by R.A. No.
144);
10) Any alien who, at any time within five years
after entry, shall have been convicted of
violating the provisions of the Philippine
Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred and
fifty-three, otherwise known as the Philippine
Alien Registration Act of 1941 (now Republic Act
No. 562), or who, at any time after entry, shall
have been convicted more than once of
violating the provisions of the same Act;
11) Any alien who engages in profiteering,
hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of
any criminal action which may be brought
against him;
12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense
penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered
Four hundred and seventy-three, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the
Philippines, or any law relating to acquisition of
Philippine citizenship;
13) Any alien who defrauds his creditor by
absconding or alienating properties, to prevent
them from being attached or executed.
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an "alien who enters the
Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false
and misleading statements or without inspection and admission
by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at
any place other than at a designated port of entry" is subject to
deportation.
The deportation of an alien under said clause of Section 37(a) has
a prescriptive period and "shall not be effected ... unless the
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years
after the cause for deportation arises" (Immigration Act of 1940,
Sec. 37[b]).
Congress may impose a limitation of time for the deportation of
alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 US 341 77 L.
Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F.
582, 8 ALR 1282).
In Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853
(1991), we held that under Section 37(b) of the Immigration Act of
1940, the deportation of an alien may be barred after the lapse of
five years after the cause of deportation arises. Justice Feliciano,
in his dissenting opinion, qualified the broad statement of the law
as follows:
 Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b)
shows that the five (5) year limitation is
applicable only where deportation is sought to
be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a)
other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that
where deportation or exclusion is sought to be
effected under clauses of Section 37(a), no
period of limitation is applicable; and that to the
contrary, deportation or exclusion may be
effected "at any time after entry."

Justice Davide, in his dissenting opinion, clarified:

Note that the five-year period applies only to

clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of
paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to
clauses 2, 7, 8, 11, and 12, the limitation does
not apply.

In Lam Shee v. Bengzon, 93 Phil. 1065 (1953), the alien admitted

that she had gained entrance into the Philippines fraudulently by
making use of the name of a Chinese resident-merchant other
than that of her lawful husband. The Court, however, held that
she could no longer be deported "for the simple reason that more
than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission."

The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has

prescribed.

Petitioner was admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on

January 13, 1979 on the basis of false and misleading statements
in her application and in the other supporting documents
submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first
complained with the CID on November 19, 1980 about the
manner petitioner was admitted into the country and asked for
her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77-78). After the EDSA Revolution, he
sent a follow-up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980
letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78).

Tolling the prescriptive period from November 19, 1980, when

Leonardo C. Banez informed the CID of the illegal entry of
petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed
before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September
27, 1990.

In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred

under Section 37(b) is the deportation of an alien and claimed
that what they ordered was not the deportation of petitioner but
merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa
previously granted her (Rollo, p. 102).

The "arrest" contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest for

the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the
arrest prior to proceedings to determine the right of the alien to
stay in the country. When public respondents revoked the
permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect,
ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary

restraining order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.

The Decision of the Board of Commissioners dated September 27,

1990 revoking the issuance of the permanent resident visa to
petitioner and the Resolution dated January 29, 1991 are
REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

103