Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Groundwork For The Metaphysics of Morals - Written Report PDF
Groundwork For The Metaphysics of Morals - Written Report PDF
Groundwork For The Metaphysics of Morals - Written Report PDF
IMMANUEL KANT
Submitted by
Alla, Raliegh F.
Cabungcal, Jichelle R.
Jepsane, Genevie P.
Romano, Joana
of
Early Life
• Immanuel Kant was the fourth of nine children born to Johann Georg
Cant, a harness maker, and Anna Regina Cant.
• Later in his life, Immanuel changed the spelling of his name to Kantto to
adhere to German spelling practices.
• Both parents were devout followers of Pietism, an 18th-century branch of
the Lutheran Church. Seeing the potential in the young man, a local pastor
arranged for the young Kant's education. While at school, Kant gained a
deep appreciation for the Latin classics.
• In 1740, Kant enrolled at the University of Konigsberg as a theology
student, but was soon attracted to mathematics and physics.
• In 1746, his father died and he was forced to leave the university to help
his family. For a decade, he worked as a private tutor for the wealthy.
During this time, he published several papers dealing with scientific
questions exploring the middle ground between rationalism and
empiricism.
Later Years
• Though the Critique of Pure Reason received little attention at the time,
Kant continued to refine his theories in a series of essays that comprised
the Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgement. Kant
continued to write on philosophy until shortly before his death. In his last
years, he became embittered due to his loss of memory. He died in 1804
at age 80.
• For Kant there was only one such categorical imperative, which he
formulated in various ways.
• is a purely formal or logical statement and expresses the condition of the
rationality of conduct rather than that of its morality,
• which is expressed in another Kantian formula: “So act as to treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in another, always as an end,
and never as only a means.”
First formula:
FUL The Formula of Universal Law: ‘‘Act only in accordance with that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’’
FLN The Formula of the Law of Nature: ‘‘So act as if the maxim of your action
were to become through your will a universal law of nature’’
Second formula:
FH The Formula of Humanity as End in Itself: ‘‘Act so that you use humanity, as
much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same
time as end and never merely as means’’
Third formula:
FA Formula of Autonomy: ‘‘the idea of the will of every rational being as a will
giving universal law’’ or ‘‘Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of
one’s choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as
universal law’’
FRE The Formula of the Realm of Ends: ‘‘Act in accordance with maxims of a
universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends’’
Kant begins with the idea that one must first establish a basic understanding of
how to think morally. He calls this common rational moral cognition. From
there, Kant works from this established common understanding to one that is
philosophical in nature, which he calls philosophical moral cognition. This is
a way of looking at moral action based on three propositions:
2. Good moral action is based on the principle and not the aim or object of
the action.
3. Moral actions must be done because of one's respect for the law.
Our ordinary ways of thinking about morality, Kant believes, reflect a
commitment to a universal moral law. Upon examination of the good will, which
is the only thing in the universe that is unconditionally good, Kant finds a will
motivated to act from a respect for duty, regardless of competing interests. Duty,
in turn, is "the necessity of action from respect for the law." The moral law is that
one must act only on a maxim that can become a universal law.
Kant presents important topics and concepts in this chapter. For the purpose of
analysis, they have been broken out by subhead.
Duty
People recognize morality as a duty. Because human beings are not exclusively
rational, morality presents itself as a command. People are often inclined to do
what satisfies this or that urge or desire, so morality has to appear as a
command, rather than a matter of course. In other words, if people were perfectly
rational, they would simply do what is right—there would not be any counter-
motivation. Consequently, the good will is the will that acts according to the
dictate of duty, and for the sake of duty.
Motivation to Act
Kant lays out four cases that clarify the concept of duty by isolating motives for
acting:
1. An action that is contrary to duty, though still useful for some purpose,
4. An action performed for the sake of duty and against the inclination to do
otherwise.
Case 3: The same shopkeeper does not overcharge his customers because he is
immediately inclined this way. In other words, he cares about his customers—
he loves them—and does not want to show preference to one customer over
another by charging different prices. His motivation is the immediate inclination
associated with his sentiment.
Case 4: A person wants to die but does not commit suicide. Most people's
inclinations are to preserve their lives, but in this case the person wants to die.
Indeed, all inclination is pushing this person toward suicide, but the act is not
carried out. This person "wishes for death, and yet preserves his life, without
loving it, not from inclination, or fear, but from duty."
One who acts from duty is acting from a formal principle (a generalized maxim)
rather than self-interest. This principle must be abstract (purely rational) in
order to guide one under any possible set of circumstance, and must have the
force of a law—that is, the binding power of a command. This law commands as
follows: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my
maxim should become a universal law."
One may think it prudent not to lie, because doing so could create more problems
later on. One cannot, of course, foresee the future. Alternatively, one may think
lying does not conform to duty, because one cannot will that everyone lie when
it suits their purposes without also committing oneself to a world in which no
one can be taken at their word—that is the maxim, universalized. A world in
which people do not keep their promises defeats the purpose of wanting to lie in
the first place. It is, as a practical matter, contradictory. Lying also contradicts
the concept of promise keeping. Insofar as the liar wishes to be an exception to
the rule that everyone keeps their promises, the liar wants to preserve both lying
and not lying.
Summary
This section takes up the results of the analyses in Section 2. There, Kant derived
from an analysis of the common conception of duty the definition that "duty is
the necessity of an action from respect for the law." In Section 2 Kant works to
clarify what makes an action necessary. From this analysis Kant derives the
formulations of the categorical imperative.
These formulations show how moral law is applied to maxims, that is, to personal
rules for acting. One of the formulations introduces the concept of autonomy,
which is then connected to the ideal moral community, the kingdom of ends, as
well as to human dignity.
Kant presents important topics and concepts in this chapter. For the purpose of
analysis, they have been broken out by subhead.
Kant next develops a more technical vocabulary to account for the discoveries
made in his analysis of the "common moral cognition." Reason commands one
to do one's duty, but there are also rational commands dictated by what it takes
to satisfy a goal. Kant calls these commands categorical and hypothetical
imperatives, respectively.
Hypothetical imperatives are those that tell a person what they should do in
order to achieve some end, while categorical imperatives tell a person what they
ought to do. The former concern doing something in order to secure a particular
end, while the latter concern doing something for its own sake. While
hypothetical imperatives do not apply to everyone equally, the categorical
imperative does.
It is rational to say to oneself, "If I want to be healthy, I should eat fruits and
vegetables." It is also rational to say to oneself, "I must never lie." The difference
between the two is the difference between willing the means to achieve an end
and willing an end. In both cases, however, it is necessary to do something. A
hypothetical imperative assert that one should will the necessary means to an
end. A categorical imperative assert that one must will the end. One can say, for
example, that if eating fruits and vegetables is necessary to the goal of health,
then one should eat fruits and vegetables to achieve that goal. One can also say
that it is necessary not to lie, and for no reason beyond the moral wrongness of
lying.
This specific way of acting is "lawlike," which is to say, in thinking about the
maxim of the action, one must consider whether it could be a law. Kant clarifies
the notion of law by adding that the maxim of the action could be "a universal
law of nature." Nature is a coherent system of laws, and morality parallels nature
to the extent that one's maxim for acting could be part of a system of moral laws,
such as "One ought to never lie," or "One ought to develop one's talents."
There is only one categorical imperative, but there are variations of expression.
Kant offers four examples to illustrate the nature of the categorical imperative.
In particular, he distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties.
Every act undertaken is an act that the agent determines is compulsory for self
and others. Acts are commanded "perfectly" or "imperfectly" as duties to self or
to others. Perfect duties to self or others are duties that must always be done,
while imperfect duties are ones that must be done whenever one can.
Consequently, it is never permissible to lie or to kill oneself. The lying promise,
as discussed in Section 1, cannot be universalized because it is self-defeating.
Suicide cannot be universalized because it contradicts the natural impulse to
live. Lying violates the conception of law. Suicide violates a proposed law of
nature.
Imperfect, or wide duties, are those duties one ought to satisfy whenever
possible. It is not possible to relentlessly pursue one's talents, for example, so
one cannot be obliged to do so. This does not mean that one should fritter away
one's talents in favor of mere amusement. The attempt to universalize a maxim
that allows one to avoid cultivating one's talents runs aground. That is because
it could not be a law of nature. People have natural capacities meant to be used
for their own, and others' benefit. Just as suicide conflicts with the natural
tendency to preserve life, so also ignoring one's talents conflicts with their
natural purpose.
It is also not possible to help every person in need at every moment, for example,
so one cannot be obligated to attempt to do so. This does not mean that one is
never obliged to help. Indeed, the attempt of the wealthy person to universalize
the maxim not to help anyone, but instead pursue only his own happiness, fails.
Just as one cannot universalize the maxim that allows lying promises, because
they are self-defeating, so also one cannot universalize the maxim not to offer
aid to those in need. A world in which no one offered aid would be a world in
which the wealthy and selfish were members—and a world in which they would,
at one point, require help they would not receive. Kant does not think people are
completely self-sufficient, such that they would never require any sort of
assistance.
Humanity is an end in itself. As such, it has absolute value, to which all other
values are relative, and for which no other values can be substituted. The man
who wishes to commit suicide, then, treats himself as a means to his own end,
which is relief from suffering. The man who wishes to lie treats the lender as a
means to his end, which is to obtain money.
The same principle of humanity applies also to the imperfect, or "wide," duties.
The man who wishes to substitute his talents for his own happiness selfishly
uses himself as a mere means. Similarly, the man who wishes not to help others
thwarts, rather than supports, their ends.
Hypothetical Imperatives
The formula of a universal law reflects several important features. One is that it
is reciprocal. What is moral for one is moral for all—there are no exceptions, no
extra special people that are not subject to it. Another related feature is that it
requires a dispassionate or disinterested judgment of the circumstances.
Because it exists outside all empirical factors, including one's inclinations, one
must judge the circumstances according to a standard that is blind to one's
particular interests or the influences of outside factors. Reason alone determines
whether the law is moral.
The humanity formula, which articulates the dignity of persons, emerges from
the universal formula: When one acts only on those maxims that anyone could
also adopt, one respects humanity, that is, one thereby acknowledges the dignity
of personhood. This is what Kant means in Section 1 when he asserts that the
good will is the one that wills the good and that morality is doing one's duty for
its own sake.
The main difference between the first and the third formulations of the
categorical imperative is the focus. When one acts "only according to that maxim
through which [one] can at the same time will that it become a universal law,"
one's focus is on following the moral law. When one acts as a moral legislator,
one's focus is on creating the moral law.
Kant enlists the term autonomy in a way not previously employed. It was
common in the world of politics, beginning with the ancient Greeks that a polis,
or city-state, was free to generate its own legal documents, such as a constitution
and laws, rather than follow those of another city-state. Kant broadens the
concept by employing it in his moral theory. One is autonomous when one is free
from internal determining influences on the will, such as inclination. One is also
free to be a moral law giver.
So far, Kant has identified an a priori moral law binding on all rational beings.
Such a law presupposes that these beings are free. Were they not free but still
purely rational, they could not do otherwise than what reason dictates. In that
case there would be no need for any sort of law. Kant has yet to establish that
there is human freedom—that, as the source of the moral law, human beings are
their own causality, rather than subject to an external causality.
Events in the natural world are determined by antecedent conditions: every event
is caused. A dropped pen falls to the floor, for example. Morality, on the other
hand, presupposes the freedom to act or not to act in a certain way. Moreover, it
presupposes that an action is a sort of cause that is itself not determined by
antecedent conditions. That cause has a law (moral) that explains the action,
just as the cause of the pen dropping has a law (physical) that explains its action.
In the latter case the cause is autonomous. In the former no such cause is
possible—pens are mere bodies. A free will cannot be caused, then, but is itself
a cause. Moreover, awareness of moral demands is a presupposition of freedom—
it is the a priori idea that the will is free to be obligated in this way. So, although
there is no rational proof of the freedom required for morality, there is room to
think that the causal network of the physical world applies also to the moral
agent.
Analysis
Kant recognizes that human beings are not purely rational but also empirical
beings. As such, humans are subject to physical laws—unable, for example, to
ignore gravity. In the physical world all events are caused, which means all
events are determined by antecedent conditions. How is it possible, then, for one
to be motivated by reason's commands? How is it possible for choice and
deliberation to occur when all natural events are caused? These are the main
questions Kant answers in this final section of Groundwork. If humans are free,
and if reason can motivate moral action, then the categorical imperative is
binding. The challenge Kant has in Section 3 is to show that it is plausible to
think both that humans are free and that reason can motivate moral action,
despite the fact that natural, or causal, determinism exists in the empirical
world.
Kant thinks it is impossible to prove that humans have free will. However, he
argues that it is at least not inconceivable that they do. Indeed, when one
deliberates about what to do, and when one chooses what to do, one presupposes
that one is free. Not only this, but one also presupposes that one can be
motivated by reason. Here again, while Kant thinks people do make such a
presupposition, he does not think it can be proven that reason does so motivate.
He simply believes it is advisable that we act as if it does, because otherwise we
have no basis for morality.
Second, Kant’s ethical thought has been profoundly influential. It is one of the
two or three most important contributions that modern moral philosophers have
made to our culture. The Groundwork has always been the main text used to
learn about Kant’s ethics. Anyone who wants to understand the history of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century moral philosophy and its importance for
society has to understand this book.
Third, the positions Kant took in the Groundwork are very much alive in moral
philosophy today. A renewal of scholarship, commentary, and philosophical
discussion concerning the book began around the middle of the last century.
Many misunderstandings have been cleared away, and Kant’s other writings on
ethics have been brought in to illuminate this one. New philosophical insights
from recent work are being used to show the depth and importance of what Kant
said. Kantian views of morality are a central topic of contemporary moral
philosophy. In developing Kant’s positions to bring out their pertinence today,
advocates of Kantian views depart more or less from what he himself actually
said. But an understanding of the Groundwork is indispensable for anyone who
wants to take part in current discussions of ethics.
The philanthropist is going through a really bad time in his life. He no longer has
any inclination to help the needy, and it gives him no pleasure. Nevertheless, he
does it because it is the right thing to do.
While we perform the action that duty commands, we don’t do it for that reason.
Rather we do it because we are inclined to – it pleases us or is in our interests.
A philanthropist helps the needy, not because this is his duty, but because it
pleases him – he finds ‘inner satisfaction in spreading joy.
The difference?
In acting from duty, and in acting in accordance with duty, the action is the
same. The difference relates to the motivation of the act (our will).
Kantianism begins with freedom. More particularly, it begins with the fact that
we are free, and with an account of that freedom. So we must begin with that
account.
“Act only in accordance with the maxim through which you at the same time can
will that it became a universal law”
Are deontological, revolving entirely around duty rather than emotions or end
goals. All actions are performed with some underlying maxim or principles.
Consequentialism
Lehrer, Keith (2003), “Reason and Autonomy,” Social Philosophy & Policy 20:
177-98.
https://study.com/academy/lesson/kants-metaphysics-of-morals-summary-
analysis.html
https://www.coursehero.com/lit/Groundwork-of-the-Metaphysics-of-
Morals/section-1-summary/
https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/kantsgrounding/section3/