Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs.People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan, G.

R. No. 220598, 19 July 2016 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx
JULY 27, 2016JUDYBAUTISTA82CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
PLUNDER, EXPRESS CONSPIRACY, IMPLIED CONSPIRACY, RULE 652 Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager, all
COMMENTS
Bersamin, J:
public officers committing the offense in relation to their
FACTS:
respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions official positions, authority, relationships, connections or

for certiorariseparately filed by former President Gloria Macapagal- influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one

Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally

and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas. amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of

former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and  PCSO Budget PHP365,997,915.00, more or less, [by raiding the public treasury].

and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their

and Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed by respective petitions for bail which were denied by the

the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against

were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for them was strong.

conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under

Section 2 (b)  of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas

No. 7659. then separately filed their demurrers to evidence asserting that the

Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 same were denied by the Sandiganbayan, holding that there was

to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto xxx accused sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit
plunder. After the respective motions for reconsideration filed by of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law.

GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly

filed their respective petitions for certiorari. provides that “the order denying the motion for leave of court to
ISSUES:
file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
Procedural:
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment.” It is not an

1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the

proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence. demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order
Substantive:
that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of

1. Whether or not the State sufficiently   established the the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their

existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ; conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the

2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal

elements of the crime of plunder: (a) Was there evidence of that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should

amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the not be limited, because to do so “x x x would be to destroy its

total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the

predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the court that authority is not wanting to show thatcertiorari is more

information proved by the Prosecution? discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise
RULING:
of our superintending control over other courts, we are to be
Re procedural issue:
guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to
ends of justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted
assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because
where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the

substantial justice.” accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or

The exercise of this power to correct  grave abuse of discretion a chain conspiracy.

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any

branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan

by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538, 556] to the

convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the

bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word

discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate,

notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts

the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common

the accused could avail themselves of the remedy understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such

of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea

of discretion. to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.We are not

Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte. talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the

allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution
identification of the main plunderer sought to be
sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder
prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime
among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions
of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was
prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that
not only necessary because the law required such
 (a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at
identification, but also because it was essential in least Php50 Million was adduced against GMA and Aguas.

safeguarding the rights of all of the accused to be properly

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or
informed of the charges they were being made answerable
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than
for. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of the
Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should
crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the
lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.
accused to suitably prepare their defense because they are
As regards the element that the public officer must have
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth
constituted the offense charged.
at least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no
Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer
evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even
or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned
Uriarte, for that matter, had amassed, accumulated or
GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind
acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also
despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to
no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the
that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated
Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the
such sweeping generalization.
CIFs [Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been

diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main (b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public
treasury  (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)
plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public

the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to

treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying

be informed of the charges against each of them.
Re second substantive issues:
words:misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in

conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a the company of the four other terms that require the use of the

sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly

phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the

various meanings may be made by considering the company of the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere

words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids

associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in on the public treasury.Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a

association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to

therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter. use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the

property as if it were one’s own; tomisappropriate means to own, money went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had

to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did

substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond

not as intended;” and malversationoccurs when “any public officer reasonable doubt.

who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari;

funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal Case

misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and

negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners’ respective

funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-

binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the 0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and

BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES
no pronouncements on costs of suit
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION (petitioner) v CIR (respondent)
April 24 2007 | Ynares-Santiago, J. |
CTA denied RCBC’s petition for review, and RCBC did not file a MR or an appeal.
RCBC then filed a petition for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable
negligence but this was denied by the CTA. The SC said that first, RCBC was not
denied due process when its petition for relief was denied because it was given
ample opportunity to be heard, and the negligence it alleged was not excusable.
Second, even if the petition for relief was granted, the action for the cancellation of
its assessments had already prescribed. According to the law, If the protest (against
the tax) is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within 180 days from
submission of documents, the taxpayer may appeal to the CTA within 30 days from
receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of the 180-day period; otherwise the
decision shall become final, executory and demandable.
The assignment is the MR. The first part of this digest will be the original case
decided on June 16 2006.
July 5 2001: RCBC received a Formal Letter of Demand dated May 25 2001 from CIR
for its tax liabilities for Gross Onshore Tax in the amount of P53,998,428.29 and
Documentary Stamp Tax for its Special Savings Placements in the amount of
P46,717,952.76, for the taxable year 1997. July 20: RCBC filed a protest
letter/request for reconsideration/reinvestigation pursuant to Section 228 of the
NIRC. As the protest was not acted upon by the CIR, RCBC filed on April 30, 2002 a
petition for review with the CTA for the cancellation of the assessments. July 15
2003: CIR filed a motion to resolve t
he issue of CTA’s jurisdiction,
which was granted by the CTA in a resolution dated September 10 2003. The
petition for review was dismissed because it was filed beyond the 30-day period
following the lapse of 180 days from
RCBC’S
submission of documents in support of its protest, as provided under Sec. 228 of
the NIRC and Section 11 of RA 1125 (Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals) RCBC
did not file a MR or an appeal to the CTA En Banc from the dismissal of its petition
for review. Thus, the September 10 2003 Resolution became final and executory on
October 1 2003 and Entry of Judgment was made on December 1 2003. CIR sent a
Demand Letter to RCBC for the payment of the deficiency tax assessments.
February 20 2004: RCBC filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground of
excusable negligence of its
counsel’s secretary who allegedly mis
filed and lost the September 10 2003 Resolution. The CTA Second Division set the
case for hearing on April 2 2004, but on May 3 the CTA Second Division rendered a
Resolution denying
RCBC’s
Petition for Relief from Judgment.
RCBC’s
MR was denied in a Resolution dated November 5, 2004, hence it filed a petition
for review with the CTA En Banc, which affirmed the CTA. RCBC
’s contention
: it was denied due process when it was not given the opportunity to be heard to
prove that its failure to file a MR or appeal from the dismissal of its petition for
review was due to the failure of its employee to forward the copy of the September
10, 2003 Resolution, which constitutes excusable negligence. ISSUE:
Should RCBC’s petit
ion for relief have been denied, even if based on a technicality? YES Considering
that the subject assessment, insofar as it involves alleged deficiency DST on special
savings accounts, is an issue affecting all members of the banking industry, should
RCBC have been afforded an equal opportunity to fully litigate the issue and have
the case determined on its merits rather than on a mere technicality? RULING: CTA
decision AFFIRMED.
ON DUE PROCESS
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is a legal remedy that is
allowed only in exceptional cases whereby a party seeks to set aside a judgment
rendered against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived of a hearing,
or was prevented from taking an appeal, because of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain, for it is this
opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of due process. The essence of
due process is a hearing before conviction and before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal, but due process does not always require a trial-type
proceeding. The essence of due process is to be found in
the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense.
"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
(Batongbakal v Zafra) The CTA set the case for hearing on April 2 2004 after the
filing by RCBC of its petition for relief from judgment.
RCBC’s
counsel was present on the scheduled hearing and in fact orally argued its petition.
Moreover, after the CTA dismissed the petition for relief from judgment, RCBC filed
a MR and the court further required both parties to file their respective
memorandum. Indeed, RCBC was not denied its day in court considering the
opportunities given to argue its claim. Relief cannot be granted on the flimsy
excuse that the failure to appeal was due to the neglect of RCB
C’s
counsel. Otherwise, all that a losing party would do to salvage his case would be to
invoke neglect or mistake of his counsel as a ground for reversing or setting aside
the adverse judgment, thereby putting no end to litigation. Negligence to be
"excusable" must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have
probably been impaired.
RCBC’s
former counsel’s omission could hardly be characterized as excusable, much le
ss unavoidable.
RCBC’s
counsel failed to check periodically, as an act of prudence and diligence, the status
of the pending case. The fact that counsel allegedly had not renewed the
employment of his secretary, thereby making the latter no longer attentive or
focused on her work, did not relieve him of his responsibilities to his client. It is a
problem personal to him which should not in any manner interfere with his
professional commitments. In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so
palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a second
opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the case at
bar, especially since petitioner had squandered the various opportunities available
to it at the different stages of this case.
ON PRESCRIPTION
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that the negligence of
RCBC’s
counsel is excusable, still the petition must fail. Even if the petition for relief from
judgment would be granted, RCBC will not fare any better if the case were to be
returned to the CTA since its action for the cancellation of its assessments had
already prescribed. RCBC protested the assessments pursuant to Section 228 of the
NIRC, which provides:
SEC. 228.
Protesting of Assessment
.- xxx x x x x Within a period to be prescribed by implementing rules and
regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer
fails to respond, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative shall issue
an assessment based on his findings. Such assessment may be protested
administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within 30
days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed
by implementing rules and regulations. Within 60 days from filing of the protest, all
relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted; otherwise, the
assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within 180 days
from submission of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or
inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days from receipt of the
said decision, or from the lapse of the 180-day period; otherwise the decision shall
become final, executory and demandable.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the periods provided, from July 20 2001 (date of
RCBC’s
filing of protest) it had until September 18 2001 to submit relevant documents and
from September 18 2001, the Commissioner had until March 17 2002 to issue his
decision. As admitted by RCBC, the protest remained unacted by the CIR.
Therefore, it had until April 16 2002 within which to elevate the case to this court.
Thus, when RCBC filed its Petition for Review on April 30, 2002, the same is outside
the 30-day period. As provided in Section 228, the failure of a taxpayer to appeal
from an assessment on time rendered the assessment final, executory and
demandable. Consequently, RCBC is precluded from disputing the correctness of
the assessment. While the right to appeal a decision to the CTA is merely a
statutory remedy, the requirement that it must be brought within 30 days is
jurisdictional. If a statutory remedy provides as a condition precedent that the
action to must be commenced within a prescribed time, such requirement is
jurisdictional and failure to comply therewith may be raised in a motion to dismiss (
Ker & Company, Ltd. v CTA
). Failure to comply with the 30-day statutory period would bar the appeal and
deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of its jurisdiction to entertain and determine the
correctness of the assessment.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
–
DENIED!
RCBC argument #1
: its counsel’s neglect in not filing the petition for review within the reglementary
period was excusable, as the counsel’s secretary misplaced the Resolution, hence
the counsel was not aware of its
issuance and that it had become final and executory.
SC:
(same as original decision) Relief cannot be granted on the flimsy excuse that the
failure to appeal was
due to the neglect of petitioner’s counsel. Negligence to be "excusable" must be
one which ordinary diligence
and prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which the rights of
an aggrieved party have
probably been impaired. Petitioner’s former counsel’s omission could hardly be
characterized as e
xcusable
RCBC argument #2:
the case should have been re-opened considering that it was allegedly not
accorded its day in court when the CTA dismissed its petition for review for late
filing. The rules of procedure are intended to help secure, not override, substantial
justice.
SC:
If indeed there was negligence,
it would be on the part of RCBC’s
counsel, and his negligence cannot support
RCBC’s
claim for relief from judgment. Besides, tax assessments by tax examiners are
presumed correct and made in good faith, and all presumptions are in favor of the
correctness of a tax assessment unless proven otherwise. ALSO,
RCBC’s
failure to file a petition for review with the CTA within the statutory period
rendered the assessment final, executory and demandable, thereby precluding it
from interposing the defenses of legality or validity of the assessment a
nd prescription of the Government’s right to assess.
The CTA is a court of special jurisdiction and can only take cognizance of such
matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction. Section 7 of RA 9282, amending RA
1125, otherwise known as the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, provides:
Sec. 7.
Jurisdiction.
— Revenue Code; Rule 8, Sec. 3. Who May Appeal; Period to File Petition.
The CTA shall exercise: (a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as
herein provided: (1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2)
Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National
Internal Revenue Code provides a specific period of action, in which case the
inaction shall be deemed a denial;
The Court also cited Rules 4 (Jurisdiction of the Court) and 8 (Procedure in Civil
Cases) (sorry copy pastin
g…)
Rule 4, Sec. 3. Cases Within the Jurisdiction of the Court in Divisions.
—
The Court in Divisions shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction
to review by appeal the following:
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code
or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2) Inaction by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds
of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or
other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal
Revenue Code or other applicable law provides a specific period for action:
Provided, that in case of disputed assessments, the inaction of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue within the one hundred eighty day-period under Section 228 of
the National Internal Revenue Code shall be deemed a denial for purposes of
allowing the taxpayer to appeal his case to the Court and does not necessarily
constitute a formal decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the tax
case; Provided, further, that should the taxpayer opt to await the final decision of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the disputed assessments beyond the
one hundred eighty day-period abovementioned, the taxpayer may appeal such
final decision to the Court under Section 3(a), Rule 8 of these Rules; and Provided,
still further, that in the case of claims for refund of taxes erroneously or illegally
collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review with the Court prior to the
expiration of the two-year period under Section 229 of the National Internal
—
(a) A party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or the inaction of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on disputed assessments or claims for refund of
internal revenue taxes, or by a decision or ruling of the Commissioner of Customs,
the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Secretary of
Agriculture, or a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may
appeal to the Court by petition for review filed within thirty days after receipt of a
copy of such decision or ruling, or expiration of the period fixed by law for the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the disputed assessments. In case of
inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on claims for refund of internal
revenue taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for
review within the two-year period prescribed by law from payment or collection of
the taxes. (n)
It is clear that the jurisdiction of the CTA has been expanded to include not only
decisions or rulings but also inaction of the CIR.
The decisions, rulings or inaction of the CIR are necessary in order to vest the CTA
with jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, provided it is filed within 30 days after the
receipt of such decision or ruling, or within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-
day period fixed by law for the CIR to act on the disputed assessments. This 30-day
period within which to file an appeal is jurisdictional and failure to comply
therewith would bar the appeal and deprive the CTA of its jurisdiction to entertain
and determine the correctness of the assessments.
In case the CIR failed to act on the disputed assessment within the 180-day period
from date of submission of documents, a taxpayer can either: 1) file a petition for
review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or 2)
await the final decision of the CIR on the disputed assessments and appeal such
final decision to the CTA within 30 days after receipt of a copy of such decision.
However, these options are mutually exclusive, and resort to one bars the
application of the other. In the instant case, the CIR failed to act on the disputed
assessment within 180 days from date of submission of documents. Thus, RCBC
opted to file a petition for review before the CTA. Unfortunately, the petition for
review was filed out of time, i.e., it was filed more than 30 days after the lapse of
the 180-day period. Consequently, it was dismissed by the CTA for late filing. RCBC
did not file a MR or make an appeal; hence, the disputed assessment became final,
demandable and executory. RCBC cannot now claim that the assessment is not yet
final as it remained unacted upon by the CIR. After availing the first option, i.e.,
filing a petition for review which was however filed out of time, RCBC cannot
successfully resort to the second option, i.e., awaiting the final decision of the CIR
and appealing the same to the CTA. Lastly, RCBC is raising the issue of prescription
for the first time in the instant MR. Although the same was raised in the petition for
review, it was dismissed for late filing. No MR was filed. Thereafter, RCBC filed a
petition for relief from judgment, but failed to raise the issue of prescription
therein. After its petition was denied, RCBC filed a petition for review before this
Court without raising the issue of prescription. Issues and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by
the reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, much
more in a MR as in this case
CAPITOL STEEL CORPORATION v. PHIVIDEC INDUSTRIAL AUTHORITY 510 SCRA 590
(2006)
Upon compliance with the requirements for a valid expropriation, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the trial court to issue a writ of possession. Capitol Steel
Corporation (Capitol Steel) is a domestic corporation which owns 65 parcels of land
located at the province of Misamis Oriental. Phividec Industrial Authority
(PHIVIDEC) is a government owned and controlled corporation which is vested the
power of eminent domain for the purpose of acquiring rights of way or any
property for the establishment or expansion of the PHIVIDEC areas. PHIVIDEC filed
an expropriation case for the properties of Capitol Steel because it was identified as
the most ideal site for the project of PHIVIDEC. The trial court denied PHIVIDEC‘s
issuance of a writ of possession, noting that the amount deposited was seemingly
inadequate and was simply out of PHIVIDEC‘s interpretation of the prevailing zonal
valuation and was not mutually agreed upon but it was finally granted by the trial
court. On appeal, the appellate court ruled in favor of PHIVIDEC, ordering the RTC
to issue a Writ of Possession. Hence, this present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in ordering the RTC to issue a writ of
possession in favor of PHIVIDEC
HELD:
Under R.A. 8974, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in
expropriation proceedings involving real property are: (1) the filing of a complaint
for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant;
(3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including payment of the value of
the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and
in cases of utmost urgency, the payment of the proffered value of the property to
be seized; and (4) presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds
from the proper officials. Upon compliance with the requirements, a petitioner in
an expropriation case, in this case PHIVIDEC, is entitled to a writ of possession as a
matter of right and it becomes the ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith
issue the writ of possession. No hearing is required and the court neither exercises
its discretion or judgment in determining the amount of the provisional value of
the properties to be expropriated as the legislature has fixed the amount under
Section 4 of R.A. 8974.
To clarify, the payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the issuance of
a writ of possession differs from the payment of just compensation for the
expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current relevant
zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of
the property.
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY AND PEDRO BALUBAL
519 SCRA 432 (2007), SECOND DIVISION
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (Superlines) is engaged in the business of
providing public transportation. One of its buses, while traveling north and
approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, crashed into the radio room of
respondent Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC). PNCC‘s Sofronio
Salvanera, and Pedro Balubal, then head of traffic control and security department
of the South Luzon tollway, investigated the incident. The bus was turned over to
the Alabang Traffic Bureau for its own investigation. Because of lack of adequate
space, traffic investigator Pat. Cesar Lopera requested that the bus be towed by the
PNCC patrol to its compound. Superlines made several requests for the release of
the bus but Balubal refused. Instead, Balubal demanded the sum of P40,000.00 or a
collateral with the same value for the reconstruction of the damaged radio room.
Superlines filed a replevin suit with damages against PNCC and Balubal before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The trial court dismissed the complaint and ordered
Superlines to pay PNCC an amount of P40, 320.00, representing actual damages to
the radio room. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision and concluded that
the case should have been brought against the police authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a suit for replevin is proper
HELD:
Contrary to PNCC‘s contention, the petition raises questions of law foremost of
which is whether the owner of a personal property may initiate an action for
replevin against a depositary and recover damages for illegal distraint. In a
complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the
owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered,
and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully
detains the same.
In the case at bar, Superlines‘ ownership of the bus being admitted by PNCC,
consideration of whether PNCC has been wrongfully detaining it is in order. The bus
was towed by the PNCC on the request of Lopera in violation of constitutional right
against unreasonable seizures. The seizure and impounding of Superlines‘s bus, on
Lopera‘s request, were unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by
the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that it cannot pass upon the same
without impleading Lopera and any other police officer responsible for ordering the
seizure and distraint of the bus. The police authorities, through Lopera, having
turned over the bus to PNCC for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected
between them and PNCC. Superlines or the trial court motu proprio may implead
as defendants the indispensable parties Lopera and any other responsible police
officers.
SPOUSES RAFAEL ESTANISLAO v. EASTWEST BANKING
CORPORATION 
G.R. No. 178537,February 11, 2008 
FACTS: On July 24,1997, petitioner obtained a loan fro the respondent
in the amount of P3,925,000 evidenced by a promissory note and
secured by two deeds of chattel mortgage covering two dump trucks and
a bull dozer . Petitioner defaulted entire obligation became due and
demandable. A deed of assignment was drafted by the respondent on
October 6, 2000 and March 8, 2001 respectively. Petitioners completed
the delivery of heavy equipment mentioned in the deed of assignment to
respondent which accepted the same without protest or objection.
Respondent manifested to admit an amended complaint for the seizure
and delivery of two more heavy equipment which are covered under the
second deed of the chattel mortgage. RTC ruled that the deed of
assignment and the petitioner’s delivery of the heavy equipment
effectively extinguished the petitioner’s obligation and respondent as
stopped. CA reversed the decision ordering the petitioner the
outstanding debt of P4,275,919.69 plus interests. 
ISSUE: Did the Deed of Assignment operate to extinguish petitioner’s
debt to the respondent such that the replevin suit could no longer
prosper? 
RULING: The deed of assignment was a perfected agreement which
extinguished petitioner’s total outstanding obligation to the respondent.
The nature of the assignment was a dacion en pago whereby property is
alienated to the creditor in the satisfaction of a debt in money. Since the
agreement was consummated by the delivery of the last unit of heavy
equipment under the deed, petitioner’s are deemed to have been
released from all their obligations from the respondents
DR. JOSEFA T. DIGNUM v. PALAO M. DIAMLA et al.
A.M. No. P-06-2166 (2006)
A sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the
order of the court strictly to the letter, thus, when a writ is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.
Following a collection of money over a civil judgement for damages, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) assigned Sheriffs Palao Dimala (Diamla) and Acmad C. Aliponto
(Aliponto) to seize several properties for auction owned by Dr. Josefa T. Dignum
(Dignum) until her debt is satisfied. Palao then proceeded to seize the land,
accompanied by several armed guards who later turned out to be the police. Over
the course of a few weeks, Palao seized a total of four (4) properties owned by
Dignum.
After the seizure, Dignum filed a complaint against Diamla and Aliponto. Dignum
alleges that Palao and Aliponto exceeded their authority, in violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, for despite the fact that the value of her auctioned
properties was more than enough to cover the amount of the judgment debt, they
still went on to search and levy some more of her properties. Dignum also alleged
that Diamla and Aliponto were negligent in their duty in failing to provide reports
during the execution of the court order. In defense, Diamla and Aliponto
contended that the property seized was the one stipulated by the court. They fault
Dignum for not stating the true value of her property. They contended that they
relied on the tax declarations for the value of the properties.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that respondents
Diamla and Aliponto be suspended from office for one month and one day. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Diamla and Aliponto were guilty of violating Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel by seizing property which exceeded the obligation.
HELD:
A sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is to execute the
order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute the
judgment or not. He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in
the decision. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the
absence of any instructions to the contrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity
and promptness to execute it according to its mandate. Diamla and Aliponto
explanation that they relied on the values of the auctioned properties reflected in
their respective Tax Declarations is well-taken.
Diamla and Aliponto cannot escape administrative liability, however, for their
failure to make periodic reports on the status of the Writ. Section 14 of Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court explicitly mandates compliance with the manner in which a writ
of execution is to be returned to the court, as well as the submission of periodic
reports every 30 days until the judgment is fully satisfied, the reason behind which
being to update the court on the status of the execution so it could take necessary
steps to ensure its speedy satisfaction
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, ET AL., V. BENJAMIN CO, ET AL.
Published by symba on September 2, 2013 | Leave a response
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, et al., v. BENJAMIN CO, et al.
565 SCRA 600 (2008), SECOND DIVISION
China Banking Corporation (Chinabank) sold two parcels of land situated in
Pampanga to Spouses Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro (Spouses Castro) and Richard
and Editha Nogoy (Spouses Nogoy). Bordering the lot was a residential property
owned by Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.
Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with Three Kings Construction and
Realty Corporation for the development of the Northwoods Estates, which included
constructing a wall along the border of their property. Engineer Dale Olea, an
independent contractor, constructed a wall that blocked side access to the Spouses
Nogoy‘s and Castro‘s property. Spouses Nogoy and Castro communicated with Co,
asking for a halt in the activities because the construction closed the only means of
ingress and egress of their property.

Co told the spouses that the construction could not be halted since the same was
almost finished, and that the disputed construction did not block the right of way
of the two spouses‘ property. The spouses thus filed a writ of preliminary
injunction to temporarily stop the building activity. The Regional Trial Court (RTC),
however, denied the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an injunction can be granted by mere claim of right of way

HELD:

Spouses Nogoy and Castro failed to prove that they will be prejudiced by the
construction of the wall. The spouses have not clearly shown that their rights have
been violated and that they are entitled to the relief prayed for and that
irreparable damage would be suffered by them if an injunction is not issued.

To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the spouses Nogoy and

Castro must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of the right sought
to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear
and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage.

While the Spouses Nogoy and Castro correctly argue that certain requirements
must be observed before encumbrances, in this case the condition of the lot’s
registration as being subject to the law, may be discharged and before road lots
may be appropriated gratuity assuming that the lot in question was indeed one,
enjoy the presumption of regularity and the legal requirements for the removal of
the memorandum annotated on Co‘s lot are presumed to have been followed.