JUDGMENTS CITED AT THE BAR

S.No Title Citation Ratio

1. B. Surendra Mohan AIR 1920 Patna What Munsif should have done was to direct the
Sinha v. Gena 820 plaintiff to proceed with his case as against the
Sardar other defendants, making a note in the order sheet
that the decree would not be binding upon the
minor defendants – this course was not taken – the
order as passed by the Munsif was clearly without
jurisdiction and must be set aside. The order
dismissing the suit for default is set aside.

2. Bahubhai v. Shah AIR 1980 Whether a statutory tenant has also an estate or is
Bharatkumar Gujarat 89 heritable and transferable, would it require a notice
for determination of that lease as prescribed
U/S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act?

A person continuing in occupation with or without

the assent of landlord after determination of the
contractual tenancy is for all intents and purposes a
tenant entitled to all the rights and subject to all
the obligations under the relevant Rent Act. No
notice is required U/S.106 TPA in view of Dhanpal’s
case.
3. Edwin Stephen v. 19 (1981) DLT Whether the Controller has power to revive eviction
Sada Nand 88 proceedings, when the eviction order passed
against the minors, without appointment of a
proper person to be a guardian U/O.32 CPC has
been held to be a nullity by the Controller during
execution proceedings?

Held: If minor defendant in a suit was not duly

represented through a guardian, U/O.32 R.3 CPC
and the decree was passed, the same is a nullity
and could not be executed. AIR 1968 SC 954

In the Code there is no specific provision for revival

of a suit or proceedings in such circumstances. It
therefore appears that the inherent powers could
be exercised U/S.151 CPC. When the eviction order
is held to be a nullity, it seems that the Controller
who declared the eviction order to be a nullity has
inherent power to revive the eviction proceedings.
4. Gauri Shanker v. (1994) 6 SCC Whether S.2(l)(iii) DRC Act is ultra-vires and
Union of India 349 violative of the Constitution of India?
= AIR 1995 SC
55 Held: A commercial tenancy is invaluable and has
got distinct features and characteristics of its own
different from that of a residential tenancy. None of
the peculiar or unique features present in the case
 of residential tenancies exist in the case of
commercial tenancies. If the legislature thought it
fit to afford a greater and extended right of benefit
to the heirs of the statutory tenants of commercial
premises and not to extend such rights to the heirs
of the statutory tenants of residential premises, it
only stands to reason and reckons the stark
realities of the prevailing situation. The protection
afforded by the Rent Act to a tenant after
termination of the tenancy and to heirs of the
tenancy is only a creation of the Act and it is open
to the legislature to make appropriate provisions in
that behalf. It can make suitable and appropriate
provisions in the Act with regard to the nature and
extent of the benefit and protection to be so
enjoyed and the manner in which the same is to be
enjoyed. The provisions in Section 2(l)(iii) of the
Act, which seeks to restrict or limit the right of the
heirs, in so far as the statutory tenants of
residential premises are concerned and to the
extent provided therein, are not in any way
discriminatory and do not offend the guarantee
under Art. 14 of the Constitution.

5. Gian Devi Anand v. (1985) 2 SCC Rule of heritability held extends to statutory
Jeevan Kumar 683 tenancy of commercial premises as much as to
 residential premises under the Delhi Rent Act –
Tenancy rights to devolve according to the ordinary
law of succession unless otherwise provided in the
statute.

6. H. M. Doyal & Co. 1985 RLR 414 S.14(1)(a) DRC Act – In the notice of demand,
v. Ram Nath landlord is not bound to mention details of rent
arrears. After service of notice, it is the duty of the
tenant to pay the arrears which he thinks is due.
When payment by cheque is not agreed mode, then
sending of cheque is not a valid tender of rent. If
ultimately it is found that tenant had paid correct
amount then suit will be dismissed. If tenant claims
notice to be invalid, he should plead grounds. When
landlord denies his signature on AD receipt, he
must give evidence to prove signature.
7. Inderjeet Kaur v. (2001) 1 SCC S.25-B(5) DRC Act – Leave to Defend – The landlord
Nirpal Singh 706 sought eviction on the ground of bonafide
requirement – No one shall be subject to suffer a
civil consequences like eviction from a premises
resulting in hardship to him without providing
adequate and effective opportunity to disprove the
case against him and establish his case, as pleaded.
As is evident from S.25-B(4) and (5) of the Act,
burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in
that if the affidavit filed by him discloses such facts
as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an
order for the recovery of the possession of the
premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of
the proviso to S.14(1) of the Act are good enough to
grant leave to defend.

A landlord, who bona fidely requires a premises for

his residence and occupation should not suffer for
long, waiting for eviction of a tenant. At the same
time a tenant cannot be thrown out from a
premises summarily, even though prima facie he is
able to say that the claim of the landlord is not
bona fide or untenable and as such not entitled to
obtain an order of eviction. The approach has to be
cautious and judicious in granting or refusing leave
to defend to a tenant to contest an eviction petition.

At a stage when the tenant seeks leave to defend, it

is enough if he prima facie makes out a case by
disclosing such facts as would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. It
would not be a right approach that unless the
tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case
as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend
should not be granted when it is not the
requirement of S.25-B(5). A leave to defend sought
for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a
routing manner which will defeat the very object of
the special provisions contained Chapter IIIA of the
Act.

Leave to defend cannot be refused where an

eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire
of a landlord to recover possession of the premises
from a tenant under S.14(1)(e), when as a matter of
fact the requirement may not be bona-fide.
Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to
eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great
hardship to him and his family members, if any,
although he could establish if only leave is granted
that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of
eviction. At the stage of granting leave to defend,
parties rely on affidavits in support of the rival
contentions. Assertions and counter-assertions
made in affidavits may not afford safe and
acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an
affirmative conclusion one way or the other unless
there is strong and acceptable evidence is available
to show that the facts disclosed in the application
filed by the tenant seeking leave to defend were
frivolous, untenable or most unreasonable.
8. K. D. Nagrath v. 2000 (1) RCJ 1 S.14(1)(e) DRC Act – A person who is settled
Neena Sharma abroad and has been working as a professional-in
the present case as a Doctor – has different and
distinct life style. Even if the petitioner has to shift
India in his own house, he cannot be compelled to
stay only in two bed rooms on ground floor. The
tenant cannot dictate to landlord that he must have
to live in two rooms because he is occupying other
two rooms on the first floor. Petitioner would
require a room for consultation for his clinic and
one room for his guests and relations either from
India or aboard. According to our way of style, no
evidence is required about visit or friends and
relatives. Friends and relatives do visit occasionally
every person until and unless it is brought on
evidence that a man is recluse, therefore,
requirement of a guest room for that purpose is
neither malafide nor excessive.

9. Kesar Das v. Jaisa 1967 (69) PLR Right of a statutory tenant to remain in possession
Ram 499 is personal and not capable of being transferred or
assigned – on the death of statutory tenant his
tenancy comes to an end, and as such a tenancy
has not transmittable incidence and cannot be
inherited. It is thus obvious that on the death of
 Jessa Ram the possession of the other appellants,
who are his sons, became that of trespassers and as
such they could be dispossessed by the Civil Court.

10. Kesho Lal Sharma 2000 (1) RCJ Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act,
v. Ram Singh 249 1973 – Bonafide requirement – The landlord is the
Hooda best judge of his requirement. Unless it is a
whimsical desire or the requirement is mala fide,
the landlord should be left to decide the
accommodation required by him.

11. Laxmidas Bapudas (2001) 7 SCC Whether a petition U/S.21(1)(h) of the Karnataka
Darbar v. Rudravva 409 Rent Control Act, for eviction of a tenant under a
contractual fixed-term lease, would be maintainable
on the ground of bonafide requirement of landlord?

Ans: So far as fixed-term lease if concerned, it shall

be effected only to the extent that even after expiry
of period of the lease the possession cannot be
obtained by the lessor unless one or more of the
grounds contained S.21 of the Act are available for
eviction of the tenant. There is noting to indicate
nor has it been held in any case that in view of S.21
of the At a contract of fixed-term tenancy stands
obliterated in totality. None of the State Rent Acts
have abrogated or affected the provisions of S.107
of the TPA which provides for lease of immovable
property from year to year or for a term more than
a year or reserving a yearly rent. A contract of
tenancy does not lose significance on coming into
force of the Karnataka Rent Act. A period of a
subsisting lease for fixed term could not be
curtailed in the absence of a forfeiture clause in the
lease.
The effect of the non-obstante clause contained
U/S.21 of the Act on the fixed term contractual
lease may be explained as follows:
(i) On expiry of period of the fixed-term lease,
the tenant would be liable for eviction only
on the grounds as enumerated in clauses (a)
to (p) of sub-section (1) of S.21 of the Act.
(ii) Any grounds contained in the agreement of
lease other than or in addition to the
grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (p) of
the Act shall remain operative.
(iii) Proceedings for eviction of a tenant under a
fixed-term contractual lease can be initiated
during subsistence or currency of the lease
only on a ground as may be enumerated in
clauses (a) to (p) of sub-section (1) of S.21
of the Act and it is also provided as one of
the grounds for forfeiture of the lease rights
 in the lease deed, not otherwise.
(iv) The period of fixed-term lease is ensured
and remains protected except in the cases
indicated in the preceding paragraph.
12. Liaq Ahmed v. JT 2000 (5) SC S.25-B(5) DRC Act - The provisions of the Rent Acts
Habeeb-Ur-Rehman 611 = are, therefore, not required to be interpreted in a
AIR 2000 SC hyper-technical manner which in cases may result
2470 in frustrating the object for which the legislation
was made.

If tenant discloses grounds and pleads a cause

which prima facie is not baseless, unreal and
unfounded, the Controller is obliged to grant him
leave to defend his case against the eviction sought
by the landlord. The enquiry envisaged for the
purpose is a summary enquiry to prima facie find
out the existence of reasonable grounds in favour of
the tenant. If the tenant brings to the notice of the
Controller, such facts as would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of
possession, the Controller shall give him leave to
contest. The law envisages the disclosure of facts
and not the proof of the facts.

The question as to whether the property had

actually vested or not, the consequence of its
 vesting or non-vesting and the authenticity of the
sale deed relied upon by the respondent, were the
questions which could be determined only at the
trial after the appellants were granted leave to
contest the claim of the respondent-landlord. The
pleas raised by the appellants could not, in any
way, be termed to be frivolous, baseless, unreal and
unfounded. If that be the position, the Controller
was obliged to grant the leave and after affording
the parties opportunity, adjudicate the rival claims.

13. M. L. Prabhakar v. 2001 RLR 123 S.14(1)(e) DRC Act – A landlord is required to
Rajiv Singhal (SC) disclose other properties owned by him only if
these are residential and are suitable to him. If
other properties are far off and no near or adjacent,
than these can be claimed as not suitable. Landlord
is not expected to split his family. Tenant is not
entitled to give additional evidence in Supreme
Court if withholding of some information by
landlord has caused him prejudice.

14. Mahinder Kumar 1984 (7) DRJ Slum Areas (Improvement & Clearance) Act, 1956 –
Khandelwal v. 196 finding of the Competent Authority to the effect
Padam Chand that the respondent was sole owner and landlord
was perverse and set aside, and remanded.
15. Mangat Rai v. (1980) 4 SCC Rent Acts afford a real and sanctified protection to
Kidar Nath 276 = AIR 1980 the tenant, the same should not be nullified by
SC 1709 giving a hyper-technical or liberal construction to
the language of the statute which instead of
advancing the object of the Act may result in its
frustration. The Rent Acts hav been enacted to give
protection to the tenants.

16. Mt. Ganesh Kuer v. AIR 1937 Oudh One of the defendants not properly served through
Sheo Raj Singh 502 negligence of plaintiff – suit cannot be dismissed
against defendants properly served.

17. Nanu Mal v. 54 (1994) DLT S.50 DRC Act and O.1 R.9 CPC – In order to defend
Bhagwat Pershad 249 the suit, the defendants had only to prove that they
@ Bhagwat Swarup were the tenants, or that they were in lawful
possession of the shop premises. This they did. Civil
Court, therefore, had no jurisdiction and the suit
was barred U/S.50 DRC Act.
In the absence of plea of implied surrender or
abandonment, no notice thereof can be taken.

Where the necessary parties are not before the

Court, it cannot decide the suit at all in their
absence. AIR 1979 SC 1682
18. Parkash Chand Jain 25 (1984) DLT S.14 (1)(h) DRC Act – Once a tenant acquires
v. Madan Mohan 444 vacant possession of another premises and shifts
Lal Sri Ram (P) Ltd. his residence it is immaterial whether the newly
acquired premises are sufficient or not. Unless
there is definite allegation about the knowledge of
the landlord regarding acquisition of new premises,
it cannot be said that landlord’s right for eviction
would be defeated by principles of waiver or laches.
In Hem Chand Baid v. Prem Wati Parekh, 1979
(16) DLT 191; Once protection is lost by a tenant by
his default under clause (h), it is lost for ever and
cannot be revived at any point of time or under any
circumstances. The landlord’s right of eviction
might get defeated by application of general
principles of waiver or laches in exceptional
circumstances.
In case the landlord satisfies the conditions
mentioned in clauses to the proviso to sub-section
(1) of S.14 of the Act, the Controller was bound to
pass an order for the recovery of possession and he
has no discretion to refuse it.
19. Prakash Chand 2001 (1) RCR Application U/S.14-C was maintainable inasmuch as
Gupta v. K. S. 139 SC the landlord was due for retirement on and the
Gupta = AIR 1999 SC other petition having been withdrawn was no
2241 longer pending and could not be treated as
 proceedings arising out U/S.14-C.

During the pendency of the proceedings the

appellant secured possession of the premises
pursuant to the proceedings arising out under the
Rent Control Act or otherwise would be a relevant
factor to find out as to the need of the respondent
and sufficiency of accommodation.

20. Pushpa Soni v. 2001 RLR 333 S.14(1)(e) DRC Act – A tenant must be sent
Sarbati Devi summons through process server as well as
registered post. If these two modes fail then
Controller may permit service by publication in
newspaper. Even when latter is allowed, summons
must also be sent by registered post AD and
through process server. Tenants adopt various
methods to avoid reports of service of process while
landlords efforts are to somehow procure service of
process. Courts can plug this nuisance by giving
monthly date of service. This practice would tire
out most litigants. Lawyers who are officers of the
Court are given licence not to rush to court with
undeserving prayer. They must conduct in such a
way that time and money is not wasted.

Knowledge of the pendency of the eviction petition

 appears to have been gained by the tenant in a
most novel but incredible way i.e. by the tenant
having overheard a conversation in which there
was a mention of the eviction petition by the
landlady. I had observed in the course of hearing
that perhaps it would only be the tenants and no
one else who would believe this fantastic version.

21. Santosh Devi Soni JT 2000 (3) SC S.25-B(4) – Leave to Defend – Landlady is widow
v. Chand Kiran 397 and is in occupation of the first floor the building –
This is a case for additional accommodation and
looking to the facts and circumstances of the case,
especially in the light of the additional
accommodation, the question of landlady’s need
was required to be thrashed out on merits by a full-
fledged trial. Where additional accommodation is
asked for in proceedings under Delhi Rent Control
Act, normally leave to defend should not be
refused.
22. Savitri Verma v. 2000 (1) RCJ S.14 D DRC Act – Petitioner widow living with her
Karol Bagh Bangiya 252 son – Not relevant for disposing of petition U/S.14
Sansad D DRC Act – Approach of ARD was erroneous,
lopsided and illegal.
23. Sham Lal v. Baroo 68 (1997) DLT S.14(1)(h) DRC Act – It is not necessary for the
Mal 287 tenant to have shifted to the another
accommodation. It is sufficient for the landlord to
 prove that the tenant has acquired vacant
possession of another residential premises.
Even if law of pleadings are not applicable to the
Act yet it cannot be denied that these are summary
proceedings, the procedural part as far it touches
the principle of natural justice would apply. One
party cannot take the other by surprise at the stage
of evidence. Rigours of the procedure laid down in
the CPC may not be applied to the rent matters.
But at the same time principles of natural justice
does apply.
To understand when property stood acquired. We
must know what is “acquired”? It means one
coming into possession. That is to say that the
tenant obtained vacant possession of another
premises by virtue of a right vested in him. This
right can be two-fold, (i) either by ownership; or (ii)
by becoming tenant of another premises.
24. State of Punjab v. 1985 (87) PLR There was no occasion for dismissing the
Gama 706 application simply because the process fee was not
filed for the second time. One more opportunity
should have been allowed to do the needful. There
is no finding by the trial court that the process fee
was not filed with an ulterior motive or the State of
Punjab was interested in any way in delaying the
service on the respondent. Order 9 Rule 2 CPC
 provides for dismissal of the suit where summons is
not served in consequence of plaintiff’s failure to
pay the court-fee or postal charges for service but
that does not mean that the court is not to exercise
its discretion judiciously under the said rule. The
suit is to be dismissed under very special
circumstances.
25. Surinder Pal Singh (1996) 4 SCC Leave to Defend - when an application for leave to
Bhattal v. Rakesh 275 = AIR 1996 defend is made by the tenant supported by an
Jain SC 1907 affidavit for grant of leave to contest the eviction
petition, the rent controller is not required to
examine the issue from the point of view of the
ultimate proof which the tenant may produce but
the only thing which the Controller is required to
examine is to look into the averments made in the
application by the tenant and the affidavit in
support thereof to see whether the tenant has made
out a case which, if proved, would disentitle the
landlord from claiming the eviction of tenant from
the premises occupied by him in summary
proceedings.
26. Sushil Chand Gupta 1980 RLR 423 S.14(1)(d) DRC Act – The crucial period for proving
v. Radha K. Bathija the non-residence of the tenant in the premises is
the period of six months “immediately before the
date of the filing of the application” for eviction –
The application for ejectment was made on
 27.08.74. So it has to be seen if the tenant was in
premises from 27.02.74 to 27.08.74. This is the
single question to be determined in the case.
The presumption of service of notice does not
necessarily imply that the tenant himself received
the notice and he was actually residing there. The
presumption of service has a limited role. In the
first place, the presumption is raised in favour of
the sender of the notice. It cannot be raised for the
benefit of the tenant. He has to prove the positive
fact that he was residing in the premises during the
crucial period.
Residence is a state of things. To prove the
existence of a certain state of affairs presumption
by itself signifies very little. A tribunal of fact
requires a degree of probability which is
commensurate with the occasion. The question of
residence or non-residence is not a question of
presumption. It is a question of fact.
27. T. N. Rai v. Rent 67 (1997) DLT S.3(d) and S.14(1)(h) DRC Act – Statute has
Control Tribunal 308 granted expressly ten years exemption from the
operation of this Act to those landlords who have
constructed their house on or after the
commencement of the Act, 1988. This exemption is
not available to the tenant who has acquired his
own accommodation or vacant possession or
 allotted the accommodation. Relied on: AIR 1984
SC 87
28. Textile Association AIR 1990 SC Original tenant died leaving behind his widow, two
(India) Bombay 2053 sons and daughters. Landlord filed eviction petition
Unit v. Balmohan on the ground of bonafide requirement and non-
Gopal Kurup payment of rent without impleading the
respondent. Ex-parte decree passed and possession
obtained. Held: The respondent was as much a
tenant as the mother and the other brother. The ex-
parte decree for eviction obtained against his
mother and brother without impleading him in that
suit has to be set aside. The decree cannot be kept
alive against two other tenants. The mother and the
other son are also entitled to possession.
29. V. Dhanpal Chettiar (1980) 1 SCR S.106, S.111(g) and S.111(h) TPA - Eviction against
v. Yesodai Ammal 333 = tenant under any State Rent Control Act - Giving of
AIR 1979 SC notice under Section 106 T. P. Act - Not necessary -
1745 Determination of lease by forfeiture - Mode.

In order to get a decree or order for eviction

against a tenant under any State Rent Control Act
it is not necessary to give notice under Section 106
T. P. Act. Determination of a lease in accordance
with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary
and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot
get eviction of the tenant even after such
 determination.

30. Vidhya Wati v. 1974 RCR 47 S.25 DRC Act – The scheme of the Act makes it
Takan Dass clear that it deals with a pre-existing relationship of
landlord and tenant. The relationship is not created
by or under the Act. It is created under the
Transfer of Property Act or under an agreement or
any other relevant law under which an interest in
the premises belonging to the landlord is created in
favour of a tenant and such an interest amount to a
lease. This is why the contractual relationship of
landlord and tenant has to be first terminated by
the landlord by a notice to quit under S.106 TP Act
before a petition for eviction under the Act can be
filed by him. (Battoo Mal v. Rameshwar Nath,
1970 RCR 532; ILR (1970) 1 Delhi 740). S.14 DRC
Act dealing with the eviction of a tenant by the
landlord pre-supposes that the relationship of
landlord and tenant exists and then proceeds to lay
down that the landlord shall not evict his tenant
except on certain specified grounds.
S.25 DRC Act is divided into two parts. The
substantive part of the section describes the
persons on whom the order for the recovery of
possession of the premises is binding and who are,
therefore, liable to be evicted in execution of this
order. These are “all persons who may be in
occupation of the premises”. The words
“occupation” is material. It only signifies the
physical the physical occupation of the premises. It
does not indicate or imply any interest in or title to
the premises or the lack of it in the occupant. It
seems to be used in contradistinction with the
words “where the interest of a tenant in any
premises is determined”. The interest in the
premises had been of the tenant and that has been
determined. The implication is that such an interest
is not possessed by the persons in occupation.
Similarly, the words “vacant possession thereof
shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such
persons therefrom” also show that the landlord is
entitled to possession because of the termination of
the interest of the tenant. The occupants were not
in legal possession of the premises and they have,
therefore, to be evicted. The word ‘occupation’
does not, therefore, apparently amount to legal
possession of the premises. The second part of S.25
consists of the proviso. The word ‘occupation’ used
in the substantive part is general and wide. It has
been well said that the purpose of proviso is to be a
‘qualification’ of the preceding enactment which is
expressed in terms too general to be quite general
to be accurate.

Because the word ‘occupation’ can include

occupation with or without title, it is clarified in the
proviso that it is to be restricted only to occupation
without ‘an independent title’. A person who has an
independent title to the premises would not be
included in ‘person who may be occupation of the
premises’. An order of eviction is not binding on a
person who claims a title to the premises
independent of the tenant. A person who claims to
be real tenant of the landlord can be covered by the
proviso and excluded from the substantive part of
S.25.

The title which the appellant Vidyawanti claimed to

the premises in her application made under the
proviso to S.25 of the Act was that she was a tenant
in her own right. The maintainability of her
application had to be considered by the Controller
on the assumption that her allegations were true.
The truth or falsity thereof could be found later
only by deciding the merits of the application. On
her allegations, all the heirs of the deceased Pishori
Lal inherited the tenancy. The question, therefore,
arose whether the heirs of Pishori Lal were joint
tenants or only co-tenants. The answer to this
question is given by S.19(b) of the Hindu
Succession Act. The concept of joint tenancy is a
peculiarity of the English Common Law. As
observed by the Privy Council in Joginder Narain
Deo v. Ram Chandra Dut, ILR 23 Calcuta 670 at
679, “the principle of joint tenancy appears to be
unknown to Hindu Law, except in the case of co-
parcenary between the members of an undivided
family.” This analogy with English Law, though
important, has since been established as was
recognized by the Federal Court in the matter of
the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, AIR
1941 PC 72 at 77. But joint tenancy was restricted
in Hindu Law to the relations between the
coparceners. It had no application outside the
coparcenary. Therefore, in India, the Courts
strongly leaned against joint tenancy. As pointed by
Mulla in his commentary on the Transfer of
Property Act, 6th Editition, pages 638-639 – “Joint
tenants have a unity of title…….Tenants in common
have unity of possession but not unity of title.”
Therefore, if one of the joint tenants dies, the other
joint tenants takes his interest by survivorship. On
the contrary, if one of the co-tenants dies, his
interest will pass on to his own legal heirs and will
not go to the other co-tenants by way of
survivorship. In view of S.19(b) of the Hindu
Succession Act, the heirs of Pishori Lal inherited
the tenancy as co-tenants and not as joint tenants.
They had unity of possession but no unity of title.
The order of eviction against Tarlochan Lal is not
binding on other co-tenants.

Held: A person who asserts to be tenant of the

landlord and who does not claim through the
person against whom the order for eviction has
been passed is a person having an independent title
to the premsies within the meaning of the proviso
to S.25.

Held: As pointed by one of us in Mrs. D. David v. R.

Makha, 1972 RCR 253; the proper procedure under
the Act is that in an application by the landlord for
the eviction of a person alleged to be his tenant, the
jurisdiction of the Controller is not lost merely
because the alleged tenant denies the relationship
(See: Babulal v. Nandlram, AIR 1958 SC 677). The
Controller has to make an inquiry into such
relationship and decided whether it existed from
before the filing of an application for eviction by
the landlord. But this decision binds the parties
 only for the purpose of the proceeding before the
Controller. It is not, however, final. For, under sub-
section (4) of S.50 DRC Act, the persons aggrieved
by the decision can go to the civil court to get the
question of the title decided by the civil court.
31. Mangat Ram v. 1980 (2) RCR Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, 1934 – East
Kidar Nath 673 (SC) Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act – Whether or
not the deposit made by he appellant could be
treated as a deposit under the Rent Act and
therefore, a valid tender to landlord?

Ans: U/S.31 of the Indebtedness Act any person

who owes money is entitled to deposit in court the
money owed either in full or in part in the name of
his creditor. It is manifest, therefore, that his
provision would apply even to a tenant who owes
money to his landlord by way of rent due and he
can also enjoy the facility by S.31 of the
Indebtedness Act.
32. Siri Kishan Dev. 1970 RCJ 523 P East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 –
Babu Nand Kishore &H Whether payment of rent to one of the joint
Advocate landlords gives a ground for eviction against the
tenant to the landlord or landlords on the basis of
non-payment of arrears of rent?

Ans: In the definition of the expression ‘landlord’ as

 in S.2(c) of the Rent Act, a person is entitled to
receive rent for the time being whether on his own
account or on behalf of another, is a landlord and
so also every person from time to time deriving title
under a landlord. It is further apparent that either
may receive rent on behalf of the other, and no
circumstances stated in this case prohibited one
landlord from receiving rent on behalf of the other.
33. Kiran Bahadur 1972 RCJ 773 U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
Singh v. Hari ALL 1947 – Any rent paid to one of the co-owners of the
Kishan Mathur premises would be a legal discharge of the liability
of the tenant.
34. Ganga Prasad v. 1975 RLR 547 = On the death of the tenant, his heirs inherited the
Tribeni Devi AIR 1975 Delhi tenancy as co-tenants and not as joint tenants. They
145 have unity of possession but not unity of title. The
interest of the lessee vested in them. Heirs of
deceased tenant succeeded as co-tenants and each
one of them is entitled to notice of termination of
tenancy and in its absence, eviction petition U/S.14
is not maintainable.
35. Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. 1989 RLR 386 S.14 (1)(b) DRC Act - The appellant has put M/s.
Beharilal Kohli (SC) = United Automobiles in possession of the premises
AIR 1989 SC and has thus parted with the possession within the
1806 meaning of S. 14(l) Proviso (b) of the Act. The
appellant company has a separate legal entity and
has nothing to do with M/s. United Automobiles
except that the latter is the dealer-distributor of
some of its manufactured articles. M/s. United
Automobiles is not a licensee and is not in
possession of the premises on behalf of the
appellant. The monetary benefit available to the
dealer is confined to the commission it receives on
the sale of every vehicle; and does not include the
right of enjoyment of the premises. The dealer pays
a fixed sum as rent to the appellant and the rent is
not related or dependant on the sale of any vehicle.
The fact that this amount is same as what is paid by
the appellant to the respondent does not appear to
be material. The irresistible conclusion is that the
appellant has created a Sublease in favour of its
dealer.

Q. Whether the clause in the lease mentioned

above amounts to the respondent's consent in
writing?

Ans: The question whether a lessee is entitled to

create a sub-lease or not is undoubtedly a term of
the transaction of lease, and if it is incorporated in
the document it cannot be disassociated from the
lease and considered separately in isolation. If a
document is inadmissible for non-registration, all
 its terms are inadmissible including the one dealing
with landlord's permission to his tenant to sub-let.
It follows that the appellant cannot, in the present
circumstances be allowed to rely upon the clause in
his, unregistered lease deed.

36. Jagat Taran Berry AIR 1980 Delhi S.106, S.107 TPA - The tenant contends that as the
v. Sardar Sant 7 lease was for 'manufacturing purposes' the notice
Singh ought to have been of said months. There was no
written lease deed executed by the parties; at least,
none has been brought on record.

Logically, S. 107 should be read first because it

states how leases are made, whereas S. 106
prescribes by fiction the duration of various kinds
of leases 'in the absence of a contract or local law
or usage to the contrary'. A lease falls under the
first or second paragraph depending on its
duration. The purpose for which the lease is
granted is wholly immaterial under this Section.
Thus, for example, a lease granted for a
manufacturing purpose can be made only by
'registered instrument' if its duration is that stated
in the first paragraph. But, a lease for the same
purpose of a lesser duration can, under, the second
 paragraph, be made 'either by a registered
instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by
delivery of possession.

S.106 TPA - Here, the classification of leases is

according to their purpose. The object of this
Section is to determine the duration of leases when
the parties have left a lacuna. If the parties have
themselves indicated the duration, the Section is
redundant. For, it operates only 'In the absence of a
contract...........to the contrary'. What it does is to
prescribe the duration of various kinds of leases by
legal fiction. Leases for 'agricultural or
manufacturing purposes' are 'deemed to
be..........from year to year'. All others are 'deemed
to be............from month to month'.

Held: The ultimate conclusion is that the tenancy

was from 'month to month'. Hence, the notice to
quit served on the tenant was valid.
37. Mangilal v. Sugan AIR 1965 SC 17 Held: That the provisions of S. 4 of the
Chand Rathi (Overruled in) Accommodation Act in addition to those of the
AIR 1979 SC Transfer of Property Act and that before a tenant
1745 can be evicted by a landlord he must comply both
with the provisions of S. 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act and those of S. 4 of the
 Accommodation Act.

All that is necessary for him to establish is that the

tenant was in fact in arrears, that he was given one
month's notice to pay up the arrears and that in
spite of this he failed to pay those arrears within
one month of service of notice on him.
38.