Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • Uleman Jennifer Kant and Moral Motivation The

    Uploaded by

    Tanner Burke
    3 views25 pages

    Original Title

    uleman-jennifer-kant-and-moral-motivation-the

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    3 views25 pages

    Uleman Jennifer Kant and Moral Motivation The

    Uploaded by

    Tanner Burke

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    of 25
    OXPORD PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS CChristia Mercer, Columbia University Efficient Causation Edited by Tad Schmalez Sompathy Edited by Ese Schlieser The Feculiee Edited by Dominik Perle Health Edited by Pe Boll Edited by Andrew Chignell Dignity Edited by Remy Debes Animale ited by G. Fay Edwards and Peter Adamson Space $dited by Andrew Janiak Series Editor PUBLISHED Memory Edited by Dit Nin Moral Metivation Edited by lakovos Vasilou FORTHCOMING Exornity Edited by Yitzhak Melamed Self Krotoledge Edited by Ursula Renz Consiousness dived by Alison Simmons OX¥OKD PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS Moral Motivation A HISTORY ain Edited by lakovos Vasilou OXFORD OXFORD Oxford Universy Presi a deparement ofthe Unive of Oxi i farthes che University objecove of exellnce in esearch, chalaship, ant education by publishing wodwide. Oxford isa egstered wade markof (Oxford Univeray Press in che UK and eran other counues Published inthe United Ses of America by Oxford Univesity ess 198 Maduon Avenue, New York, NY 100%6, United States of Amica © ford Universi Press 2016 Allsighs reserved No parcof this publication may be reproduced, scored in recy ystem, or ane, n ny form orby ay mesa ‘thou the piorpemiason in wrvingof Oxford Univesity Pras, cor seaprely petted byl by licen, or under terme sree vith the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inguies concening reproduction ouside the scope ofthe above shouldbe seat eo he Rights Department, Oxford Univericy Pres, ache addres above You muse noe cele hi work in ay other fore, and you mut impore chi tame condition 0a any aque. Libery of Congress Calogingin-Publleion Dasa ‘Name: Vaio, kovos,166-edito. “Tile: Moral mocvacion :ahiory /Edlted by lakovs Vasu Deserieon: New York: Oxford Universey Pres 216, | Series: Oud hlosophicalconceps| Inches bibliographical references and index eneiers: LCCN 2015040383 ISBN g7Bo19936s7 (ble: alk psp | ISBN o780199316564 (hardcover: alk pape) Sabjees: LCSH: Moral moisio, (Clasifation: LCCBJsa4 M64 Mér 2016 | DDC s7o—dess UC record able a hp //eenloegov/2s040583 155798642 Prine by Webcom, Ine, Canada CONTRIBUTORS vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii Introduction: Moral Motivation and Its History 3 TAKOVOS VASILIOU 1 Plato and Moral Motivation 15 TAKOVOS VASILIOU Reflecsion Moral Motivation: Achilles and Homer iad 39 2 Aristotle on Moral Motivation 44 SUSAN SAUVE MEYER 3 A Late (and Nonstandard) Aristotelian Account ‘of Moral Motivation 65 BRAD INWOOD Reflection: Cicero on Moral Motivation and Seeing (How) to Be Good 87 JOY CONNOLLY vi conTENTS 4 Moral Motivation in Christian and Jewish Medieval Philosophy 95, JONATHAN JACOBS 55 Actand Moral Motivation in Spinoza’s Ethics 123 STEVEN NADLER Reflection: Moral Motivation and Music as Moral Judge 146 (CHADWICK JENKINS 6 Locke on Pleasure, Law; and Moral Motivation 153 PHILLIP Mrrsis, 7. Humeon Moral Motivation 179 JACQUELINE TAYLOR 8 Kant and Moral Motivation: The Value of Free Rational Willing 202 JENNIFER ULEMAN ‘9 Moral Motivation in Post-Kantian Philosophy: Fichte and Hegel 227 ANGELICA NUZZO Reflection: Moral Motivation and the Limits of Moral Agency in Literary Naeurlism: Dreiser’ Sister Carrie 253 ‘ANNE DIEBEL 10 Consequentialism, Moral Motivation, and the Deontic Relevance of Motives 259 STEVEN SVERDLIK BIBLIOGRAPHY 285 INDEX 31 Contributors JOY CONNOLLY, Professor of Classis and Dean for Humanities ar New York ‘Universcy. isthe author of The Stat of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome (2007), The LifeofRoman Republianiom (204), and essays about Roman literatare and culrure. Current interests include melodrama, exem- platy, and ancient literary theory. ‘ANNE DIEBEL received her PAD in English and Comparative Literarure from Co- Jumbia University, where she now teaches in the Core Carticulum asthe Robert ‘Belknap Faculty Fellow. She has published articles on Henry James and Theodore Dreiser and is working ona book about American modernism and personaliry. BRAD INWOOD is University Profesor, Classis and Philosophy, at che Univer- sity of Toronto and Canada Research Chait in Ancient Philosophy. He is che author of Ethics and Human Acion in Early Sticom (198s), Reading Seneca Stoic Philesophy at Rome (200:), and Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters (2007), all published by Oxford Universiy Pres JONATHAN JACOnS, PAD University of Pennsylvania (1983), works on moral psychology, metaethics, history of philosophy, and criminal justice. He has pub- lished over seventy articles and several books and has held fellowships nd been a Visiting scholar at universities inthe United States and Great Britain. He is Pro- fessor and Chair of Philosophy, John Jay College, City University of New York. (CHADWICK JENKINSisan Assocste Profesor of Musicat the City College of New York and the Graduate Center, City University of New York. He specializes in CHAPTER EIGHT Kant and Moral Motivation ‘THE VALUE OF FREE RATIONAL WILLING Jennifer Uleman “This chaprer isshaped by a kind of incredulity. For Kant, L was taught, a conception of right, or law, or duty—which one depended on who ‘was teaching—comes before any conception of the good. A concep- tion of the gocd did not drive Kantian morality. There was, of course, ‘ext to underwrite the claim. In the 1788 Critique of Practical Reason, ‘Kane writes: “instead of the concepe of the good as an object deter- mining and making possible the moral law, itis on the contrary the _moral law that first determines and makes possible the concept of the good” (KpV 5:64)" In the 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of + RfsenesroKenewors acy ini (om the Geran og ied here with volume ‘dnd page number fm the tandad Aladdin: Kana puma Serif, Konigichen ‘Preulaon [ler Deicke Aad der Wiseruchaen (Bein: GxorgReime [er Wale de ‘Grae 1900+). The exceptions are ins to Kanes Grtgue of are Rawr, which ge page number rbot he A (78) and (178)edtions eg, Aj/B3 (where pasage occurs ony ‘Se etn, lyon gen, ef Bt, and to Rtexionen, which ince Relesonnambers “Tanto ae fom the Engl eons ited here ule ocherwe noted. The vuarebrackted number llowing hs pbs dat here she Akademie vlue nbe KANT AND MORAL MOTIVATION 203 Morals, Kant urges “the renunciation of al interest” in moral willing, thats, “in volition from duty” (G 42431). Kane, che argument seemed to be, carves out a space for rightness, or wfulness, or moral obliga- tion, or “volition from duty,” that is independent of a story about goodness. Kant is concerned with formal principles, not conceptions of the good life; or, Kant requires a kind of rule-governed reasoning, rngt a determinate outcome: or, most extremely, for Kant, morality just consists in volition from duty, for its own sake. This piceure, in any of its versions, did not make sense. Why would ‘we want to do right, or be in the right, or be principled, or lawful, or do our duty, or pursue morality at all, however you put it, unless the right, or the law, or duty, or morality, were somchow good? Whatever else was the case, it seemed to me, will could only be expected to engage, could onlybe motivated, when it took somethingtobe good. Thislast thought 4s, of cours, present in the first line of Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics and is endorsed by the many after him who, like me, ae persuaded on the conceptual point—we make things objects of our wills ffand only if they seem to us in some way good. The thought that a morally proper will was precisely one that eschewed attention to the good seemed to ‘me impossible. ADB Kinder reine Vomunf 8 98) [Ak Bed) ie tens Pal Cp nd Als nd Cap Cnt ater si Pres, 2000) © Grundig eur Mops de Ste) [AA]. Groundeor of the Metpysof Mora ans May Gregor (Cambridge: Cabri Unive iPro 997) KV Ko depron Verma (788 (Ak (Citgo Praca Ream tans May Grego (Cambie: Cambridge Unive Pres, 1997). KU Keer Urb (790) [A Cig of th Pave of udpens, eas. asl Guyer and Ese Mathews (Canale: Cam ‘edge Ustey Pes, 2009) MS Mapas der Sites (797) (A 8 Maple of Moral an Mary Gro (Cambie: Cambridge Univeiy Pe). exons (handhrfice Nuban30-17928) (Ak 4-19) [Nees and Fragment ed. Pal Gaye, tans C. Bowman. . Gye, and F. Rausch (Cam ‘ridge: Cambridge Unie Pen, 2509 ZeF- “Zam eigen Peden: in plleepbicher Eatwat” (1793) (A) “To Pepe Peace: A Philosophical Sketch in Perpetual Peace and Oe Ey, as Ted Hramphvey (ndlanapoll: Hacker. 198) 204 MORAL MOTIVATION understood the nonconsequentialist claim, chat is, the claim that for Kant aim matters more than actual results in determining moral worth. But I could not understand the claim that moral worth depends somehow on a form of reasoning that had no aim. But yes, no, I was given to believe itis so with Kane—we must pursue duty for its own sake, not because of some ulterior motive, like a mere feeling that the demands of duty are good. Eyebrows up, internally, anyway. I seemed, incredibly and as Bemnard Williams has putt, that for Kane, “there can be no reason for being moral, and morality itself presents itself as an sunmediated demand, a categorical imperative.” “The possibility chat this was Kane's view also worried many of his friends, Schiller’ 1794 Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man sought. +o make clearer to a skeptical public wherein the ennobling power and appeal of Kane’s moral view lay At present, thanks significantly to ‘work by Barbara Herman and Paul Guyer, characterizations of Kant’s work as purely formal are out of favor. The moral law has an end, a value that grounds it, their work has insisted. The account I offer here 2 Berard Willams, Ec and be Limi Pilsply (Cable, MA: Haran Unies Pes. 98) > Fedich Scher 1794 On be Ae Education of Man a See of Lester sought do this vena Schiller athored di aos sal verse which cls the Kanéan moral Gewissensskrupel (Gere deich den Pande, dock cher mit Nelgang. Undo mart emir of ich lc egendhaf bn Decvam Dae ei andere Ray du nit uchen seu vere, ‘Und mie Abiche sledann cn, ie de Pach di gebeut Iserpl of Conese] (Gad Lerve my fends bo ala [do wih pleasure “Hence Lam plage wih doubt chat Lam no aos eso, (Rating) ‘Surly your oly roc to yt dpe them ene ‘And the with aversion to do wat your duyejlns you. Fed Schilr, Nene 177) celled a Goethe, Wek eed by Bch Tune (Hansburg (Chisin Wegner Veda, 949, 1 his ean (put om Engh beatings hich ve added) fppes in Hi). Paton The Cetera Imperie Sty x Kat Morel Pip (Londo: Huchino, 147) 4 See Bachara Hesma, “Leaving Deontology Behind n Herman, The Practice of Merl Jud iment (Cambcigs, MA: Harvard Univesity Pres, 993), 208-4. See Paal Guys, ‘Kans ‘Moni of Lavand Mozy felon Gi, Kn Fredo a nd Happines (Cai KANT AND MORAL MOTIVATION 205 builds on his work and also, thereby, seeks to address the worry that Kantian moral stbjects are motivationally opaque, ifnot, as some have also charged, perverse.* ‘This chapter has ewo sections. ‘The first defends a claim chat, for Kant, moral atinides and actions are precisely those motivated by re- spect for and commitment to actively promote the activity of fee ra- tional willing itself. The second addresses the question that lingers even once this has been established, namely, what motivates this re- spect and commitment? What, in other words, motivates the moral Kantian? Here, | seek to make explicit those aspects of free rational -willing that motivate moral subjects to respect and actively promote fee rational willing; free rational willing promises release from the mechanism of nature and from boch interpersonal and inner turmoil, forms of intellectual and moral self sufficiency, and experiences of self and others as universal, necessary infinite, and creative (among other things). Many of these echo merits advertised by other moral theories, though in Kane they find distinctive derivation and expression. Notic- jing them, I claim, not only begins to answer critics who worry that ‘there is no reason to be Kantian, but may also remind us of the power and appeal of Kant’ view. 1. KANT ON MORAL MOTIVATION “This section sketches Kane's basic view of moral motivation. It begins by asking what is distinctive about that view, indicating why characteriza- tions ofthe view as “nonconsequentialse” and “deontological” both fil toadequately caprure it. The section chen turns to the mechanics of Kan- ‘ian willing itself articulating both “bare” and “full” senses ofthe wis ‘Cabal Uae Fes cee), tp-i1- Herman chances thecd of moray os ‘ares Gayer characteris etdom {pele acy offeetonal ming freon ‘Sat wl become cla My view ball wkd on ier leas dm redo ‘Kent Mord Phloapby (Cambde: Cambs Uneniy Pre, soa). Ts caper ends ‘acwore 5 See Schl’ eal eneea for inne Eemann escrenp, "Kat Sali” Paley uae 19-46 206 MORAL MOTIVATION {eeedom and rationality: Understanding these distinct senses will be im- ‘portant for understanding che motives available to a Kantian will. The section ends by showing that the specifically moral Kantian willis one motivated by a respect for and commitment to actively promote fully ‘ree ratioral willing itself This sets the stage for section 2, where Iask the farther question of what might motivate such respect or commitment. What Is Distinctive about Kans’ View of Moral Motivation? Everyone knows part of the answer here: for Kant, the wills motives, and not its effects, are decisive in determining whether an agent has acted in away that is morally worthy. This is Kant’ well-known “non- -consequentialism? his refusal co locate a story about moral worth in the effects or consequences of willing, the way a Humean or a utilitarian ‘would, Here, as he knew, Kant has commonsense on his side. Familiar forms of moral judgment and moral practice ae focused on motive and intent, on what an agent wills and why, and they assess responsibility and award moral (as well as legal) praise and blame on these bases. For Kant, motives and intentions are what matter morally speaking, and truly good ones pave the road not to hell but to perpetual peace. ‘But nonconsequentialism for its own sake is not driving Kant. Kant seriously does want worldwide perpetual peace and thinks the mora law will help us achieve it” His 1797 Metaphysics of Morals lays out the basic principles for a morally successful human society, including principles ‘of externél (political, legal) governance and of internal (psychological, self) governance. Kant’ commitment to finding bases for human hope, 6 There an roughsod oer echnical dineoas berween motives (Beneyunyrande incentives (ef iso insatons Abin) and incre Inter), Siictios Kant ad com ‘nenston sntie nde very ep make. For my puspne here de diecions f les Inportane dn che fice ha all une reson or grounds (Grande) fe acing, Take the gbeon hoor motein dh vlume wo bean evercngqberonsboe what can move to action. 4 See Kant sey "Pepe! Prac” (7+). Alaa Kate Morin, Comma and Progen Kant ‘Mora Pnipy (Wabingon, DC: Cathal Unversity Pes 101), Moran rakes an import ‘cs forthe les pled in Rant’ mon doughy idelsof progres and feline mor comms ty. Se alo David Camis, Kantian Conspuntlion (Oxford: Oxford Univer Pres 96) KANT AND MORAL MOTIVATION 207 that is, grounds for opsimism thar the arrangements ofthe world will increasingly conduce to human well-being, makes clear that he is not Stoically indifferent ro consequences, nor does he think the rest of us could, should, or will be (see, for instance, A805/B833; KpV 5:129-1305 ZeF). So while there is something right, there is also something inade- quate in the claim that Kant is a nonconsequentialist. _ Similarly, there is something right but also something inadequate in the claim thae Kane is a deontologist, chat i, that he understands mo- tality to consist justin conformity with a set of rules or roster of duties. Itis true that the surest way to find one’s moral footing, for Kant, is to consult the “fundamental law of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:30), which serves as “the canon of moral appraisal of action in general” (G 4:424). But this law is not, like one of the Ten Commandments, handed us from on high or otherwise simply given, something to be adhered to without rationale. The Kantian moral law is something we give ourselves, and (presumably) we give it to ourselves because we value and respect what it promotes. It is also true, as those calling Kant a deontologist will note, that Kant confines moral worth to actions undertaken out of duty (G 4:397-398). An action that conforms, exter nally co moral requirements buts performed for “non-dusiful’ chats, base or anyway ulterior, motives deserves no special moral praise. But i is misleading to characterize Kant’s view as ultimately about dury for its own sake, leaving macters there; this characterization muzzles itself con the question of why we would be motivated to act out of duty chat is, on che moral law, Ie cems to insist that we do the right thing just s right, where tightness is arbitrary and opaque. Kane opens the first section of the Groundivork by announcing: {s impossible to think of anything a¢ all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, chat could be considered good without limitation except a good will (G 4:393; Kant’s emphasis). Kane there proceeds to unfold an account ofthe thing that, in us, is subject to morivation—the will — and of those morives that alone can make it morally good, indeed the only unconditionally good thing “in the world, or indeed even beyond it” 208 ‘MORAL MOTIVATION (G 42395). Kant’ moral philosophy, I now tur to argue, revolves around this good. Yes, intentions matter more than consequences for Kane; and yes, morally worthy actions are morally worthy in vireue of their accord with a particular kind of law. But there is more to be said than nonconsequentialism or deontology can say about what makes the unconditionally good will so good. I turn now to the mechanics of| Kantian willing, asking what chat will i, explaining its freedom and rationality, and describing the motives available to i. What Is the Will, That Is, What Is the Thing That ls Motivated, for Kant? For Kant all living things (even plants, it seems) have a faculty of de- sice.* This faculty, as Kant carefully puts it, is “a being's faculky to be by ‘means of its representations the cause ofthe reality of the objects of these representations” (KpV s:gn). A faculty of desire, in other words, is acapacity o curn ideas into realities, choughts into things, or atleast to try to (suceess is not guaranteed). To have this capacity is precisely to be able to want something and act toward it realization. A faculty of desir is, as Kant’s careful definition makes clear, form cof causality’ As a form of causality a faculty of desire is always both a source of effects and something that works according to a principle.”® ‘These features will become important shortly. In human beings, the faculty of desire has a special name, the will" Willis distinct from other faculties of desire (eg, those in 1 The caput fer dea ig for Kane, cancer of i el We oun think of plant ae ving, bties hard tl om Kens comment whether eal mana ced hear ‘ser plantas vel ranma, Insofar a plane parses ends (light, wate) and vee the ‘rvionnet, ie may pts be aldo “ct in acconance with ks epeeentadons wich ep, “Kane wre,“ if" (MS Gans abo KV 98, 29 Specialy ola on final form of cali (eG 4436 KU spo md 369-170). ro Reade who naga hey can doe wth eft shold coe Ken sso of how ven ‘here abing mesh blood rah andthe hear pound ar KU 77-18 scala MS $659 1 Ateeive ender of Kant and of he Kane eerie, wl know ht Kane we went ope ‘aterm Willy rated "wa and wll (oral ate "cpcy fro) Here, Tundesandby “wi? what Kan undeseands by Wl nascely the whole ety f pact soning ncing he spell human fey of dee witht omer oepacyfr(fe) coke. KANT AND MORAL MOTIVATION 209 animals) in being both rational and free. Crucially, it is rational and free, for Kant, in ewo importantly different senses. In the first, bare senses, any human willis always already rational and frees its ration- ality and freedom are inevitable and thoroughgoing, not something ‘we can avoid even if we want to. In the second, full senses, rationality and freedom are achievements of a will, achievements that are far from inevitable, that admit of more and less, and that can be for- feited all too easily. To make better sense of this, let us look at ration- ality and freedom each in turn. Ina first, bare sense, rationality isan inevitable and thoroughgoing feature not only of human will but of human mental life in general. Rationality here comprises our use of concepts to determine objects and their relations and to compare what is given to standards; ration- ality in this minimal, bare sense is employed whenever we make judg- ‘ments of any kind, however routine or unconscious, Specifically practical reason—the species of reason proper to will—also has a minimal or bare version. Whenever I will, I will for reasons (however bad, of what- ever origin, however unconsciously endorsed). Where I am not willing for reasons, the things I do are not property actions or willed at all but mere physical events that take place in or with my body: driving to Brooklyn is a willed action; digesting my lunch is not. My willis chus rational ina bare sense whenever I make any prudential or means/ends calculations, whatever the end, whatever the source or moral status of the end, whatever the wisdom of the course or of my calculations. In this minimal sense, then, the wills rationality is inevitable and thor- oughgoing, In the second, full sense, the wills rationality is an achievement. ‘Willis fully rational only when its reasons for willing are endorsed by reason qua reason—that is, only when its reasons are not serving as prudential Humean slaves to the passions but are serving reason on its ‘own behalf, as it were. As Iwill show, the only reasons that reason qua reason can endorse are reasons of its own, that is, reasons for willing that have their origin not in sensuous desires or inclinations but in the interests of reason itself. The will is thus rational in this second, full 10 MORAL MOTIVATION sense only when it is moved by reasons of reason’s own. It is moved by reasons of reason’s own only through effort and commitment, and only the will thats rational in this second sense is fully moral. In the same way, there are two senses in which will can be free. The firs, bare sense picks our something inevitable and theroughgoing, and the other sense picks out a precarious, morally praiseworthy achievement. For Kant, all freedom consists in not being determined by something external, whether that external ching is nature, God, or another's will; freedom is self-determination. In the frst, bare, inevi- table, and thoroughgoing sens, willis free insofar asics not, ike acog in a machine, forcibly sprung into organism-galvanizing action by sen- suous desires. There is a gap, always, between the desires I have as a sensuous creature and my choice of whether to be determined, that is ‘moved to action, by them. This distinguishes human will from the fac- ulties of desire in plants and animals; chey just go whenever a relevant inclination or stimulus is present. ‘We are free in this first, bare sense whenever we choose what to will, ‘whether we choose willing determined by nature, God, another's will, or ourselves, We are thus alivays fee inthis sense, because we always do choose. Thus does Kant hold that we can be held responsible forall our actions (hough not of course for all che motions of our bodies, some of which, as I have shown, are not actions). We always have the ca- pacity to choose what reason for acting will move us, and so we are always responsible for the actions we undertake. The metaphysics re- aquired for this claim will need to be left for another tims; the upshot hereis that there isa firs, bare sense in which the Kantian wills always free, in away chats inevitable and choroughgoing, In the second, fall sense, willis free for Kant when it chooses to will in away that sustains its own freedom. It does this whenever it chooses +o will on a reason that is fully its own—not one given by nature, or God, or another's will. A reason that is reason's own is one that belongs to reason qua reason. Only when will chooses in favor ofsuch a reason fly self-determined—only thus are both the choice of reason and KANT AND MORAL MOTIVATION aur the reason itself fully its own—and so only here is the wills freedom sustained throughout determination. Full freedom, like full ration- ality, cannot be taken for granted but is an achievement; and, like fall rationality, it sa precarious one. Now, because will is always and inevitably rational and free in the bare senses, it always wills on a principle, or maxim. “Maxim” is the term Kant uses for che “subjective” or local and actually operative prin- ciple adopted by an individual wil. To adopt a maxim isto represent it to oneself (however unconsciously) and to choose (again, however un- consciously) to be guided by it. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant discusses a case in which I have “made it my maxim to increase iy wealth by every safe means” (KpV 5:27). Earlier in the Critique, Kant considered the maxim “Let no insult pass unavenged” (KpV si1g). These maxims, like the maxims considered and rejected in the four famous Groundwork examples," turn out to be morally problem- atic, bue Kant elsewhere offers examples of maxims thae are morally sound. One can make “pursuit of morality itself” one’s maxim (MS 6:392), along with, “love of one's neighbor in general’ “love of one’s parents" (MS 6:390), and “the happiness of others” (MS 6:393). ‘Maxims thus come in many syntactic shapes and sizes and vary widely in specificity. What they have in common is that they are the local laws ‘or principles thar govern or determine aceual wills, and char do so just in vireue of having been chosen by che subject. ‘Why choose one maxim rather than another? Maxims also have in common that they all advert to an end or ground, that is, to an ulti ‘ate reason for acting. This end or ground constitutes the reason the 1a The maxims ae; () “Hom slo mak it my principe ro shorten my fe whe es longer

    You might also like