PARENTAL AUTHORITY the issue on custody and support shall have been

determined in a proper case.

DAISIE T. DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RAMON R.
ISSUE: Whether the custody of the minor should be
VILLAR
given to the mother.
FACTS
RULING: Yes.
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the
respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles
writ of habeas corpus  shall extend to all cases of illegal
City. Private respondent is a married man and the father
confinement or detention by which any person is
of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
relationship between petitioner and private respondent
of any person is withheld from the person entitled
developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a
thereto." In the case of Salvaña v.  Gaela, it was held
son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them.
that the writ of habeas corpus  is the proper remedy to
Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy
daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a
Mae on April 24, 1988.
third person of her free will because the parents were
compelling her to marry a man against her will.
The children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to
his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child
family.
since at the time of his conception, his father, private
respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his
to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar
the parental authority of his mother, the herein
refused to give back the child. Villar said he had
petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is
enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for
entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly,
the next school year.
petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of
her child by private respondent, she is entitled to
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
corpus.
Indeed, Rule 1021 §1 makes no distinction between the
RTC: The rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T.
case of a mother who is separated from her husband
David is given to the natural mother and the respondent
and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a
is ordered to give a temporary support of P3,000.00 a
mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested
month to the subject minor and his siblings.
with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her
rightful custody of her child.
CA: Reversed, holding that the petition is not proper in
a habeas corpus  case. Law and jurisprudence wherein
The fact that private respondent has recognized the
the question of custody of a minor child may be decided
minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give
in a habeas corpus  case contemplate a situation where
support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of
the parents are married to each other but are
the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child
separated. Furthermore, rspondent is financially well-
under seven years of age shall be separated from the
off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas,
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to
petitioner depends upon her sisters and parents for
order otherwise
support. In fact, he financially supported petitioner and
her three minor children. It is, therefore, for the best
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a
interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily
reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her
remain under the custody of respondent-appellant until
children, especially considering that she has been able
to rear and support them on her own since they were
1
born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000
to P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was
rendered. She augments her income by working as
secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc.
earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an
arrangement with her employer so that she can
personally attend to her children.  of their daughter submitted that Wendell caused her
Although the question of support is proper in a
proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this
case is justified by the fact that private respondent has
expressed willingness to support the minor child. The
order for payment of allowance need not be
conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child.
Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to
give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is
entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a
moral or legal obstacle thereto."
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,
Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC,
cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now
that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's
custody over him will have to be upheld because the
child categorically expressed preference to live with his
mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must
respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit" and here it has not
been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have
custody of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves
his child, he should not condition the grant of support
for him on the award of his custody to him  subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE
GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondent spouses are the legitimate parent of
Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of deplorable
incident which took place, was an 18-year old first year
commerce student; while petitioners are parents of
Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of
age living with aforesaid parents, and who also died in
the same event.
Two years before their deaths, Julie Ann Goting
and Wendell Libi were sweethearts unit Julie Ann broke
up her relationship with Wendell after she found him to
be sadistic and irresponsible. On January 14 1979, Julie
Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot
wound inflicted with the same firearm licensed in the
name of petitioner Cresencio Libi.
Private Respondents, bereaved over the death
death by shooting her with the said firearm and
thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit suicide.
On the other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise
distressed over the death of their son, rejected the
imputation and contended that an unknown third party,
whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by
reason of his work as narcotics informer of the
Constabulary Anti-Narcotics unit (CANU), must have
caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julia Ann to
eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, parents of Julie Ann
filed an action to recover damages against the parents
of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s
viarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners are liable for damages under
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
RULING: Yes.
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
their minor children who live in their company.’
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell
Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly
kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are
criminal act of said minor who was living in their
company. This vicarious liability of herein defendants-
appellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in
many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas v.
Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-
367), which held that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused
by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.’
‘The subsidiary liability of parent’s arising from the
criminal acts of their minor children who acted with
discernment is determined under the provisions of
Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised
2
Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent.’ (3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-
appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key to
the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without
defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had
been missing from that safety box since 1978 when
Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly
displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his
sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell
Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping
up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ."
chanrobles
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG v. CA and
TERESITA MASAUDING
G. R. No. 115640, 15 March 1995, Third Division,
(MELO, J.)
“While the bonds between a mother and her small child
are special in nature, either parent, whether father or
mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of
custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much
the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent
but the welfare of the child which is the paramount
consideration.”
FACTS:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu employed by
National Steel Corp and respondent Teresita
Masauding, a nurse in a local hospital first met
sometime in 1976 in Iligan City. Teresita left for Los
Angeles, California to work as a nurse and eventually
acquired immigrant status while Reynaldo was sent by
his employer to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as its liaison
officer. Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife. On
August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was
born. On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief
vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got
married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child, a son, this time, and given the name
Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until
they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita
blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was
always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo
contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying
expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of
attending to household expenses. Teresita left Reynaldo
and the children and went back to California. She
claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long
distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch with
her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the
Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh
was not yet completed, he was sent back by his
company. He had to leave his children with his sister, co
petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family. Teresita
claims that she did not immediately follow her children
because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy
against her and she was afraid of being arrested. She
legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17,
1984 in California and less than a year later, she had
already commenced living with Reynaldo. The judgment
of conviction in the bigamy case was actually rendered
only on September 29, 1994. On December 8, 1992 she
filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
herein two petitioners to gain custody over the
children.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's
parental authority over Rosalind and Reginald and
declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over
them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon by
the parties and to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to
Teresita and visitation rights on weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners contended that the respondent court
resolved the question of custody over the children
through an automatic and blind application of the age
proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on
the care, custody, education and
property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her
child under seven years of age, unless
3
 the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure.
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn
provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation
of the parent’s parental authority shall
be exercised by the parent designated
by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the custody of the 2 children
should be awarded to the mother.
RULING:
NO. The task of choosing the parent to whom
custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function
to be determined by a simple determination of the age
of a minor child. The paramount criterion must always
be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court
to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child,
and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald
are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated
her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald
reached the same age on January 12, 1995. Once the
choice has been made, the burden returns to the court
to investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to
assume parental authority and custodial responsibility.
While the bonds between a mother and her
small child are special in nature, either parent, whether
father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her
suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is
not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of
either parent but the welfare of the child which is the
paramount consideration.
The Court is inclined to sustain the findings and
conclusions of the regional trial court because it gave
greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and
considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing on
the issue of custody. The argument that moral laxity or
the habit of flirting from one man to another does not
fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious
nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children
over seven years old and their clear choice is the father,
but the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at
least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction
for the crime of bigamy, which from the records
appears to have become final.
It must be noted that both Rosalind and
Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand
the difference between right and wrong, ethical
behavior and deviant immorality. Their best interests
would be better served in an environment characterized
by emotional stability and a certain degree of material
sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the
Family Code. In fact, he has been trying his best to give
the children the kind of attention and care which the
mother is not in a position to extend.
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. v. COURT OF APPEALS, and
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and
Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo
City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. who was born on 1987. From the time the
boy was released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his
maternal grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner and wife Julia
agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of
the latter's parents. The latter alleged that they paid for
all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support
of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy's mother left for the United States in May 1988
to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her
whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United
States proved futile. Private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending
financial support to them for her son. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy.
4
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care,
Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.,".
The trial court awarded custody of the child to his
grandparents. The CA affirmed.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in
awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents and
not to himself. He contends that since private
respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an
unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental
authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art.
214 of the Family Code is inappropriate. On the other
hand, private respondents aver that they can provide an
air-conditioned room for the boy and that petitioner
would not be in a position to take care of his son since
he has to be assigned to different places. They also
allege that the petitioner did not give a single centavo
for the boy's support and maintenance. Besides, Julia
Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted the boy to
them before she left for the United States.
Furthermore, petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in
abducting the child in 1990, after being hospitably
treated by private respondents, does not speak well of
his fitness and suitability as a parent.
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr.?
Ruling:
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law.  The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody
of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.  His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled
to keep them in their custody and  children.
company. The child's welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody. 
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common
children.  In case of absence  or death of either parent,
the parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority.  Only in case of the parents' death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. The situation
obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother
of the minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States
while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not
only are they physically apart but are also emotionally
separated. There has been no decree of legal separation
and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of
his wife has failed. 
The considerations made are insufficient to defeat
petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant
right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be an
unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents'
demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a
deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof
that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to over
three years when he took the boy from his in-laws
without permission, should not be sufficient reason to
strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody.
While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep
his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious
efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him
custody would help enhance the bond between parent
and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove
his love for his son and for the son to experience the
warmth and support which a father can give.
custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are
assigned to different parts of the country in the service
of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their
5
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his
boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise
not a ground to wrest custody from him.
Still and all, the law considers the natural love of a
parent to outweigh that of the grandparents, such that
only when the parent present is shown to be unfit or
unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute
parental authority, a fact which has not been proven
here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by
private respondents as grandparents should not be seen
as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over
the child as a father. Moreover, who is to say whether
the petitioner's financial standing may improve in the
future?
NERISSA Z. PEREZ v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and RAY
C. PEREZ
G.R. No. 118870 March 29, 1996, SECOND DIVISION
It has long been settled that in custody cases,
the foremost consideration is always the welfare and
best interest of the child. The fact that the mother
works on twelve-hour shifts thrice weekly, at times,
even at night is not a compelling reason for her to be
separated from her child.
Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of
medicine practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife who
is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were
married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six
miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy,
petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York
on July 20, 1992.
Petitioner who began working in the United
States in October 1988.She became a resident alien in
February 1992. Private respondent stayed with her in
the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became
pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a
tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17,
1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a
few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She
alleged that they came home only for a five-week
vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.
However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his
sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby.
According to Ray, they had agreed to reside
permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in
New York, she changed her mind and continued
working.
When Nerissa came home a few days, before
Ray II's first birthday, the couple was no longer on good
terms. That their love for each other was fading became
apparent from their serious quarrels. Petitioner did not
want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her
husband's meager income of P5,000.00.1 She longed to
be with her only child but he was being kept away from
her by her husband.
On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here,
where he could raise his son even as he practiced his
profession. They could live comfortably on his
P15,000.00 monthly income2 as they were not
burdened with having to pay any debts.
Despite mediation by the priest who solemnized
their marriage, the couple failed to reconcile.On July 26,
1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas
corpus3 asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the
custody of their son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her.
Respondent Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the boy's father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial court's
decision to grant custody to Nerissa Z. Perez, the child's
mother.Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having
been denied, she filed the instant petition for review
where the sole issue is the custody of Ray Perez II, now
three years old.
ISSUE: Should custody of the 3-year old child be granted
in favor of the mother?
RULING:
Yes. When the parents of the child are separated,
Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. It
provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the
parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by
the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
6
 No child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother.  unless
the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
Since the Code does not qualify the word
"separation" to mean legal separation decreed by a
court, couples who are separated in fact, such as
petitioner and private respondent, are covered within
its terms.
The Revised Rules of Court also contains a
similar provision mandates that a child under seven
years of age shall not be separated from his mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of
the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised
Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.
The general rule that a child under seven years
of age shall not be separated from his mother finds
its raison d'êtrein the basic need of a child for his
mother's loving care. Only the most compelling of
reasons shall justify the court's awarding the custody of
such a child to someone other than his mother, such as
her unfitness to exercise sole parental authority on the
following grounds: neglect,
abandonment,15 unemployment and
16
immorality,  habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a
communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody
19
cases,   the foremost consideration is always the
welfare and best interest of the child. Courts invariably
look into all relevant factors presented by the
contending parents, such as their material resources,
social and moral situations.In the case at bench,
financial capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch
as both parties have demonstrated that they have
ample means.
Respondent court stated that petitioner has no
permanent place of work in the U.S.A. and has taken
this point against her. The records, however, show that
she is employed in a New York hospital 22 and was, at the
time the petition was filed, still abroad. She testified
that she intends to apply for a job elsewhere,
presumably to improve her work environment and
augment her income, as well as for convenience.  The mother's role in the life of her child, such as Ray II,
The decision under review casts doubt on
petitioner's capability to take care of the child,
particularly since she works on twelve-hour shifts thrice
weekly, at times, even at night. There being no one to
help her look after the child, it is alleged that she cannot
properly attend to him. This conclusion is as
unwarranted as it is unreasonable.
First, her present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time for Ray
II, applying time management principles judiciously.
Second, many a mother, finding herself in such a
position, has invited her own mother or relative to join
her abroad, providing the latter with plane tickets and
liberal allowances, to look after the child until he is able
to take care of himself. Others go on leave from work
until such time as the child can be entrusted to day-care
centers. Delegating child care temporarily to qualified
persons who run day-care centers does not detract
from being a good mother.
Third, private respondent's work schedule was not
presented in evidence at the trial. Although he is a
general practitioner, the records merely show that he
maintains a clinic, works for several companies on
retainer basis and teaches part-time. Hence,
respondent court's conclusion that "his work schedule is
flexible (and h)e can always find time for his son" is not
well-founded. Fourth, the fact that private respondent
lives near his parents and sister is not crucial in this
case. Fifth, petitioner's work schedule cited in the
respondent court's decision is not necessarily
permanent. Hospitals work in shifts and, given a
mother's instinctive desire to lavish upon her child the
utmost care, petitioner may be expected to arrange her
schedule in such a way as to allocate time for him.
Finally, it does not follow that petitioner values her
career more than her family simply because she wants
to work in the United States.
In the instant case, it has been shown that petitioner
earned enough from her job to be able to construct a
house for the family in Mandaue City. The record
describes sketchily the relations between Ray and
Nerissa Perez. The transcripts of the three hearings are
inadequate to show that petitioner did not exert
earnest efforts and make sacrifices to save her
marriage.
is well-nigh irreplaceable. In prose and poetry, the
7
depth of a mother's love has been immortalized times
without number, finding as it does, its justification, not
in fantasy but in reality.
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, vs. HELEN G. BELMES
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,  J.:
DOCTRINE/S:
Respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his
guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the
Family Code which provides: “Art. 211. The father and
the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over
the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary…”
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise
substitute parental authority only in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that
respondent is very much alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner
has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s
guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner,
however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that respondent is not suited to be the
guardian of Vincent.
Courts should not appoint persons as guardians who are
not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find
it difficult to protect the wards
FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C.
Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of
America who died in the said country on December 22,
1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had 2 children named
Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes.
In May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the
RTC of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings (Special
Proceedings No. 1618-CEB) over the persons and
properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time,
Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year
old child. It is claimed in the petition that the minors are
residents of Cebu City, and have an estate consisting of
proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits
with a probable value of P100k.
Later, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.. In August 1987, the
natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted
an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings,
saying that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City (Special
Proceedings No. 2819)
Thereafter (in 1988), Helen Belmes followed her
opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian
and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is
the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the subject minors in
Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently
residing; that the petition was filed under an improper
venue; and that at the time the petition was filed
Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being
a naturalized American citizen.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT:
the trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to
remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of
Valerie and Vincent Jr. Instead, ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her
duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond
(Php50k).
COURT OF APPEALS:
Dismissed the case of Bonifacia Vancil (Special
Proceedings No. 1618-CEB). It held that the Civil Code
considers parents, the father, or in the absence, the
mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The
law on parental authority under the Civil Code or P.D.
603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the
Family Code) ascribe to the same legal
pronouncements.  The Revised Rules of Court confirms
the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of
their minor children without need of a court
appointment and only for good reason may another
person be named. In this case, there is nothing on
record of any reason at all why Helen Belmes, the
biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights
as natural guardian of her minor children.
In September 1998, Helen Belmes stated that her
daughter Valerie turned eighteen on September 2, 1998
as shown by her Birth Certificate. thus prayed that this
case be dismissed with respect to Valerie, she being no
longer a proper subject of guardianship proceedings.
8
ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor
Vincent should be his guardian.
RULING:
Vincent should be under the guardianship of Helen
Belmes; Valerie is no longer under the guardianship of
Helen, in view of the fact the she had already reached
the age of majority during the pendency of the
proceedings.
The Court agreed with the ruling of the CA that
respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has
the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his
guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the
Family Code.
"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary. xxx."
Being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent
Helen Belmes has the corresponding natural and legal
right to his custody. The rule long accepted by the
courts is that ‘the right of parents to the custody of
their minor children is one of the natural rights incident
to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound
public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or decisions of the courts, but
derives from the nature of the parental relationship."
While petitioner contends that she is more qualified as
guardian of Vincent, the Court said that her claim to be
the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way
of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214
of the Family Code.
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or
unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In
case of absence or death of either parent,  the parent
present shall continue exercising parental authority .
Only in case of the parents’ death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Petitioner (Vancil), as the surviving grandparent, can
exercise substitute parental authority only in case of
death, absence or unsuitability of respondent (Belmes).
Considering that respondent is very much alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,
petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner,
however, has not proffered convincing evidence
showing that respondent is not suited to be the
guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that
respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie
considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner
raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of
major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship
proceeding.
Even if Belmes is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It
bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to
perform the responsibilities and obligations required of
a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the
difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian by an
expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate
those duties to someone else who may not also qualify
as a guardian. The Court also observed that petitioner is
already old and her conviction of libel by the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu City (filed by one Danilo Deen), will
give her a second thought of staying here. Indeed, her
coming back to this country just to fulfill the duties of a
guardian to Vincent for only two years is not certain.
Finally, Courts should not appoint persons as guardians
who are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for
they will find it difficult to protect the wards. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint
residents only as administrators or guardians. However,
notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory
requirements upon this question, the courts, charged
with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of
deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find
much difficulty in complying with this duty by
appointing administrators and guardians who are not
personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding
that there is no statutory requirement, the courts
should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
9
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with modification in the sense that Valerie,
who has attained the age of majority, will no longer be
under the guardianship of respondent Helen Belmes.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM
CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS,
GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR.,
and VIVENCIO
VILLANUEVA
FACTS
St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet
of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were
studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with
other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their
way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan
City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15
years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly,
the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a
result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died.
RTC ordered St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City to pay
plaintiffs Sps. Carpitanos, the following sums of money:
a. P50,000.00 indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S.
Carpitanos; b. P40,000.00 actual damages incurred by
plaintiffs for burial and related expenses; c. P10,000.00
for attorneys fees; d. P500,000.00 for moral damages.
RTC held defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel
susbsidiarily liable, ordering them to pay herein
plaintiffs in the event of insolvency of the school. James
Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of
the tort and who was under special parental authority
of defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED. Vivencio
Villanueva (vehicle owner) is ABSOLVED of any liability.
On appeal by St Marys, CA reduced the actual damages
to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the decision.
Issue: Whether petitioner is liable for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos
Ruling: No.
The CA held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219
of the Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having
a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall
have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers;
or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care. This special parental authority and
responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other
affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its
teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor while under their
supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a
finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence must have a causal connection
to the accident. In their comment to the petition,
respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted
the documentary exhibits establishing that the cause of
the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the
jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical
defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents,
including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the
report and testimony of the traffic investigator who
stated that the cause of the accident was the
detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the
jeep to turn turtle. Significantly, respondents did not
present any evidence to show that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II.
Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the
Family Code that those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by
10
acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor was
unfounded.

Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school

allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched
Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep.
He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel
II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the

negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The
negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a
remote cause of the accident. Between the remote
cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of
the minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep. Consequently, we find that
petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral
damages in the amount of P500,000.00.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered

owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He
never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have
held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if
not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries
caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on
the highways or streets. Hence, with the overwhelming
evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of
the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep,
it is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. The Court remands
the case to the trial court for determination of the
liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City.

11

PROPERTY
Leung vs Strong Machinery
Facts:
In 1913, Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) was indebted
to two personalities: Leung Yee and Frank L. Strong
Machinery Co. CAF purchased some rice cleaning
machines from Strong Machinery. CAF installed the
machines in a building. As security for the purchase
price, CAF executed a chattel mortgage on the rice
cleaning machines including the building where the
machines were installed. CAF failed to pay Strong
Machinery, hence the latter foreclosed the mortgage –
the same was registered in the chattel mortgage
registry.
CAF also sold the land (where the building was standing)
to Strong Machinery. Strong Machinery took possession
of the building and the land.
On the other hand, Yee, another creditor of CAF who
engaged in the construction of the building, being the
highest bidder in an auction conducted by the sheriff,
purchased the same building where the machines were
installed. Apparently CAF also executed a chattel
mortgage in favor Yee. Yee registered the sale in
the registry of land. Yee was however aware that prior
to his buying, the property has been sold in favor of
Strong Machinery – evidence is the chattel mortgage
already registered by Strong Machinery (constructive
notice).
Issue: Who is the owner of the building?
Held: The SC ruled that Strong Machinery has a better
right to the contested property. Under the law, if the
same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transfer to the person who may
have the first taken possession thereof in good faith, if
it should be personal property. Should it be real
property, it shall belong to the person acquiring it who
first recorded it in the registry. Should there be no
entry, the property shall belong to the person who first
took possession of it in good faith, and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
The judgment must be sustained in favor of Strong
Machinery on the ground that the agreed statement of
facts in the court below discloses that neither the
purchase of the building by the plaintiff nor his
inscription of the sheriff's certificate of sale in his favor
was made in good faith, and that the machinery
company must be held to be the owner of the property
under the third paragraph of the above cited article of
the code, it appearing that the company first took
possession of the property; and further, that the
building and the land were sold to the machinery
company long prior to the date of the sheriff's sale to
the plaintiff.
Yee cannot be regarded as a buyer in good faith as he
was already aware of the fact that there was a prior sale
of the same property to Strong Machinery.
The SC also noted that the Chattel Mortgage Law
expressly contemplates provisions for chattel mortgages
which only deal with personal properties. The fact that
the parties dealt the building as if it’s a personal
property does not change the nature of the thing. It is
still a real property. Its inscription in the Chattel
Mortgage registry does not modify its inscription the
registry of real property.
DBP VS CA, MYLO O. QUINTO AND JESUSA CHRISTINE
S. CHUPUICO
FACTS:
12
On April 20, 1978, Petitioner granted a loan of
P94,000.00 to Sps. Santiago and Olivia Olidiana. To
secure the loan, Sps. Olidiana executed a real estate
mortgage on several properties among which was Lot
2029 (Pls-61) with Tax Declaration No. 2335/1, situated
in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur with an area of 84,108
sqm. At the time of the mortgage, the property was still
the subject of a Free Patent application filed by the Sps.
Olidiana with the Bureau of Lands (BOL) but registered
under their name in the Office of the Municipal
Assessor of Molave for taxation purposes.
On Nov. 2, 1978, Sps. Olidiana filed with the BOL a
Request for Amendment of the Free Patent application
stating that they are renouncing, relinquishing and
waiving all their rights and interests over Lot No. 2029
(Pls-61) in favour of Jesusa Christina S. Chupuico and
Mylo O. Quinto, herein respondents.
On Jan. 10, 1979, the BOL granted the free patent,
equally divided the lot, and awarded Lot 2029-A and Lot
2029-B to Chupuico and Quinto, respectively.
On April 20, 1979, Petitioner granted additional loan of
P62,000.00 to Sps. Olidiana. Correspondingly, Sps.
Olidiana executed additional mortgage on the same
parcel of land (Lot No. 2029) as loan security.
Thereafter, for failure of Sps. Olidiana to comply with
the terms and conditions of the loan, Petitioner
extrajudicially foreclosed all their mortgaged properties.
Consequently, these properties including Lot 2029 were
sold at public auction for P88,650.00 and awarded to
Petitioner as the highest bidder.
However, when the Petitioner tried to register the Sale
and Affidavit of Consolidation and to have the tax
declaration transferred in its name, it was discovered
that Lot 2029 has already been divided and placed in
the name of the Respondents.
In view of the discovery, the Petitioner filed an Action
for Quieting of Title and Cancellation or Annulment of
Certificate of Title against the Respondents.
RTC Ruling:
It ruled in favour of the Respondents and declared the
mortgage and all subsequent legal consequences
relative to Lot 2029 null and void. It stated that the
contracts of mortgage entered into by the Petitioner
and the subsequent foreclosure of the subject property
could not have vested valid title to Petitioner because
the mortgagors were not the owners in fee simple of
the property mortgaged. The court also found the
mortgages over Lot 2029 of no legal consequence
because they were executed in violation of Art. 2085,
par. 2 of the New Civil Code which requires that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
mortgaged.
CA Ruling: Affirmed the RTC Decision
ISSUE: WON the land in dispute could have been validly
mortgaged while still the subject of a Free Patent
Application with the Government.
RULING: NO
We hold that Petitioner bank did not acquire valid title
over the land in dispute because it was public land
when mortgaged to the bank. We cannot accept
Petitioner’s contention that the lot in dispute was no
longer public land when mortgaged to it since Sps.
Olidiana had been in open, continuous, adverse and
public possession thereof for more than thirty (30)
years.
In Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer, we ruled that the
approval of a sales application merely authorized the
applicant to take possession of the land so that he could
comply with the requirements prescribed by law before
a final patent could be issued in his favor. Meanwhile
the government still remained the owner thereof, as in
fact the application could still be cancelled and the land
awarded to another applicant should it be shown that
the legal requirements had not been complied with.
What divests the government of title to the land is the
issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent
registration with the Register of Deeds. It is the
registration and issuance of the certificate of title that
segregates public lands from the mass of public domain
and converts it into private property. Since the disputed
lot in the case before us was still the subject of a Free
Patent Application when mortgaged to petitioner and
no patent was granted to the Sps. Olidiana, Lot No.
2029 (Pis-61) remained part of the public domain.
With regard to the validity of the mortgage contracts
entered into by the parties, Art. 2085, par. 2, of the
New Civil Code specifically requires that the pledgor or
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged
or mortgaged. Thus, since the disputed property was
13
not owned by the Sps. Olidiana when they mortgaged it
to Petitioner, the contracts of mortgage and all their
subsequent legal consequences as regards Lot No. 2029
(Pls-61) are null and void. In a much earlier case we
held that it was an essential requisite for the validity of
a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner
of the property mortgaged, and it appearing that the
mortgage was constituted before the issuance of the
patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage in question
must of necessity be void and ineffective. For, the law
explicitly requires as imperative for the validity of a
mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of
what is mortgaged.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DAMIAN ERMITAÑO
DE GUZMAN ET. AL. G.R. No. 137887, February 28,
2000, FIRST DIVISION, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
The property subject of private respondents' application
was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date,
the same was forest land incapable of private
appropriation. It was not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into
private property, (unless) and until such lands were
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
FACTS:
Subject parcels of land were released as agricultural
land only in 1965 while the petition for confirmation of
imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in
1991.Thus the period of occupancy of the subject
parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application
was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4)
years short of the required thirty (30) year period
possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A.
No. 6940. Conflicting applications for confirmation of
imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and
private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of
land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits,
the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent De Guzman, to wit -
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by this
Court as follows:
(1) In LRC Case No. TG-362, this Court hereby denies the
application for registration of the parcels of land
mentioned therein by applicant Norma R. Almanzor for
lack of factual and legal bases;
(2) In LRC Case No. 396, this Court hereby approves the
petition for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 946 and/or P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Law, the
land described in Plan Psu-67537-Amd-2 and containing
an area of 308,638 square meters, as supported by its
technical descriptions now forming parts of the records
of these cases, in addition to other proofs adduced in
the names of petitioners Damian Ermitaño De Guzman,
Deogracias Ermitaño De Guzman, Zenaida Ermitaño De
Guzman, Alicia Ermitaño De Guzman and Salvador De
Guzman, all married, of legal age and with residence
and postal addresses at Magallanes Street, Carmona,
Cavite, subject to the claims of oppositors Dominga
Ermitaño, Natividad Encarnacion, Melba E. Torres, Flora
Manalo, Socorro de la Rosa, Jose Ermitaño and
Esmeranso Ermitaño under an instrument entitled
'Waiver of Rights with Conformity" the terms and
conditions of which are hereby ordered by this Court to
be annotated at the back of the certificates of title to be
issued to the petitioners pursuant to the judgment of
this Court. Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE: Did the petitioner acquire the property through
acquisitive prescription?
RULING: NO.
In the case before us, the property subject of private
respondents' application was only declared alienable in
1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land
incapable of private appropriation. It was not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, could not convert it into private property,
(unless) and until such lands were reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.
In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as
alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession
thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the
thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord
with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra),
and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect
titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain.
Did the petitioner acquire the property through
14
acquisitive prescription?
While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding
that private respondents and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject land for
sixty three (63) years at the time of the application of
their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws
and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The
fact remains that from the time the subject land was
declared alienable until the time of their application,
private respondents' occupation thereof was only
twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider their thirty
seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of
the land as alienable because absent the fact of
declassification prior to the possession and cultivation
in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by
him remained classified as forest or timberland, which
he could not have acquired by prescription. Further,
jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate that
forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation and possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert them into private property. Possession
of the land by private respondents, whether spanning
decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership.
This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim
"(d)ura lex, sed lex".
GERARDO, TRINIA AND IYLENE, ALL SURNAMED
MENDOZA v. SOLEDAD SALINAS G.R. No. 152827,
February 6, 2007, THIRD DIVISION (Austria-Martinez, J.)
Key Doctrine: “A writ of possession may be issued
under: (1) land registration proceedings under Sec. 17
of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the
debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no
third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real
estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135.”
FACTS:
The RTC granted Salinas’s application for registration
and OCT was issued in her name covering a parcel of
land located in the Province of Zambales .
The Mendozas opposed claiming that they were not
oppositors/parties to the registration case and they
have been in actual physical possession of the property
since 1964. The RTC rejected their arguments and
granted respondent's application for the issuance of a
writ of possession. Hence, the present petition.
The Mendozas set forth that the RTC erred in issuing
the writ of possession and acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction,
reiterating their argument that they cannot be ousted
of their possession of the property, having been in
actual possession of the property since 1964, as
evidenced by Gerardo C. Mendoza's Sales Application
made in January 1986 over the property. Salinas
counters that the petition should have been initially
with the CA based on the principle of hierarchy of
courts, and that the general order of default issued by
the RTC binds them and personal notice was not
necessary.
ISSUE:
Is the issuance of the writ of possession by the RTC
proper?
HELD:
No. A writ of possession may be issued under the
following instances: (1) land registration proceedings
under Sec. 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged
realty and no third person, not a party to the
foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Sec. 7 of
Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
In land registration cases, principles regarding the
issuance of a writ of possession are well-settled. A
judgment confirming the title of the applicant in a
registration case and ordering its registration in his
name necessarily carries with it the delivery of
possession which is an inherent element of the right of
ownership.
This is sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction
and by the generally accepted principle upon which the
administration of justice rests. Also, a writ of possession
may be issued not only against the person who has
been defeated in a registration case but also against
anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or
any portion thereof during the land registration
proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree, and
it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ
when asked for by the successful claimant.
15
Based on these tenets, the issuance of a writ of
possession, therefore, is clearly a ministerial duty of the
land registration court. Such ministerial duty, however,
ceases to be so with particular regard to petitioners
who are actual possessors of the property under a claim
of ownership. Actual possession under claim of
ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. This conclusion is supported by Article 433
of the Civil Code, which provides: Actual possession
under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
Under said provision, one who claims to be the owner
of a property possessed by another must bring the
appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery. The
term "judicial process" could mean no less than an
ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the
ownership claims of the contending parties may be
properly heard and adjudicated.
It is noted that there already exists a final and executory
decision disregarding respondent's claim for possession
over the property. In a Decision dated January 21, 2002,
rendered by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of Olongapo City, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 4643, an
action for unlawful detainer filed by respondent and her
spouse against petitioners and several other occupants
of the property, the case against petitioners was
dismissed by the MTCC for lack of cause of action. While
the MTCC Decision was appealed by the other
defendants, respondent and her spouse manifested
that they will not appeal the decision and, instead, will
file for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. N-04-0-97.
Note should also be made that petitioners registered
their opposition to respondent's application for the
issuance of a writ of possession and apprised the RTC of
their actual, peaceful, physical and uninterrupted
possession since 1964, including therein documents
supporting their claim, consisting of Gerardo C.
Mendoza's Sales Application made on January 1986 and
a Declaration of Real Property for the years 1976 and
1985, among others. The RTC, nevertheless,
disregarded their opposition and, instead, relied on the
ruling in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, that a writ of
possession may be issued in a land registration
proceeding.
A reading of the Serra Serra case, however, supports
the Court's conclusion that a writ of possession should
not have been issued in this case. It was ruled by the
Court that while a writ of possession may be issued only
pursuant to a decree of registration in an original land
registration proceedings, it cannot issue against
possessors under claim of ownership, as actual
possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership, and the true owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property, not summarily through a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession.Thus, it was erroneous
for the RTC to have issued the writ of possession against
petitioners. This conclusion, of course, is without
prejudice to any case that respondent may file for the
recovery of the property.
Isaguirre vs. De LaraCornelio M. Isaguirre vs. Felicitas
De LaraG.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000Gonzaga-Reyes,
J.
Doctrine: As a general rule, the mortgagor retains
possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage
is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass
to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee
does not have possession of the property, there is no
impairment of his security since the mortgage directly
and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the
mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose
the mortgage, whether judicially or extra judicially,
whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a
public auction and the proceeds there from given to the
creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the
mortgage loan.
Facts:
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant
for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a parcel of
land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre,
filed with the Bureau of Lands with an area of 2,342
square meters. Upon his death, his wife – respondent
Felicitas de Lara, as claimant, succeeded Alejandro de
Lara. The Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources amended the sales application to cover only
1,600 square meters. By virtue of a decision rendered
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, a
subdivision survey was made and the area was further
reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lotstands a
two-story residential-commercial apartment declared
16
for taxation purposes in the name of respondent’s sons
– Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de
Lara.Respondent obtained several loans from the
Philippine National Bank. When she encountered
financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner
Cornelio M. Isaguirre, who was married to her niece, for
assistance. A document denominated as “Deed of Sale
and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was
executed by respondent and petitioner, whereby the
former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No. 502,
together with the two-story commercial and residential
structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for
and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.Apolonio and
Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for
recovery of ownership and possession ofthe two-story
building. However, the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a sales application over the
subject property on the basis of the deed of sale. His
application was approved, resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title, in the name of petitioner.
Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over
the entire 1,000 square meters of subject property
(including the 250 square meter portion claimed by
petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the
issuance of Original Certificate of Title, in the name of
respondent.
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an
action for quieting of title and damages with the RTC of
Davao City against respondent. After trial on the merits,
the trial court rendered judgment, in favor of petitioner,
declaring him to be the lawful owner of the disputed
property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s decision, holding that the transaction
entered into by the parties, as evidenced by
theircontract, was an equitable mortgage, not a sale.
The appellate court’s decision was based on the
inadequacy of the consideration agreed upon by the
parties, on its finding that the payment of a large
portion of the “purchaseprice” was made after the
execution of the deed of sale in several installments of
minimal amounts; and finally,on the fact that petitioner
did not take steps to confirm his rights or to obtain title
over the property for several years after the execution
of the deed of sale. As a consequence of its decision,
the appellate court also declared Original Certificate
issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. This
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, we
denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.Respondent filed a motion for
execution with the trial court, praying for the
immediate delivery of possession of the subject
property, which motion was granted. Respondent
moved for a writ of possession. Petitioner opposed the
motion, asserting that he had the right of retention over
the property until payment of the loan and the value of
the improvements he had introduced on the property.
The trial court granted respondent’s motion for writ of
possession. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration. Consequently, a writ of possession,
together with the Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate, was served
upon petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable
mortgage has the right to retain possession of the
property pending actual payment to him of the amount
of indebtedness by the mortgagor ?
Held:
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure
the fulfillment of a principal obligation. Recording the
document, in which it appears with the proper Registry
of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the
mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties,
constitutes it. Thus, the only right granted by law in
favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and
the recording of the document in which the mortgage is
formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains
possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage
is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass
to the mortgagee. However, even though a mortgagee
does not have possession of the property, there is no
impairment of his security since the mortgage directly
and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the
mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose
the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially,
whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a
public auction and the proceeds there from given to the
creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the
mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioner’s contention that
“to require him to deliver possession of the Property to
17
respondent prior to the full payment of the latter’s
mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation
of the mortgage is without basis. Regardless of its
possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold,
with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the
debtor’sdefault in the payment of his loan obligation.A
simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to
the possession of the property unless the mortgage
should contain some special provision to that effect.
Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any
evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to
prove that the real intention of the parties was to allow
him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until
full payment of the loan.The trial court correctly issued
the writ of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ
was but a necessary consequence of affirming the
validity of the original certificate of title in the name of
respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time
nullifying the original certificate of title in the name of
petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential
attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for
respondent to go back to court simply to establish her
right to possess subject property.
Federico Geminiano, Maria Geminiano, Ernesto
Geminiano, Asuncion Geminiano, Larry
Geminiano, and Marlyn Geminiano vs.  Court
of Appeals, Dominador Nicolas, and Mary A.
Nicolas
FACTS:
The lot in question was originally owned by the
petitioners' mother, Paulina Amado vda. de
Geminiano. On a portion of that lot stood the
petitioners' unfinished bungalow, which the petitioners
sold to the private respondents for the sum of
P6,000.00, with an alleged promise to sell to the latter
that portion of the lot occupied by the house.
Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a
contract of lease over a 126 square-meter portion of
the lot, including that portion on which the house
stood, in favor of the private respondents starting
November 1978 for P40.00 per month for a period of 7
years. The private respondents then introduced
additional improvements and registered the house in
their names. After the expiration of the lease contract in
1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused to
accept the monthly rentals.
It turned out that the lot in question was the
subject of a suit, which resulted in its acquisition by one
Maria Lee. In 1982, Lee sold the lot to Lily Salcedo, who
in turn sold it in 1984 to the spouses Dionisio. The
Dionisio spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the
said property in favor of the petitioners. As such, the lot
was registered in the latter's names. Petitioners never
lost possession of the land because Lee and company
never issued a writ of possession against them.
In 1993, the petitioners sent a letter to private
respondent demanding that she vacate the premises
and pay the rentals in arrears. Upon failure of the
private respondents to heed the demand, the
petitioners filed with the MTCC of Dagupan City a
complaint for unlawful detainer and damages.
Respondents claim that they should be entitled to buy
the land because of the promise of the petitioners to
sell them the land and because they were builders in
good faith.
MTCC: Private respondents to vacate the premises and
to pay rent. Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code,
which allow possessors in good faith to recover the
value of improvements and retain the premises until
reimbursed, did not apply to lessees like the private
respondents, because the latter knew that their
occupation of the premises would continue only during
the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the private
respondents were specifically governed by Article 1678,
which allows reimbursement of up to one-half of the
value of the useful improvements, or removal of the
improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
RTC: Reversed the Decision of MTCC. Ordered the
petitioners to reimburse the private respondents for the
value of the house and improvements in the amount of
P180,000.00 and allowed the private respondents to
remain in possession of the premises until they were
fully reimbursed for the value of the house. It ruled that
since the private respondents were assured by the
petitioners that the lot they leased would eventually be
sold to them, they could be considered builders in good
faith, and as such, were entitled to reimbursement of
the value of the house and improvements with the right
of retention until reimbursement had been made.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
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 1. Whether or not the private respondents are
builders in good faith.
2. Which provision of law governs the case at
bench: Article 448 or Article 1678 of the Civil
Code?
HELD:  only if the lessor opts to appropriate the
1. No. It is undisputed that the private
respondents came into possession of a 126 square-
meter portion of the said lot by virtue of a contract of
lease executed by the petitioners' mother in their
favor. The juridical relation between the petitioners'
mother as lessor, and the private respondents as
lessees, is therefore well-established, and carries with it
a recognition of the lessor's title. Being mere lessees,
the private respondents knew that their occupation of
the premises would continue only for the life of the
lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors
nor builders in good faith.
Anent the alleged promise of the petitioners to
sell the lot occupied by the private respondents' house,
the same was not substantiated by convincing
evidence. Neither the deed of sale over the house nor
the contract of lease contained an option in favor of the
respondent spouses to purchase the said lot. And even
if the petitioners indeed promised to sell, it would not
make the private respondents possessors or builders in
good faith so as to be covered by the provisions of
Article 448 of the Civil Code. The latter cannot raise the
mere expectancy of ownership of the aforementioned
lot because the alleged promise to sell was not fulfilled
nor its existence even proven. The first thing that the
private respondents should have done was to reduce
the alleged promise into writing, because under Article
1403 of the Civil Code, an agreement for the sale of real
property or an interest therein is unenforceable, unless
some note or memorandum thereof be produced. Not
having taken any steps in order that the alleged promise
to sell may be enforced, the private respondents cannot
bank on that promise and profess any claim nor color of
title over the lot in question
2. Art. 1678 governs. In a plethora of cases, this
Court has held that Article 448 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows
full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made,
applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it
would always be in the power of the tenant to
"improve" his landlord out of his property.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to
indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises
improvements. Since the petitioners refused to exercise
that option, the private respondents cannot compel
them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and
improvements. Neither can they retain the premises
until reimbursement is made. The private respondents'
sole right then is to remove the improvements without
causing any more impairment upon the property leased
than is necessary.
TECHNOGAS VS. CA
G.R. No. 108894, February 10, 1997
FACTS:
Plaintiff (herein petitioner) is the registered
owner of a parcel of land said land was purchased by
plaintiff from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together
with all the buildings and improvements including the
wall existing thereon. Defendant (herein private
respondent) is the registered owner of a parcel of land,
that said land which adjoins plaintiffs land was
purchased by defendant from a certain Enrile Antonio
also in 1970, that portions of the buildings and wall
bought by plaintiff together with the land from Pariz
Industries are occupying a portion of defendants
adjoining land; upon learning of the encroachment or
occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of
defendants land, plaintiff offered to buy from defendant
that land occupied by portions of its buildings and wall
with an area of 770 square meters, more or less, but
defendant, however, refused the offer.
The parties entered into a private agreement
before a certain Col. Rosales, wherein plaintiff agreed to
demolish the wall thus giving to defendant possession
of a portion of his land previously enclosed by plaintiffs
wall. Defendant later filed a complaint before the office
of Municipal Engineer of Parañaque as well as before
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against plaintiff
in connection with the encroachment or occupation by
plaintiffs buildings and walls of a portion of its land but
said complaint did not prosper. Defendant dug or
caused to be dug a canal along plaintiffs wall, a portion
of which collapsed and led to the filing by plaintiff of the
19
supplemental complaint and a separate criminal
complaint for malicious mischief against defendant and
his wife which ultimately resulted into the conviction in
court of defendants wife for the crime of malicious
mischief. While trial of the case was in progress, plaintiff
filed in Court a formal proposal for settlement of the
case but said proposal, however, was ignored by
defendant.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Appeal was
duly interposed to the CA, which reversed and set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is a builder in bad
faith because it is presumed to know the metes and
bounds of his property.
HELD:
This court disagree with respondent Court. Its
main pronouncement that a registered owner of land
has presumptive knowledge of the metes and bounds of
its own land, and is therefore in bad faith if he
mistakenly builds on an adjoining land. There is nothing
that would suggest, however remotely, that bad faith is
imputable to a registered owner of land when a part of
his building encroaches upon a neighbors land, simply
because he is supposedly presumed to know the
boundaries of his land as described in his certificate of
title.
There is no question that when petitioner purchased
the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other
structures were already in existence. The record is not
clear as to who actually built those structures, but it
may well be assumed that petitioners predecessor-in-
interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil
Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to
show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-
shaped portion of private respondents land was done in
bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures,
the latter should be presumed to have built them in
good faith. It is presumed that possession continues to
be enjoyed in the same character in which it was
acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith
consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or
flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law, passed
on to Parizs successor, petitioner in this case. Further,
where one derives title to property from another, the
act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding
the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against
the former. And possession acquired in good faith does
not lose this character except in case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is
not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the
property by the true owner.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code, which reads:
The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles
546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted
to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed,
the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably
more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
The question, however, is whether the same
benefit can be invoked by petitioner who, as earlier
stated, is not the builder of the offending structures but
possesses them as buyer.
We answer such question in the affirmative.
In the first place, there is no sufficient showing that
petitioner was aware of the encroachment at the time it
acquired the property from Pariz Industries. We agree
with the trial court that various factors in evidence
adequately show petitioners lack of awareness
thereof. In any case, contrary proof has not overthrown
the presumption of good faith under Article 527 of the
Civil Code, as already stated, taken together with the
disputable presumptions of the law on evidence. These
presumptions state, under Section 3 (a) of Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, that the person is innocent of a
crime or wrong; and under Section 3 (ff) of Rule 131,
that the law has been obeyed. In fact, private
respondent Eduardo Uy himself was unaware of such
20
intrusion into his property until after 1971 when he
hired a surveyor, following his purchase of another
adjoining lot, to survey all his newly acquired lots. Upon
being apprised of the encroachment, petitioner
immediately offered to buy the area occupied by its
building -- a species of conduct consistent with good
faith.
In the second place, upon delivery of the property
by Pariz Industries, as seller, to the petitioner, as buyer,
the latter acquired ownership of the
property. Consequently and as earlier discussed,
petitioner is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of
the seller in regard to all rights of ownership over the
immovable sold, including the right to compel the
private respondent to exercise either of the two options
provided under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
 
PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, WILSON KEE, C.T.
TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. and ELDRED JARDINICO,
respondents.
FACTS:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel
of lot designated as Lot at the Pleasantville Subdivision
in Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Jardinico bought
the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was
vacant. Upon completing all payments, Jardinico
secured from Register of Deed TCT Title No. 106367 in
his name. It was then that he discovered that
improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by
Respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession
thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought
on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision fro T.T
Torres Enterprise, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate
agent of petitioner. After preparation of the lot plan and
a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its
employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kees wife,
Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. Unfortunately, the
parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9.
Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a
store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on
the lot.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by
Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach
an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinicos lawyer wrote
Kee, demanding the latter to remove all improvements
and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9,
Jardinico filed with the MTCC a complaint for ejectment
with damages against Kee.
ISSUE: Is Kee a builder in good faith?
RULING: Yes.
We agree with the following observation of the Court of
Appeals:
The roots of the controversy can be traced
directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it
pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife.
It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a lot would
knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot
owned by another, deliberately exposing himself and
his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and
losing all improvements thereon, not to mention the
social humiliation that would follow.
Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the
manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of
his property. Lot 8 is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-69561, while Lot 9 is identified in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-106367. Hence, under the
Torrens system of land registration, Kee is presumed to
have knowledge of the metes and bounds of the
property with which he is dealing. x x x
But as Kee is a layman not versed in the
technical description of his property, he had to find a
way to ascertain that what was described in TCT No.
69561 matched Lot 8. Thus, he went to the subdivision
developers agent and applied and paid for the
relocation of the lot, as well as for the production of a
lot plan by CTTEIs geodetic engineer. Upon Kees receipt
of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site
accompanied by CTTEIs employee, Octaviano, who
authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing
to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in
the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the companys
positive identification of the property, Kee saw no
reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery.
The steps Kee had taken to protect his interests were
reasonable. There was no need for him to have acted
ex-abundantia cautela, such as being present during the
geodetic engineers relocation survey or hiring an
independent geodetic engineer to countercheck for
errors, for the final delivery of subdivision lots to their
21
owners is part of the regular course of everyday
business of CTTEI. Because of CTTEIs blunder, what Kee
had hoped to forestall did in fact transpire. Kees efforts
all went to naught.

Good faith consists in the belief of the builder

that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad
faith on the part of Kee.

At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee

believed that said lot was what he bought from
petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to
him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kees good faith. Petitioner
failed to prove otherwise.

22