‘Feminism is the struggle to end sexist oppression.

’ Examine and
comment on bell hooks’ definition of feminism.

Suchintan Das

bell hooks’ attempt to arrive at a definition of feminism stems precisely from her urge to
reject Betty Friedan’s metonymization of “the problem that has no name” with the exclusive
concern of upper-class white women, and the consequent invisibilization of their other—“all
non-white women and poor white women”.1 By accentuating the collusion between
hierarchies entrenched in social stratifications on the basis of class and race and those arising
out of patriarchal gender relations, hooks foregrounds her definition of feminism at the
intersection of these oppressive social structures. Consequently, her understanding of feminist
praxis, significantly departs from that of ‘liberal’ or ‘bourgeois’ feminists. This
understanding, hooks argues, is shaped to a large extent by her “knowledge of both margin
and center.”2

For hooks, the lack of a consensually agreed upon unificatory definition of feminism that
would provide a “sound foundation on which to construct theory or engage in overall
meaningful praxis”, “indicates a growing disinterest in feminism as a radical political
movement”, which is rather disheartening. 3 In a way, this lacuna seems to negate the
possibility of solidarity among women. The aim of women’s liberation to make women “the
social equals of men” does not satisfy hooks as a definition, since men themselves are not
equals in a “white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal class structure”. Such an aspiration,
therefore, will perpetuate existing structures of oppression by glossing over them instead of
obliterating the same.

Women at the margins, that is those who are “part of the whole but outside the main body” 4
know it too well that neither they nor men in their social groups share a common social status
with those who belong to the more privileged race or class. Moreover, they are more “likely

1
bell hooks, Feminist theory from margin to center, 1-2.
2
Ibid, x.
3
Ibid, 17.
4
Ibid, ix.
to see exaggerated expressions of male chauvinism among their peers as stemming from the
male's sense of himself as powerless and ineffectual in relation to ruling male groups.”5
Exploitation for these women is manifold in general and the sexist oppression that they face
is amplified in particular. Consequently, they remained suspicious of the role of liberal
reforms in eradicating “systems of domination” and their “positive impact on women’s lives”
for ‘women’ was never a homogenous socio-biological category.6

According to hooks, the deficiency of liberal feminism lies in its undue emphasis on the
upward mobility of women in their respective social groups without recognizing the need for
“challenging and changing the cultural basis of group oppression” or for that matter, the
capitalist status quo7 which sought to extract greater labour power at a lesser cost from the
divorced woman (who was previously not employed in any formal sector and now has to look
for avenues of securing her family’s subsistence) due to her decreased bargaining power
under the pretence of a non-existent socio-economic independence of women. This has also
been a reason for liberal feminism’s inability to come up with a widely acceptable definition
of feminism, which has made women—even those who have benefited from “feminism
generated social reforms”—to shy away from a public espousal of their commitment to the
feminist movement at large. 8

The term feminism has therefore come to mean anything and nothing at all at the same time.
As an empty signifier,9 it has been made to surrogate in place of several popular negative
perceptions of “women’s lib” at worst and romanticized notions of an individualist, apolitical
variant of feminism at best. A definition that is much needed, has to be free from the
axiomatic assumption that all women as autonomous human beings have an equal possibility
to attain equality of opportunity with men, irrespective of their social contexts. Such a
definition, for hooks, is provided by “a struggle to end sexist oppression” for it seeks to take
on patriarchy at the level of an ideology of domination, not as an end in itself, but as a means
to reorganize society in order to prioritize “self-development of people” over “imperialism,
economic expansion, and material desires.”10
5
Ibid, 18.
6
Ibid, 19-20.
7
One which ensures the appropriation of surplus by the owners of the means of production by expropriating
the same generated by suppliers of wage labour.
8
bell hooks, op. cit., 20-22.
9
Also called a “floating signifier.” For a detailed theoretical exposition, see Jeffrey Mehlman, ‘The “Floating
Signifier”: From Lévi Strauss to Lacan’, 23ff.
10
bell hooks, op. cit., 23-24.
hooks goes on to suggest that articulation of personal lived experiences was necessary but not
sufficient for the progress of the feminist movement at large. What is therefore required is a
“comprehensive understanding of women’s political reality” such that racism and classism
would be viewed as much women’s issues as sexism itself. By displacing simplistic notions
like “men are the enemy”, systems of domination and women’s role in maintaining and
perpetuating the same are exposed to scrutiny, so much so that the hegemony of white
bourgeois women (whether liberal or radical) over the feminist movement and its direction is
threatened with questions.11 As hooks would have us understand, feminism is neither an
alternative lifestyle to be adopted nor a ready-made identity to be stepped into. She goes on to
argue that the nature of feminism as a political commitment is significantly undermined by
class-blind and race-blind attempts of envisaging feminist “counter-cultures” and “alternative
communities” as goals of the movement, for they might seem alienating for women at the
margin, who lack even the means of attaining those objectives.12

hooks continues to argue that the need for feminist “spaces”, “communities”, “identities”, or
for that matter “lifestyles” may not be perceived as an urgent need or even a real need for
women at the margin. According to hooks, the emphasis placed on these is misplaced for it
evokes a false sense of being engaged in praxis, which in effect, does not have a radically
transformative impact on society. She displaces the notion of praxis as individualist self-
fulfilment with that of collective political action seeking to destabilize the status quo. 13 She
suggests that the expression “I advocate feminism” instead of “I am a feminist” shifts the
focus away from self-fashioning to a conscious assertion of political choice (and by
implication, will) which does not in any way negate the possibility of supporting other
political movements. This strategy, hooks argues, rejects a dualistic conception of the self as
pitted against an ‘other’, and instead of creating false binaries by privileging one political
struggle over another, harmonizes multiple compatible political stances like ‘anti-sexist’,
‘anti-racist’, and ‘anti-classist’.14

bell hooks stresses the acute need for women at the margin to assert their right to develop
theories for the feminist movement at large, instead of merely providing “colourful life
11
Ibid, 25-26.
12
Ibid, 27-28.
13
Ibid, 28.
14
Ibid, 29-30.
stories to document and validate the prevailing set of theoretical assumptions” provided by
white, bourgeois, academic women. Defining feminism as “a movement to end sexist
oppression” provides a good point to begin such an endeavour for it focuses on the
continuation of “revolutionary struggle” that attacks the “inter-related systems of dominance”
at their juncture. hooks concludes her argument by highlighting the need to prevent a co-
option of feminism to “serve the opportunistic ends of special interest groups” and
simultaneously “challenging and changing the very philosophical structures” on which forms
of group oppression are rooted.15

Notwithstanding the brilliance of hooks’ original theoretical intervention in the feminist

discourse, her formulation gives rise to certain problems. Firstly, by attempting to provide a
unifying and unitary definition for the sake of building consensus, hooks gives rise to an
essentialist (albeit significant) understanding of feminism which stems from her engagement
with two opposing strands of feminist movement—liberal and radical. In doing so, she
unwittingly excludes theoretical insights which other strands like eco-feminism and anarcho-
feminism have to offer. Secondly, hooks’ argument seems weakest when she axiomatically
assumes, that the women at margin are incapable of envisaging feminist counter-cultures
and/or alternative spaces of their own, which might be manifested in completely different,
subversive ways altogether than those imagined by the women at center. Thirdly, although
her argument reeks of Marxist undertones, she does not adequately explain what she means
by “revolutionary struggle” that has the potential of “radically transforming the society.” She
lays down a possible method of how feminist struggle is to be carried out, without specifying
what the society without sexist oppression might actually look like. Whether feminisms can
have a singular, all-encompassing definition, therefore, remains open to further debates.

Bibliography:

1) hooks, bell. Feminist theory from margin to center. Boston: South End Press, 1984.
2) Mehlman, Jeffrey. ‘The “Floating Signifier”: From Lévi Strauss to Lacan.’ Yale
French Studies, no. 48 (French Freud: Structural Studies in Psychoanalysis), 1972, pp.
10-37.
15
Ibid, 31.