Comprehensive Report

Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals

IMMANUEL KANT

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Immanuel Kant
Synopsis

• Immanuel Kant was a German philosopher during the Enlightenment era

of the late 18th century. His best known work is the Critique of Pure
Reason.
• was born on April 22, 1724, in Konigsberg, Prussia, or what is now
Kaliningrad, Russia.
• While tutoring, he published science papers, including "General Natural
History and Theory of the Heavens" in 1755.
• He spent the next 15 years as a metaphysics lecturer. In 1781, he
published the first part of Critique of Pure Reason. He published more
critiques in the years preceding his death on February 12, 1804, in the
city of his birth.

Early Life

• Immanuel Kant was the fourth of nine children born to Johann Georg
Cant, a harness maker, and Anna Regina Cant.
• Later in his life, Immanuel changed the spelling of his name to Kantto to
adhere to German spelling practices.
• Both parents were devout followers of Pietism, an 18th-century branch of
the Lutheran Church. Seeing the potential in the young man, a local pastor
arranged for the young Kant's education. While at school, Kant gained a
deep appreciation for the Latin classics.
• In 1740, Kant enrolled at the University of Konigsberg as a theology
student, but was soon attracted to mathematics and physics.
• In 1746, his father died and he was forced to leave the university to help
his family. For a decade, he worked as a private tutor for the wealthy.
During this time, he published several papers dealing with scientific
questions exploring the middle ground between rationalism and
empiricism.

Full-Fledged Scholar and Philosopher

• In 1755, Immanuel Kant returned to the University of Konigsberg to

continue his education. That same year he received his doctorate of
philosophy. For the next 15 years, he worked as a lecturer and tutor and
wrote major works on philosophy. In 1770, he became a full professor at
the University of Konigsberg, teaching metaphysics and logic.
• In 1781, Immanuel Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason, an
enormous work and one of the most important on Western thought. He
 attempted to explain how reason and experiences interact with thought
and understanding. This revolutionary proposal explained how an
individual’s mind organizes experiences into understanding the way the
world works.
• Kant focused on ethics, the philosophical study of moral actions. He
proposed a moral law called the “categorical imperative,” stating that
morality is derived from rationality and all moral judgments are rationally
supported. What is right is right and what is wrong is wrong; there is no
grey area. Human beings are obligated to follow this imperative
unconditionally if they are to claim to be moral.

Later Years

• Though the Critique of Pure Reason received little attention at the time,
Kant continued to refine his theories in a series of essays that comprised
the Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgement. Kant
continued to write on philosophy until shortly before his death. In his last
years, he became embittered due to his loss of memory. He died in 1804
at age 80.

Kant’s Categorical Imperative

“Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that
it should become a universal law”

• For Kant there was only one such categorical imperative, which he
formulated in various ways.
• is a purely formal or logical statement and expresses the condition of the
rationality of conduct rather than that of its morality,
• which is expressed in another Kantian formula: “So act as to treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in another, always as an end,
and never as only a means.”

Formulations of the Moral Law

Kant formulates the moral law in three principal ways. The first and third of
these have variants which are intended to bring the law closer to intuition and
make it easier to apply. These five principal formulations of the moral law are
abbreviated as follows.

First formula:
FUL The Formula of Universal Law: ‘‘Act only in accordance with that maxim
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’’

with its variant

FLN The Formula of the Law of Nature: ‘‘So act as if the maxim of your action
were to become through your will a universal law of nature’’

Second formula:

FH The Formula of Humanity as End in Itself: ‘‘Act so that you use humanity, as
much in your own person as in the person of every other, always at the same
time as end and never merely as means’’

Third formula:

FA Formula of Autonomy: ‘‘the idea of the will of every rational being as a will
giving universal law’’ or ‘‘Not to choose otherwise than so that the maxims of
one’s choice are at the same time comprehended with it in the same volition as
universal law’’

with its variant,

FRE The Formula of the Realm of Ends: ‘‘Act in accordance with maxims of a
universally legislative member for a merely possible realm of ends’’

Section 1: Transition from Common Rational to Philosophic Moral

Cognition
Summary

Kant begins with the idea that one must first establish a basic understanding of
how to think morally. He calls this common rational moral cognition. From
there, Kant works from this established common understanding to one that is
philosophical in nature, which he calls philosophical moral cognition. This is
a way of looking at moral action based on three propositions:

1. Something is moral only if it is done out of duty.

2. Good moral action is based on the principle and not the aim or object of
the action.

3. Moral actions must be done because of one's respect for the law.
Our ordinary ways of thinking about morality, Kant believes, reflect a
commitment to a universal moral law. Upon examination of the good will, which
is the only thing in the universe that is unconditionally good, Kant finds a will
motivated to act from a respect for duty, regardless of competing interests. Duty,
in turn, is "the necessity of action from respect for the law." The moral law is that
one must act only on a maxim that can become a universal law.

Kant presents important topics and concepts in this chapter. For the purpose of
analysis, they have been broken out by subhead.

The Good Will

The investigation into "the supreme principle of morality" begins in an analysis

of what Kant calls "common cognition"—how people generally think about
morality. He begins with an account of the good will, which is unconditionally
good. All other things that can be said to be good are only conditionally good.
This means that, under certain conditions, these same things could be bad. For
example, "talents of the mind," such as intellect, can become good or bad,
depending on how they are used. Similarly, "gifts of fortune," such as health or
wealth, can become negative. Neither is unconditionally good; each requires a
good will.

Moreover, a good will is a requirement of one's worthiness of happiness. Rather

than equating morality with happiness, morality is entirely independent of it.
Indeed, being moral may not guarantee one is or becomes happy, but it surely is
a condition for one's being deserving of it.

Because the good will is good without qualification, it is good in itself—

intrinsically or inherently good. In order to be good, a good will doesn't have to
do anything except will the good. Thus, the consequences of the action
undertaken by a good will have no effect on the goodness of the will. Actions are
right, therefore, not for their results but for the motive that initiated the action.
"Like a jewel, [such a will] would still shine by itself," even if it is unable to bring
about the state of affairs at which its action aims.

Duty

People recognize morality as a duty. Because human beings are not exclusively
rational, morality presents itself as a command. People are often inclined to do
what satisfies this or that urge or desire, so morality has to appear as a
command, rather than a matter of course. In other words, if people were perfectly
rational, they would simply do what is right—there would not be any counter-
motivation. Consequently, the good will is the will that acts according to the
dictate of duty, and for the sake of duty.

To will is to follow an internal command—one says to oneself, "Do this." An act

of will is contrasted with an action done from inclination. Inclinations are
essentially selfish motives. Acts of will are motivated rationally. To be motivated
to act from a good will is to be motivated to do one's duty, rather than to follow
inclination. Indeed, the less one wants to perform one's duty, the more clearly
visible is the moral worth of the action. Someone whose acts are in accordance
with duty, or whose inclinations (self-interests) are in line with duty, is not as
morally praiseworthy as the one who has acted solely from duty.

Motivation to Act

Kant lays out four cases that clarify the concept of duty by isolating motives for
acting:

1. An action that is contrary to duty, though still useful for some purpose,

2. An action that conforms to duty but is performed in order to satisfy a self-

serving interest,

3. An action that conforms to duty but is performed in order to satisfy an

immediate inclination, and

4. An action performed for the sake of duty and against the inclination to do
otherwise.

Kant offers examples of Cases 2, 3, and 4.

Case 2: Suppose a shopkeeper does not overcharge any customer. Suppose

further that this action conforms to duty, that is, the action is in accordance
with duty. Now suppose the shopkeeper's motivation is to preserve his reputation
in the community—he does not want to become known as someone who cheats
customers when he can, because such a reputation will damage his business.
His motivation is, then, self-serving.

Case 3: The same shopkeeper does not overcharge his customers because he is
immediately inclined this way. In other words, he cares about his customers—
he loves them—and does not want to show preference to one customer over
another by charging different prices. His motivation is the immediate inclination
associated with his sentiment.

Case 4: A person wants to die but does not commit suicide. Most people's
inclinations are to preserve their lives, but in this case the person wants to die.
Indeed, all inclination is pushing this person toward suicide, but the act is not
carried out. This person "wishes for death, and yet preserves his life, without
loving it, not from inclination, or fear, but from duty."

The Form of Morality

One who acts from duty is acting from a formal principle (a generalized maxim)
rather than self-interest. This principle must be abstract (purely rational) in
order to guide one under any possible set of circumstance, and must have the
force of a law—that is, the binding power of a command. This law commands as
follows: "I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my
maxim should become a universal law."

Kant defines a maxim as "the subjective principle of willing." Each person

develops a personal rule or policy that guides and explains action. "Why did you
do X?" is answered by a maxim. According to Kant, a maxim that is properly
moral is one that can be universalized. He offers an example of what
universalizing a maxim involves. Suppose one considers making a "lying
promise," that is, a promise that one does not intend to keep. One is capable of
lying, but should one adopt lying as one's personal rule for acting? In other
words, does one say, "I will lie when it suits my purposes," and make it a habitual
practice?

One may think it prudent not to lie, because doing so could create more problems
later on. One cannot, of course, foresee the future. Alternatively, one may think
lying does not conform to duty, because one cannot will that everyone lie when
it suits their purposes without also committing oneself to a world in which no
one can be taken at their word—that is the maxim, universalized. A world in
which people do not keep their promises defeats the purpose of wanting to lie in
the first place. It is, as a practical matter, contradictory. Lying also contradicts
the concept of promise keeping. Insofar as the liar wishes to be an exception to
the rule that everyone keeps their promises, the liar wants to preserve both lying
and not lying.

Section 2: Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to Metaphysics of

Morals

Summary

This section takes up the results of the analyses in Section 2. There, Kant derived
from an analysis of the common conception of duty the definition that "duty is
the necessity of an action from respect for the law." In Section 2 Kant works to
clarify what makes an action necessary. From this analysis Kant derives the
formulations of the categorical imperative.

These formulations show how moral law is applied to maxims, that is, to personal
rules for acting. One of the formulations introduces the concept of autonomy,
which is then connected to the ideal moral community, the kingdom of ends, as
well as to human dignity.

Kant presents important topics and concepts in this chapter. For the purpose of
analysis, they have been broken out by subhead.

Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives

Kant next develops a more technical vocabulary to account for the discoveries
made in his analysis of the "common moral cognition." Reason commands one
to do one's duty, but there are also rational commands dictated by what it takes
to satisfy a goal. Kant calls these commands categorical and hypothetical
imperatives, respectively.

Hypothetical imperatives are those that tell a person what they should do in
order to achieve some end, while categorical imperatives tell a person what they
ought to do. The former concern doing something in order to secure a particular
end, while the latter concern doing something for its own sake. While
hypothetical imperatives do not apply to everyone equally, the categorical
imperative does.

It is rational to say to oneself, "If I want to be healthy, I should eat fruits and
vegetables." It is also rational to say to oneself, "I must never lie." The difference
between the two is the difference between willing the means to achieve an end
and willing an end. In both cases, however, it is necessary to do something. A
hypothetical imperative assert that one should will the necessary means to an
end. A categorical imperative assert that one must will the end. One can say, for
example, that if eating fruits and vegetables is necessary to the goal of health,
then one should eat fruits and vegetables to achieve that goal. One can also say
that it is necessary not to lie, and for no reason beyond the moral wrongness of
lying.

A hypothetical imperative focuses the agent's attention on the circumstances at

hand and the consequences of an action. It also expresses the agent's
inclinations, and, while it may inspire approval, it does not inspire respect.

In contrast to a hypothetical imperative, the essential features of a categorical

imperative are:
 • that it is necessary to act in a specific way;
• that it does not include one's own purposes or any ends to achieve;
• that it does not include inclination;
• that it contains nothing empirical, i.e., that it abstracts from all specificity;
and
• that it inspires respect.

This specific way of acting is "lawlike," which is to say, in thinking about the
maxim of the action, one must consider whether it could be a law. Kant clarifies
the notion of law by adding that the maxim of the action could be "a universal
law of nature." Nature is a coherent system of laws, and morality parallels nature
to the extent that one's maxim for acting could be part of a system of moral laws,
such as "One ought to never lie," or "One ought to develop one's talents."

It is possible to know the categorical imperative because it is a statement of a

particular type: it is "synthetic a priori." It is a priori, because it is known
independently of experience—and because it is not true by definition, it is
synthetic. An analytic statement is true by definition, such as "All triangles are
three-sided figures." One need only understand the meaning of "triangle" to
extract from it "three-sided figure." On the other hand, knowing that "ought"
means "what one must do" does not tell one what, exactly, it is one ought to do.
Hence, a maxim is supplied. In Section 3 Kant will attempt an explanation of
synthetic a priori knowledge of the categorical imperative.

Formulations of the Categorical Imperative

There is only one categorical imperative, but there are variations of expression.

1. The Formula of Universal Law: "Act only according to that maxim

through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal
law." Or in other words, "Act as if the maxim of your action were to become
by your will a universal law of nature."
2. Formula of Humanity: "Act that you use humanity, in your own person
as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end,
never merely as a means."
3. Formula of Autonomy: Act so that your will regards itself, at the same
time, "as a universally legislating will."
4. Formula of the Kingdom of Ends: "So act as if your maxim were to serve
at the same time as a universal law (of all rational beings)."

The categorical imperative is a rationally generated obligation for all rational

beings. It is rationally generated because no empirically generated law could hold
with the strict universality Kant thinks morality reflects. Moreover, moral
deliberation and choice suggest a rational evaluation that something is good.
Kant thinks this understanding of morality reflects the inherent dignity and
autonomy of every rational agent. As lawgivers, human beings are autonomous.
Kant calls externally imposed law "heteronomous." As lawgivers, human beings
command themselves to act from respect for themselves as moral agents. In the
ideal "kingdom of ends," rational agents legislate and bind themselves by law.

Perfect and Imperfect Duties: Employing the Principle of Universality in

the Categorical Imperative

Kant offers four examples to illustrate the nature of the categorical imperative.
In particular, he distinguishes between perfect and imperfect duties.

1. A suicidal person has a narrow, or perfect, duty to himself. That duty is

not to commit suicide out of a desire to end his own suffering.
2. A person in need of money has a narrow, or perfect, duty to others. That
duty is not to lie.
3. A person has a wide, or imperfect, duty to himself: it is to cultivate his
talents.
4. A person has a wide, or imperfect, duty to others: it is to be beneficent.

Every act undertaken is an act that the agent determines is compulsory for self
and others. Acts are commanded "perfectly" or "imperfectly" as duties to self or
to others. Perfect duties to self or others are duties that must always be done,
while imperfect duties are ones that must be done whenever one can.
Consequently, it is never permissible to lie or to kill oneself. The lying promise,
as discussed in Section 1, cannot be universalized because it is self-defeating.
Suicide cannot be universalized because it contradicts the natural impulse to
live. Lying violates the conception of law. Suicide violates a proposed law of
nature.

Imperfect, or wide duties, are those duties one ought to satisfy whenever
possible. It is not possible to relentlessly pursue one's talents, for example, so
one cannot be obliged to do so. This does not mean that one should fritter away
one's talents in favor of mere amusement. The attempt to universalize a maxim
that allows one to avoid cultivating one's talents runs aground. That is because
it could not be a law of nature. People have natural capacities meant to be used
for their own, and others' benefit. Just as suicide conflicts with the natural
tendency to preserve life, so also ignoring one's talents conflicts with their
natural purpose.

It is also not possible to help every person in need at every moment, for example,
so one cannot be obligated to attempt to do so. This does not mean that one is
never obliged to help. Indeed, the attempt of the wealthy person to universalize
the maxim not to help anyone, but instead pursue only his own happiness, fails.
Just as one cannot universalize the maxim that allows lying promises, because
they are self-defeating, so also one cannot universalize the maxim not to offer
aid to those in need. A world in which no one offered aid would be a world in
which the wealthy and selfish were members—and a world in which they would,
at one point, require help they would not receive. Kant does not think people are
completely self-sufficient, such that they would never require any sort of
assistance.

Perfect and Imperfect Duties: The Formula of Humanity

Humanity is an end in itself. As such, it has absolute value, to which all other
values are relative, and for which no other values can be substituted. The man
who wishes to commit suicide, then, treats himself as a means to his own end,
which is relief from suffering. The man who wishes to lie treats the lender as a
means to his end, which is to obtain money.

The same principle of humanity applies also to the imperfect, or "wide," duties.
The man who wishes to substitute his talents for his own happiness selfishly
uses himself as a mere means. Similarly, the man who wishes not to help others
thwarts, rather than supports, their ends.

Humanity is to be respected as the source of value. Treating persons as ends in

themselves translates to respecting them as rational beings. Moreover, Kant
thinks, treating persons as ends in themselves enlists rational principles that
they themselves, as rational beings, would accept. This, in turn, suggests that
these principles are ones to which a rational being could consent. So, for
example, a rational person would not consent to be lied to precisely because,
while the lie occurs, that person could not know the lie is occurring.

The Formula of Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends

As rational beings, humans are the source of morality. More specifically, it is

through one's will that the moral law is "given." Kant argues that the "ground" of
the moral law is such that each person is both subject to it and legislator of it.
One is subject to the moral law because it has the relevant binding force. One is
the legislator of morality because that binding force is internal rather than
external. When one acts morally, for example, one acts as an end in oneself. If
one acts morally in relation to another person, then one treats that person as an
end in himself or herself. To be an end in oneself is to necessitate, or legislate,
through willing, that one always be treated as an end. One is, consequently,
bound through an act of one's own will.

Kant contrasts the concept of autonomy with heteronomy. To be autonomous is

both to be able to know what morality requires and to be responsible for acting
as it requires. The autonomous person lives out, as it were, moral principles that
are both self-legislating and universally legislated. To be heteronomous is to be
directed by anything other than reason.
Analysis

By itself, a command or an imperative simply directs. "Shut the window!" one

may exclaim. The response is an action: the one commanded either does or does
not shut the window. However, when the imperative is expressed as a declarative
statement, it has a truth value. In other words, it is either true or false to declare,
"You should shut the window" or "You ought not to tell a lie." Because Kant is
interested in showing what makes an action necessary, he is also interested in
showing what makes the categorical imperative true.

Hypothetical Imperatives

Hypothetical imperatives reflect instrumental reasoning, in which the actions are

instruments, or means to some end. Examples would include statements like:
Someone who wants to arrive on campus at a specific time should use the bus
as the vehicle to achieve that goal. Someone who wants to perform well on an
exam should consult a tutor to aid in learning the material, which in turn
supports the goal of performing well. Someone who wants to learn to play the
violin should practice the correct finger placements. The first two of these
"shoulds" reflect prudential imperatives, while the last reflects an "imperative of
skill." The reader should notice that if one does not want to arrive on campus on
time, if one does not want to perform well on an exam, or if one does not want to
learn to play the violin, these imperatives will simply not reflect true statements.
This is why they are described as "hypothetical imperatives." Not everyone agrees
that the outcome is necessary or desirable.

The formula of a universal law reflects several important features. One is that it
is reciprocal. What is moral for one is moral for all—there are no exceptions, no
extra special people that are not subject to it. Another related feature is that it
requires a dispassionate or disinterested judgment of the circumstances.
Because it exists outside all empirical factors, including one's inclinations, one
must judge the circumstances according to a standard that is blind to one's
particular interests or the influences of outside factors. Reason alone determines
whether the law is moral.

The Categorical Imperative

Kant's application of the humanity formula of the categorical imperative to

narrow (or perfect) and wide (or imperfect) duties is complicated, but it mirrors
the application of the universal formula to the same cases. Reading them this
way should provide a route into the complexity. The reader should recall that the
categorical imperative's first two formulations hone in on law—and law of
nature—and the inalienable dignity of humanity. One's law is moral as long as
it can be universalized either in conception or in willing. In other words, one's
law cannot be conceptually contradictory, as is a lying promise. Nor can one's
law be self-defeating in practice, as is suicide.

The humanity formula, which articulates the dignity of persons, emerges from
the universal formula: When one acts only on those maxims that anyone could
also adopt, one respects humanity, that is, one thereby acknowledges the dignity
of personhood. This is what Kant means in Section 1 when he asserts that the
good will is the one that wills the good and that morality is doing one's duty for
its own sake.

Human dignity, unlike that of other things, is inherently valuable. As such, it

cannot be quantified, as can those things that are valued at a price. In the
marketplace prices are determined by what people are willing to pay for them;
goods have transactional and, more importantly, relative value. Dignity, on the
other hand, cannot be traded because nothing has a comparable worth. Nothing
can be compared to that which is defined only by itself and not in comparison to
anything else. Moreover, dignity originates in one's rational nature.
Consequently, an attempt to trade one's dignity for some perceived good or other
is an attempt to diminish one's value. People, in short, are not to be manipulated
for any reason.

The main difference between the first and the third formulations of the
categorical imperative is the focus. When one acts "only according to that maxim
through which [one] can at the same time will that it become a universal law,"
one's focus is on following the moral law. When one acts as a moral legislator,
one's focus is on creating the moral law.

Autonomy versus Heteronomy

Kant enlists the term autonomy in a way not previously employed. It was
common in the world of politics, beginning with the ancient Greeks that a polis,
or city-state, was free to generate its own legal documents, such as a constitution
and laws, rather than follow those of another city-state. Kant broadens the
concept by employing it in his moral theory. One is autonomous when one is free
from internal determining influences on the will, such as inclination. One is also
free to be a moral law giver.

Kant's distinction between autonomous and heteronomous law should

illuminate his focus on the inherent value of the lawmaker and the respect one
feels for oneself as a rational lawgiver. The reader can consider, for example, that
the categorical imperative is a command of rationality and, as such, is the same
for all. Moreover, as such, it is self-given. The Golden Rule, on the other hand,
is a religious command. As such, it is other-given. The interest one would have
in obeying such a law would be a feeling—fear, perhaps, or desire. Kant thinks
the autonomous nature of morality makes it compelling in ways that
heteronomous morality cannot be. To act rationally, for example, is to act from
an autonomous will, and to act from an autonomous will is to act freely. To be
compelled to act by an external force, on the other hand, is to be caused to act
by something other than oneself.

This brings the discussion to Kant's conception of a "kingdom of ends." Each

person is an end in himself or herself. Collectively, persons constitute a moral
community—kingdom of ends. Each individual's actions contribute to, or detract
from, that community. As rational beings, people make choices that alter their
own lives and the lives of others. Respect for this feature of humanity, Kant
thinks, is fundamental to morality.

Section 3: Transition from Metaphysics of Morals to the Critique of Pure

Practical Reason
Summary

So far, Kant has identified an a priori moral law binding on all rational beings.
Such a law presupposes that these beings are free. Were they not free but still
purely rational, they could not do otherwise than what reason dictates. In that
case there would be no need for any sort of law. Kant has yet to establish that
there is human freedom—that, as the source of the moral law, human beings are
their own causality, rather than subject to an external causality.

Events in the natural world are determined by antecedent conditions: every event
is caused. A dropped pen falls to the floor, for example. Morality, on the other
hand, presupposes the freedom to act or not to act in a certain way. Moreover, it
presupposes that an action is a sort of cause that is itself not determined by
antecedent conditions. That cause has a law (moral) that explains the action,
just as the cause of the pen dropping has a law (physical) that explains its action.
In the latter case the cause is autonomous. In the former no such cause is
possible—pens are mere bodies. A free will cannot be caused, then, but is itself
a cause. Moreover, awareness of moral demands is a presupposition of freedom—
it is the a priori idea that the will is free to be obligated in this way. So, although
there is no rational proof of the freedom required for morality, there is room to
think that the causal network of the physical world applies also to the moral
agent.
Analysis

Kant recognizes that human beings are not purely rational but also empirical
beings. As such, humans are subject to physical laws—unable, for example, to
ignore gravity. In the physical world all events are caused, which means all
events are determined by antecedent conditions. How is it possible, then, for one
to be motivated by reason's commands? How is it possible for choice and
deliberation to occur when all natural events are caused? These are the main
questions Kant answers in this final section of Groundwork. If humans are free,
and if reason can motivate moral action, then the categorical imperative is
binding. The challenge Kant has in Section 3 is to show that it is plausible to
think both that humans are free and that reason can motivate moral action,
despite the fact that natural, or causal, determinism exists in the empirical
world.

Kant thinks it is impossible to prove that humans have free will. However, he
argues that it is at least not inconceivable that they do. Indeed, when one
deliberates about what to do, and when one chooses what to do, one presupposes
that one is free. Not only this, but one also presupposes that one can be
motivated by reason. Here again, while Kant thinks people do make such a
presupposition, he does not think it can be proven that reason does so motivate.
He simply believes it is advisable that we act as if it does, because otherwise we
have no basis for morality.

Why Study Kant’s Ethics? J. B. SCHNEEWIND

First, Kant created a dramatically new way of thinking about morality and about
ourselves as moral beings. He held that all previous attempts to spell out the
principles of ethics had been mistaken. In the Groundwork he presented the
fundamentals of a different vision of morality. And in later writings he showed
how to work out the details of morality using his new formulation of its basis. To
understand Kant’s ethics historically is to come to see the emergence of a major
new option in Western thought.

Second, Kant’s ethical thought has been profoundly influential. It is one of the
two or three most important contributions that modern moral philosophers have
made to our culture. The Groundwork has always been the main text used to
learn about Kant’s ethics. Anyone who wants to understand the history of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century moral philosophy and its importance for
society has to understand this book.
Third, the positions Kant took in the Groundwork are very much alive in moral
philosophy today. A renewal of scholarship, commentary, and philosophical
discussion concerning the book began around the middle of the last century.
Many misunderstandings have been cleared away, and Kant’s other writings on
ethics have been brought in to illuminate this one. New philosophical insights
from recent work are being used to show the depth and importance of what Kant
said. Kantian views of morality are a central topic of contemporary moral
philosophy. In developing Kant’s positions to bring out their pertinence today,
advocates of Kantian views depart more or less from what he himself actually
said. But an understanding of the Groundwork is indispensable for anyone who
wants to take part in current discussions of ethics.

Acting from duty

We perform the action because it is our duty, irrespective of whether or not we
are incline to do it, or if whether or not it is in our interest.

Acting from Duty example

The philanthropist is going through a really bad time in his life. He no longer has
any inclination to help the needy, and it gives him no pleasure. Nevertheless, he
does it because it is the right thing to do.

Acting in accordance to duty

While we perform the action that duty commands, we don’t do it for that reason.
Rather we do it because we are inclined to – it pleases us or is in our interests.

Acting in accordance to duty example

A philanthropist helps the needy, not because this is his duty, but because it
pleases him – he finds ‘inner satisfaction in spreading joy.

The difference?

In acting from duty, and in acting in accordance with duty, the action is the
same. The difference relates to the motivation of the act (our will).

Kantianism for consequentialist

Kantianism begins with freedom. More particularly, it begins with the fact that
we are free, and with an account of that freedom. So we must begin with that
account.

To understand freedom, we must first understand rationality.

Rationality

Rationality- whether practical or theoretical- consist in the ability to evaluate

beliefs and acts with an eye to whether they meet the relevant standards, and to
alter our beliefs and acts in light of those evaluations

Kant’s formula of universal law

“Act only in accordance with the maxim through which you at the same time can
will that it became a universal law”

Kantian ethics (Kantianism)

Are deontological, revolving entirely around duty rather than emotions or end
goals. All actions are performed with some underlying maxim or principles.

Consequentialism

Consequentialism is about the rightness or wrongness of an action/policy based

on its consequences.

Kantianism for consequentialist

Kantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is
incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a
system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the
maximization of the good.

Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist

approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality
as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill
and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible
with normative consequentialism.

Kantianism represents a significant account of the foundations of ethics. But

contrary to the claims of most Kantians, and Kant himself, these foundations
may well lead us to consequentialism.
References
Aune, Bruce (1979), Kant’s Theory of Morals, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press).

Course Hero. (2018, January 8). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Study Guide. In Course Hero. Retrieved from
https://www.coursehero.com/lit/Groundwork-of-the-Metaphysics-of-Morals/

Lehrer, Keith (2003), “Reason and Autonomy,” Social Philosophy & Policy 20:
177-98.

Kant, Immanuel (1997), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary

Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Aune, Bruce (1979), Kant’s Theory of Morals (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

University Press).

Kant, Immanuel (1997), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary

Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

https://study.com/academy/lesson/kants-metaphysics-of-morals-summary-
analysis.html

https://www.coursehero.com/lit/Groundwork-of-the-Metaphysics-of-
Morals/section-1-summary/

https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/kantsgrounding/section3/