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Second Division Hubert Nuez,: G.R. No. 180542
Second Division Hubert Nuez,: G.R. No. 180542
Second Division Hubert Nuez,: G.R. No. 180542
HUBERT NUEZ, G.R. No. 180542
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA,* JJ.
SLTEAS PHOENIX
SOLUTIONS, INC., through its Promulgated:
representative, CESAR
SYLIANTENG April 12, 2010
Respondent,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The determination of the jurisdiction of first level courts over ejectment
cases is at the heart of this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which seeks the nullification and setting
aside of the 31 July 2007 Decision rendered by the Special Twelfth Division of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91771.1[1]
The Facts
1 *Per Special Order No. 832, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza is hereby designated
as Additional Member of the Second Division in place of Associate Justice Roberto A.
Abad, who is on Official Leave from April 6-8, 2010.
3 [3] Vivencia Fidel, Maximo Mahipus, Jr., Hermigildo Mangubat, Epifanio Casolita II,
Erlinda Inciong, Edgar Amador, Joseph Duerme, Rolando Jamang, Romeo Granada,
Romeo Figueroa, Brando Galciso, Eunice Banaag, Cecilia Agonos, Beth De Guzman,
Mario P. Tampol, Elizabeth Francisco, Edmundo R. Barela, Reynaldo Granada, Zedric
Bananag, Estanislao J. La Fuente and Danilo P. Jerusalem.
Upon receipt of the Court of Appeals 4 November 2007 Resolution denying
his motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision,17[17] petitioner filed the
petition at bench on the following grounds:
I
THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY ARE NOT
PRESENT AND ADDITIONALLY THERE IS A QUESTION OF
OWNERSHIP.
II
THE PETITIONER SHOULD NOT VACATE THE LEASED PREMISES
CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS AN EXISTING LEASE CONTRACT WITH
THE OWNER WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF
ARTICLE 1671 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.18[18]
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
18[18] Id. at 9.
Designed to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
the right to possession of the property involved,19[19] there can be no gainsaying
the fact that ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
first level courts20[20] by express provision of Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, in relation to Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.21[21] In
addition to being conferred by law,22[22] however, a courts jurisdiction over the
subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint23[23] and the
character of the relief sought,24[24] irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims asserted therein.25[25] In much the
same way that it cannot be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the
case by one of the parties,26[26] jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon the
defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss or in a motion for
reconsideration.27[27]
The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following
requisites are essential for the MeTCs acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.:
20[20] Corpuz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117005, 19 June 1997, 274 SCRA 275, 279.
21 [21]Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of
the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building
by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after
the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person may at anytime within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.
22 [22] Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, 384 Phil. 252, 259-260 (2000).
24[24] Sunny Motor Sales, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 517, 520 (2001).
28[28] De La Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139442, 6 December 2006, 510 SCRA 103,
115.
29[29] Cajayon v. Sps. Batuyong, G.R. No. 149118, 16 February 2006, 482 SCRA 461, 471-472.
33[33] Heirs of Demetrio Melchor v. Melchor, 461 Phil. 437, 443-444 (2003).
Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the admission in the
complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, respondents claim of
prior possession is clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy
thereof since 1999. While prior physical possession is, admittedly, an
indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in petitioners
position is, however, evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not
only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action
of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right.34[34] Because possession can also be acquired by juridical acts to which
the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession, execution
and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles
and the like, it has been held that one need not have actual or physical occupation
of every square inch of the property at all times to be considered in possession.35
[35]
In this case, the subject parcel was acquired by respondent by virtue of the 4
June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and
Emerenciana Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately put the same to active
use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in
its name as of 27 February 200236[36] and to have paid the real property taxes due
thereon37[37] alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light
of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the time
respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already
been occupying the land since 1999. Ordinarily reckoned from the date of actual
entry on the land, the one year period is counted from the time the plaintiff
acquired knowledge of the dispossession when, as here, the same had been effected
by means of stealth.38[38]
Petitioner had, of course, endeavored to establish that respondents
predecessors-in-interest had served him a demand to vacate the subject parcel as
34[34] Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603, 619 (2005).
35[35] Quizon v. Juan, G.R. No. 171442, 17 June 2008, 554 SCRA 601, 612.
41[41] Almocera v. Ong, G.R. No. 170479, 18 February 2008, 546 SCRA 164, 178.
42[42] Magaling v. Ong, G.R. No. 173333, 13 August 2008, 562 SCRA 152, 170-171.
45 [45] Art. 1676. The purchaser of a piece of land which is under a lease that is not recorded
in the Registry of Property may terminate the lease, save when there is a stipulation to the
contrary in the contract of sale, or when the purchaser knows of the existence of the lease.
46 [46]Cayabyab v. Gomez de Aquino, G.R. No.159974, 5 September 2007, 532 SCRA 353,
361.